

## Early Warning Report

**IASC** Inter-Agency  
Standing Committee

December 2014 – May 2015  
Submitted by the IASC Task Team  
on Preparedness and Resilience

As an IASC early warning tool, the primary purpose of this report is to provide early warning, backed by evidence/rationale, of high risk/high impact/higher probability situations. The management of the IASC Task Team on Preparedness and Resilience (TTPR) provides the report for the following purposes:

- For consideration of appropriate action within the IASC Emergency Directors Group.
- For funding decisions taken as part of CERF deliberations (in particular consideration of underfunded situations).
- To IASC Member Organisations for IASC system and member monitoring and advocacy for early action at country, regional and global level

The report highlights twelve serious risks, either identified by the Emergency Directors Group as being of particular interest or identified by the TTPR Analysts Group as having the highest combined probability and impact, where there the risk/scenario has not been a focus of the EDG.



Of particular importance in this report is the Early Warning risk for **Somalia** (page 16) where there is a high likelihood of a very high impact for drought in the coming six month period.

This report is produced bi-annually as an inter-agency effort by the TTPR for IASC member agencies. In addition to collaboratively assembling the report, the TTPR works to improve collective efforts of the humanitarian system particularly in the fields of early warning and early action.

### SUMMARY

**EDG FOCUS – Afghanistan:** Conflict

**EDG FOCUS – Libya:** Conflict

**EDG FOCUS – Nigeria:** Conflict, also affecting Camerron, Niger and Chad

**EDG FOCUS – Somalia:** Conflict

**EDG FOCUS – Turkey:** Conflict

**EDG Focus – Yemen:** Conflict

**Honduras, Nicaragua, El Salvador, Guatemala:** Income losses and high food prices related to blight and drought

**Jordan:** Armed conflict between the Jordanian military and armed groups

**Liberia, Sierra Leone, Guinea:** Economic and Institutional Collapse

**Peru, Ecuador, Colombia:** Flooding


**Somalia:** Drought

**Tanzania:** Flooding, also affecting Kenya

# EARLY WARNING EARLY ACTION REPORT

## Risks of Concern

Task Team on Preparedness and Resilience



## IASC Early Action Recommendations

Except where mentioned otherwise the IASC TTPR recommends a Standard Operating Procedure Action (SOP Action) of updating/verifying that contingency planning and other appropriate advanced preparedness actions are sufficient to accommodate the potential needs described in the scenario. TTPR Members can provide technical advice. For refugee situations this would involve action coordinated by UNHCR.

### **EDG FOCUS – Afghanistan:** Conflict

- SOP Action

### **EDG FOCUS – Libya:** Conflict

- SOP Action
- Candidate for a simulation activity related to the scenario.

### **EDG FOCUS – Nigeria:** Conflict, also affecting Camerron, Niger and Chad

- SOP Action with UNHCR lead for any potential refugee situations

### **EDG FOCUS – Somalia:** Conflict

- SOP Action

### **EDG FOCUS – Turkey:** Conflict

- No specific recommendations

### **EDG Focus – Yemen:** Conflict

- SOP Action

### **Honduras, Nicaragua, El Salvador, Guatemala:** Income losses and high food prices related to blight and drought

- SOP Action

### **Jordan:** Armed conflict between the Jordanian military and armed groups

- SOP Action , possibly under RHC

### **Liberia, Sierra Leone, Guinea:** Economic and Institutional Collapse

- SOP Action

### **Peru, Ecuador, Colombia:** Flooding

- SOP Action
- A candidate for simulation at the regional level in coordination with relevant National Disaster Management Agencies

### **Somalia:** Drought

- SOP Action
- EDG/ERC to formulate an advocacy plan for early action

### **Tanzania:** Flooding, also affecting Kenya

- SOP Action
- A candidate for a simulation in coordination with relevant National Disaster Management Agencies


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## CHART AND SYMBOLS

Detailed technical notes can be found on the last two pages of this document.

### Risk Type Icons:



### EDG FOCUS RISKS

- For EDG Focus risks, the colour of the icon is in neutral blue. In general, these risks describe ongoing situations or situations for which there has already been an early warning.
- For EDG Focus risks, rather than projecting impact ranges describing estimated numbers of new beneficiaries, the graph depicts the analysts' projections regarding the likelihood of the current humanitarian impact remaining the same (status quo), deteriorating or improving. If more than 20,000 people are expected to need humanitarian assistance (or be cut off from receiving assistance they need), the situation is thought to be deteriorating. Improving situations are those where the beneficiary caseload is expected to decrease in the reporting period.

### EARLY WARNING RISKS


- For Early Warning risks, the colour of the icon shows the risk "seriousness", i.e. the geometric average of impact and likelihood. Seriousness is rated on a five point scale using the following colours:

Seriousness	Very Low	Low	Mod.	High	Very High
Likelihood	0-5%	6- 15%	16-30%	31-50%	51-100%
Impact	<20k	20-100k	100- 250k	250- 500k	>500k

- **Likelihood** is the probability of over 20,000 people requiring humanitarian assistance in the next six months as a result of the risk.
- **Impact** is a rough approximation of the number of people expected to need humanitarian assistance in the coming six months, based on the probability of impact assessment.

### Probability of Impact


- The horizontal axis shows impact ranges, with numbers of people who could need humanitarian assistance in the next six months. The vertical axis shows probabilities from 0 – 100
- The graph columns show the probability of the risk having each level of impact





**AFGHANISTAN: Conflict**<sup>1</sup>

The key risk for Afghanistan remains armed conflict among militant groups and with the Afghan National Security Forces (ANSF) for the December 2014 to May 2015 period. The peaceful resolution of the question of the presidency in October was an important step for Afghanistan to assure the continuity of foreign support and demonstrated the type of concessions Afghans will have to make to overcome decades of identity-based politics in favour of the growth of the country. Afghanistan is facing a number of major developmental challenges that will test public patience for the new leaders finding their rhythm. There are currently over 700,000 IDPs in Afghanistan with a further 244,000 from Pakistan’s North Waziristan. The Taliban has reportedly increased its ranks by 15% and the ANSF has the same difficulty in projecting power beyond Kabul that it had 5 years ago. Attacks in Helmand and Kunduz in mid-October displaced 10,000. The arrival of winter does more to affect those people living in transitional housing than it does to limit the frequency of militant attacks.



