

# **Inter-Agency Standing Committee**

## **Reference Group on Post-Conflict Reintegration**

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03 November 1999

## I. Background and Work of Reference Group

The IASC Reference Group on Post-Conflict Reintegration is convened by UNDP and was established by the IASC Working Group in November 1998. Its membership extends beyond the traditional IASC membership to include DPA, DPKO, the World Bank (now full a IASC member), UNDGO, the SRSG for Children and Armed Conflict and other actors concerned with ensuring comprehensive approaches to crisis and post-crisis countries and, in particular, bridging the gap between relief and development. The Reference Group has met regularly in 1999 and has maintained close contacts with other relevant bodies and processes, including the Brookings Roundtable group of UN actors and donors, the OECD/DAC, the Humanitarian Liaison Working Group and the ECOSOC Humanitarian Segment. The Group engaged a consultant to prepare a report on “the gap”, which was endorsed by the IASC WG and shared with Brookings, ECOSOC and the Conflict Prevention and Post-Conflict Reconstruction Network. The report identified 5 major gaps, namely institutional, political, authority, synchrony and sustainability, and made some concrete recommendations for addressing the issue. The report was circulated, along with a set of questions (see below), to Resident/ Humanitarian Coordinators in Afghanistan, Azerbaijan, Tajikistan, Haiti, Liberia, Burundi, Angola, Sudan, Democratic Republic of Congo, Rwanda, Sri Lanka and Colombia. The responses received from those countries are under review, with a view to selecting a smaller group of countries for follow-up.

### Terms of Reference

In its meeting of 19-20 November 1998, the IASC Working Group, acting on a decision by the ECPS/ECHA/UNDG Joint Executive Committees meeting of 3 November 1998, considered the “gap in international response to post-conflict rehabilitation” and agreed that: “UNDP will convene a reference group – including interested IASC members and the additional entities recommended by the Joint Executive Committees meeting – aiming at developing strategies and mechanisms to respond appropriately to the gap. This process should avoid preparing further conceptual documents but should rather promote innovative and creative approaches to a practical solution of the problem”. The reference group will be chaired by UNDP and will consist of all interested IASC members, as well as DPKO, DPA, the Special Representative of the Secretary-General for Children and Armed Conflict, and the World Bank.

The group will be called the ‘Reference Group on Post-Conflict Reintegration’. Reintegration is understood as the achievement of sustainable reintegration of war-affected displaced populations. The ambit of the Reference Group is understood to necessarily cover enabling factors for sustainable reintegration, and hence the interface between such issues as: public security, human rights, good governance, reconciliation, infrastructure and agricultural rehabilitation, demobilization, and access to basic social and economic services (such as health, education, micro-credit, etc.). The Reference Group will also consider ways of addressing the special needs of vulnerable groups, especially women and children. As stipulated by the IASC-WG, the focus of the group will be operational rather than conceptual. A guiding principle of the group’s work will be the better incorporation of the voice of the beneficiary into all reintegration activities.

Specifically, the group will:

1. Follow-up on and consider ways of operationalizing the principles outlined under Section III ‘Local Capacities/Relief and Development’ in the report ‘IASC Recommendations Related to the Review of the Capacity of the United Nations System for Humanitarian Assistance’.
2. Review current work in progress (or work needed) in the development of performance indicators relating to sustainable reintegration. This will include looking at the adequacy of base-line data, assessment methodologies, information management, etc.;
3. Examine existing post-conflict response tools and capabilities, in particular joint assessment, programming and evaluation mechanisms, available to the relevant actors and recommend measures to further harmonize them;
4. To this end, initiate stocktaking of existing resource materials (best practice/lessons studies, evaluations, policy papers, publications, and expertise networks, institutions). An inventory of these will be posted on member web-sites. Based on the stock-taking, identify areas where lessons-learned and best practices need to be developed;
5. Take account of and build on the recommendations emanating from the Brookings meeting and from the resulting working group, which is due to issue its report on 1 April 1999.

Expected Outputs:

1. Examine the current procedures and incentive structure for information-sharing, coordination and the delineation of roles among UN agencies and other actors, with a view to recommending measures to improve and clarify them;
2. Recommend measures to improve the linkages between relief and development activities at the country and headquarters levels, with a view to achieving more integrated, sustainable reintegration of war-affected populations;
3. Suggest measures to improve the capacity of the country team, including the HC/RC, to respond to post-conflict reintegration issues.

## II. Consolidated Field Responses to Reference Group Paper & Questionnaire

### MEMORANDUM

**To:** Resident/Humanitarian Coordinators

**From:** Mr. Omar Bakhet, Director/ERD  
On behalf of the IASC Reference Group on Post-Conflict Reintegration

**Subject:** Request for input on the relief-to-reintegration gap

**Date:** 24 August 1999

The Inter-Agency Standing Committee (IASC) Reference Group on Post-Conflict Reintegration was established in November 1998 with the aim of developing strategies and mechanisms to improve the UN System's response to post-conflict reintegration. Much of the initial work of the Reference Group has been based on input from headquarters in order to develop creative approaches to closing the relief-to-rehabilitation gap. However, we feel that substantive input is required from the field at this juncture.

Please find, attached, a copy of the report entitled "Bridging the Gap: A Report on Behalf of the IASC Reference Group on Post-Conflict Reintegration." We'd very much appreciate your feedback to the report itself as well as your experience with the obstacles (institutional, financial and in terms of inter-agency coordination) that give rise to the relief and rehabilitation gap. Following are a few specific questions.

1. How is the analysis presented in the IASC Reference Group paper on Post Conflict Reintegration relevant to your country situation?
2. Which recommendations appear appropriate or useful for your country situation?
3. Describe the relationship of the Resident/Humanitarian Coordinator with the World Bank, EU, USAID and other major bilateral donors in terms of post-conflict planning and implementation?
4. To what extent is the capacity, or lack of it, of government institutions an obstacle to post-conflict rehabilitation? What can be done to improve it?
5. How would you describe the interaction between humanitarian and development agencies in your country and in what manner is humanitarian and development planning integrated to deal with the gap?
6. What funding mechanisms are currently in use and how effective are they in addressing post-conflict transition?
7. What is the feasibility/desirability of joint training programs that would involve both humanitarian and development personnel?

