

Second background document for Briefing on the Work of the Joint UNDG/ECHA Working Group on Transition Issues

WORKING GROUP ON TRANSITION ISSUES COUNTRY STUDY -- ANGOLA



April 2003

CHARACTERISTICS -- ANGOLA:

A Forty Years War -- In January 1975, following the collapse of the Salazar Regime, the new government in Portugal signed an agreement with Angola's main nationalist factions--the Popular Movement for the Liberation of Angola (MPLA) and the Union for the Total Independence of Angola (UNITA). The Alvor Agreement provided for a transitional government that included representatives from each group led by a Portuguese High Commissioner. The transitional government would shepherd the country to independence, set for 11 November 1975.

By August the same year, the transitional government had already collapsed. Disagreement between the liberation factions over policy, representation and the apportionment of power led to renewed, but this time, internecine fighting. On 11 November, with no recognized transitional government available, the colonial administration surrendered power to the "people of Angola."¹ The MPLA quickly established control in Luanda and formed an independent government. UNITA returned to the bush to contest MPLA rule through armed conflict. After fifteen years of fighting for liberation, Angolans would endure nearly three unbroken decades of civil war.

In 2002, after several unsuccessful attempts at peace in the 1990's, change came swiftly and unpredictably to Angola. UNITA entered 2002 in a weakened position. A large-scale counterinsurgency campaign by the MPLA and diminished external support had forced UNITA to abandon territorial control and switch to hit-and-run guerilla tactics. Still, with an annual income of nearly US\$ 300 million in the late 90's from diamonds,⁴⁶ UNITA was expected to remain formidable. In March however, MPLA forces ambushed and killed UNITA's leader, Jonas Savimbi. The Black Cockerel, as Savimbi was popularly called, had been the only leader the highly-centralized movement had ever known.

In quick succession UNITA and the government's armed forces agreed to a cease-fire in March, followed by a Memorandum of Understanding in April to fully implement the 1994 Lusaka Protocol--the most recent attempt to bring peace to Angola. By early June nearly 82,000 UNITA soldiers had assembled in 35 quartering areas² awaiting demobilization and reintegration.

Conditions in the Aftermath -- After four decades of unremitting war, Angola entered 2002 as one of the worst places in the world to live, in league with Afghanistan, the DRC and Sierra Leone. According to government reports, 4.0 million people were internally displaced--nearly a third of Angola's total population. Of these, 1.2 million were confirmed IDPs, registered for humanitarian assistance.⁵ In a population increasingly urban, 63% lived below the poverty line--surviving on less than \$1.68 per day. Nearly 25% lived in extreme poverty--a figure double the rate only seven years prior. In rural areas, poverty was even deeper. Sixty percent of rural households relied on unprotected wells for their water. A typical rural household spent nearly three-quarters of its income on food.⁸ As noted in the Common Country Assessment of 2002, most rural households had receded into a demonetized, subsistence economy.


In conditions such as these, life expectancy in Angola is a mere 42 years. Immunization rates are generally lower than elsewhere in sub-Saharan Africa. Mortality rates for mothers and children under five

HEALTH INDICATORS ²¹	
under five mortality	295 per 1,000 live births
maternal mortality	1,850 per 100,000 live births
children under 2 vaccinated against measles	53.4 %
children under 2 vaccinated against polio	63.2 %
children under 2 vaccinated against DPT	33.9 %

are among the highest in the world. Only 6% of women practice birth control and rates of HIV among expectant mothers in Luanda have climbed to 9% in 2001 from only 1% six years prior.²¹

Most alarming about many of these figures is that they are likely to understate the misery wrought by the conflicts. Prior to Savimbi's death and the détente that ensued, humanitarian agencies had access to only a fraction of Angola due to widespread insecurity and the presence of an estimated 6 million mines. The survey results are based, for the most part, on data from the accessible areas.


In the wake of the MOU, humanitarian agencies launched a Rapid Assessment of Critical Needs (RACN). In the newly accessible areas, agencies encountered conditions even more critical than the situation prevailing elsewhere in the country. In vast portions of the Planalto and the interior, heavy fighting had occurred throughout the closing period of the war. The government's counter-insurgency campaign had uprooted populations and destroyed crops. UNITA had conscripted whole villages and marched them into the bush to work as porters, cooks and soldiers. As a result of the intense warfare, agencies found more than 70% of the population at risk of food insecurity.



taken from 2003 CAP

Nearly 25% were already severely to moderately malnourished. Only 5 people in 100 had access to safe drinking water. In many areas crude mortality rates had reached emergency levels.⁴¹

Return -- To this backdrop of massive need, massive migration was quickly added. Between the end of hostilities and the end of August 2002, as many as 430,000 IDPs returned to their areas of origin.³⁷ In early September, the rate of return increased sharply, reaching 10,000 persons per day--a tempo reminiscent of the displacement rates at the height of the counterinsurgency campaign.



