

# IASC REAL-TIME EVALUATION OF THE HUMANITARIAN RESPONSE TO THE **HORN OF AFRICA DROUGHT CRISIS**

PREPARED BY THE GLOBAL EMERGENCY GROUP RTE TEAM



KENYA

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# ACRONYMS

ACAPS	Assessment Capacities Project
ALNAP	Active Learning Network for Accountability and Performance
ALRMP 2	Arid Lands Natural Resource Management Project Phase II
CERF	Central Emergency Response Fund
DART	Disaster Assessment and Relief Team
DFID	Department for International Development
DOS	US Department of State
DRR	Disaster Risk Reduction
EW	Early Warning
ECHO	European Commission Humanitarian Aid Office
FAO	Food and Agriculture Organisation
FEWSNET	Famine Early Warning Systems Network
FEMA	Federal Emergency Management Agency
FSNAU	Food Security and Nutrition Analysis Unit
FSNWG	Food Security and Nutrition Working Group
GEG	Global Emergency Group
GIEWS	Global Information and Early Warning System
GoK	Government of Kenya
HC	Humanitarian Coordinator
HCT	Humanitarian Country Team
IA	Inter Agency
IASC	Inter Agency Standing Committee
ICRC	International Committee of the Red Cross
IDP	Internally Displaced Person
IFRC	International Federation of the Red Cross and Red Crescent Societies
IOM	International Organisation for Migration
IPC	Integrated Food Security Phase Classification
KFSSG	Kenya Food Security Steering Group
KHPT	Kenya Humanitarian Partnership Team
KRCS	Kenya Red Cross Society
M&E	Monitoring and Evaluation
MOUs	Memoranda of Understanding
MSF	Medecins Sans Frontieres
NCA	Norwegian Church Aid
NFI	Non-Food Items
NGO	Non-Governmental Organisation
OCHA	Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs
OECD	Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development
SEA	Sexual Exploitation and Abuse
SOP	Standard Operating Procedure
TOR	Terms of Reference
UK	United Kingdom
UNDSS	United Nations Department of Safety and Security
UNHCR	United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees
UNICEF	United Nations Children's Fund
US	United States
USAID	United States Agency for International Development
WB	World Bank
WHO	World Health Organisation
WFP	World Food Programme



# EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

## **RTE BACKGROUND & METHODOLOGY**

For most of 2011 the pastoralist and marginal cropping communities of Kenya endured a severe food crisis. Over 3.75 million Kenyans<sup>1</sup> and 598,218 refugees<sup>2</sup> were severely affected and in need of humanitarian assistance. As the emergency met the “automatic trigger” criteria<sup>3</sup> endorsed by IASC Working Group in July 2011, the Emergency Relief Coordinator requested an IASC Real Time Evaluation (IASC RTE) in Kenya. The purpose of this evaluation is to provide rapid real-time feedback to the Humanitarian Country Team, addressing issues requiring immediate action, lesson learning for the future, and to seek out the views of affected communities.

The Kenya IASC RTE is a rapid, light, and participatory evaluation that was conducted between November 2011 and January 2012. It comprised a desk review, field visits to affected communities, three workshops, an outcome summary of workshops and a final report. The desk review included a thorough

analysis of situation reports, briefings, appeals, policies, other third party analysis, and evaluations concerning the Horn of Africa Drought crisis in Kenya and beyond. The field visit included interviews with more than 180 key stakeholders and beneficiaries, concluding with three workshops conducted in three different locations (Nairobi, Dadaab, and Turkana). Two different humanitarian contexts were specifically considered: the drought affected communities (such as Turkana) and the refugee assisted populations (such as Dadaab). The field visits, community feedback, and workshops, built upon the desk review, and served as the basis for the final report. In the final report, findings and trends observed during the field visits and discussed in the workshops were reconciled with the data analysed in the desk review to produce the findings and recommendations. Complementary to the recommendations, Frameworks for Future Action were developed with the IA community, during the workshops in Nairobi and Dadaab, to guide future efforts aimed at improving the quality of the response.

## **FINDINGS**

The findings of this evaluation are based on data collected at the field level and through the secondary data review. They are presented according to the issues identified in the evaluation’s Terms of Reference and can be summarized as follows:

1. Kenya Food Security Steering Group 2011 Long Rains Season Assessment Report, pg. 3.

2. OCHA Horn of Africa Humanitarian Snapshot, December 16, 2011.

3. According to the ‘automatic trigger criteria’ endorsed by IASC Working Group, an IA RTE is automatically triggered if the following two criteria are fulfilled: (1) The Flash Appeal identifies that more than 1 million individuals are affected, or a revised Consolidated Appeals Process identifies more than 1 million newly affected people; (2) The Flash Appeal requests an amount of more than US\$50 million, or the revised Consolidated Appeals Process requests an additional US\$50 million. (<http://onerresponse.info/Coordination/IA RTE/publicdocuments/IA%20RTE%20Procedures%20and%20Methodologies%20Guide.pdf>)

## SITUATION, CONTEXT, AND NEEDS:

The humanitarian crisis in Kenya is complex and multi-layered, exacerbated, particularly in the past several months, by a very challenging security environment. The immediate crisis has abated somewhat due to the humanitarian response and improved rains. However, the IA humanitarian community in Kenya will likely struggle with the same challenges again unless it takes proactive steps to address ongoing issues and better manage the appropriate scaling up and down of humanitarian response operations. More specific findings related to this area of the RTE include:

- The Horn of Africa Crisis in Kenya was caused by much more than drought alone. It is complex and multi-layered.
- In response to the crisis, the efforts of the humanitarian community helped to save lives and reduce suffering.
- Strong short-season rainfall throughout the drought-affected areas of Kenya from October to December 2011 will probably result in an improved food security situation in early 2012.
- The Government of Kenya (GoK) takes the lead in all humanitarian coordination and response operations. However, the GoK sometimes struggles to effectively manage this responsibility.
- The security environment, particularly in the north eastern border areas with Somalia, remains an increasing challenge for the IA community.
- The humanitarian community struggles to manage the transition from humanitarian relief to development within the disaster response continuum.

## STRATEGIC PLANNING, OPERATIONAL PLANNING AND RESOURCE MOBILIZATION:

The IA humanitarian community and Government of Kenya were reactive to the emerging and predicted crisis without taking the proactive and preventative measures that may have alleviated the negative effects of the crisis. However, once the decision was made to respond there was an impressive and effective collective response to the situation. Systemic challenges remain along with the need for better results in IA community wide strategic planning (and donor funding of those plans) in order to break the cycle of chronic vulnerability to droughts and other regularly occurring crises in Kenya. More specific findings related to this area of the RTE include:

- Despite good Early Warning data well in advance, the impetus to act decisively in response to the crisis was finally driven by the 'CNN Effect.' This reactive decision-making approach created the perception that the UN, IA community, and GoK, collectively lacked leadership.
- Once calls for emergency international assistance were made to address the crisis, the donor community (national and International) responded with significant resourcing.
- There is a lack of coherent, inclusive and strategic IA planning processes.
- There is a dual threat of high staff-turnover and staff entrenchment within humanitarian agencies.

## COORDINATION AND CONNECTEDNESS:

Coordination mechanisms for humanitarian response exist and are utilized in Kenya particularly through GoK mechanisms and IA sector coordination. However, these coordination mechanisms usually are more for information exchange purposes and they do not necessarily guide effective decision-making. Furthermore, effective coordination is hampered by a lack of staff coordination skills, a disconnect between Nairobi and field based operations, and a lack of inclusion of faith based and local community based organisations. More specific findings related to this area of the RTE include:

- Inter-sector coordination is working reasonably well, ensuring operational coordination and communication, and reducing duplication. Individual sector level coordination however is inconsistent with some sectors performing better than others.
- Many non-traditional humanitarian agencies are marginalized within IA coordination.
- There is limited beneficiary or host community input into the IA coordination mechanisms.
- GoK and IA mechanisms exist for coordination but they require strengthening.
- There is often a disconnect between Nairobi and field operations within IA agencies.
- Coordination skills are missing for many staff who fill key coordination roles. Furthermore, many staff are also 'double-hatting'.

## RESPONSE COVERING THE NEEDS AND SET STANDARDS:

The response, once mobilized, met many outstanding needs. The nutrition sector in particular is an excellent example of a key sector providing coordination and service delivery leadership that other sectors could emulate. There is a strong impetus in the IA community to significantly increase disaster mitigation programming, particularly through more scalable DRR programming and market base interventions, that will more effectively strengthen the coping capacities of those in the most vulnerable communities. This shift is both appropriate and needed. More specific findings related to this topic include:

- Disaster Risk Reduction (DRR) programming areas suffered less than other areas that have no DRR programming.
- The nutrition sector is functioning well and is a good example for other sectors to follow.
- Emergency food aid injects, once mobilized and distributed to needed communities, had a positive impact on mitigating the effects of the crisis.
- A significant shift to market based programming is in progress. This is both appropriate and needed.
- Coordinated IA needs assessments are conducted primarily through individual sectors yielding valuable information. However, there is a gap with respect to comprehensive multi-sectoral assessments.
- Coordination and service provision in Dadaab is led by UNHCR and is meeting needs, particularly as related to nutrition and health. Concerns remain regarding service provision in other key sector areas.
- Information management and critical information sharing were sufficient to enable response entities. However, information management tools lack dynamic information sharing functions.

## RECOMMENDATIONS

Based on these findings, the RTE has five recommendations that, if followed, would enable a more effective IA coordinated response now and in the future.

- 1 Match Early Warning with Early Action.
- 2 Coordinated IA community analysis and scenario planning needs to guide transparent decision making.
- 3 Invest in scalable disaster risk reduction and transition now from response to DRR.
- 4 Empower the Government of Kenya as the lead, while also supporting them with the real-time resourcing to take on this role.
- 5 Revise the Inter-Agency Strategic Planning process.

## CONCLUSION

In conclusion, the RTE interpreted two key summary questions from this work that can be answered as follows:

### **Has the IA community effectively met the needs of those in need as a result of the crisis in Kenya?**

The Kenya RTE found that once mobilized, that the IA humanitarian response was significant and met many beneficiary needs. However, the response and mitigation measures were delayed despite clear early warning data. This can be prevented in the future by investing in scalable DRR programming, and augmenting the IA community's collective ability to create dynamic analyses and contingency planning that guide better forward leaning decision making. Support was provided in an impartial manner, taking into account the needs of specific target groups (women and children), serving both the IDPs and the affected communities. More support, however, needs to be targeted at the host communities surrounding the Dadaab refugee camps.

### **Was the IA community well coordinated in its response to the crisis?**

The IA humanitarian community, led by the GoK, used the existing coordination mechanisms to avoid widespread duplication and facilitate the response. Coordination overall has been reasonably well done, however, there is room for improvement in certain sectors.



# 01 BACKGROUND

## 1.1 **CONTEXT**

Two consecutive seasons of significantly below average rainfall made 2011 one of the driest years in the Eastern Horn of Africa since 1995. Crops failed, substantial livestock mortality occurred and local cereal prices increased.<sup>1</sup> The on-going conflict in Somalia aggravated the situation, further deteriorating food security in the country and leading to a significant outflow of refugees into neighboring states (particularly Kenya). On June 7, FEWSNET declared the drought as the most severe food security emergency in the world.<sup>2</sup> At the height of the crisis, famine was declared in 6 regions of Somalia, with large areas of Kenya, Ethiopia, and Djibouti facing severe food insecurity. In all, 13.3 million people were in need of humanitarian assistance in the region.<sup>3</sup>

## 1.2 **BACKGROUND TO THE RESPONSE**

The Kenya Food Security Steering Group (KFSSG) 2011 Long Rains Season Food Security Assessment estimated that 3.75 million people in the pastoralist and marginal cropping areas of Kenya were affected by the crisis.<sup>4</sup> The most vulnerable were the 1.4 million pastoralists in the north and northeastern districts of Wajir, Turkana, Isiolo, Mandera, Marsabit, and Garissa.<sup>5</sup> In those areas, the failure of short season crops and decreasing livestock productivity (due to water scarcity, increase in livestock disease, and longer trekking distances) caused severe food insecurity. The situation was further complicated by weakened community coping mechanisms, and a highly unstable security situation (particularly in northeastern Kenya and the Dadaab camps), that was preventing humanitarian assistance from reaching beneficiaries. In addition, famine and conflict in Somalia were causing an increase in the number of refugees in the Dadaab Refugee Camps and a further strain on resources.

The crisis however, was not unexpected. Early Warning (EW) Systems provided forecasts concerning the impending situation as early as August 2010, when FEWSNET declared a La Niña event and associated it with drier-than-normal conditions during the October-December rainy season in the eastern sector of East

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1. FEWSNET East Africa Regional Alert, June 07, 2011.

2. Ibid.

3. OCHA Horn of Africa Humanitarian Snapshot, December 16, 2011.

4. Kenya Food Security Steering Group 2011 Long Rains Season Assessment Report.

5. FEWSNET Kenya Food Security Alert, September 19, 2011.

Africa.<sup>6</sup> By November FEWSNET was calling for pre-emptive livelihood support to mitigate La Niña effects.<sup>7</sup> In January 2011, the Under-Secretary-General and Emergency Relief Coordinator (USG/ERC) approved the use of CERF underfunded allocations for Kenya.<sup>8</sup> Approval of the programs to be funded began in March with almost USD 6 million being disbursed by mid April.<sup>9</sup> However, the International Agency (IA) community<sup>10</sup> and the Government of Kenya (GoK) did not take decisive action until after the failure of the March-May 2011 rains. On May 30th, 2011 the GoK declared the drought a national disaster. In early June the Humanitarian Country Teams in the region began discussing the possibility of utilizing the CERF rapid response facility, with the Kenya country team presenting an official submission on July 14, 2011.<sup>11</sup> The UN twice revised its funding requirements for Kenya due to the severity of the crisis, increasing the request for humanitarian assistance in Kenya from the USD 525.8 million requested in November 2010<sup>12</sup> to USD 741 million in July 2011.<sup>13</sup> Following the release of the Horn of Africa Drought Appeal, the donor community (national and international), which had provided less than 50% of the original EHRP requirements in the first 6 months of 2011 responded with significant resourcing.<sup>14</sup>

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6. FEWSNET Executive Brief: La Niña and Food Security in East Africa, August 2010.

7. FEWSNET East Africa Food Security Alert, November 02, 2010.

8. CERF funding in food and nutrition, including the recent response in the Horn of Africa; CERF Secretariat, October 12, 2011, p. 3.

9. By April 13 a total of USD 5,993,848 had been disbursed from CERF Underfunded Allocations to WFP, WHO, UNHCR, IOM, and FAO.

10. The IA community refers to United Nations agencies, intergovernmental organizations, international NGOs and the Red Cross and Red Crescent Movement.

11. CERF funding in food and nutrition, including the recent response in the Horn of Africa; CERF Secretariat, October 12, 2011, p. 3.

12. 2011 Kenya EHRP, November 30, 2010.

13. Funding for Kenya was revised from USD 525,827,794 to USD 604,845,876 in the EHRP Mid-Year Review released on July 20, 2011 and to USD 741 million in the 2011 Horn of Africa Drought Appeal released on July 28, 2011.

14. By the end of August an additional USD 16,689,624 had been disbursed from the CERF rapid response facility while by November 23, 70% of the revised request had been funded (<http://ochaonline.un.org/cerf/CERFFararoundtheWorld/Kenya2011/tabid/7546/language/en-US/Default.aspx> and OCHA Financial Tracking Services).

# 02

# METHODOLOGY

## 2.1 SCOPE

As described in the Terms of Reference the scope of the RTE is to “focus on the effectiveness and efficiency of the coordination and management systems, and address critical issues related to both the provision of relief and to the transition to recovery” in order to “support the HCT to develop and agree to clear plans of action to address key coordination problems or operational bottlenecks with the overall aim of enabling a more effective response moving forward”. These critical issues are organized in four main areas: (1) Situation, Context, and Needs; (2) Strategic planning, Operational Planning and Resource Mobilization; (3) Coordination and Connectedness; (4) Response Covering the Needs and Set Standards.