**STATUS QUO:** The likeliest outcome is a continuation of the status quo in Afghanistan. The capacity and intent of the ANSF as an agent of government interests is effectively unchanged, though may suffer somewhat as the ISAF mission ends at the end of 2014, leaving only 9000 non-combat American troops and 2000 other troops. The Taliban have proven they still have the capacity to conduct major impact attacks in Kabul, as they did in the car bombings in Ghazni and Kabul in response to President Ashraf Ghani signing the Status of Forces Agreement that dictated the terms of further foreign military support. Afghanistan has a mixed record on Millennium Development Goals, falling behind on many equality-based initiatives but exceeding expectations on indicators related to infrastructure such as access to health services, connectivity and governance. The government is expected to try to translate those structural investments into social cohesion and improvements in services to reduce the appeal of groups like the Taliban.

**SITUATION IMPROVES:**

The slim chance that the situation will improve in Afghanistan in the coming 6 months is related to the possibility that with the political situation resolved, that there could be a gradual and palpable improvement in the capacity and legitimacy of the ANSF to deploy decisively and effectively to curtail Taliban activities outside of Kabul. While there is reason to be hopeful that the new unity government will be motivated to build on and exceed what Hamid Karzai managed, the challenges are not easily dismissed and capacity of the armed forces takes time to build.

**SITUATION DETERIORATES:**

High food insecurity is projected for the period from January to March 2014. More than 750,000 people are expected to be cut off from services over the coming 6 months. The current situation is expected to deteriorate as a result of severe winter conditions, heavy snow and the blockage of roads in certain provinces. Market prices are expected to increase, per the seasonal pattern, while food availability will be diminished. Bamyán and Daykundi provinces are expected to shift from Phase 3 to 4 Food Insecurity because of the expansion of drought to the area, inadequate food availability and poor access to markets. Ghazni province is expected to deteriorate from Phase 2 to 3. While other provinces should remain in the same phase, a higher proportion of the total population will see its food security compromised. Increased food insecurity heightens the risk of conflict, as more people are likely to seek alternative means of support and turn to the Taliban. Taliban militants could seek to re-gain territory in Pashtun areas, notably in the southern regions of Helmand and Kandahar. As the Taliban are looking to expand territories under their control, it is possible that association with Sunni tribes could result in direct targeting of Shia communities, particularly in the north of the country.


**PREPAREDNESS PROFILE (via OCHA): Scenarios pertaining to AG-identified risks listed below:**

- No contingency plan in place for this risk

<sup>1</sup> Early Warning for this risk was issued in the **June 2014 Early Warning Early Action Report**. This is an update of that analysis.

LIBYA: Conflict <sup>2</sup>

The key risk in Libya in the coming six months is the ongoing conflict between armed groups in Libya competing for power, territory and political legitimacy. Operation Dignity was initiated in May 2014 when retired Libyan Army General Khalifa Haftar formed a militia that would undertake an armed campaign against the Shura Council of Benghazi Revolutionaries which he labelled as illegitimate and Islamist. His goal is to ensure that the revolution that ousted Muammar Qaddafi is actualised through the formation of a democratic government. His support includes several powerful tribal leaders from Benghazi and a large part of the Libyan military. At the outset, Operation Dignity struck Islamist militias in Benghazi as well as the Libyan Parliament in Tripoli to highlight that Dignity believe them to be linked. The conflict has divided Libya's security, tribal communities and government. As a result of the worsening political crisis, there had been calls for new elections, which were last held in June 2014. The establishment of the new House of Representatives (HoR) was disputed when the former General National Congress claimed that it remained in power. As a result, the country had two competing parliaments and governments, two official militaries and two Central Banks. Islamist forces support the General National Congress while the House of Representatives declared a formal alliance with General Haftar in late October. Fierce positional fighting has been nearly constant throughout since mid-May 2014 with airports, fuel depots, ports and major urban areas in the north seeing the most intense fighting. In what is widely portrayed as an existential crisis, both major parties are employing any judicial, political and military means they can muster but neither has the capacity to end the conflict.



**STATUS QUO:** The divisive nature of the conflict has drawn in Tuareg and other identity-based groups and has resulted in an environment rife with weapons and in which physical security is so uncertain that even several months since fighting began, there are only rough estimates of the number of people who have been displaced. UNHCR estimates 290,000 people have been displaced, OCHA believes it is 331,000. After months of neglect, many basic services are severely damaged, including infrastructure, schools, health services and trade; until mid-2014, Filipinos and Indians made up 80% of health staff in Libya, all have since evacuated. In September 2014 UNSMIL and OHCHR affirmed that extensive destruction of property not justified by military necessity and carried out unlawfully and wantonly, wilful killing, and torture or inhuman treatment also constitute war crimes in Libya. Human Rights Watch has also reported on suspected ethnic targeting and crimes against humanity. Borders with Algeria, Egypt and Tunisia are closed to all but returning nationals.

**SITUATION IMPROVES:** It is effectively impossible that this situation will improve in the coming 6 months. There is no source of stability and none of the key players has the capacity or even intent to resolve this conflict in the near term. Analysts believe that the gap in primary-source impact figures masks an impact range much worse than current estimates and any new information will inevitably reveal more displacement and infrastructure damage than is currently verifiable.

**SITUATION DETERIORATES:** If there is improved information and humanitarian access over the coming 6 months, it will inevitably betray that the displacement and damage situation is worse than currently estimated. The longer the conflict continues and the more violent the combatant parties become over territory, the more likely that previously-uninvolved parties and territories will be drawn into the conflict. Ethnic rivalry is expected to become more intense if there is not a political resolution but political talks, even if fruitful, are unlikely to influence the most hard-line militant groups. Conflicting parties, both political and military elements, are diametrically opposed and unless there is a change in leadership or in battle momentum, they cannot be expected to be reconciled in a power-sharing solution. Thus far, mediation efforts have failed, though there is a Special Representative of the Secretary General currently engaged in political mediation. Based on historical trends, it is believed that there is or will be a shortage of medical supplies. The national human rights institution has been under particular attack, and human rights activists, humanitarian workers, lawyers and media professionals have been threatened or killed with impunity.