from OCHA Angola's Quarterly Analysis Aug to Oct 2003

In humanitarian terms, the period following the peace was much like the period preceding it.¹⁰ Although many IDPs returned voluntarily to prepare land for the planting season, many others were encouraged to resettle by promises of future assistance or because authorities planned to cut off aid in their current residences.³⁷

By the end of the year, nearly 1.3 million IDPs had returned to areas of origin, principally in the Planalto and other regions of the interior. At the same time, the government estimates that 120,000 Angolan refugees had spontaneously returned to border provinces.¹⁶ Of the IDPs that have gone home, an estimated 70% have returned to areas without any form of assistance from local authorities or humanitarian organizations. They remain at risk due to limited access, lack of agricultural inputs and inadequate infrastructure.³⁸

Wealth -- Remarkably, the inadequate conditions and alarming human indicators exist in a country with growing oil reserves that received substantial foreign investment even during the war. Oil contributes 54% of GDP and nearly 80% of government revenues. Between 1997 and 2001 however, only 8% of these revenues were spent on education and health. By comparison, the other 14 members of the Southern African Development Community spent 16.7% on these sectors. In addition, despite its majority share of GDP and revenues, the oil sector is estimated to contribute little more than 10,000 jobs to the Angolan economy. Thus far, the oil economy has been of benefit mainly to a small portion of the urban population. As noted in the recent Common Country Assessment, the richest 10% of Angola received the same share of income in 2000, as the bottom 80%. The disparity is growing. In 1995, the richest 10% accounted for 32% of total household expenditure in Angola. By 2002, this had risen to 42%.⁸

In short, forty years of war has rewarded Angola with a shattered infrastructure, weak state administration, massive displacement, large-scale population movement, food insecurity, overwhelmed or absent social services, subsistence agriculture, a mined landscape and a massive imbalance of resources and wealth. Conventional wisdom maintains that it's the emergency that is complex. In Angola, the emergency was simple. It's what comes next that's going to be complex.¹⁴

CHARACTERISTICS -- THE UN SYSTEM:

Political -- The UN has been a major feature of the Angolan context since 1988 when the United Nations Angola Verification Mission (UNAVEM I) was established to observe the withdrawal of Cuban troops. Following the success of UNAVEM I, a series of missions were authorized by the Security Council--each to monitor and facilitate implementation of accords reached by the government and UNITA in 1991 and 1994. The missions so authorized included UNAVEM II, UNAVEM III and MONUA. When the implementation of these accords collapsed in the late 1990's, the political credibility of the UN's political presence was considerably weakened.¹³ In February 1999, MONUA was disbanded and replaced eight months later with a much reduced peacebuilding office under the leadership of a Personal Representative to the SG.

Following the death of Savimbi and the conclusion of the Memorandum of Understanding, the UN's political presence was once again expanded with the creation the United Nations Mission to Angola (UNMA) led by an SRSG. The creation of the mission was not altogether without controversy. The government, some donors and even some agencies favored a more limited role

for the political part of the UN. By resolution 1433 of 2002, UNMA was eventually mandated to assist the parties in concluding the Lusaka Protocol⁴⁴ and to assist the government with elections, promoting human rights, enhancing rule of law, supporting reintegration of demobilized soldiers and promoting economic recovery.⁴²

By early 2003, implementation of the Lusaka Protocol had been completed. Accordingly, in his report of 7 February to the Council, the Secretary General concluded that UNMA had completed its mandated political tasks.⁴³ A decision was therefore made to dissolve the mission and transfer responsibility for the remaining activities envisaged in Resolution 1433 to a strengthened office of the UN Resident Coordinator.

Humanitarian and Development -- Against this backdrop of changing UN political missions, the composition of the UN's humanitarian and developmental arms has been relatively more stable. The usual make-up has prevailed: FAO, UNDP, UNFPA, UNHCR, UNICEF, WFP, and WHO. Coordination has varied, but since 2000 has been supported by the typical arrangement: an RC/HC backstopped by OCHA. In contrast to the occasionally dim view taken in Angola of the UN's political entities, the development and humanitarian actors have been viewed positively.

IFI's -- As for the international financial institutions, recent involvement has been relatively light. Angola has never been involved in any program of support through the International Monetary Fund.¹⁶ Regular visits under the Fund's Articles of Agreement are the most important area of activity to date in Angola. Such missions are usually undertaken in the context of a request to use IMF resources. In the preliminary report⁴⁰ of the most recent Article IV visit, a number of recommendations were made to increase the transparency of government operations. Although not specifically stated in the report, a lack of transparency is frequently cited as one of the most significant barriers to an IMF program of support.

Throughout the 1990's the various elements of the World Bank Group supported or approved 12 projects. In mid-1999, as a result of unstable economic conditions, the resumption of significant fighting, a shrinking portfolio and lack of conditions conducive to new lending, the Bank reduced its Country Office and declined to replace a vacating Resident Representative.⁴⁵

PLANNING -- WHAT'S BEEN DONE:

The 2000, 2001 and 2002 Appeals, Looking Beyond Emergency Assistance During War -- At the time of Savimbi's death, UN agencies were three months into their ninth Consolidated Appeal for Angola. Since its inception in the early 1990's, the Consolidated Appeal has been the principle, if not the only, inter-agency planning tool for the UN system in Angola.

