February 2010

update



a Development Initiative 👖

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The massive earthquake to hit Haiti has thrown attention once more onto the humanitarian system. Issues of financing, coordination, programming, planning and implementation of short and long-term aid in such a devastated context have all been prominent.

This update from the Global Humanitarian Assistance programme provides an introductory factsheet on Haiti and then follows the trajectory of a crisis, highlighting some of what we know – as well as what we don't know – about the interrelations within humanitarian financing. Using the latest available figures, we follow the path from crisis to implementation, from the country context to the difficulties of understanding needs, from the use of consolidated appeals to the priorities of donors and the mechanisms they may choose, and then to the complex world of humanitarian delivery. Finally we return to the context and situate natural disasters in a fragile state setting.




Haiti

12 January 2010. Earthquake. Port-au-Prince.

The earthquake that hit Haiti on 12 January 2010, measuring 7.0 on the Richter scale and reported as the strongest to have hit the country in 200 years, is just the latest but probably worst crisis to have hit this country – one of the least able to cope with such a shock. Political upheaval and insecurity, as well as a long list of natural disasters, especially tropical cyclones and flooding, have had a serious impact on Haiti over the last 20 years.

In terms of scale, this earthquake ranks as one of the worst in recent memory. Initial reports suggested that over 100,000 people had been killed and three million affected by the disaster.



Source: Centre for Research on the Epidemiology of Disasters (CRED); 'Haiti earthquake 2010' based on initial estimates (UN sources)

Haiti is often called the poorest country in the Americas but even when compared to the whole world it is revealed as fraught with huge humanitarian and development challenges.


Indicator	Result	Global ranking	Americas ranking
Gross domestic product (GDP) per capita	US\$1,155	23rd worst	Worst
Life expectancy:	61 years	32nd worst	Worst
Probability of not living until 40	18.5%	44th worst	Worst
% of population not using an improved water source	42%	16th worst	Worst
Adult illiteracy	37.9%	16th worst	Worst
Corruption	n/a	10th worst	Worst
Fragility	n/a	16th worst	Worst
Aid dependency (total ODA as % GDP)	13%	15th worst	2nd worst

Source: Human Development Report, OECD, MDG Monitor, Foreign Policy, World Bank, Transparency International, Development Initiatives

A history of fragility, crisis and aid

Official development assistance (ODA) to Haiti has increased by 312% (or US\$655 million) since 2002, with sharp rises in both development and humanitarian aid. At US\$175 million, humanitarian aid – aid that aims to save lives, alleviate suffering and maintain human dignity – accounted for just over 20% of the total aid spent in the country in 2008. This is second only to 1995, when humanitarian aid to Haiti reached US\$316 million – or 37% of total ODA.

The trend towards increased humanitarian aid can be attributed to disaster relief following several devastating hurricanes that affected the country in 2004, which were then followed by food riots in April that year. The January 2010 earthquake will most likely ensure that humanitarian aid to Haiti remains a major donor priority.



1995

elections; René Préval

UN peacekeepers

arrive; Aristide

supporters win

elected president

Source: CRED, BBC, January 2010

200

1998

Cyclone

190 and affects 12,029

Préval

George kills

1999

declares that

parliament's

expired and begins ruling by decree

2000

Aristide

re-elected

term has

Armed attacks and attempted seizure of the National Palace suggested to be a prelude to a coup

2006 Préval becomes president. A democratically-elected government headed by Jacques-**Edouard Alexis takes power** Tropical storm Ernesto, regional Humanitarian aid flooding and storm surges kill 16 and affect 39,700 Non-humanitarian aid Total ODA (excluding debt relief) 2005 Cyclones Dennis, Alpha, Stan and Emily as well as regional flooding kill 76 and affect 41,878 2006 Multiple floods and cylones Noel, Olga and Dean kill 73 and affect 220,042 2008 2002 Food riots. Parliament dismisses Alexis: 2003 Cyclone Lili Michèle Pierre-Louis and flash Flooding and succeeds as prime floods kill 35 storms kill minister. Brazil boosts and affect 88 and affect peacekeeping force to 38,589 combat violence 197,225; drought Cyclones Gustav, Ike, affects Hanna and Fay kill 698 another and affect 246,726 35,000 2004 200 years of independence marred by violent uprising. Rebels seize towns and cities. Aristide forced into exile; 2009 interim government takes over. UN peacekeepers arrive Jean-Max Bellerive becomes to take over security. Political

and gang violence levels rise

kill 5,422 and affect another


Severe flooding, tropical storm Jeanne and cyclone Ivan

353,377

15 January 2010. UN launches flash appeal for US\$575 million.


On 15 January the UN launched a US\$575 million flash appeal for 30 appealing agencies to carry out emergency operations for some three million people over the next six months.

The World Food Programme (WFP) estimates that lack of access to supplies and the damaged infrastructure will leave at least two million people in need of food aid. The water, sanitation and hygiene (WASH) cluster, led by UNICEF, has the next largest requirements.



UN flash appeal for Haiti, January 2010 [Source: UN OCHA Financial Tracking Service (FTS)]

Over the last seven years, only the Indian Ocean earthquaketsunami, which was estimated to have affected five million people, has had a higher flash appeal requirement in response to an earthquake (US\$978 million). On a per person basis, requirements for the Indian Ocean earthquake-tsunami and Haiti appeals are similar.



Initial UN flash appeal requirements [Source: UN OCHA FTS]

Jean-Max Bellerive becomes prime minister after the Senate passes censure motion against Pierre-Louis

World Bank and IMF cancel US\$1.2bn of Haiti's debt, 80% of the total



Since the signing of the Comprehensive Peace Agreement in January 2005, Southern Sudan has been a major recipient of humanitarian assistance, receiving over US\$6 billion through the UN consolidated appeals process (CAP) alone. But to what extent has this huge volume of funding addressed the dizzying scale of needs?

A World Bank and UN-led post-disaster joint assessment mission (JAM) was conducted in the early days of the peace. It emphasised the need to maintain humanitarian safety nets and a large peacekeeping mission in tandem with ambitious institution-building and poverty reduction measures. In practice this balance has not been met.