Please add any additional comments that you feel are relevant. Our ultimate goal in this exercise is to receive honest and practical feedback from country offices that will enable us to develop solutions that are not only appropriate on a theoretical or conceptual level but on a practical level as well. In order to keep the process moving forward, we ask that you please respond by the end of September.

Please respond by e-mail: [omar.bakhet@undp.org](mailto:omar.bakhet@undp.org)

Or by fax: 212-906-5379

With best regards.

## **Afghanistan (received 30 September)**

Thank you for sending us the report "Bridging the gap: A report on behalf of the IASC Reference Group on Post-Conflict Reintegration." This is an excellent report, both in terms of identifying the mayor problems faced by the international community when trying to deal with post-conflict and protracted crisis situations, as well as in terms of the conclusions and recommendations it suggests.

Before I answer your 7 questions, allow me to make one comment as I am not so sure whether the real issue really refers to the so-called gap between relief and development. In many countries relief and development activities take place simultaneously during periods of crisis. (even in the case of Afghanistan it is not always easy to draw a clear line between relief and development activities). In these countries, specially the poorest ones, even when there is peace and stability, the basic needs of often large parts of the population are not adequately met. These same people only seem to attract the attention of the international community once a crisis evolves and are labeled as either refugees or IDPs. It is then that special programmes are being developed for them and they (temporary) may enjoy better living conditions than before e.g. access to education, health, reduced levels of discrimination etc.. So when there are millions of people suffering all over the world, as a result of conflict or not, the moment a conflict comes to an end, this suffering is all of a sudden declared to be unacceptable for those who have to be "reintegrated", either as returnees, IDPs or demobilized soldiers. There must be reasons why this is so but it still remains a somewhat strange phenomenon. Let me now answer your questions.

1. The analysis presented in the paper is also relevant to the situation in Afghanistan. Not necessarily in terms of the "gap" but the country does have extremely serious problems in the areas mentioned namely, institutional, political, authority, synchrony and sustainability.
2. Most of the recommendations are with greater or lesser success already applied in the case of Afghanistan. E.g. we have a Strategic Framework, an Afghanistan Support Group, good support to the Humanitarian/Resident Coordinator, five operational thematic groups. a consolidated Appeal process(in which the NGOs are included) as an effective fund raising tool, etc..
3. The World Bank does not work in Afghanistan we nevertheless have them actively participating in the Support Group(ASG) and the Afghanistan Programming Body(APB). In addition they collaborate in the production of a quarterly brief on Afghanistan and have allocated US\$ 350.000 to UNDP to implement a so-called watching brief which includes a series of economic studies and seminars. The EU participates in the same fora as the World Bank. Their ECHO programme was temporary put on halt after the unfortunate visit of Commissioner Emma Bonino to Kabul last year but is now being reinstated. In emergencies the EU works very closely with the UN system. USAID participate in the same manner as all other bilaterals. Therefore is in the ASG and the APB.
4. The official Government controls through commander Massood around 15% of the country's territory. There is a rudimentary administration which focuses much on the war effort. The other 85% is in the hands of the Taliban which is not recognized by the UN. Whatever capacity left in the administration under Taliban control is directed towards the war effort and the implementation of a rather strict interpretation of Islamic law.
5. For Afghanistan no real distinction is being made between humanitarian and development agencies, There is very good collaboration.
6. We can not speak about post-conflict as the war is still ongoing. Apart from Agencies' core funds, the consolidated annual appeal and ad hoc appeals for recurring disasters and emergencies are the main funding mechanisms.
7. Joint training of both humanitarian and development personnel is a most useful and desirable complement to the on-the-job training which is ongoing.

## **Angola (received 8 October)**

Although the prevailing Angolan situation can hardly be characterized as "post-conflict", the analysis and recommendations of the Report are nevertheless relevant and timely. Indeed, the pertinence of the issue of reintegration in Angola, notwithstanding the existing state of war, is underscored by the recent realization (29 September –1 October

1999) of a *National Debate on Integration/Reintegration*, organized by the Ministry of Social Assistance and Reintegration (MINARS) and funded by UNDP. A strong consensus which emerged from the discussions was the need to help the war-affected, particularly the most vulnerable groups, reestablish basic livelihoods and engage in longer-term development activities in areas least touched by the conflict. It was emphasized that, to have the desired long-lasting beneficial effects, reintegration strategies must be anchored in long-term reconstruction and development programmes.

The five reintegration gaps identified by the Report appropriately apply to the Angolan situation which prevailed during the periods following the signing of the politically negotiated peace settlements of 1991 and 1994, and amply explain the factors behind the collapse of those two peace processes. It is important to point out that reintegration is by nature a political process, subject to political pressures which may slow its implementation and hence the need for flexibility and contingency planning. Furthermore, reintegration also has an important cultural dimension which should be taken into consideration.

The psycho-social effects of war and the methods of treatment of the victims, particularly the traumatized, cannot be left entirely to Western psychology. For a people steeped in their traditional African cultures which emphasize the spirit world and belief in the cleansing and purification of community members “stained” with human blood, appropriate treatment is seen to require more spiritual than psychological healing. This cultural dimension of reintegration was completely neglected by the UN mediated Lusaka Protocol. As a result, the culturally-insensitive reintegration packages which were designed and implemented had limited impact in addressing the psycho-social needs of the demobilized. It should be recognized that reintegration is not only a family affair but also a community affair. There is a need to support not only the families of the demobilized but also the communities to which the demobilized and their dependents are to be reintegrated, in order to close what may be considered the *socio-cultural gap*.

