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New Agenda For The CAP: Draft Review of The Consolidated Appeals Process

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**DRAFT IASC REVIEW OF
THE
CONSOLIDATED APPEALS
PROCESS**

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A REVIEW OF THE CONSOLIDATED APPEALS PROCESS

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A REVIEW OF THE CONSOLIDATED APPEAL PROCESS

I. INTRODUCTION

History and Evolution

At the outset it was all quite simple: GA 46/182 requested that within seven days of a complex emergency, a consolidated inter-agency appeal would be presented to the donor community through the newly created Emergency Relief Coordinator.¹ Unstated though implied, this newly sanctioned instrument – the CAP – was regarded as an additional tool for the ERC, along with the IASC and the CERF to promote inter-agency coordination. It was also seen as a means of ensuring more inter-agency coherence and collaboration and of eliminating duplication. DHA evolved as a secretariat to the newly created ERC position.

However, between the *Special Programme for the Horn of Africa* in 1992 and the CAP launch festivals almost nine years later,² the CAP's seeming simplicity was buried in a welter of complexity. Few if any appreciated or even understood in those heady days of 1991-1992 the changing external environment and internal factors that would often frustrate and modify the original intention of GA 46/182. Over the years determined efforts have been made to "fix" the CAP. In some instances, these efforts have borne fruit; in others they have not. In retrospect, though, there can be little doubt that the aims of those who originally proposed consolidated appeals in the context of GA 46/182 were well intentioned and foresighted. The founding fathers strived to ensure the instrument that would give the UN the leverage and independence to reach populations in need, preserving humanitarian space and without discrimination because of nationality, ethnicity, gender or other characteristics.

It was originally assumed that Consolidated Inter-Agency Appeals would be rarely used instruments, brought out only when emergency situations of unusual complexity had to be addressed. Nevertheless, within a two-year period, from 1992 to 1994, CAPs began to proliferate. In the wake of the fall of Ethiopia's Mengistu and Somalia's Syad Barre, all the countries of the Horn of Africa came under one single consolidated appeal. Implosion within what became "the Former-Yugoslavia" led soon to another series of

¹ [Reference GA 46/182]

² The history of "consolidated appeals" depends upon one's definition. One could argue that the 1984-1986 Office for Emergency Operations in Africa [OEOA] produced consolidated appeals. Consolidated appeals were issued by the UN to cover Liberia (Jul 91 to Sep 93) and Iraq (Jan 92 to Mar 93) However, it is generally assumed that the first consolidated inter-agency appeals for complex emergencies and coordinated by DHA were for Liberia and Somalia (March 1993) This brief introduction focuses upon those appeals that followed GA 46/182, assuming the starting point was when the General Assembly officially sanctioned the term, Consolidated Inter-Agency Appeal.

consolidated appeals. These in turn were followed by an extensive drought emergency that affected all SADAC states that led to a regional consolidated appeal under the rubric of the *Drought Emergency Programme for Southern Africa*. And on top of these was the genocide in Rwanda that required the intensive commitment of the system, reflected in yet another CAP in 1994.

What was initially intended as a rarely to be used instrument was becoming more and more a norm. This norm was less a reflection of the inherent success of the CAP process and more a reflection of a desperate search for some form of appropriate response to a post-Cold War world order in which conventional initiatives no longer seemed relevant. In the face of an ever-growing number of collapsed states and seemingly irreconcilable civil wars, the CAP was at least an answer. Its uniqueness, however, declined, and with it the unusual measures – the headquarters-field consultative process and the special field teams – that marked the CAP from normal disaster or emergency appeals.³ The CAP was becoming more and more the standard response not only to a growing number of emergencies and disasters, but also to a wider array of types of emergencies and disasters.

The more the CAP's uniqueness declined, the greater appeared the need to regularize the process. *Ad-hocracy* by 1994 was replaced by the IASC endorsed *Guidelines*, a comprehensive set of proposals that ranged from strategy formulation to enhanced responsibility for Humanitarian Coordinators. Over the ensuing four years, more attempts to strengthen the appeal process were made. This included the *Technical Guidelines* which describe the elaboration of the CHAP and the Appeal document, a *CAP Users Guide* which emphasised strategic planning and strategic monitoring and review, but was never endorsed nor disseminated, and a set of Training Tools, developed in an interagency workshop in 1999.

This centre-stage placing of the CAP coincided with the demise of the so-called "relief-to-development continuum" and the emergence of "relief-development parallelism". The latter's rise was an important breakthrough. At long last one accepted that relief, recovery, rehabilitation and even development need not be sequential but frequently could be undertaken simultaneously. However, while the "continuum's" demise was a positive trend, "parallelism" added further complexity to the consolidated inter-agency appeal process. Consolidated inter-agency appeals were no longer solely about emergency and disaster response; they were nibbling across boundaries into the realm of development. New actors were now becoming involved in the process, and the process inevitably was becoming heavier.