Despite stubbornly persistent and severe humanitarian needs, a situation developed where funding designated for urgent life-saving activities and material assistance was diverted to recovery activities and basic service provision to compensate for the poorly performing Multi-Donor Trust Fund (MDTF). The net result is that the provision of basic services has been increasingly squeezed and humanitarian

donors, together with the pooled Common Humanitarian Fund (CHF), have made a number of emergency funding decisions to keep hospitals and clinics from closing.

In some areas, access to health care has declined and humanitarian needs have actually increased since the end of the war.

A morass of needs assessment information is generated each year, considering diverse aspects of the multi-dimensional needs of a population emerging from – and in some areas still submerged in – a complex emergency. Much of this information is collected on an ad hoc incomparable basis and sinks without trace. Without a clearly articulated picture of humanitarian needs in Southern Sudan, it is becoming increasingly the norm for each priority to be as important as the next. In such situations, how can donors make the right funding decisions?

Funding according the case of Southe

Data and information on needs

The leading repository for information on the impact of disasters is the Centre for Research on the Epidemiology of Disasters (CRED), which is located within the School of Public Health of the Université Catholique de Louvain (UCL), Brussels. One of CRED's core data projects is the EM-DAT disaster database, which contains data on the impact of 16,000 mass disaster events dating back to 1900.

EM-DAT is complemented by CE-DAT – CRED's database on complex emergencies, which serves as a unique source of health indicators (primarily mortality, malnutrition and measles vaccination coverage rates) for monitoring conflict-affected populations.

The European Commission, through its humanitarian aid department, DG ECHO, has led the donor field in developing a severity index of global needs with its Global Needs Assessment (GNA) tool, which ranks countries according to nine criteria, spanning development, poverty, natural and man-made disasters, refugees/internally displaced people (IDPs), undernourishment, mortality and levels of donor funding, aggregated to demonstrate their relative severity and scale of needs.

We often use the UN CAP as a proxy measure of funding according to need. Each appeal sets out its list of priority funding requirements. Funding can then be measured within and 'outside' the appeal, between countries and between crises, to gauge whether it responds to the priority needs as defined by the UN and participating agencies. Applying this to the case of Sudan, consolidated appeal requirements 2005-2009 inclusive totalled just under US\$9 billion. Donors have responded to these appeals with just over US\$6 billion of funding. By this methodology, 33% of needs in Sudan remain unmet.

Funding according to need: a core humanitarian principle

Funding according to assessed need is a core humanitarian principle, yet the necessary methodologies, tools and capacities to achieve and measure this commitment are lacking. There is no internationally accepted objective standard that humanitarian need can be measured against that would allow comparison of the scale and severity of needs across contexts. The alternative, grossing up needs from piecemeal and incompatible source data, has significant limitations. However, initiatives to advance common objective standards of need and to collate comparable global aggregations of need are gathering pace.

Is funding in line with the severity of need?

This is a surprisingly difficult question to answer. A comparison of the countries most severely affected by crisis and vulnerability, according to the ECHO's GNA index, and the amount of humanitarian aid received per capita, indicates a possible divergence between levels of need and funding.


Central African Republic (CAR), which ranked the worst affected country, received less than half the funding per capita of the next worst affected country, Somalia. Meanwhile, Afghanistan, which ranked 10th worst affected, received more money per capita than all but Somalia and Sudan.

This comparison doesn't tell us however, about the costs of responding to need in different places, whether populations can be accessed, or whether agencies exist to receive and spend the funds.

What we are doing

We are building on data links with existing and emergent aggregations of need, including with the CRED's EM-DAT and CE-DAT databases, and ECHO's GNA severity index, in order to develop our analysis of funding according to need.

We are also developing case study analysis of how needs assessment information is collected and used. Looking at both complex emergency and rapid onset natural disaster settings, we hope this will enable us to share a better understanding of how needs are measured, articulated and used to inform resource allocation and to what extent practice measures up to policy commitments to assess and fund according to need.




Ten worst affected countries according to ECHO's scale of severity and official humanitarian aid per capita, 2008 [Source: ECHO GNA 2008/9 and OECD DAC]



UN consolidated appeals 2010: more money, same places

Launched in November 2009, the combined UN Humanitarian Appeal 2010 generated a request of over US\$7 billion for consolidated appeals in eleven countries and one region. That makes the Appeal's initial requests second only to 2009's over the last 10 years.



Initial requirements, UN Humanitarian Appeals 2000-2010 [Source: UN OCHA Financial Tracking System (FTS)]

The UN Humanitarian Appeal and the consolidated appeals process (CAP)

Coordinated by the United Nations (UN), the CAP is undertaken in a country or region to raise funds for humanitarian action as well as to plan, implement and monitor activities. Two different kinds of appeal are generated by the CAP: consolidated appeals and flash appeals.

Consolidated appeals include projected activities for the following year, and often pertain to conflict or post-conflict scenarios where the needs of that year are relatively predictable. These country and regional consolidated appeals are then amalgamated by the UN, with the launch of the Humanitarian Appeal each November for the following year.

Flash appeals are a rapid strategic and fundraising tool based on immediately identified needs – these may be issued following sudden onset disasters such as earthquakes and cyclones. It is not unusual for there to be both a consolidated and flash appeal for the same country in the same year, usually when a sudden natural event brings additional humanitarian need, such as when severe flooding affected Sudan and Uganda in 2007.

Humanitarian funding outside of consolidated or flash appeals can be significant. Some of this may be due to agency choice, for example neither the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) nor Médecins Sans Frontières (MSF) participates in the appeals process. Other times, donors may have specific preferences to fund non-CAP projects. Some appeals may not meet basic criteria, such as having direct funding for national government institutions or ministries. Other times a country may have an appeal but not wish to call it a CAP appeal, even though a similar process is carried out to determine the needs and projects. Finally there are occasions when no central appeal is launched or coordinated but significant funds are still spent in response, such as after Cyclone Sidr in Bangladesh, where the government did not officially appeal and yet received more than USS400 million for initial and longer-term humanitarian aid.

This does not necessarily mean there has been a particular increase in humanitarian need. The consolidated appeals process (CAP), as an instrument for bringing together humanitarian activities and funding requests in one place, has received additional impetus in recent years from the humanitarian system, both implementing agencies as well as donors. Neither do consolidated appeals represent all humanitarian plans for all countries. (See box, below left.) However they do provide real evidence of how priorities have changed – or not – over time.