Regarding the UN System Initiatives and Inter-Agency Collaboration, it should be pointed out that their realization implies the availability of qualified staff at the country level – particularly staff with experience in policy analysis and planning. The Report should acknowledge the human resource constraints at country offices like Angola.

#### Responses to Questions Posed

1. How is the analysis presented in the IASC Reference Group paper on Post Conflict Re-integration relevant to your country situation? The Angolan experience of post-conflict reintegration confirms similar efforts in other parts of Africa and the World and provides an instructive example of how failure to bridge the reintegration gaps identified by the Report could, and did, plunge a country into the worst-case scenario of return to war. The legacies of Portuguese colonial domination and almost four decades of war have left the country with a virtually collapse socio-economic infrastructure, resulting in complex crisis and complex peace processes. The analysis presented in the Report facilitates an understanding of the Angolan context and the reasons behind the failed peace processes.
2. Which recommendations appear appropriate or useful for your country situation? At this juncture, it would appear that the recommendations most useful for Angola are those concerning (i) planning as a process – the need for a planning process, ideally initiated at the pre-crisis stage, which involves all the relevant humanitarian and development actors, including donor support groups, and which, at the same time, strengthens the resident coordinator/humanitarian coordinator systems; (ii) strategic partnerships; (iii) strategic objectives. The failed Angolan peace process provides an opportunity for the thorough revision of the strategy proposed in the document *UN Strategy in Support of Angola's Transition from Emergency to Development*, prepared in early 1998 by the UN Country Team, to incorporate a clear strategic vision of the role of the UN and the five critical elements identified by the Report as missing in the several important planning mechanism devised over the past few years.
3. Describe the relationship of the Resident/Humanitarian Coordinator with the World Bank, EU, USAID and other major bilateral donors in terms of post-conflict planning and implementation? During the post-conflict phase, there was active dialogue between the Resident Coordinator and the World Bank, whose Representative was a member of the UN Country Team and regularly participated in the Heads of Agencies Meeting. Until the curtailment of its operations in the country early this year, the World Bank collaborated closely with UNDP on macroeconomic policies and institutional and human capacity building projects. Missions from the World Bank regularly met with the Resident coordinator and all heads of UN agencies.

During the post-conflict phase, collaboration between the Resident Coordinator and multilateral donors like the European Union, Angola's major development and aid partner was particularly marked. It should be recalled that

the European Union hosted the UNDP supported Round Table Conference on Angola held in the capital of the Union in September 1995. Cooperation with important bilateral donors like the United States, Sweden and Norway was also more evident during this period. While consultations with the major bilateral and multilateral donors still continue, the collaborative relationship which has been established needs to be institutionalized.

4. To what extent is the capacity, or lack of it, of government institutions an obstacle to post-conflict rehabilitation? What can be done to improve it? Institutional capacity in Angola is weak at all levels of government, due largely to a fragile human resource base and an inherited colonial administration beset by problems of over-centralization and excessive bureaucratic procedures reinforced after Independence by a rigidly centralized one-party system. The problem has been exacerbated by the acute shortage of educated and trained staff and low morale and motivation caused by poor salaries and incentives. As a result, relevant government institutions found themselves ill-prepared to formulate and implement post-conflict rehabilitation programmes, or even coordinate humanitarian and /or development activities. Indeed, human and institutional capacity building has been, and remains, a major activity of the UN agencies in Angola. With the Angolan Government's adoption of the national execution modality for the implementation of rehabilitation/development programmes (for example, the Community rehabilitation and National reconciliation Programme), the necessary capacity needs to be, and is being, built and strengthened. It is a long-term development objective.
5. How would you describe the interaction between humanitarian and development agencies in your country and in what manner is humanitarian and development planning integrated to deal with the gap? At the level of the UN, the interaction is assured by active participation of the Humanitarian agencies in the Resident Coordinator system, through regular meetings of the Heads of Agencies, the UN Programme Working Group and other established bodies. Interaction is also achieved through participation in the National Humanitarian Coordination Group, co-chaired by the Humanitarian Coordinator (with the Minister of MINARS) and comprising representatives of key Government Ministries, UN agencies, donors, and the representative associations of the national and international NGOs. Much work needs to be done as effective collaboration in the area of integrated humanitarian and development planning is constrained by the unfolding political-military and socio-economic crisis of the country; limited human and financial resources of the UN agencies; overlapping mandates and responsibilities; and, among other things, traditional institutional rivalries.
6. What funding mechanisms are currently in use and how effective are they in addressing post-conflict transition? The Round Table mechanism was used to mobilize funds for the Angolan Government's comprehensive Community Rehabilitation and National Reconciliation Programme (CRP), which was presented to the Donors Conference in Brussels in September 1995 and resulted in the pledging of funds (USD 882 million) over and above the requested amount of USD 639 million. Although only 26% of the pledged funds were actually disbursed, it nevertheless enabled the implementation of some significant transitional programmes. An important outcome of the Brussel Conference was an Open Trust Fund (Funds in Trust) managed by UNDP, to implement the CRP. The other funding mechanisms currently in use include:
  - TRAC I and 2
  - TRAC 3 – countries in special situations.

These funding mechanisms were effective in providing funds that enabled the implementation of programmes which contributed substantially towards the overall UN effort to improve the lives of needy Angolans and enable the Organization to pursue with greater vigor its objective of capacity building within the technical ministries.

It should be noted that a Country Cooperation Framework (CCF) for Angola, covering the period 1997-1999, mobilized resources to support activities in three thematic areas: (i) assistance in post-conflict situation; (ii) support to poverty eradication; and (iii) support to good governance. A request has been made to the Angolan Government for an extension of the CCF to cover the period January–December 2000, to allow the preparation of a UNDAF and the finalization of a new CCF for the period 2001-2003.