The RTE broadly defines inter-agency collaboration to include established formal coordination structures (e.g., the cluster system) as well as other forms of coordination, such as coordination in the refugee camps, formal and informal programmatic coordination, coordination across HCTs in the region, communication in the early warning systems in this slow-onset crisis, joint needs assessments as the foundation for the response, regional coordination by way of the Regional Humanitarian Partnership Team (RHPT), and other areas of collaboration.

## 2.2 APPROACH

The RTE has been separated into three phases including: Desktop Analysis & Project Set-Up; Field Study & Workshops; and Reporting and Recommendations.

### Phase 1: Desktop Analysis & Project Set-Up

During this initial phase, the RTE team designed tools for use during the field evaluation and conducted a thorough review of reports, policies and procedures related to the crisis. A dedicated secondary data analyst working remotely (not deployed with the team to Kenya) ensured that all relevant secondary data materials were identified and incorporated into the RTE. A list of the most important documents consulted can be found in the bibliography attached as Annex 7. Phase 1 included the development of a field study plan and confirmation of needed logistical support with field offices prior to the field mission. An initial scoping mission was conducted (October 24-28th, 2011) by the RTE Team Leader with the OCHA Evaluation Manager prior to the RTE team being deployed for its field mission.

### Phase 2: Field Study & Workshops

The RTE was designed and delivered as a light, rapid and participatory evaluation. A Kenya RTE advisory group comprised of key members of the IA community in Kenya helped to guide the field study component of this work. Once deployed to Kenya, interviews were first conducted with key stakeholders in Nairobi. Two different humanitarian contexts were considered specifically the drought

affected communities (such as Turkana) and the refugee assisted populations (such as Dadaab). A total of more than 180 individual stakeholders participated in this review either through individual interviews, focus groups, or the workshops. Stakeholder groups included representatives from the Government of Kenya, beneficiary representatives, all major UN agencies involved in the crisis, the Red Cross and Red Crescent Movement, international NGOs, national Kenyan NGOs and Kenyan Community Based Organizations (CBOs). Please see Annex 5 for a detailed listing of those stakeholders who were involved in this RTE process.

Stakeholder coverage ensured that representative perspectives from the drought and refugee contexts were included along with appropriate gender consultation (women's groups in both Dadaab and Turkana), and youth group consultation (in Dadaab only). The data collection in the field incorporated a mix of direct observation, semi-structured interviews, and focus group work. Once the stakeholder interviews were complete, data from the interviews were triangulated and combined with field observations, providing trends to inform the RTE analysis. A substantive analysis process collated this data so that it could be subsequently translated into findings. Findings were presented in real-time during the workshops to test their validity and to allow real-time input from field staff.

A total of three workshops were conducted in three different locations (Dadaab, Turkana and Nairobi) over a two-week period (November 22nd to December 19th, 2011) directly involving 57 stakeholders (see Annex 5 for the Participants Listing). A specific methodology was utilized to seek both critical feedback and direction to the RTE, while also ensuring the creation of forward looking action steps (primarily through the prioritization process and creation of Frameworks for Future Action).

This Framework for Future Action (FFA), as represented in Figure 1 on the next page, is composed of four key components: Objective(s) in addressing the issue, Forum/ Mechanism (existing, or to be created) through which the issue should be addressed, Responsible Party (or parties) who should take action on the issue, and the Timing parameters in which the issue should be addressed. FFAs were developed by working groups in both Dadaab and Nairobi.

### **Phase 3: Reporting & Recommendations**

Upon returning from Kenya, findings and trends were reconciled with data collected through the desktop analysis. A matrix was created identifying findings and recommendations (see Annex 2). This final report includes all of the findings from the IASC RTE with recommendations. A draft of the RTE final report was provided on February 2, 2012 for client consideration.

The results of the workshops guided the RTE final report, and serve as the basis for proactively addressing many of the key topics identified by the RTE so that they can be advanced beyond the fixed timeframe of the RTE. Figure 2 on the next page illustrates process flow related to the field work and the workshops:

Figure 1: Framework for Future Action





Figure 2: Field Work and Workshops Process Flow





## 2.3 CONSTRAINTS & LIMITATIONS

The review was mainly limited by the following key factors:

- ⦿ The security environment in the field that prevented access to particular field site locations (particularly to the Dadaab refugee camps) and generally restricted review team movement in the Dadaab area.
- ⦿ Confusion related to the RTE mission as compared to other evaluations either previously conducted or in progress. Given time limitations for most key informants, the timing of similar evaluations around the same timeframe as the RTE tested their patience and availability.
- ⦿ The provision of internal documentation that is not publicly available.
- ⦿ The participation of all the desired stakeholders in the workshops or for interviews due to scheduling conflicts.
- ⦿ Administrative contracting for the RTE team.

## 2.4 DATA COLLECTION STRATEGY

The review team used a tailored set of tools, templates, and matrices to gather, vet, clean, and transform data from its rough form into a useful information product for analysis. These tools also included rigorous project management functions that guided all phases of the methodology development and evaluation rollout.

A total of more than 180 key stakeholders (see Annex 5) in Kenya participated in this RTE. The following specific data collection methods and tools were used during the RTE:

### Desktop Analysis

A detailed document review was undertaken and reviewed documents included:

- ⦿ Operational reports
- ⦿ Early Warning reports
- ⦿ Financial reports
- ⦿ Program implementation plans
- ⦿ Organizational charts
- ⦿ Progress reports
- ⦿ Strategies
- ⦿ Other relevant evaluations

### Direct observation

During the field visit, direct observation was used to gather data that assisted in the final analysis.

### Interviews

Collection of data was based primarily on individual and group interviews of many key stakeholders in Kenya (Nairobi, Dadaab and Turkana) using questions derived from a tailored questionnaire. The review team worked closely with OCHA and other IA actors to develop and refine the list of interviewees to ensure a nuanced understanding of the subject matter. Interviews were conducted via face-to-face and telephone conference and primarily focused on qualitative data collection.

### Focus group discussions

Group discussions were facilitated to solicit feedback from beneficiaries and key IA actors. This was especially useful during the field visits where the interactions took place under time pressure. Information from each focus group was recorded including observations about context, group dynamics, intonation, and participation to aid in analysing qualitative

responses. As needed, focus groups were followed by one-on-one interviews to further explore sensitive or detailed issues raised in the group setting.

### Review matrix

Data was collected according to the areas of focus most relevant to the RTE and compared against key thematic objectives as specified in the terms of relevance.

## 2.5 DELIVERABLES

For the Kenya RTE, there were six relevant deliverables listed in the ToR.

1. Field visits to the affected country to gather information and evidence on issues described in this ToR. Field visits took place over a 3-week period.
2. A matrix of findings, conclusions and recommendations.
3. Presentations and lessons-learned workshops to the HCT in each affected country. The workshops are considered, together with the final evaluation report, as the primary output of the evaluation. The purpose of the workshops is to present and discuss findings, conclusions and recommendations and reformulate them if necessary and to identify key actors and timelines to respond to these recommendations.
4. An outcome summary (2-5 pages) of workshops (one week after workshops).
5. A draft IASC RTE report (2 weeks after workshops).
6. A final IASC RTE report containing an executive summary of less than 2,000 words and a main text of less than 10,000 words, both inclusive of clear and concise recommendations.

## 2.6 QUALITY ASSURANCE

In order that final project outcomes weigh favourably against the required deliverable as specified in the ToR, GEG used a tested and proven project management approach – Quality Assurance Management (QAM). Application of QAM ensured that results of the RTE were delivered at the quality level required by the client and GEG. GEG's QAM-trained and experienced review team worked with the client from the outset and continued to do so throughout the course of the engagement to deliver its high quality work products on time and according to budget. The client approved each project phase before advancing towards completion of the next phase using a tailored implementation plan (see Annex 4). Any critical adjustments to the project were agreed to by OCHA and GEG.







# 03 FINDINGS

## 3.1 **SITUATION, CONTEXT, AND NEEDS**

### 3.1.1 THE HORN OF AFRICA CRISIS IN KENYA WAS CAUSED BY MUCH MORE THAN DROUGHT ALONE. IT IS COMPLEX AND MULTI-LAYERED.

The Horn of Africa Crisis in Kenya during 2010-2012 is not only related to severe drought conditions. While the drought conditions were indeed a key factor, the crisis also stems from the failure of the Somalia state to create a safe and healthy environment for its people<sup>1</sup>, the inability of the GoK to access key funding (particularly through the closed Arid Lands Natural Resource Management Project Phase II), a lack of effective developmental programming in Kenya that can and should strengthen coping mechanisms, acute crises juxtaposed over chronic crisis situations, and a highly unstable security situation (particularly along the Kenyan northeastern border areas). All of the these factors, when combined with high food and non-food prices<sup>2</sup>, a lack of decisive action by the Government of Kenya and the United Nations leadership after clear early warnings<sup>3</sup>, and underfunded 2010-2011 IA appeals, resulted in a crisis situation that necessitated a hasty humanitarian response.

Kenya is affected by the volatile situation not only in Somalia, but in South Sudan as well. The threat of retaliation from Al Shabab related to the GoK military action in Somalia will not dissipate quickly, and will have an ongoing effect on the national psyche, and the government attitude towards the refugees. Rumors of “refoulement”<sup>4</sup>

1. The UN reports that Kenya hosts more than 519,000 Somali refugees (<http://data.unhcr.org/horn-of-africa/regional.php>) of whom more than 443,000 live in the Dadaab Camps (<http://data.unhcr.org/horn-of-africa/region.php?id=3&country=110>). Of the more than 443,000 in Dadaab, 152,317 had arrived between January and December 14, 2011 (OCHA Horn of Africa Humanitarian Snapshot, December 16, 2011). This figure is substantially larger than the 60,000-100,000 new arrivals envisaged by the 2011 Kenya Emergency Humanitarian Response Plan (EHRP), or the 130,000 envisaged by the 2011 EHRP Mid-Year Review. The continuous influx of refugees from Somalia since 2009, and the spike in arrivals in 2011, were a critical challenge to rapid IA community action.

2. Kenya Food Security Steering Group 2011 Long Rains Season Assessment Report, pg.3.

3. There was strong EW data and analysis as early as November 2010 calling for livelihood support assistance in both the northeast pastoralist and the southeast marginal cropping areas of Kenya. By March 15, 2011 FEWSNET declared that “current assistance programs were inadequate to mitigate existing and expected food deficits and malnutrition” (FEWSNET East Africa Food Security Alert, March 15 2011). While the IA community took several steps to strengthen early response, the Government of Kenya only declared the drought a national disaster on May 30, 2011, while the UN, while starting the revision of the Kenya 2011 EHRP on May 19, waited until July to issue two subsequent funding requirement revisions for it.

4. The expulsion of persons who have the right to be recognized as refugees; <http://www.unesco.org/new/en/social-and-human-sciences/themes/social-transformations/international-migration/glossary/refoulement>.

abound, and the possibility of violence in the forthcoming elections cannot be ignored. Historical distrust between the GoK and its neighbors in Ethiopia could also exacerbate these conditions. The ongoing situation will not quickly resolve itself and all concerned (particularly the IA humanitarian community) need to be vigilant and well prepared for all eventualities.

### 3.1.2 THE HUMANITARIAN RESPONSE EFFORTS OF THE HUMANITARIAN COMMUNITY HELPED TO SAVE LIVES AND REDUCE SUFFERING IN RESPONSE TO THE CRISIS.

In June-July 2011 when decisive actions were eventually undertaken by the GoK, the IA community and the donors, significant IA resources were mobilized in response. This response, while certainly flawed, still helped to save lives and reduce suffering<sup>5,6</sup>. At the height of the crisis, in August 2011, the Kenya Food Security Steering Group (KFSSG) estimated that 3.75 million people (an increase of 1.35 million from January 2011 and almost 10% of the population of Kenya) would require food and non-food humanitarian assistance until February 2011.<sup>7</sup> Once refugees were included, the total number of people requiring assistance in Kenya reached 4.3 million.<sup>8</sup> Figure 3 below describes this change in the Kenya at-risk population from November 2010 to December 2011.

The international community substantially scaled up its operations to respond to the crisis during the summer of 2011. Following a brief interruption due to security concerns, by the end of December, an estimated 77% of planned beneficiaries had received food assistance, while about 73% were assisted with cash support.<sup>9</sup> Despite the heavy influx of refugees, according to remote monitoring reports, the IA humanitarian community has been able to ensure that by the end of 2011 refugees in all camps have access to life-saving services, including water supply and health services.<sup>10</sup> While the RTE is not an impact evaluation<sup>11</sup>, all of the interviews, focus groups, workshops and secondary data collected suggests from both those who received the services, and those who provided services, that actions taken prevented the further loss of life, and reduced the suffering of those in need.

5. By the end of July, a total of 2.4 million people were receiving food assistance in Kenya. WFP was feeding 1.6 million and the government of Kenya 800,000 (<http://www.wfp.org/news/news-release/horn-africa-emergency>).

6. In its 3 month progress report released in October 2011, UNICEF reported that the WASH sector was reaching 1.63 million people with access to safe water while in July and August 2011 a total of 45,000 malnourished children were admitted to feeding programs (UNICEF Response to the Horn of Africa Emergency, Regional three-month progress Report, October 2011, p.15-16).

7. Kenya Food Security Steering Group 2011 Long Rains Season Assessment Report, pg. 3.


8. USAID Drought Fact Sheet No. 14, January 19, 2012.

9. OCHA Horn of Africa Situation Report No. 30, January 13, 2012.

10. OCHA Horn of Africa Situation Report No. 29, December 30, 2011.

11. In an impact evaluation a comparison would need to be made between beneficiaries that are randomly assigned to either a treatment or control group providing evidence of a relationship between the intervention and the outcome measured.



**Figure 3: Kenya 2011 At Risk Population**

### 3.1.3 STRONG SHORT-SEASON RAINFALL THROUGHOUT THE DROUGHT-AFFECTED AREAS OF KENYA FROM OCTOBER TO DECEMBER 2011 WILL PROBABLY RESULT IN AN IMPROVED FOOD SECURITY SITUATION IN EARLY 2012.

Strong early rainfall throughout the crisis affected areas of Kenya from October to December 2011 will probably result in improved food security conditions in early 2012. The 2011 short rains season started three weeks earlier than usual, and most areas received “abundant and evenly distributed rains.”<sup>12</sup> Pastoralist and cropping communities are already benefitting from improved livestock productivity and the harvesting of short cycle crops.<sup>13</sup> With these strong rains pastoralists are currently benefitting from increased milk production and smaller short harvest crops (such as family garden produce).

However, it must be understood that one positive rain season is not sufficient to significantly reduce the vulnerabilities of at risk populations. Strong short rains would need to be followed by a strong long rains season and average subsequent rainy seasons in order for the situation to substantially improve over the long-term. There remain concerns that poor long rains in the spring of 2012 could once again send the country back into emergency conditions again.<sup>14</sup> Thus, the worst affected populations remain extremely vulnerable to these conditions, and sustainable efforts to address these underlying vulnerabilities and strengthen coping mechanisms are essential.

12. GIEWS Kenya Country Brief, January 10, 2012, pg 1.

13. FEWSNET reported improved conditions in pastoralist communities in mid November (FEWSNET Kenya Food Security Outlook Update, November 19, 2011) while GIEWS reported that household food security the southeastern and coastal cropping areas improved since November (GIEWS Kenya Country Brief, January 10, 2012).

14. <http://www.irinnews.org/Report/94985/HORN-OF-AFRICA-Drought-warning-prompts-call-for-early-action>.

### 03.1.4 THE GOVERNMENT OF KENYA (GOK) TAKES THE LEAD IN ALL HUMANITARIAN COORDINATION AND RESPONSE OPERATIONS. HOWEVER, THE GOK SOMETIMES STRUGGLES TO EFFECTIVELY MANAGE THIS RESPONSIBILITY.

The Government of Kenya (GoK) assumes the primary responsibility for leading humanitarian programming throughout the country. However, the GoK sometimes struggles to effectively manage this responsibility. This is primarily due to a lack of capacity on the part of the GoK, ineffective IA development approaches that are not yet delivering effective Disaster Risk Reduction (DRR) programming that can substantively mitigate large-scale crises<sup>15,16</sup>, inconsistent annual funding, and the targeting of funds to vulnerable areas, as well as the existence of leakages undermining trust between the GoK and the IA community.

