

INTER-AGENCY STANDING COMMITTEE
63RD WORKING GROUP MEETING

**Synthesis Review of the United Nations
Joint Logistics Center (UNJLC):
Issues and Recommendations Arising from
Reviews of the UNJLC**

21-22 November 2005
Hosted by ICVA, International Council of Voluntary Agencies
ECOGIA, Versoix (Geneva)

Circulated 8 November 2005

I Executive Summary

This synthesis review summarises common issues arising from past reviews of individual UNJLC deployments and the Core Unit and makes recommendations for strengthening the role, performance of and engagement in the UNJLC.

The UNJLC's Core Unit in Rome is actively pursuing the recommendations of previous reviews and has included the most important of them in its current Concept Paper and 2005 Workplan.

The United Nations Joint Logistics Centre (UNJLC) has established itself in an important and necessary role as an emergency response mechanism. UNJLC's coordination and operations have been appreciated by donors, the Red Cross Red Crescent Movement and NGOs but to a lesser extent by its host agency, World Food Programme (WFP). Consolidating a mutually positive relationship with WFP is critical to its future success as the UNJLC cannot function without the personnel, financial and administrative support of WFP, while at the same time UNJLC must retain its independence and avoid a bias or perceived bias in favour of WFP.

As UNJLC's operations have matured the appreciation of its varied operational roles, in addition to coordination, has become clear. The UNJLC should continue this operational role in filling critical, temporary, gaps in logistics services but the UNJLC should only become operational with the approval of the UNJLC Field Steering Group and only until an alternative mechanism is in place.

The fundamental lesson learned from UNJLC's experience so far is that the very early deployment of experienced staff, linked to an effective support mechanism, is absolutely vital to its effectiveness. The Core Unit needs to be strengthened with

additional, experienced logistics officers to establish a cadre of staff capable of leading UNJLC field operations and able to deploy at short notice.

1.1 Key Summary and Recommendations

Recommendations are included under each topic heading through the report. Key summary recommendations are:

1. Every UNJLC field operation should have a Field Steering Group made up of Country Team (CT) members or their delegated staff. The Field Steering Group can approve operational case-specific logistics services within UNJLC capacity.
2. Logistics preparedness missions to potential trouble spots should be considered a regular part of the operations of the Core Unit, involving partners where possible.
3. The UNJLC only intervenes until an appropriate alternative mechanism is in place, which the UNJLC should assist as necessary to ensure a smooth handover.
4. Where possible, the UNJLC should be co-located with the other Humanitarian Common Services (HCS).
5. The UNJLC should provide a platform where potential logistics cost savings and market trends can be identified.
6. UNJLC should retain its impartiality and inter-agency character while receiving personnel, financial and administrative support from its host, WFP.
7. UNJLC should play a role in strategic air coordination where necessary and coordinate/prioritise cargo for aircraft available for common humanitarian use including the Humanitarian Air Services (HAS).
8. UNJLC should perform its liaison and coordination role with military entities at the logistics operational level and within the framework of the UN Humanitarian Civil-Military Coordination (CMCoord) Concept.
9. The quarterly meetings of stakeholders should be maintained as the 'UNJLC HQ Steering Group'.
10. A template agreement covering human resources, finance and administration issues should be developed to clarify the UNJLC relationship with its partners. Existing technical agreements between WFP and other agencies should be updated in this respect.
11. The UNJLC Core Unit should be strengthened with two additional logistics officers capable of being Chiefs of Field Operations. Core Unit staff should be drawn from and funded by UN agencies.
12. WFP should resolve the issue of signing authority for UN staff deployed as Chiefs of Field Operations that are not staff of WFP.

13. The UNJLC should broaden its register of potential UNJLC staff available under advance commitments from a variety of sources.
14. Donors should be encouraged to make regular annual contributions to the Special Account to put the Core Unit's finances on a sound and predictable footing.
15. The UNJLC must be strict in crediting and acknowledging the origin of the material on its maps, website and documents.
16. The UNJLC should develop a clear communication strategy to make itself more widely known to a general humanitarian audience and to Humanitarian Coordinators (HC) and Country Offices in particular.