**PREPAREDNESS PROFILE (via OCHA): Scenarios pertaining to AG-identified risks:**

Contingency Plan: Inter-Agency Contingency Plan (June 2012)

<sup>2</sup> Early Warning for this risk was issued in the **June 2014 Early Warning Early Action Report**. This is an update of that analysis.


**NIGERIA: Conflict – also affecting Cameroon, Niger and Chad**<sup>3</sup>

Armed conflict between Nigeria's army and Boko Haram presents a high risk for the period of December 2014 to May 2015. Following false claims of a ceasefire, which further discredited the government and the army, Boko Haram continues to extend its territory. The group has seized at least two dozen towns and villages in recent months, with the government remaining unable to hamper the group's progression. The February 2015 presidential elections are likely to trigger additional unrest if the incumbent southern Christian President, Goodluck Jonathan is re-elected, hence compromising the power-sharing agreement between Nigeria's Muslim north and Christian south. Since the beginning of 2014, clashes between the army and Boko Haram in the states of Borno, Yobe and Adamawa have led to 1.5 million IDPs. Nine million people are affected by violence in the northeast, with three million acutely needing humanitarian assistance. A string of coordinated attacks on Cameroonian territory at the beginning of November 2014 created additional displacement, with a total number of people fleeing into Cameroon reported by local authorities to be 43,700. As of mid-September 2014, people having fled Nigeria and sought refuge into Niger amounted to 105,000 and there were some 1500 Nigerian refugees in Chad. Massive displacements within the country with a spill over effect to the neighbouring countries, especially Cameroon and Niger, are expected to continue. The refugee populations are often hosted in already exhausted host communities. The conflict has also disrupted trade, crop cultivation, agricultural labour and pastoral activities, limiting household food access despite favourable weather conditions. Only about 20% of normally cultivated land was cultivated this season. Harvests which usually last until January are expected to be below average in conflict-affected areas leading to reduced food stocks.



**STATUS QUO:** Emboldened by its successful advance in north eastern Nigeria, Boko Haram met with weak resistance from the army and its insurgency is unlikely to decline. The group's conquests in the past months denote a departure from its previous hit-and-run tactics, and the declaration of a Caliphate in Gwoza in August indicates that the group will fight to hold and expand its territory rather than simply creating insecurity in the north east. Plagued by corruption, low morale and desertions, as well as by infiltration by Boko Haram elements, the Nigerian army has proven its incapacity to hamper the insurgents' expansion, while creating additional displacement due to its violent counterinsurgency. In early November, the insurgents took control of the commercial hub of Mubi in Adamawa State, with a population of 200,000, sending 13,000 people crossing into Cameroon, most of them returned to Nigeria and the state capital, Yola.

**SITUATION IMPROVES:** If a Muslim candidate from Nigeria's north wins the 2015 presidential elections, a temporary ease might be achieved, yet a long-term peace solution is unlikely as the insurgent group maintains capacity and intent to control territory.

**SITUATION DETERIORATES:** With a sustained capacity, it is expected that Boko Haram will consolidate its gains in the north east of Nigeria while cross-border attacks into Cameroon, recruitment and intelligence activities in Niger continue. With limited military resistance from Nigeria's army or a regional force, Boko Haram is likely to further extend its territory. Armed opposition from the local population in the form of vigilante groups is expected to lead to more attacks as Boko Haram retaliates against both the vigilantes and the broader community, perpetuating a spiral of violence. President Jonathan has violated the tacit power-sharing agreement between Nigeria's north and south with his bid to run again for president in February 2015. If he wins, Boko Haram is likely to intensify its attacks beyond Nigeria's northeast, targeting the capital. In addition, a high cholera risk affecting all four adjoining countries is expected in the coming three months around Lake Chad.

**PREPAREDNESS PROFILE (via OCHA): Scenarios pertaining to AG-identified risks:**


- No contingency planning in place for this risk

<sup>3</sup> Early Warning for this risk was issued in the **June 2014 Early Warning Early Action Report**. This is an update of that analysis.




**SOMALIA: Conflict** <sup>4</sup>

Armed conflict between Al-Shabaab and the Somali National Army (SNA) as well as the African Union Forces in Somalia (AMISOM) poses a high risk for December 2014 through May 2015. Since March 2014, SNA and AMISOM have been making their most significant military advances since 2012, targeting Al-Shabaab strongholds in southern Somalia. According to OCHA, military operations have caused the internal displacement of 80,000 people since January 2014, with 7000 fleeing in August and September, largely in Bakool and Lower Shabelle regions. According to OCHA, 1.5 million people live in areas that could be affected by military operations. In addition, political tensions over the forming of a new federal South West State as part of Somalia's transition to federalism fuels protests that can turn violent. The number of people in need of humanitarian assistance in Somalia is currently estimated at over 1 million, including 220,000 children under the age of five, while 2 million people are struggling to meet their minimal food requirements.



**STATUS QUO:** Retreating Al-Shabaab militants in southern Somalia will trigger additional displacement. Under 'Operation Indian Ocean', the joint forces recaptured the port city of Barawe. While the loss of Barawe is a blow to Al-Shabaab's operational capabilities, the group remains in control of rural areas and supply routes retaining its ability to conduct attacks. The loss of territories, while sizable, is unlikely to change the economic power of the group as it relies on extortion even in areas controlled by the government. Al-Shabaab is likely to relocate further inland, possibly to Jilib or Jamaame.

**SITUATION IMPROVES:** With the advances of SNA and AMISOM, Al-Shabaab has lost not only important strongholds and revenue income but also public support. While the killing of Al-Shabaab leader Godane has had limited effect on the group's operational capacity, Al-Shabaab is expected to stage retaliatory attacks. However, public support for Al-Shabaab may re-emerge if government response and presence in the recovered areas is not significant.