The Inter-Agency Consolidated Appeal Process launched annually since 1995, has been an effective mechanism for mobilizing efforts to respond to the funding requirements of urgent emergency humanitarian activities needed to enable the implementation of more sustainable rehabilitation and reconstruction programmes with medium and long-term development objectives. Notwithstanding the often significant shortfalls between appealed funding and funds actually raised, the appeal mechanism has proven effective in addressing relief and rehabilitation problems both during the post-conflict situation and in the present context of armed conflict.

7. What is the feasibility/desirability of joint training programs that would involve both humanitarian and development personnel? There is an urgent need for joint training programmes involving both humanitarian and development personnel given the fact that there are no sharp lines of demarcation on the continuum between emergency, rehabilitation and development, and particularly in view of an explicit UN requirement (General Assembly Resolution 46/182) that emergency relief assistance should be provided in ways that will establish strong linkages between the recovery process and long-term development activities. In the Angolan context, it is imperative that such training be undertaken as soon as possible.

## **Azerbaijan (received 29 September)**

1. How is the analysis presented in the IASC Reference Group paper on Post Conflict Re-integration relevant to your country situation? We believe that the report presents an in-depth assessment of the nature of the problems encountered by the organizations which take part in the reconstruction and rehabilitation activities. It is only natural that not all reported features can be attributed to the specific situation in Azerbaijan, where UNDP responded to the appeal of the Government to assist the reintegration of IDPs as far back as early 1996. This was the time when the tools developed to enhance the strategic cooperation between UN agencies and streamline the development activities (e.g. CCA, Strategic Frameworks, etc.) had not been developed yet and the mandates of various agencies, such as UNHCR, WFP and others did not encourage them to exercise the development operations. In addition, individual agency funding appeals and internal processes and procedures did not allow UN agencies and WB to tackle the situation in a concerted manner just from the outset of the post-conflict period. To say nothing of donors, who were very cautious in taking a decision to fund the operations in unstable "no peace - no war" conditions of 1996. What was required at that period was initiative, encouragement and leadership and it was provided by UNDP.

The quick allocation of 500,000 USD from TRAC-3 resources made it possible for UNDP CO to launch a small pilot project of rehabilitation in the war-damaged area and to create a relevant national capacity capable of implementing reconstruction projects and coordinate rehabilitation activities in Azerbaijan. It was an immediate response of UNDP to the self-return of population to their homes in the war-damaged areas. This and another 2.7m USD of "seed" money allowed to attract 70 m donors contributions. This could be taken as example that in order to lead the process, it is not necessary to be a "funding" leader.

2. Which recommendations appear appropriate or useful for your country situation? Without arguing the statement that the planning process has to begin far earlier than is normally the case, it needs to be remembered that in a fragile situation when the hostilities can be resumed any time and the focus is at the tackling of the humanitarian situation, it is extremely difficult to assure donors in the timeliness of the development planning and to justify the intervention. On the other hand, the UN programme planning requires to be based on the national priorities and national strategy to be reflected in the national programme of reconstruction and rehabilitation. As it was the case with Azerbaijan, the international assistance was required to help the Government to develop the national programme, To that end, damage assessment, IDPs and refugees survey and opinion poll among IDPs and refugees were conducted.

Recommendations to agree between the agencies on a common set of procedures that will facilitate joint funding, disbursement and accountability could be useful to enhance the cooperation. For achieving this goal, more flexibility and authority should be delegated to the field level to hasten the receipt and disbursement of much needed resources.

3. Describe the relationship of the Resident/Humanitarian Coordinator with the World Bank, EU, USAID and other major bilateral donors in terms of post-conflict planning and implementation? The pilot reconstruction project in Fizuli has shown to the international community what can be accomplished by taking a coordinated, integrated approach to a situation of seemingly overwhelming proportions. In close collaboration with the GoA, the UNDP, UNHCR, WFP, WB and the EU, working through a number of NGOs have demonstrated effective interagency cooperation in moving towards a common goal. The Government proved to the donors the sincerity of its commitment, that it has the will and , with their support, the capacity, to carry out the complex job of rehabilitation.

The cooperation between the UN Agencies, WB, EU and other major donors has been promoted through the establishment of the International Advisory Group chaired by the UNDP, WB, UNHCR and EU, which was



planned to be the high coordination and policy body channeling the donors' funds into the reconstruction and rehabilitation activities. Given the complexity of the task, and the multitude of agencies, some obstacles were inevitable. The lack of data about available resources, obligated funds and project commitments outside the UN system became an obstacle for ensuring the smooth cooperation between the partners. Notwithstanding any difficulties encountered, the positive impact of the joint efforts is indisputable.

4. To what extent is the capacity, or lack of it, of government institutions an obstacle to post-conflict rehabilitation? What can be done to improve it? Both the humanitarian operations and development efforts could not be successful without the capacity building of the Government to coordinate the assistance. The decision taken by UNDP to start with the establishment of the national agency for reconstruction and its capacity building allowed UNDP to take a lead role in the reconstruction process. In addition, it gave self-confidence to the Government. The national Agency for Reconstruction and Rehabilitation (ARRA) had a clear TOR and was trained to improve the performance and comply with international standard procedures. The key staff members were exposed to the experience of Bosnia Reconstruction Programme. As a result it obtained a good image and trust of the international community. Out of 70m USD raised for reconstruction, 30m USD are being disbursed directly through ARRA.
5. How would you describe the interaction between humanitarian and development agencies in your country and in what manner is humanitarian and development planning integrated to deal with the gap? When the cease-fire between the warring parties to the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict was adopted in May 1994, Azerbaijan was left with one of the largest uprooted population in the world - more than 10% of the population living the country being either an Internally Displaced Person (IDP) or refugee. More than five years have passed during which the emergency humanitarian phase was progressively replaced by a long lasting no-war no-peace, while the country underwent a progressive economic and social recovery which unfortunately does not impact yet on the living conditions of the poor segments of the population and in particular IDP and refugees who are among the poorest. A post conflict situation was addressed in Azerbaijan by different UN Agencies according to their mandates. The UNHCR, UNDP, WFP, then UNDHA, UNICEF and other agencies and international organizations joined their efforts in order to support the Government in giving the relief aid and resettle refugees and IDPs.