1.2 Review's Objective and Methodology

17. This review was an inter-agency initiative with the participation of representatives from WFP, the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR), the United Nations Children's Fund (UNICEF) and the Office of the Coordinator of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA). The review scope, methodology and process were discussed and agreed upon prior to the review.
18. There have been comprehensive previous reviews of the Afghan, Iraq and Liberia operations by the Dutch consulting company, Royal Haskoning, The Core Unit has been reviewed by an external consultant and WFP has conducted detailed internal reviews of its finance, HR, ICT, and procurement relationship with the UNJLC. The objective of these studies was to derive lessons and best practices for application in future deployments
19. The review was carried out by a consultant with previous WFP experience, exposure to the UNJLC and under inter-agency guidance. WFP provided oversight for the review through its Office of Evaluation (OEDE). The review followed a multi-step approach starting with a desk study which analysed the reports of all of the earlier UNJLC reviews undertaken to date and developed a list of common and key issues arising from these reviews. This, together with interviews of UN agencies and NGOs, provided an analysis of the current status of the UNJLC and identified issues that required further inter-agency discussion and debate and suggestions for the future direction of the UNJLC. A draft synthesis report was circulated to the four commissioning agencies for their inputs and comments in advance of an inter-agency workshop¹ which took place in Rome from 21-22 April 2005. The workshop considered the draft synthesis report in detail and made proposals for its refinement.
20. The review will be presented to the WFP Executive Board and to the Inter Agency Standing Committee – Working Group (IASC-WG) in late 2005.

¹ Participants: WHO, WFP, UNFPA, UNHCR, OCHA, Care International, FAO, UNICEF, IOM, OCHA.

II History and Background of the UNJLC

2.1 Evolution of the UNJLC

21. The UNJLC has evolved from an initiative to share logistics assets, originally aircraft, during the 1996 Eastern Zaire crisis when UNHCR, WFP and UNICEF combined efforts in Uganda to provide an airlift of relief materials into Eastern Zaire and to bring refugees out on the same aircraft.
22. Since Zaire the UNJLC concept of combining and coordinating logistics has been used in a number of emergencies in different forms; in the floods in Somalia in 1998, during the Balkans crisis and the East Timor crisis in 1999 and the Mozambique floods in 2000. Although not termed UNJLCs, inter-agency air cells in Bosnia and Rwanda were similar UN joint operations.
23. In March 2001 the IASC tasked WFP to take the lead role in further developing the UNJLC concept.
24. The UNJLC was active in the complex emergency in Afghanistan from 2001 to 2003.
25. In March 2002 the IASC-WG recognised the UNJLC as a UN Humanitarian Response mechanism under the aegis of WFP.
26. By October 2002 the Core Unit of the UNJLC was initiated in Rome.
27. The UNJLC was deeply involved in Iraq in 2003 and Liberia in 2003/4. UNJLC played a minor role in Nepal and Haiti in 2004 and is currently operational in both south and north Sudan and in the Tsunami response.

2.2 Current status of the UNJLC

28. The UNJLC is now operationally independent of, but hosted by, WFP from whom it draws its administrative support services. The UNJLC is recognised by the IASC as a Humanitarian Common Service (HCS).
29. The UNJLC's mission statement is to complement and coordinate the logistics capabilities of cooperating humanitarian agencies in large-scale emergencies. The UNJLC works within OCHA's overall coordination of emergency response.
30. WFP provides UNJLC with administrative, financial and human resources support services. The UNJLC in the field reports operationally to the Humanitarian Coordinator/Resident Coordinator and through the Chief of the UNJLC Core Unit to the Director of the Transport and Procurement Division (ODT) in WFP Rome.

31. The stakeholders of the UNJLC (members and observers of the IASC-WG²) meet quarterly to review its progress and provide operational and policy guidance. The UNJLC reports to its oversight body, the IASC–WG.
32. The Core Unit provides a base from which to launch and manage UNJLC operations. The Core Unit maintains contact with the other agencies, contributes to appeals, relieves the field operations of much of the reporting burden, links the field operations to the support services of WFP, organises training, manages a broad range of information and takes the initiative to improve the effectiveness and capacity of the UNJLC. The Core Unit also acts as a hub where UNJLC’s partners can bring together their views and act on a range of global logistics matters.
33. A staff member of WFP on the regular budget manages the Core Unit and staff members of UNICEF, UNHCR and IOM are currently on reimbursable loans, funded by UNJLC.
34. The UNJLC expects to be operational in the field within 48 hours of activation.

