



## Disclaimer

The opinions expressed in this report are those of the authors and do not necessarily represent those of the members / standing invitees of the Inter-Agency Standing Committee.

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
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## Acronyms

ACF	Action Contre la Faim
AFD	Agence Française de Développement (French Development Agency)
AGDM	Age, Gender, Diversity Management
ANT	Armée Nationale Tchadienne (Chadian National Army)
AOM	Armed Opposition Movement
CAR	Central African Republic
CCO	Comité de Coordination des ONG
CIMIC	Civil Military Coordination
CNAR	Commission Nationale d'Assistance aux Réfugiés
CONAFIT	Commission Nationale d'Appui au déploiement de la Force Internationale au Tchad
DFID	Department for International Development
DIS	Détachement Intégré de Sécurité (Integrated Security Department)
DO	Designated Official
DONG	NGO Directorate
DPKO	Department of Peace Keeping Operations
EC	European Commission
ECHO	Humanitarian Aid department of the European Commission
EON	Assistance programmes linked to development (German LRRD)
EU	European Union
FAO	Food and Agriculture Organisation
GTZ	German Agency for Technical Cooperation
HC	Humanitarian Coordinator
UNHCR	The Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees
HLU	Humanitarian Liaison Unit (MINURCAT)
IASC	Inter-Agency Standing Committee on Humanitarian Affairs
ICRC	International Committee of the Red Cross
IRC	International Rescue Committee
JEM	Justice and Equality Movement
MdM	Médecins du Monde
MINURCAT	Mission des Nations Unies pour la République Centrafricaine et le Tchad
MSF	Médecins Sans Frontières
OECD	Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development
OCHA	Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Aid
OGB	OXFAM Great Britain
PRSP	Poverty Reduction Strategy Paper
PTPH	Police Tchadienne de Protection Humanitaire (Chadian Humanitarian Protection Police)
RC	Resident Coordinator
UNICEF	United Nations Children's Fund

Illustration 1  
Map of Chad and the mission itinerary



## Executive summary

### Context

Part of a very unstable region, Chad has received waves of refugees from its neighbours, the Central African Republic (CAR) and Sudan since 2003. The UNHCR coordinates the assistance and protection provided to the 250 000 Sudanese and Central African Republican refugees in a number of different camps. This assistance is implemented by NGO partners of the UNHCR.

The arrival of refugees from Darfur and cross-border attacks by armed groups, increased competition for natural resources, growing insecurity and increasingly lethal confrontations between communities in 2006-2007 led to the displacement of large numbers of Chadians. Greater quantities of international aid were sent and classic camps (referred to as IDP sites to distinguish them from refugee camps) were set up and managed by the UNHCR. From spring 2007, OCHA supported the implementation of the Cluster Approach.

The international community and the UN Security Council have been very active in trying to deal with security problems affecting humanitarians and protection problems affecting the local population in Eastern Chad. In order to create favourable conditions for refugees to return home, EU and UN military operations for Chad and CAR (EUFOR and MINURCAT 1) were deployed<sup>1</sup> in 2007-2008. The EUFOR withdrew from Chad definitively on 15 March 2009 and its mandate was transferred to MINURCAT 2<sup>2</sup>.

### Presentation of the mission

As part of phase 2 of the Cluster Approach evaluation, an evaluation team travelled to Chad from 26 October to 11 November 2009. The team met a broad range of actors including UN agencies, NGOs, Red Cross organisations and donors present in the field. Most of the field visit took place in Eastern Chad, particularly in Abéché, Goz Beida and Koukou.

### Findings and Recommendations

In general, the implementation of the Cluster Approach was difficult in Chad for the following reasons:

- the multiplication of coordination mechanisms created confusion and led to a marked increase in the number of meetings;

1 Security Council Resolution 1778 of 25 September 2007.

2 Security Council Resolution 1861 of 14 January 2009.

- in such a politically complex and volatile context, concern about the increasing domination of the United Nations in humanitarian action led to a loss of respect for humanitarian principles.

Though these concerns and problems remain, with time there have been major improvements in terms of coordination. Current challenges concern creating links between the Clusters and national coordination mechanisms to improve the transition from relief to development and deciding how roles and responsibilities should be distributed between N'Djamena, Abéché and the field.

#### Findings related to recommendations

The role of the Cluster Lead agency is not specified clearly in the Terms of Reference of Heads of Agencies and the HC.

§ 64

The Cluster Terms of Reference do not specify expected results clearly enough even though progress has been made since 2007.

There are too many meetings (Cluster meetings and UNHCR sector group meetings) and many of them are badly or inefficiently run.

Not enough Cluster coordinators have been deployed and trained and they are not provided with a complete "kit" with the IASC directives and the other documents (in French) that they need to do their job efficiently and effectively.

§§ 37, 41, 50, 57, 58, 59, 69, 73

#### Recommendations

##### Recommendation 1

Ensure that the responsibilities of the Cluster Lead are clearly specified in the Terms of Reference of Heads of Agencies and the HC.

##### Recommendation 2

Ensure optimal use of the resources dedicated to coordination (for OCHA and the Cluster Lead agencies) and that the objectives of each Cluster are precise and understood:

- The role of the Cluster Lead agencies clearly defined in Heads of Agencies' ToRs;
- Revision of each Cluster's ToR;
- Training for Cluster coordinators (facilitation skills, complete IASC kit in French, etc.).

The diversity of different population groups affected by the crisis in Eastern Chad is not sufficiently taken into account though some progress has been made.

a) The needs of host populations are not taken into account enough in technical discussions within Clusters and there is insufficient funding for this purpose.

b) The participation of the UNHCR in the meetings of Clusters such as Health and WASH is an important new trend.

§§ 37, 43, 76, 89, 99, 100

### Recommendation 3

Ensure that the Cluster system allows the diversity of the target population to be taken into account more effectively (for OCHA, UNDP and the UNHCR):

- Continue to carry out joint meetings involving Clusters and the UNHCR as happens for Health and WASH;
- Continue to develop long-term solutions.

The mechanisms for activating and de-activating Clusters are not clear.

Though the Abéché hub was useful for a time, it now wastes energy and makes it difficult to establish a national approach.

§§ 39, 40, 44, 64, 67

### Recommendation 4

The mechanisms for implementing and withdrawing Clusters need to be revised, and the relations between the national and sub-national levels need to be rethought (for OCHA, the IASC and the ERC).

There is insufficient analysis of interaction between coordination, security and action. There is a risk that Clusters become an information collection tool for Cluster Lead agencies who no longer have access to the field due to insecurity.

Coordination with the MINURCAT on technical subjects goes through the right channels. However, there are too many mechanisms which allow interaction with the MINURCAT and this creates confusion and the risk of incoherence.

§§ 33, 34, 126

### Recommendation 5

Each Cluster needs to manage problems to do with the humanitarian environment more effectively (insecurity, presence of the MINURCAT and of the DIS). The role of MINURCAT in relation to humanitarian coordination and within Clusters needs to be clarified.



Even though the links between Clusters and planning tools are very beneficial, the fact that certain Cluster Lead agencies also have a virtual monopoly over the provision and/or management of funds (CAP and CERF) creates dependency and concern among NGOs.

§§ 72, 137, 138, 139, 140

#### **Recommendation 6**

Improve interaction between funding mechanisms and Clusters:

- Avoid relationships of “domination” between Cluster Leads and NGOs;
- Continue to use Clusters as a place to discuss strategy, establish priorities and define criteria for selecting projects;
- Increase transparency regarding project selection and funding decisions.

Though each Cluster has been able to define its own strategy, there is a strong tendency to develop technical decisions (silo approach) rather than situation-specific or multi-dimensional analyses.

Mechanisms for facilitating inter-sector coordination are not very effective, apart from the CCCM Cluster

§§ 45, 82, 113

#### **Recommendation 7**

Improve the way multi-sector issues are taken into account at the field level (geographical coordination, which is multi-sector by nature) and at the central and strategic level.

Analysis of diversity does take place (Age, Gender, Diversity Monitoring -AGDM) but it is neither systematic nor always transformed into action points. Despite the importance of environmental issues related to the humanitarian situation and the presence of the aid community, they are not taken into account in a satisfactory manner.

§§ 104, 108, 109, 110

#### **Recommendation 8**

Improve the way that cross-cutting issues are taken into account:

- Due to the importance of environmental issues, UNEP should urgently consider either setting up an office in Chad or establishing an alternative mechanism for improving the way the environment is taken into account by sending experts or funding a specialised structure;
- Increase the appropriation of cross-cutting themes by the Clusters.

In order to defend humanitarian principles more effectively, certain agencies have tended to avoid engaging with the national authorities, as they are party to the conflict.

Technical governmental structures rarely have the capacity and means to take over technical coordination.

Respecting the fundamental principles of humanitarian action is indispensable as long as there is a conflict situation.

The Sector Groups that UNDP is in the process of setting up with the Chadian technical ministries do not include the Clusters.

§§ 117, 118, 119, 120, 121, 122

#### **Recommendation 9**

Reinforce mechanisms for transferring responsibilities to national institutions as soon as the situation allows and supporting national capacity so that they can take over coordination (link with sector-based groups).

Despite the fact that the Clusters have proven to be extremely useful tools for collecting and disseminating information, there is no real Information and Knowledge Management strategy. Different systems exist within several Clusters, but they are not necessarily compatible with each other or designed to work together. There are frequent losses of institutional memory.

§§ 61, 77, 79, 80, 106

#### **Recommendation 10**

Improve information management in the short term and knowledge management in the medium term for each Cluster and for the system as a whole.

## Introduction

- 1 Part of a very unstable region, Chad has received waves of refugees from its neighbours, the Central African Republic and Sudan, since 2003. Via its sub-offices, the UNHCR coordinates the assistance and protection provided by numerous NGOs to approximately 250 000 Sudanese and Central African refugees in a number of different camps.
- 2 The situation in Eastern Chad has deteriorated since 2004 due to the setting up of camps for refugees from Darfur, related cross-border attacks and increased competition over natural resources. This has led to internal displacement in different regions and departments in the East: Ouaddaï, Assoungaha and Dar Sila<sup>3</sup>. The uprooted populations have gradually and spontaneously gathered around existing settlements, near areas where they have family or community ties.
- 3 Increasing insecurity and increasingly lethal confrontations between communities between 2006 and 2007, particularly in Dar Sila, led to more internal displacement, with more than 180 000 Chadians fleeing the violence. More international aid was deployed and classic camps (referred to as “IDP sites” in Chad, to differentiate between them and “refugee camps”) were set up and managed by UNHCR. OCHA arrived in the field in the spring of 2007 and supported the implementation of the Cluster Approach.
- 4 The international aid presence in Chad has regularly been disturbed due to military operations carried out by armed opposition movements. These have led to a series of evacuations: the evacuation of international aid organisations from Abéché in 2006, the evacuation of a large number of organisations from N’Djamena in February 2008 and the evacuation of certain organisations from Goz Beida in 2009.
- 5 The international community and the UN Security Council have been very active in trying to deal with security problems affecting humanitarians and protection problems affecting the local population in Eastern Chad. In order to create favourable conditions for refugees to return home, EU and UN military operations for Chad and CAR (EUFOR and MINURCAT 1) were deployed<sup>4</sup> in 2007-2008. The EUFOR withdrew from Chad definitively on 15 March 2009 and its mandate was transferred to MINURCAT 2<sup>5</sup>.
- 6 The security situation in which humanitarian aid is delivered in Eastern Chad has deteriorated steadily, with stolen vehicles, thefts from humanitarian bases,


3 Dar Sila region was created in 2008 on the basis of pre-existing departmental lines.

4 Security Council Resolution 1778 of 25 September 2007.

5 Security Council Resolution 1861 of 14 January 2009.

murders and recently hostage-taking having become increasingly common. The United Nations raised the security level from 3 to 4 and staff are obliged to travel in convoys with military escorts. NGOs have tried to find other, more appropriate ways of managing security, such as strategies based on acceptance, but security risks remain high.

## Illustration 2 Timeline of events and cluster system dynamics



Source: GPPi/Groupe URD

- 7 This Country Report presents an analysis of the Cluster Approach and its effects based on the following criteria (these criteria are described in greater detail in the evaluation terms of reference and in the inception report):
- The role of the Global Clusters in implementing and running the Cluster system in Chad,
  - Gap-filling / Coverage,
  - Ownership / Connectedness,
  - Predictable leadership,
  - Partnerships / Coherence,
  - Accountability,
  - Interaction between the Cluster Approach and the other pillars of the Humanitarian Reform.
- 8 This report includes some recommendations for ways of improving and re-orienting the Cluster system. It therefore aims to contribute to discussions about ways to improve the humanitarian response in Chad and more general debates about the functioning of the Cluster Approach<sup>6</sup>.
- 9 The report is organised as follows: chapter 2 presents the evaluation methodology, chapter 3 describes the implementation and functioning of the Clusters in Chad, chapter 4 presents the different actors present and the main challenges of humanitarian coordination in Chad, chapter 5 presents the main results and chapter 6 presents the main conclusions. Finally, the recommendations are presented in chapter 7.

The performance of each individual Cluster is analysed in Annex 1.

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
6 A final summary report of phase 2 of the evaluation of the Cluster approach will present the lessons learned in Chad and the five other field missions (Myanmar, Uganda, DRC, Haiti, Gaza/Palestinian Occupied Territories).

## 2 Methodology and limitations of the evaluation

- 10 This report focuses on the effects of the implementation of the Cluster Approach in Eastern Chad since 2007. The fact that the whole of Chad is not yet covered by the Cluster system and that the activities in favour of refugees coordinated by UNHCR do not fall within the Cluster system meant that it was possible to compare the Cluster system to other forms of coordination.
- 11 The Cluster system was analysed using the Cluster Approach Logic Model included in the evaluation Terms of Reference. It is presented below.

### Illustration 3

#### The Cluster Approach Logic Model



Source: Alexander (2009), p.7

- 12 Data was collected via:
- A desk review: the preparatory mission conducted by OCHA in June 2009 brought together a series of documents on the Cluster Approach in Chad. A large number of additional documents were also collected in Europe (particularly via internet sites dedicated to the Cluster Approach) and during the field mission (see Annex 4).