As with any national government, the GoK has its strengths and weaknesses that, depending on the context, enhance or diminish its capacity to lead humanitarian programming. Depending on the location (county or national level) and ministry or administrative body involved, there are varying levels to which the government may be able to take on a leadership role in humanitarian coordination and response. GoK and IA community representatives acknowledge this situation and understand the need for increased developmental efforts aimed at increasing GoK capacity.

The government's ability to fully meet its leadership responsibilities is further diminished by governance issues<sup>17</sup> undermining the relationship between the GoK and key partners in the IA community. The Kenyan government suffers from high levels of corruption and lack of transparency undermining its legitimacy and credibility.<sup>18</sup> This has undermined trust between the IA community and the GoK leading not only to reluctance to transfer leadership responsibilities to the GoK, but also restraining development assistance.<sup>19</sup>

15. DRR programming is discussed further in subsequent sections of this report. More effective development programming focused on DRR should reduce the need for humanitarian assistance by building resilience, and decreasing the need for emergency humanitarian assistance. IA planning and resourcing is also being focused to a greater extent on DRR programming. Yet, significant underlying vulnerabilities to drought remain for particular populations in Kenya.

16. Recent publications that also note the role that ineffective development programming in Kenya and the Horn of Africa: 'System Failure? Revisiting the problems for timely response to crises in the Horn of Africa,' Simon Levine, Alexandra Crosskey and Mohammed Abdinoor. HPN Network Paper #71, November 2011. 'A Dangerous Delay,' Oxfam GB & Save the Children, January 2012.

17. Transparency International ranked Kenya 154 out of 182 countries in its 2011 Corruption Perception Index ranking countries and territories according to their perceived levels of public sector corruption (<http://cpi.transparency.org/cpi2011/results/>).

18. USAID reports that in Kenya "rampant corruption, the absence of effective checks and balances, and ineffective service delivery undermine the government's legitimacy." USAID Kenya Democracy and Governance Profile ([http://www.usaid.gov/locations/sub-saharan\\_africa/countries/kenya/kenya\\_dg\\_profile.pdf](http://www.usaid.gov/locations/sub-saharan_africa/countries/kenya/kenya_dg_profile.pdf)).

19. In July 2010, the World Bank halted the Phase 2 of its Arid Lands Resource Management Project after an audit uncovered suspected fraudulent expenditures in up to 29 percent of those sampled, totalling more than \$4 million. ([http://www.capitalfm.co.ke/news/2011/06/arid-lands-project-under-review-over-fraud/?wpmw\\_switcher=mobile](http://www.capitalfm.co.ke/news/2011/06/arid-lands-project-under-review-over-fraud/?wpmw_switcher=mobile))

### 03.1.5 THE SECURITY ENVIRONMENT, PARTICULARLY IN THE NORTH EASTERN BORDER AREAS WITH SOMALIA, REMAINS AN INCREASING CHALLENGE FOR THE IA COMMUNITY.

In August 2010, Kenyans peacefully and overwhelmingly voted to pass a new constitution<sup>20</sup> that is meant to tackle, amongst other areas, corruption and a lack of transparency.<sup>21</sup> The Constitution will also put in place substantial changes to the local government administrative set-up<sup>22</sup> that could lead to improvements thanks to more focused administration at the county level. Kenya is also holding elections in March 2013. Given past instabilities related to Kenyan elections, new humanitarian challenges undermining response and developmental programming could rise in the forthcoming months. Coupled with the constitutional changes, these could lead, at least over the next 12-18 months, to a less stable working environment for the IA community. Overall, the new Kenyan constitution, elections and administrative set up present a rare opportunity for reform and improvements throughout the Kenyan government. However, these significant changes also bring about inherent risks and potential threats that could further undermine the GoK capacity and credibility.

During the fall of 2011 and continuing into early 2012, the security situation along the Kenyan northeastern border area declined rapidly (particularly around the refugee camps near Dadaab). Corresponding to the GoK military incursion into Somalia there has been a rise in violent attacks along the border area, with more than ten incidents being reported in the month of December 2011.<sup>23</sup> This rise in insecurity has severely hampered humanitarian operations around Dadaab, restricting travel and decreasing the access of humanitarian agencies operating in the area and thus decreasing the services provided, despite the best efforts of the IA community.<sup>24</sup> In addition, inter-communal conflict has intensified between Borana, Gabra, and Turkana pastoral communities in areas of northern Kenya since mid-December.<sup>25</sup> The security situation continues to deteriorate and it may be necessary for humanitarian agencies operating in the area to use more remote programming if access does not improve.

Security particularly in and around the Dadaab camps remains an ongoing issue. The recent killings of police and refugee camp leadership, and the inter-clan rivalries and killings that are now a regular occurrence are an indication of this. Access to and from the camps remains very insecure and the IA humanitarian community is taking

20. The constitution was approved by 67% of voters. <http://www.reuters.com/article/2010/08/05/us-kenya-referendum-idUSTRE6743G720100805>.

21. [http://www.consultancyafrica.com/index.php?option=com\\_content&view=article&id=567:the-road-to-kenyas-new-constitution&catid=91:rights-in-focus&Itemid=296](http://www.consultancyafrica.com/index.php?option=com_content&view=article&id=567:the-road-to-kenyas-new-constitution&catid=91:rights-in-focus&Itemid=296).

22. The new Constitution created 47 Counties responsible for, development and other services (<http://republicofkenya.org/reform/constitutional-reforms/>).

23. "More than 10 serious incidents involving grenade attacks and improvised explosive devices (IED) have occurred in Dadaab, Garissa town, Wajir and Mandera in December alone." OCHA Kenya Humanitarian Bulletin, December 29, 2011.

24. As of January 2012, registration of new arrivals remains on hold as per Government directives (OCHA Kenya Humanitarian Bulletin, January 2012).

25. USAID Horn of Africa Drought Factsheet 14, January 19, 2012.

significant steps<sup>26</sup> to proactively adapt to the changing security environment. There is a much greater emphasis now on IA security coordination with strong leadership in this regard from UNCHR and other key agencies. These proactive steps to strengthen IA security coordination are to be commended and the resourcing required to continue on-going progress aimed at protecting IA humanitarian workers, the camp population, and the host community, are essential and need to be acknowledged and supported by donors.

Camp inhabitants themselves requested an increase in resources and personnel for their own in-camp community security teams. Although not without its difficulties<sup>27</sup>, the challenges facing the Kenyan police working within the camps could make increased refugee community policing a more viable option, and would also be a step towards increased responsibility within the refugee community towards ownership of its own issues.

Clearly, the GoK and the IA humanitarian needs to further prioritize a safe and secure humanitarian operating environment in response to this threatening security context.

### 3.1.6 THE HUMANITARIAN COMMUNITY STRUGGLES TO MANAGE THE TRANSITION FROM HUMANITARIAN RELIEF TO DEVELOPMENT WITHIN THE DISASTER RESPONSE CONTINUUM.

Kenya is in the unique position geographically of being a hub for most major IA agencies that have both national and regional offices based in Nairobi. Thus, there is a significant presence (Nairobi UN operations are the 3rd largest in the world after New York and Geneva) of humanitarian agencies permanently in Nairobi though they are often focused on activities beyond Kenya. This permanent presence results in a community that is quite ponderous and set in its ways. Scaling up for humanitarian relief operations, as was needed for this crisis operation, takes this Nairobi based development oriented community out of its comfort zone. The struggle to rapidly scale up during this operation is likely related to the reality that many organizations are normally focused on delivering development programming in Kenya and other countries. As stated later in this report, the RTE team sensed a real gap between the urgency of the field operational staff and their Nairobi or headquarters office counterparts.

Rains will fail again at some point in the future. Given the chronic vulnerability of so many in Kenya, there is the increasing likelihood that droughts will negatively impact people again. More election violence in 2012-2013 could result in challenges and the humanitarian situation in Somalia will remain of concern (with its refugee populations directly impacting Kenya). Flooding regularly impacts (as did in late 2011) certain parts of Kenya. Increasingly vulnerable Kenyan populations are less likely to

26. The humanitarian compound in Dadaab is being upgraded with a range of security measures including increased and better trained security personnel, adjustments to the perimeter and personnel access. Kenya police are receiving upgrades in equipment and staffing resources, though the ability to rapidly mobilize these additional resources has been slower than desired.

27. The inherent Islamic system of payments of assets as compensation for crimes undertaken by one family or individual against another however, is outside of the Kenyan legal system, and should be dealt with cautiously.

be able to withstand these shocks.

Until DRR and other developmental programming have a more significant impact on reducing these vulnerabilities, IA humanitarian relief will likely be needed again. Large scale humanitarian operations can take a great deal of time, effort and resourcing to scale up, and then scale down, only to have to subsequently scale up and down again with the changing seasons and humanitarian conditions. Developmental programming continues to be designed without scalability for humanitarian response being incorporated therein, while humanitarian responses too often do not factor in more sustainable developmental practices.

While some humanitarian programs have developmental components and some developmental programs incorporate humanitarian response and scalability, examples of programs imbedding humanitarian-developmental linkages are limited. Addressing the IA community's collective ability in Kenya to scale up and scale down operations to meet humanitarian requirements will be critical to the success of these future IA interventions.

## 3.2 **STRATEGIC PLANNING, OPERATIONAL PLANNING, & RESOURCE MOBILIZATION**

### 3.2.1 **DESPITE GOOD EARLY WARNING DATA WELL IN ADVANCE, THE IMPETUS TO ACT DECISIVELY IN RESPONSE TO THE CRISIS WAS FINALLY DRIVEN BY THE 'CNN EFFECT.' THIS REACTIVE DECISION-MAKING APPROACH CREATED THE PERCEPTION THAT THE UN, IA**

Early Warning information was available as early as August 2010, when FEWSNET declared a La Niña event<sup>28</sup> and reported on the increasing number of Somali refugees arriving in Dadaab due to the persisting humanitarian crisis in Somalia.<sup>29</sup> By November 2010, FEWSNET was calling for livelihood support assistance to help prevent the deterioration of food security in the northeastern pastoral and southeastern marginal cropping areas of Kenya.<sup>30</sup> However, while the IA community took several intermediate steps in an attempt to address the rapidly worsening crisis situation,<sup>31</sup> the GoK and UN leadership did not act decisively until after the long rains

28. FEWSNET associated La Niña with drier-than-normal conditions during the October-December rainy season in the eastern sector of East Africa. It further claimed this could lead to February 2011 crop harvest deficits, reduced rangeland resources, and possible reductions in the 2011 long rains. FEWSNET Executive Brief: La Niña and Food Security in East Africa, August 17, 2010.

29. FEWSNET Somalia Food Security Alert, August 23, 2010.


30. FEWSNET predicted poor October-December 2010 rains as well as below-average March-May 2011 rains. FEWSNET East Africa Food Security Alert, November 02, 2010.

31. The ERC approved the use of CERF underfunded allocations for Kenya in January 2011 (CERF funding in food and nutrition, including the recent response in the Horn of Africa; CERF Secretariat, October 12, 2011, p. 3) with about USD 6 million being disbursed by mid April. In addition, the 2010 Short Rains Season Assessment Report was accelerated to provide updated figures of populations in need and the revision of the EHRP began on May 19th, and included donors.



failed in the spring of 2011<sup>32</sup> and the media attention in Kenya and internationally became very intense. There remains a risk of this pattern repeating itself in the future. The Kenya summarized crisis timeline below (please refer to Annex 2 for a Detailed Timeline of the Crisis) in Figure 4 depicts the time evolution of the crisis and key events that transpired:

**Figure 4: Kenya Summarized Crisis Timeline**



The main factors cited as to why the GoK and IA community did not act earlier in a more significant manner were the hope that the March-May 2011 rains would improve the food security situation and a lack of available GoK resources due to the closing of the World Bank funded Arid Lands Natural Resource Management Project Phase II (ALRMP 2).


The perception of there being a gap in UN leadership is likely related to the Kenya Humanitarian Coordinator and UN Country Team's inability to act proactively and decisively to address the crisis. IA leadership's inability to do so was hampered by the lack of clear analysis that translated early warning data into actionable options for response. Such analysis would have better guided decision-makers. Related to this was the absence of a clear documentation trail showing why decisions were made (or not made). The lack of these two key elements (an analysis linked to options for decision making and the documentation of decision making) had a detrimental effect on how the IA community managed and reacted to the crisis. Thus, it is critical looking forward that both issues of effective analysis of early warning data and assessment information, as well as transparent IA community leadership decision-making be addressed. In doing so, the IA community and the GoK can take a more informed, proactive and accountable role that can then be followed by donors and the international media.

32. The UN issued the Horn of Africa Drought Appeal on July 28th, increasing the funding request for Kenya from US\$ 604.8 million to US\$ 741 million. The Kenyan government declared the drought a national disaster on May 30.

### 3.2.2 ONCE CALLS FOR EMERGENCY INTERNATIONAL ASSISTANCE WERE MADE TO ADDRESS THE CRISIS, THE DONOR COMMUNITY (NATIONAL AND INTERNATIONAL) RESPONDED WITH SIGNIFICANT RESOURCING.

When in July 2011 the United Nations issued its mid-year review of the Kenya 2011 Emergency Humanitarian Response Plan, it announced that in the first six months of the year, less than half of the originally requested USD 525.8 million had been received between contributions, commitments, and carry-over funds.<sup>33</sup> The publication of the mid-year review followed the May 30th national disaster declaration by the GoK and the June FEWSNET report classifying the region as the most severe food security emergency in the world. In June-July 2011, the donor community, and people around the world, fully responded to calls for international assistance by providing significant resourcing. In the first four weeks of July, USD 73.8 million was donated to the appealing organizations.<sup>34</sup> An additional USD 16.689 million was disbursed by CERF between July and August, bringing total CERF funding to USD 22.683 million for 2011.<sup>35</sup> By December 16, total funding had reached USD 529.4 million, covering 71% of the updated appeal funding requirements.<sup>36</sup> This significant increase over time (from November 2010 to December 2011) is reflected in the following Figure 5:

**Figure 5: Kenya 2010 and 2011 Humanitarian Funding**



33. As of June 30, 2011 USD 283.2 million had been received (Kenya 2011+ EHRP Midyear Review, July 20, 2011).

34. As of July 28, 2011 USD 357 million had been received (2011 Horn of Africa Drought Appeal, July 28, 2011).

35. <http://fts.unocha.org>

36. <http://fts.unocha.org>

Notably the GoK itself contributed with USD 3.4 million<sup>37</sup> and the Kenya Red Cross Society accessed substantial amounts of local funding, approximately USD 7.4 million, through its 'Kenyans for Kenyans' national appeal. Total Humanitarian funding for Kenya in 2011 reached USD 654.2 million.<sup>38</sup> The United States was the biggest donor with USD 193.7 million, followed by the European Commission with USD 79.8 million, Germany with USD 63.9 million, the United Kingdom with USD 32 million, and Japan with USD 29.7 million.

It should be noted that it can be difficult for some donors to release funds, in any substantive amount, prior to the government declaring a state of emergency and accepting the launch of an international appeal. Furthermore, donors can also be reticent regarding the release of funds based on a predicted disaster, indicating that should they release funds for all predicted disasters there would be none left when the real disaster strikes. Although, to a certain extent, understandable, there is a need to strike a balance, and to make a judgment call in order not to let circumstances deteriorate too far before the decision to intervene is taken.

### 3.2.3 THERE IS A LACK OF COHERENT, INCLUSIVE AND STRATEGIC IA PLANNING PROCESSES.

While there are many individual agency plans, annual appeals processes with planning elements, IA emergency humanitarian response plans<sup>39</sup>, and significant efforts to bring about planning and reporting cohesion, there remains a lack of progress in linking together the humanitarian and development aims of the IA community or in connecting the strategic priorities of the GoK and the IA community. Better results in IA community wide strategic planning (and donor funding of those plans) are needed in order to break the cycle of chronic vulnerability to droughts and other regularly occurring crises in Kenya. Too often the humanitarian and development goals of the humanitarian community are addressed separately. The lack of a linked GoK and IA longer-term strategic plan (or planning process) results in a greater focus on humanitarian relief operations and less of an emphasis on more durable DRR programming.

Furthermore, there were concerns raised at all levels regarding the non-inclusion of partners (particularly NGOs) into the planning processes of the major UN agencies active in Kenya. The lack of an inclusive and truly strategic planning process is undermining the IA community's ability to prevent crises from occurring, and thwarts the collective desire to focus more on DRR programming.