III Achievements of the UNJLC

35. The UNJLC has filled gaps in the overall logistics picture providing a responsive, innovative and practical lead in coordination and implementation. Both in concept and in practice donors, the Red Cross Red Crescent and NGOs, appreciate the UNJLC and its ‘can-do’ attitude has been very much to its credit. The Core Unit provides the base for these operations and the secretariat for discussion and agreement on logistics activities that underpin future operations, for example in strategic air planning, the standardisation of trucking fleets, strategic warehousing and commodity tracking systems.
36. The UNJLC has provided logistics coordination and complementary services in a number of large-scale emergencies, including:
 - Interagency logistics contingency planning exercises
 - Regular logistics coordination meetings in the field
 - Logistics training with all of its partners
 - The expansion and dissemination of information on logistics through an information platform
 - Identification of and action on vital operational logistical bottlenecks
 - Strategic air planning

2 WHO, WFP, UNHCR, UNICEF, UNFPA, FAO, UNDP, ICVA, InterAction, SCHR, IOM, IFRC, ICRC, WorldBank, Office of the Special Representative of the Secretary General on IDPs, OHCHR. (OCHA also participates in the quarterly meetings as a stakeholder).

- Planning for air operations requirements
- Coordination platform for the use of commercial and military aircraft
- Liaison and coordination with military logistics at the operational level
- Slot allocation at destination airfields
- Air cargo prioritisation
- Facilitation of air cargo handling at destination
- Entry port and external road route planning
- Collective negotiation of logistics rates
- Transport infrastructure assessments
- Light vehicle workshop organisation
- Strategic and operational fuel issues
- NFI logistics
- Specific road, water and rail initiatives

IV Common and Key Issues from Previous UNLC Reviews

37. The headings in bold type in this section represent the common issues that have emerged from the earlier reviews of the UNJLC. The accompanying text illustrates the current UNJLC approach to these issues and any recommendations appear in boxes.

4.1 Operational involvement

38. There has been considerable debate amongst UNJLC's stakeholders over the advisability of UNJLC taking on operational tasks in addition to its coordination role. The UNJLC has been successful in demonstrating a flexible, innovative and rapid response to operational problems and common examples of this have been in the area of resolving customs bottlenecks and dealing with fuel issues. A specific example of this was UNJLC's negotiation of prime space at an airport in Afghanistan, in advance of any immediate need, that was eventually utilised for helicopter operations. In addition to its coordinating role UNJLC has a much appreciated operational role in Darfur in managing the pipeline of NFIs, assisting in the purchase of light vehicles, helping HIC to make logistics maps, and collecting general logistics data, including transport rates. The proposed establishment of a Fuel Cell in the UNJLC represents a typically useful initiative which has already made advance fuel studies of both northern and southern Sudan.

39. The UNJLC's logistics support to elections and in the currency conversion operation in Afghanistan are clear examples of operational interventions that were clearly outside its usual role but at the same time were very useful.
40. As the UNJLC is not a legal entity it cannot contract logistics services, putting a clear limitation on its operational role.

41. **Recommendation**

The UNJLC's primary task is logistics coordination and augmentation as described in the Terms of Reference approved by the IASC-WG prior to and for individual field operations. In addition, the Field Steering Group can approve operational case-specific logistics services providing UNJLC has the capacity.

42. **Recommendation**

Every UNJLC field operation should have a Field Steering Group made up of Country Team (CT) members or their delegated staff.

4.2 Logistics preparedness, intervention timing and authority

43. UNJLC is making preparedness plans for South Sudan for the impact of possible return of refugees and Internally Displaced Persons (IDPs). In 2004 the UNJLC Southern Sudan team completed work on an electronic book detailing airstrips, comprehensive logistics planning maps, an overview of the likely post peace logistical situation and a review of all road and river transport corridors into southern Sudan together with an assessment of the status of customs and immigration services.
44. The UNJLC's preparation for Iraq is considered an excellent example of logistics preparedness planning and its early activation was clearly appropriate. UNJLC has helped to consolidate the emergency logistics preparedness plans of the CT in Nepal.
45. UNJLC has been involved in the preparatory phase of operations through logistics preparedness planning and could already be in country, for example as part of an UNDAC mission or operating elsewhere as in the Sudan case.
46. The UNJLC only activates on the request of a CT or the HC, sent to the UNJLC Core Unit. UNJLC then prepares the Terms of Reference (TORs) for the IASC-WG. IASC-WG approval can be obtained in 48 hours. At the same time a Special Operation is prepared in WFP.