- Interviews with a large number of actors in the field: United Nations agencies, NGOs, the ICRC, national authorities, donors and certain development organisations, including national NGOs. To conduct these interviews the evaluation team organised individual interviews and workshops and took part in Cluster meetings. The full itinerary of the mission is presented in Annex 3.
- 13 A final presentation meeting was organised at the end of the mission for IASC staff in Chad.
- 14 The evaluation team was confronted with several constraints and limitations during the field visit to Chad:
- *Time available and geographical coverage:* The evaluation would have benefited greatly if the field visit had been longer so that more areas of the country could have been visited, particularly regions where the Cluster Approach has not been implemented (UNHCR camps in the North and South and the Kanem region). This would have allowed alternative coordination systems to be studied in more detail.
  - *Staff turnover:* Many of the staff in the United Nations Country team were new to their positions. The Humanitarian Coordinator and the representatives of OCHA, the WFP and the UNHCR had only been in place for a few months, if not a few weeks. Luckily, their assistants had more experience in the country and were able to provide precious information about the history of the Cluster system in Chad. Staff turnover was also very high in NGOs. However, the evaluation team was able to retrace the missing parts of the story by directly contacting staff who had already left the country.
  - *The relatively weak involvement of Chadian NGOs in the humanitarian response:* Before the current crisis, there was only a limited number of Chadian NGOs in the East of the country. Only the biggest of these, with good connections with international NGOs were able to take part in the international response.
  - *Interaction with affected people.* Due to the fact that the population is scattered over a large number of sites and camps and that there are strict logistical and security constraints, beneficiaries were only met at the IDP sites of Goz Beida (during visits to certain sites and site management meetings) and Koukou-Angarana (focus group at the Habile 3 IDP site).

## 3 Humanitarian coordination in Chad

### Actors and challenges

- 15 The Cluster Approach was implemented in Chad in June 2007 at a time when the country was facing an IDP crisis. Several coordination systems were already in place and other mechanisms have been added since, notably in connection with the deployment of the EUFOR and MINURCAT.

### 3.1 National coordination

- 16 The Ministry of Planning and the technical ministries are usually at the heart of coordination between national organisations. During 2007 and 2009, their technical coordination was made difficult by the political instability in the country and their distance from the camps in the East of the country (ministries are located in N'Djamena). What is more, in order to respect the principles of independence and impartiality, humanitarian NGOs did not want to systematically establish formal links with the Chadian authorities as they are perceived to be party to the conflict.

### 3.2 Regional authorities

- 17 In the regions, coordination is theoretically organised at the level of Provinces or Cantons, under the administrative authorities (governors, general secretaries, technical service representatives) and traditional authorities (sultans, canton and village leaders and deputy leaders). However, these regional authorities are not in a position to implement effective coordination. They have very few resources at their disposal and have been weakened due to the total or partial evacuation of management staff during the periods when the armed opposition was active (2007, 2008 and 2009) and by changes in administrative limits (creation of the new Dar Sila region in 2008).

### 3.3 Coordination between national structures and international actors

- 18 The NGO Directorate of the Ministry of Planning (DONG) plays a key role in coordinating activities with NGOs, including establishing agreements between the Chadian state and international NGOs. The DONG also monitors the activities of NGOs. The establishment of monitoring and control mechanisms for NGOs was a sensitive and complex process. The main areas of conflict are linked to the question of who covers the cost of the DONG's monitoring and control missions in the field (as the DONG does not have the necessary funds at its disposal to run its field missions, it asks NGOs to pay for them, including the per diems).



- 19 The *Commission Nationale d'Accueil des Réfugiés* (CNAR) is one of the key actors of Chadian state coordination<sup>7</sup>. Following the Arche de Zoé affair, its role in coordinating and controlling the movements of NGO expatriate staff in Eastern Chad was reinforced.
- 20 *La Commission Nationale d'Appui au déploiement de la Force Internationale au Tchad* (CONAFIT) was created to accompany the deployment of the EUFOR and the MINURCAT. It has a military component which is responsible for coordination with international forces and a civilian component which is responsible for coordination with the international aid community in Eastern Chad. At present, the CONAFIT is more active in the implementation of EU Stabilisation Support Programmes and bilateral cooperation with France than in the coordination of aid per se.
- 21 On several occasions, the political and military instability in the area has led to the evacuation of the political, administrative and technical authorities in the field, thus cutting relations between these and humanitarian organisations.
- 22 One of the issues at stake regarding the relationship between Cluster coordination and national authorities is therefore to develop a national body which would take up the coordination role played by Clusters during the emergency phase.
- 23 The levels and methods of interaction vary a great deal between the national and regional levels. The modification of the geographical limits of administrative entities and the creation of new regions to replace Ouaddaï (Wadi Fira, Dar Sila) led to the emergence of new authorities during the period 2008-2009 with whom the Clusters had to establish relations.

### 3.4 International coordination

- 24 Since the beginning of the crisis in Eastern Chad (first waves of refugees in 2004), different mechanisms have been created to coordinate the international aid effort in Eastern Chad, some of which are still in place.
- 25 The coordination of donors and international development agencies has existed for a long time for the implementation of the PRSP<sup>8</sup>. A great deal of interaction takes place between this inter-donor coordination mechanism and the technical ministries, particularly with the Ministry of Planning, which plays a pivotal role.

7 The CNAR's mandate includes managing the arrival of refugees, managing relations between refugees and host populations and camp security. Approval is needed from the CNAR before an NGO can set up in the East and before an agreement can be obtained from the Ministry of the Interior for travelling in the country.

8 Poverty Reduction Strategy Paper

- 26 The UNHCR has been responsible for coordinating NGO emergency relief and protection activities for Sudanese refugees since 2003-2004 (as well as coordinating the same activities in southern Chad for CAR refugees). Coordination is situation-based at the level of each camp. Beyond that, each sector has a coordination group which is responsible for ensuring that there is coherence between the activities supported by the UNHCR in different camps. The highly dynamic UNHCR team in Abéché oversees coordination in all the refugee camps in Eastern Chad. Coordination activities in the east are communicated to the capital where UNHCR agents ensure that there is coherence with activities in southern Chad.
- 27 The IASC Country team has played an increasingly important role since the nomination of a Humanitarian Coordinator (who also happens to be the Resident Representative), and since OCHA opened its offices in response to the IDP crisis in the east. These changes took place at the same time as the Cluster Approach was implemented.
- 28 The Humanitarian Liaison Unit (HLU) within MINURCAT is specifically responsible for coordinating MINURCAT's activities. This includes both its civilian component and the MINURCAT force itself, in liaison with the MINURCAT CIMIC unit. In theory, the CIMIC unit of each of the MINURCAT's military components also plays a coordinating role, but in practice, their effectiveness varies from one armed force to another<sup>9</sup>.
- 29 NGOs have progressively organised themselves to deal with the numerous challenges with which they were faced, including the deployment of international military forces, the implementation of the United Nations humanitarian reform and the Cluster Approach. The NGO Coordination Committee (CCO)<sup>10</sup> has become increasingly active since 2008 and is now a major interlocutor for the MINURCAT<sup>11</sup>, UN agencies<sup>12</sup> and the authorities.

### 3.5 The challenges of humanitarian coordination in Eastern Chad

- 30 There are a number of different challenges involved in the coordination of humanitarian action. The spectrum of interactions is complex, with coordination between international humanitarian organisations and national bodies, between civilian and military organisations and between relief and development organisations.
- 31 The Resident Representative/Humanitarian Coordinator plays an essential coordinating role in this system. He/She must:

9 Cf. Terms of Reference of the HLU, MINURCAT.

10 The CCO includes almost all of the NGOs present in Eastern Chad (international and national, humanitarian and development).

11 CCO, Recommandations sur les Relations entre ONG et MINURCAT, September 2009.

12 CCO, Plan d'action, Relation ONG-Système onusien au Tchad, September 2009.

- Deal with the numerous challenges of a country where there is little development and where there is armed conflict, carrying out very time-consuming coordination tasks for poverty reduction and humanitarian activities.
  - Manage the arrival of operations with strong military contingents in a security situation which has deteriorated regularly over the past three years.
- 32 Coordination between international and national institutions is limited to some extent by doubts about how the country is evolving politically (development of the democratic process since the Agreements of the 13th August 2007, relations with armed opposition forces). The question is often raised within coordination bodies about whether to prioritise humanitarian or development activities<sup>13</sup>.
- 33 Coordination and relations between civilian humanitarian actors and the different military forces present in the area (EUFOR, then MINURCAT, as well as the Chadian military police *Détachement Intégré de Sécurité* or DIS) remain problematic.
- 34 With an increasingly difficult security context and a humanitarian space which is getting smaller, any challenge to humanitarian principles is seen by humanitarian actors, and particularly NGOs and the Red Cross movement, as a real danger<sup>14</sup>. The perception of these dangers and the way that they are dealt with varies between different UN agencies and between UN and non-UN organisations<sup>15</sup>. This difference in analysis is not without repercussions for coordination methods. For example, the fact that Eastern Chad is classified as phase 4 of the United Nations security system, UN agencies have to use military escorts when travelling by road in the field. Most NGOs have been looking for alternative methods in order to respect humanitarian principles and be more effective in gaining access to the affected population in the field. The difference in analysis has also created tension in partnerships between NGOs and UN agencies, particularly with regard to the vehicles which UN agencies allow NGOs to use. It is important to note that the NGOs were able to discuss this issue at the highest level of the Chadian state. A system was proposed whereby they gave notification of their movements rather than systematically using escorts<sup>16</sup>.

13 Interview with representatives of donors, UNDP and the Ministry of Planning.

14 Working document on humanitarian space in Chad, Groupe URD, December 2009.

15 Interviews with representatives of NGOs, UN agencies and the ICRC.

16 Exchanges between General Dagash, leader of the DIS and the CCO.

## 4 Findings

35 The following chapters present the evaluation results using the model which appears in the evaluation Terms of Reference as prepared by OCHA and validated by the Cluster 2 evaluation steering committee. Each chapter is sub-divided into two sections, the first presenting the results of the Cluster Approach and progress made, the second analysing problems encountered and opportunities to explore. The evaluation team's recommendations are presented in chapter 6 and the performance of each Cluster is individually analysed in Annex 1.

### 4.1 Humanitarian coordination in Chad via the Cluster Approach

- 36 The Cluster Approach was introduced in Chad in 2007 at the peak of the IDP crisis.
- 37 The implementation and establishment of the Cluster Approach was marked by a “coordination crisis”, which was regularly highlighted in inter-donor reports<sup>17</sup>. There was much discussion and criticism of the risk of duplication between the system implemented by UNHCR (sector-based groups) and the one supported by OCHA (Clusters). The increase in the number of technical meetings on similar subjects was the object of a great deal of criticism on the part of donors and NGOs. The UNHCR maintained that its specific mandate to provide assistance and protection to refugees meant that refugee camps could not be “clusterised”. However, a few months ago, it adopted a new strategy whereby it systematically attends numerous technical cluster meetings in order to discuss specific issues to do with refugee camps in a very constructive way and to compare them with specific issues to do with IDP sites. Nevertheless, tension remains between needs-based and status-based coordination systems.
- 38 The nomination of a Deputy Humanitarian Coordinator, based in Abéché in 2007 and 2008, was supposed to make humanitarian coordination easier, by separating more clearly humanitarian coordination from the Resident Coordination activities. However, this does not appear to have brought any particular improvement. The majority of actors did not consider that this nomination brought any added value as the HC already had a dynamic and competent OCHA team at his disposal in N'Djamena, Abéché and in the field (Goz Beida, Farchana, and recently Koukou) and the Cluster Approach was in the process of being implemented.
- 39 The following clusters were set up in Eastern Chad<sup>18</sup>: Nutrition (UNICEF), Protection (UNHCR) with two sub Clusters – Child Protection (UNICEF) and


17 Multi-donor mission of February 2008.

18 The agencies in brackets are the Cluster Lead agencies.

Gender-related violence (UNFPA), Logistics (WFP), Shelter and non-food aid (UNHCR), WASH (UNICEF), Health (WHO), Food Security (WFP/FAO), with an Agriculture sub-group (FAO), and a Food Aid sub-group (WFP), Camp management - CCCM (UNHCR), Education (UNICEF) and Early Recovery (UNDP).

- 40 The clusters meet at different levels. Closest to the ground in Goz Beida, Koukou or Farchana, the number of meetings can vary. Coordination needs vary depending on the number and diversity of agencies present in the zone. Inter-agency meetings are an opportunity to discuss inter-agency issues (relations with the authorities, information from Abéché or N'Djamena, etc.) and to present the activities of each Cluster in the zone. The same system is in place in Abéché where information from all the zones concerned in Eastern Chad are gathered. At the N'Djamena level, Cluster Leads meet within the IASC Country office under the chairmanship of the Humanitarian Coordinator. These are meetings between agency heads rather than an opportunity for cluster heads to discuss. Due to the distance from the field, these meetings also deal with zones in Chad where the Cluster Approach has not been deployed (South, Kanem, etc.).

#### Illustration4 Clusters in Chad



### Main achievements and progress made

- 41 Apart from the coordination crisis mentioned above, the implementation of the Cluster Approach took place without any major problems. Even though all the national and international NGOs continue to complain that the system is extremely time-consuming, they take part in it almost systematically. Actors like the ICRC and MSF also take part as “active observers”. They recognise the need for coordination (sharing action plans, discussing work methods to avoid incoherence) and the need to monitor what is said and what is decided at the Cluster level.
- 42 After a number of initial hiccups, the respective roles of different Cluster Lead agencies were clarified and, at the time of this evaluation, the Clusters were functioning very smoothly: regular meetings were taking place in most Clusters, with precise timetables and minutes of meetings prepared by each Cluster coordinator and shared with the relevant agencies.
- 43 There are still problems in creating links between the UNHCR coordination system and the Cluster system, but a lot of progress has been made. For example, UNHCR experts are very involved in the WASH Cluster. This is due to the fact that refugees, IDPs and host populations all depend on the same water resources and there needs to be a coherent and concerted approach towards the management of this limited resource. There have been several announcements that the two coordination systems for the WASH sector will merge in 2010. There are also current initiatives to establish joint coordination meetings (Cluster and sector groups) for the Nutrition Cluster via the creation of a technical committee jointly presided by UNICEF and the UNHCR in March 2009.

### Main problems and areas for improvement

- 44 The links between the different levels of coordination and the respective roles of the Abéché and N’Djamena levels continue to pose problems. These have brought extra work and travel costs which have reduced the system’s efficiency considerably. Inter-agency meetings are held in N’Djamena and Abéché in addition to the Security<sup>19</sup> meetings which alternate between Abéché and N’Djamena. This allows many stakeholders to take part, but also causes repetition. A considerable amount of time during the Security meetings was taken up presenting the MINURCAT Force<sup>20</sup>. Ideas for improving the system are currently being discussed: coordination would be re-centred around field-capital exchanges by reducing the role of the Abéché hub. This would allow both a better vision of issues at the national level and a strengthening of coordination with the national ministries

19 Minutes of IASC meetings in N’Djamena and inter-agency meetings in Abéché (2008-2009).

20 Minutes of Security meetings in N’Djamena and Abéché (2008-2009).

- 45 Coordination between Clusters is more an inter-agency mechanism than a tool which allows a complete response to multi-dimensional problems. Inter-sector questions of this kind are most effectively dealt with at the field level, and notably via the Camp Coordination and Management (CCCM) Cluster<sup>21</sup>.