37. Kenya Emergencies 2011, Total Humanitarian Funding per Donor in 2011 as of 27-January-2012. [http://fts.unocha.org/reports/daily/ocha\\_R24c\\_C110\\_Y2011\\_asof\\_1201261720.pdf](http://fts.unocha.org/reports/daily/ocha_R24c_C110_Y2011_asof_1201261720.pdf).

38. This included contributions to the appeal and additional contributions outside the appeal (Kenya Emergencies 2011, Total Humanitarian Funding per Donor in 2011 as of 27-January-2012 [http://fts.unocha.org/reports/daily/ocha\\_R24c\\_C110\\_Y2011\\_asof\\_1201261720.pdf](http://fts.unocha.org/reports/daily/ocha_R24c_C110_Y2011_asof_1201261720.pdf))

39. The Emergency Humanitarian Response Plan (EHRP) is a good example of the extensive humanitarian planning efforts that currently take place within the IA community.

### 3.2.4 THERE IS A DUAL THREAT OF HIGH STAFF-TURNOVER AND STAFF ENTRENCHMENT WITHIN HUMANITARIAN AGENCIES.

The scaling up of Kenya operations with appropriate personnel was a significant constraint for most humanitarian organizations. Less visible, but likely just as important, is the fact that many staff are entrenched in Kenya holding key positions relevant to the humanitarian response, but without the needed skill sets for humanitarian relief coordination and response. Staff are entrenched in the same position, sometimes for many years in the same difficult locations. As a result they can be resistant to change, and are often professionally challenged by the rapidly changing situation that a major humanitarian crisis presents. Some of these staff undoubtedly performed admirably given the serious humanitarian needs and a slow ability to scale up human resources to meet this need. However, it was noted that some staff lacked the humanitarian response profile needed to effectively manage a crisis operation, often retreating into the modus operandi of how they worked before the crisis. This finding links directly with related finding 3.1.6 questioning the IA community's ability to appropriately and rapidly scale up and scale down related to a crisis response.

## 3.3

### **COORDINATION AND CONNECTEDNESS**

#### 3.3.1 INTER-SECTOR COORDINATION IS WORKING REASONABLY WELL, ENSURING OPERATIONAL COORDINATION AND COMMUNICATION, AND REDUCING DUPLICATION. INDIVIDUAL SECTOR LEVEL COORDINATION HOWEVER IS INCONSISTENT WITH SOME SECTORS PERFORMING BETTER THAN OTHERS.

Inter-sector coordination, particularly at the Nairobi level, is functioning reasonably well. Related to operational service delivery and decision-making this is the primary mechanism through which IA coordination results in action. The Kenya equivalent of the Humanitarian Country Team (or Kenya Humanitarian Partnership Team) regularly relies on the sectors to both deliver and coordinate the operational response. While this works for most operational coordination purposes, there is higher-level operational direction, decision-making and guidance which should come from the HCT level. It appears that while the HCT was indeed active, much of the operational decision making fell to the sector leads and the inter-sector working group which performs reasonably well given the circumstances. However, questions were raised consistently as to the operational decision-making role of the HCT vis-à-vis the inter-sector working group.

It is important to note that the Cluster system is no longer activated in Kenya although existing sector working groups still seek to perform 'cluster functions', with the sector co-leads mirroring the IASC cluster system. In July 2009, a strategic decision was made when ten clusters were handed over to the GoK line ministries with Cluster Leads becoming sector co-leads. The cluster system was not activated in 2011 in response to this crisis. Currently, Sectoral Working Groups, active in Kenya, lead sector coordination, and are divided as follows: KFSM (GoK/WFP), Education (MoE/

UNICEF/Save the Children), Shelter<sup>40</sup> (MOSSP Department of Resettlement/UNHCR), Nutrition Technical Forum (MOPHS/UNICEF), Protection (MOJ/UNHCR) with sub sectors for National Child Protection in Emergency (DCS/UNICEF) and GBV (MCG/MOG), WESCOORD (MOWI/UNICEF), Health Sector Coordination Committee (MOPHS/MOMS/WHO), and Agriculture and Livestock (MOA/MOLD/FAO). There are no longer any Emergency Telecommunications or Logistics working groups. The multitude of GoK line ministries involved in the various sectors has made sector coordination even more challenging.

Individual sectors are performing to greatly varying levels of success, dependent on the level of lead agency organizational commitment, amount of resources allocated, or available, and the experience or expertise of the individual involved. Each sector lead agency is clearly identified. The functioning of each sector's coordination is directly related to each organization's ability to dedicate appropriate personnel (in Nairobi and the various field levels) and related resourcing. Guidelines regarding indicators for the measurement of the impact or success of coordination need to be provided to sectoral leads to enable performance measurement and improved coordination management.

Inter sector coordination at a field level is currently under resourced in terms of UNOCHA support to the government county coordination mechanisms. Although the individuals involved are performing well, the geographical area to be covered, and the number of agencies involved, make the task overwhelming.

Another key element is the coordination with the host community around the Dadaab camps. Although there is some communication ongoing and governmental coordination systems exist, there is a need for a more structured dialogue, increased governmental capacity, and a greater involvement of local host communities in both the running of the camps, as well as in how the future of the camps, and their services, are foreseen. This is particularly important with respect to the environmental impact of the camps on the surrounding areas.

### 3.3.2 MANY NON-TRADITIONAL HUMANITARIAN AGENCIES ARE MARGINALIZED WITHIN IA COORDINATION.

There is evidence that some key non-traditional humanitarian actors, particularly faith-based organizations and community based organizations, are not participating actively in the IA coordination mechanism. This was particularly noticeable at the Nairobi level, where local Community Based Organizations reported a lack of knowledge regarding coordination mechanisms, as well as a lack of understanding of the availability of funds that they may be able to access. This situation is much improved in the districts due to the smaller working community as well as the amount of time some of the faith-based organizations have been working in those areas.

Some local NGOs have been able to utilise the political influence of their founders to attract funding, particularly in the Dadaab area. However, overall, little advantage

40. The shelter sector was not activated for the drought response.

has been taken of local civil society, and a greater focus needs to be directed to this source of local knowledge, understanding, and community acceptance.

One particular concern related to this issue is that smaller local and faith-based organizations play a significant role in cross border operations into Somalia. Should some of these organizations continue to remain 'outside' of the IA humanitarian coordination system there will continue to be gaps in the knowledge and understanding of the changing context and needs across the border in Somalia that also have a direct impact on operations in Kenya. Better inclusion and participation of marginalized organizations could in turn lead to better cross-border information flow improving preparedness and response activities in Kenya.

### 3.3.3 THERE IS LIMITED BENEFICIARY OR HOST COMMUNITY INPUT INTO THE IA COORDINATION MECHANISMS

There is also little evidence that beneficiaries from the drought affected communities, refugee camp leadership, or representatives from local host communities are included in any substantial way within IA coordination (at the Nairobi and field levels). This is particularly relevant given that the most significant IA operations are conducted in the northeastern and northwestern parts of the country. These areas are traditionally marginalized and neglected in terms of resourcing particularly when compared to other parts of the country. This creates a divide within Kenya that should be considered in any country specific analysis.

The elected camp representatives in Dadaab, when interviewed, stated that their contributions into programmatic initiatives, planning activities, or camp co-ordination issues were rarely requested. Similarly, women representatives in the only community the RTE team was able to visit (Nadapal, Turkana) expressed that although they had received many visitors, only on the occasion of the RTE team visit had the women been taken to one side and interviewed (by the RTE team female gender specialist), about their individual concerns. Although this instance is not representative of the overall response, there are indications of a need for improved community consultation not only in Dadaab, but also in other areas of Kenya where humanitarian services are provided.

Beyond the camps, it is a similar scenario amongst the host communities, who can compare the inequality of the support provided to those affected, against the support they receive from their own government. Although host communities can benefit from the presence of camps, more could be done to improve the livelihoods and social services available in the host communities. Recent efforts, by a number of NGOs and INGOs have led to an improvement in the situation, and OCHA support to coordinate this process, has been generally well received.

An upcoming issue will be the response to the needs of Nairobi's urban community. Systemic identification of local community leaders needs to be undertaken to ensure urban community involvement and ownership of any action undertaken in response to current and future crises.



### 3.3.4 GOK AND IA MECHANISMS EXIST FOR COORDINATION BUT THEY REQUIRE STRENGTHENING.

Of particular note in supporting humanitarian coordination related to the drought response are structures led by the GoK such as the District Steering Group (DSG) and the Kenya Food Security Steering Group (KFSSG). While these forums facilitate information flow, they are not decision-making forums and are usually preoccupied with food aid related topics (as opposed to also systematically incorporating other relevant sectors). Within the IA system there are several key bodies, such as the Kenya Humanitarian Partnership Team (KHPT) or Kenya HCT equivalent, and the Kenya Donor Forum. Feedback suggests that these IA forums can be useful for information sharing purposes but that they lack inclusive analysis and decision-making needed for proactive IA action. Future GoK administrative changes will affect coordination arrangements in the field. UNOCHA should work to ensure that such changes result in a situation where all sectors are well represented and feel empowered to express their opinions.

### 3.3.5 THERE IS OFTEN A DISCONNECT BETWEEN NAIROBI AND FIELD OPERATIONS WITHIN IA AGENCIES.

Not unlike many major operations, there is often a feeling (particularly from field based staff) that there is a disconnect between Nairobi and the field. This disconnect applies particularly to agency prioritization, planning, information exchange and coordination. Often agencies at the field levels are working well together in challenging environments to deliver services. There tends to be a higher level of competition amongst agencies at the Nairobi level. The field staff perceive themselves as the 'doers' of the operation while Nairobi based staff are more comfortably located, often working at a different pace, as compared to field operations. This disconnect can sometimes hinder cohesive operational coordination and service delivery.

### 3.3.6 COORDINATION SKILLS ARE MISSING FOR MANY STAFF WHO FILL KEY COORDINATION ROLES WHILE MANY STAFF ARE ALSO DOUBLE-HATTING.

Staff members (IA and GoK) in key coordination positions (such as working group leads in the field) readily admit that they themselves may not have the skills or training required to fulfill key coordination roles. Staff members, particularly at the field levels, are also constrained by having to 'double hat' (i.e. filling both programming and coordination functions in a crisis response operation). While 'double hatting' can certainly work in developmental programming where workloads can be spread out over a longer period of time, it is very difficult to deliver on both responsibilities during crisis response situations. These issues create significant constraints on staff and hinder more effective coordination.

## 3.4 RESPONSE COVERING THE NEEDS & SET STANDARDS

### 3.4.1 DISASTER RISK REDUCTION (DRR) PROGRAMMING AREAS SUFFERED LESS THAN OTHER AREAS THAT HAVE NO DRR PROGRAMMING.

Anecdotal evidence and some data collected<sup>41</sup>, suggest that those areas that did have DRR programming, in advance of the crisis, suffered at a reduced rate as compared to areas that did not have DRR programming. Although requested and researched, concrete evidence of DRR impact is not readily or widely available. This is unfortunate, as the desire to emphasize more on DRR support is widespread, and donors will require such evidence to secure needed DRR funding.

However, the positive direction in DRR programming cannot be ignored and must be appreciated when considering how best to address some of the underlying vulnerabilities and coping mechanisms of at-risk populations throughout Kenya.

### 3.4.2 THE NUTRITION SECTOR IS FUNCTIONING WELL AND A GOOD EXAMPLE FOR OTHER SECTORS TO FOLLOW.

The nutrition sector is functioning well and can serve as a useful model for other sectors (understanding that each sector has its own specific contextual issues). In particular, there were several aspects of UNICEF's lead role in the sector which provided some insight as to why this sector was regularly cited as being the most effective:

- UNICEF scaled up resources rapidly with the appropriate technical expertise,
- UNICEF imbeds staff in targeted Government of Kenya ministries,
- Significant efforts and staff resourcing were devoted specifically to the sector's coordination function.

However, there are significant opportunities for sector coordination enhancements particularly as related to the agriculture and livestock, protection, health and cash interventions. The agricultural and livestock sector is a critical component of any successful intervention aimed at addressing the fundamental vulnerabilities of those most at risk. Increased efforts and resourcing aimed at strengthening the agricultural and livestock coordination could have a much more significant impact towards improved programming in this critical area. Similarly, the health sector was cited as having less than optimal coordination resourcing despite the critical role that this sector also has. Increasing the capacity of health sector coordination could improve the effectiveness and impact of IA interventions. Cash as a humanitarian intervention, is growing very rapidly in Kenya, however it is not clear where cash interventions are best placed within the sector working group coordination structure. As a result there are some concerns as to how this intervention will be better coordinated so as to avoid duplication of efforts, and enable effective inter-agency collaboration. It was noted that the WASH (or WESCOORD) sector has recently received an inject of coordination resourcing which is having a positive effect on this sector's work.

41. IFRC reports that farmers involved in the KRCS Tana River Drought Recovery Project fared better than the surrounding communities during the drought. With a USD 234,000 investment, the Tana River Drought Recovery Project created 33 farms and provided long term food security for almost 10,000 people. The same money spent on food aid would have given 1,250 people a partial food ration for six months. IFRC, Drought in the Horn of Africa, October 27, 2011.

### 3.4.3 EMERGENCY FOOD AID INJECTS, ONCE MOBILIZED AND DISTRIBUTED TO NEEDED COMMUNITIES, HAD A POSITIVE IMPACT ON MITIGATING THE EFFECTS OF THE CRISIS.

Food aid (particularly through WFP and its implementing partners) and emergency nutritional interventions are proven to assist in saving lives and preventing suffering. In overcoming pipeline and supply chain challenges, emergency food aid and nutritional programming addressed critical needs for those populations that received assistance. When finally mobilized in a meaningful way, this effort likely prevented the further loss of life and is essential in stemming malnutrition rates until the agricultural and pastoral prospects substantially improve. However, concerns were raised as to the availability of more detailed and timely information related to food aid programming. This lack of information and transparency can be a detriment to IA coordination in Kenya particularly given the critical role that food aid plays in humanitarian response operations.

### 3.4.4 A SIGNIFICANT SHIFT TO MARKET BASED PROGRAMMING IS IN PROGRESS. THIS IS BOTH APPROPRIATE AND NEEDED.

There is widespread agreement amongst key stakeholders in Kenya that there is a need to decrease the reliance on food aid. However, before doing so the livelihoods (with related income generation) and/or replacement income (through cash or voucher based programs) of those at risk would need to be strengthened so that they could move from food aid to market based support programming. Market based programming is proven in this context to decrease dependency, build longer-term resilience and empower beneficiaries while also more efficiently transferring needed assets.<sup>42</sup> Further, market based initiatives can improve the targeting of support to women, particularly as compared to food aid, although improved targeting is a consistent challenge for all programs.<sup>43,44</sup> The IA humanitarian community has already initiated market-based programming,<sup>45</sup> and there is increasing evidence that a gradual scaling up of market based interventions is feasible so as to serve the large numbers of vulnerable people in Kenya and the region.<sup>46</sup> This shift towards more market based programming and away from dependency creating food aid is a positive and welcome development.

42. The Sphere Project, 2011 Humanitarian Charter and Minimum Standards in Humanitarian Response, pg. 199-203.

43. Market based initiatives are better for gender as cash in the hands of women can increase the likelihood that cash will be spent on the household (Kerren and Knox Clarke, p.12).

44. Food and water aid can upset local coping mechanisms and also aggravate gender relations. Livelihood-based interventions improve women's conditions more than short term humanitarian response (Flintan, 2011, Executive Summary p. iii).

45. As of November 9 2011, WFP had completed targeting for unconditional cash transfers with 5,679 families enrolled in the programme. Under the WFP cash-for-assets programme, nearly 195 beneficiaries had received cash in return for asset creation (WFP Horn of Africa Update, November 9, 2011). UNICEF's cash transfer programme in Kenya was expected to cover 12,000 households by the end of October 2011 (UNICEF Response to the Horn of Africa Emergency, Regional Three Month Progress Report, October 2011).

46. Despite a temporary increase in the price of maize in the last months of 2011 due to heavy rains, the above average 2011/2012 maize and aggregate cereal production predicted by GIEWS should provide the right conditions for a gradual scale up of market based interventions. GIEWS Kenya Country Brief, January 12, 2012.