47. Recommendation

Logistics preparedness missions should be considered a regular part of the operations of the Core Unit. UNJLC should inform partners in advance of such missions and give them the opportunity to participate, and invite them to provide information on in-country logistics. The UNJLC should make logistics preparedness plans for potential trouble spots in coordination with the IASC Sub-Working Group on Preparedness and Contingency Planning.

4.3 *The length of operational intervention*

48. The UNJLC makes it clear at the outset of an operation to the CT that it is a stopgap measure in those areas where its partners would normally assume operational responsibility. In Darfur, for example, UNJLC will hand over its NFI role as soon as a partner is in a position to take over. In Darfur UNJLC, in agreement with WFP HAS, organised the ramp operations at airfields in the early stages of the operation and subsequently handed this over to WFP HAS.

49. Recommendation

The UNJLC should only intervene until an appropriate alternative mechanism is in place. The UNJLC should assist the relevant entity to take over and provide capacity building to local government where appropriate. It may be appropriate for UNJLC to transfer staff to one of its partners to ensure a continuing operation.

4.4 *The location of the field office*

50. Arguments have been put forward for making the default location the WFP office and very strong cases were made for location with other HCS and the HC's office. In Sudan, the UNJLC started in the OCHA office but moved out due to lack of space into the unsatisfactory position of being on its own.

51. Recommendation

In principle, the UNJLC should be co-located with the other Humanitarian Common Services. Where local circumstances make this not feasible, then it should be determined through agreement between the Chief of the Core Unit, the WFP CD and the HC/Resident Coordinator (RC).

4.5 *Logistics costs*

52. The UNJLC's successful renegotiation of barge prices on the northern border of Afghanistan, its success in renegotiating trucking rates in Afghanistan and WFP's agreement to share barge capacity with NFIs until a bridge opened, illustrate the UNJLC's role in logistics costs. The UNJLC does not publish commercially

sensitive information on costs. In Darfur, UNJLC is monitoring fuel and trucking costs but is not yet able to obtain regular information from agencies. The monitoring of costs in air, road, rail, river and warehousing helps to ensure that competition is not pushing up costs and where possible leads to sharing assets. In South Sudan, it is clear that cost savings can be made through joint negotiation of fuel supplies.

53. Recommendation

The UNJLC should provide a platform where potential logistics cost savings and market trends can be identified. Agencies are encouraged to share information on this subject.

4.6 The relationship with WFP

54. The appreciation of donors, the Red Cross Red Crescent and NGOs has not been matched by a similar appreciation by the host agency. Duplication of effort and non-observance of WFP's support service rules have been common criticisms. WFP in the field perceives the efforts of the UNJLC as benefiting others and conferring an implementation role on the HC, thus eroding its own influence on the logistics scene. In the Liberia operation the UNJLC was fully funded whilst the WFP was struggling for a minimum of logistics staff. The net result of its relationship with WFP and lack of knowledge of UNJLC staff of WFP procedures has been that the UNJLC has often failed to obtain appropriate support services from WFP and there have been considerable misunderstandings.
55. UNJLC's operational activities are sometimes seen by WFP staff as peripheral to the main logistics effort, or are perceived as placing a burden in providing services on its host agency that is out of proportion to the advantages to WFP of a UNJLC. Some WFP CDs think that the UNJLC puts them in the position of having to decide on priorities between the provision of limited support services to their own operations and the independent UNJLC which raises resources in competition with WFP.
56. Slowness and confusion in the timing of hiring staff, payment of salaries, obtaining UN identification, procurement and the approval of travel were past examples of what UNJLC saw as weak support and WFP has not found it possible to delegate financial authority to UNJLC staff that are seconded or on loan from other agencies.
57. Many initiatives have been taken to strengthen the UNJLC's relationship with WFP both administratively and operationally. Administratively, the Core Unit has established an Admin/Finance/HR Liaison officer to provide a critical link between the field operations and WFP support services at a practical level. Operationally, the UNJLC is making sure that WFP staff are aware of the advantages of the UNJLC.