## 4.2 Support from the Global Clusters, the IASC and OCHA

- 46 As part of the United Nations' reform of humanitarian coordination, the Cluster lead agencies were given global responsibilities. These were provided with substantial funding by donors via two special appeals. Their responsibilities include strengthening the human resources and technical capacity of field level clusters via 'rosters' of staff who can be rapidly deployed, developing training systems (both on technical issues and on Cluster management), supporting the identification and dissemination of standardised technical tools, best practices and coordination management tools, and supporting the mobilisation of stockpiles.

Importance of the surge capacity during the launching of the Clusters

The importance of specialised "rosters"

- 47 The actual support provided to field level Clusters by the Global Clusters two years on varies from one Cluster to the next. This is explained in part by the fact that some Global Clusters are only just developing their tools and support capacity while others are much further ahead in this department. The Agriculture sub-Cluster, which was supported by a global work group but did not benefit from resources from the Global Appeal is behind in relation to the WASH Cluster which has benefited from the full implication of UNICEF and other agencies involved in the WASH Global Cluster.

Variable support depending on the Global cluster

### Main achievements and progress made

- 48 OCHA has played a crucial role in the field in disseminating the main documents on the Cluster Approach, and all the Guidance Notes produced by the IASC.
- 49 In certain cases, there has been significant support from the Global Cluster. Staff support via the PROCAP project was essential for the Protection Cluster even though the experts worked for the UNHCR rather than as Cluster coordinators.
- 50 The ability of Cluster Leads to deploy technically competent Cluster coordinators trained by Global Clusters was essential to ensure that Clusters functioned in a harmonious and productive way. In contrast, for a long time, the WASH Cluster in Chad was considered to function in a very laboured manner due to the coordinator's poor leadership skills and the absence of coordinators in the field.

It is essential that Cluster coordinators receive adequate training

21 See the reports of inter-agency meetings in Goz Beida which always include the following points: 1) Following up recommendations, 2) OCHA Information, 3) Population movement, 4) Sector-based activities; 5) Refugees 6) Other.



The recent arrival of someone in charge of coordination and improved facilitation has brought significant improvements.

- 51 Even though the WHO has been present in Chad for a long time and was able to intervene rapidly during the recent crises<sup>22</sup>, there was no Cluster Coordinator<sup>23</sup> at the national level until 2009. An evaluation of the implementation of the Health Cluster commissioned by the Global Cluster and carried out by a joint WHO-NGO team recommended that coordination needed to be reinforced at the N’Djamena level.
- 52 The Early Recovery Cluster, which was the last one to be launched, was treated somewhat differently due to the complexity of the subject and the frequent misunderstanding that it causes. From April 2008, the Global Cluster coordinator carried out a series of missions in order to facilitate discussion. It was only in mid-2009 that an “Early Recovery” Advisor took charge of Cluster coordination in addition to other functions<sup>24</sup>.
- 53 The “Service” Clusters have received a great deal of support from the Cluster Lead at the global level. The Logistics Cluster was given support by the WFP, which has a solid logistical capacity and in-depth knowledge of the working conditions in Chad. The fact that the data from WFP’s logistical evaluations was systematically recorded at the central level and shared with the Cluster members was essential to manage logistical problems<sup>25</sup>.
- 54 The experience of the HRC and certain of its partners in camp management was crucial in setting up coordination systems (via NGOs who coordinate sites) and providing quality support for the Camp Management Cluster which coordinated services in IDP sites.
- 55 Very few Global Clusters ran or took part in an evaluation of the Cluster in the field. A notable exception is the Health Global Cluster which organised a joint WHO-NGO evaluation in 2009.
- 56 Due to the high turnover of Cluster coordinators in 2007 and 2008, the OCHA offices in Abéché, Goz Beida, Farchana and N’Djamena played an essential role in ensuring there was a modicum of system memory.

22 Notably, by supplying a lot of surgical material in February 2008 to deal with the injured in N’Djamena and by setting up a coordination unit on the Cameroon side.

23 Quite experienced staff who had received ad hoc training and having been the coordinator of the Health Cluster in DRC.

24 The Early Recovery Advisor answers to the Resident Coordinator/Humanitarian Coordinator who supports UN agencies. His two other functions are: a) Coordinator of the national Early Recovery Cluster in N’Djamena and b) Head of the Coordination component of the UNDP Recovery programme in Eastern Chad (which has been operational since mid 2009).

25 Caused by the blockage of access routes and means of transport due to the deployment of the EUFOR and MINURCAT forces or in managing difficulties linked to the rainy season.



### Main problems and areas for improvement

- 57 The deployment of the Cluster system encountered some difficulties because Cluster Lead agencies did not fully understand what their role was, and particularly due to a lack of support from the Global Clusters. Furthermore, linking UNHRC's coordination system and the Cluster system was not easy. The OCHA offices in N'Djamena and Abéché made considerable effort to ensure that there was better understanding of the new coordination method<sup>26</sup>.
- 58 There were three main problems: making the consultants' files compatible with the need to have detailed understanding of contexts, adapting global technical manuals to specific contexts (see paragraph on standards), and providing training, which only took place late in the process of deploying the Clusters.
- 59 Very few Cluster coordinators genuinely benefitted from training before taking up their functions. Some of them only received ad hoc training at the end of 2009. And as the IASC Guidance Notes were often only available in English, it was not always easy to use them in this French-speaking country<sup>27</sup>.
- 60 Apart from certain cases (the Health and Logistics Clusters), vertical consultation between the field and Global levels was relatively weak.
- 61 In general, the flow of information or requests for information from Global Clusters was rarely in line with field requests and needs. For example, training was only provided after a long delay<sup>28</sup>, which meant that the Cluster Coordinators were unable to benefit from it.

There is a danger of becoming overly dependent on expertise which is completely external to the context

IASC Guidance notes should be translated into the working languages of the country concerned.

Mechanisms for feedback between the field and global clusters are not effective.

### 4.3 Predictable leadership

- 62 One of the objectives of the Cluster Approach is to strengthen the predictability and effectiveness of leadership via the nomination of agencies who are in charge of sector-based coordination, promote cross-cutting issues and are « providers of last resort ».
- 63 Analysis of the Cluster Approach in Eastern Chad shows that leadership has improved a great deal since its deployment in 2007, but that there are still significant difficulties<sup>29</sup>.

26 Interviews with OCHA representatives, the Heads of certain Cluster Lead agencies and Cluster members present in Chad at the time.

27 Interviews with Heads of Cluster Lead agencies and field coordinators.

28 Cluster coordinator training in Dakar, October 2009.

29 Interviews with Cluster coordinators in Abéché.

64 Whether or not leadership is predictable and effective depends on where agencies are based. The leadership role of the Cluster Leads based in N'Djamena is not considered very strong by other agencies, whereas that of the Cluster coordinator in Abéché is much more widely recognised. Cluster coordinators at the infra level are crucial for the Clusters to function properly<sup>30</sup>. The Agriculture sub-Cluster in Abéché is extremely dynamic, with a great deal of communication and discussion and the elaboration of common strategies. In Abéché there is a dynamic Cluster Coordinator capable of motivating “observer” organisations (like the ICRC) to such an extent that they share important evaluation documents<sup>31</sup>. In contrast, there is much less leadership at the N'Djamena level. The role of the Cluster Lead is rarely mentioned in the ToRs of Heads of agencies in the field and of the Humanitarian Coordinator.

Little mention of the role of the Cluster Lead in Head of agency and HC ToRs

65 The role of OCHA has proved to be essential, as was made obvious during the months when the position of Head of the N'Djamena office remained vacant for a number of months, even though OCHA middle management ensured that there was some continuity.

66 The role of OCHA is all the more crucial regarding inter-agency and inter-Cluster themes such as displaced persons and the question of their return<sup>32</sup>.

UN OCHA's presence in the field is crucial for the cluster approach to function properly

67 Technical coordination is currently being re-centred around N'Djamena. This has two objectives:

- to improve links between the Cluster Lead agency, the Cluster coordinators and the members of the Cluster by limiting the number of coordination locations (field and capital) and reducing the importance of the Abéché hub<sup>33</sup>;
- to strengthen relations between the Clusters and technical Ministries.

### Main achievements and progress made

68 Each Cluster Lead agency appears to be properly assuming its responsibilities in terms of the implementation and running of Clusters. The Cluster Lead agencies provide field coordinators, organise effective coordination processes, coordinate a certain number of tasks, such as those linked to the preparation of the Consolidated Appeals Process (CAP) and mid-term reviews and requests to the Central Emergency Response Fund (CERF) – see section 4.9.

30 Interviews with members of the WASH, Food Security and Health Clusters.

31 Enquête sur l'impact des distributions CICR sur les récoltes 2008 dans l'Assoungha et les zones frontalières du Sila, March 2009, ICRC.

32 Comptes-rendus des réunions de coordination IDP de Farchana.

33 This will also allow the international presence in Abéché to be reduced and the security risks that this brings.

- 69 On the whole, the humanitarian agencies in Chad<sup>34</sup> are satisfied with the predictability of the leadership provided by the Cluster Leads. The regular arrival of experienced Cluster coordinators from other countries where the system has already been deployed strengthens the effectiveness of the Cluster Lead role. However, if the Cluster coordinator is not sufficiently experienced and does not have the necessary skills, the role of the Cluster Lead is immediately challenged.
- 70 One of the critical points of leadership within the Cluster system concerns whether or not cross-cutting issues are taken into account (see section 4.6).

### Main problems and areas for improvement

- 71 Though each Cluster has a designated Coordinator who is in charge of leading the cluster, very few of them dedicate themselves fully to this task. Most of them are in fact also in charge of their agency's operations. The Nutrition, Health and Logistics Clusters have full-time coordinators but the Education, Food Security and Protection Clusters only have part-time coordinators. The coordinators of the Protection Cluster in Abéché and Goz Beida explained that Cluster leadership activities were very time-consuming and infringed on the time they had left for their other tasks.
- 72 In numerous cases, the difference between the activities of the Cluster and those of the Cluster Lead is not clear. This is particularly problematic in relation to budgetary issues which can create conflicts of interest (see paragraph 5.9). It is by looking at how the activities of the Cluster Lead are organised in relation to those of the other members of the Cluster that we can evaluate whether the mechanism is functioning properly and whether or not the Lead agency is abusing its position<sup>35</sup>.
- 73 In a number of cases, the Cluster Lead lost a great deal of credibility through lack of technical competence and/or poor management of meetings and the group. For example, UNICEF's credibility as Lead agency of the WASH Cluster was badly damaged by meetings which lasted more than three hours and during which a great deal of time was spent going round the table to collect information and fill in an Excel sheet<sup>36</sup>. In such a context, the main reason that NGOs continue to attend the meetings is because they are financially dependent.
- 74 With regard to the concept of "supplier of last resort", no agency really has the means to fulfil this role and the concept does not appear to be implemented a great

It is fundamental that the cluster approach is able to manage complex and diversified situations

34 Interviews with NGO members of the WASH, Education, Health and Protection Clusters.

35 CCO, Relation ONG-Système onusien, op. cit.

36 Situation Eau et Assainissement de sites de déplacés tables produced by the WASH Cluster.

deal in Chad. When WFP's supply chain was cut, this caused problems for food supplies which pushed the ICRC to set up its own pipeline. The Lead agency of the Logistics Cluster, the WFP, does not act as a supplier of "last resort" but as a supplier of "first resort" as it takes care of a great deal of the logistics of numerous organisations.

#### 4.4 Partnership, cohesion and coherence

- 75 The aim of the Cluster Approach was to make the system more cohesive, promote partnerships between actors (in accordance with the "Principles of Partnership"<sup>37</sup>) and ensure that technical responses were more coherent.
- 76 Due to the wide variety of situations and their propensity to change, the different levels of access to the field and the often difficult security conditions, what is needed is not a single response strategy but rather particular strategies for targeted areas and based on detailed analysis of ongoing developments. Analysis of this kind and subsequent strategies can only be achieved if there is constant discussion between local, provincial, national and regional levels.
- 77 OCHA contributes to this search for coherence via information sharing tools like the "Who Does What Where" maps, and the elaboration of contact lists.

#### Main achievements and progress made

- 78 The very regular meetings that the Cluster Approach involves has allowed organisations (and the individuals who work for them) to get to know each other better. The evaluation team noted that this has led to the development of genuine partnerships in the field, and the carrying out of joint evaluations<sup>38</sup>, for example, which has led to more coherent responses.
- 79 The existence of Clusters makes it easier for new agencies or new staff to gain access to information<sup>39</sup>. Attending a Cluster meeting to introduce oneself is an excellent way to meet many of the actors concerned by a subject in order to ask questions and identify potential partners or useful sources of information. Makes it easier for those who have just arrived to gain access to structured information
- 80 The implementation of simple information sharing and discussion mechanisms on strategic and operational issues is one of the most crucial contributions of the Cluster Approach in Chad. It has even convinced organisations which are generally Clusters provide an excellent forum for exchanging information

37 The Principles of Partnership, IASC, Geneva.

38 Oxfam GB and Concern WW, Evaluation de la Sécurité Alimentaire, Populations Déplacées et Villages Hôtes, Goz Beida and Kerfi, May 2008.

39 Interviews with NGO staff, minutes of WASH Cluster meetings.

reticent about UN mechanisms, such as MSF and the ICRC<sup>40</sup>, to regularly attend Cluster meetings both in Abéché and in the field<sup>41</sup>.

- 81 One of the essential points of the Cluster Approach is its capacity to support more coherent responses through coordinated, or at least linked, needs assessments. The Clusters can also instigate concerted planning. One of the most eloquent examples of this in Eastern Chad concerns the Food Security Cluster within which the WFP, the FAO, the ICRC and certain NGOs work together to establish maps of food insecurity. Another notable example is the joint mission of the Education Cluster in Kerfi (Dar Sila), which has allowed better understanding of needs and the strategy<sup>42</sup> which needs to be put in place to deal with school attendance issues in this area where there are host populations, IDPs and returnee families.
- 82 The majority of Clusters have produced relatively sophisticated strategic plans, with quantitative indicators (especially result indicators) and sometimes qualitative indicators. These indicators are generally linked to the CAP but are rarely revised during the mid-term review. The action plans produced by the Education<sup>43</sup> and Food Security<sup>44</sup> Clusters are of particularly high quality. Certain Clusters also propose strategies to be discussed and adopted<sup>45</sup>.
- 83 The times when Clusters are particularly effective, when there is obvious cohesion within the group, are when the CAP is being drawn up and during its mid-term review. This is the point when needs assessments are presented, action plans are decided and sector-based strategies are drawn up which the Clusters will then adopt. This process was particularly lively and productive in Chad during the last CAP exercise which took place in August-September 2009<sup>46</sup>.
- 84 On the other hand, fewer Clusters have developed contingency plans. The Health Cluster is ahead of the other Clusters on this issue<sup>47</sup>, no doubt due to the importance given to preparedness activities by the WHO, the Cluster Lead. However, it should be noted that several Clusters contributed to the contingency plan for Eastern Chad prepared by the IASC<sup>48</sup>.