³ In preparing the SEPHA Consolidated Inter-Agency Appeal, UN country teams from each of the affected countries were brought to Geneva to meet with their headquarters counterparts to prepare the appeal within four days. A similar though lighter process took place in Geneva for the Former Yugoslavia. Conversely, in preparation for the Drought Appeal for Southern Africa, each of the country teams met in Harare, Zimbabwe, with a team from headquarters to develop a regional consolidated appeal. This process also took four days.

There were attempts in 1996 to reconcile this trend by creating yet another instrument, the *Expanded Consolidated Inter-Agency Appeal*. However, the idea of an ECAP quickly waned, and the CAP, itself, continued to shoulder the burden of parallelism. In and of itself, the burgeoning CAP still made sense were it not for the fact that, though it grew in its boundaries, the CAP's fundamental weaknesses were never practically addressed.

Intended to reduce duplication and add greater coherence to inter-agency activities, the CAP from the very outset resembled more often than not "shopping lists" of agency requirements rather than harmonized and integrated programmes and projects. Now with a broader CAP scope, the shopping lists were growing but with little evidence of commensurate inter-agency harmonization. The fact of the matter remained that, despite the considerable energy of many to strengthen the CAP process, no one really was willing to grab the nettle. While Resident Coordinator's were ostensibly responsible for the CAP process, they had little authority to prune or eliminate the overlaps and duplications that were frequently evident in the final products. Agencies generally introduced their already pre-determined programmes into CAPs, maintaining that these could not be altered, that "they had already been agreed". The lists grew.

The issue of ownership also increasingly came to haunt the consolidated appeal process. In the late 1980's and early 1990's, UN emergency appeals were seen by most recipients as well as donor governments as a relatively objective reflection of needs – a useful means to convince the latter that needs were neither exaggerated nor tainted by political calculations. However, the wider and deeper the CAP went into root causes and development linkages, the more the authorities of affected countries felt compelled to monitor and intervene in the process. In and of itself, such intervention was understandable, if not always acceptable. And yet, it pointed to another area where clarity was lacking and was needed: who owned the CAP and what was the role of government? This brings us back to the issue of humanitarian imperatives and the importance of UN not losing its edge in deciding to reach victims of crisis even when those who exercise territorial control over them may not share the same concerns.

CAP ownership was also an issue that came increasingly into question as greater efforts were made to engage non-governmental organizations into the process. Accepting on occasion to participate in the process, NGOs found themselves frequently on the process's periphery. Their programmes and projects were normally found in CAP annexes, on occasion incorporated in sectoral sections but rarely as part of an overall or sectorally-based strategy. The choice of appealing for funds through the CAP is largely at the discretion of the NGO, and this practice varies from country to country. Increasingly, NGOs are presenting their projects in the Appeals, and some donors request NGOs to demonstrate programme coherence with CAP Strategy.

Following efforts to expand NGO involvement, today, better mechanisms and criteria are needed to define their participation.

What is their appropriate role in the CAP? What mechanisms can be put in place to ensure NGO coherence with the CAP strategy? Should there be criteria for NGO participation (i.e., size of programme, sector expertise, etc.)? How to reflect NGO programmes when they are not appealing for funds through the CAP but to illustrate complementarity?

Donors looked on the evolution of the consolidated appeal process with a degree of ambivalence and frustration. GA 46/182 appeared to have given the UN system the sort of instrument it required to ensure that there would be greater coherence and coordination in responding to complex emergencies. Nevertheless, all too often donors complained that "wish lists" grew longer, duplication continued, and there was little evidence of "prioritization"; that CAPs lacked sound practical strategies or lacked strategies at all; that there was no obvious movement towards harmonized, let alone integrated, programming.

Yet, donor criticisms were often disingenuous. Rarely did donors take heed of the strategies that they insisted be incorporated in the CAPs, and it became increasingly evident that – not unlike many agencies – the donors, too, had pre-determined contributions that would reflect their responses to CAPs, whatever the proposed strategies or prioritized projects. And yet, while these factors hampered the consolidated appeal process, there was one aspect of donor behaviour that significantly limited the CAP's success and development – the lack of donor coordination.

The lack of donor coordination continues to be a hurdle to the consolidated appeal process. Rather than a coherent response to agreed needs, donors prefer to pick and choose funding areas that cohere with what earlier was called "predetermined contributions" or projects of particular choice. Rarely if ever have donors come together to determine how best to meet the needs of CAPs in a coherent way. This in turn leads to distortions – under-funding of important sectors – and perpetuation of agency competition for funds in order to interest a particular donor in a particular set of projects.