Looking ahead from their vantage points in September 2001, the UN agencies and their partners had identified the status quo as the most likely scenario for 2002. Internal displacement would continue as a result of guerilla and counter-insurgency warfare. Influxes of displaced into provincial centers would increase the number of vulnerable people accessible to international agencies. Territorial access outside provincial capitals would remain restricted. Agencies would continue to support the resettlement of approximately 125,000 displaced persons from transit centers in accordance with the Norms for the Resettlement of Displaced Populations--standards

based on international law and the Angolan constitution that were elaborated by the government with support from OCHA and the humanitarian community. Large-scale return to points of origin was deemed unlikely.⁵

Given this expected scenario--essentially protracted warfare--the UN agencies and their partners formulated a strictly relief-oriented goal for 2002. Humanitarian partners would preserve lives and promote the well-being of vulnerable populations through an integrated, rights-based strategy coordinated under the leadership of the government of Angola.⁵

Despite the solid grounding in emergency action however, the 2002 Consolidated Appeal, like its several predecessors, made significant overtures to other types of activities. In their most likely scenario for 2002, humanitarian partners predicted that the majority of activities would remain emergency-focused but many would also attempt to promote self-reliance and lay the groundwork for recovery.

In the 2001 Appeal, agencies indicated the humanitarian operation in Angola would be focused, flexible, cost-effective and pragmatic. To achieve this, agencies would maintain “flexible programming capable of meeting the human development needs of populations in either emergency, emergency recovery or transition situations.”⁴

In the Appeal for 2000, agencies stressed that their approach would emphasize the “physical rehabilitation of the most vulnerable population and life-saving assistance where necessary.” It goes on however, to assert that emergency interventions would address “a measure of beneficiary sustainability that will serve as the foundation for future development initiatives.”³

The notion of dealing with, or preparing for, something other than life-saving assistance has been a feature of inter-agency planning in Angola right through the last period of the war--a period often considered among the worst in the forty years of conflict. What is meant by recovery, emergency recovery, transitional situations, sustainability and development initiatives however, is never made precisely clear. Rather, these other states are defined by what they are not; they are not immediate, life-saving assistance. Alternatively, they are characterized as the assistance that comes next, after the emergency assistance, while war continues. Securing access to land, and the provision of seeds and tools are suggested as appropriate activities. In the Appeals for 2001 and 2002, agencies outlined a strategy that entailed resettling IDPs from camps and transit centers to “safe and secure areas, where the establishment of civil administration guarantees the defense of human rights and [where] populations have access to supporting social structures and sustainable livelihoods.”

It does not appear however, that donors were as well convinced of the imperative to do something beyond life-saving assistance. The Consolidated Appeals from 2000, 2001 and 2002 were well funded when compared to the overall mean for each of the three years. When examined by sector however, the typical disparities emerge. Food-assistance programs are among the best funded sectors, followed by health. Overt resettlement and reintegration programs are consistently under-funded. As in other countries, it has been relatively easy to get funding for food during the emergency--the rest has been difficult.¹³

In the immediate aftermath of the ceasefire, planning focused almost exclusively on how to ratchet-up the humanitarian operation to stabilize populations in acute distress. In mid-June, the United Nations issued a Bridging Request appealing to donors for additional funds to continue providing assistance in areas where programs were already underway and to initiate life-saving assistance in newly accessible locations as well as quartering and family reception areas. Planning was operationally focused and carried out through existing coordination mechanisms. Specifically, an Inter-Agency Technical Team coordinated and aggregated provincial-level inputs. The Technical Team is a working-level group chaired by OCHA, comprising staff from the UN agencies and representatives from a consortia of international NGOs working in Angola.

By the time the Bridging Request was issued, initial planning had also started for the return of IDPs to their places of origin. To ensure that return movements were conducted on the basis of agreed standards, the Norms on Resettlement were adapted to ensure that appropriate conditions were in place at return sites. In addition, the annual provincial planning workshop, organized by OCHA and the government, was brought forward from autumn to June. OCHA field officers then worked with provincial authorities to develop Provincial Emergency Plans for Resettlement and Return.⁷

Both the Bridging Request and the provincial planning fed into efforts by the Technical Team to draft the yearly mid-term review of the Consolidated Appeal. The Review, completed in August and released in September, indicated that the strategy for humanitarian agencies until the end of the year would be: to continue the expansion of access to populations in distress, to stabilize these populations through integrated emergency interventions and to support normalization by providing assistance to returnees.⁷

The Mid-Term Review, it should be noted, was not an exercise welcomed by the OCHA team in Angola, the UN agencies or the donor community. Partners on the ground felt the operational planning and appeal for resources in the Bridging Request were sufficient to guide the humanitarian response to the situation in Angola until the elaboration of the Consolidated Appeal for 2003. Pressure to complete a Mid-Term Review came primarily from OCHA headquarters in New York.