Importance of the links between the Clusters and the CAP process.

40 Applying its “Action oriented, field based coordination” doctrine.

41 Interviews with representatives of the ICRC and MSF in N’Djamena and Abéché.

42 Report of the Education Cluster’s mission in Kerfi, 22/10/2008.

43 Education Cluster action plan for 2009.

44 Minutes of the workshop of 18 and 19 January 2008.

45 UNICEF CHAD, Hygiene Promotion in Emergency situations in Eastern Chad, Strategy document, April 2009, provisional version

46 See minutes of Cluster meetings and CAP workshops in Abéché and N’Djamena.

47 Health Cluster contingency plan, 2009.

48 Contingency plan for Eastern Chad, IASC Chad, March-June 2009.

85 The Working Group on Return did some very interesting work in liaison with the governor of Dar Sila. This work group, which is both inter-Cluster and inter-agency, has just been revived by UNDP as part of its Early Recovery activities. It will be important to follow how the inter-agency and inter-Cluster dynamic is maintained.

86 Apart from a few very developed national NGOs (often in the context of a partnership between a national NGO and an international NGO as exists between SECADEV and Caritas) and others who make a particular effort to take part in the humanitarian response (Futurs Portes du Tchad, Shora, etc.), national NGOs are significantly under-represented in the humanitarian response and, as a result, under-represented within the Clusters. The difficulty of getting access to Internet in Eastern Chad and the logistical difficulties of getting around and the related costs (even if air transport is free thanks to a reasonably well-developed and effective multi-actor service) mean that they are only able to take part in Cluster meetings relatively rarely<sup>49</sup>. Chad's recent history has mostly led to the emergence of NGOs that are active in the field of Human Rights and are very present in N'Djamena. There are very few operational national NGOs, particularly in Eastern Chad. International humanitarian actors, who aim for rapid technical effectiveness, generally make little effort to ensure that national organisations take part in coordination mechanisms.

National NGOs under-represented

87 In certain Clusters, it was easy to opt for common standards, particularly when these came from the government. This was the case for the Education Cluster which very quickly established a method of working with the government's Education Delegations. This Cluster nevertheless did manage to adapt its standards to the specific needs of the population for future return and reintegration into their places of origin<sup>50</sup>. It was in this context that the Education Cluster adopted a "community teacher" strategy. The teachers' training was paid for by the communities but they were trained in government teacher training institutions. The Health Cluster managed to increase the extent to which the Chadian health card was taken into account and contributed to the elaboration and dissemination of national standards in hospital and health centre construction<sup>51</sup>.

Clusters can provide support for the elaboration and dissemination of national standards

### Main problems and areas for improvement

88 Though the Clusters have helped to make a great deal of progress in allowing organisations to explain their strategies to each other, look for joint action points and possible links between operations, there are still significant opportunities for improvement.

49 Interviews with representatives of Chadian NGOs in Abéché.

50 Interviews with Education Cluster members and participation in a Cluster meeting.

51 District hospital and health centre construction norms.



- 89 The question of standards for water and sanitation was complicated. Certain NGOs wanted to discuss the idea of adapting quantitative SPHERE standards to the Chadian context, though the WASH coordinator was not open to this idea. However, several studies<sup>52</sup> have shown that the strict application of SPHERE quantitative standards creates a situation which can not be maintained and puts pressure on natural resources. This increases tension with the local population<sup>53</sup> who do not receive the same service and creates a pull factor which attracts more people to the camps and sites. The standardised approach which is promoted in Chad does not leave much room for discussion about the difference between “untreated” and “potable” water and the importance of taking different water needs into account<sup>54</sup>.
- 90 One of the difficulties which were encountered during the elaboration of collective or shared strategies is connected to the fundamental choice between targeting on the basis of needs or on the basis of status. Resource allocation methods and technical choices are different depending on which approach is chosen. This explains, for example, the differences between the ICRC’s priorities and technical standards for areas which are far away from camps and sites and those of OXFAM in IDP sites.
- 91 One of the means of achieving possible improvements which is still not used enough is for the Cluster to set up evaluations itself, using resources from the Global Cluster. One such evaluation was set up by the Health Cluster.
- 92 The high turnover of staff often prevents organisations from achieving the necessary level of analysis and understanding of the region to be able to elaborate sector-based strategies. Apart from high levels of responsibility in the UN and NGOs and national staff, who are rarely used to full advantage in terms of institutional memory, the average length of time that staff stay in the field is 6 to 8 months.

Clusters can be sources of technical innovation if they do not limit themselves to the question of respect for international norms.

## 4.5 Accountability

- 93 One of the roles which Clusters are supposed to play as part of the UN humanitarian reform is to improve accountability between the Cluster Leads and the Humanitarian Coordinator.

52 Laurent Saillard, Eau et assainissement dans les camps et zones d’accueil des déplacés et réfugiés ainsi que dans les zones possibles de retour, strategic analysis for DG ECHO, June 2008.

53 During the mission, serious incidents took place between the population, refugees and IDPs due to competition over resources and differences in treatment.

54 Report on water in Eastern Chad, ICRC, 2008, ICRC Ndjamen.

- 94 Due to the relatively weak engagement of the former RC/HC on humanitarian issues, the feeling of accountability towards him was weak<sup>55</sup>. The current RC/HC has just arrived and has yet to establish himself.
- 95 Donors have shown real interest in whether or not the Clusters have strengthened coordination. The issue was central to all the multi-donor evaluations which took place such as those in 2008 and 2009. It is also discussed at each of the meetings of the Informal Group of Donors in Geneva, under the aegis of the British permanent mission<sup>56</sup>. This leads to demands for greater accountability from the agencies involved, whether this concerns the Cluster Lead or the members of the Cluster in question.

Power relations are often complicated between Cluster Leads and other members of the Cluster

### Main achievements and progress made

- 96 The existence of a system whereby minutes are systematically produced for each meeting by each Cluster and then shared for comments necessarily creates a form of accountability between the Cluster members.
- 97 Certain Clusters have carried out internal evaluations or evaluations linked to the Global Cluster (example of the Health Cluster<sup>57</sup>) which improve the internal accountability between members of the Cluster. In a number of cases, Cluster members have been evaluated or have carried out internal evaluations and have shared these with the other Cluster members<sup>58</sup>.
- 98 Accountability between peers within each Cluster has often been strengthened. The minutes of the majority of Clusters present the tasks to be carried out with action points for different actors which can be followed up at the next meeting<sup>59</sup>. Accountability between peers has also been strengthened in certain Clusters, when these have been a real place for debate. These clusters have made it possible to collectively discuss certain difficulties or shortcomings observed in the field in relation to the activities of Cluster members<sup>60</sup>. WFP's revision of its needs assessment tools and methods has reinforced accountability within the Food Security Cluster.

### Main problems and areas for improvement

- 99 Within Clusters, accountability mechanisms between Cluster Leads and Cluster members work more from the members to the Cluster Leads than in the opposite direction, notably in the frequent cases when Cluster members are NGO partners

55 Interviews with Cluster Leads in Chad.

56 Interviews with donors.

57 WHO/IRC "Analysis of the implementation of sector-based responsibility, op. cit.

58 ICRC, op. cit.

59 Analysis of minutes of Education and Food Security Clusters from 2008 to October 2009.

60 Observation made during a WASH Cluster meeting in Goz Beida.



of the Lead agency and are therefore financially dependent on it to some degree<sup>61</sup>. This is the case for the Clusters led by the UNHCR (Protection and CCCM) and UNICEF (Education, WASH and Child Protection).

- 100 Examples of accountability towards beneficiaries are much more difficult to identify. Genuine participatory approaches are rare and the Clusters have very limited impact on these. Notable exceptions are a number of agencies in charge of camp management like CONCERN Worldwide which has systematically implemented mechanisms for consultation and handling complaints in IDP sites that they manage as part of the Camp Management Cluster<sup>62</sup>.

Participatory practices  
rarely used

#### 4.6 Gap filling and coverage

- 101 The main goals of the Cluster Approach are to improve geographical and sector-based coverage and to limit, or completely avoid duplications and the loss of limited financial resources that they incur.
- 102 As access is fundamental to being able to identify and fill gaps, and thereby improve geographical coverage, it is necessary to analyse how well this criteria has been met in the face of major security constraints. Increasingly, difficult access to entire areas has led to the concentration of assistance in accessible areas - IDP sites in safe locations or areas (Goz Beida, Koukou) - and the limitation of activities in the other areas where assistance is needed (Chad-Sudan border).
- 103 The slow deployment of the MINURCAT meant that the area could not be completely made safe and pushed the MINURCAT to promote armed escorts to protect humanitarians. The security situation remains difficult and geographical gaps have been getting bigger since the 2nd semester of 2009. A large part of the Assounga and the Sila border have become more or less “out of bounds” for the vast majority of actors.
- 104 Taking into account cross-cutting issues such as the different needs of the numerous categories present in the area (men, women, children, the elderly, and the handicapped) or the environment is one of the most persistent difficulties encountered by the Clusters.

61 Interviews with a large number of NGOs.

62 Evaluation of programmes by CONCERN WW in Goz Beida for Irish Aid, DEC and CONCERN USA.

## Main achievements and progress made

- 105 The discussion of Cluster members' projects during monthly meetings generally allow gaps to be identified and the risk of duplication to be dealt with. Certain donors, like DG ECHO, even make these Cluster meetings the main place for managing these gaps and risks of duplication and strongly urge organisations who want to request funds from them to actively participate in these Clusters and to present their projects<sup>63</sup> to ensure, via a peer review, that there are no duplications.
- 106 Certain Clusters have set up mechanisms to identify gaps in the response. The WASH Cluster has developed a complex matrix to identify gaps in geographical coverage and in meeting standards (litres per person, number of people per latrine, etc.). The Food Security Cluster identifies non-covered needs using the WFP's VAMs and post-harvest surveys<sup>64</sup>. The Health Cluster produces a lot of information which makes it easier to identify gaps: minutes of meetings, information bulletin, weekly mortality and morbidity bulletin.
- 107 An example of good practice in managing coverage is when CARE withdrew from Assoungha in 2009. UNICEF, the Cluster Lead agency, appealed for funding from donors and DG ECHO responded by supporting an NGO present in the area who took up the activities which had been abandoned following CARE's withdrawal.
- 108 The issue of gender is given a lot of consideration by the Protection Cluster. In 2009, the UNHCR, the Lead agency of the Camp Management and Protection Clusters, launched a study into "Age, gender and diversity" for the second consecutive year in order to understand better the specific needs of different categories of population. The UNHCR and UNFPA, who are responsible for taking into account diversity, work together regularly in relation to providing assistance to victims of SGBV.

Environmental issues not sufficiently taken into account by the Clusters

## Main problems and areas for improvement

- 109 The ability to fill gaps in coverage is severely constrained in this context by security issues. The United Nations push for the use of armed escorts while NGOs and the ICRC try to resist. Certain Cluster Leads who have financial relations with Cluster members (or via loans or donations of vehicles) use their position to put pressure on them. This approach has created a great deal of tension between the Cluster Leads and the NGOs with whom they work.

63 OXFAM INTERMON, Project documents for DG ECHO from 15 June 2009 for 2008 WASH activities in Habilé and Koukou Angarana and from 30 March 2009 for 2009 WASH activities in Djabal, Habilé and the region of Dar Sila.

64 Minutes of Food Security Cluster meetings.

- 110 An option which is used in numerous contexts to identify gaps is that of joint missions. In Chad, this strategy is used, but its effectiveness is significantly reduced by security constraints (slowness of escorts, limited time in areas to be visited, problems regarding how the evaluators are perceived by the population due to the fact that they arrive with an armed escort or by helicopter, etc.).
- 111 Duplications and overlapping mandates can also exist between Clusters. This is the case regarding village profiling, which was launched by the UNHCR in Assounga and Sila with some of its partners (InterSos, Première Urgence and Solidarités) in order to identify displacement dynamics and analyse the level of services (water, health, education, etc.) in these areas. This task, which was presented as an activity of the Protection Cluster, created some confusion about this cluster's mandate. It is referred to indiscriminately as the Protection Cluster and the IDP Cluster despite the fact that other Clusters and agencies are obviously concerned with IDPs and more particularly with the return of displaced people<sup>65</sup>.
- 112 Despite the importance of environmental questions in Chad, these are rarely taken into account at a strategic level in the Cluster system. On the other hand, the UNHCR<sup>66</sup> has integrated them into camp management for a long time and a dedicated environmental expert is in place in Abéché. In the WASH Cluster, this issue is rarely taken into account, despite the pressure on water resources that the presence of the sites exerts and the standards that UNICEF tries to promote. The lack of consideration for environmental issues is reinforced by the absence of UNEP, the UN's environment focal point for the Cluster system, which is currently not present in Chad.
- 113 Nothing in the Cluster system in Chad makes it easy to take on the leadership when a multi-disciplinary approach needs to be adopted to ensure that there is complementarity between several sectors to resolve complex and multi-dimensional issues. Inter-sector coordination happens during the meetings in the field organised by NGOs who manage IDP sites.

#### 4.7 Ownership and connectedness

- 114 One of the important challenges of the implementation of the Cluster system is to ensure that there is structured interaction with national actors and that they then take over responsibility for coordination

65 WFP, November 2008, Enquête sur les Capacités d'Autosuffisance Alimentaire des Réfugiés, Déplacés et Retournés à l'Est du Tchad.

66 UNHCR, Environment Unit Abéché, Rapport d'évaluation de l'impact de la stratégie de fourniture de l'énergie domestique aux réfugiés vivant dans les camps de l'est du Tchad, December 2008.

- 115 Several evaluations have noted that, on arriving in the area in 2004 and at the time of their mass deployment in 2007, humanitarian actors often ignored local technical authorities, national NGOs and pre-existing development programmes in the area<sup>67</sup>. The implementation of Clusters was often done in a similar way. One of the recognised risks of the Cluster Approach is that it can create conflict between the national authorities and humanitarian actors if relations with the national authorities are not treated with care.
- 116 One of the issues facing the Cluster system is whether it is capable of changing from a coordination system geared towards emergency relief into another mechanism capable of ensuring the transition to development.

Local authorities rarely have the capacity to manage clusters

### Main achievements and progress made

- 117 Relations with the local and national authorities vary from one Cluster to the next. However, in general, there has been a great deal of effort to establish good working relations with the technical authorities. For certain Clusters like the Health Cluster, the meetings in Abéché always take place in the premises of the regional health delegation. This raises a certain number of questions as the majority of the activities to be coordinated take place in other regions. The Education delegate is systematically invited to the Cluster meetings in UNICEF's offices in Abéché and in Goz Beida and he attends quite regularly. Similarly, the Hydraulics delegate in Abéché often chairs the meetings of the WASH Cluster.
- 118 Interaction between the Clusters and the national authorities is not very advanced. The transfer of information in either direction has yet to be established, as was apparent during a WASH Cluster meeting during which the Director of Hydraulics at the Central Ministry in N'Djamena came to find out about the situation.
- 119 With the centre of gravity of coordination gradually moving from Abéché to N'Djamena, the efforts of certain Clusters to strengthen their relations with technical ministries will surely be constructive. This will be essential when there is a transition from the current protracted crisis situation to a development situation.