3.4.5 COORDINATED INTER AGENCY NEEDS ASSESSMENTS ARE CONDUCTED PRIMARILY THROUGH INDIVIDUAL SECTORS YIELDING VALUABLE INFORMATION. HOWEVER, THERE IS A GAP WITH RESPECT TO COMPREHENSIVE MULTI-SECTORAL ASSESSMENTS.

When an emerging need due to a new crisis situation is reported the standard methodology for conducting assessments in Kenya is to refer to the sectors most able, willing and relevant to that particular situation. The sector then coordinates with other agencies in the sector to conduct sector specific assessments. This assessment information is then fed back into the inter-sector coordination body for wider dissemination as appropriate. The information collected through this process is of considerable value and relevant to meeting emerging needs. However, there does not appear to be a comprehensive multi-sector assessment process through which inter-sector coverage duplication and cross-sector gaps can be identified.

The current multi-sectoral assessments that are undertaken are the annual long and short rain season assessments<sup>47</sup>. These valuable annual assessments provide useful information and data around which regular planning and humanitarian response operations can be based. However, these are static regular assessments and not necessarily dynamic or responsive to emerging crises. Emergency multi-sector assessments are a key part of translating Early Warning data into the field grounded information that should serve as the basis for analysis and decision-making. Without a multi-sector assessment with which to triangulate data from the EW, it is even more challenging to construct a reliable analysis and scenario planning through which evidence-based options for response can be formulated. A lack of effective analysis often leads, as it did in this case, to reactive decision-making and less responsive operational service delivery.

3.4.6 COORDINATION AND SERVICE PROVISION IN DADAAB IS LED BY UNHCR AND IS MEETING NEEDS, PARTICULARLY AS RELATED TO NUTRITION AND HEALTH. CONCERNS REMAIN REGARDING SERVICE PROVISION IN OTHER KEY AREAS.

UNHCR has, according to its mandate, taken the key lead role related to service provision in and around the Dadaab refugee camps<sup>48</sup>. With the GoK, UNHCR is responsible for the coordination of all sectors and operational humanitarian agencies in the area. This coordination and service provision role has been handled in a challenging environment over an extremely long period of time (20+ years) and, now, in ever worsening security conditions. Recent UNHCR efforts to strengthen their team and resourcing are improving IA coordination, security provision and operational management in Dadaab. It is critical to IA coordination in the region that these recent measures taken by UNHCR are sustained. Those IA actors taking a leadership role in these conditions are to be commended for their work under difficult circumstances.

47. A mid season food security assessment was also conducted in May 2010.

48. OCHA provides coordination support in the Dadaab area and the northeastern region of Kenya specifically related to the host communities.

However, the IA management and coordination for the Dadaab camps is sometimes considered to be prescriptive and less than inclusionary. Sector challenges highlighted during the RTE include education (lack of access for many), shelter (related to the spacing of housing in some camps), water supply (of specific concern is borehole placement and aquifer sustainability) and environmental concerns related to fuel collection. Further, given the long-term nature of the camps, it is surprising that better progress has not been made in terms of longer term developmental programming support. In particular, this refers to support aimed at creating more sustainable incomes and stronger livelihoods for camp residents.

The recent deterioration in security has led to a protection issue related to the suspension of new arrival registration. Unregistered refugees are not allowed to reside in the camps, and were therefore living in makeshift shelters on the camps' periphery, beyond the support of community security measures.<sup>49</sup> This places female unregistered arrivals in a very dangerous position, exposed to robbery and sexual assault<sup>50</sup>, however, there seemed to be little urgency about reversing this scenario.

Furthermore, there seems to be a lack of ownership within the camp communities regarding the management of the camps. Although unable to visit the Dadaab camps to get a more in-depth understanding, the RTE team recognizes that camp residents are now seemingly a largely dependent population. Community representatives bemoan the fact that, although there is a complaints procedure, that this complaints system did not function well, and that they often had difficulty gaining access to the UNHCR decision-makers to discuss issues of concern. Although camp committees do exist and refugees themselves receive some compensation for their work depending on their positions in the camps, camp residents expressed their desire to have a greater voice in how services in the camps are delivered. Communities also expressed a desire to move towards greater capacity building of individuals in term of both vocational training and education. Although frustrated with the limitations that restrict the movement of camp inhabitants outside of the camps, thereby reducing their employment opportunities, the camp representatives expressed their desire to at least be able to contribute to Somalia's redevelopment upon their eventual return to their country of origin.

The needs of women and children in the camps are acknowledged and being addressed, albeit in an inconsistent manner from one camp to another depending on access and camp management. The RTE's findings are supported by NGOs operational in Dadaab suggesting that single women, female-headed households and adolescent girls are most at risk to sexual and gender based violence (SGBV). Women are particularly vulnerable to SGBV when en route to the Dadaab camps from Somalia, prior to registration, when traveling outside of the camps in search of firewood, when using the forest as a toilet (often due to a shortage of culturally appropriate latrines) and when collecting water.<sup>51</sup> Vulnerabilities that affect women's lives include marginalization from decision-making processes and insecure access to resources and assets.<sup>52</sup> There is only one safe house in all of the camps, where women

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49. UNHCR Donor Relations and Resource Mobilization Service (2011), Response to the Somali displacement crisis into Ethiopia, Djibouti and Kenya, July 2011.

50. IRC Gender Based Violence Rapid Assessment, July 2011, p.4-5.

51. IRC Gender Based Violence Rapid Assessment, July 2011.

52. Flintan, 2011, Executive Summary p.ii.



can retreat to in times of need. This service could be increased. Health is intended to be available for all, and education programs are open to children of all ethnicities (there is a substantial Sudanese population in the camps as well as Somali).

Overall, there is a need for greater involvement of the communities themselves in the IA coordination mechanisms and processes in order to create a greater sense of ownership of camp issues amongst the camp inhabitants, however, with this influence, comes responsibility, and the community leaders also need to be prepared to undertake such an increased role.

#### 3.4.7 INFORMATION MANAGEMENT AND CRITICAL INFORMATION SHARING WERE SUFFICIENT TO ENABLE RESPONSE ENTITIES. HOWEVER, INFORMATION MANAGEMENT TOOLS LACK DYNAMIC INFORMATION SHARING FUNCTIONS.

The information management component of the Kenya response, particularly as provided by OCHA, was repeatedly cited as being timely, appropriate and useful to those engaged in the response, although, at times, the accuracy of some figures quoted was challenged. Importantly, the GoK has developed a significant capacity for information collection and dissemination that can be further built upon. Response information was shared widely throughout the various organizational levels (field, Nairobi and global levels) and helped to meet the needs of key stakeholders.

However, this RTE found that the information provided (3/4 W, situation reports) was static in nature without a dynamic information collection function requiring a great deal of staff time and delays. Much time and effort is currently spent trying to collect information that rapidly becomes old and that often lacks the level of specificity required to enable operational planning and service delivery. Widespread dynamic information collection that allows users to directly input their information, and that is more specific in terms of exactly where (using GPS coordinates) particular services are being provided (thus including a mapping interface) could significantly enhance response operations in Kenya. Further, there is evidence of some key IA actors (particularly UNICEF with its nutritional surveys and UNHCR in its camp statistics) disaggregating data based on sex and age. Other key actors may also disaggregate according to sex and age but there is little consistency regarding disaggregated data across all IA agencies and the GoK<sup>53</sup>. Nor is it clear as to how this data is incorporated into the process of analysis. Critically, while information collection can certainly be improved in Kenya, the fundamental point is that it needs to be used to inform better analysis and decision-making.

53. For example, the Kenya Food Security Steering Group 2011 Long Rains Mid-Season Assessment Report does not disaggregate data based on sex/age.

# 04

# RECOMMENDATIONS

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The recommendations that follow are based upon the RTE workshops conducted in Kenya with the IA community. They are prioritized from the Frameworks for Future Action (FFA) as developed by the RTE workshop participants. As agreed at the Nairobi RTE workshop, the Kenya RTE Advisory Group assumes responsibility advancing these recommendations for future action.

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## RECOMMENDATION #1

### **MATCH EARLY WARNING WITH EARLY ACTION**

Despite the clear early warning of the emerging crisis situation in Kenya, coordinated and proactive early action aimed at alleviating the forecasted effects of the crisis did not take place. Early Warning will only be an effective tool in the future in Kenya, and other areas of the Horn of Africa, when it is matched with early action. To the greatest extent possible, preventative early action should be aimed at mitigating or preventing the loss of livelihoods and assets. The IA community has a responsibility to more effectively coordinate and manage its

members so that errors made in the past are not repeated. The recommendations that follow are meant to guide the IA community with clearly defined steps that can be taken immediately to ensure that the humanitarian community is proactive, responsive and more effective the next time a massive humanitarian challenge presents itself in Kenya. Tactical and strategic efforts made now can and should save lives, reduce suffering and more effectively allocate resources in the future.

## RECOMMENDATION #2

## COORDINATED IA COMMUNITY ANALYSIS & SCENARIO PLANNING NEEDS TO GUIDE TRANSPARENT DECISIONS MAKING

Early Warning data is a critical first step in recognizing and then responding to slow onset emergencies in Kenya. This first step is currently well covered through existing EW mechanisms in Kenya. However, Early Warning data should also be matched with IA multi sector assessment in affected communities. Once the IA community has good early warning data and strong assessment information, there is the need to have experienced operational staff from the GoK and IA humanitarian community translate this data into real-time analyses and scenarios<sup>1</sup> for response that can guide decision-makers. Analysis and scenario planning is the critical next step following the information collection process. Included in this analysis and scenario planning process should be the inclusion of crisis calendars<sup>2</sup> that feed into the analytical process helping to ensure that the IA community is forward looking and working as proactively as possible.

A formal humanitarian analysis through a structured analytical framework, can serve to improve the timeliness of the response to those in need, better engage preparedness steps, facilitate better decisions, and increase transparency in the decision-making process. Triggers could be developed, based on a crisis calendar that would automatically ensure that IA assessments and analysis are completed

in a timely manner in advance of when key decisions need to be made. Triggers can be matched with proposed action steps by the Government of Kenya, the IA community, and the donor community, strengthening justifications for the release of rapid funding aimed at preparing for, and preventing, crises.

The subsequent analysis provided to decision-makers would have clearly defined decision points for those in leadership positions to build their key operational decisions around. With these decision points, would come a record of decisions made at indicated points in time. A more analytical and defined process should result in greater transparency in the decision-making chain, and in the ability to evaluate the decision-making process throughout the evolution of the crisis. This would be particularly relevant and helpful to the HCT in Kenya so that it can take more proactive, transparent and decisive decisions to help guide the IA community in response to the current situation, and as future crises arise in Kenya.

For example, it could be envisioned that certain early warning data would automatically trigger an IA multi sector assessment. This rapid assessment process would build upon the twice annual regular assessments already undertaken in Kenya, but focus primarily on the emerging, or current crisis situation. It is critical that all assessments, either for an emerging crisis situation, or as related to the annual rains assessments, are conducted on time and results released far enough in advance to inform future planning and decision making. Once the early warning data and rapid multi sector assessments are complete, this information would be analysed by a purposively

1. Some scenario planning efforts were made related to this crisis. However, they were not linked across the region and sectors decreasing their utility to the IA multi sector community throughout the Horn of Africa. These efforts can be built upon in the future to further advance this important component of effective analysis and decision making.

2. 'System Failure? Revisiting the problems for timely response to crises in the Horn of Africa,' Simon Levine, Alexandra Crosskey and Mohammed Abdinoor. HPN Network Paper #71, November 2011.

selected group of GoK and IA community representatives (with at least one external technical expert). This analysis process would take the early warning data, assessment information and input it all into a simple but effective analytical framework that includes the development of forward leaning planning scenarios with related options for response. This analysis with its planning scenarios, crisis calendar, and options for response, can continually be updated through an iterative

process so that they remain current and assist decision makers, and particularly the Kenya HCT, in adjusting to emerging realities. This should be a rapid process involving a small representative sampling of key IA stakeholders but with beneficiary and non-traditional IA actor representation as well. The result should be a clear set of recommended priorities from operational managers to decision-makers that can improve IA preparedness and response.

### RECOMMENDATION #3

## **INVEST IN SCALABLE DISASTER RISK REDUCTION – TRANSITION NOW FROM RESPONSE TO DRR**

Disaster Risk Reduction is the single most effective intervention that can address the recurring causes and vulnerabilities of the populations in Kenya affected by this crisis. Additional investment, and the delivery of DRR programming, is essential to break the cycle of chronic vulnerability that subjects many Kenyan communities to the effects of recurring crises situations.

Bridging the gap that often divides IA humanitarian response programming and development oriented DRR programming is therefore essential, and should be prioritized by IA leadership now and into the future.

It is important as well that these DRR interventions be designed and implemented with the ability to scale up or scale down according the humanitarian context. Community based DRR programs can be

designed so as to allow for increased resource allocation, particularly through livelihood based approaches, that can serve both a preventive and response function.

For example, in pastoralist communities throughout Kenya there are DRR programs aimed at increasing their resilience to environmental or market shocks. When it is anticipated through early warning that these communities may be placed in a newly vulnerable position due to drought or rising food prices, these existing programs can receive injections of resourcing to either increase the size or geographic scope of the program. By intentionally designing these DRR programs with a scalability function, DRR programs could be more effectively used to both prevent and respond to the next crisis that will invariable arise.

## RECOMMENDATION #4

## **EMPOWER THE GOVERNMENT OF KENYA AS THE LEAD BUT ALSO PROVIDE THE REAL-TIME RESOURCING TO TAKE ON THIS LEAD ROLE**

The Government of Kenya has the lead role in the management of any natural or man-made disaster affecting those people within its borders. It has a certain level of capacity to prepare for and manage emergencies. However, as with any government faced with major humanitarian challenges there are times when its technical and human resourcing capacity simply cannot keep pace with the demands of the crisis.

When it is clear that this is the case, the IA humanitarian community can offer critical technical support. Yet, the technical expertise that the humanitarian community usually mobilizes is almost entirely focused on increasing individual international agency capacity. Significant resourcing is allocated to bring in teams of technical experts, consultants and equipment to the benefit of specific international agencies and their programs in Kenya. However, there is little to zero augmentation of the government's internal capacity for response. The IA humanitarian community approaches how it supports the GoK from the 'outside-in' with programming that is designed to work in collaboration with the GoK instead of working from the 'inside-out' that would include imbedding technical expertise inside the GoK increasing their internal capacity.

There is increasing evidence that augmenting capacity by imbedding additional staffing expertise in key Government of Kenya ministries during an emergency response and in development programming can increase the ability of the GoK to better manage its lead role responsibilities. Imbedded technical support with the GoK in real-time could empower the GoK to better meet its lead role responsibilities in Nairobi and the key areas affected by the crisis. Technical staff provided by the IA community would report to the GoK, work within the GoK structures, and be accountable for assisting the GoK. This could be on a temporary basis to respond to an emerging or existing crisis, or to advance key DRR programming led by the GoK. There is indeed a unique opportunity now to pursue this type of real-time 'inside out' resourcing approach in support of the GoK given the constitutional and administrative changes taking place.



## RECOMMENDATION #5

**REVISE INTER-AGENCY STRATEGIC PLANNING**

The 2011 crisis in Kenya has created a pivot moment for a strategic shift in the way that the IA community works in Kenya. To tie together the IA community and the inter-related recommendations provided previously, there is the need to revise existing strategic planning<sup>1</sup> so that it better demonstrates tangible progress on linking the humanitarian and development aims of the IA community, while also connecting, in more productive ways, the IA community and the GoK. Furthermore, this planning must be linked to rapid, early funding mechanisms that are enabled (as opposed to hindered) by the IA appeal process. With early funding, better analysis, timely decision making and stronger linkages across a continuum

of longer-term planning (beyond one year planning), more substantive advances can be made in responding and preventing future crises while also addressing the underlying vulnerabilities of those most at risk. This revised strategic planning should go beyond the annual planning process, while also remaining connected, so that it captures the strategic longer-term linkages and changes needed to bring about substantive change. If possible, this strategic plan would also be linked to a Regional Horn of Africa strategy aimed at addressing the same vulnerabilities and inadequacies in response prevalent throughout the Horn of Africa.

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1. Existing IA planning includes the Emergency Humanitarian Response Plan 2009-2012 that was updated for 2011-2013.