UNHCR started its emergency humanitarian program late 1992. From 1993 to 1996, UNHCR continued its assistance operations in the framework of an inter-agency appeal for the South Caucasus, coordinated by UNDHA. This framework was abandoned mid 1997 on the basis of a consensus between concerned agencies and donors that the emergency phase was over and that new strategies should be proposed to facilitate the process of transition from an emergency to a development phase.

In Azerbaijan, a wide inter-agency coordination has been maintained, including UN Agencies, other concerned international organizations and NGOs through regular food assistance and non-food assistance coordination meetings chaired by DHA and, since 1998, OCHA. UNHCR has continued issuing yearly special appeals for the assistance of IDPs and refugees in Azerbaijan with a gradual shift of assistance strategy from care and maintenance to local settlement oriented activities addressing the long-term needs of IDPs and refugees.

The framework of operational Co-operation between UNDP and UNHCR" dated 10 April 1997 governs the implementation of UNDP/UNHCR cost shared measures toward the institutional capacity building of the national Agency for Reconstruction and Rehabilitation and supports the Government's national programme for Reconstruction and Rehabilitation of war-affected areas and repatriation of IDPs. The MOU, combined with the directions from the respective HQ has created a situation when the two country offices could assume their full responsibility in the area of repatriation and reconstruction thereby contributing to a strong coordinated UN effort in the activity considered as priority by the government. The experience of UNHCR in implementation of shelter projects was very useful for the effective implementation of the national programme of reconstruction which encompassed the voluntary mass repatriation of IDPs. UNDP, from the other side, was focused more at the capacity building of the national agency and establishment of sustainable livelihood for returnees through income generation. Therefore, the joint efforts of UNHCR and UNDP approached the problem from different angles complementing each other.

The above-mentioned MOU was followed by signing the Joint UNDP/UNHCR/World Bank/Government Agreement for assisting the IDPs and Refugees in Azerbaijan. The Agreement was based on the twin objectives of the joint strategy which called for an increase in development assistance: (a) to relocate IDPs and refugees out of camps and public buildings, and (b) to assist them in finding job as quickly as feasible.

6. What funding mechanisms are currently in use and how effective are they in addressing post-conflict transition? The major constraint is still the lack of adequate financial resources to expand the programme to other parts of the liberated territories so that more IDPs could be resettled who are currently living in camps and under other temporary arrangements in unacceptably difficult circumstances. Though the 70m USD raised allowed to initiate a relatively large scale rehabilitation in the war-torn areas, the target is 117m USD to facilitate the relocation of 36,000 IDPs.

As it was mentioned above, the mechanism of funding the national programme is as follows: UNDP (direct funding of ARRA's implementation with certain income generation activities subcontracted to NGOs) WB (direct funding of ARRA's implementation through grants, loans and credits) TACIS (direct funding of ARRA's implementation and through INGOs) ECHO (International NGO implementation) UNHCR (International NGO and National NGO implementation) Islamic Bank (planned through credit modality)

In order to further increase the efficiency and impact on the post-conflict situation, a Social Investment Fund is planned to be established. As compared to the existent scheme, it will have several advantages; first, it will increase cooperation between the partners; also, since the projects for which the funds would be utilized are expected to be proposed by IDPs, refugees, communities of returnees or non-governmental organizations working with them, they can be expected to have the full support of the potential beneficiaries; secondly, approval, for the proposed use of the funds as well as procurement is greatly simplified compared to traditional projects financed by the World Bank.

7. What is the feasibility/desirability of joint training programs that would involve both humanitarian and development personnel? Joint inter-agency training for the humanitarian and development personnel is very needed, as well as the sensitization programmes that would bring these two types of specialists together to consider alternative approaches to transitional issues. At the end, the ultimate goal is to develop a common inter-agency approach to the post-conflict situation, leveling the differences in the "model behavior" of the humanitarian and development organizations.

## Burundi (received 6 October 1999)

1. Relevance of the IASC paper for Burundi: The analysis presented in the IASC paper includes many issues of direct relevance to the situation in Burundi.
- Institutional gap. Slow response of agency bureaucracies remains a problem. This has been particularly serious vis-à-vis UNDP, which has not yet defined well enough its role in emergency/conflict situations. As a result, flexible, appropriate procedures have not been developed; the few that have been developed are not yet operational (e.g., DHR policies).
  - Political gaps. This is particularly relevant for Burundi, as most donors have linked assistance to the signing of a peace accord in Arusha. For the last three years, the only funding available has been for strictly-defined humanitarian activities. The UN and its partners have developed a series of strategies to stretch this funding to cover the gap ("expanded humanitarian assistance"; "constructive engagement"), with limited success. It is important to note that the failure to bridge the gap in Burundi is not a result of budgetary constraints or inflexible policies, it represents a deliberate decision on the part of most donors not to fund anything but the most urgent humanitarian needs.
  - Synchrony gap. The involvement of the Government in humanitarian/recovery initiatives thus far has been uneven. On the one hand, many of the largest donors channel funding through NGOs and UN agencies on the condition that Government not be directly involved. Nonetheless, Government has tried to outline plans in the areas of reconciliation and judicial reform. These plans have received minimal support, primarily through UNDP projects (relying almost entirely on core funds) and some modest activities of NGOs.
  - Sustainability gap. As donors are for the most part unwilling to fund anything that could be considered sustainable (humanitarian aid is, by definition, temporary), this is not a major issue for us. After six years of crisis, however, Government structures are extremely weak and would be unable to manage very much in their current state.
  - Factors compounding the gap
    - One of the most striking aspects of Burundi is the fact that the relief, recovery and development needs coexist. Unfortunately, development needs are left largely ignored.
    - The sole emphasis in Burundi (again due to funding constraints) is on meeting immediate human needs: We are therefore very aware of the dangers of ignoring all state centered needs. People-centered and state-

centered needs are not only reconcilable; they can be mutually reinforcing if correctly planned and implemented.