**SITUATION DETERIORATES:** Some commanders such as Abdikadir Mohamed Abdikadir 'Ikrima', are believed to have cultivated links to ISIL, pushing for a shift of allegiance to ISIL. In the long-term, this is likely to lead to an internal schism. While the joint forces' operations proved militarily successful, the SNA lacks sufficient funds for equipment and training and suffers from weak command and low morale among its ranks, which will make it easier for Al-Shabaab to regroup once AMISOM plays a less prominent role. The approaching dry season is likely to lead to increased clashes as mobility increases, yet, in the short term, Al-Shabaab will continue to lose fighters to ISIL while others desert due to the government's amnesty offer. Al-Shabaab's long-term and ad-hoc blockades of trade routes have caused localised price increases and continue to cause supply restrictions of basic goods and services. The situation is likely to be compounded by a slow response from government and humanitarian agencies in the provision of food and other basic items in the recovered areas. The lack of effective presence of the FGS could lead to an increase in insecurity and human rights abuses, with high risk of retaliatory attacks against civilians who show support to AMISOM/SNA.


**PREPAREDNESS PROFILE (via OCHA): Scenarios pertaining to AG-identified risks:**

- CP: Baidoa Sub-office Hazard and Agency Response Capacity Mapping (August 2013)
- CP: Lower and Middle Juba Hazard and Agency Response Capacity Mapping (Jul 2013)

<sup>4</sup> Early Warning for this risk was issued in the **June 2014 Early Warning Early Action Report**. This is an update of that analysis.


**TURKEY: Conflict** <sup>5</sup>

The key risk in Turkey between December 2014 and May 2015 is related to the conflict in Syria and Iraq spilling over and causing displacement or re-displacement of people inside Turkey. The number of Syrian and Iraqi refugees residing in Turkey is expected to increase in the next 6 months due to unstable security conditions in the areas of Syria bordering Turkey, individual cases are expected to continue to trigger communal hostility, leading to further deterioration of the relationship between the two communities if no sustainable solution is found to support both refugees and host communities. The Turkish government and military have avoided being drawn into combat in Syria, though Turkey had supported forces opposing Syria's President Bashar al Assad in the early phases of that war. It is geopolitical location means that Turkey is both a transit route for foreign fighters to enter Syria or Iraq, a refugee-hosting country and the front-line of western countries' military mission to combat the Islamic State (ISIL). Turkey has been forced to re-evaluate its policies regarding Kurds and in October 2014, facilitating Kurdish resupply of both arms and fighters to the besieged Syrian Kurdish city of Kobane. The Government of Turkey recently allowed Iraqi Kurdish forces to cross its territory into Syria to bolster defenders in the border town. Turkey has become a transit point for both refugees and militants. There are around 1.35 million Syrian refugees in Turkey, most residing outside of official camps. Social cohesion will be the determining factor behind any unrest in Turkey in addition to spill-over of the conflict, reigniting the Kurdish issue in Turkey. The growing number of Syrian refugees has put strains on Turkish host communities and pressure on labour and rental markets. Violent clashes have already been witnessed in the eastern part of Turkey and further political polarisation is likely during this period, particularly with parliamentary elections due to take place between April and mid-June 2015. A regional power-player, Turkey is interested primarily in employing its half-million strong military to maintain isolation from being drawn into the war on the southern border and in keeping the question of Kurdish independence off the public agenda.



**STATUS QUO:** The likeliest outcome for Turkey in the coming six months is a relative status quo. The creation of a militarily-enforced buffer zone along parts of their border, resistance to joining the US-led coalition and the strategic management of hundreds of thousands of refugees in a way that neither legitimizes Kurdish independence nor aligns Turkey with ISIL are likely to result in Turkey avoiding the risk of an ISIL attack inside their territory. The US-led coalition will seek to draw contributions from Turkey but unless Turkish forces become involved in direct clashes inside Iraq or Syria, roughly consistent impact is the likeliest outcome.

**SITUATION IMPROVES:** Given that the pressures in the surrounding countries are unlikely to be resolved soon and given Turkey's complicated relationships with ISIL, Turkish Kurds and the west, it seems highly unlikely that the risk level in Turkey will diminish in the coming 6 months. Kurdish politicians are highly unlikely to jeopardise the political capital they have earned in fighting ISIL by seeking statehood soon. The best hope this outcome is for Turkey to be highlighted for more humanitarian support both in terms of bilateral funding and cooperation and engagement with humanitarian organisations.

**SITUATION DETERIORATES:** In the event of a collapse in the ceasefire with the Kurdish PKK party, Turkey would almost certainly find itself in a position to take a decision regarding the movement and freedom of Kurds inside Turkey - this would have repercussions on the treatment and integration of Kurdish refugees from Iraq and Syria and would likely draw reproach from western supporters. Given the pressure it faces, it is not unreasonable to believe that Turkey may witness acts of terrorist violence inside its territory. In an unusual example of mercy, the Islamic State released 49 Turkish politicians it had been holding hostage; the price of this release is not known. ISIL has shown no compunction in executing its victims quickly in most other cases. If Turkey aligns with western governments against IS, retribution from IS would become much more likely.

**PREPAREDNESS PROFILE (via OCHA): Scenarios pertaining to AG-identified risks:**


- Information not available

<sup>5</sup> Early Warning for this risk was issued in the **June 2014 Early Warning Early Action Report**. This is an update of that analysis.