# 05 ANNEXES

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## ANNEX 1: EVALUATION MATRIX

KEY ISSUES	FINDINGS	RECOMMENDATIONS
<b>SITUATION, CONTEXT, AND NEEDS</b>	<ol style="list-style-type: none"> <li>1. The Horn of Africa crisis in Kenya was caused by drought and much more. It is complex and multi-layered.</li> <li>2. The humanitarian response efforts of the humanitarian community helped to save lives and reduce suffering in response to the crisis.</li> <li>3. Strong short-season rainfall throughout the drought-affected areas of Kenya from October to December 2011 will probably result in an improved food security situation in early 2012.</li> <li>4. It is right to have the government of Kenya (GoK) take the lead in all humanitarian coordination and response. However, the GoK sometimes struggles to effectively manage this responsibility.</li> <li>5. The security environment, particularly in the north eastern border areas with Somalia, remains an increasing challenge for the IA community.</li> <li>6. The humanitarian community struggles to manage the transition from humanitarian relief to development within the disaster response continuum.</li> </ol>	<p><b>Main recommendation:</b> Empower the government of Kenya as the lead but also provide the real-time resourcing to take on this lead role.</p> <p><b>Sub recommendation:</b> Linkages between humanitarian relief interventions and long term development programmes need to be proactively identified and initiated.</p>
<b>STRATEGIC PLANNING, OPERATIONAL PLANNING, AND RESOURCE MOBILIZATION</b>	<ol style="list-style-type: none"> <li>1. Despite good early warning data well in advance, the impetus to act decisively and respond to the crisis was finally driven by the 'CNN effect.' This reactive decision-making approach brought about a perceived lack of UN, IA community and GoK leadership.</li> <li>2. Once calls for emergency international assistance were made to address the crisis, the donor community (national and international) responded with significant resourcing.</li> <li>3. There is a lack of coherent, inclusive and strategic IA planning processes.</li> <li>4. There is a dual threat of staff-turnover and staff entrenchment within humanitarian agencies.</li> </ol>	<p><b>Main recommendations:</b> Invest in scalable disaster risk reduction – transition now from response to DRR.</p> <p><b>Sub recommendation:</b> Encourage future multi-sector assessment teams to be comprised of a broader range of sectors</p>

KEY ISSUES	FINDINGS	RECOMMENDATIONS
<p><b>COORDINATION AND CONNECTEDNESS</b></p>	<ol style="list-style-type: none"> <li>1. Inter-sector coordination is working reasonably well, ensuring operational coordination and communication, and reducing duplication. Individual sector level coordination however is inconsistent with some sectors performing better than others.</li> <li>2. Many non-traditional humanitarian agencies are marginalized within IA coordination.</li> <li>3. There is limited beneficiary or host community input into the IA coordination mechanism.</li> <li>4. GoK and IA mechanisms exist for coordination but they require strengthening.</li> <li>5. There is often a disconnect between Nairobi and field operations with ia agencies.</li> <li>6. Coordination skills are missing for many staff who fill key coordination roles what many staff are also double-hatting.</li> </ol>	<p><b>Main recommendations:</b> Coordinated IA community analysis &amp; scenario planning needs to guide transparent decision making.</p> <p><b>Sub recommendations:</b> Efforts to engage faith based organisations and local cbos within the coordination process need to be stepped up. Camp leaders and host community representatives need to be more engaged within the overall planning and implementation processes.</p> <p>Training on coordination skills and performance management of staff in key coordination positions.</p>
<p><b>RESPONSE COVERING THE NEEDS AND SET STANDARDS</b></p>	<ol style="list-style-type: none"> <li>1. Disaster Risk Reduction (DRR) programming areas suffered less than other areas that have no drr programming.</li> <li>2. The nutrition sector is functioning well and a good example for other sectors to follow.</li> <li>3. Emergency food aid injects, once mobilized and distributed to needed communities, had a positive impact on mitigating the effects of the crisis.</li> <li>4. A significant shift to market based programming is in progress. This is both appropriate and needed.</li> <li>5. Coordinated inter agency needs assessments are conducted primarily through the sectors yielding valuable information. Comprehensive multi-sector assessments across all sectors is a gap.</li> <li>6. Coordination and service provision in Dadaab is led by UNHCR and is meeting needs (particularly as related to nutrition and health). Concerns remain regarding service provision in other key sector areas.</li> <li>7. Information management and critical information sharing were sufficient to enable response entities. However, information management tools lack dynamic information sharing functions.</li> </ol>	<p><b>Main recommendations:</b> Invest in scalable disaster risk reduction – transition now from response to DRR.</p> <p><b>Sub recommendation:</b> Encourage future multi-sector assessment teams to be comprised of a broader range of sectors</p>

## ANNEX 2: DETAILED TIMELINE OF THE CRISIS

Date	Event	Source
<b>18-JUN-2010</b>	FSNAU claims that "the overall food security situation outlook is favorable for most livelihoods of Somalia, as a result of good Gu rainfall performance." However, "sustained conflicts in the country continue to be the primary reason of displacement, affecting mainly southern and central parts of Somalia. Civil insecurity has increased food insecurity by disrupting market supply and delivery of humanitarian aid, primarily affecting the urban and internally displaced population (IDP)."	FSNAU
<b>JULY 2010</b>	World Bank suspends Arid Lands Natural Resource Management project (ALRMP2), providing "Reduced livelihood vulnerability, enhanced food security, and improved access to basic services in 28 drought prone arid and semi-arid districts in Kenya" following audit uncovering financial management problems.	WORLD BANK
<b>17-AUG-2010</b>	FEWSNET declares a La Niña event associating it with drier-than-normal conditions during the October–December rainy season in the eastern sector of East Africa. Its impact could include: <ol style="list-style-type: none"> <li>1. Significant February 2011 crop harvest deficits in Southeastern Kenya, Somalia, and northern Tanzania;</li> <li>2. Reduced rangeland resources (water and pasture) in key pastoral areas in the Horn of Africa between October 2010 and March 2011;</li> <li>3. Possible reduction in 2011 long rains agricultural production, depending on the severity of the La Niña event.</li> </ol>	FEWSNET
<b>23-AUG-2010</b>	FEWSNET report claims that a serious humanitarian situation persists in Somalia due to ongoing conflict, continued impacts of the 2007–09 drought, and a host of chronic issues. FEWSNET reports of a steady increase in the number of Somali refugees in the Somali region of Ethiopia and Kenya. The number of Somali refugees arriving in Dadaab refugee camp in Kenya increased by 16 percent in July 2010 compared to July 2009. The latest statistics from UN agencies in Dadaab confirm that weekly arrivals reached their highest level (1,868 people) in 2010 during the second week of August.	FEWSNET
<b>SEPTEMBER 2010</b>	FAO reports that in Eastern Africa countries there are "favorable prospects for 2010 main season crop production." However, it warns that "close monitoring is warranted for the likely occurrence of the La Niña phenomenon that may negatively affect the 2010 October–December short rainy season, particularly in pastoralist areas."	FAO CROPS PROSPECTS AND FOOD SITUATION
<b>20-OCT-2010</b>	FSNGW announces that key members of the FSNWG will convene a meeting in early November to discuss coordinated early response strategies based on the climatic predictions forecasting drier-than-normal conditions during the October–December rainy season of 2010 in the eastern sector of East Africa.	FSNGW



Date	Event	Source
29-OCT-2010	Djibouti drought appeal for October 2010 to October 2011 issued. Request is for US\$ 39 million. Appeal states that only 38% of the 2008 Djibouti drought appeal was funded (US\$ 10.96 million out of US\$ 31.69 requested).	OCHA
2-NOV-2010	FEWSNET predicts lower than average rainfall for the October-December 2010 period in the Eastern Horn. Lists four areas of particular concern (agro pastoral areas of southern and central Somalia, southeast marginal cropping areas of Kenya, cropping areas of Rwanda/Burundi, and pastoral areas of Somalia, North-eastern Kenya, and South-eastern Ethiopia) calling for livelihood support assistance in these at-risk areas to prevent deterioration of food security situation. The most severe food security outcomes, assuming additional assistance is not provided, would be expected in SE Kenya and Somalia, particularly after January/ February, when harvests normally occur.	FEWSNET
4-NOV-2010	FSNAU warns that "multiple risk factors that may easily reverse the fragile improvements in the region (La Niña event, conflicts, etc)."	FSNAU-SOMALIA QUARTERLY BRIEF
8-NOV-2010	FEWSNET predicts above average assistance needs for Somalia and Kenya in May 2011	FEWSNET
NOVEMBER/ DECEMBER 2010	FSNGW develops La Nina task force and calls for pre-emptive responses and coordinated assessments to protect livelihoods	FSNGW
30-NOV-2010	Somalia CAP launched; US\$ 529.5 million requested. Warns that La Niña forecast for early 2011 will likely cause below-average rainfall. States urgent need to consolidate 2010 in order to prepare vulnerable populations for renewed drought.	OCHA
30-NOV-2010	Kenya EHRP launched; US\$ 525.8 million requested. Report states that in most likely scenario, there will be an increase in the refugee population in Dadaab of between 60,000 and 100,000 in 2011. In addition drought-induced food insecurity is expected to worsen. The number of people requiring direct food assistance 1.2 million people may increase as a result of the predicted La Niña phenomenon.	OCHA
DECEMBER 2010	FAO reports that in Eastern Africa countries, "La Niña is a concern and may reverse recent improvements in food security. La Niña conditions are expected to produce below-normal rains in October-March. Low rains already recorded in October-December 2010 have affected the crops planted during the short-rains season in south-central Somalia, southeastern Ethiopia (mainly Somali region and east SNNPR), northern and eastern Kenya and inland Djibouti. Pasture and water conditions in these areas are likely to deteriorate from December 2010 to March 2011, if dry weather conditions persist."	FAO CROPS PROSPECTS AND FOOD SITUATION

Date	Event	Source
13-DEC-2010	FEWSNET predicts above average assistance needs for Somalia and Kenya in June 2011 as well as average assistance needs for Djibouti for the same period	FEWSNET
16-DEC-2010	FSNAU warns of "clear signs of a worsening food security situation in most livelihoods of Somalia, as a result of unusually below average precipitation caused by the La Niña meteorological phenomenon."	FSNAU SOMALIA QUARTERLY BRIEF
31-DEC-2010	World Bank closes ALRMP 2, implementation of successor project termed Adaption to Climate Change in Arid and Semi-Arid Lands (KACCAL) is pending the outcome of the audit and any follow-up measures.	WORLD BANK
31-DEC-2010	Complete failure of October-December rains	FEWSNET
28-JAN-2011	Somalia Support Secretariat Special Meeting, FSNAU issues press release stating that "Somalia is facing a severe water shortage following failure of the short rains also known as Deyr, heightening fears of deepening humanitarian crisis in coming months, a new report shows."	FSNAU PRESS RELEASE
15-FEB-2011	FSNAU reports that "the post Deyr 2010/11 seasonal assessment indicate that the number of people in need of humanitarian assistance in Somalia has increased by 20 percent to 2.4 million. This represents 32 percent of Somalia's 7.5 million people."	FSNAU POST-DEYR SPECIAL BRIEF
23-FEB-2011	FEWSNET reports that ongoing drought and uncertain forecast raise food security concerns in the Horn of Africa. Quotes recent assessments indicating that nearly five million people in the areas of southern Ethiopia, central/southern Somalia, and eastern/northern Kenya will have difficulty meeting basic food and water requirements for survival over the coming months. Calls for the implementation of substantial assistance programs to address current and expected food insecurity, as well as the beginning of large scale contingency planning given that a failure of the March-May rains would result in a major crisis.	FEWSNET
15-MAR-2011	Based on the findings of a multi-agency scenario building process, FEWSNET predicts that the likely poor performance of the March - May rainfall (60% 80% of average) is expected to result in further deterioration in food security. FEWSNET states that current assistance programs are inadequate to mitigate existing and expected food deficits and malnutrition. Expanded multi-sectoral programming should be implemented to address current and expected food insecurity. The development of new strategies to reach affected households in restricted areas is especially critical.	FEWSNET
MARCH 2011	FSNWG reports that overall food security situation remains alarming.	FSNWG MARCH 2011 UPDATE

Date	Event	Source
<b>MARCH 2011</b>	FAO reports, "unfavorable prospects for current second season crops and pasture growth due to drought." States that "food insecurity has significantly increased in the last few months, especially in drought-affected areas of Somalia, Kenya and Ethiopia. The total number of food insecure people in need of humanitarian assistance in the sub region is currently estimated at about 15.3 million people (including 6 million in Sudan, 2.8 million in Ethiopia, 2.4 million each in Kenya and Somalia), about 2 million people more than the previous FAO estimate in December 2010.	FAO CROPS PROSPECTS AND FOOD SITUATION
<b>21-MAR-2011</b>	FEWSNET predicts extreme food insecurity in the Easter Horn of Africa likely due to drought and lack of humanitarian response.	FEWSNET
<b>24-Mar-2011</b>	Short Rains Assessment published	GoK
<b>6-MAY-2011</b>	FEWSNET indicates that conditions in Kenya and Somalia pastoral areas are moving towards 'worst case scenario.' Given the poor rainfall progress, the significantly below-normal short- and medium-term rainfall forecasts in north-central and eastern Kenya, and the limited potential for any additional rains to improve conditions in belg areas of Ethiopia, FEWANET calls for expanded programming to be implemented immediately to address current and expected food insecurity, and contingency/response plans to be activated.	FEWSNET
<b>30-MAY-2011</b>	Kenyan government declares drought national disaster.	GoK
<b>7-JUN-2011</b>	FEWSNET reports that March - May rains began late and performed erratically, the second season of significant below average rainfall. Classifies the region, as the most severe food security emergency in the world today, and the current humanitarian response is inadequate to prevent further deterioration. Large-scale emergency assistance is urgently needed across the eastern Horn of Africa in order to save lives, treat acute malnutrition, and prevent further asset losses.	FEWSNET
<b>JUNE 2011</b>	FAO reports that "In Eastern Africa, food insecurity has reached an alarming level in some areas of Djibouti, Ethiopia, Kenya and Somalia due to two consecutive seasons of below-average rainfall which reduced harvests and grazing resources, as well as to escalating food and fuel prices."	FAO CROPS PROSPECTS AND FOOD SITUATION
<b>5-Jul-2011</b>	Long Rains Mid-Season Assessment published	GoK
<b>17-JUL-2011</b>	World Bank publishes forensic audit report of ALRMP 2, revealing fraudulent behavior in 29% of transactions reviewed.	WORLD BANK
<b>20-JUL-2011</b>	Somalia CAP mid-year review issued. Report warns that number of people in need is expected to increase further in the second part of 2011. Revises request from US\$ 529.5 to US\$561.5 million. As of the date of the review, only US\$ 265.3 has been provided (47% of total).	OCHA

Date	Event	Source
20-JUL-2011	Kenya EHRP mid-year review issued. Report states "by the end of May 2011, 53,641 new refugees and asylum seekers had been registered country-wide compared to 27,651 during the same period in 2010. As of 31 May, there were 479,919 refugees in the country." Revises request from US\$ 525.8 million to US\$ 604.8 million. As of the date of the review only US\$283.2 million have been provided (47% of total).	OCHA
20-JUL-2011	Famine in Somalia declared in the Bakool agro pastoral and the lower Shabelle region	FSNAU AND FEWS NET
25-JUL-2011	World Bank Plans \$500 Million Aid For Drought-Hit Horn Of Africa	WORLD BANK
25-JUL-2011	At request of French government FAO convenes an emergency ministerial-level meeting to address deteriorating drought conditions in the Horn of Africa and several other regions worldwide.	FAO
27-JUL-2011	The World Food Programme begins airlifting emergency supplies to Mogadishu.	DAILY TELEGRAPH AUGUST 25
28-JUL-2011	U.N. issues Horn of Africa Drought Appeal increasing the number of affected people to 12 million (a 38% increase from March 2011 figures). Funding request was increased to 2.5 billion USD, of which 1 billion USD had already been provided (for Somalia the request increased from US\$ 561.5 million to US\$ 1.063 billion while for Kenya from US\$ 604.8 million to US\$ 741 million. Requests for Djibouti and Ethiopia are US\$ 33 million and US\$ 644 million respectively).	OCHA
3-AUG-2011	Famine declared in three additional areas of Somalia: the agro pastoral areas of Balcad and Cadale districts of Middle Shabelle, the Afgoye corridor IDP settlement, and the Mogadishu IDP community.	FSNAU AND FEWS NET
11-AUG-2011	FAO follow-up meeting to respond to the deteriorating food situation in the Horn of Africa	FAO
26-AUG-2011	Closing Date Expression of Interest for IA-RTE of The Humanitarian Response to Horn of Africa Drought Crisis.	OCHA
5-SEP-2011	Famine declared in Bay Region of Southern Somalia (6th region of Somalia). An additional 50,000 people in cropping areas of Gedo and Juba and pastoral areas of Bakool face Famine-level food deficits. In total, 4.0 million people are in crisis in Somalia, with 750,000 people at risk of death in the coming four months in the absence of adequate response.	FSNAU AND FEWS NET
8-Sep-2011	Long Rains Assessment published	GoK