Nonetheless, the Mid-Term Review did provide a hint of the thinking that would underlie the UN planning to come for an Angola emerging from war. As stated in the Review, UN agencies and NGOs would be working closely in the coming months to define strategies for:

• revitalizing the family agricultural sector,	• supporting de-mining,
• rebuilding the health-care infrastructure,	• preventing and treating HIV/AIDS;
• getting children back to school,	• repairing infrastructure;
• rebuilding water systems,	• supporting rural electrification; and
• supporting income-generation,	• promoting good governance and administrative reform

The 2003 Appeal, Supporting Normalization -- On 3 September 2002, the UN country team met at the heads-of-agency level to discuss the UN program for 2003. At the meeting, the RC/HC indicated that the UN in Angola would produce an UNDAF. This would be the first for Angola. Given the time needed for drafting and endorsement by executive boards however, an UNDAF would not be ready for use as a planning and organizing framework until the beginning of 2004.

Accordingly, the United Nations would still need a Consolidated Appeal in 2003, though it could very well be the last. Given the need to launch a 2003 Appeal in November however, the team felt there was insufficient time to create a strategy that covered the humanitarian, transition and development program. The transition and development program would require substantial input from the Angolan Government, yet coordination structures needed to obtain appropriate input did not yet exist within the relevant ministries.²⁴ In addition, donors indicated that they would prefer to avoid hybrid documents. The UN country team decided therefore to develop a twelve-month Consolidated Appeal that focused mainly on the humanitarian emergency, resettlement and return, but also included some elements of “early transition.”

In the remainder of the meeting on 3 September, the Country Team brainstormed on the aim, goals, approach, core assumptions and planning scenarios of the appeal. The RC/HC made the point during the ensuing discussion that essentially the team had started to identify those factors that would contribute to, or detract from, the process of normalizing the situation in Angola. The remainder of the meeting focused on returning to normalcy.¹⁸ Factors that could speed normalization included infrastructure repair, an effective poverty reduction strategy, extension of the rule of law, and the rapid integration of vulnerable populations into a development framework. Factors that could slow normalization included the spread of HIV/AIDS and the return of displaced populations that was not in compliance with the Norm--i.e., return to areas that did not offer sustainable conditions, such as access to land and social services.²⁴

Although it was not made explicit in the 2003 Appeal, normalization came to be a basis for the UN’s work in Angola. UN agencies would promote factors that contributed to normalization and attempt to ameliorate those that impeded the process. The government was likely to appreciate the focus on speeding-up normalization. At the same time, it also gave the UN a platform to raise potentially difficult issues. This focus on normalization found echoes within the larger humanitarian community. As noted by IFRC, the country is now emerging from a war economy, with all its related down sides, and has therefore started going through a period of “transition from emergency to normalization.”¹²

Within the overarching framework of supporting normalization, the Inter-Agency Technical Team devised and elaborated the architecture of the Appeal. In a brainstorming meeting on 28 August, the Technical Team had posited the following aims for the 2003 Appeal: provide life-saving assistance, stabilize vulnerable populations, facilitate the expansion and strengthening of state support to social services, lay the groundwork for economic recovery through transition activities, and strengthen local capacities. These aims were roughly grouped into three types of assistance that were expected to prevail in 2003: i.) life-saving, ii.) resettlement and return, and iii.) recovery.²³

To ensure consistency in the Appeal and in the humanitarian operation, members of the Technical Team met again on 3 September to agree on definitions for each type of assistance.²⁵ Life-saving assistance meant those activities aimed at reducing mortality and morbidity and stabilizing populations in acute distress. Resettlement and return referred to activities aimed at promoting and ensuring compliance with the Norms--in other words, activities that helped the government establish sustainable conditions in areas of return, such as activities to promote the revitalization of agriculture or build basic social services. Recovery activities included those efforts that supported national reconciliation, poverty reduction and the strengthening of public institutions.

Five program blocs completed the architecture. Appeals are frequently criticized for being too focused on sectors, with a separate strategy or approach for each which narrows the overall approach of the Appeal. The 2002 Consolidated Appeal for Angola included 13 separate sectors, each with an individual strategy. To achieve a more cohesive, and streamlined program in 2003, the Technical Team recommended the consolidation of sectors into five program blocs.²⁶ Each bloc would develop an integrated response plan that addressed, as appropriate, each of the three types of assistance activities expected in 2003. The objectives of each response plan would have to specifically relate to one or more of the core aims or principles of the Appeal. Any agency or NGO could participate in the elaboration of each bloc's response plan, although specific agencies were asked to take the lead in facilitating planning for specific blocs based on common terms of reference drafted by the Technical Team.²⁷ By 3 September therefore, the overall approach and architecture of the 2003 program for the UN and its humanitarian partners was in place.