As with all innovations, the CAP has found itself over the past decade adjusting to new and changing circumstances. From a seemingly simple tool for quick response to unusual and complex emergencies, it has become a high visibility instrument that is more and more the norm for a greater number and types of emergency and disaster responses. The CAP now has to incorporate broad strategies – strategies that relate to internal UN reform and peace-building as well as to development linkages. In ten years, considerable progress has been made in fine-tuning this instrument. The high profile launchings in Donor Capitals have now become the hallmark of CAP.

And yet, unless the fundamentals are addressed – commitments by all, real systems of coordination amongst the aid community and between the aid community and the donor community, real harmonization and prioritization, real elimination of

duplication – the CAP will remain a potentially useful though inherently blunt instrument.

II. PURPOSE OF THE REVIEW

The review of the CAP was initiated by the IASC Working Group in May 2001 to address concerns that:

- a) IASC Members at senior levels and senior OCHA staff were not giving CAP needed attention, guidance and direction.
- b) OCHA CAP Unit and Sub-Working Group on CAP were assuming over-delegated responsibilities and self-managing the process
- c) Most of major recent developments and tools introduced to strengthen the CAP process could be credited more to the initiatives of talented OCHA staff than to an agenda driven by IASC.
- d) Although the field has been involved in the major developments in the CAP relating to policy and training tools, more inter-agency and field consultation should be conducted to improve the process further.⁴
- e) Following SG's report to Humanitarian Segment of ECOSOC – *a decade of coordination of humanitarian assistance in review* – it is timely to also examine in-depth one of the important four instruments of Resolution 46/182 [ERC, IASC, CERF and CAP]
- f) The exercise could facilitate the articulation of a renewed IASC policy position (since 1994) on the CAP and establish a new future agenda for the mechanism

III. RELATIONSHIP OF THE REVIEW TO EVALUATIONS

In light of the various evaluations underway and being planned on funding and meeting humanitarian needs globally, it became necessary to define the place and relevance of the Review in the context of these studies. The Review:

- a) Is a quick (desk-top and consultative) exercise to identify the achievements and shortfalls of the CAP and offer options for Directors of Emergency and IASC to consider

⁴ Major developments in the CAP - relating to training tools development - have been done in close consultation with field representatives. Key training events since 1999 sought to capture this expertise:

- 1999, ToT: one-third of all participants from the field;
- 2000, Best Practices Workshop: one-quarter of all participants from the field;
- 2000 training tools development – reviewed with field input from Russia, DPRK, Afghanistan, Indonesia
- 2001 Trainers Retreat, one-third of all participants from the field;
- 2001, ToT, more than 50% of all participants from the field.

- b) Could identify and flag issues for in-depth study that could be adopted and addressed by future evaluations
- c) Could allow IASC, the ERC and the Chairman of IASC-WG to establish the agenda and direction for Evaluations, on IASC terms
- d) Could present short term recommendations that could be applied immediately without having to wait two plus years for especially the Donor Evaluation to conclude

IV. FINDINGS AND CONCLUSIONS

The extensive consultations with IASC members, the field, donors, NGOs and a number of selected personalities knowledgeable on the CAP as well as desk reviews revealed a number of findings relating to the strengths, achievements and shortfalls of the mechanism. These findings and conclusions are presented in eight subsections [(a) – (h)] below:

a) Perceptions

Within the UN the CAP is a household word for the staff at HQ and the field who are directly involved with the process. The same could be said of donors and NGOs who participate in the process in one way or another. However, for many key humanitarian stakeholders the CAP is not widely known, is little understood and not fully appreciated. This is due to high staff turnover and could partly be attributed to the fact that CAP has not been used extensively as an advocacy tool.

Whereas CAP was conceived as an instrument to give the UN the primacy to define and meet acute humanitarian needs without hindrance, unclarity about the true nature of the mechanism to fulfill this mandate persists. Related closely to this unclarity is the delicate issue of humanitarian imperatives – authorities resorting to sovereignty as an excuse to deny humanitarian assistance to populations in need and the UN upholding the paramountcy of the best interest of the victims.

The CAP is viewed primarily as a resource mobilization tool but is not demand driven by its main client - the field. Looked at from the Headquarters perspective, agencies admit that they have knowingly or otherwise, abdicated their responsibilities for the CAP to OCHA and OCHA had in turn over-delegated its leadership and guidance roles to functionaries. In some instances agencies feel OCHA has not been aggressive enough in involving IASC members. There is a clear lack of commitment to the process at senior levels in agencies and OCHA. When this was pursued further, it became clear that senior staff would assume responsibilities for the process if their roles were clearly defined.