There is naturally a clear connection between the end of conflict and return of valid governance with the end to continuous consolidated appeals. For example some countries subject to repeated appeals in previous years, such as Burundi (2000-2007), Angola (2000-2004) and the Caucasus (2001-2005), are now not included. The combined appeal for West Africa, which contains proposed humanitarian interventions for 15 countries, now also includes Côte d'Ivoire, Liberia and Sierra Leone, all of which have had sufficient humanitarian need to merit their own standalone appeals in the past.

In fact the only countries represented in the Humanitarian Appeal 2010 and for all of the years back to and including 2000 are Sudan, Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC), Uganda and Somalia. This is significant not only because of their ever-presence, suggesting the intractability of the problems in these countries, but also for the volume of money that has been spent in these countries over time and their share of total funding. The four countries' combined appeals have been responsible for US\$19.4 billion of the total amount requested over the last ten years (42% of the total) and have received more than US\$13 billion (also 42% of that total). Basically for every 10 US dollars, British Pounds, Euros or Saudi Riyals requested and donated, just over four of them have been for Somalia, Sudan, DRC and Uganda.

Of the remaining eight countries represented in the Humanitarian Appeal 2010, the majority are represented in the bulk of the last ten years' appeals, especially in the most recent years; for example the Central African Republic (CAR) and Palestine/Occupied Palestinian Territories (OPT) have been represented in the last seven, Chad in the last six, and Zimbabwe in the last eight. The only relatively recent additions to the list of countries included are Yemen, where humanitarian needs have been triggered by the escalation of conflict between the government and rebels in the north and, perhaps surprisingly, Afghanistan. Indeed one might have expected to have seen Afghanistan with its multiple overlapping conflict, displacement and natural disaster needs over the last decade to have been more regularly represented. Following seven years' absence, its recent reappearance in 2009 only came about after the heavy criticism of the UN peacekeeping humanitarian coordination efforts in the country and subsequent re-entry of the UN Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA) after many years' absence. Similarly we might also have expected to see Sri Lanka or Nepal much more represented in consolidated appeals. Neither has Colombia had a consolidated appeal in the last ten years despite having the second highest reported number of internally displaced in the world for much of the decade.

Despite the recent entry of Yemen and re-entry of Afghanistan, the 2010 Humanitarian Appeal countries still account for a huge proportion of all funding over the last ten years – nearly US\$32 billion requested and US\$21.5 billion of the amount contributed. Just under 70% of all humanitarian funds requested have therefore been for these same 12 countries and just over 69% of all funding granted has been for those countries, seven out of every ten of those US Dollars, British Pounds, Euros, Saudi Riyals or whatever other currency.





Consolidated appeal countries and regions since 2000 [Source: UN OCHA FTS]

This may sound a little obvious since it's natural that current conflicts are heavily represented in current humanitarian appeals. However there is more to it than that, since this is further evidence of how much humanitarian funding – with its relatively short cycles of planning and implementation – is often spent in the same context each and every year, even long after major hostilities have ended. Secondly, and interrelated, is that these countries in or coming out of conflict are often plagued by natural disasters without the national structures, institutions, community or family resilience, or coping possibilities needed to react and resist; they remain chronically vulnerable.

The Humanitarian Appeal 2010 articulates this dilemma of humanitarian priorities competing with recovery, disaster risk reduction, governance, long-term livelihoods and the reduction of poverty. On the one hand it gives early recovery (in its simplest form the bringing of development principles into humanitarian interventions, government and community ownership, integration with national planning and so on) its strongest showing yet whilst asking key questions: "How should the humanitarian system identify crises that should trigger humanitarian action and be eligible for humanitarian methods and resources? Does the fact of a crisis being rooted in extreme chronic vulnerability, and in stresses that do not amount to the usual image of a 'disaster' mean that it is a 'poverty' problem and should be addressed only with developmental methods and resources?" (Humanitarian Appeal 2010, UN, November 2009, p7.)

The humanitarian argument is that acute needs have to be addressed by urgent humanitarian methods, regardless of the root causes, and those causes have to be addressed by recovery and

development approaches. Yet how is the balance between the funding for these differing priorities managed and coordinated, especially given that there remains a clear divide between humanitarian and development worlds in priorities, planning and implementation, and of course that funds are always limited?

Of the US\$7.1 billion requested for 2010, more than 35% (US\$2.5 billion) is for the World Food Programme (WFP), most of that no doubt going to basic food provision, essentially keeping people alive. Yet it received US\$3.4 billion in 2009 for much the same work. Sudan alone has accounted for US\$7.2 billion of appeal funding over the last ten years, which is more than 23% of the total funds granted. Yet Sudan appears as precarious as ever, the Darfur conflict continues, the Comprehensive Peace Agreement looks fragile and the population in many areas is suffering from the same problems of localised conflict and insecurity, inadequate basic services and lack of sustainable livelihoods as it did in 2000.

These are significant sums and arguably used mostly to keep people alive year-on-year with not much improvement over time.

The question is: are the right choices being made?




overnment donors: ructures, changing

Government donors play a very large part in shaping the international humanitarian response.

They influence outcomes not just through decisions about how much to spend, where to spend it and what to spend it on – but also who they choose to spend it through. Such choices have the potential to affect the behaviour influence and balance of power of all those involved in humanitarian response.

Released in December 2009, the latest Development Assistance Committee (DAC) data shows that DAC donor governments and the European Commission accounted for US\$11.2 billion of the international humanitarian aid effort in 2008. So, in the absence of an internationally accepted standard for measuring need – a core humanitarian principle, enshrined in the Good Humanitarian Donorship (GHD) and with an ethical foundation in humanitarian law – what can the historic data tell us about how these tough decisions are being made?



Official humanitarian aid from DAC donors, 2000-2008 [Source: OECD DAC]

What is the Development Assistance Committee (DAC)?

The DAC is the principal body through which the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) deals with issues relating to cooperation with developing countries. It provides a forum for donors to share policy experience and good practice.

Who are the DAC donors?

Australia, Austria, Belgium,
Canada, Denmark, Finland,
France, Germany, Greece,
Ireland, Italy, Japan, Korea,
Luxembourg, the Netherlands,
New Zealand, Norway,
Portugal, Spain, Sweden,
Switzerland, the United
Kingdom, the United States
and the European Commission.