- The “muddy boots factor” is being imposed on us from the outside. We have lots of ideas/strategies for the post-conflict period but no means or resources to put them in place.
- We are also aware of the importance of addressing affected populations psycho-social needs, yet we have no means to do so.

IASC participating organizations views on operational aspects of the gap

- We have encountered no real difficulties in working together as a UN country team, or in working with NGOs. The most difficult problems have arisen because of slow, inappropriate procedures at headquarters level and/or mandate battles at global (rather than country) level.

UN System Initiatives

- Country teams are asked to produce too many documents of limited value. For example, the Consolidated Appeal has for the past three years resulted in little or no funding for Burundi, yet we are expected to produce a new document each year.
- More work needs to be done to adapt the CCA/UNDAF process to post conflict situations.
- Regional cooperation. The Great Lakes situation provides a strong argument for more regular, effective regional/sub-regional planning and action. We have taken a number of our own initiatives with the UN Country Team in Rwanda, but more HQs institutional support and encouragement would be helpful.
- Strategic partnerships. We are pursuing many of the ideas presented here. We have used the lead agency approach to coordinate work in particular sectors, and it has worked well.
- New funding mechanisms. UNDP has established a trust fund for community assistance. Through this mechanism we have been able to attract donor resources that would otherwise not have been available; build partnerships with national and international NGOs; and better coordinate initiatives at all levels. The efficient back-up of ERD as Trust Fund Manager has been critical to our success.

Activities of IASC Members

- The Transition Team of the new Administrator has some excellent ideas concerning UNDP’s role in post-conflict situations. They should be given serious consideration.
- OCHA is administratively unequipped to fulfill its role. Its personnel procedures are particularly ill-suited to the tasks at hand.

Inter-agency collaboration

- We welcome recognition of effective UN system collaboration in Burundi. This collaboration has, however, nothing whatsoever to do with the UNDAF process, which is inappropriate for Burundi.

## 2. Recommendations useful for Burundi

- All the recommendations are useful.
- Among the most relevant for us is the one concerning donor support groups: The UN initiated a local donors group this year. There are now only a limited number of donors, but we hope that we are laying a firm foundation for the future.

## 3. Relationship of HC/RC to World Bank, EU USAID and other donors

- USAID and most other donors are not present in Burundi. Relationships are therefore long distance and intermittent.
- World Bank has no Representative in Burundi. Relations have been developed primarily through missions from Washington. Relations with UNDP have thus far been satisfactory. World Bank has given UNHCR a USD 1 million grant for reintegration activities, many of which are designed to fill the gap.
- European Commission (EU) has a delegate in Burundi, who is open to collaboration with the UN system. In the newly-approved EU cooperation framework with the Government of Burundi, USD 900,000 is earmarked as a contribution to the UNDP Trust Fund.

## 4. Capacity of Government institutions regarding post-conflict rehabilitation

- Government institutions have received very low levels of support for the past four years. Their capacity is greatly weakened; many are more or less non-functional. No funds are available to improve them. This will have a significant, negative impact on Government’s ability to manage future recovery and development initiatives.

5. Interaction between development and humanitarian agencies
  - UN agencies are virtually the sole development actors in Burundi, in addition to being among the main sources of humanitarian assistance.
  - As a result, the UN country team coordinates both humanitarian and development initiatives. Thus there is no problem in harmonizing the two areas, except that very little funding is available for development work.
6. Funding mechanisms
  - See earlier point concerning the UNDP Trust Fund. This mechanism has been critical in attracting funds of donors who are not ready to allocate funding directly to the Government of Burundi.
  - It is important that this funding remain relatively unearmarked, to ensure maximum control and flexibility on the part of the managing agency.
  - Another factor critical to the success of this mechanism is direct execution. In many post conflict situations, national execution is not a viable option and agency execution is cumbersome, slow and ill-suited to a rapidly evolving context. The need for direct execution is not limited to reinstallation activities; it also includes areas related to national reconciliation and good governance.
7. Joint training programmes
  - At present, humanitarian and development personnel are the one and the same in Burundi. Development initiatives are extremely limited.

## **Democratic Republic of Congo (received 27 September)**

Thank you very much for sharing with us the report of IASC's Reference Group on the above issue. I find this paper very pertinent to the DRC context and as such an excellent tool to assess the current inter agency dynamics, and what lessons Kinshasa might bring to the System. For there can be no gap here since there has hardly ever been neither a reference point (apart from 1991 and 1993 when the two waves of looting set a kind of zero-point in this country's scale of crisis). With regard to the specific questions you raised in your memo of 26 August (keeping in mind you gave us until late September to respond) , I would like to propose the following thoughts:

1. Question on the relevance of the IASC paper to DRC: Since January 1999, the functions of Resident and Humanitarian coordinators are shared by two persons: the former by the UNDP Resident Representative a.i., the latter by the UNHCR regional Delegate. A coordination unit – set up by UNDP in 1995 and merged with OCHA since February 1998 – provides support to both Coordinators, and runs three UNDP programmes in the fields of crisis management, local governance, support to community-based initiatives in crisis areas and medium-term response to urban food insecurity. Nine months later, the level of coherence is such between the two Coordinators that a letter addressed to the Under-Secretary General for humanitarian Affairs and the UNDP Administrator has recently been co-signed by nine Heads of Agencies (including the acting DPA representative in Kinshasa) after constructive exchanges of views. Indeed, at this stage of the conflict or peace process in DRC, there cannot be an institutional hand over agreement (namely from relief to development): one would rather call for a “join hands agreement”, whereby the UN system, supported by the donor community represented in Kinshasa as well as NGOs, would plead for a humanitarian strategy linking urgent, life saving considerations and objectives on the one hand, and peace facilitating initiatives in the fields of socio-economic reintegration of displaced persons as well as soldiers (including child soldiers) on the other hand. In this endeavor, UNDP-Kinshasa, through its humanitarian unit, is known for being a strong advocate of capacity building through emergency operations. An example is the inter-Agency Emergency Humanitarian Intervention mechanism. This facility – which the British seem ready to support – will allow for specialised Agencies to respond to emergencies while UNDP and other capacity building-oriented Agencies will try to strengthen local structures in crisis management capacities (stock management, data collection) and identify future integration into wider programmes, should appropriate conditions and resources come.