**YEMEN: Conflict**<sup>6</sup>

The key risk in Yemen is related to the conflict between armed groups and the government, competing for resources and political power. Since the departure of former President Saleh in 2011, the Yemeni government of President Hadi has been facing threats from Al Qaeda, Houthi opposition and a separatist movement known as Al Hirak. In April 2014, the government launched a military campaign targeting Al Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP) in the Hadramawt Governorate. Shia, Houthi militants expanded their control from their northern stronghold of Saada towards the south during the same period, fighting with Sunni groups and tribal militias affiliated with the Sunni Islah Party. The Houthis leveraged popular protests against fuel subsidies cuts to gain control of the capital Sanaa by the end of September. Despite an UN-brokered peace agreement signed by the Houthis in September 2014, they continued their territorial expansion. The Houthis' seek a role in government to transform their military gains into political power and to focus their armed forces against AQAP. One day after the agreement was signed to form a new government, a prominent Yemeni politician, Mohammed Abdel Malek al-Mutawakel, was killed by an unknown gunman, presumably to hamper the political resolution of the conflict. There are 14.7 million people in need of humanitarian assistance in Yemen, among which 5 million are severely food insecure. That figure has doubled since 2009. More than one million children under five are acutely malnourished, 280,000 of whom are severely malnourished while 8.6 million people do not have access to healthcare and 13.1 million do not enjoy access to safe water or sanitation.



**STATUS QUO:** Despite the fact a new Prime Minister was approved by the Houthis, they did not leave Sanaa, and instead expanded towards Hudaydah, Ibb and Marib. The incapacity of the Yemeni military to stop their advance led Sunni tribes to form local alliances with Al Qaeda in order to push back the Houthis. The Houthis seek influence in the political dialogue, and are likely to seize economic assets while being outwardly committed to a National Unity government. The Yemeni government is likely to make some political concessions as it seeks to avoid a sectarian civil war, and the division of the country. To open the door to a negotiated agreement, President Hadi has mentioned his willingness to meet with Al Qaeda if foreign fighters quit the country; a move that is unlikely to happen as both the Houthis and AQAP are engaged in fighting around the oilfields. The airport could close if intense fighting erupts in the capital, a growing likelihood as the development of "Popular Committees" - armed, sectarian civilian defence groups - in Sanaa highlight and feed the growing polarisation of the population.

**SITUATION IMPROVES:** The PM was approved and Houthis supported a National Unity government, suggesting reconciliation is possible. Doubt for this comes from the fact that all actors believe they can capture territory and gain political power by force.

**SITUATION DETERIORATES:** Houthi leader Abdel Malik al-Houthi promised to not marginalise other political groups, however Houthi fighters have targeted institutions and the homes of prominent members of the major Sunni party, Islah. With Islah leadership fleeing to Saudi Arabia, the vacuum on the Sunni political spectrum is a boon to AQAP's recruiting. The development of Popular Committees will further polarise the population. The Houthis' growing political profile and choice of economic target - oilfields in Marib and port infrastructure in Hudaydah - suggests a desire to control Yemen's oil output, and position themselves as the new powerbroker. Saudi Arabia has already begun a military build-up along the border. The Houthi strategy of both cooperating with and fighting the Yemeni government suggests an outcome similar to that of Lebanese Hezbollah. Extension of conflict areas will exacerbate humanitarian access to vulnerable people and have a significant impact on the protection of human rights for the population. Price volatility is linked to conflict and the harvest will deteriorate because of drought and water scarcity. The government is facing difficulties in meeting import needs in light of budget restrictions.

**PREPAREDNESS PROFILE (via OCHA): Scenarios pertaining to AG-identified risks:**

- CP: Inter-Agency Contingency Plan (September 2014 - March 2015); Next Update: April 2015. Sufficient stocks available in all hubs for Food Security, Water and Sanitation, Health, Emergency Shelter and Logistics Clusters. Nutrition, Protection, Multi-Sector and Education Clusters need additional funding, amount not specified.
- CP considers the economic crisis as "likely to deepen over the next six months", and includes worst-case outcome (conflict affecting 1.5 million people). Planning for 'most likely' scenario is covered in 2014 SRP (funded 48.7%).


<sup>6</sup> Early Warning for this risk was issued in the **June 2014 Early Warning Early Action Report**. This is an update of that analysis.



## HONDURAS, NICARAGUA, EL SALVADOR, GUATEMALA: Income losses and high food prices related to blight and drought <sup>7</sup>

Income losses and high staple prices pose a high risk in Nicaragua, Honduras, El Salvador and Guatemala in the coming six-month period. Rainfall between May and July was generally less than 75% of average rainfall across the central Dry Corridor, with some locations receiving less than 50% of the annual rainfall. The drought directly affected about 1.7 million people. Guatemalan farmers, especially indigenous groups in the northern part of the country were later affected again when heavy rains flooded their farms. Subsequent harvest losses in September resulted in staple price increases of up to 74% for red beans in Honduras and 52% for maize in El Salvador, between June and August as well as significant income reductions for small-scale and subsistence farmers. This inhibited the affordability of agricultural inputs for the *Postrera* season (September to December) for small-scale farmers which, in combination with planting delays, poses a risk of another below average harvest for December and January. Coping measures such as selling assets have made the affected households more vulnerable and are likely to affect their ability to produce food in the future. The deterioration of coffee exports due to the coffee leaf rust blight, which affected 55% of coffee plantations and endangers the livelihoods of almost 2 million people who depend on coffee production as a primary source of income.

### Six Month Probability of Impact Analysis



#### <20k-250k: Mitigated staple prices, residual impact of shocks on purchasing power

Although income losses and high staple prices caused by drought will continue to impair household food affordability in the next six months, current agro-climatic conditions do not indicate significant rainfall shortfalls. The coming harvests are thus expected to mitigate the price pressure to some extent although the lasting residual effects of the drought including unsustainable coping mechanisms will reduce the total area planted. Households relying on earnings from casual and migrant labour in the coffee sector will continue to face stressed budgets due to reduced income opportunities during the harvest period in late 2014. Considering pre-existing poverty rates of around 30% of the population and vulnerability to income and price shocks, families who lost most of their agricultural production and income would face budget constraints and have difficulty acquiring food and other products in local markets, causing a deterioration of food security and nutrition.