Humanitarian principles

Members of the DAC and 12 other government donors have committed to the Good Humanitarian Donorship (GHD) principles, which aim to improve the flexibility, timeliness and appropriateness of humanitarian financing.

Under this commitment, and with an ethical foundation in international humanitarian law, humanitarian aid is governed by the principles of humanity, neutrality, independence and impartiality.

Policy and practice

DAC donors' international development policies are enshrined in their national legislation. DAC peer reviews (carried out every four or five years) allow donors to assess the amount and nature of their contributions to aid programmes and to consult on development policy.

Official humanitarian aid

US\$6.5bn US\$6.3bn US\$6.6bn

US\$7.9bn

US\$10.5bn US\$7.9bn

US\$9.8bn

US\$8.7bn US\$11.2bn

In the DAC context, humanitarian aid is a subset of official development assistance (ODA). It includes: emergency response, reconstruction relief and disaster prevention and preparedness.

Our total official humanitarian aid figures include multilateral ODA to UNHCR, UNRWA and WFP – UN agencies with almost exclusively humanitarian mandates.

ODA

ODA is a grant or loan from an 'official' (government) source to a developing country or multilateral agency for the promotion of economic development and welfare.

ODA includes funding for short-term, life-saving and exceptional humanitarian purposes as well as for sustainable and povertyreducing development assistance (for sectors such as governance, growth, social services, education, health, and water and sanitation). Our total ODA figure excludes debt relief.



Measuring humanitarian aid as a share of ODA provides some insight into how donors prioritise humanitarian expenditure within their overall aid policies. As a group, DAC donors have spent between 7.6% and 10.2% of their ODA on humanitarian aid over the decade. However, this can range widely by donor - from 3.5% (Japan) to 17.8% (Ireland) in 2008, for example.

Largest recipients

These figures, which include money spent through the **Central Emergency Response** Fund (CERF) and country-level pooled funding mechanisms, show the top three recipients of DAC donor humanitarian aid each year since 2000. But some countries, such as DRC, Pakistan and Somalia, have also been priorities since 2000 in terms of overall volume received.

Serbia	Afghanistan	Afghanistan	Iraq	Iraq	Sudan	Sudan	Sudan	Sudan
US\$702m	US\$557m	US\$852m	US\$1.2bn	US\$915m	US\$1.4bn	US\$1.4bn	US\$1.3bn	US\$1.3bn
States Ex Yugo US\$307m	Palestine US\$350m	Palestine US\$451m	Ethiopia US\$788bn	Sudan US\$844m	Indonesia US\$676m	Palestine US\$757m	Palestine US\$833m	Afghanistan US\$823m
Palestine	Serbia	Angola	Afghanistan	Palestine	Ethiopia	Indonesia	DRC	Ethiopia
US\$257m	US\$298m	US\$268m	US\$483m	US\$544m	US\$639m	US\$46om	US\$409m	US\$807m

Some crises have a clear beginning, middle and end. Others are more intractable.

2006 2008 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2007

These percentages show how much donors (including non-DAC donors and the private sector) gave in response to the priority needs identified and listed inside appeals launched and coordinated by the UN.

Funding required and % appeal needs met

Channels of expenditure 2008

Largest UN consolidated process appeal (CAP) requirement

South Eastern Europe	South Eastern Europe	Afghanistan	Iraq	Sudan	Sudan	Sudan	Sudan
56% US\$629m	53% US\$413m	67% US\$1.8bn	91% US\$483m	76% US\$727m	53% US\$1.9bn	66% US\$1.7bn	82% US\$1.3bn
Multilateral organisations (including totally unearmarked)			NGOs & civil society 23.8%		Public sector 14.3% Other 2.4% To be defined 1.6%		

Source: OECD DAC, UN OCHA Financial Tracking Service (FTS)

Sudan

70%

US\$2bn

Korea's transition from aid recipient to aid donor



1960s: International Development Associations (IDA), United Nations Development Programme (UNDP), World Bank, Asian Development Bank (ADB), United States Agency for International Development (USAID) and the Overseas Economic Cooperation Fund (OECF) of Japan were major donors during the 1960s

1962: Launch of Korea's first five-year economic plan

On 1 January 2010, the Republic of Korea became the 24th member of the OECD DAC. The country has seen impressive economic progress over the last 50 years and, although only absent from the World Bank's list of recipients since 1995, has been ramping up its own ODA contributions since its first entry of US\$90 million 1990. But in spite of its relatively recent appearance as a donor in the 'official' statistics, Korea regards itself as having been a provider of cooperation since the 1960s, when it trained technical staff from developing countries with the support of USAID, and of independent assistance since the 1980s, when it designed a development programme in support of South-South cooperation.

1991: Korea International Cooperation Agency (KOICA) founded as a government agency to manage bilateral grant aid, including emergency and distress relief activities

1995: Korea ceases to be on the World Bank list of recipients

1996: Korea joins the OECD

DAC ODA to Korea
ODA from Korea


19609

19709

19809

19909

2000s



Half a century ago, Korea was one of the poorest nations in the world, endeavouring to emerge from the ashes of the Korean War to rebuild itself

Deputy Minister of Foreign Affairs, Oh Joon, November 2009 2002/2003: Korea implements special assistance programmes in Afghanistan and Iraq

2005: Korea's humanitarian aid expenditure almost doubles in the wake of the Indian Ocean earthquake-tsunami

2006: Korea announces expansion of its ODA programme for Africa and also contributes US\$5 million to the newly established CERF

2007: Korea introduces global anti-poverty contribution fund

2008: Korea ranked as the 13th largest economy by World Bank. Korea reports US\$30.1 million in total official humanitarian aid expenditure: top recipients include China, Iraq and Myanmar

2009: Korea joins the GHD group

2010: Korea becomes a member of the DAC

2011: Korea to host Fourth High Level Forum on Aid Effectiveness

2015: Will Korea's ODA reach 0.25% of its gross domestic product (GDP) as pledged?

Where do donor governments spend their humanitarian aid?

Sudan proved to be the largest recipient of DAC donor humanitarian expenditure for the fourth consecutive year in 2008. Its US\$1.4 billion represented 13.8% of the total allocated by DAC donors to specific countries. While its share of the total declined in 2008 (from 17.2% in 2007), the actual volume of aid to the country increased by US\$80 million. The next largest recipient was Afghanistan (US\$823 million). But it was the third largest recipient, Ethiopia (US\$807 million), that received the biggest increase in humanitarian aid – up by over US\$500 million in 2008.