			Life Saving Assistance	Resettlement and Return	Recovery Assistance
Food Security	▪ agriculture	▪ food assistance	Lead Facilitator: FAO Support: WFP		
Public Health	▪ health ▪ water	▪ nutrition ▪ sanitation	Lead Facilitator: WHO Support: UNICEF		
Protection	▪ education	▪ protection	Lead Facilitator: HRD* Support: UNICEF		
Public Institutions	▪ good governance ▪ municipal reform	▪ administrative reform	Lead Facilitator: UNDP Support: OCHA		
Access & Coord.	▪ access ▪ communications	▪ coordination ▪ logistics ▪ mine action	Lead Facilitator: OCHA Support: UNDP		

*note: HRD is the Human Rights Division of the United Nations Mission in Angola

adapted from OCHA note for the file³⁰

Before this approach and architecture could be fully implemented however, the Angolan Government began to rethink its support for a Consolidated Appeal.³² At the time, the government was determined to hold a large donor conference in December focused on recovery and development despite tepid donor support. Before any such conference, donors wanted to see an interim PRSP with clear demonstrations of greater fiscal transparency and solid indications of increased government expenditures on social services. After all, Angola--with its oil fields and diamond mines--is not resource poor.¹⁶ In the eyes of the donors, and indeed many others, the end of the war meant it was time to apply revenues from those resources to the needs at hand.

The government however, seemed to feel rather strongly that the West had done much to support the war through support given to various factions. The West now had a moral responsibility to support and pay for reconstruction. Equally, the government seemed to feel that it had won the war. Accordingly, it would decide how to manage its internal affairs. As part of managing its own affairs, it wanted to see planning and resources organized through its donor conference and channeled through its coffers. Resources fed through the CAP were outside its control.¹⁵

A compromise was quickly reached, at least with regard to the Appeal. Both the humanitarian community and donors emphasized to the government that recovery and development activities would not immediately improve the situation in the country. Humanitarian activities on the other hand would continue to stabilize vulnerable populations. Such programs depended on a Consolidated Appeal. In addition, it was noted that donors frequently had separate funding streams for humanitarian and development assistance. As such, humanitarian assistance channeled through the CAP would not necessarily mean less development funding available at the donor conference.

Agreement was reached to issue a Consolidated Appeal that omitted recovery activities and did not include a Public Institutions bloc. In reality however, the changes to the Appeal were not as substantive as appeared. The response plans for the program blocs were already well advanced, including recovery activities. Many of the crucial recovery activities were subsequently woven into the resettlement and return thread of assistance. In addition, a decision had already been taken to move bloc-specific capacity building efforts from the Public Institutions bloc into the remaining four. For example, capacity building of provincial-level services of the agriculture ministry were addressed in the Food Security bloc. In short, it was possible to design activities within the remaining “humanitarian” framework that were still also relevant for recovery.¹⁸

What was lost from the Appeal due to the compromise with the government was more generic efforts to strengthen municipal administration which could in fact slow efficient implementation of activities in other areas of work. The Public Institutions bloc would however resurface. To ensure a degree of complementarity between the Appeal for 2003 and the forthcoming UNDAF, the RC/HC was advocating that the same structure be used in each.¹³ In other words, the program blocs--including Public Institutions--would be maintained after the Appeal and used as a means of elaborating the UNDAF.

The CCA and UNDAF, Addressing What Lies Beneath -- On 8 November and again on 12 December, a facilitator from the UN Development Group led the UN country team, meeting at the heads-of-agency level, through one-day retreats focusing on the UNDAF. In the first, the team reviewed the findings the Common Country Assessment for Angola.³⁵ The CCA for Angola had been completed in June 2002 and released with the endorsement of the UN Country Team shortly thereafter. At the insistence of the team, the CCA looked beyond current conditions and attempted to address and analyze the underlying causes of the conflict. As a result, though it was largely elaborated prior to the death of Savimbi, the CCA nonetheless reflected the post-conflict situation and challenges. It encapsulated the structural problems in the country, their underlying causes and the possible challenges to come.¹⁵

More specifically, the CCA has two main components. In the first, the situation facing Angola’s people is assessed with respect to the civil, political, economic and social rights embodied in international human rights conventions and national law, particularly the Angolan Constitution. It is “an assessment or ‘photograph’ of the situation and identifies the set of rights that will be used as guiding references during development.”¹⁶

The second component is an analysis of the main factors preventing the achievement of the rights outlined. “The analysis stresses that while the end of the war has removed the main causal factor for the emergency, peacetime pushes to the foreground a series of other deep-seated underlying problems that need to be seriously addressed.”¹⁶

The CCA for Angola identified “six major sets of issues or challenges, that should feature prominently in any post-war recovery strategy, along with specific post-conflict measures such as demobilization, the return of IDPs and refugees, and community regeneration.” The challenges identified are:

- reducing urban and rural poverty through policies that promote improved access of the poor to employment, land and other resources;
- responding to the high levels of urbanization and the country’s other demographic problems;
- diversifying the economy away from extreme oil dependence through policies that promote the development of the non-oil sectors;
- rebuilding social sectors with particular emphasis on basic social services;
- mounting of an effective national response to HIV/AIDS; and
- developing political participation and democratic accountability and strengthening public administration.