Prioritization for the CAP lies at the heart of the mechanism as a strategic planning tool. However, views vary widely on this subject. Some agencies e.g. FAO see the necessity to reflect the totality of needs in the CAP, while others, e.g. WFP want only to reflect what the UN considers as priorities.

A major recent development with the CAP is the initiative to launch the appeals in the Donor Capitals. Now in its second year the initiative is perceived as an effective effort to bring home to the decision-makers and key constituencies in the capitals a sense of the plight of populations affected by conflict and engage them in a productive dialogue. Feedback from the 2001 launches indicates that after the high profile events in the capitals, the momentum is not kept.

b) IASC Policy Guidelines on CAP

The policy guidelines on the CAP was adopted by the IASC in 1994. Most of the *tenents* of the guidelines have been superseded by recent developments and improvement in the CAP. Nevertheless, the guidance remains clear and strong on a number of relevant issues. It empowers the ERC and the IASC to use the CAP for major and complex emergencies. It encourages the strengthening of the capacities of emergency affected countries.

The policy stresses the crucial strategic role of the country team in assessments, in initiating and preparing the CAP and in implementing and monitoring programmes. It advocates for the integration of humanitarian activities to promote cost-effective and efficient relief and recovery activities to eliminate duplication. It presents the CAP as a programming process through which regional and international relief systems are able to mobilize and respond to selective major or complex emergencies. Finally the Policy upholds the leadership role of the ERC in coordinating, facilitating, steering and sanctioning the CAP process and arbitrating on all matters requiring consensus.

The 94 guidelines provide a good conceptual basis but need to be taken further. The guidelines state that determination of a complex emergency will be made by the IASC on a case by case basis. It also says that a complex emergency is one that exceeds the mandate of one agency and requires a system-wide approach. This would mean there should be a CAP for many more emergencies than is currently the case. There needs to be *guidance* on proposing the process and *criteria* that trigger a CAP. Criteria may be based upon precedents, and should clarify host Government participation, mechanisms to include/exclude potential appealing agencies, and benchmarks as well as exit strategies to indicate phase-

out of CAP. Another issue is natural disasters, such as drought, and whether these are considered complex emergencies to be covered by the CAP.

The guidelines need to be further revised to reflect new developments and strategies in joint assessments, the CHAP and strategic planning, post-conflict reintegration, the transition, the gaps in human rights and humanitarian action, gender, security and safety of staff etc etc

c) Coordination

The CAP is widely accepted as an important coordinating mechanism and rallying point for UN agencies and some NGOs in the humanitarian sphere. The Red Cross and Red Crescent movement has also come to appreciate its strategic potential and its value in demonstrating what key actors are doing in humanitarian emergencies. OCHA's leadership in the process is undisputed. However, the coordinating function has its strengths and its weaknesses.

(i) Commitment to Coordination

Although the technical and practical aspects of the CAP are ably managed by Programme Staff, Senior OCHA Management and HCs (plus Country Representatives) are not all in the driver's seat. This shortfall does not diminish the involvement and participation of the agencies in the process. However, it was not easy to determine if the willingness of agencies to rally around the CAP is a genuine desire to be team players or jockeying to ensure adequate shares of resources. Humanitarian coordination is distorted by this dilemma.

Agencies feed differently into the CAP. Some agencies have programmes that are reflected in CAP and others develop local projects and feed them into CAP in the hope of getting financing. There is need to reconcile this dichotomy through better prioritization

(ii) The Field Perspective

CAP is time consuming and often marked by a packed programme of work heavy especially towards the end of the year. This tends to build unnecessary pressure and rush with the completion of the appeal documents and their release and launch. The field is often frustrated by changes introduced in the CAP at the HQ level that contradict the positions of country teams. To address this concern, the CAP Calendar requires a critical review. Additionally the need for continuous close consultations between the field and Headquarters throughout the CAP exercise cannot be over-emphasized.

(iii) Donors

Donors are key actors in the CAP. Their view of the CAP vary widely. A good number of donors view the CAP as a primary source for making funding decisions. Some consider it as a useful consolidated source of information. Some donors consider the CAP has no direct impact on the amount of contributions but may influence policy-makers. Others think the CAP provides additional assurances of coordination but does not influence funding decisions.

The donor budget year and the CAP period are not always synchronized resulting in contributions not being in time. The view is held that the differences within donor missions or between policy and the field practice are a contributing factor to the shortfall in funding. The field thinks lack of adequate aid mission staff in countries result in CAP reviews being undertaken primarily in donor capitals where information on the relative needs of each country is lacking.