UNDP also made a point in including in the course of the Consolidated Appeal Process (CAP), initiatives – now funded by UNDP - aiming at strengthening the will and capacity of local communities or groups to overcome their own, local crisis (be it of social or ethnic and political nature) through income generating activities. Thus, “the CAP doesn't feel the gap”. The latter is filled with an on-going approach to the DRC context: a move in one direction

and “traditional” humanitarian aid prevails ; a move in the other direction and UNDP-type of community-supportive initiatives just have to be given more impetus (please see in para 6 my point on TRAC 113).

Heads of Agencies are equally unanimous to call in a more aggressive way for resources for an urgent response to the human effects of the crisis, whatever the fate of the political/military process. In this sense, although the relevance of the AISC document to the DRC is unquestionable, the trend here is towards a capacity to help sustain life and livelihood whichever direction is taken by the ships “DRC” or “Lusaka”.

2. At this stage of implementation of the Lusaka cease-fire agreement and with the arrival of an advance team of the MONUC in DRC, the recommendation for ways to relate political, peace support functions to those of recovery, rehabilitation and development in a coherent and consistent way is already addressed here, most notably through inclusive heads of Agency meetings (“senior security and disaster management team”), extended to the MONUC since Friday last week. Also, the tasks undertaken by the UNDP-OCHA unit include support to the Resident Coordinator’s mandate.

Another recommendation equally meets the views and intentions of the country team, namely the need to address the authorities with a crystal clear view on parameters of post-conflict initiatives. For example, the implementation of the Resolution 1258 on the ground has to be described in order not to feed and nurture an already existing, though unfounded, background of suspicion towards the United Nations System.

The part on “planning as a process” rightly points to the need to relate in a more systematic way with private corporations – especially in a country unable to defend its assets in the years to come, and thus exposed to real predators and false friends, notwithstanding internal accomplices.

3. The volatile social, political and military situation in the country since the early 90s contributed to a partial disengagement of major donors from both the humanitarian and development scene. Like no other country in the region, DRC is facing a durable de facto embargo on bilateral and multilateral cooperation. This situation corresponds in basic terms to what was described in the above paper as political gaps. In spite of a complicated environment, contacts and daily working relations are being maintained with donor countries and multilateral donors in the fields of Human Rights, Judicial Reforms, and Demobilization of Child soldiers, etc. A contact group made up of US and Belgian Ambassadors, ICRC, the Director of the UN human Rights office and the two Coordinators, have been dealing with the issue of minorities at risk in Kinshasa. In addition, within the framework of the Consolidated Appeal Process, the UN Humanitarian Coordinator maintains regular contacts, including visits to donor capital and regular briefings, with a view to promote the humanitarian and post-conflict resolutions envisaged in the UN Common Humanitarian Assistance Strategy (July 1999).
4. DRC has a record of its own in terms of post-conflict planning and implementation. The inconclusive fate of the Friends of Congo process, as well as a number of setbacks that characterized relations between the DRC Government and Bretton Woods institutions eventually reduced the level of sustained interest on the part of major donors. Only a handful of countries have adopted since the onset of the new regime an uphill policy of open support (cf point 3). So far, only a clear implementation of the Lusaka agreement by all the protagonists would render a post-conflict rehabilitation process something else than mere slogans. The UN-led operation of transfer of national exams from eastern DRC to Kinshasa, on 31 August when the Lusaka accord was eventually co-signed, was a strong message to both sides on the need to embark on, and stick to, the peace and governance process.
5. The UN system in the DRC possesses, in my view, a unique experience in dealing with development and humanitarian agendas in a coherent and complementary manner, through the establishment of system-wide coordination unit, which was born through merging OCHA and UNDP coordination cells into a UN Humanitarian and Rehabilitation Coordination Unit. Thus, the compartmentalization of relief and development aid has been avoided, at least at this stage. This augurs well of the new challenge ahead, i.e., the MONUC mandate and the appropriate integration of development, political and emergency requirements within the structure of the SRSG.
6. I must stress at this point that, although the TRAC 113 is referred to as UNDP’s available tool for urgent response to crises, UNDP-Kinshasa has requested this facility to no avail since the last TRAC 113 operation in January 1998. In May-June 1998, this office was told that there were no funds available for community-initiated projects in crisis areas. Some clarification on the status of TRAC 113 would be welcome. The concept of « Mini Marshall plans » accurately reflects the changed nature of crises that the system faces nowadays and offers an innovative approach to

funding constraints. But there is a but: the Marshall plan stemmed from a political not a marketing decision. Where is DRC on the world political map, the shape and fate of the MONUC will hint it before long.

7. A joint training programme in the case of DRC would, in my view, only be viable once the Lusaka process is on its feet and funds for immediate response are available. Another workshop among fund-thirsty participants would only generate bitter concepts and non applicable resolutions. The post Lusaka DRC will inevitably bring forward a variety of non-standard situations and issues that could create a fertile ground for conflicting principles and mandates, leadership, objective-oriented coordination, institutional cultures, etc... As the Buddhist say, before conceptualizing on future challenges, “that one who conducts a herd of elephants ought to know where they want to go”.