The Government of Angola has primary responsibility for addressing these challenges by setting an appropriate policy framework, ensuring that appropriate institutional structures are in place, providing leadership and coordination for other actors, and allocating budgetary resources in accordance with well-defined priorities. The proposed Interim Poverty Reduction Strategy Paper (I-PRSP), is a potential vehicle for addressing this responsibility.⁸ The role for the UN is to apply its comparative advantages to support the government as it addresses these challenges. The UNDAF is essentially the parameters and guide for doing so.

In the second of the two UNDAF retreats, the country team began setting its markers. The team elaborated the following draft mission statement. The role of the UN in Angola during the period 2004 to 2008 would be to assist in the creation of an enabling environment for the consolidation of peace and national reconciliation, the promotion of social justice, and the equitable distribution of resources. In addition, the UN would assist in the creation of full participation by supporting the attainment of human rights, national poverty alleviation, sound economic management, diversification, the Millennium Development Goals and empowerment of all Angolans in the development process.³⁶

In the second of the two retreats, the country team also grouped elements of the CCA and elaborated a draft strategic objective for each:

Group	Strategic Objective
Resettlement & Reintegration	To promote sustainable resettlement and reintegration of populations currently receiving humanitarian assistance through integrated rural recovery programs in the Planalto and border provinces.
Peace Building & Democratic Governance	To strengthen the capacity of institutions at all levels to promote the attainment of rights to personal security, physical integrity and full participation and protection.
Rebuilding Social Sectors	To strengthen the nation’s capacity for development and delivery of services and to sustain processes of social empowerment aimed at reducing child and maternal morbidity and mortality, controlling HIV/AIDS and universalizing access to primary education.

Within this architecture, resettlement and reintegration is a mirror of the resettlement and return component of the Consolidated Appeal. When the current Appeal ends on 31 December 2003, its complement of resettlement and return activities--from provision of seeds and tools, to rehabilitation of wells and pumping systems--will be carried on within the context of the UNDAF, or by the government with UN support organized through the UNDAF.

The UNDAF however, is still very much a work in progress. An additional retreat is envisaged for the first quarter of the year that will determine for each objective the contribution of each agency. Each agency will then elaborate a corresponding program. At this point, the program blocs at the heart of the Appeal may be brought back to flesh out objectives. Whatever the process employed, a number of contextual challenges and potential gaps in the UN's planning architecture confront a seamless evolution of UN assistance in Angola.

PLANNING -- REMAINING CHALLENGES:

Building Capacity -- Activities in support of public institutions that have been dropped from the Appeal are to be addressed in 2004 through country programs linked to the UNDAF. In the interim however, how will these programs be supported? Good programming that aims at decentralization and municipal reform are crucial for Angola's transition period.¹⁴ As noted by one NGO that works closely with the UN: "planning at national level is mostly coherent in relation to needs. In practice, the coherence slips at the level of provinces and municipal areas where there are cases of duplication of resources and skills. Now that we are in transition / early recovery, it is absolutely essential that sectoral planning is done increasingly with the active participation of the respective ministries."

The same NGO noted however, that "in Angola, the effective coordination of humanitarian actors by the UN was perceived by national actors, government and NGOs, as exclusive of Angolans."¹¹ During the emergency, there was not a well-defined capacity-building strategy. Activities aiming at reinforcing the capacity of the government were planned and implemented by UN agencies on an ad-hoc basis.

Discussions are now underway on the establishment of a capacity-building working group whose main task will be to develop a coherent strategy. This strategy will focus on several levels, including the provincial and municipal level where state presence is lacking despite the official extension of state administration throughout the country.¹⁶ Nonetheless, dropped from the Appeal and awaiting the UNDAF, how will such capacity building programs be supported?

Residuals -- In addition, what becomes of residual humanitarian needs? Between April and June 2003, it's expected that emergency programs will be needed to assist as many as 450,000 people that have been inaccessible due to the rainy season. This type of punctual emergency will continue to occur in the years to come, requiring the maintenance of a response capacity.³⁹ What part of the UNDAF will address any need for life-saving assistance remaining after the 2003 Appeal? Or will there be a 2004 Appeal with only one column--life saving assistance?

Support -- There is a package of activities such as information management, monitoring, analysis and donor or NGO coordination that are key to managing the transition. Many of these functions are currently carried out by OCHA and funded through the Appeal. At present, UN

agencies do not have the structures or resources to take over the functions that OCHA performs. If the UN wants to effectively manage activities during the transitional period, some of the functions and services currently provided by OCHA will need to be continued.