#### 250k->500k: High food prices, depleting household stocks

These impact ranges could be reached if the *Postrera* and *Apante* (between February and March in Honduras and Nicaragua harvest) seasons are below average due to adverse weather conditions or reduced affordability of agricultural inputs and fail to provide adequate maize and bean supplies. If imports prove unfeasible and stocks deplete towards the end of the reporting period, prices could increase further. This could result in an early start of the lean season which normally begins in April and lasts until July. However, latest meteorological models generally indicate near average rainfall conditions across Central America and favourable crop conditions for the *Postrera* season. Government response mechanisms such as lower import tariffs are also expected to mitigate to some extent the amount of individuals in need of humanitarian assistance.

#### PREPAREDNESS PROFILE (via OCHA): Scenarios pertaining to AG-identified risks:

- Nicaragua - Multi-hazard contingency plan in place; awaiting CP for detail on scenarios covered.
- El Salvador - Information not available. Awaiting planning documents for detail on scenarios covered.


<sup>7</sup> Early Warning for this a drought risk in these countries was issued in the **June 2014 Early Warning Early Action Report**. This is an update of that analysis.



## JORDAN: Armed conflict between the Jordanian military and armed groups

There is a small but meaningful risk of conflict between the Jordanian military and armed groups, including Islamic State (ISIL) in the coming six months. Jordan has avoided the turmoil of the Arab Spring - the king opting to voluntarily introduce reforms to reduce the social pressure for democratisation and liberalisation which has undercut the appeal of jihadist armed groups. The government has made it both a policy and a national trait to accept refugees; Syrians and Iraqis are merely the most recent in a decades-long policy of integrating those fleeing violence (although it should be noted that Jordan has an official policy not to accept Palestinian refugees from Syria, which has led to cases of *refoulement* and places this category of refugees in a particularly vulnerable situation). Jordan now hosts 620,000 registered Syrian refugees, primarily in the north, with 80% living within host communities. There are a further 5000 Syrians estimated to be waiting inside Syria to cross the border and 100-200 Iraqis crossing per day for a total of 35,000 since September. The Jordanian military is well resourced and professional, though does not have the capacity to patrol the entire northern and eastern border where it is believed both militants and weapons transit.

### Six Month Probability of Impact Analysis



**<20k:** ISIL has not made any direct moves toward Jordan but does enjoy significant support from several Jordanian tribes, particularly in Ma'an, in the south. Jordan is a close ally of the United States, has signed a peace agreement with Israel, is ruled by a king whose mother was British, and in parts of the capital Amman, western-style consumerism and wealth is highly visible; as such, it would be in keeping with ISIL philosophy for a symbolic attack. It is doubtful that ISIL will be seeking to move into Jordanian territory - despite promotional material to the contrary - until they have a somewhat more viable footing in Iraq and Syria. Jordan may offer too attractive an opportunity, though, to garner international attention and draw in more international actors - all of which are in line with ISIL strategy. What remains in doubt though, is whether even a large-scale symbolic attack would prompt the displacement of more than 20,000 people; the capital, Amman, could be a target but in the event of an attack there, there are not many options for flight.

**>100k:** In the event of a major attack on civilians inside Jordan, the likeliest outcome would be a relatively muted response from the Jordanian populace. The military and government would tighten controls, close borders and would offer reassurance that the situation was under control; they would also likely receive immediate international military support. As such, mass displacement is relatively unlikely unless the attack targeted or involved Syrian refugees, particularly near the northern border. The material barriers to conducting an attack of this type are relatively low and the key question is whether it is in the interest of ISIL to open another major front.

### PREPAREDNESS PROFILE (via OCHA): Scenarios pertaining to AG-identified risks:


- No contingency planning in place for this risk. A comprehensive risk assessment is being planned for Jordan, to be undertaken jointly with the Government.



**LIBERIA, SIERRA LEONE, GUINEA: Economic and institutional collapse, also affecting Mali, Senegal, Burkina Faso, Gambia, Cote D'Ivoire and Guinea Bissau**

The economic costs of the Ebola (EVD) outbreak in West Africa will have a significant impact on the populations beyond the currently-affected countries of Guinea, Liberia and Sierra Leone in the next six months. The spill-over effects will affect Mali, Senegal, Burkina Faso, Gambia, Cote D'Ivoire and Guinea Bissau. As quarantine measures continue and trading and agricultural activities slow down, a decrease in output, higher fiscal deficits, inflation, reduction of household incomes and expenditure will exacerbate poverty. Healthcare and social programs risk collapse since government resources to support them will be limited. The stigma created by the Ebola outbreak is likely to scare foreign investors and have a recessionary effect on the economies of these countries as the region faces isolation, reduced trade, tourism and foreign investments that will undercut output per capita. The World Bank estimates that the economic losses for the region could amount to USD 25 billion in the next six months, which averages 5% loss of GDP.

**Six Month Probability of Impact Analysis**



**100-250k:** This impact range could be reached if the rate of the EVD transmission is reduced over the next six months and governmental and international efforts limit the geographic spread of infection. This would still result in a deterioration of local food security conditions as general price increases hit urban households. According to most recent estimates and warnings by the relevant agencies, it is not likely that the impact of the disease will be adequately reduced in the short term. Food stocks in rural, inland areas are expected to deplete towards the end of the forecast period as reduced planting activities due to labour shortages as a result of movement restrictions leading to below average rice harvests – an important staple in the affected countries. A higher impact range is thus more likely.

**250->500k:** Fear caused by Ebola will continue to limit economic activities. Border closures, market shutdowns and interruption of planting seasons for cash crops and main staples will have an effect on household incomes and increase prices. Households in urban areas are expected to be more affected by the market closures, given their greater reliance on market supplies. Concurrently, diminished farm purchases by traders are also expected to negatively impact rural households' incomes, further aggravating the already fragile food security conditions. Foreign investments in the mining, services and tourism sector will decrease and there is a risk of capital flight that will depreciate local currencies and affect fiscal revenues and government spending as well as employment. A decrease in government revenues will limit the ability of governments to respond to the Ebola emergency and lead to other externalities such as public sector layoffs and decreased public investments. The healthcare systems of these countries risk total collapse and may not be able to respond to other health emergencies like malaria or other illnesses. In this scenario, the number of food insecure people is likely to increase as food availability and access will be limited by lower supplies. The Ebola epidemic may trigger social upheaval that could enhance the negative effects of the economic crisis, causing displacement or conflict.


