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**Iraq: UNITED NATIONS ASSISTANCE MISSION IN IRAQ  
CONCEPT FOR SECURITY (REVISED)**

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**UNSECOORD Iraq**



**UNITED NATIONS ASSISTANCE MISSION IN IRAQ**  
**CONCEPT FOR SECURITY**

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## UNAMI CONCEPT FOR SECURITY IN IRAQ

### INTRODUCTION

1. This brief summarizes the concept of UN security operations in Iraq under current conditions. This concept reflects the direction of the Secretary-General in his report to the Security Council of 5 December 2003 and subsequent to the inter-agency workshop of last November in Nicosia. The security concept has been worked out with Permanent Missions in New York, and in detail on the ground. It addresses the special security challenges of operations in Iraq, is endorsed by the DO and SMT and includes many unique features not necessarily applicable in other countries.

### ASSUMPTIONS

2. The concept is based on the following assumptions:
  - a. The threat to UN staff is expected to remain very high for the foreseeable future, thus requiring the UN to mitigate risk.
  - b. Checks and balances must be established to ensure operations do not outstrip the security structure. Security plans will be prepared, approved and in place before the deployment of international staff to the operating bases.
  - c. The overall security situation is not likely to improve after the handover on 30 June 2004. It may in fact deteriorate, and the UN is likely to remain a high-value target.
  - d. Reducing risk through mitigation does not guarantee security.
  - e. Phase IV, which permits emergency humanitarian relief operations, security operations, or any other operations deemed essential by the SG, will continue to apply.
  - f. The return to Iraq of significant numbers of UN international staff members is contingent in large part to acquiring and upgrading suitable working and living accommodations, and enhancing security arrangements.
  - g. UNSECOORD, in cooperation with agency security advisors, will continue to play the lead role in determining the threats and acceptable level of risk to UN operations within Iraq.
  - h. For reasons of security, the advance detachments, which will deploy to operating base locations, will initially be co-located and accommodated with the CPA.

- i. In the early stages, deployment to the operating bases will be by UNHAS, with CPA as an alternate means.

## THREAT

3. There is much that is unknown regarding the potential threats to the UN, including why and by whom the UN was targeted last year. It is assessed that the situation will deteriorate in the coming weeks running up to the handover of sovereignty to the Iraqi Governing Council. Therefore, there is a particular need to exercise extreme caution in our deployments and activities.
5. It is assessed that the risk to the UN will come directly or indirectly from the following elements:
  - a. Religious and Ideological Extremists. Both national and international.
  - b. Former Regime Elements. This includes Baathist elements and those expelled from the military and security services of the former regime.
  - c. Political and Business Criminality. With or without foreign participation.
  - d. Militias. Such as the Al-Sadr Al-Mahdi Militia which have approximately 10,000 fighters and who have been fighting the CF for over two months in Southern Iraq (primarily Hilla, Kufa, Karbala, Najaf, Baghdad and Basra).
6. Violence against UN staff in Iraq may take the following forms:
  - a. A well-planned and deliberate attack or multiple coordinated attacks against UN facilities, with the intent to cause mass casualties.
  - b. Ambushes and attacks on UN convoys and staff by use of vehicle and person borne improvised explosives (VBIED) (PBIED),
  - c. Drive by shootings,
  - d. Assassination of prominent political or administrative figures,
  - e. Kidnapping/murder/threats against staff working or cooperating with the UN,
  - f. Attacks against foreign contractors.
  - g. Hijacking or attacks on UN aircraft and passengers on the ground or in the air.
7. It is assessed that the Iraqi national security system will remain very ineffective for at least a year and remain only moderately effective for 2 – 5 years. The CF is adopting a cautious and conservative approach to operations after the relatively heavy losses and the negative public reaction in its recent operations. It is considered that the combination of an ineffective national Iraqi security structure and a cautious CF/MNF could result in an environment in which militants are not appropriately constrained.

## RISK and RISK MITIGATION MEASURES

8. It is assessed that the following measures should be implemented to mitigate risk to UN staff, programs and reputation:
  - a. Lightest Possible Footprint. Maximizing impact while minimizing presence will be a guiding principle for UN activities in Iraq.

- b. Standard Operating Procedures (SOPs). SOPs will facilitate safe and effective management of movement, facilities and evacuation.
- c. Discrete Operations. Until more is known about the motives behind those who have targeted the UN in the recent past, it is therefore considered prudent to operate discretely – without UN markings, flags or insignia. The UN media campaign should complement this approach.
- d. Intelligence and Early Warning. A Security and Information Operations Center (SIOC) responsible for gathering, analyzing and disseminating intelligence information and warnings should be established to make staff aware of the threats and risks and also advise on how to mitigate and avoid these risks.
- e. Effective Contingency Plans. Plans covering all aspects of security including evacuation should be in place prior to re-entry of international staff.
- f. Security Awareness Induction Training (SAIT). Pre-entry training designed to provide basic skills, increase general knowledge and enhance the security awareness of all UN staff and associated agencies.
- g. Staff and Vehicle Tracking. An efficient staff and vehicle tracking system is an essential component of an effective security management system.
- h. Protective Equipment and Protected Facilities. Protective personal equipment, armored vehicles and MOSS compliant facilities will mitigate weapons effects.

## **MISSION**

- 9. To provide the safe and secure environment for the UN to return to Iraq and carry out its mission.

## **TASKS**

### 10. Key Tasks:

- a. Facility security;
- b. Movement security;
- c. Establishment and maintenance of liaison, coordination, and communications.