The group of donors represented in Geneva are closely engaged with the CAP through continuous interactions with the IASC members and their annual retreats on the CAP. They have contributed in ideas and thinking on the strengthening of the CAP. However, on the whole the UN system continues to receive mixed signals and guidance from the various donors especially on prioritization and ear-marking of funds. There is a need to harmonize the donor concerns and guidance to the agencies through better coordination and cultivating a sense of joint ownership of the process with the humanitarian actors.

(iv) Host Governments/Authorities

Currently host governments may or may not participate in the CAP process. Participation in the process ensures commitment and ownership. However, this may dilute the strength of the CAP as a strategic planning instrument that gives the UN the leverage to intervene and assist populations in need without the conditional clearance of concerned authorities.F

d) Assessment

Planning and delivery of humanitarian assistance depends much on how effective joint assessments of needs are undertaken. Joint assessments are being led currently by OCHA but not enforced rigorously. No guidelines on joint assessments exist, hence there are disparities in application between countries with wide variations in prioritization and strategy setting. NGOs are happy to be part of joint assessment of needs but inclined to retain separate channels

for resource mobilization. The need for a comprehensive guidelines on joint assessment is urgent. The Inter-Agency guidelines on preparedness and contingency planning under preparation will be a useful complement in bridging this gap.

Closely related to assessment is the debate that is underway in the humanitarian community as to whether the CAP could serve as a broad framework for assessing total humanitarian needs globally or not. There is merit in viewing the CAP as the potential basis for building a comprehensive picture of the global humanitarian needs and work towards creating that capability and scope.

e) CHAP and Strategic Planning

(i) Strategic Planning

The Common Humanitarian Assistance Plan (CHAP) was conceived as the tool for prioritization and strategy setting. It is premised on better analysis of situations and environments for better planning. However, the internal planning/programming procedure of the agencies and the timing of the CAP do not often match. Besides the CAP is not used as a dynamic tool for guiding and following up programme implementation in the field. Some effort has been made to relate the CAP to the other programming mechanisms viz UNDAF and CCA, but no effective working linkages have been established between these mechanisms. Better guidance is required for more effective appreciation of the CHAP as well as on planning and managing the transition from CAP to UNDAF/CCA as well as the co-existence between the two mechanisms.

(ii) Agency Participation

Compliance of agencies to meet CHAP conditionalities have been half-hearted. The question is what incentives to give agencies to embrace CHAP fully. Donors are beginning to shift emphasis to planning rather than resource mobilization. NGOs are willing to participate in joint planning framework. Donors and NGOs concur. This leaves the UN in a quandry with little choice but to accept and apply the CHAP widely.

(iii) NGO Participation

The collaboration between NGOs and the UN operational agencies is substantive especially at the country level. In some instances, this partnership as in the case of UNHCR is highly institutionalized. The UN/NGO partnership provides limitless opportunities for matching UN's leadership role with the implementation capacities of the NGOs. However, of recent, this *contractor/sub-contractor* type of relationship is being questioned.

Some of the major NGOs are now insisting to be given place at the table as equal partners. Some of the richer ones have even indicated readiness to fund some of the UN supported programmes. There is need to re-examine the UN/NGO partnership in light of the changing humanitarian environment.

NGOs participate in CAP but have so far remained largely outside the realm of this mechanism. They have expressed strong interest to participate in the strategic planning aspect of emergencies but want at the same time their independence in resource mobilization and implementing programmes. As major actors in the field the call of the NGOs to be active participants in the CHAP is legitimate and should be encouraged. They have the right to maintain their own channels of resource mobilization. However, NGOs need to be team players when it comes to programme implementation and keeping the Humanitarian Coordinator and the rest of the system regularly informed. They must also accept guidance from the Humanitarian Coordinator on programme issues and security to which the NGOs are gradually becoming an integral part of the UN system.

(iv) Thematic Issues

The CAP incorporates and addresses a number of thematic issues. Significant of these are Gender, IDPs and Staff Security and Safety. Of these, gender is the most advanced in terms of application. There is still need to articulate the themes and incorporate them substantively in the mechanism. Emphasis is now on Capacities and Vulnerabilities Analysis (CVA), which bases strategy development and programmes on objective assessment of vulnerability. CVA replaces the notion of thematic, or cross-cutting issues.