	Change in		
Top 10	US\$m	Share of total allocable by country	share since 2007 (% points)
Sudan	1,344	13.8%	-3.4
Afghanistan	823	8.4%	+4.3
Ethiopia	807	8.3%	+4.3
Palestine/OPT	750	7.7%	-3.7
Somalia	541	5.5%	+2.1
DRC	501	5.1%	-0.4
Iraq	370	3.8%	-0.4
Myanmar	349	3.6%	+3
Zimbabwe	320	3.3%	+1.1
Kenya	292	3.0%	+0.7

Seven of the top 10 recipients of DAC donor humanitarian assistance in 2007 remained within the top 10 list in 2008 – Sudan, Palestine/OPT, Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC), Afghanistan, Ethiopia, Somalia and Iraq. Meanwhile, Lebanon, Pakistan and Indonesia were replaced in the top 10 by Myanmar, Zimbabwe and Kenya – subjects of a UN flash appeal, UN consolidated appeal and emergency plan respectively in 2008.

It stands to reason that the largest donors can shape the headline trends through large contributions to just one or a few countries. To put this in context, in 2008, the United States' US\$550 million contribution to just one country, Ethiopia, outstripped 16 other DAC donors' entire official humanitarian aid contributions. But the involvement and policies of smaller donors makes their aid highly significant for some recipient countries. Spain, for example, which has more than doubled its humanitarian aid contributions since 2004 to become the DAC's sixth largest humanitarian donor, states its priority countries as Haiti, Dominican Republic, Guatemala, Honduras, El Salvador, Nicaragua, Ecuador, Peru, Bolivia, Paraguay,

Who are the biggest donors?

The United States remains the biggest single donor of humanitarian aid by volume, accounting for 38% (US\$4.3 billion) of the US11.2 billion total in 2008. It increased its humanitarian expenditure by US\$1.3 billion in 2008 – just over half of the total US\$2.5 billion rise in DAC donor expenditure that year. The next biggest donors are the European Commission (US\$1.9 billion) and the United Kingdom (US\$1.1 billion), which increased their expenditure by US\$277 million and US\$338 million respectively.

Donor governments

The traditional donorrecipient divide is defined by whether a country is still on the World Bank/DAC's list of aid recipients. But in 2008, 98 such recipients provided humanitarian assistance, as reported through UN OCHA's FTS. The larger ones include: Saudi Arabia. Kuwait, Qatar, United Arab **Emirates, Brazil, Russian** Federation, India, China, South Africa, Thailand and Malaysia.

Mozambique, Namibia, Angola, Senegal, Western Sahara, Mauritania, Cape Verde, Algeria, Tunisia, Morocco, Vietnam and the Philippines – not necessarily natural choices for other DAC donors.

New donors, new dynamics

The response to the Haiti earthquake demonstrates that public support for humanitarian funding is still strong and, despite a few 'blips', the trend is clearly towards increased levels of humanitarian aid from DAC donor governments generally.

If the 23 donors of the DAC (24 now that Korea has joined) display variations in their patterns of expenditure by volume, policy emphasis, country, region, or choice of implanting agency or partner, what of the 98 other governments that accounted for US\$1.3 billion of the humanitarian expenditure reported through UN OCHA's FTS in 2008? Their contributions may be outweighed by DAC donors' in terms of scale, and their policies, structures and reporting procedures may be even less homogenous than those within the DAC donor group – but again, their choices about which countries and emergencies to support, together with the nature of delivery, can make their involvement significant.

It's not just about the money

The number of governments participating in humanitarianism is growing. The Haiti earthquake appeal has prompted pledges from donors as diverse as DRC (somewhat controversially) and attracted contributions from many more. To date, Botswana, Brazil, Cambodia, Kazakhstan, Nigeria and Tunisia have contributed US\$7 million through the Emergency Response Fund (ERF) alone – perhaps an indication of the ability of such funds to provide non-traditional donors ways of supporting humanitarian crises and highlighting that the boundary between donors and recipients is much more blurred than it once was.

Meanwhile several non-DAC countries, including Turkey and European Union (EU) accession countries, are committed to significantly increasing their aid and each major crisis seems to drive funding to a new high. Are these changes simply mirroring a more complex world and the rise of new powers?

The humanitarian system has been converging and standardising over the past ten years and more, with agreements on donor principles, an architecture of coordination of aid through clusters and the flowering of significant pooled funding mechanisms. Yet new donors, non-traditional donors from outside this relatively enclosed circle, are participating with increased volumes of humanitarian assistance, with their own ideas about aid, their own policies and their own priorities. There is a major challenge of integration ahead.

What influences decisions on humanitarian intervention?

Potential (often interrelated) factors include:


- access and logistics
- budgetary considerations such as pressure on finances (although analysis suggests humanitarian aid is less susceptible than development assistance)
- strategy, politics and diplomacy (policies on aid, national security, climate change and the environment, etc)
- public and media opinion
- historic/geographic/ religious ties.



Photo: Development Initiatives/Lisa Walmsley

Humanitarian pooled fund where are we now? Photo: Stealth Foto Ninja While pledges made to the CERF in 2010 are at an all time high, funding for 2009 was down on previous levels. Funding through ERFs and CHFs was also down.

Why is this? Fluctuating exchange rates and the global financial crisis provide some clues.



Contributions of over US\$1 million to ERFs, 2008-2009 [Source: UN OCHA Financial Tracking Service (FTS) and OCHA field offices, 6 January 2010]

Central Emergency Response Fund (CERF)

The UN CERF allows donor governments and the private sector to pool their financing on a global level to enable more timely and reliable humanitarian assistance to those affected by natural disasters and armed conflicts.

Common humanitarian funds (CHFs)

CHFs are in-country pooled mechanisms. Funding received is totally unearmarked. This allows money to be allocated on the basis of needs (as defined in the emergency's humanitarian action plan).

Emergency/humanitarian response funds (ERFs)

ERFs are also country-level mechanisms. They vary from CHFs in that they have the facility to provide finance to small-scale projects, allowing more NGOs to access resources directly rather than via UN agencies.