58. Directly beneficial operations to WFP such as the formation of the Fuel Cell, joint work on LCAs, linking them to other agency inputs, and putting website expertise at the disposal of the Fleet Forum and the HRD are having the right effect. The Core Unit has also produced a brief on the relationship it sees between the UNJLC office in field and WFP field office support services and is travelling more frequently into the field to look into complaints.
59. At a meeting of WFP senior staff chaired by the WFP Senior Deputy Executive Director, in April 2005, the relationship between UNJLC and WFP was reviewed and WFP reaffirmed its commitment to hosting UNJLC.

60. **Recommendation**

UNJLC cannot function without human resources, financial and administrative support from WFP, its host agency, and must therefore consolidate a mutually positive relationship with WFP, whilst retaining its impartiality and inter-agency character. This relationship should be clarified by WFP through further dissemination of information by, for example, an OD Directive.

4.7 Strategic air coordination and working with the Humanitarian Air Service (HAS)

61. The UNJLC has had an essential role working with military and civilian authorities at strategic level over air corridors, security and airfields, slot allocation, planning and utilisation of commercial and military aircraft and other available air assets. It has also been involved in the prioritisation of cargo for HAS aircraft with the potential for overlap with the air operator role of HAS. A recent division of responsibility agreed between HAS and UNJLC for Sudan resulted in an appropriate, agreed, role for the UNLJC and the eventual handover to HAS.

62. **Recommendation**

UNJLC should play a role in strategic air coordination where necessary. At the operations theatre level, the UNJLC should continue to coordinate/prioritise cargo for aircraft available for common humanitarian use, including HAS if present.

63. **Recommendation**

UNJLC and WFP should issue a paper further detailing their roles in air coordination.

4.8 Working with the military

64. During large-scale emergencies the UNJLC is the focal point to coordinate humanitarian logistics issues with the military at the operational level. As UN CMCoord Officers from OCHA have been deployed where a military force is

operating the roles of UN CMCoord officers and the UNJLC risked confusion and duplication.

65. UNJLC, together with other members of the Advisory Panel to MCDU, contributed to MCDU's drafting of the UN Humanitarian CMCoord Concept (endorsed by the IASC-WG in March 2005), which includes a description of the UN CMCoord deployment system, the difference and links between the UN CMCoord Officer and the staff deployed by other UN entities to deal with military staff, as well as examples of generic Terms of Reference.
66. While the UN CMCoord officers assigned to the HC/RC are responsible for the civil/military coordination and relationship at the policy level, the UNJLC CMCoord Officers (this title is under discussion) will be assigned to coordinate humanitarian efforts at the logistics operational level. Use of Military and Civil Defence Assets (MCDA) will be in accordance with the 'Oslo' and 'MCDA' and other related IASC-WG Guidelines.
67. UNJLC has been involved in operational planning with military authorities and Department of Peace Keeping Operations (DPKO) during the crises in Afghanistan, Iraq, Liberia and Sudan. In addition, UNJLC has undertaken a planning mission to the DRC and Burundi to assess Inter-Agency logistics coordination and the interface with DPKO.

68. **Recommendation**

UNJLC's role in liaison and in coordination of logistics issues with military entities should be at the operational level and within the framework of the UN Humanitarian Civil-Military Coordination (CMCoord) Concept. Contacts with DPKO and other UN-mandated forces should be to identify common logistics ground and provide a link between humanitarian and military logistics.

4.9 Working with its partners

69. UNJLC is working on a standard presentation of logistics services that it can offer to the HC and the CT which will present a very clear view of what expertise the UNJLC can offer to its partners.
70. UNJLC's funding has not been transparent to its partners. A recent decision to present a summary of UNJLC's financial position to its stakeholder meetings should resolve this issue.
71. UNJLC plans to periodically analyse the cost effectiveness of its operations and report on this subject to the UNJLC 'HQ Steering Group'.
72. UNJLC is actively pursuing cooperation with other logistics coordination mechanisms to lay the groundwork in advance of field operations. There is already cooperation with international organisations in the humanitarian field,

both in the public and the private sector. Groundwork is being laid with DPKO and the European Union (EU).