(v) Benefits of the CHAP

When fully developed and widely applied, the CHAP should allow us to improve strategic decision-making; identify in a timely way problems or gaps in the humanitarian response; clarify accountability with the humanitarian system and between the international system and recipient governments or national authorities; ensure that the wider views and concerns of beneficiaries affected by humanitarian interventions are made available to humanitarian decision-makers; support resource mobilization; build on existing organization-specific or inter-organizational monitoring systems; build consensus and transparency in information collection and analysis and provide the humanitarian community with a basis for monitoring, reviews and evaluations.

The bottom line and challenge to the humanitarian actors is to earn confidence and trust through good strategic planning, effective implementation and accounting for resources received and actions taken

f) Resource Mobilization

(i) Trends

A look at a decade of funding of humanitarian assistance shows some interesting trends. Funding doubled in 1991 to US\$ 4.6 Billion. It peaked to US\$ 5.7 Billion in 1994 exceeding 10% of total ODA for first and only time. It rose in 1995 followed by three years of decline but in 1997 by a sharp increase to US\$ 4.5 Billion. Over past quarter of century trends in ODA humanitarian assistance has exhibited some distinctive patterns – periodic increases in humanitarian aid tend to be followed by a plateau and then another rise – funding never appears to fall back to its pre-plateau level! If these patterns are true we need to engage all actors including the field to fit CAP into this trend and analyze its falls and rises.

(ii) Performance

Whatever its shortfalls, the CAP is still the most important mechanism for funding humanitarian assistance. However, the precise weight of CAP in the global funding of humanitarian assistance is still to be determined. CAP ceilings have been steady but increased in the mid-nineties with an average response above 60%. Disparities between countries, regions, sectors and agencies still exist. The issue of funding gaps in the CAP at the end of the year have not been addressed nor the question of whether they should be reflected in the new CAP as unmet needs or not. No country-specific strategy is developed with the HQ for fund-raising. The allocation of lumpsum donations to regional appeals e.g. Great Lakes Region has caused problems of transparent, recording and accounting. Smaller and newer IASC members e.g. FAO and WHO feel unsupported with resource mobilization.

There is room for improving the capacities of agencies for absorbing funds, implementing programmes and accounting for resources received. It is not clear if reserves and carry-over of funds at the end of the year are due to the efficient use of resources or inability to implement or Christmas dumping by donors. The ICRC approach is a sterling example to emulate. ICRC considers resource in hand more important than ceilings. It utilizes resources received rapidly, implements planned activities and accounts for actions taken.

(iii) Donor Attitude

Donors are often dismayed by glowing reports by agencies on even under-funded programmes. This works against the call for better response. Donors are numbed by constant pleas for greater response that they describe as *crying wolf!* However, donor preferences have not changed despite improvement in CHAP – food versus non-food/ geographic/sectoral. Moreover, despite increase in overall humanitarian assistance globally, more resources are flowing bilaterally and not through the CAP.

g) Monitoring and Evaluation

ECOSOC resolution 1995/56 requested the agencies to develop inter-agency systems for monitoring and evaluating humanitarian assistance. Significant progress was made in developing these instruments but this was abruptly stopped by the UN Reform process. In the meantime, agencies have established their own monitoring systems and are inclined not to be keen on an inter-agency system. The need for developing a Strategic Monitoring System is now urgent. The system being anticipated would enable the HC and the country team, the ERC and OCHA and the operational agencies at the HQ level to monitor globally all elements of the CHAP.

As for Strategic Evaluation, the IASC effort to develop a methodology for evaluation was abandoned for the same reasons in the mid-nineties. Nevertheless, some independently undertaken studies such as the Multi-Donor Evaluation of Humanitarian Assistance, the Review of Coordination in the Great Lakes Region and the ODI Study on Coordination are relevant. The IASC itself has commissioned an evaluation of the Afghanistan programme which is being finalized.

h) Developments and Improvements in CAP

Developments and improvements in CAP have been substantive. Progress has been made in developing a number of CAP instruments and tools in the last few years. Significant among these are the Annual Technical Guidelines, Capacities and Vulnerability Analysis (CVA); the CAP in Transitional Countries, links between CAP and other Strategic Instruments, CAP Training and the Financial Tracking System (FTS). However, many of these instruments require further development and perfection.

A number of IASC Agencies have undertaken a number of initiatives in support of the CAP. To cite a few examples: WFP has organized two workshops on CAP for its HC and field staff; FAO has organized a workshop on CAP for its staff and

is planning to designate focal points in the field for CAP; UNHCR has issued a directive to its field offices to support the CAP; UNICEF has issued an Executive Directive (ExDir) to the field giving guidelines and defining responsibilities between HQ, Regional Offices and Country Offices; UNDP is in the process of developing positions and policies on the CAP and resource mobilization in transitional situations as well as in countries transitioning from relief to recovery. The Non-UN Members of IASC have much to offer in terms of minimum standards (the Sphere Project) and parameters for measuring and maintaining accountability.