Date	Event	Source
24-SEP-2011	World Bank increases support to countries in the Horn from more than \$500million to \$1.88 billion	WORLD BANK
11-NOV-2011	Analysis by FSNAU and FEWS NET confirms that Famine will persist through December 2011 in agro pastoral areas of Middle Shabelle and among Afgoye and Mogadishu IDP populations. Bay, Bakool and Lower Shabelle regions of Somalia reclassified from "Famine/Humanitarian Catastrophe" to "Humanitarian Emergency". Humanitarian needs however still persist, with 250,000 out of a previous 750,000 Somalis still at risk of starvation.	FSNAU AND FEWS NET
25-NOV-2011	Approximately 10,000 out of a total of about 27,000 refugees living in Ifo 2 East camp have been displaced by floods in the month of November	IOM
28-NOV-2011	Al-Shabab bans 16 aid groups from its controlled areas (6 UN agencies, 9 INGOs, and 1 Local NGO).	WASHINGTON POST, NOVEMBER 28
29-NOV-2011	Funding coverage for the appeals for the four drought-affected countries in the Horn of Africa region was: Djibouti Drought Appeal – 57%; Ethiopia Humanitarian Requirements, July-December 2011 – 93%; Ethiopia refugee-related requirements – 58%; Kenya Emergency Humanitarian Response Plan – 70%; Somalia CAP – 80%. The Djibouti and Ethiopia (Humanitarian Requirements) appeals have this week increased by four and 12%, respectively. In total 2.422 billion have been requested and 78% funded (2.07 billion USD).	OCHA



## ANNEX 3: RTE TERMS OF REFERENCE

### 1.0 TERMS OF REFERENCE

#### 1.1 Introduction and Rationale

The Horn of Africa is experiencing the most severe food crisis in the world today. Over 12 million people in Djibouti, Ethiopia, Kenya and Somalia are severely affected and in urgent need of humanitarian aid, and there is no likelihood of this situation improving before the end of 2011. As the humanitarian emergencies in Kenya, Somalia and Ethiopia meet the “automatic trigger” criteria endorsed by IASC Working Group in July 2010, the Emergency Relief Coordinator requested an IASC Real Time Evaluation (IASC RTE) in the Horn of Africa sub-region.

The full IASC RTE of the Horn of Africa will consist of four separate assessment missions that will provide four sets of workshops, and four reports, plus an additional synthesis report. The four different missions will be designed to meet the needs of four target groups; the HCTs, Clusters, Government, Red Cross/Red Crescent, and NGO's involved in the humanitarian response in 1) Somalia, 2) Kenya and 3) Ethiopia and 4) the regional response structure in Nairobi. An evaluation synthesis will highlight common issues and findings across the country and regional level assessments. This approach matches the response structure, and will enable country teams to receive targeted and timely analysis and support to facilitate actions for improved response. A preparatory mission was conducted to refine this ToR, identify key issues and stakeholders, and develop an evaluation plan in consultation with decision makers.

#### 1.2 Objectives and Use

The main objectives of IASC RTEs are to provide real-time feedback to the Humanitarian Country Teams, lesson learning for the future and to seek out the views of affected people on the quality of the response.

The IASC RTE aims to be a light and self-sufficient evaluation (i.e., with a footprint that does not unduly burden the country team) but will nonetheless provides a clear understanding of the key issues and challenges of the response through rigorous evidence-based analysis (triangulation, document analysis, key informant interviews etc.). Based on the assessment of the current situation, the IASC RTE will support the three HCTs and regional fora and mechanisms to develop and agree to clear plans of action to address key coordination problems or operational bottlenecks with the overall aim of enabling a more effective response moving forward. Its purpose is not to substitute for other evaluations that IASC members may conduct for their own purposes.

#### 1.3 Methodology

An IASC RTE is a rapid participatory assessment, conducted during the early stages of a humanitarian operation which almost simultaneously feeds back its findings for immediate use by the broader humanitarian community at the field level. These evaluations differ from other forms of humanitarian evaluation in their speed of mobilization; their narrow scope focusing on inter-agency coordination; a methodological approach that seeks to enhance participation and minimize evaluators' “footprint”; and their emphasis on participatory end-of-mission feedback and remedial action planning by the HCTs.

The applied methods for The RTE shall be light and participatory, yet rigorous enough to lend credibility to its conclusions and recommendations. The evaluation will be

carried out through analyses of various sources of information including desk reviews; field visits where possible; interviews with key stakeholders (affected population, UN, I/NGOs, donors, governments); systematic analysis of remotely gathered data (documentary evidence, monitoring data where available); and through cross-validation of data<sup>1</sup>. The country and regional level analysis will also consider, as relevant, operational support to refugee and IDP camps, and the linkages with country, regional and corporate levels. While maintaining independence, the evaluation will seek the views of all parties, including the affected population. Evaluation teams will serve as 'facilitators', and as critical friends to the HCT, encouraging and assisting field personnel, both individually and collectively, to look critically at their operations and find creative solutions to problems.

The focus of analysis and learning will be on the ongoing country-level responses in Kenya, Somalia and Ethiopia, and the functioning of the different regional fora and mechanisms in Nairobi. An evaluation team will be deployed to each affected country and facilitate a series of workshops with stakeholders as appropriate. These workshops will support country team learning and help initiate follow-up and needed corrective actions. A matrix of findings, conclusions and recommendations will be shared with the HCT prior to the workshops.

#### 1.4 Focus and Key Issues

The major thrust of the IASC RTE will be its focus on the effectiveness and efficiency of the coordination and management systems, and addressing critical issues related to both the provision of relief and to the transition to recovery. As noted above, it will broadly define inter-agency collaboration to include established formal coordination structures (e.g., the cluster system) as well as other forms of coordination, such as coordination in the refugee camps, formal and informal programmatic coordination, coordination

across HCTs in the region, communication in the early warning systems in this slow-onset crisis, joint needs assessments as the foundation for the response, regional coordination by way of the Regional Humanitarian Partnership Team (RHPT), and other areas of collaboration.

The IASC RTE Evaluation framework displays crucial characteristics of an 'ideal humanitarian response', and is available at <http://onerresponse.info/Coordination/IARTE>. It serves as a communication tool between all stakeholders and can therefore be referred to as a means of developing relevant findings and recommendations. In-country consultations were held as part of the ToR finalization process for each country, and there is also some scope to focus in on the priority areas of the framework based on inputs from the in-country Advisory Group. Emerging out of the IA RTE framework is a series of generic evaluation questions that can be tailored to address the specific context of the present crisis in the Horn of Africa subsequent to the aforementioned scoping mission. The specific key issues that each part of this IASC RTE will address have been agreed to with the relevant HCT and stakeholders and are attached as separate annexes for Kenya, Somalia, Ethiopia and regional issues.

1. In order to support the consultant team, members of the Evaluation Management Group have agreed to gather information relevant to the main questions: e.g. Situation Reports, description of cluster and camp coordination arrangements, description of agency response arrangements, main contact lists of key humanitarian stakeholders, any existing monitoring data or evaluative reports, key communications, etc.

The generic questions to be addressed in each national context are the following:

### Situation, Context and Needs

- ⦿ What were the main (security or other) events which hampered the response?
- ⦿ What parts of the affected populations benefitted from humanitarian assistance?
- ⦿ Have coordinated assessments of the needs of all parts of the populations, men and boys, women and girls and vulnerable groups been performed?

### Specific questions:

- ⦿ Has a common needs assessment and analysis been carried out and if yes / by whom, has it been used in planning and response?
- ⦿ What proportions of the affected population could be assisted? Who was excluded, and what were the key barriers to full access? Has humanitarian assistance been impartial, i.e., based strictly according to needs?
- ⦿ How was the early warning system used? Did donors allocate funding, and did agencies respond to take pre-emptive action?
- ⦿ What critical factors (e.g., security events, infrastructure, procedures, access, enabling environment, etc.) help explain why the response was or was not delivered in an adequate and timely manner? In insecure operating environments, how has this affected humanitarian responsibilities to uphold strict neutrality, i.e., to ensure that humanitarian action does not have the appearance of favoring any party to a conflict?
- ⦿ How far has the humanitarian response been tailored to meet national and local needs and ensure ownership at these levels by, and accountability to, affected populations? What measures are in place to ensure transparency in humanitarian action?
- ⦿ To what extent have the needs of all segments of the population, men and boys, women and girls and vulnerable groups been assessed and the response tailored to the differential needs of the specific subpopulations? Do

the assessment mission reports and related strategies reflect such discussions with all segments of the population?

- ⦿ Have the identification of humanitarian priorities been based on sex/age disaggregated data and gender analysis of these data, and other key drivers of marginalization, including by livelihood system or ethnic affiliation?
- ⦿ Has information about the humanitarian response been communicated in a manner that is widely accessible to the affected people in the region of the Horn of Africa? Are feedback mechanisms in place that link beneficiary concerns to adaptations in humanitarian strategies/approaches?

### Strategic and operational planning and resource mobilization

#### Overarching question:

- ⦿ Have relevant, prioritized, inclusive and appropriate strategic and response plans been developed in a timely way and based on analysis of the common needs assessment at all levels?
- ⦿ Were the appeals issued in a timely way and responded to?

#### Specific questions:

- ⦿ How effective has the overall inter-agency planning and management process been?
- ⦿ How timely, relevant and coherently inter-linked have the various appeals, strategies and operation plans been?
- ⦿ To what extent have these been based on an inclusive, prioritized and coordinated needs assessment and analysis that reflects the views of various international and national stakeholders, including government, civil society organizations and affected populations (including socially excluded groups and groups and individuals vulnerable to human rights violations due to discrimination and stigma)?
- ⦿ How adequately has the political, economic and security dimensions of the country and regional context been considered in assessments, planning and provision of

assistance, protection and transitions to early recovery efforts?

- How sufficient have funding flows been, both in quantity and timeliness, so as to allow humanitarian actors to respond effectively to both humanitarian and time-critical early recovery needs?
- Was there any meaningful presence of gender expertise to inform the planning processes? Was there funding for activities to enhance capacity for integrating gender equality in strategies and programs?

### Coordination and Connectedness

#### Overarching questions:

- Has an inclusive and well-managed coordination system been established/ strengthened early on, including with the national (federal, provincial, district level) actors, the military and all other relevant stakeholders?
- Were activities planned in support to pre-existing response plans, structures and capacities?
- Have local capacities been involved, used and strengthened and have partnerships with civil society organizations been built-up?
- Was the coordination system supported by an efficient communication and information management system (e.g., enhancing information flow within the field, between field and HQs)?
- How adequately have cross-cutting issues be dealt with in all aspects of the response and in all clusters/ sectors?

#### Specific questions:

- In what ways, if any, has the cluster approach led to a more strategic response in terms of predictable leadership, partnership, cohesiveness and accountability?
- How effective has inter-cluster coordination been (with specific focus on cross cutting issues, cash/voucher transfer schemes, Protection and Early Recovery)?

- How effectively has the humanitarian community coordinated the response with the Government (at federal, provincial and district level) and the national military force?
- In what ways, if any, has the government's leadership capacity been strengthened as it has the primary responsibility to respond to its people's needs?
- In what ways, if any, have national and local capacities been capitalized on and strengthened (e.g., in needs assessments)?
- In areas of protracted crisis, how do we ensure that the response supports, rather than undermines, community resilience?
- How effectively have cross-cutting issues been addressed in the cluster response? Was there a network to ensure information sharing and gap filling on cross-cutting issues across programs and sectors?
- Has statistical evidence been gathered disaggregated by sex and age and other key markers of social distinction influencing patterns of risk and vulnerability?

### Response covering the needs and set standards

#### Overarching question:

- What were the main operational results, and the positive and negative outcomes for all segments of the affected population, during each phase?
- Have critical gaps and issues been identified and addressed in a timely way system-wide and by each Cluster?
- Have appropriate common standards been adapted/applied within the coordination systems (globally and for each Cluster) and to what degree have these been met?

#### Specific questions:

- How timely and successful is the humanitarian response in delivering against stated objectives/indicators (as per cluster work plans at the global and the country level, individual agencies' articulated benchmarks)?
- Have the Clusters been instrumental in identifying and addressing critical gaps early on?

- ⦿ What segments of the affected population could and could not be assisted, and why?
- ⦿ What is the humanitarian system's level of commitment and compliance to national standards as well as international standards (such as SPHERE, INEE, LEGS, some subset of the Core Commitments for Children in Humanitarian Action, HAP 2007 Standard in Humanitarian Accountability and Quality Management (and as updated 2011), Code of Conduct for the International Red Cross and Red Crescent Movement and NGOs in Disaster Relief, guidance on civil-military relations and protected humanitarian space and on gender equality)?
- ⦿ Additional questions and key issues raised during the Evaluation Preparatory Mission are listed as an annex to the Terms of Reference.

### 1.5 Management Arrangements

The IASC RTE will be overseen by the evaluation Management Group (MG) established on a voluntary basis from members of the IASC IA RTE Steering Group.<sup>2</sup> In-Country Advisory Groups will be established to provide feedback and advice to the evaluation team during the planning phase and the evaluation mission. Members will attend the workshops, review and provide input on draft reports, and help coordinate the follow up process and monitoring of action plans.

2. The MG is chaired by OCHA and composed of evaluation managers from UNICEF, UNHCR, the International Rescue Committee (representing the International Council of Voluntary Agencies), Oxfam, WFP, FAO and CARE (representing the Emergency Capacity Building Project). On an ad-hoc basis, heads of evaluation may join EMG meetings, as necessary.

### 1.6 Evaluation Team, Reporting Requirements and Deliverables

The services of independent consultant company/ research institutes will be sought to undertake different components of the evaluation. The first seven deliverables are relevant to the assessments in Kenya, Somalia and Ethiopia, and the regional level, and the last deliverable highlights the evaluation synthesis.

1. Field visits to the affected country to gather information and evidence on issues described in this ToR. Field visits will take place over a 3-week period.
2. A matrix of findings, conclusions and recommendations.
3. Presentations and lessons-learnt workshops to HCT in each affected country and the regional level, as appropriate. The workshops are considered, together with the final evaluation report, as the primary output of the evaluation. The purpose of the workshops is to present and discuss findings, conclusions and recommendations and reformulate them if necessary and to identify key actors and timelines to responds to these recommendations.
4. An outcome summary (2-5 pages) of workshops (one week after workshops). A draft IASC RTE report (2 weeks after workshops).
5. A final IASC RTE report containing an executive summary of less than 2,000 words and a main text of less than 10,000 words, both inclusive of clear and concise recommendations. Annexes should include a list of interviewees, bibliography, a description of method(s) employed, and any other relevant materials. (1 week after final stakeholder comments on draft report).
6. A matrix outlining comments received to the draft evaluation report, whether they were accepted, partially accepted or rejected, and the rationale for that decision.
7. Synthesis Report
8. A synthesis report will be prepared containing an executive summary of no more than 2,000 words and a main text of no more than 10,000 words. The synthesis will be based on the



country and regional level reports, and will highlight the key issues and findings relevant to both the response in the Horn of Africa and the broader humanitarian community.

### **1.7 Duration of Evaluation and Tentative Timeplan**

A planning mission was conducted to Nairobi, October 31-November 6 and Addis Ababa, November 6-November 10. The itinerary for each part of the IASC RTE is included in the annexes.