### Main problems and areas for improvement

- 120 It is reasonably clear that the Cluster system, which uses up a lot of time and depends on regular access to internet, is not adapted to the capacity and way of working of local authorities.

67 Groupe URD, Strategic Report on Eastern Chad, DG ECHO, 2008.

- 121 Concerns about how the regional situation will develop, the possible dynamics of future conflicts and the security of areas where activities are taking place represent obstacles to greater interaction between the Clusters and the national authorities in the future.
- 122 There are doubts about the role of the Early Recovery Cluster and more generally, of UNDP, in developing transition strategies. The creation of sector-based groups by UNDP at the level of ministries in N'Djamena was done without interaction or consultation with the specific technical Clusters, which has raised questions amongst humanitarian actors.
- 123 Certain national instruments are still not very well known and are often not used by humanitarians, particularly by international agencies and NGOs. Examples of these instruments are the Schéma<sup>68</sup> directeur de l'eau et de l'assainissement du Tchad and the Code de l'eau.
- 124 A subject which has raised a lot of questions is the interaction between the humanitarian system and the MINURCAT. This has taken on particular importance with the elaboration by the MINURCAT and part of the UN Country team of an Integrated Strategic Framework<sup>69</sup> which obviously concerns numerous technical sectors coordinated via the Clusters, without them being involved or even informed. Opinions differ a great deal about this integration process (even if the MINURCAT is not an integrated mission) between different UN agencies and different levels within the agencies (policy or operations levels) and NGOs on the whole are excluded from discussions on this matter, despite the fact that it concerns them.
- 125 It should be noted that the DG ECHO/BPRM<sup>70</sup> joint mission report of January 2009 stated that it was important to have a Humanitarian Coordinator who was able to remain independent in relation to the MINURCAT and was able to defend certain positions concerning humanitarian principles when faced with the political machinery set in motion by the DPKO in connection with the political decisions of the UN General Assembly, the Security Council and other mechanisms (Political Affairs, Peacekeeping Commission, etc.).
- 126 The fact that police and legal authorities as well as representatives of the civil components of the MINURCAT participate in the activities of the Protection Cluster close to the field level (directly observed during Protection Cluster

The relations between the Cluster system and DPKO missions have yet to be clarified

68 Ministry of the Environment and Water: Schéma directeur de l'eau et de l'assainissement du Tchad, April 2003. Ministry of the Environment and Water, law n°16/PR/99 of 18 August 1999, known as Code de l'eau.

69 The drawing up of these ISFs is part of the new strategy by the DPKO to reinforce integration between civilian and military actions during peacekeeping operations.

70 Joint mission by DG RECHP/BPMR, January 2009.

meetings in Goz Beida) poses a certain number of questions, one of which is how well the Clusters can manage confidential information. As a result, the ICRC, one of the main actors involved in protection, is very reticent about taking part in this Cluster. On several occasions, information which was supposed to remain confidential made its way to New York a few days later and figured in a report by the Secretary-General.

#### 4.8 Effects on affected populations

- 127 One of the objectives of the UN humanitarian reform, and the Cluster Approach, is to improve the quality of response and improve the living conditions of victims of crises.

##### Main achievements and progress made

- 128 It is possible to outline certain positive effects on beneficiaries of the increased responsibility that the Cluster Approach gives to sectors.
- 129 Health monitoring<sup>71</sup> and the rapid response capacity of the Health Cluster mean that any epidemiological phenomenon can be caught in time. Measles epidemics are rapidly checked and possible risks of meningitis are monitored with great care.
- 130 The monitoring of available water for displaced populations led to increased efforts to provide site residents with the required daily quantity of water. However, this improvement widened the gap between their living conditions and those of the local population and the living conditions they are used to in the villages they come from.

##### Main problems and areas for improvement

- 131 Though it is possible to outline the effect of the Clusters on the quantity of people reached, through improved coverage of areas and communities where there is no response, on the other hand, it is difficult to really quantify, or sometimes even qualify, the effects of this new coordination method on local people. Population control groups are rare. It is not really possible to compare a situation « with » and a situation « without ». On the one hand, the implementation of the Cluster system happened almost exactly at the same time as the peak in the IDP crisis. The refugees who are the other group targeted by humanitarian programmes and a coordination system who could serve as a control group, already benefit from a high level of humanitarian aid provided by the UNHCR.

71 Via the implementation of the epidemiology surveillance system, the production of the weekly Mortality and Morbidity Bulletin (EWAR bulletin) and the Cluster meetings.

132 The fact that the WFP food supplies was cut did not have any observable nutritional repercussions on the population. This can be explained by the fact that the population had developed coping strategies having understood that it was not in their interest to be completely dependent on aid. These mechanisms are carefully monitored by certain members of the Food Security Cluster and the related information is presented at the Cluster meetings.

#### 4.9 Interaction with the other pillars of the UN humanitarian reform

133 The Cluster Approach is part of a package of reforms which includes strengthening the way the Humanitarian Coordinator system functions, improving funding mechanisms (CERF and CAP) and reinforcing partnerships (on the basis of the principles of partnership).

134 The Humanitarian Coordinator component was covered in section 4.3 and the question of partnerships was looked at in detail in “section 4.4.

##### Main achievements and progress made

135 The Consolidated Appeals Process (CAP) and the Central Emergency Response Fund (CERF) are the main mechanisms used by the United Nations and a certain number of donors to fund humanitarian action in Chad. Funds from the CERF are attributed on the basis of a certain number of “life-saving” criteria which are not necessarily adapted to the context in Chad where there is a low-intensity protracted crisis and sporadic violence.

136 Interaction between the Clusters and the CAP is intense and constructive. The Clusters contribute to the preparation and mid-term review of the CAP by transmitting information to OCHA. During the group work which takes place each year between the end of August and mid-September, each Cluster takes part in the identification of needs and the drawing up of sector strategies for the CAP. They must also contribute to establishing priorities for each sector and, in certain cases, selecting projects. The new e-request system which was introduced in 2009 by OCHA has transferred the responsibility for selecting projects from the field to the CAP office in Geneva, thus removing this responsibility from each Cluster.

137 In theory, funding priorities for the CERF are established via relatively similar procedures, but on a smaller and more limited scale on the basis of information about the funds that are available for the country sent by the Emergency Relief Coordinator to the Humanitarian Coordinator<sup>72</sup>.

72 Letter of 20 July 2009 from John Holmes, ERC, to Michele Falavigna, Chad RC/HC.



- 138 Priorities for funding requests to the CERF are also decided within the Clusters. Each Cluster then presents their needs during inter-Cluster meetings<sup>73</sup> in N'Djamena and the HC arbitrates between them.
- 139 Project documents completed by UN agencies, the only agencies with access to CERF funds, regularly point out that the agency in question is a Cluster Lead and also mention its implementing partners. However, phrases such as, “As Cluster lead in education and in collaboration with NGO partners such as JRS, PU, SCF-UK, IRD and IRW, UNICEF thus plans to ensure access to quality education to the affected IDP and host communities in the main gap areas<sup>74</sup>” do not give any indication of the extent to which member agencies were consulted and will benefit from CERF funds. In other cases, such as a request by UNICEF for the creation of areas for children, implementing partners are mentioned more clearly<sup>75</sup>, thus reinforcing the Cluster effect.

#### Main problems and areas for improvement

- 140 NGO partners of UN agencies who receive funds from the CERF regularly complain about the slowness of disbursements by these agencies. According to the CERF Secretariat in New York, the funds are systematically transferred to the agencies within a month of the HC giving his/her accord. As the NGOs often mention delays of several months, the hold up appears to be taking place within the UN agencies.
- 141 A certain number of bilateral donors, who do not formally contribute to the CAP, find that the Cluster system is very useful<sup>76</sup> as it allows projects to be discussed between peers, helps to avoid duplication and improve coherence between each project and encourages collective reflection.

73 Minutes of the preparation meeting for requests to the CERF, 12 August 2009, N'Djamena

74 Presentation document for the project to improve education, presented by UNICEF to CERF, CHD-09/E/21968.

75 In the precise case of request CHD-09/P-HR-RL/22007 of 14 August 2009, the NGOs concerned were: InterSOS, SECADEV, CARE, Africare, CORD and COOPI.

76 Interviews with representatives of DG ECHO in Chad as well as with the French Embassy's Humanitarian correspondent.



## 5 Conclusions

- 142 In general, the evaluation team met with far fewer negative opinions about the Cluster Approach than it had initially expected. There is general agreement that improved coordination has brought positive effects. The improved identification of gaps in the coverage of needs, reduced risks of duplication and the establishment of ties between individuals and institutions are seen by all those involved as fundamental aspects of the Cluster Approach.
- 143 However, the system is not very efficient. It imposes a significant workload on everyone which could compromise the credibility and viability of the system in the medium term. NGOs, and national NGOs in particular, have found it difficult not to be excluded from the system which imposes an enormous workload and requires significant means in terms of logistics and communications.
- 144 Though the Cluster system has not contributed to the establishment of many joint missions, it has nevertheless been an important mechanism for presenting the results of needs analyses carried out by different members. The sharing and articulation of these is central to the Cluster system.
- 145 The impact that the Cluster system has had on the adoption of international standards is judged to be weak. The real impact that it has had on technical practices has come from technical debates which have taken place during Cluster meetings, particularly when Clusters have allowed national standards to be elaborated, reinforced and disseminated.
- 146 The pyramid system of the Cluster Approach, which goes from the field to the capital, with inter-agency components at each level, does not allow cross-cutting and multi-dimensional issues to be taken into account in a strategic manner. Attempts to implement multi-disciplinary approaches have been hampered by the cumbersome nature of the Cluster system's silo approach and the complex, or unwieldy nature of inter-Cluster processes.
- 147 The Cluster system in Chad is also badly equipped conceptually to determine its methods of disengagement. The fact that there is still debate about whether assistance should be provided in a "relief" mode, "protracted crisis" mode or whether a "development" mode can be revived, does not make it easy to identify transition mechanisms.
- 148 Staff turnover within Cluster member organisations and the turnover of Cluster coordinators and Heads of agencies mean that particular care needs to be taken with information management.

- 149 It is absolutely crucial to have a strong OCHA Country Office in order for the Clusters to function correctly from the beginning to the end of the crisis and for information management to be as effective as possible.
- 150 The principle added value of the Cluster Approach in Chad is:
- The predictable way in which the organisation or individual who will lead the Clusters is designated;
  - The implementation of a coordination system that is both systemic and systematic with clear expected outputs (minutes, maps, preparation of CAPs and CERF funding requests);
  - The implementation of information sharing mechanisms and bodies.
- 151 *Do these results justify the financial and human investment involved?* With regard to the Chad Country study, the answer is yes, both with regard to the operational results obtained and everything that has been learned which can be used to help coordination mechanisms become more efficient, more convivial and more flexible and which are capable of adapting themselves to changing situations and needs in the field.
- 152 The Chad Country Study was an opportunity to re-examine a certain number of the hypotheses which figured in the logical framework developed by OCHA in relation to the TORs of the Cluster 2 evaluation.
- 153 One of the key lessons of the Chad Country Study is the importance given to humanitarian issues by the RC (the relative importance given to the HC function in relation to the RC function). It is a determining factor with regard to the accountability of Clusters towards the HC. In a context where the RC/HC shows relatively little interest in humanitarian issues or has just taken up the position, accountability still needs to be established and is therefore not a real input.
- 154 A second lesson is the importance of individuals. Even though one of the objectives of the Cluster system is to establish a systemic approach to coordination, the quality of individual staff remains a key factor in determining whether or not a Cluster will succeed or fail. Leadership is as much an input as it is an output.
- 155 Following on from this observation, we can conclude that the establishment of partnerships and coherent approaches are more the result of leadership rather than outputs at the same level, as proposed in the logical framework.

<sup>156</sup> In the same way, it is clear that the notion of accountability is above all a result which is linked to the respect and credibility that the Cluster manages to generate between Cluster members and between the Cluster members and the Cluster Lead.

## 6 Recommendations

### Guiding principles and objectives of these recommendations

157 The following recommendations were drawn up with reference to a certain number of basic principles, some from the Logic Model and others which the authors consider to be fundamental for the future of the Cluster Approach. The central focus of the recommendations are local people and they are made with the following objectives in mind:

- better coverage, better management of time and better quality of response;
- greater involvement of different actors, notably international and Chadian NGOs;
- more strategic relations with national authorities;
- relations with the MINURCAT firmly based on humanitarian principles;
- greater respect for the humanitarian principles of independence, impartiality, neutrality and humanity;
- better analysis of contexts and understanding of needs through regular assessment of situations and constraints;
- regular monitoring and evaluation which allows continual adaptation to changing contexts.

### Recommendations

158 **Recommendation 1**

**Ensure that the responsibilities of the Cluster Lead are clearly specified in the Terms of Reference of the Agency Head and the HC.**

159 In addition to the presentations which are made during Montreux retreats and training courses, HCs should be properly informed about their responsibilities with regard to the Clusters.

160 **Recommendation 2**

**Ensure optimal use of the resources dedicated to coordination and that the objectives of each Cluster are precise and understood.**

» OCHA and the Cluster Lead agencies

161 To do this, the role of Cluster Lead is clearly specified in the ToRs of Heads of agencies in the capital. The ToRs of each Cluster should be revised to clarify what the expected results are. Cluster coordinators should be given more training and should have a complete “kit” in French, including the IASC directives and the other documents that they need to do their job effectively and efficiently. The way that meetings are run also needs to be improved so that they do not just involve the collection of information but also focus on key issues which can be debated collectively. Data about the activities carried out by each partner and the value of indicators should be collected, organised and made available to the Cluster members before each meeting. It is also necessary to ensure that Cluster coordinators have the necessary skills for this function, particularly facilitation and mobilisation skills.

162 **Recommendation 3**

**Ensure that the Cluster system allows the diversity of the target population to be taken into account**

» OCHA, UNDP and the UNHCR

163 In order to do this, the interaction between the different coordination systems needs to continue to improve, with the UNHCR taking part in the meetings of technical Clusters such as Health and WASH. The needs of host populations also need to be taken into account in technical discussions within Clusters. If this is difficult because of lack of funding, there should be an active advocacy campaign to ask donors to support actions in favour of host populations.

164 It is important to continue to develop sustainable solutions based on people’s strategies (return to the area of origin, relocation to another area, integration into settlements around sites and camps).