Five first-time donors to the CERF – Madagascar, Mauritania, the Russian Federation, Singapore, and the Sovereign Order of Malta – were amongst the 61 donors that pledged US\$424 million to the CERF for 2010 at its high-level conference in December – a record high. And if as many as the 90 donors that contributed to the fund in 2009 were to donate again in 2010, total contributions this year could reach the highest in the CERF's history.

Contributions to the CERF in 2009 reached US\$375 million, which is less than the US\$447 million total for 2008. However this decrease can be explained by the fluctuation in exchange rates throughout the year. At the start of 2009 the US dollar was very strong against other currencies. The rate to exchange Euros reached 1.25 during the first six months of the year and then increased to Euros 1.43 by the end of the year, a similar rate to 2008. Therefore contributions made in original currencies during the start of 2009 would be worth much less in US dollars even if the donor gave the same amount as the previous year. Spain maintained its donation of Euros 30 million in 2008 and 2009 – but its 2009 contribution in US dollars equated to US\$5 million less than the year before.

United Kingdom Netherlands Sweden Luxembourg Spain Ireland Norway Denmark Canada 180 Belgium 160 US\$ million (constant 2007 prices) 140 120 100 80 60 40 20 Sudan Sudan DRC CAR DRC CAR DRC 2008 2006 2007 2009

Total contributions to CHFs, 2008-2009 [Source: UN OCHA FTS and OCHA field offices, 6 January 2010]

Therefore if the dollar rate for 2008 is applied to the 2009 figures, it would almost certainly show an increase rather than a decrease in total contributions to the CERF.

Sweden was the only donor to have increased its contributions to ERFs in 2009. Overall, funding was down by 40% on the previous year.

The top two donors to ERFs in 2008, the United Kingdom and the Netherlands, significantly reduced their contributions – most notably to the fund in Ethiopia. This might be due to a reduction in needs caused by the onset of sudden emergencies in the country, or alternatively donors could be choosing to contribute larger sums to longer term development activities. Or they simply might be choosing to fund via other channels and mechanisms.

Despite the decline in contributions, several new ERFs were established and became active in 2009. These include funds in Nepal, Kenya, Uganda and Colombia. With the re-entry of the UN's Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA) in Afghanistan, an ERF is due to commence operation.

CHFs also witnessed a decline in funding during 2009. Although the CHF in Sudan has steadily decreased since its inception in 2006, in 2009 it suffered 33% reduction in total contributions. The total received by the CHF in Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) declined by 32%. What might be the cause of this?

The CHFs have been set up to provide financing on the basis of needs identified in the country's humanitarian action plan (HAP). With this in mind, when looking at the consolidated appeal requirements for 2008 and 2009, there has been an increase in funding requirements for Sudan and DRC rather than a decrease. Therefore the reason for a drop in funding through CHFs is not due to a reduction in need.

Neither did the percentage of money that donors spent through CHFs vary greatly between 2008 and 2009. Indeed in some instances it even increased, which suggests that donors remain confident in the operation and use of the funds. On the other hand, analysis of total humanitarian funding reported through UN OCHA's FTS shows that contributions to Sudan and DRC declined in 2009. This suggests that the decrease in donor spending through the CHFs is proportionate to overall humanitarian spending decreases in those countries, likely due to both exchange rates as well as the global financial crisis.

When looking at the overall picture of support for pooled financing mechanisms, it would appear that they remain reasonably well supported and that other factors negatively affected donor contributions in 2009. Furthermore, it could be argued that the pooled funding mechanisms are playing a key role in providing small and new donors ways of channelling funding in support of humanitarian crises – the ERF in Haiti has already attracted US\$7 million from six non-traditional government donors.

A roadmap to beneficiaries: the simplified version

At the sharp and most important end of humanitarian response is of course the final delivery of aid to individuals, families and communities. A key area of development for the Global Humanitarian Assistance programme is to deepen its knowledge and understanding of the role of delivery agencies – those organisations that provide aid to those in need. In the simplest sense we mean any organisation with a mandate to deliver humanitarian assistance to affected populations, whether non-government organisations (NGOs), the United Nations (UN) or the International Red Cross and Red Crescent Movement.


The humanitarian world is complex because of the context of assistance. The Haiti earthquake has highlighted how a huge disaster can seriously affect the delivery of humanitarian assistance, and of the huge challenge of delivery amidst the chaos of a post-crisis situation, where governance has been severely damaged and infrastructure shattered.

It is further complicated by the complex interrelation of the organisations delivering aid, which are dependent on country and disaster context, and the relative strengths of an organisation or its mandate. Firstly the UN, Red Cross and Red Crescent Movement and NGOs can have various and changing roles of both coordination and delivery of aid. Furthermore, each one may act as a donor, recipient or deliverer of aid, often in the same context.

The work of the Global Humanitarian Assistance programme is to unpick these humanitarian financing relations and their implications.

What we know about government contributions to delivery agencies


- Statistics published by the OECD Development Assistance Committee (DAC) allow us to see how its members channel their 'official' humanitarian expenditure
 - in 2008, DAC donors directly disbursed just under 58% of their humanitarian aid to multilateral organisations and UN agencies – some of this will then have been implemented through NGOs or other partners ... we still have some unravelling to do in order to find out exactly how much ...
 - in 2008, DAC donors spent 23.8% of their humanitarian aid through NGOs, civil society and the Red Cross and Red Crescent Movement ... again, we need to find out how much of this was directly implemented and how much was spent by these 'recipient' delivery agencies through other partners
- Analysis of UN OCHA's Financial Tracking Service (FTS) allows us to see how other government donors channel their humanitarian expenditure
 - in 2008, non-DAC donors channelled just over 53% of their funding through multilateral agencies and about 10% through NGOs, civil society and the Red Cross and Red Crescent Movement.