A recent OCHA mission to review the operation of the office suggested that OCHA should continue its current operations during 2003, while making preparations to drop certain activities from its portfolio and to transfer others to the government. During the first half of 2004, OCHA should then manage an operation that has been reduced in scale and scope. On 1 July 2004, the remaining operations should be then transferred to a “post-conflict” or “transitional coordination” unit in UNDP or the RC’s office. While the RC’s office is the logical place to put a unit dedicated to carrying out the kinds of services OCHA now provides, there do not appear to be precedents for this type of structure.³⁹ Can they be taken on by a Resident Coordinator system that has limited ability to fund raise its activities?

Flexibility -- The UNDAF is not a funding mechanism. It is essentially a statement of intent with activities organized and funded through the country programs of agencies. These programs must go to the executive boards of agencies each year for approval. Will the UNDAF be able to provide sufficient flexibility to address the fluidity of the transition that is likely to continue well into 2004? If changes are needed in mid 2004 to return and resettlement efforts, will approval have to wait until the alterations are made to country programs and approved in 2005?

A number of agencies have in-house mechanisms or procedures for adapting resources to changing circumstances.¹⁶ WFP’s Protracted Relief and Recovery Operation (PRRO) is one example.²⁰ UNICEF allows its Representatives to shift between \$75,000 and \$100,000 from regular country programs to emergency response.¹⁹ It can also decide to employ a one-year bridging program tool.¹⁸ The difficulty then is how quickly could these differing mechanisms and procedures be aligned to address rapidly evolving and interconnected needs? Certainly, the track record from other countries does not appear good.

It is noteworthy that every SG Report since 1993 to the Humanitarian Segment of ECOSOC has mentioned the transition from relief to development. In 1997 a previous major effort by all agencies to forge better linkages between relief and development resulted in the creation of extended CAPs, the CCA, the UNDAF and the PRRO. Before the ink was even dry on these new formats, the debate shifted to how the UN was going to get all these new processes, formats, approaches and frameworks to work together and cohere.

The Government -- The most pressing or difficult problem the UN may have to deal with however, at least in the near term, as it wrangles with the new situation in Angola is the still unresolved tension between the donors and IMF on the one side, and the government on the other. The donors and IMF continue to insist on greater transparency in the operations of the Angolan government. In addition, they continue to seek greater political and financial commitments by the government towards the social sector within the interim PRSP.¹⁸ Without these commitments and improved transparency the donors are reluctant to move forward with the Donor Conference that the government is eager to hold. The government has in turn requested that the UN wait for the results of the interim PRSP and donor conference before harmonizing their program cycles.¹⁶ In other words, since the UNDAF retreats in November and December, the government has requested that the UN hold off on launching an UNDAF until 2005--one year later than envisaged. At the same time, the government continues to maintain that the

conference will still supercede the need for a CAP, and thus continues to indicate that the present CAP will be the last.³⁹ The UN therefore, faces a situation in 2004 where it may be unable to use either of its two principle inter-agency planning tools. As a result, all the difficulties in managing the handover or construction of linkages between the CAP and UNDAF--from planning, to resource mobilization, to implementation, to monitoring--are likely to be exacerbated.

Nonetheless, Angola and the UN system are still very much at the beginning of the 'transition period' and, despite the challenges remaining, are possessed of two critical elements to successful planning. From the early meeting in August and September on the CAP, the UN Country Team and its humanitarian partners have been guided by a fairly clear and consistent vision of their aim and purpose in Angola--supporting normalization. At the same time their planning has employed and was built around the same core coordination structures and staff. It is not yet clear to what extent the government, or the funding and bureaucratic systems of the UN will support or enable a cohesive plan and seamless evolution of assistance, but the key elements are in place to make the best of it.

PROGRAM:

While the future program and activities of the UN remain to be determined through the ongoing planning efforts, programs continue to be operated within the framework of the 2003 Appeal. In 2003, the following issues will require the UN's special attention:

- the demobilization and reintegration of former UNITA combatants and their families;
- the return of IDPs and refugees in compliance with the Norms and *regulamento*
- HIV/AIDS; and
- mine action.

HIV / AIDS

Angola has a rare opportunity to halt the spread of HIV/AIDS. Although the available data is limited, rates of infection appear to be lower than rates found in neighboring countries. Measures to combat the epidemic in the near-term will determine the extent to which the impact of the pandemic on the country's future is mitigated. Taking into account expected large-scale population movements, both within Angola and cross-border, a UN strategy to respond to this challenge is urgently needed.¹⁶

To these ends, the UN is doing the following:

FAO is shifting its focus from the distribution of seeds and tools to strengthening food security by dealing with land tenure issues, increasing access to land, building infrastructure and strengthening markets.

UNDP is focusing on disarmament, demobilization and reintegration (DDR), good governance, administrative reform and mine action coordination. In addition, UNDP will support the interim PRSP process, poverty reduction programs, and organization of the Donor's Conference.

UNHCR is giving priority to the rehabilitation of basic services in border areas and to the development of areas where large numbers of IDPs and refugees are returning. In addition, UNHCR believes there is a need for a 4Rs approach.¹⁷ UNHCR will therefore, also advocate for the inclusion of returnee issues in government development plans and in the activities of international development agencies.