### **1.8 Additional key issues and feedback for Kenya IASC RTE**

#### **Strategic**

Does the HCT have a cohesive vision and strategy and to what extent does the HCT address areas of overlapping mandates and activities between UN agencies?

#### **Government engagement**

To what extent is the government engaged in the co-ordination system, and does the UN effectively encourage and support government involvement?

#### **Sub-national Coordination**

Have appropriate sub-national coordination capacities and mechanisms been established in the field, and how effective are sub national co-ordination arrangements?

**How are non-IASC partners supported** to engage with the IASC and government partners to support effective coordination?

#### **Camp Coordination**

Are the coordination mechanisms for refugees and host communities in and around Dadaab appropriate and effective? How can the UN and partners support the government to increase its support to refugees and host communities?

#### **Information Management**

Are reporting formats appropriate and sufficiently linked? How effective are the co-ordination mechanisms around information sharing?

#### **Advocacy**

To what extent do all actors have access to the critical information they require to do effective humanitarian advocacy?

#### **Security**

How do security concerns affect co-ordination systems in the camps? Are opportunities for expanding humanitarian space used effectively? How effective are the co-ordination systems and contingency planning mechanisms?

#### **Regional link**

To what extent is there a strong link between the national responses and the regional fora and mechanisms?

## ANNEX 4: IMPLEMENTATION PLAN

Tasks	Owner	Start Date	Due Date
<b>Overview</b>		<b>26-Aug-11</b>	<b>11-Mar-12</b>
<b>1 Start-Up</b>		<b>26-Aug-11</b>	<b>15-Nov-11</b>
1.1 Proposal Submitted	GEG	26-Aug-11	26-Aug-11
1.2 Proposal Review by Client	OCHA	27-Aug-11	15-Nov-11
1.3 Contract Accepted and Signed	OCHA/GEG	14-Nov-11	14-Nov-11
<b>2 Phase I: Planning &amp; Field Deployment</b>		<b>24-Oct-11</b>	<b>25-Nov-11</b>
2.1 Planning Mission to Kenya (Nairobi)	GEG/OCHA	24-Oct-11	28-Oct-11
2.2 Administrative Set-Up for Field Mission	GEG	15-Nov-11	21-Nov-11
2.3 Desk Review: Compile & Review Existing Materials	GEG/OCHA	15-Nov-11	25-Nov-11
2.4 Identify Key Internal and External Stakeholders	OCHA	15-Nov-11	25-Nov-11
2.5 Design Methodology and Tools	GEG	15-Nov-11	25-Nov-11
2.6 Full RTE Team Travel to Kenya (Nairobi)	GEG	19-Nov-11	19-Nov-11
<b>2.7 M1: Implementation Plan Submitted</b>	<b>GEG</b>	<b>25-Nov-11</b>	<b>25-Nov-11</b>
<b>3 Phase II: Data Collection &amp; Workshops</b>		<b>20-Nov-11</b>	<b>15-Dec-11</b>
3.1 Meetings/Interviews with Advisory Group and Key Stakeholders in Nairobi	GEG	20-Nov-11	8-Dec-11
3.2 Field Interviews & Workshops Kenya (Dadaab & Turkana)	GEG	28-Nov-11	4-Dec-11
3.3 Initial Findings & Nairobi Workshops Preparation	GEG	1-Dec-11	6-Dec-11
3.4 Nairobi Workshop (Kenya)	GEG	8-Dec-11	9-Dec-11
3.5 Revise Findings and Present	GEG	9-Dec-11	9-Dec-11
3.6 Flight Departures from Nairobi	GEG	9-Dec-11	9-Dec-11
<b>3.7 M2: Outcome Summary of Workshops with Draft Findings</b>	<b>GEG</b>	<b>15-Dec-11</b>	<b>15-Dec-11</b>
<b>4 Phase III: Final Reports</b>		<b>16-Dec-11</b>	<b>11-Mar-12</b>
4.1 Draft Final IASC RTE Report	GEG	16-Dec-11	1-Feb-12
4.2 Review and Feedback Provided by RTE Management Group	Management Group	1-Feb-12	10-Feb-12
4.3 Incorporate RTE Management Group Feedback	GEG	11-Feb-12	14-Feb-12
4.4 Review and Feedback Provided by Wider IA Community	OCHA	15-Feb-12	7-Mar-12
4.5 Incorporate Wider IA Community Feedback	GEG	8-Mar-12	11-Mar-12
<b>4.6 M3: Final Reports Submitted &amp; Approved</b>	<b>GEG</b>	<b>11-Mar-12</b>	<b>11-Mar-12</b>



## ANNEX 5: LIST OF PERSONS MET/INTERVIEWED & WORKSHOP PARTICIPANTS

### KEY STAKEHOLDERS INTERVIEW LISTING

NAME	ORGANIZATION
1. Ben Parker	OCHA
2. Patrick Lavandhomme	OCtHA
3. Gabriella Waaijman	OCHA
4. Lucy Dickinson	OCHA
5. Mbaye Diouf	UNDSS
6. Martin Notley	UNDSS
7. Stanlake Samkange	WFP
8. Roderick Charters	FAO
9. David Otiengo Obong'o	FAO
10. Aeneus Chuma	UNDP/HC Kenya
11. Mark Bowden	HC Somalia
12. Ann Kristen Brunborg	UNHCR
13. Megan Gilgan	UNICEF
14. Elhadj As Sy	UNICEF
15. Elke Wisch	UNICEF
16. Killian Kleinschmidt	UNHCR
17. Lore Ikovac	IOM
18. Pippa Bradford	WFP
19. Jordi Vila	WFP
20. James Teprey	WHO
21. Stuart Kuffor	UNDP
22. Philippe Royan	EC
23. James Oduer	GoK - Arid Lands Resource Management Project
24. Koitamet Olekina	GoK - Crisis Response Center
25. Nick Cox	USAID
26. Denise Gordon	USAID
27. David Coddington	USAID
28. Christophe Leudie	ICRC
29. Maxine Clayton	IFRC
30. Teresa Kamara	People in Aid
31. Maria Kiani	HAP
32. Gregory Gleed	HAP
33. Abdurahman Sharif	Muslim Charities Forum
34. Nasr Muflahi	Islamic Relief
35. Stanley Kimani	Islamic Relief
36. Hany El Banna	Islamic Relief

37.	Fauz Qureish	Ummah Foundation
38.	Musa Wekesa	Ummah Foundation
39.	Ellas Kamau	Workd Concern
40.	Michael Adams	CARE
41.	Francis Lacasse	OXFAM
42.	Tom White	Horn Relief
43.	Alexander Matheou	IFRC
44.	Chris Porter	DFID
45.	John Watt	DFID
46.	Francis Nganda	NRC
47.	Mahadi	KRCS
48.	James Mwangi	KRCS
49.	Haron Komen	GoK - Dept of Refugee Affairs
50.	Sinead Murray	IRC
51.	Mararo Lilian	RRDO
52.	Araman Misa	Samaritans Purse
53.	Geoffrey	GoK - Disaster Management Officer
54.	Philip Acmun	OXFAM
55.	Tony	Catholic Church (Turkana)
56.	Sally Burrows	WFP
57.	Steve Dennis	NRC
58.	Matthew Croucher	Save the Children
59.	Nathan Belete	World Bank
60.	Glenn Hughson	CaLP
61.	Melonee Douglas	PRM
62.	Wojciech Dabrowka	UNOCHA
63.	Yves Horent	ECHO

**KENYA REAL TIME EVALUATION WORKSHOP // Dec 8, 2011**

NAME	ORGANIZATION
1. Greet de jong	NETHERLANDS EMBASSY
2. Solo wgarimon	AUSAID
3. Njoki Kinyanjui	GENCAP/UN WOMEN
4. Lore Ikovac	IOM
5. Fatma Said	IOM
6. Teresa Kamara	PEOPLE IN AID
7. Caterina Pino	OCHA
8. Kilian kleinschmit	UNHCR
9. Massimo Nioovetti Altimari	ECB
10. Gregory Gleed	JSI
11. Paul O' Hagan	JSI
12. Tamsin Scurfield	WORLD COMCERN
13. Lucus Mukinson	OCHA
14. Ben Henson	WESCOORD/WASH
15. Yvonne Forsen	WFP
16. Pauline Ballaman	OXFAM GB
17. Gerry W Cartthy	PFM
18. DR. Thomas Ogaro	WHO/EHA
19. Denise Gordon	USAID/OFDA
20. Ann Kristin Brunborg	UNHCR
21. Zipporah Gathiti	UNFPA
22. Sally Gregory	DFID
23. Vincent Matiolo	GOK MINISTRY OF SPECIAL PROGRAMMES
24. James Odour	MDONKOAL

**TURKANA REAL TIME EVALUATION WORKSHOP // Dec 2, 2011**

NAME	ORGANIZATION
1. Philip Aemun	OXFAM
2. Michael Ameripus	VSF.B
3. Elizabeth Nabutola	WFP
4. Elaine Jepsen	UNOCHA
5. Magret Gwada	UNICEF
6. Mark E. Lokaito	ALRMP
7. Goeffrey E. Kaituko	MDNKOLS
8. Hassan D. Elmi	WHO/EHAt
9. Jacob E. Lotesiro	MOLD



**DADAAB REAL TIME EVALUATION WORKSHOP // Nov 29, 2011**

NAME	ORGANIZATION
1. Charles Egambi	WFP
2. Wojciech Dabrowha	UNOCHA
3. Alieu Sannoh	CVT
4. Joseph Musyoka	WTK
5. Faith Adu	AVSI
6. James Mwangi	RRDO
7. Emma Karuri	
8. Flora Awiti	
9. Jane Gombe	
10. Weire Bichangu	
11. Martin Gichuru	
12. Noah O' Hora	GOAL
13. M.Nandawale	OXFAM
14. Michael Adams	CARE
15. Bintu Jabbie Koroma	GIZ
16. Dominic Bartsch	HCR
17. Goerge Francis Iwa	NRC
18. Mahdi Mohammed	KRCS
19. Peter Briggs	CRS
20. Francis Kidake	UNICEF
21. Hussein K Golicha	UNICEF
22. Moses Mukhwana	LWF
23. Fafa Attidzah	UNHCR

**DADAAB UNHCR FOCUS GROUP MEETING // Nov 28, 2011**

NAME	ORGANIZATION
1. Robert Ikoha	UNHCR
2. Michael Makove	UNHCR
3. Jackson Karugu	UNHCR
4. Fafa Attidzah	UNHCR
5. Abubakar Jallom	UNHCR
6. Henok Ocholla	UNHCR
7. Josephine Ndayizigiye	UNHCR
8. Salam Shahin	UNHCR
9. Gloria Kisia	UNHCR
10. Edward Gathurai	UNHCR
11. Sonia Aguilar	UNHCR
12. Nicholas Midiwo	UNHCR
13. David Magolo	UNHCR

**TURKANA HEADS OF UN AGENCIES FOCUS GROUP MEETING // Dec 2, 2011**

<b>NAME</b>	<b>ORGANIZATION</b>
1. Hassan D Elmi	WHO/EHA
2. Elaine Jepsen	OCHA
3. Elizabeth Nabutola	WFP
4. Abukar Madoobe	UNICEF
5. Edward Katondo	UNICEF
6. Margaret Gwada	UNICEF
7. Joyce Emankor	UNICEF
8. Jimmy Greene	UNICEF

**DADAAB CAMP BENEFICIARY FOCUS GROUP MEETING // Nov 28, 2011**

<b>NAME</b>	<b>ORGANIZATION</b>
1. Hodan Harun Nasib	IFO1
2. Shukri Kariyow Mohamed	IFO2
3. Shukri Abdi Ilmi	KAMBIOS
4. Hassan Osman Mohammed	HAGADERA YOUTH
5. Hassan Yusuf Mohamud	HAGADERA YOUTH
6. Amiin Mohamed Hilowle	KAMBIOS CHAIRPERSON
7. Alexis Nduwimana	IFO
8. Dahir Mohamed Ali	HAGADERA OGADEN
9. Ojulu Odommi Aballa	HAGADERA GAMBELLA
10. Peter Atem Nyuon	IFO
11. Adan Ibrahim Diriyé	IFO
12. Wali Adan Mohamed	IFO YOUTH CHAIRPERSON
13. Bilay Mohamed Jama	HAGADERA CHAIRLADY
14. Kusow Abdi Nuni	HAGADERA CHAIRPERSON
15. Abdfatah Ahmed Ismail	DAGAHLEY CHAIRPERSON
16. Abdi Maalim Mohamed	DAGAHLEY CPST CHAIRPERSON
17. Habibo Abdirahman Mursal	DAGAHLEY YOUTH CHAIRLADY
18. Halimo Dahir Mohamud	DAGAHLEY CPST CHAIRLADY

**DADAAB CAMP BENEFICIARY FOCUS GROUP MEETING // Nov 28, 2011**

<b>NAME</b>	<b>ORGANIZATION</b>
1. Michael Ameripus	VSF.B
2. Elizabeth Nabutola	WFP
3. Elaine Jepsen	OCHA
4. Mark E. Lokaito	ALRMP
5. Goeffrey E. Kaituko	MDNKOLS
6. Hassan D. Elmi	WHO/EHA
7. C.L Ajele	GoK - Ministry of Livestock
8. Okita B	MOA
9. Raphael Khaemba	MOA
10. Joseph Losuru	DLMC
11. Flora K. Kyondo	Kenya Red Cross
12. Iris Mariaio	UNICEF
13. Everu Benedist	TUPADO
14. Jillo Bonaya	WVK
15. Tobias A. Barasa	GoK - Water Department
16. David K. Koskei	GoK - Water Department
17. Benson L. Akol	MOCD&M (cooperative)
18. Samuel Njalale	MOLD
19. Theresa Fovo	IRC
20. Benjamin Barrows	IRC
21. Christopher Eregae	CHILDFUND
22. Haron. Ateh	DOL
23. Vinson Ekai	CHILDFUND
24. Oliver Otsimi	World Relief

# ANNEX 6: INTERVIEW GUIDE

## HORN RTE INTERVIEW GUIDE

1. Respondent's name:
2. Respondent's title & function:
3. Interviewer's name(s):
4. Date:
5. Location:

<b>Opening</b>	1. What is the role of your organization in the humanitarian response? What is your specific role within your organization
<b>Situational Context</b>	2. What have been key issues and achievements within your response context?
	3. How effective has been the overall inter-agency response?
<b>Coordination &amp; Connectedness</b>	4. Which coordination mechanisms are you a part of?
	5. Are the coordination mechanisms achieving their purpose?
	6. Are joint humanitarian assessments being conducted? To what extent is that information leading programming decisions?
	7. What clusters are working well? Why is that the case?
	8. What clusters have not working? Why is that the case?
	9. To what extent are cross-cutting issues being addressed in the clusters you are involved with? How are gender, protection and security issues in particular being addressed?
	10. To what extent are national authorities (federal, provincial or local level) contributing substantively to humanitarian coordination? Why is that the case?
	11. To what extent is the Humanitarian Country Team (HCT) providing cohesive leadership?
	12. What is the level of involvement of the local community in humanitarian coordination? How have you observed that the humanitarian response is building local community resilience and reducing vulnerability?
	13. How useful, accessible and reliable is the information management (and reporting) function within this operation?
	14. Are we connecting the relief to recovery to developmental tracks? (twin tracks, transition)

<b>Needs &amp; Standards</b>	15. What humanitarian needs do you believe that the humanitarian community is meeting best for beneficiary populations?
	16. What humanitarian needs do you think that the humanitarian community is not addressing that it should be?
	17. What is the humanitarian community's ability to adjust to critical emerging needs in a timely manner? (Addressing host community needs?)
	18. What mechanisms or good practices are in place for humanitarian accountability to beneficiaries?
	19. Planning & Resource Mobilisation
	20. What are the strengths and weaknesses to the appeal process? How open is it?
	21. Which humanitarian funding mechanisms are most useful? CAP? CERF? ERRF & HRF? How has the HCT engaged with the donors effectively?
	22. To what extent was contingency planning and early warning incorporated into the response?
	23. What are the strengths and weaknesses to the strategic & operational planning processes?
<b>Solutions &amp; Closing</b>	24. What possible solutions/changes can you offer to improve the humanitarian coordination and response?
	25. Is there any other relevant information related to the RTE that you would like to provide?

## ANNEX 7: BIBLIOGRAPHY

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