Source: Public support for humanitarian assistance through NGOs in 2006, Global Humanitarian Assistance, February 2009

What we know about voluntary contributions from members of the public

- Collecting comparable data is a challenge! Many different agencies make up the UN, and there are literally thousands of NGOs around the world. Data has to be sought on an organisation-byorganisation basis. These are diverse organisations, with different mandates, capacities, financial systems and reporting periods. They also have different views as to what constitutes 'humanitarian' assistance expenditure. All that diversity has to be translated into a single comparable understanding of the income and expenditure of humanitarian delivery in a given year. Consolidating this into a single format for meaningful research is complex.
- The complexity and scale of delivery agency humanitarian income and expenditure makes comprehensive representation of the delivery system difficult. We have established a methodology that allowed us to carry out some initial analysis for 2006 and 2007 based on a study set of 19 of the largest and most well known individual NGOs, coalitions and groupings of national societies, which comprises 114 organisations raising funds in 23 countries. We found that:
- some of the big NGOs make more significant contributions than many governments. Médecins Sans Frontières (MSF), for example, spent US\$496 million on humanitarian assistance in 2006 if it were a country, that would make it the third most generous
- voluntary contributions to NGOs are substantial, adding 24% to official humanitarian aid in 2006
- for every US\$10 spent in 2006, US\$4 was spent by NGOs.





delivery

- Government donors might give their humanitarian funding to the UN, the Red Cross and Red Crescent Movement, international NGOs or the governments of affected countries
- Foundations fund mainly the UN, the Red Cross and Red Crescent Movement, and international NGOs
- Public donations go to the UN, international NGOs, local NGOs, the Red Cross and Red Crescent Movement and directly to the people affected
- The private sector might give money to the UN, the Red Cross and Red Crescent Movement or international NGOs
- The World Bank, with some very limited exceptions, provides funding directly to governments that appeal for support, and may negotiate a loan
- The UN provides direct support to people affected by a disaster but also implements its own activities through other delivery agencies such as NGOs, international and national, which provide direct support to affected people
- National Red Cross and Red Crescent Societies from donor countries might support the International Federation of Red Cross and Red Crescent Societies (IFRC), the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC), the National Society of the affected country, or deliver aid directly to people themselves
- International NGOs usually carry out direct support to beneficiaries but in the past decade have increasingly worked through local NGOs to deliver aid

First responders: the unaccounted for world of domestic response



It is not the international humanitarian system that is first to deal with the aftermath of a natural disaster or the humanitarian effects of conflict. It is domestic responders that act first. National and local government, local communities and families, civil society and the private sector almost always prove the most immediate deliverers of humanitarian aid. This immediate humanitarian assistance, originating in-country and beyond the gaze of international actors and global media, is in many cases sizeable

but remains largely unreported and uncounted precisely because it is outside this internationally-dominated humanitarian aid system.

Complementing the work of others, the Global Humanitarian Assistance programme has set up a workstream that brings its understanding of humanitarian financing to bear upon the world of domestic response. We are developing methods to gauge the full scale of domestic response globally. At the same time we are working with teams in Bangladesh and Uganda to investigate in depth how domestic response functions in disasters and its interplay with the international response.

How do affected families, communities, governments, civil society organisations/NGOs and the private sector respond to crises?

Who gives /does what? (governments, CSOs/NGOs etc.) How do we know? (data sources)

What role do remittances play?

Structures, legislation, policies and budgets?

What triggers the response?



How are resources targetted? Who makes the decisions? Do some people get more than others?

How are resources valued by recipients?
Does this change the course of humanitarian action? What changes in benefits and impacts over 10 years?

Accessing resources

Barriers? Systems of redress if people perceive allocations to have been unjust?
Or corrupt?

Accountability

To do by end of 2009

Find out what's been done/being done already. Case studies

- design the methodology
- identify countries 🗸
- identify partners 🗸
- establish teams 🗸

Identify the type of global data we can use

To do 2010

Capture and make visible domestic response
Start analysing and making info available
for GHA reports and the website

Make detailed country case studies available by June

Make synthesis report available by June Provide input for GHA Report 2010 by May

The Bangladesh team comprises researchers, disaster experts and community workers, drawn from a mix of academia, the country's disaster risk management structures and a prominent community-based NGO. In Uganda we have partnered with influential NGO, Development Research and Training (DRT).

Work has started to broaden our knowledge in other contexts and with other partners beyond the initial case studies; we're

working now with IMARA, an Argentinian NGO, which will be using our methodology to examine domestic response.

Global data sources World Food Programme (WFP)

 Government funding for activities in their own countries

Development Assistance Databases (DADs)

Government budgets

Remittances

• World Bank



Natural disasters, financial crisis and fragile states: a bad situation made worse

Almost one-third of those surviving on less than a dollar a day live in fragile states – states that continue to suffer the cumulative effects of the food and oil price crises, and states that now find themselves hit by the global financial downturn. Given that at least 40% of revenues managed by fragile states consistently derive from external sources, development and humanitarian assistance have a vital role to play in countering these crises, preventing entrenched poverty as well as the real threat of escalating violence within and beyond national borders.

What is a 'fragile state'?

Fragile states are characterised by widespread extreme poverty, are the most off-track in relation to the Millennium Development Goals (MDGs), and are commonly caught in, or are emerging from, violence and conflict.

Exact definitions of what fragile states are can vary by donor and institution.

"States are fragile when governments and state structures lack capacity – or in some cases, political will - to deliver public safety and security, good governance and poverty reduction to their citizens." OECD DAC, 2006


"There are two categories of fragile states: vulnerable and in crisis. The former are those states unable or unwilling to adequately assure the provision of security and basic services to significant portions of their populations and where the legitimacy of the government is in question, this includes states that are failing or recovering from crisis. The latter are those states where the central government does not exert effective control over its own territory or is unable or unwilling to assure the provision of vital services to significant parts of its territory, where legitimacy of the government is weak or nonexistent, and where violent conflict is a reality or a great risk." USAID, 2005

In this analysis, we consider 43 states as 'fragile'. Our list is based on the definitions and lists compiled by the World Bank (Country Policy and Institutional Assessment (CPIA) 2008), Brookings Institution (Index of State Weakness in the Developing World 2009) and Carleton University (Country Indicators for Foreign Policy (CFIP) 2008 index).