V. OPTIONS FOR CONSIDERATION

A number of options were presented to the Directors of Emergency, Donors and the IASC agencies to consider. Below is a summary of these options. The major options have been submitted as recommendations to the IASC for endorsement.

a) Strengthening senior level management of the CAP

- Under the leadership of the ERC, encourage all IASC members, especially at the senior levels, to give the CAP their strong support and commitment.
- Under the leadership of the Chairman of the IASC WG, encourage the IASC and its subsidiary bodies to give the CAP special attention in their deliberations and management, and when necessary arbitrate (especially ERC) on contentious CAP issues.
- Chairman of IASC-WG should, as part of his normal introductory report to IASC-WG meetings, give a brief State of CAP Report including progress on implementation of IASC recommendations
- Clarify the responsibilities of the Humanitarian Coordinators (HC) for the CAP and encourage the HCs to lead the process at the field level with the support of the country teams. Use opportunity of the annual HC retreat to orient and empower HCs in their responsibilities for CAP.
- Provide greater management, technical and capacity-building support for the CAP to the field, with the guidance of the ERC and OCHA.
- Institutionalise annual meetings of Directors of Emergency to review a number of Consolidated Appeals before they are finalised.
- Review which crises warrant a CAP for the following year and decide which appeals to submit for review by Directors of Emergency at the yearly IASC WG meetings in May.
- Strengthen OCHA's CAP and Donor Relations Section to manage the new agenda for strengthening the CAP.
- Country support on CAP to be led by Senior IASC members

- Membership of IASC-Sub-Working Group on CAP to be strengthened with experience and decision-making and dedicated time to undertake tasks.
- Chair of Sub-Working Group on CAP to be senior-level and with relevant experience, for example Chief RCB or his/her alternative OCHA Chief of Branch. On major issues, Chairman of IASC-WG should chair Sub-Working Group. When he cannot do so, another senior IASC member should chair the Sub-Working Group to promote collective ownership.
- Chief of CAP/Donor relations Section should continue to serve as Secretariat to Sub-Working Group

b) Strengthening Advocacy through the CAP

- Develop and promote greater use of the CAP as an advocacy tool for drawing attention to the plight of victims of conflicts and disasters, especially in forgotten emergencies; for keeping the humanitarian agenda centre stage in all fora, and for supporting resource mobilization by maintaining the momentum generated at CAP launchings in Donor Capitals. Examples include:
 - _ High level advocacy on burning humanitarian issues utilizing the CAP
 - _ Special attention on the launching of CAPs in the capitals that will require continuous evaluations and adjustments including matching of country appeals to specific capitals
 - _ Strengthen advocacy aspects of the CAP/Donor Relations Section of OCHA
 - _ In countries with peace-keeping missions the advocacy roles of SRSG/RSGS is important and should be encouraged.
- Adopt selected emergency countries for mentoring, guidance and support by individual Senior IASC Members as advocates to draw attention to the plight and needs of the affected population.
- Encourage donors to better coordinate their efforts to provide timely and balanced support to the strategy and programmes in the CAP across emergencies, sectors, and agencies.
- Appoint selected celebrities as Goodwill Ambassadors to raise awareness for the plight of victims and advocate for the needs of populations affected by conflict.

c) Strengthening the CAP as a Tool for Strategic Planning and Coordination

- Revise the 1994 IASC Guidelines on the CAP to benefit from the recent developments in strategic thinking, approaches and strategies that have been introduced into the process; in particular: setting criteria for when to begin and when to end a CAP, clarifying the role of CAP in transition countries, and outlining common law practice of government involvement in the CAP.
- Define criteria and mechanisms for NGO participation and inclusion in the CAP and incorporate these into the revised guidelines.
- Encourage the IASC-WG to continue to guide the various developments and improvements of the CAP already underway, especially with regard to the Technical Guidelines; Capacities and Vulnerability Analysis (CVA); the CAP in Transition Countries; links between the CAP and other strategic planning instruments viz, UNDAF, CCA, Strategic Framework; CAP Training and Financial Tracking System (FTS).
- Affirm the primacy of the Common Humanitarian Action Plan (CHAP) as the central inter-agency strategic planning tool for emergencies, and ensuring that the CHAP is further refined.
- Review whether and how humanitarian needs in countries not covered by a CAP are being addressed, and propose recommendations on appropriate strategies.
- Develop standardised guidelines for Joint Assessments and Evaluation to strengthen the programming aspects of the CAP.
- Develop multi-year strategies for CAP for chronic emergencies and encourage donors to make multi-year commitments.
- Develop guidelines for strategic monitoring to improve impact analysis of the CAP in order to demonstrate the impact of under-funding, and to standardise mechanisms for accountability.
- Examine the use and management of Emergency Revolving Fund (ERF) and its relations to the CAP
- Shift emphasis from the "appeal" label of the CAP and give the strategic planning aspect greater importance.
- Preserve the inter-agency character of CAP training, but involve specialized institutions in the planning and organization of CAP training initiatives.