73. The UNJLC has a clear understanding with the Red Cross Red Crescent family and is developing a stronger relationship with NGOs.
74. The UNJLC has agreed with UNDAC that UNJLC staff will be on the UNDAC roster for deployment within 24 hours as a part of the UNDAC teams in the event of disasters. The UNJLC activated in response to the Tsunami while in its UNDAC role. In this way the UNJLC will be on the ground early with UNDAC and will be in a position to prepare for possible extended operations.
75. The UNJLC took part in Exercise Triplex in 2004, organised by the International Humanitarian Partnership, a grouping of European donors and countries, and is planning, in collaboration with OCHA, a simulated complex emergency exercise for all the HCS (UNJLC, HAS, CMCoord, HIC and IAET) in 2006.
76. UNJLC is working together with PAHO/WHO, OCHA and WFP to develop the Logistics Support System (LSS). This is essentially a multi-commodity tracking system for coordination purposes and for those operations without a NFI tracking tool.
77. The UNJLC is actively involved in an initiative to establish a network of coordinated strategically located stocks of emergency materials. A number of such depots managed by UN agencies and the Red Cross/Red Crescent organisations are already independently in operation.

78. **Recommendation**

The quarterly meetings of stakeholders should be maintained as the 'UNJLC HQ Steering Group'. Senior representation from the humanitarian agencies that attend the IASC-WG and from DPKO is essential.

79. **Recommendation**

To clarify the UNJLC relationship with its partners a template agreement should be developed covering human resources, finance and administration issues between UNJLC and the respective entity. Existing technical agreements between WFP and other agencies should be updated with an addendum on UNJLC in this respect.

4.10 Deployment of Chiefs of field operations and technical support staff

80. The fundamental key to UNJLC's effectiveness is the early arrival on the ground of experienced staff with personal transport and communications and an effective link to support services. Whilst JLC is better than most, it is still far from optimum. At the time of an emergency everyone needs staff at the same time and rosters break down. This is the issue on which virtually all-else hinges.

81. **Recommendation**

The UNJLC Core Unit should be strengthened with two additional logistics officers capable of being Chiefs of Field Operations. This would give the Core Unit five senior logistics officers from participating UN-Agencies in addition to the Chief of the UNJLC Core Unit, all of whom would be rapidly deployable. The participating UN agencies will be encouraged to fund these positions.

82. **Recommendation**

Before the arrangement above is put into place WFP should resolve the issue of signing authority for non-WFP UN-staff.

83. Experience has shown that there would be no lack of tasks to employ these senior logistics officers during non-emergency periods. They would be based in Rome but available during non emergency periods to operate from regional offices, for example, in preparatory roles, training, or be on loan to other agencies on a cost recovery basis.

84. **Recommendation**

Although the WFP Logistics Service's Standby staffing arrangement through ALITE works well the UNJLC should maintain its register of potential UNJLC staff, drawing from a variety of sources, broadening the pool of available staff with appropriate experience and reflecting its inter-agency role. Arrangements should be made with their employers to make staff rapidly available and to familiarise them with the UNJLC.

4.11 Financing the Core Unit and field operations

85. UNJLC field operations are funded through a WFP Special Operation mechanism.³ Special Operations are normally part of the Consolidated Appeals Process (CAP) listed in the category 'coordination and support services'.

86. In advance of funds being available from the WFP SO, WFP's Immediate Response Account (IRA) and the Direct Support Costs Advance Facilities (DSCAF) as well as OCHA's CERF⁴ and OFDA's Rapid Response Account can be used to jump start UNJLC activities

87. Although the Core Unit is the base from which UNJLC operations are launched its funding has not been reliable. The recent approval of the Special Account will allow donors to fund the Core Unit directly.

3 A WFP Special Operation is used to fund interventions undertaken to rehabilitate and enhance transport and logistics infrastructure to permit timely and efficient delivery of food assistance, especially to meet emergency and protracted relief needs and/or to enhance coordination within the United Nations System and with other partners through the provision of designated common services.

4 The Central Emergency Revolving Fund (CERF) is a cash flow mechanism, under the authority of the Emergency Relief Coordinator, to allow for an immediate response to an emergency.