**PREPAREDNESS PROFILE (via OCHA): Scenarios pertaining to AG-identified risks:**

- Information not available



Flooding poses a high risk across southwest Colombia, Ecuador, Peru and Bolivia for December 2014 through May 2015. Due to a developing El Niño and above average sea surface temperatures across the eastern Pacific, the beginning of the rainy season (October through December) is expected to be above average for much of northwest South America. While moderate flooding is expected for the start of the rainy season, above average precipitation at the beginning of the season is likely to saturate the soil and increase river levels resulting in an enhanced risk for flooding through the peak of the season in January through March. Recently, models have increasingly indicated a higher likelihood of flooding across both Peru and Colombia. In the past, even weak El Niño conditions have resulted in floods and displacements across the region, such as in the 2006-7 El Niño, where over 300,000 people were affected. However, it can be difficult to determine several months in advance where the greatest floods will occur.

**Six Month Probability of Impact Analysis**



**20-100k:** Above average rainy season with variable heavy rains. It is possible that multiple minor and moderate events result in only minor displacement. Seasonal flooding is common and local governments and humanitarian organisations are able to provide assistance in minor to moderate events. As significant flooding has already occurred last season, especially across Bolivia, there is increased vulnerability to repeated shocks and a greater need for assistance.

**100-250k:** Moderate to heavy rains continue to affect the region. This is the most likely scenario, as heavy rainfall is expected across much of the region in the beginning and peak of the season, and due to the high vulnerability of the region, it is likely that some people will be displaced and some crop loss is expected. As above, average rainfall is likely for the entire season, more than 100,000 people are likely to need assistance.

**250->500k:** Significantly above average rainfall with major storms over several urban areas. It is possible that if there is a major flooding event that affects a highly populated city, more than 250,000 people will be in need of assistance. With the latest weather model guidance, this appears to be possible. However, as displacement figures typically range from 200,000 to 300,000 during minor to moderate El Niño events, it is unlikely that the number of people impacted will be significantly greater than 250,000.


**PREPAREDNESS PROFILE (via OCHA): Scenarios pertaining to AG-identified risks:**

- Peru - Contingency Plan: Inter-agency Response Plan (November 2013)
- Ecuador - Contingency Plan: Inter-agency Emergency Response Plan & National Disaster Response Plan (2011). Next Update: 2015



Drought in the southern third of Somalia, and the effects of above average flooding along the Juba and Shebelle Rivers pose a high risk in November 2014 through May 2015, and is likely to result in significantly reduced harvests. Central and northern Somalia have enjoyed an early start to the *Deyr* season (October through early December), but rains have been below average in November, which has resulted in average to slightly below average pastoral conditions. However, rainfall has been well below average and poorly distributed across the main crop producing areas of Somalia in the south. Harvests from the main *Gu* season from late-March to June were 28% below the five year average which has resulted in localised price increases. If the current drought continues across southern Somalia, recovery from the *Deyr* season is unlikely, and a significant number of people will be in need of food assistance. It is estimated that some 1,025,000 people are in Crisis and Emergency (IPC Phase 3 and 4) and 220,000 children under the age of five are acutely malnourished (increase of 20% since January 2014), while 2.1 million people face Stressed food security levels (IPC Phase 2) and live on the fringe of requiring food assistance.

**Six Month Probability of Impact Analysis**



**100k-250k: Improvement in rains across the southern third of Somalia resulting in near average harvests**

It is possible that above average rainfall could occur towards the end of November into early December, improving the yield of the upcoming harvest of the current *Deyr* season. However, as there already have been rainfall deficits and rain delays early in the season, it is likely that some regions will still have reduced harvests and below average yields. Further, satellite data indicates a significant region of below average vegetative health, which would be unlikely to improve significantly by mid-December. As a result, below average cereal harvests are expected and it is likely that greater than 250,000 people will be in need of assistance.

**>250k: Below average rainfall and harvests for the *Deyr* season**

This is the most likely scenario, as above average rainfall has only occurred in the middle of November, well into the middle of the growing season. While the latest satellite data indicates that vegetative health has improved somewhat since the middle of November, the majority of central and southern Somalia still has below average vegetative health. While in some areas of southern Somalia, it is likely that harvests will approach average, satellite data indicates that across the majority of the main crop growing regions in the sorghum belt in Bay region as well as in Lower Shabelle, vegetative health is below average. In addition, from the end of October into the beginning of November, both the Juba and Shabelle Rivers were both near high flood risk level especially along the lower reaches of both rivers. It is likely that crops were damaged from these floods. With these two strong threats to crop growth occurring concurrently, it is likely that harvests will be negatively affected and that a significant number of people will be in need of assistance after the *Deyr* harvests with a possible early start of the agricultural lean season in April. Pastoral households in drought affected areas saw below average conception rates, low milk availability and kidding and calving rates are expected to continue to stress incomes until seasonal improvements in April. As a result, it is likely that greater than 500,000 people will require assistance as they recover from a significantly below average *Gu* season, and below average *Deyr* season.

**PREPAREDNESS PROFILE (via OCHA): Scenarios pertaining to AG-identified risks:**

- CP: Nutrition and WASH Contingency Plan (Aug 2014)
- CP: Baidoa Sub-office Hazard and Agency Response Capacity Mapping (Aug 2013)
- Somaliland: >180,000 (worst case), Puntland: >40% pop (worst case), South Central: 1 million (worst case), (Nutrition/WASH CP)






## TANZANIA: Flooding - also affecting Kenya

Flooding poses a moderate risk across Uganda, western Kenya and Tanzania for December 2014 through May 2015. The rainy season typically lasts from October through December and peaks in November. As models are in good agreement for above average rainfall during the peak of the rainfall season some flash flooding and river flooding is likely. Historically El Nino years result in above average rainfall in eastern Africa, but the location of floods during El Nino years varies from year to year. While generally above average rainfall will probably lead to increase in food production, localized moderate to severe flooding could result in displacement or the need for additional humanitarian assistance. Due to the varied pattern nature of rainfall, flooding events are expected to be related to isolated thunderstorm events. As a result, it is more likely that multiple small events will result in displacement instead of a major flood. In addition to a flood risk, there is an increased risk for landslides in areas of steep terrain of Uganda, west Kenya, and northern Tanzania.