For further discussion:

- Prioritise programs and allocate resources on the basis of realistic assessment of availability and needs.

VI. A NEW AGENDA FOR STRENGTHENING THE CAP PROCESS

Based on the options presented, a Plan of Action has been developed to reflect a New Agenda for Strengthening the CAP.

- Implement recommendations of the IASC Review of the CAP process (see Plan of Action)
- Address the outstanding issues identified by the Review, including:
 - informing studies and Evaluations of the CAP
 - joint monitoring and reporting
 - studying the percentage of ODA channelled through CAP, the pattern of funding and its impact on effective humanitarian action
 - ownership of the CAP and use of CAP by agencies for setting priorities,
 - Needs assessments in the CAP
 - Joint accountability towards the strategy and programmes in the CAP

Over the last few years, a number of developments, strategies and approaches have been introduced to strengthen the CAP process. These should be developed further. They include:

- **Annual Technical Guidelines:** issued regularly to the field to assist them to prepare more analytical and prioritized CAPs. The guidelines are still undergoing major changes especially in incorporating and balancing the mandates and priorities of the participating agencies
- **Capacities and Vulnerability Analysis (CVA):** has been introduced and being encouraged to improve targeting and prioritization of needs; to address underlying vulnerabilities of the population to ensure more effective support to longer-term development programmes and to support and maximize local capacities and coping strategies for humanitarian response. More extensive work is still required to perfect this instrument and apply it more widely.

- **The CAP in “Transitional” circumstances**

Few HCs notably of Republic of Congo and Somalia have initiated transition CAPs to bridge the critical phase linking relief to development. The results have been mixed. The IASC needs to establish policy and guidelines on transition CAPs.

- **Links between CAP and other Strategic Planning Instruments**

Efforts have been made to relate the CAP to other strategic planning mechanisms especially UNDAF, CCA and the UN Strategic Framework. Beyond the joint recommendation of the joint ExComs (ECHA, ECPS and ECEA) no substantive

progress has been made to establish a working linkage between these mechanisms and cut a niche for CAP

- **CAP Training**

Significant progress has been made in developing tool kit for Expanded CAP Training in holding field workshops and applying the methodology for CAP trainers and Agency specific CAP training. The use of expert institutions and resource persons should be encouraged. Identifying and assigning training facilitators early to the countries will strengthen the process.

- **Financial Tracking System (FTS)**

The new site for FTS has been launched, the database allowing access to tracking of all humanitarian assistance including the CAP, natural disaster response and bilateral humanitarian assistance. The system needs to be perfected to serve the stakeholders better.

- Encourage accurate and timely reporting from agencies and donors to ensure up to date financial tracking statements.

- ***Complex Emergencies and Natural Disasters***

The reorganization of OCHA has introduced the integration of the response to complex emergencies and natural disasters functionally especially in the Response Coordination Branch. The merge provides an opportunity for greater coherence in strategy formulations, strategic planning and resource mobilization. More work will be required to streamline these processes further.

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VII. A NEW VISION

Commitment, Creativity, Strategic Planning and Accountability

Following the 11th September event and the consequent spiraling global effect on security and the economy, the emerging humanitarian environment is bound to be different. It is therefore important that the humanitarian community gears itself adequately to work differently in addressing the new different sets of problems. While accountability will remain the cornerstone of the effective humanitarian response, there will be a growing demand for creativity and innovative approach to humanitarian work. The ability to relate and work closely with partners in the human rights, political and military spheres will become crucial.

The new vision envisaged for the CAP is premised upon the assumption that the process would receive greater commitment from the IASC, OCHA and HCs especially at the senior levels as well as donors; would encourage humanitarian actors to cultivate the culture of planning strategically to gain trust and credibility; promote the rapid and effective delivery of humanitarian assistance and account in a transparent manner for all actions taken to all concerned and especially to the beneficiaries.

The key challenges to the humanitarian community are to plan well, deliver effectively, monitor rigorously and account for every action taken and for every cent received. To the donors the call is to coordinate efforts, provide coherent guidance and establish a collective ownership of CAP together with the humanitarian community to ensure a stronger, proactive and transparent mechanism to serve the humanitarian world better.