165 **Recommendation 4**

**The mechanisms for implementing and withdrawing Clusters need to be revised, and the relations between the national and sub-national levels need to be rethought**

» OCHA, IASC, ERC

166 The mechanisms for activating and de-activating Clusters need to be clarified with regard to coordination needs and with regard to the relations between humanitarian action, LRRD, risk reduction and the effects of weak development. They also need to be clarified to take into account the diversity of territorial issues. It is to be encouraged that coordination will primarily take place between the capital and

the field and that Abéché's "hub" role is being drastically reduced. This will make it easier to consider the deployment of certain Clusters in other regions (Food security, Nutrition and WASH Clusters in Kanem region, for example).

**167 Recommendation 5**

**Each Cluster needs to manage difficulties and issues related to the humanitarian environment (insecurity, presence of the MINURCAT and of the DIS) more effectively**  
» OCHA, MINURCAT and DPKO

168 The interactions between coordination, security and action need to be analysed more effectively. Clusters must not become a tool for collecting information and producing reports for Cluster Lead agencies who no longer have access to the field.

169 The role of the MINURCAT also needs to be clarified with regard to the humanitarian coordination system in general and specifically within the Cluster system. Coordination with the MINURCAT on "technical" subjects should go through the right channels. Interaction is possible via a number of mechanisms (HLU, certain Clusters that MINURCAT is a member of, CIMIC, "QIP" committee) but this leads to confusion and the risk of incoherence.

**170 Recommendation 6**

**Improve interaction between funding mechanisms and Clusters.**

171 It is important that the financial relationships which exist within certain Clusters between the Lead agency, which receives the funds, and NGOs, should not be allowed to become relationships of domination which are contrary to the "Principles of Partnership". Care needs to be taken to make sure that participation in a Cluster is not seen simply as a way of gaining access to funds, as this would distort the way they functioned (for Cluster Lead agencies and NGOs).

172 Cluster coordinators should encourage members to speak openly at meetings. With regard to the interaction between Clusters and funding mechanisms (CAP, CERF, etc.), Clusters should continue to be a place for discussing strategic issues, making decisions about priorities in terms of needs and areas for operations and defining criteria for the selection of projects. The way projects are selected and financial decisions are made should be made more transparent (by systematically communicating the results of these processes to Cluster members).

173 **Recommendation 7**

**Improve the way multi-sector issues are taken into account at the field level (geographical coordination, which is multi-sector by nature) and at the central and strategic level**

» all

- 174 To improve multi-sector capacity, exchange and coordination need to be reinforced at the infra levels of the system, which is where information is exchanged and solutions to multi-dimensional issues are identified (problem-based versus sector-based). The question of people returning to their places of origin also needs to be managed as an inter-Cluster issue. As such, strong links need to be established with the database created by the UNHCR so that it really becomes an inter-agency database.

175 **Recommendation 8**

**Improve the way that cross-cutting issues are taken into account.**

» all

- 176 The analysis of diversity needs to be improved (Age, Gender and Diversity) and needs to be taken into account at the operational level. Environmental issues related to the humanitarian situation and the presence of aid must be taken into account operationally by each Cluster and not only in relation to Early Recovery. There is an urgent need for UNEP to either establish an office in Chad or implement an alternative mechanism to improve the way the environment is taken into account by sending experts or supporting a specialist organisation.
- 177 Certain cross-cutting themes like the environment are discussed during CAP workshops but Clusters need to incorporate them more effectively. They deserve to be analysed and discussed in each Cluster in order to outline an operational strategy and establish action plans.

178 **Recommendation 9**

**Reinforce mechanisms for transferring responsibilities to national institutions as soon as the situation allows and supporting national capacity so that they can take over coordination (link with sector-based groups).**

» all

- 179 Basic training and equipment should be given to technical governmental bodies so that they can gradually take over technical coordination, without forgetting the fundamental principles of humanitarian action (and particularly independence and impartiality, while there continues to be a conflict situation). The Clusters should participate in the Sector Group system that UNDP is currently setting up with the Chadian technical ministries.



180 **Recommendation 10**

**Improve information management in the short term and knowledge management in the medium term for each Cluster and for the system as a whole**

» OCHA, IASC and Global Clusters

181 An Information and Knowledge Management strategy should be put in place.

**Table 1**  
**Elements of an Information and Knowledge Management Strategy**

When?	What?	Who?
When the Clusters are deployed in other areas than the East	Implementation of a launch kit including: The Cluster Terms of Reference Technical guides, etc. Information gathered about previous experience	OCHA and Cluster Lead agencies  OCHA and the Government
During the "protracted crisis" phase	Avoid duplications in the GIC systems and ensure on the contrary that services such as cartography (map production) or file management (coordinated and compatible data bases) are shared. Place OCHA at the heart of the information management system. Redistribute ToRs, technical guides, etc. regularly Store the information continually produced by the Clusters. Develop Internet sites and Google groups. The current use of the OCHA Chad internet site as an information sharing tool (information about the Cluster system, the Terms of Reference as well as Cluster strategies and different coordination platforms, etc.) should be reinforced.	OCHA OCHA and Cluster Lead agencies OCHA and Cluster Lead agencies OCHA
During the preparation of the transition	Compile information Organise feedback Transfer to the Government and the global level	OCHA and Cluster Lead agencies OCHA, Government, and Cluster Lead agencies OCHA and Government

## Annex 1

### Analysis of the performance of each Cluster

L'équipe d'évaluation a tenté d'évaluer la performance de chaque cluster mis en place au Tchad grâce à une série d'indicateurs (voir Annexe 2). Le jugement porté sur chacun de ces indicateurs est le résultat d'un travail de revue extensive de la documentation, d'interviews et d'exercices participatifs. Sur cette base, chacun des évaluateurs de l'équipe a donné ses notes sur chacun des clusters de façon indépendante et les a comparés avec celles données par les autres indicateurs. Quand il y a eu des différences, les deux évaluateurs ont cherché à trouver une base commune. Les « portraits des clusters » ci-dessus révèlent plus des tendances que de remplacer pas des évaluations précises cluster par cluster. L'échelle utilisée cherche à présenter de façon compacte des informations très complexes et détaillées.

## Protection


















### Echelles des indicateurs

N°	Indicateur	Echelle
1	Mesure de la couverture géographique supplémentaire	
2	Mesure de la couverture thématique supplémentaire	
3	Ciblage basé sur des besoins différenciés	
4	Degré d'implication des acteurs nationaux appropriés	
5	Stratégies de passation et de sortie	
6	Interaction avec le système du Coordinateur Humanitaire	
7	Interaction avec le pilier du financement	
8	Prise de responsabilité (leadership prévisible)	
9	Mise en oeuvre du concept 'opérateur en dernier recours'	
10	Qualité des relations entre (non-)membres du Cluster	
11	Qualité des relations entre Clusters	
12	Qualité du partage de l'information	
13	Cohérence des directives stratégiques et des activités	
14	Degré de réalisation des standards pertinents	
15	Participation des populations affectées	
16	Redevabilité envers le HC/RC et à l'intérieur du Cluster	
17	Réponse aux besoins/attentes des acteurs humanitaires	
18	Qualité et niveau de soutien du Global Cluster	

- Le Cluster Protection joue un rôle important dans le dialogue sur des questions sensibles. Il reste néanmoins vu comme un outil du HCR via le financement des partenaires HCR plutôt que comme un vrai espace de dialogue collectif.
- participation de la MINURCAT lors des réunions du Cluster Protection pose question sur la protection des informations partagées. Des dispositions sont prises (réunions spécifiques pour les cas individuels sans la MONUC) pour assurer la confidentialité des informations sur les cas individuels.
- L'appropriation par le Cluster Protection d'activités nécessairement inter-Clusters, spécialement la cartographie des zones de retour, contribue à une certaine confusion qui fait parfois appeler le Cluster Protection le Cluster « IDP ».

## Nutrition

### Echelles des indicateurs

N°	Indicateur	Echelle
1	Mesure de la couverture géographique supplémentaire	
2	Mesure de la couverture thématique supplémentaire	
3	Ciblage basé sur des besoins différenciés	
4	Degré d'implication des acteurs nationaux appropriés	
5	Stratégies de passation et de sortie	
6	Interaction avec le système du Coordinateur Humanitaire	
7	Interaction avec le pilier du financement	
8	Prise de responsabilité (leadership prévisible)	
9	Mise en oeuvre du concept 'opérateur en dernier recours'	
10	Qualité des relations entre (non-)membres du Cluster	
11	Qualité des relations entre Clusters	
12	Qualité du partage de l'information	
13	Cohérence des directives stratégiques et des activités	
14	Degré de réalisation des standards pertinents	
15	Participation des populations affectées	
16	Redevabilité envers le HC/RC et à l'intérieur du Cluster	
17	Réponse aux besoins/attentes des acteurs humanitaires	
18	Qualité et niveau de soutien du Global Cluster	DONNÉES PAS SUFFISANTES

- Le Cluster Nutrition est un Cluster doté d'une bonne capacité technique et d'une bonne capacité à travailler avec les autres Clusters pertinents (Sécurité alimentaire et Santé).
- Les membres et non-membres y participent de façon relativement active.
- Par contre, il a du mal à aborder un certain nombre de questions qui touchent à la diversité des besoins en fonction des zones et des types de populations.

## WASH

### Echelles des indicateurs

N°	Indicateur	Echelle
1	Mesure de la couverture géographique supplémentaire	
2	Mesure de la couverture thématique supplémentaire	
3	Ciblage basé sur des besoins différenciés	
4	Degré d'implication des acteurs nationaux appropriés	
5	Stratégies de passation et de sortie	
6	Interaction avec le système du Coordinateur Humanitaire	
7	Interaction avec le pilier du financement	
8	Prise de responsabilité (leadership prévisible)	
9	Mise en oeuvre du concept 'opérateur en dernier recours'	
10	Qualité des relations entre (non-)membres du Cluster	
11	Qualité des relations entre Clusters	
12	Qualité du partage de l'information	
13	Cohérence des directives stratégiques et des activités	
14	Degré de réalisation des standards pertinents	
15	Participation des populations affectées	
16	Redevabilité envers le HC/RC et à l'intérieur du Cluster	
17	Réponse aux besoins/attentes des acteurs humanitaires	
18	Qualité et niveau de soutien du Global Cluster	

- Le Cluster WASH est souvent ressenti comme un outil de l'UNICEF pour collecter de l'information, plutôt que comme un outil stratégique de réflexion stratégique et de résolution de problèmes.
- Il a notamment jusqu'à très récemment été rendu largement inefficace par un mode de fonctionnement lourd et très consommateur de temps.
- Il a également connu une longue période d'activité ralentie du fait d'absence ou d'insuffisance de ressource humaine.
- Le fait que l'UNICEF s'y positionne comme un guichet de financement est largement tempéré par le fait que de nombreuses ONG soient financées par d'autres bailleurs (DG ECHO, DFID, Coopération Française).
- Le manque de contact entre le Cluster WASH et les acteurs de développement travaillant dans la zone sur le secteur de l'eau rend la définition de stratégies de sortie plus difficile.

## Santé

### Echelles des indicateurs

N°	Indicateur	Echelle
1	Mesure de la couverture géographique supplémentaire	
2	Mesure de la couverture thématique supplémentaire	
3	Ciblage basé sur des besoins différenciés	
4	Degré d'implication des acteurs nationaux appropriés	
5	Stratégies de passation et de sortie	
6	Interaction avec le système du Coordinateur Humanitaire	
7	Interaction avec le pilier du financement	
8	Prise de responsabilité (leadership prévisible)	
9	Mise en oeuvre du concept 'opérateur en dernier recours'	
10	Qualité des relations entre (non-)membres du Cluster	
11	Qualité des relations entre Clusters	
12	Qualité du partage de l'information	
13	Cohérence des directives stratégiques et des activités	
14	Degré de réalisation des standards pertinents	
15	Participation des populations affectées	
16	Redevabilité envers le HC/RC et à l'intérieur du Cluster	
17	Réponse aux besoins/attentes des acteurs humanitaires	
18	Qualité et niveau de soutien du Global Cluster	

- Le Cluster Santé fonctionne plutôt bien, et ceci devrait encore s'améliorer avec la nomination récente d'un Coordinateur du Cluster pour le niveau central de N'Djamena.
- Le Cluster Santé est le seul à prendre en compte d'une façon globale l'ensemble des populations de l'Est du Tchad (réfugiés, populations déplacées et populations hôtes).
- Les outils produits par le Cluster Global sont arrivés régulièrement au cours de la période récente.
- C'est un des Clusters qui a la stratégie de communication et de partage de l'information la plus active, notamment dans le cadre des mécanismes de veille sanitaire.
- Les liens entre le Cluster et les institutions tchadiennes en charge de la santé sont plutôt bonnes avec une implication régulière des Délégués de la Santé lors des réunions des Clusters à Abéché et à Goz Beida.



## Sécurité alimentaire

### Echelles des indicateurs

N°	Indicateur	Echelle
1	Mesure de la couverture géographique supplémentaire	
2	Mesure de la couverture thématique supplémentaire	
3	Ciblage basé sur des besoins différenciés	
4	Degré d'implication des acteurs nationaux appropriés	
5	Stratégies de passation et de sortie	
6	Interaction avec le système du Coordinateur Humanitaire	
7	Interaction avec le pilier du financement	
8	Prise de responsabilité (leadership prévisible)	
9	Mise en oeuvre du concept 'opérateur en dernier recours'	
10	Qualité des relations entre (non-)membres du Cluster	
11	Qualité des relations entre Clusters	
12	Qualité du partage de l'information	
13	Cohérence des directives stratégiques et des activités	
14	Degré de réalisation des standards pertinents	
15	Participation des populations affectées	
16	Redevabilité envers le HC/RC et à l'intérieur du Cluster	
17	Réponse aux besoins/attentes des acteurs humanitaires	
18	Qualité et niveau de soutien du Global Cluster	PAS APPLICABLE

- La double tutelle PAM-FAO commence à bien fonctionner, avec néanmoins des visions et des perspectives parfois différentes.
- Le Cluster a mis en place une dynamique assez inclusive d'évaluation des besoins, en impliquant notamment ONG et CICR.
- Le niveau de fonctionnement du Cluster est beaucoup plus porté par le Coordinateur du Cluster sur le terrain que par la Représentation de la FAO à N'Djamena. Ceci pose des questions sur le niveau de redevabilité du Cluster face au HC.
- Le fait que les activités agricoles et pastorales soient au cœur des problématiques de retour induit une nécessité de bonne coordination entre le Cluster Sécurité alimentaire et le Cluster Relèvement précoce. Ceci était encore, lors du passage de la mission, au stade de la réflexion.