UNICEF will focus on rapidly extending a minimum level of services during 2003 with emphasis on universal provision. The Back to School initiative, will provide learning opportunities for children and contribute to achieving universal primary education. The National Measles Campaign will lay the groundwork for reinforcing routine vaccinations and expanding the national primary health network. Promotion of child registration will strengthen child protection mechanisms and will assist in developing national child legislation.

UNFPA: a key priority will be assisting the government with preparation and implementation of the first population census since 1970. This will help to create a basis for good democratic governance, protection (identity, citizenship, access to public services) and development. Promoting access to reproductive health information and services, and contributing to the reduction of HIV/AIDS will also be priorities for UNFPA

WFP will continue working to improve food security for vulnerable populations. In addition, WFP will encourage the government to repair damaged transport infrastructure, including roads, bridges and airstrips, in order to expand access.

WHO will advocate with partners for the universal provision of a minimum health care package to stabilize returning and resettling populations.

Looking ahead, the change from emergency to transitional and development activities will also mean that some agencies decrease their role as social service providers and focus more on support to policy making. This decrease may result in a changed relationship with NGOs, as the comparative advantages in the field of logistics and procurement wanes.¹⁵

LESSONS LEARNED:

For well over three years, the UN in its Angola Appeals has been using different terms and turns of phrase for the work that comes after life-saving assistance. When agencies move beyond food assistance before a cease fire has been established, to providing IDPs with access to land and micro-credit, what is this called relief, recovery, or transitional assistance? The ECHA / UNDG working group in its initial discussion paper has suggested that transitional assistance is the set of activities that help to consolidate the move to peace. But what if there has not yet been a move toward peace? The definition isn't necessarily unsuitable. Nor should the definition necessarily be broadened--i.e., transition assistance refers to those activities that promote a move to peace. Such a definition would be too broad to be useful. Feeding people, after all, promotes peace. The case study suggests however, that the Working Group will need to define relief as well as transition.

As for planning, the use of program blocs in the 2003 Appeal appears to have been an important step in maintaining the coherence of planning. The integration of 13 sectors into 4 blocs laid the groundwork for the type of integrated planning and policy-making that is necessary for dealing with the transition.¹⁶

More notable though, and perhaps more important, is the use of the Millennium Development Goals and the human rights that underlie them, in both the CCA and the Consolidated Appeal. The CCA is a rights-based assessment of the country situation, using data "to assess the extent to

which Angola's people are enjoying their rights." The assessment is organized into "five broad 'clusters': the right to personal security and physical integrity; the right to development; the right to survival and a long and healthy life; the right to protection; and the right to participation."

The Appeal used seven of the eight Millennium Development Goals as a vehicle for organizing an analysis of vulnerability. Each goal in the Appeal is explicitly linked to one of the Millennium Goals. Article 9 of the Angolan Constitution and Article 11 of the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights inform the Millennium Goal of eradicating extreme poverty and hunger, which in turn informs the goal of the Food Security Bloc in the Appeal: "Prevent malnutrition and hunger by providing direct food aid and assistance to highly vulnerable populations and by helping at-risk households become self-sufficient through agricultural production."

The UNDAF will be similarly rooted in the Millennium Development Goals and their associated rights.¹⁶ Even the emphasis on normalization is about rights. Normalizing is essentially getting to that point where people can reasonably hope to pursue and attain their full range of rights.

For planning to succeed, a shared vision of the desired end-state is key. In Angola, the Millennium Development Goals and the rights upon which they are based seemed to have served this purpose--guiding normalization. As a common end-state for each of the UN's main, inter-agency planning tools the Millennium Goals also seem to have encouraged a degree of coherence and consistency across the entire spectrum of assistance.

To some extent, the emphasis in Angola's planning on rights can probably be traced back to the Norms and *regulamento*. This legal framework, created and approved by the government with significant support from the UN specified the pre-conditions and social targets that were to be met during resettlement, based Angola's constitution and international legal instruments. Originally crafted to deal with poor conditions in resettlement areas, these laws and regulations continued to be useful when return began and framed the discussion on the kind of assistance that would be needed in the post-conflict context.¹⁵ Interestingly, unlike many rights-based approaches, the Norms and subsequent rights-oriented planning put the rights at the end of the process rather than at the beginning--a state to be achieved through a variety of activities, rather than a programmatic starting point.

As important as the Norms were however, the emphasis in Angola's planning on rights, and the consequent consistency engendered is, more than anything, the serendipitous result of like minded people being in the right place, at the right time. Nonetheless, there is a potential institutional lesson here for the forthcoming effort of the ECHA / UNDG working group to craft guidelines that will facilitate greater planning consistency in transitions. The working group may wish to consider whether or not it can jump start the difficult process of achieving a common vision by suggesting in its guidance that UN planning, and planning tools -- be it the CCA, Appeal or UNDAF--use as their end-state the Millennium Development Goals and their underlying rights.

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