### 11. Supporting Tasks:

- a. Quick reaction force (QRF);
- b. Emergency medical evacuation;
- c. Exchange of information (threat briefings and warnings);
- d. Combat search and rescue (CSAR);
- e. Support to UNHAS operations

- f. Determine security requirements;
- g. Identify command and control structure;
- h. Confirm and establish command/support relationships
- i. Liaison officers (including coalition LNO team), and
- j. Communications architecture.

## **CONCEPT FOR SECURITY**

- 12. Initial support will likely be provided from within MNF resources.
- 13. Operations inside Iraq will initially center around three operating bases: Baghdad, Basra and Erbil. At first these operations will be managed from Amman, Jordan, and logistically supported from Camp Kheitan and Camp Khor in Kuwait.
- 14. Recent developments arising from the Electoral Mission indicate that the UN may need a facility in Baghdad as early as July; the ongoing activities in Umm Qasr; and the distant prospect of further expansion beyond Basra and Erbil appear likely.
- 15. It should also be noted that the concept does not take into account election activities. The UN has received no formal or informal information on what support might be required for this activity as yet.

### Concept of Facilities Protection - Three-Ring Concept

- 16. MNF and UN have accepted the 3-ring concept. The MNF will be responsible for the outer and middle rings and the UN for the inner ring. The layers will vary subject to each individual site.
- 17. Inner Ring. UN Responsibility. The inner ring consists of the UN building(s) and facilities. It may be surrounded by an inner perimeter. The UN will be responsible for its own UN Guard Force, including personal protection details and protection coordination officers. Inner Ring UN Guard Force will be responsible for:
  - a. Supervision of inner perimeter access control procedures for staff, workers and visitors;
  - b. Supervision and operation of badging and identification;
  - c. Facility Control Room and Communications Center operations;
  - d. Maintenance of communications with Inner, Middle and Outer rings;
  - e. Monitoring of GPS tracking locators fitted to active "in-transit" elements;
  - f. Key control;
  - g. Fire Control; and
  - h. Patrol activity.
- 18. Middle Ring. MNF responsibility. This ring consists of the UN compound wall and access area at least 50 m from it. MNF will be responsible for wall security and entry control. This task will be undertaken in Baghdad by US forces, UK soldiers in Basrah and ICDC in Erbil.
- 19. The Middle-Ring force is responsible for:

- a. Deny (prevent) penetration of the compound perimeter by unauthorized personnel;
  - b. Provide warning of imminent and latent threat to the UN facility through surveillance;
  - c. Search all incoming vehicles, personnel, and visitors at specially designed area constructed OUTSIDE the facility;
  - d. Control vehicular and pedestrian access allowing only those who have passed through the search process access through the outer perimeter;
  - e. Control of parking operations (after search by middle ring personnel cars will be directed where to park – an area outside the perimeter wall);
  - f. Upkeep and maintenance of facility safe havens; and
  - g. Maintenance of active operational coordination with outer ring.
20. Outer-Ring. This is an MNF responsibility. Forces here are responsible for area and route surveillance, access control and Quick Reaction Force (QRF) and security of locations outside the UN Facilities. The Outer-Ring force s responsible for:
- a. Deter attack on the facility;
  - b. Provide warning of any threat;
  - c. Provide security of facilities used for UN functions and meetings outside UN facilities. This could be moved to the middle ring responsibility – depending on the facility and the situation.
  - d. Operate vehicle checkpoints, where deemed necessary, on the approaches to the facility;
  - e. Disrupt potential attacks through overt patrolling;
  - f. Maintain the continuous ability to provide QRF;
  - g. Provide emergency medical evacuation support (at agreed levels)
  - h. Contribute to collection of information for development of threat assessment;
  - i. Provide dedicated liaison function at agreed levels of command; and
  - j. Provide necessary communications equipment and personnel for deployment in operations cells.
21. Security for Locations Outside of UN Facilities. This function can consume a significant number of MNF forces and it is assumed that this will be an infrequent rather than routine requirement.
22. Protection on the Move.
- a. MNF accept the vehicle escort concept but are conscious that this is a task requiring considerable resources, risk mitigation and coordination.
  - b. When MNF escorts are required, MNF will task a minimum of 2 armored vehicles.
  - c. It is envisaged the UN will carry their own armed security personnel in their own armored vehicles. MNF will not provide or operate UN vehicles.
  - d. The ability to call a QRF is essential. Air and ground route reconnaissance will determine whether route travel is permissible, and the level of protection required for the convoy.

## **COORDINATION, LIAISON AND COMMUNICATION**

23. Coordination. Recognizing the critical need for coordination, a comprehensive structure affording coordination and liaison at national, operational and regional-local levels are essential.
24. Timings. The UN may require a facility in Baghdad very shortly after the transfer of sovereignty to an Iraqi government
  - a. The UN plans to establish a regional presence, in addition to the Baghdad facilities. In the near term this will be Irbil and Basra. A facility in Irbil has been identified is under construction at the airport. Facilities have been identified in Basra, at the old port, and will need 6-8 weeks work to bring up to UN MOSS. It is estimated that the UN presence in Irbil and Basra is unlikely to be established before October 2004.
  - b. The UN intends to establish a presence in Hillah, Mosul, and Suleimaniyah in the medium term. However, facilities have yet to be identified, and it is unlikely this presence will be established before 2005.
25. Liaison. A number of liaison officers with secure communications will be embedded in a number of organizations to facilitate the necessary support to the UN. Such liaison officers will ensure smooth coordination of UN support, and facilitate information exchange. Required liaison officers, and associated requirements are to be determined.