HUMANITARIAN CONCERNS REGARDING ANGOLA

Impact of recent intensification of conflict and MONUA's decreased presence:

All roads to the interior are too insecure to travel for reasons of violence, the mine-threat, ambushes. Local operators are increasingly hesitant to transport convoys without a proper escort. UNITA have effectively cut the country in half and at least 30 percent of the affected population cannot be reached.

Air transport is costly and untenable. This too is restricted as recent developments in Malange prevent the re-supplying of relief aid stocks in that city while vulnerable needs are increasing.

Prior to the recent withdrawal of MONUA's team sites, the humanitarian community depended on MONUA to provide military escorts for half of the 5,000 MT that WFP delivers monthly by road. The absence of MONUA's military escorts will severely affect humanitarian assistance deliveries.

MONUA's presence brings an increased <u>international presence</u> in Angola and its regular updating of the Security Council brings <u>increased international focus</u> and attention on urgent matters. Without this spotlight, much of the crisis in Angola will continue in silence in the international community.

MONUA's mandate helps prevent and inhibit human rights abuses in Angola. The climate for <u>human rights promotion</u> has improved over the last few months with the expansion of the Human Rights Division (HRD) of MONUA.

The <u>political negotiation capacity</u> of MONUA has been instrumental for UN humanitarian agencies in facilitating their activities. Without this capacity, the aid community will find it increasingly difficult to conduct effective negotiations for its tasks.

The <u>recent UNDP/OCHA mission to Angola</u>, in extensive discussions with Government, donor and humanitarian community representatives, were clearly informed of the vital role that MONUA plays for humanitarian activities in the fields of <u>security</u>, <u>information</u>, <u>logistics and communications</u>. MONUA's support in providing air transport for humanitarian assistance has been instrumental in delivering aid to isolated locations.

Minimum Requirements for an Effective Humanitarian Intervention:

Agreement must be reached by the Government and UNITA for UN humanitarian agencies to: 1) communicate directly with all relevant parties, including UNITA (of Dr. Savimbi), on matters pertaining to humanitarian assistance; 2) establish a presence where required by humanitarian conditions.

In reaching the above agreement, UN humanitarian actors must stress that contact with

non-recognised political actors (such as Savimbi/UNITA) does not constitute either political recognition by the UN nor does it imply legitimacy.

The role of the Humanitarian Coordinator in negotiating access and security clearances needs endorsement by the UN, at the S-G/SMG level. If a UN political presence is left in Angola (either a pared-down MONUA or a new political office), that office should take as one of its core functions the task of assisting the Humanitarian Coordinator in achieving secure access throughout Angola.

Both parties to the conflict should agree to provide <u>unfettered safe and secure access</u> of humanitarian personnel and assistance to all affected populations and areas.

The granting by all parties and neighbouring countries of freedom of movement of humanitarian personnel to perform <u>cross-line and cross-border humanitarian activities</u> from neighbouring states, where access may be insecure or more difficult from areas within Angola.

<u>Security and communications capacity and support for UN</u> humanitarian operations must be strengthened.

The Government and UNITA (all elements) must give clear guarantees for the <u>safety and</u> security of all humanitarian personnel.

The <u>Government</u> should increase the devotion of its resources to <u>strengthening</u> and <u>expanding</u> its humanitarian relief operations.

Agencies must commit themselves to common responses, through the Humanitarian Coordinator, to breaches of security or access by any party.

Action taken:

Mr. Vieira de Mello successfully obtained the inclusion of safety and security, access and funding concerns in the Security Council Presidential Statement dated 21 January.

Mr. Martin Griffiths visited Angola to consult with Governmental, agency, donor and NGO actors regarding humanitarian priorities for the immediate future. Preliminary findings transmitted to all IASC members.

Decisions required.

Strategy for humanitarian intervention for the immediate future, including access in the absence of road security, contacts with all relevant parties in Angola, registration and monitoring of IDP populations, improve climate for return of refugees (especially those in the DRC.)