### Six Month Probability of Impact Analysis



**<20k:** Above average rainy season with variable heavy rains. It is possible that multiple minor and moderate events will result in only minor displacement. Seasonal flooding is common and governments are able to provide assistance in minor to moderate events. However, as above average rainfall is likely across all three countries, it is likely that more than 20,000 people will need assistance.

**20-100k:** Moderate to heavy rains across the region. This is the most likely scenario, as heavy rainfall is expected across much of the region, especially in the beginning and peak of the season. Due to the high vulnerability of the region, it is likely that some people will be displaced and some crop loss is expected. As above average rainfall is likely for the entire season, more than 20,000 people are likely to need assistance.

**50k>:** Significantly above average rainfall with major storms over several urban areas or refugee camps. It is possible that if there is a major flooding event that affects a major city, more than 50,000 people will be in need of assistance. However, as the October through December rainy season is usually the less significant rainy season, it is less likely that such major anomalous events will occur. In addition, heavy rain events in the region are usually characterized by isolated storms that tend to AFFECT impact small portions of the population at a time.

### PREPAREDNESS PROFILE (via OCHA): Scenarios pertaining to AG-identified risks:

- Information not available

## EXCLUDED RISKS

The following countries were reviewed by the inter-agency group that drafted this report, but considered to be already in an emergency and were not identified as EDG Focus countries:

1. Democratic People's Republic of Korea
2. Democratic Republic of Congo
3. Iraq
4. Lebanon
5. Mali
6. Myanmar
7. South Sudan
8. State of Palestine
9. Sudan
10. Syria
11. Ukraine

The following risks were discussed by the inter-agency group that drafted this report, but omitted because of perceived low probability of impact in the coming six months, based on current information. The Analysts group will continue to watch these risks in the coming 6 months and share with the TTPR management any change in perceived seriousness:

1. Angola: Drought
2. Bangladesh: Flooding
3. Central African Republic: Conflict
4. Pakistan: Conflict


**Probability of Impact**

Each Early Warning risk is considered for the probability that it will have each of five levels of impact in the next six months, with impact measured by the number of people likely to require humanitarian assistance in that time. This is done because every risk (e.g. “Flooding in Country X) has multiple possible outcomes depending on its scale (e.g. how high water levels rise). The probabilities always add up to 100%.

The probability-of-impact assessment produces the chart below (Figure 1) to show a rough “profile” of the risk over the next six months. In Figure 1 the analysts are saying they see a 65% chance of the risk putting less than 20,000 people in need of assistance. This could include nothing happening at all, an actual improvement, or a relatively minor negative impact. The analysts also see a 20% chance of 20,000-100,000 people needing humanitarian assistance, a 10% chance of 100,000-250,000, a 5% chance of 250,000-500,000 and no realistic chance of impact greater than that. In plain language, the risk is unlikely to have major impact in the next two months, but there is a non-trivial possibility that should not be discounted.

There is no way to know the “real” probability of a level of impact. Probability in this context is a measure of the confidence that an analyst has in an outcome, and the general shape of the graph is more important than the actual numbers. A graph with most of the probability on the left (as in Figure 1) represents relatively low perceived seriousness, i.e. more probability of low impact, or no impact at all. As the bulk of the probability pushes right, this implies increased perceptions of seriousness. Probability distributed equally across the graph means that the analysts are unable to pick any one outcome as being more likely than any other, suggesting a very volatile - and rare - situation where “anything could happen”.

**Figure 1**



**Probability**

Probability is the sum of the probabilities for all the possible impact categories in the probability-of-impact assessment, except for “<20,000”. In the probability-of-impact example in Figure 2 the calculation is 10% + 5% + 0 + 0 = 15%.

**Impact**

Impact is calculated by adding up all the Expected Impact Values (EIV) associated with each level of impact in th probability-of-impact assessment, where the EIV is the probability percentage times the mid-point of the impact range. Impact is an approximate value that gives a sense of scale of the potential problem, and the actual numbers should not be used for programme planning.

For example, the mid-point of the 20,000–100,000 range is 60,000. If the probability for this range is 20%, the EIV is .20 x 60,000 = 12,000. Thus, for the probability of impact assessment above:

Impact Range	Probability	Impact Range Mid-Point	EIV
<20k	.65	0	0
20-100k	.20	60,000	12,000
100-250k	.10	175,000	17,500
250-500k	.05	375,000	18,750
>500k	0	750,000	0
TOTAL			48,250

### Seriousness

Seriousness is the geometric average (square root of impact times probability) of the 1-5 impact and likelihood values that correspond to the actual impact numbers and probabilities, as shown in Figure 2.


Figure 2

	1	2	3	4	5
<b>Seriousness</b>	Very Low	Low	Moderate	High	Very High
Likelihood	0-5%	6-15%	16-30%	31-50%	51-100%
Impact (new caseloads)	<20,000	20,001 – 100,000	100,001 – 250,000	250,001 – 500,000	>500,00
Impact mid-points	0	60,000	175,000	375,000	750,000

### EDG Focus risks

For EDG Focus risks, the assessment takes a simplified form to reflect the ongoing nature of the risks. In each case, the coming six-month period will necessarily stay roughly the same, improve or deteriorate. Using the same subjective probability distribution technique, this report analyses whether the greater likelihood is that the status quo will persist or if drivers and trends suggest a general improvement or deterioration of the humanitarian outlook.

Figure 3



In Figure 3, the analysis indicates that the likeliest outcome, a 2/3 chance, is that this context will remain stable ( $\pm$  20,000 new beneficiaries). The next likeliest possibility is that it would get worse, with a fairly slim 10% chance that this context will have less humanitarian need over the next six months than it has at the time of the report.