## CCCM, Abris et Aide non alimentaire

### Echelles des indicateurs

N°	Indicateur	Echelle
1	Mesure de la couverture géographique supplémentaire	
2	Mesure de la couverture thématique supplémentaire	
3	Ciblage basé sur des besoins différenciés	
4	Degré d'implication des acteurs nationaux appropriés	
5	Stratégies de passation et de sortie	
6	Interaction avec le système du Coordinateur Humanitaire	
7	Interaction avec le pilier du financement	
8	Prise de responsabilité (leadership prévisible)	
9	Mise en oeuvre du concept 'opérateur en dernier recours'	
10	Qualité des relations entre (non-)membres du Cluster	
11	Qualité des relations entre Clusters	
12	Qualité du partage de l'information	
13	Cohérence des directives stratégiques et des activités	
14	Degré de réalisation des standards pertinents	
15	Participation des populations affectées	
16	Redevabilité envers le HC/RC et à l'intérieur du Cluster	
17	Réponse aux besoins/attentes des acteurs humanitaires	
18	Qualité et niveau de soutien du Global Cluster	

- Ce Cluster reproduit de façon assez claire le mode de coordination que le HCR met en place dans les camps de réfugiés. Il correspond à une bonne coordination « situationnelle » pour faire face aux différents besoins d'un site de déplacés.
- Certaines ONG impliquées ont mis en place des processus assez participatifs impliquant les populations des sites et leurs représentants.
- Il ya une certaine redondance entre ce que ce Cluster fait au niveau des sites et les mécanismes inter-Clusters « terrain ».

## Relèvement Précoce

### Echelles des indicateurs

N°	Indicateur	Echelle
1	Mesure de la couverture géographique supplémentaire	
2	Mesure de la couverture thématique supplémentaire	
3	Ciblage basé sur des besoins différenciés	
4	Degré d'implication des acteurs nationaux appropriés	
5	Stratégies de passation et de sortie	
6	Interaction avec le système du Coordinateur Humanitaire	
7	Interaction avec le pilier du financement	
8	Prise de responsabilité (leadership prévisible)	
9	Mise en oeuvre du concept 'opérateur en dernier recours'	
10	Qualité des relations entre (non-)membres du Cluster	
11	Qualité des relations entre Clusters	
12	Qualité du partage de l'information	
13	Cohérence des directives stratégiques et des activités	
14	Degré de réalisation des standards pertinents	
15	Participation des populations affectées	
16	Redevabilité envers le HC/RC et à l'intérieur du Cluster	
17	Réponse aux besoins/attentes des acteurs humanitaires	
18	Qualité et niveau de soutien du Global Cluster	

- Le Cluster Relèvement précoce est un des Clusters qui a du mal à se mettre en place et à asseoir une légitimité. Il est trop vu comme l'outil du PNUD plutôt que celui de tous les acteurs réfléchissant sur les dynamiques de la gestion de la relation « urgence-développement ».
- Le rôle de ce Cluster pour le développement de réflexions stratégiques et d'une planification des activités liées à l'intégration économique ou au retour des déplacés dans leurs zones d'origine peut potentiellement être essentiel. Ceci demandera qu'il obtienne sa légitimité vis-à-vis des autres Clusters.

## Logistique

### Echelles des indicateurs

N°	Indicateur	Echelle
1	Mesure de la couverture géographique supplémentaire	
2	Mesure de la couverture thématique supplémentaire	
3	Ciblage basé sur des besoins différenciés	PAS APPLICABLE
4	Degré d'implication des acteurs nationaux appropriés	
5	Stratégies de passation et de sortie	
6	Interaction avec le système du Coordinateur Humanitaire	
7	Interaction avec le pilier du financement	
8	Prise de responsabilité (leadership prévisible)	
9	Mise en oeuvre du concept 'opérateur en dernier recours'	PAS APPLICABLE
10	Qualité des relations entre (non-)membres du Cluster	
11	Qualité des relations entre Clusters	
12	Qualité du partage de l'information	
13	Cohérence des directives stratégiques et des activités	
14	Degré de réalisation des standards pertinents	
15	Participation des populations affectées	PAS APPLICABLE
16	Redevabilité envers le HC/RC et à l'intérieur du Cluster	
17	Réponse aux besoins/attentes des acteurs humanitaires	
18	Qualité et niveau de soutien du Global Cluster	

- Le Cluster Logistique est un Cluster de « service aux acteurs » et a assuré un travail de grande qualité reconnu par tous, tant dans le partage de l'information que dans la mise en place de solutions très pratiques aux problèmes de tous.
- Il bénéficie de l'important support du PAM et fonctionne presque plus comme « opérateur en premier recours », en solutionnant les problèmes avec une forte capacité d'anticipation.
- La grande qualité humaine du personnel impliqué a sans aucun doute fortement joué dans l'inclusivité du Cluster. Le fait d'avoir un coordinateur Cluster entièrement dédié a également joué un rôle important.

## Annex 2

### Evaluation indicators

#### KEY QUESTION

To what degree has the cluster approach modified and strengthened the humanitarian response (in terms of gaps filled and greater geographic, thematic and quality of coverage, as well as ownership/connectedness)?

#### INDICATOR

##### 1. EXTENT OF ADDITIONAL GEOGRAPHIC COVERAGE

Extent of additional geographic coverage (gaps and duplications) since the introduction of the cluster approach in frequently reoccurring sudden onset or protracted crises.

NOTE: When assessing the additional geographic and thematic coverage achieved through the cluster approach, current response efforts need to be compared to previous response efforts. Such a comparison is only reasonably possible in cases of long-term, protracted crises or where similar sudden-onset disasters reoccur frequently

#### EVALUATION CRITERION

Effectiveness

#### LEVEL OF LOGIC MODEL

Outcome

#### SCALE

**0:** No additional geographic coverage despite agreed upon needs; duplication not identified

**1:** Measures for better geographic coverage developed, but not implemented; duplications identified, but not addressed

**2:** Measures partly implemented; geographic coverage increasing; duplications avoided

**3:** Evidence of significantly increased geographic coverage

#### INDICATOR

##### 2. EXTENT OF ADDITIONAL THEMATIC COVERAGE

Extent of additional thematic coverage (gaps and duplications) since the introduction of the cluster approach, including the coverage of cross-cutting issues (gender, environment, HIV), within and between clusters

#### EVALUATION CRITERION

Effectiveness

#### LEVEL OF LOGIC MODEL

Outcome

#### SCALE

**0:** No additional coverage of programming areas despite agreed upon needs; duplication within and between sectors not identified

**1:** Gaps and duplications within and between sectors identified, but not (yet) addressed

**2:** Expanded coverage and reduced duplications within clusters, but not between sectors

**3:** Evidence of significantly increased coverage and significantly reduced duplications within and between sectors

**INDICATOR****3. ATTENTION TO DIFFERENTIATED NEEDS**

Quality of geographic and thematic coverage (timeliness of activities and targeting based on differentiated needs/risks linked to age, gender, diversity)

**EVALUATION CRITERION**

Effectiveness

**LEVEL OF LOGIC MODEL**

Outcome

**SCALE**

**0:** No differentiation and prioritization of needs, including according to age, sex, diversity

**1:** Prioritization of needs but no differentiation of needs by age, sex and other relevant categories (disabilities, ethnicity etc.); response not timely

**2:** Prioritization of needs and timely response but no differentiation of needs by age, sex, diversity and other relevant categories (disabilities, ethnicity etc.)

**3:** Tailor-made and timely geographic and thematic response according to priorities and specific needs of different groups of affected people / better targeted programming to appropriate affected populations previously underserved

**INDICATOR****4. INVOLVEMENT OF APPROPRIATE NATIONAL ACTORS**

Degree of involvement of appropriate national and local actors (state institutions, civil society)

**EVALUATION CRITERION**

Effectiveness

**LEVEL OF LOGIC MODEL**

Outcome

**SCALE**

**0:** Appropriate national and local actors are not involved, receive no funding and the response is inconsistent with national and local strategies; inappropriate actors are involved

**1:** Cluster members are sharing information with appropriate local actors (the government, local authorities and / or civil society), but provide no funding to local civil society actors

**2:** Appropriate local actors are involved in needs assessment, planning and decision making, receive a share of funding and response is consistent with national and local strategies, including those for disaster risk reduction

**3:** Where appropriate, international actors are participating in nationally or locally-led response efforts, with local civil society actors receiving the bulk of international funding

**INDICATOR****5. HAND OVER AND EXIT STRATEGIES**

Extent to which hand over and exit strategies have been developed and implemented in order to ensure that local government and civil society actors build on and continue efforts, including cross-cutting efforts (gender, environment, HIV)

**EVALUATION CRITERION**

Effectiveness

**LEVEL OF LOGIC MODEL**

Outcome

**SCALE**

**0:** Cluster lead agencies and members have no strategy for hand over and exit and do not integrate preparedness, contingency planning and early warning in their work plans; activities disengage the local authorities

**1:** Cluster lead agencies and members have developed an exit strategy and have identified capacity gaps, but have not implemented it; the strategy does not take into account existing national strategies and cross-cutting issues

Cluster lead agencies and members mainstream their strategies into existing national strategies and are beginning to implement hand-over strategies, are engaging the government and supporting the development of (national) frameworks for preparedness, disaster risk reduction, contingency planning and early warning; cross-cutting issues are partially addressed

**3:** Effective hand-over takes place, local frameworks are considered and strengthened, including in their cross-cutting dimensions, local authorities are engaged and technical knowledge has been transferred

**KEY QUESTION**

How is the cluster approach interacting with the other pillars of humanitarian reform, in particular the HC system and the reformed funding mechanisms and is it implemented in the spirit of the 'Principles for Partnership'?

**INDICATOR****6. INTERACTION OF THE CLUSTER WITH THE HC SYSTEM**

Extent to which the cluster approach and Humanitarian Coordinator system mutually support or undermine or each other

**EVALUATION CRITERION**

Coherence

**SCALE**

**0:** The HC does not fulfil its role to coordinate clusters / crucial decisions are made without the involvement of the HC; OCHA does not support the HC to fulfil its role; HC and clusters actively try to undermine each other's initiatives.

**1:** There is no significant interaction between the HC and the cluster approach.

**2:** Cluster coordinators and HCT members begin to see benefits of HC role in cluster coordination and grant the HC a certain degree of informal power; OCHA supports the HC in such a way that s/he can leverage this power; the HC considers cluster positions in his/her decisions and advocacy activities.

**3:** HC exercises clearly defined responsibilities for clusters and this role is accepted by the members of the different clusters. The HC systematically builds his/her strategies around cluster input. This role helps the clusters to better achieve their goals and strengthens the HC's formal and informal coordination role; HC and cluster system actively support each other



## INDICATOR

**7. INTERACTION OF THE CLUSTER WITH THE FINANCIAL PILLAR**

Extent to which the cluster approach and the financing pillar of the humanitarian reform (CERF, Pooled Funding, ERF, and innovations in the CAP) mutually support or undermine each other

## EVALUATION CRITERION

Coherence

## SCALE

**0:** The cluster approach and the new financing / appeal mechanisms undermine each other's goals or further emphasize each other's weaknesses (e.g. exclusiveness, "silo building" between clusters, etc.)

**1:** The interaction between the cluster approach and the new financing / appeal mechanisms sporadically strengthen the participating actors' ability to get access to information and resources, help to develop coordinated appeals and proposal development according to needs and identified gaps, but are not always consistent with the 'Principles of Partnership'

**2:** The interaction between the cluster approach and the new financing / appeal mechanisms often strengthen the participating actors' ability to get access to information and resources, help to develop coordinated appeals and proposal development according to needs and identified gaps, and are in most cases in line with the 'Principles of Partnership'

**3:** The interaction between the cluster approach and the new financing / appeal mechanisms strengthen the participating actors' ability to get access to information and resources, help to develop coordinated appeals and proposal development according to needs and identified gaps, and are in line with the 'Principles of Partnership'

**KEY QUESTION**

To what degree has the cluster approach achieved the intended outputs (predictable leadership, partnership/cohesiveness, accountability)?

**INDICATOR****8. IMPLEMENTATION OF LEADERSHIP RESPONSIBILITIES**

Clarity of roles and level of assumption of responsibility of cluster lead agencies and OCHA, including for cross-cutting issues (gender, environment, HIV)

**EVALUATION CRITERION**

Effectiveness

**LEVEL OF LOGIC MODEL**

Output

**SCALE**

**0:** Roles and responsibilities are unclear with overlapping responsibilities and conflicts or no / low level of acceptance of leadership; cluster leads represent their agencies' interest not the cluster's interest at HCT meetings

**1:** Clearly defined roles, including for cross-cutting issues and where clusters are co-led at the field level, but insufficient assumption of responsibility or limited acceptance of leadership; cluster members feel only partially represented at HCT meetings by the cluster lead

**2:** Cluster leads carry out their responsibilities as defined in TORs (including cross-cutting issues) and exhibit responsibility for the work within the cluster, not only for their own operational demands, and the cluster lead's leadership role is accepted by the majority of cluster members; they feel largely represented at HCT meetings by the cluster lead

**3:** Responsibilities within and between clusters are clear and cross-cutting issues are incorporated into cluster work plans and the leadership role is broadly accepted; cluster members feel well represented by the cluster lead at HCT meetings

**INDICATOR****9. IMPLEMENTATION OF PROVIDER OF LAST RESORT**

Clarity of the concept of "provider of last resort" and level of assumption of the related responsibilities by cluster leads (for those clusters where it applies)

**EVALUATION CRITERION**

Effectiveness

**LEVEL OF LOGIC MODEL**

Outcome

**SCALE**

**0:** There is no common understanding of the concepts of first port of call and provider of last resort

**1:** Clear common understanding of the concepts exists (e.g. as defined in the 'IASC Operational Guidance on the concept of Provider of Last Resort'), but cluster leads have not assumed responsibility, despite the necessity

**2:** Where necessary, cluster leads have started to act as "advocators of last resort" but not as providers of last resort.