88. Recommendation

Donors should be encouraged to make regular annual contributions to the Special Account to put the Core Unit's finances on a sound and predictable footing.

4.12 Information

89. UNJLC's high quality website and mapping have received widespread acknowledgment as valuable tools in logistics coordination and operations but the origin of the material used is not always clear. Attendance at coordination meetings regularly picks up immediately after the issue of a bulletin on the website.
90. UNJLC produced regular fortnightly bulletins in Iraq focussing on transport corridors into Iraq, immigration issues, the emerging aviation capacity, fuels and electrical power generation as an essential service vital to humanitarian activities. A range of resources useful to the humanitarian community, ranging from background reports to downloadable Iraqi visa application forms have been posted on the UNJLC web site.
91. The Logistics Operations Guide (LOG) is now a very comprehensive collation of a huge amount of relevant emergency documentation and guidelines and includes very valuable samples of standard documentation across a wide variety of logistics activities. A version of the LOG is on CD-ROM. The LOG includes a Field Operations Manual (FOM) containing administrative and operational guidelines for UNJLC staff going to the field. The full LOG is accessible on the web site.
92. Despite its attempts so far the UNJLC is not as generally well known as it should be and this has sometimes been a disadvantage in gaining access at the appropriate decision making level.

93. Recommendation

The UNJLC must be strict in crediting and acknowledging the origin of the material on its maps, website and disseminated documents.

94. Recommendation:

UNJLC should develop a clear communication strategy to inform relevant Humanitarian actors on the Centre's mission and capabilities. The UNJLC is encouraged to attend Humanitarian Coordinator (HC) and Country Director (CD) workshops as training cadre, as per the IASC endorsed recommendations on Humanitarian Common Services.

V Proposed Action by the IASC Working Group

1. The IASC Working Group will be requested to review and endorse key recommendations outlined in pages 2-3

VI Annex of acronyms used in this report:

CAP	Consolidated Appeals Process
CD	Country Director
CERF	Central Emergency Revolving Fund
CT	Country Team
CIMIC	Civil Military Cooperation (Military)
CMCoord	Civil Military Coordination (Humanitarian)
CO	Country Office
DFID	Department for International Development, UK Government
DPKO	Department of Peace Keeping Operations
DSCAF	Direct Support Cost Advance Facility
ED	Executive Director
ERC	Emergency Relief Coordinator
EU	European Union
FAO	Food and Agriculture Organisation
FCSS	Field Coordination Support Section (OCHA)
FITTEST	Fast Information Technology and Telecom Emergency Support Team
FOM	Field Operations Manual
HAS	Humanitarian Air Service
HC	Humanitarian Coordinator
HCS	Humanitarian Common Services
HIC	Humanitarian Information Centre
HR	Human Resources
IAET	Inter-Agency Emergency Telecommunications
IASC-WG	Inter Agency Standing Committee – Working Group
ICT	Information and Communications Technology
ICRC	International Committee of the Red Cross
ICVA	International Council of Voluntary Agencies

IDP	Internally Displaced Person
IFRC	International Federation of the Red Cross Red Crescent
IO	International Organisation
IOM	International Organisation for Migration
IRA	Immediate Response Account
LCA	Logistics Capacity Assessment
LOG	Logistics Operations Guide
LSS	Logistics Support System
MCDA	Military and Civil Defence Assets
MCDU	Military and Civil Defence Unit (OCHA)
MOU	Memorandum of Understanding
NFI	Non Food Item
NGO	Non Governmental Organisation
OCHA	Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs
OD	WFP Operations Department
ODT	WFP Transport and Procurement Division
OEDE	WFP Office of Evaluation
OHCHR	Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights
PAHO	Pan American Health Organisation
RC	Resident Coordinator
SBA	Standby Agreement
SCHR	Steering Committee for Humanitarian Response
SO	WFP Special Operation
TOR	Terms of Reference
UNDAC	United Nations Disaster Assessment and Coordination
UNDP	United Nations Development Programme
UNFPA	United Nations Population Fund
UNHCR	United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees
UNHRD	United Nations Humanitarian Response Depot
UNICEF	United Nations Children's Fund
UNJLC	United Nations Joint Logistics Centre
WFP	World Food Programme
WHO	World Health Organisation