Aid is increasing for a few, but the outlook is worrying

Official development assistance (ODA) to fragile states increased in real terms by 8.7% in 2008 to US\$33.2 billion, representing just over 30% of total global aid flows. However, over half of this benefited just six countries – Afghanistan, Ethiopia, Iraq, Palestine/Occupied Palestinian Territories (OPT), Sudan and Uganda. Aid concentration has increased over time. Ten fragile states – Angola, Equatorial Guinea, Eritrea, Guinea, Guinea-Bissau, Papua New Guinea, Sao Tome and Principe, Timor-Leste, Tonga and Yemen – saw lower ODA levels in 2008 in real terms compared to 2000. The outlook is also worrying:

22 fragile states, more than half of those considered in this analysis and the majority of them in Africa, are projected to have cuts in country programmable aid (CPA) in 2009, while Chad, Comoros, Côte d'Ivoire, Liberia, Palestine/OPT, Solomon Islands, Tajikistan and Togo are expected to see a fall of 20% or more by 2011.



Net ODA (excluding debt relief) to fragile states from DAC donors, 1990-2008 [Source: OECD DAC]



Changes in CPA, 2009-2011 [Source: Forthcoming DAC Report on Aid Predictability: Survey on Donors' Forward Spending Plans, OECD]

What links ODA, CPA humanitarian aid and development assistance?

While in many countries the longer-term, poverty-reducing and sustainable development assistance makes up the majority of ODA, humanitarian aid can form the bulk of ODA in some fragile states. Given that the year-on-year humanitarian aid has been substantial in these contexts, it suggests it is often doing more than the short-term, life-saving work that it was designed to support.

CPA is the aid that remains after deducting humanitarian aid and debt relief, imputed student costs, administrative costs, promotion of development awareness, research and refugees in donor countries, food aid and core NGO funding from ODA. In other words, it is the aid that partner countries can programme themselves.

An aid shock is where the difference in per capita ODA between two years is 15% or more of the recipient country's GDP per capita.



Fragile states are most vulnerable to the effects of poor aid, but still get a bad deal

Despite their limited institutional capacity to manage resources, fragile states experience lower rates of aid predictability and higher volatility than other developing countries. Two-thirds of aid shocks between 1970 and 2006 occurred in fragile states. Some states with small economies, such as Kiribati, Guinea-Bissau and Sao Tome and Principe, have experienced multiple aid shocks with the differences in ODA levels between two years falling by as much as 125% of GDP.

Synchronising assistance with need is as crucial for these countries as any other – perhaps more so. However, assistance is often provided when states are unable to manage the resources, with aid at risk of tailing off just as capacity develops.

Aid under threat just as other financial sources are set to fall

These worrying trends are happening just as other key resource flows are being hit by the fallout of the global financial crisis. Remittance volumes to fragile states – greater than ODA flows – are expected to have contracted in 2009. Sub-Saharan Africa's dependence on remittances from the United States and Europe was already beginning to be felt in 2008, with growth rates at 7%, down from 58% in 2007. Absolute volumes of remittances to sub-Saharan Africa are expected to have fallen by 3% in 2009.

Falling government spending will exacerbate vulnerability: assistance is vital

Falls in per capita GDP growth were projected for 27 fragile states in 2009, with many others experiencing near stagnation. While domestic revenue collection in fragile states has been increasing, those in Africa, for example, are still several percentage points below the regional average. 21 of the 32 fragile states for which 2009 estimations are available are expected to see falls in government revenues (as a percentage of GDP), although a return to (low) growth is predicted for many in 2010.

Falls in growth and revenues will translate into reduced spending. The World Bank estimates that developing countries currently face US\$11.6 billion gap in core spending – threatening cuts in key social spending. Fragile states, with minimal fiscal space to raise funds, constitute 58% of this gap. In the absence of external assistance, such cuts threaten to reverse human development gains, exacerbate vulnerability to further financial and climate shocks, and increase the risk of escalations of violence and conflict for millions of people who already face significant environmental and political insecurity.

Aid has a vital role in minimising the impact of this finance gap and the escalation of insecurity. It is therefore vital that the right decisions are made and that humanitarian aid works hand-in-hand with development.

This analysis is based on work undertaken by Development Initiatives for the OECD's forthcoming Resource Flows to Fragile and Conflict-Affected States, Annual Report 2010.

What we do

Map financial flows

We work in detail to highlight relationships between and within financial flows, mapping out who spends what, and where, enabling donors, NGOs, governments and local communities to better respond to people in humanitarian need.

Provide access to no-spin data & info

We provide no-spin analysis on financial flows, emphasising simplicity and clarity at all times, and work hard to make this complex world accessible. We help policy makers, practitioners, researchers, students and journalists to use and apply raw data, contributing to evidence-based policy making.

Encourage debate

We build a broad network for transparency in humanitarian aid flows.
We work hard to agree numbers and definitions so we can discuss the issues – not argue about the figures themselves.

Provide perspective beyond crisis

Our work on humanitarian assistance is in the wider context of a global commitment to poverty reduction and interconnects with global, regional and national concerns such as climate change, financial crises, conflict and chronic poverty.



Why clarity counts

Clarity counts because the provision of accurate data and information on humanitarian financing has the potential to inform, engage and empower beyond those 'inside' the international humanitarian system.

We believe that information on resources, and the capacity to use that information, are necessary conditions for effective humanitarian aid and the longer-term goal of poverty reduction.

Global Humanitarian
Assistance is a Development
Initiatives programme,
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of Canada, Denmark, the
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the United Kingdom.

For further information on anything inside this update, for more about the programme and its contents, for clarification on our use of data or its interpretation, or to provide feedback, please contact the Global Humanitarian Assistance team.

What you can expect from us in 2010

The Global Humanitarian Assistance team comprises researchers, analysts and policy advisors with practical field experience and backgrounds in development financing and reporting. In addition to our analyses of the humanitarian trends as presented by the main international data sources, our newly strengthened team will allow us to deepen and expand our understanding of humanitarian financing as well as greatly improve the resources we provide. This includes:

- new workstreams that will enable us to look in detail at domestic response, scale of needs, and conflict and the military
- a much more detailed examination of the complex role of delivery agencies
- more detailed profiling and understanding of a wider range of government donors
- detailed profiles of recipient countries over time
- a strengthened focus on providing more people better access to information and data
- a stronger connection between humanitarian financing and the bigger picture, from vulnerability and chronic poverty, to climate change and disaster risk reduction and to global events and crises.

Whilst much of this work will be included in our annual GHA report, due for publication mid-year, we are also planning additional updates and special features, case studies and briefing notes. We aim to make all of our work and the information that we find available on our website, www.globalhumanitarianassistance.org which we are restructuring and reorganising so that it is accessible and clear to all.

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