**3:** Cluster leads have acted effectively as providers of last resort, where necessary

**INDICATOR****10. RELATIONSHIPS AMONG CLUSTER (NON-)MEMBERS**

Quality of relationships within clusters and between cluster members and non-members with respect to the 'Principles of Partnership' (assessment missions, advocacy activities, strategy development, decision-making, access to common resources)

**EVALUATION CRITERION**

Effectiveness

**LEVEL OF LOGIC MODEL**

Output

**SCALE**

**0:** Cluster members are not included in relevant cluster activities (assessment missions, advocacy activities and decision making), appeals and allocation of common funds reflect priorities of one agency only and / or there are open conflicts among cluster members

**1:** UN and non-UN cluster members are included in cluster activities (assessment missions, advocacy activities and decision making) and allocation of common funds in a consultative fashion but not on an equal basis; they do not take into account non-cluster members; priorities of one agency dominate in appeals

**2:** UN and non-UN cluster members do joint assessment missions, advocacy activities, cluster decisions and define cluster strategies (including resource allocation of common funds) in accordance with the 'Principles of Partnership'; but do not take into account concerns and positions of non-cluster members; appeals and allocation of common funds reflect cluster priorities

**3:** Cluster members work on the basis of the 'Principles of Partnerships'; take into account inter-cluster concerns and the positions of non-cluster humanitarian actors; appeals and allocation of common funds reflect collectively identified needs

**INDICATOR****11. RELATIONSHIPS BETWEEN CLUSTERS**

Quality of relationships between clusters

**EVALUATION CRITERION**

Effectiveness

**LEVEL OF LOGIC MODEL**

Outcome

**SCALE**

**0:** Cluster approach undermines pre-existing inter-sectoral coordination; coordination mechanisms duplicate or undermine each other; OCHA has taken no steps to address this situation

**1:** Cluster approach builds on, but does not improve pre-existing coordination mechanisms; information on needs assessments, activities and service shared between clusters; OCHA attempts to strengthen cross-cluster linkages

**2:** Inter-sectoral / inter-cluster linkages strengthened through cluster approach and the active involvement of OCHA; strategy for avoiding inter-cluster duplication and enhancing inter-cluster complementarity exists

**3:** Facilitated by OCHA, clusters have effective linkages to all other relevant clusters/sectors, have clearly allocated responsibilities for inter-cluster and cross-cutting issues and coordinate activities adequately based on jointly identified needs

**INDICATOR****12. QUALITY OF INFORMATION SHARING**

Quality of and capacity for information sharing (including information about cross-cutting issues, e.g. gender, environment, HIV)

**EVALUATION CRITERION**

Effectiveness

**LEVEL OF LOGIC MODEL**

Outcome

**SCALE**

**0:** Information is not shared

**1:** Some information is shared among cluster members, but not outside or among clusters

**2:** Information is shared effectively (regularly updated and easily accessible) within clusters; some information is shared with relevant non-cluster members and other clusters

**3:** Regularly updated information of high-quality and technical detail is shared effectively within clusters; cluster members conduct joint needs assessments; data collection and evaluations and information is shared effectively with relevant non-cluster members, other clusters and the HC/RC and HCT

**INDICATOR****13. COHESIVENESS OF POLICIES AND ACTIVITIES**

Degree of cohesiveness of policies and activities

**EVALUATION CRITERION**

Effectiveness

**LEVEL OF LOGIC MODEL**

Outcome

**SCALE**

**0:** No shared objectives, contradictory strategies and activities of cluster members

**1:** Common objectives, but contradictory approaches, strategies and activities

**2:** Collectively shared objectives among cluster members; joint strategies and work plans and complementary activities; complementary strategies with other relevant clusters and non-cluster humanitarian actors, including donors

**3:** Joint policies and strategies are being implemented by a majority of humanitarian actors; division of labour with non-cluster humanitarian actors is clearly defined and implemented

**INDICATOR****14. COMPLIANCE WITH RELEVANT STANDARDS**

Extent of compliance with relevant standards, including standards that cover cross-cutting issues (gender, environment, HIV)

**EVALUATION CRITERION**

Effectiveness

**LEVEL OF LOGIC MODEL**

Output / Outcome

**SCALE**

**0:** Relevant standards do not exist, have not been defined or are unknown to the cluster members

**1:** Relevant standards exist or have been defined, where relevant adapted to country-specific circumstances and are accepted by key stakeholders

**2:** Humanitarian agencies are complying to a large extent to those standards

**3:** Relevant standards are completely implemented

**INDICATOR****15. PARTICIPATION OF THE AFFECTED POPULATION**

Extent and quality of the participation of the affected population(s) (and where relevant, the host communities) and resulting degree of accountability to the affected population

**EVALUATION CRITERION**

Effectiveness

**LEVEL OF LOGIC MODEL**

Output

**SCALE**

**0:** Affected populations are not informed and not involved in needs assessment, decision-making, implementation and monitoring

**1:** Adequate information about activities and consultation with affected populations

**2:** Participatory needs assessment and needs prioritization

**3:** Joint planning and decision making, implementation, monitoring and evaluation, leading to a consistent application of relevant standards / findings of participatory assessments guide the work of the cluster and are used in advocacy with authorities

**INDICATOR****16. ACCOUNTABILITY TO THE HC AND AMONG MEMBERS**

Degree of existence, effectiveness and implementation of accountability mechanisms (definition of roles, clear reporting lines, monitoring and evaluation, availability of information / transparency, enforcement mechanisms) between HC/RC and clusters and within clusters

**EVALUATION CRITERION**

Effectiveness

**LEVEL OF LOGIC MODEL**

Output

**SCALE**

**0:** Expectations and roles unclear, insufficient transparency, incentives and enforcement mechanisms

**1:** Clear expectations and roles, adequate reporting (but not monitoring and evaluation and no enforcement mechanisms)

**2:** Appropriate information / transparency (adequate monitoring and evaluation), poor enforcement mechanisms

**3:** Effective incentives and enforcement mechanisms

**KEY QUESTION**

Does the cluster approach enable participating organizations to deliver better response through coordination and information sharing?

**INDICATOR****17. MEETING NEEDS OF HUMANITARIAN ACTORS**

Extent to which the cluster approach responds to the needs / expectations of humanitarian actors with respect to coordination (including inter-agency coordination) and information sharing in the specific country context

**EVALUATION CRITERION**

Relevance

**SCALE**

**0:** Humanitarian agencies question the raison d'être of the cluster approach; participation in cluster meetings is very low (in terms of number of people, rank of participants or attendance induced only by financial incentives); common services are not requested; cluster or HCT meetings and other coordination mechanisms are not used to share information and exchange ideas / approaches

**1:** Humanitarian agencies are sceptical, but show reasonable participation common services at times requested and used; cluster or HCT meetings and other coordination mechanisms are sporadically used to share information and exchange ideas / approaches

**2:** Humanitarian agencies recognize some added value, show committed participation in cluster meetings and use common services increasingly; meetings are used to share information and exchange ideas

**3:** Humanitarian agencies recognize cluster approach as highly relevant to their needs, participate strongly and effectively in cluster meetings and frequently use common services; meetings and other coordination mechanisms are used to share information and develop common approaches

**KEY QUESTION**

What kind of support have global clusters delivered and how effectively has it been used at the country and field levels? Which inputs included in the generic TORs have not been provided?

**INDICATOR****18. QUALITY AND LEVEL OF GLOBAL CLUSTER SUPPORT**

Quality (timeliness, relevant to local contexts, level of technical standard) and level of global cluster support: Standards & policy setting (guidance and tools); Response capacity (surge capacity, training, system development, stockpiles); Operational support (capacity needs assessment, emergency preparedness, long-term planning, access to expertise, advocacy, resource mobilization, pooling resources)

**EVALUATION CRITERION**

Efficiency

**LEVEL OF LOGIC MODEL**

Input

**SCALE**

**0:** No support

**1:** Support not relevant to field and/or not timely

**2:** Relevant support at high technical standards provided, but not timely

**3:** Support provided, with impact on practice, including on cross-cutting issues

**KEY QUESTION**

To what degree has the cluster approach modified and strengthened the humanitarian response (in terms of gaps filled and greater geographic, thematic and quality of coverage, as well as ownership/connectedness)?

**INDICATOR****19. COVERAGE OF ETC AND LOGISTICS SERVICES**

Coverage of ETC and logistics services

**EVALUATION CRITERION**

Effectiveness

**LEVEL OF LOGIC MODEL**

Outcome

**SCALE**

**0:** ETC and logistics services are neither sufficient, nor relevant to the needs of their users

**1:** ETC and logistics services are sufficient in quantity, but not targeted to the needs of their users

**2:** ETC and logistics services are targeted to the needs of their users, but do not cover all needs

**3:** The needs of ETC and logistics users are completely covered

**KEY QUESTION**

What intentional or unintentional positive or negative effects of the cluster approach concerning affected populations, the coordination and interactions among participating organizations and the humanitarian system as a whole can be demonstrated?

**INDICATOR****20. EVIDENCE FOR EFFECTS**

Evidence for effects (intentional or unintentional, positive or negative) of the cluster approach on the affected populations, the coordination and interactions among participating organizations and the humanitarian system as a whole can be demonstrated

**EVALUATION CRITERION**

Effects

**KEY QUESTION**

Is there evidence that the results of the cluster approach justify the inputs of major stakeholders such as the IASC, NGOs, host communities and donors at the country level?

**INDICATOR****21. EVIDENCE THAT RESULTS JUSTIFY INVESTMENTS**

Evidence that the results of the cluster approach justify the investment made by major stakeholders at the country level

**EVALUATION CRITERION**

Efficiency

**LEVEL OF LOGIC MODEL**

Input



## Annex 3

### List of places visited and people interviewed

#### Lieux des visites et interviews

N'Djamena

Abéché

Goz Beida

Koukou

*Les noms de certaines personnes rencontrées ne sont pas mentionnés dans la liste ci-dessous du fait qu'elles ont été rencontrées à l'occasion de réunions et que la mission n'a pas toujours pu récupérer toutes les listes de participants. Que ces personnes trouvent ici les excuses de l'équipe d'évaluation.*

#### Personnes interviewées ou consultées

##### Organisation des Nations Unies

- Michele Falavigna, Coordinateur humanitaire/Coordinateur Résident
- UNOCHA, Ute Kollies, Chef de bureau ; David Cibonga, Chargé des Affaires humanitaires ; Lucien Simba, Chef de sous-bureau Abéché ; Narre Ngamada, National Humanitarian Affairs Officer Abéché ; Marie-Sophie Durant-Allegre, Civil-Military Coordination Officer ; Apollinaire Bigirimana, chef de sous-bureau de Goz Beida; Guelnoudji Ndjekoukousse, cadre national d'OCHA Goz Beida
- Goz Beida ; Koulibaly Eugène Moustapha, Chef de sous-bureau Koukou ;  
Interview complémentaire à distance : Eliane Duthois
- FAO: Christophe Loubaton, coordinateur adjoint des urgences
- OMS : Dr Youssouf Gamatie, Représentant ; Innocent Nzeyimana, coordinateur sous-bureau ; Dr. André ..., Coordinateur du Cluster Santé ; Christian Etama ; Rosine Sama, épidémiologiste
- PAM: Jean Luc Siblot, Représentant ; Ouedraogo Moumini, Directeur adjoint ; Gon Myers, Program adviser ; Patrick Sautron, coordinateur du Cluster Logistique; Gilbert Gokou, Head of FFW-CP Unit & Coord. IDPs Abéché; M. Taban, agent de suivi Koukou ; Denise, Chef de bureau par interim Koukou ; Modatta, assistant programme Koukou
- PNUD : Pascal Karorero, Directeur pays ; Ibrahima Sacko, Conseiller en relèvement précoce
- UNDSS : Bertrand Bourgain
- UNICEF: Dr Babilie Marzio, Représentant, Jean Baptiste Ndikumana, Chief education, Cifora Monier, Spécialiste en communication, Lillian E. Okwirry,

- Chef de programme Eau Environnement et Assainissement ; Alexide Yang Kassamba, Chargé d'Education ; Anna De Ferrari chargé de la Protection de l'Enfance Quentin Zeller, Wash Cluster coordinator ; Laurette Mokrani, Chef de sous-bureau Goz Beida ; Narcisse Ndoyengar, Coordinateur Wash Goz Beida
- UNHCR, Stephano Severe, représentant ; Michele Manca, représentant adjoint, chargé de la protection ; Jacqueline Parlevliet, Senior Protection Officer Abéché ; Benedetta Marcaccini, Administratrice associée à la protection Goz Beida ; Ana Lucia Gallman, Administratrice associée à la protection Goz Beida ; Gnepa Roger Hollo, Chef de bureau Koukou ; Bryan Hunter, Administrateur Chargé de Protection (IDP'S) Koukou
  - MINURCAT : Joseph Inganji, Officier des affaires humanitaires

#### Mouvement international de la Croix Rouge

- CICR: Mrs. Catherine Deman, Head of Delegation; Laurent Maurice, Délégué agronome ; Ariane Bauer, Délégué Sécurité économique ; Patric Youssef, chef de sous-délégation Abéché

#### Autorités tchadiennes

- CONAFIT: Djamel Al-Farouk, Chargé de programme, Yakoub Soughi Tougoutami, Responsable des urgences, Aboulhamid Seidna Saleh, Responsable Goz Beida
- CNAR; Mahamat Nour Abdoulaye, Secrétaire permanent
- Ministère du Plan: Issa Mardo, Directeur Général Adjoint, Direction Générale des Ressources extérieures et de la Programmation
- Ministère de l'hydraulique : M Tama
- Ministère de l'environnement : Khadidja Hissein
- ONDR: Mor Avintago Harmis, chef de service suivi-évaluation Abéché
- Délégué Santé Abéché
- Délégué Education Goz Beida
- Délégué Justice et droits de l'homme, Goz Beida

#### Organisations non gouvernementales

- Architectes de l'Urgence : Lucile Garrot
- CARE, Lucien Lefcourt, responsable réfugiés/populations hôtes
- CCO: Daniel Pfister, conseil civilo-militaire, Mariama Scheinder, administratrice
- Concern World Wide : Deidre Delanay, Goz Beida, Brion O'Loinsigh, Goz Beida
- Droit de l'Homme (DH) : Mahamat Souleymane
- IRC : Philippe Adapoe
- MSF : Xavier Trompete (Section France), Emmanuel Roussie (section Suisse)

- OXFAM Intermon : Cedric Turlan, Responsable programme Humanitaire, Isabel Martin Pireno, coordinatrice sécurité alimentaire, Amandine, Wash Koukou
- OXFAM GB : Pauline Ballaman, Directrice Pays, Eva Benouach, Protection
- Première Urgence, Véronique Mourdon,
- COOPI
- SECADEV: Agmat Payouni, Responsable des urgences
- Shora :
- SOLIDARITES: Alain Daniel, chef de mission, Agathe Bellergues, coordinatrice administration, Julien Vogel, Coordinateur Logistique

#### Bailleurs de fonds

- ECHO: Sophie Battas, Assistant technique ; Nicolas Louis, Assistant technique
- AFD: Camille Foulquié, Chargée de projet
- Ambassade de France: Marie Elisabeth Ingres, correspondante humanitaire

## Annex 4

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The evaluation was carried out between July 2009 and April 2010 by a group of evaluators from:

**Global Public Policy Institute**

Reinhardtstr. 15

10117 Berlin · Germany

**Tel** +49-30-275 959 75-0

**Fax** +49-30-690 88 200

**Web** [www.gppi.net](http://www.gppi.net)

**Groupe URD**

La Fontaine des Marins

26170, Plaisians · France

**Tel** +33-4-75 28 29 35

**Fax** +33-4-75 28 65 44

**Web** [www.urd.org](http://www.urd.org)

**Authors**

François Grünewald ([fgrunewald@urd.org](mailto:fgrunewald@urd.org)) and  
Bonaventure Sokpoh ([bsokpoh@urd.org](mailto:bsokpoh@urd.org))

**Evaluation Management**

Claude Hilfiker, OCHA EGS

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