## **Liberia (received 11 October)**

We acknowledge with thanks receipt of the above-cited report. We believe the report makes a significant contribution to better comprehension of the nature of the so-called “Reintegration Gap” and possible ways of reducing it considerably, if not totally closing it. We have closely reviewed the document and our detailed comments are presented below. We apologize for the delay in submitting our comments. In order to make useful contribution to strengthening the Report our comments are grouped under three headings: Comments aimed at reinforcing positive and relevant aspects of the issue of closing the gap brought out by the Report; Comments on areas that are in need of further clarification or strengthening; and Comments on the relevance of the Report to Liberia’s experience and vice-versa.

Comments Reinforcing Positive and Relevant Aspects of the Reintegration Gap Issue as Presented in the Report:

- Particular strengths of the Report include clearer conceptual and operational clarification of the nature of the reintegration gap, comprehensive analysis of the propagating factors that tend to compound and perpetuate the problem as presented in Section I.2, as well as an objective analysis of the weaknesses in the response of IASC member organizations themselves to the crisis as set out in Sections I.3 and II.
- The Report could be enhanced significantly if the above analysis is further strengthened. For instance, the conceptual presentation should be unambiguous about the reduced relevance of the “continuum” approach to today’s post-conflict situation; which tend to be protracted. This is an important issue given that an appropriate conceptual framework provides a sound basis for measures aimed at effective tackling of the reintegration gap problem.

Comments on Areas that are in Need of Further Clarification or Strengthening:

- Although the analysis of other dimensions of the gap, which had hitherto been neglected, is commendable, there is need for further clarification or rationalization. There is notable overlapping and, in some cases, confusion in the presentation on institutional, authority and synchrony gaps. Although this may be partly attributable to close interrelationships between the issues and their crosscutting nature, it arises to a large extent from lack of rationalization. For instance, institutional weaknesses within a post-conflict Government could also lead to “authority vacuums” as well as the “synchrony gap” owing to the defensive posture of national authorities vis-à-vis both the domestic losers in the political process following cessation of hostilities on one hand and international development organizations on the other. Clear comprehension of this problem should prompt donors and NGOs to be more sensitive to the capacity weaknesses of governments as well as put emphasis on rapid rebuilding of relevant national institutions, e.g. those concerned with coordinating humanitarian and reconstruction activities or their implementation.
- Analysis of the different aspects of the gap should, therefore, be done in such a way that the respective elements of each gap are rationalized in order to effectively link solutions to the exact nature of each gap.
- Another important issue that needs reinforcement is the framework for planning the post-conflict recovery and development process, donor collaboration among themselves and with the Government as well as resource mobilization efforts.

- The Report makes mention of the strategic framework as probably the most appropriate for these highly interrelated processes, but which unfortunately has not been effectively implemented by the UN system. Full operationalization of the strategic framework concept by both the external partners and national stakeholders should have been one of the key recommendations made by the Report for dealing with the reintegration gaps. Its continuing relevance is indisputable.
- One recommendation of the Report, which is questionable, also relates to the “Planning Process”. It is the proposal to initiate the planning process at “what one might call the pre-crisis stage and be developed, adjusted and adapted throughout the conflict period.....” This recommendation conveys an unfortunately passive and accommodating approach to conflicts. What one would have expected from such a postulation is a pro-active approach to conflict prevention and reinforcement of recommendation for development of early warning systems, embodied in the concepts of preventive development and preventive diplomacy.
- Another important issue raised by the Report that needs to be reinforced is the need for the UN operational system to speed up the process of adapting its current operational rules and procedures for evolving conflict situations. In order to enhance the utility of recommendations that may be made here, specific examples need to be identified and presented, such as the speed of allocating and accessing extra-budgetary expenditures, more flexibility in the application of certain rules such as those that stipulate the limit on the use of vehicles and hiring of personnel, etc. Similarly, auditing criteria such as the amount of ARLs, need to be modified to better reflect the realities of conflict and post-conflict situations.

The Relevance of the Report’s Findings and Recommendations to Liberia’s Situation: On the specific questions raised about the relevance of the Report to our Country (Liberia) situation, the following responses are given:

1. The analysis presented in the Report is relevant to Liberia in the light of the country’s emergence from a devastating seven-year civil conflict and current efforts by the Government to ensure peace consolidation, resettlement and full reintegration of displaced people and ex-combatants, and generate poverty-reducing growth.
2. The conceptual framework presented in the Report, the nature of the gaps and the role of external partners in the process are all instructive for Liberia and the country’s experience underscores their relevance for post-conflict countries.
3. Regarding the relationship between the Resident/Humanitarian Coordinator with the World Bank, EU, USAID and other major bilateral donors in post-conflict planning and implementation, there has been a close and mutually reinforcing working relationship among these partners. They have worked closely together in assisting the new Government formulate an integrated post-conflict reconstruction programme, with the strategic framework as the guiding principle. There is a particular close collaboration between the UN Country Team, USAID, EU and ADB in programme implementation. Liberia’s current serious arrears problem with the Bretton Woods institutions has constrained a more active participation of these institutions in programme financing and implementation.
4. With respect to the issue of the Government’s capacity for effective programme implementation right from the outset, both the Government and the external partners recognized that the devastating impact of the war on governance institutions, at both central and local levels, has resulted in significant erosion of Government’s capacity for post-conflict reconstruction programme formulation and implementation. It was agreed that this could be addressed fully only in the long-term through capacity building programmes. Currently, the Government’s limited capacity is being augmented through partnership with NGOs and private sector in programme implementation.
5. Regarding the interaction between the humanitarian and development agencies, this is relatively smooth under the leadership of the Resident Coordinator. Humanitarian and development planning is a highly integrated planning process, which recognizes the close interrelationship between humanitarian assistance, peace building process, reconstruction and development and is in line with the strategic framework, adopted after the crisis. Such an integrated approach was used in the formulation of the country’s post-war reconstruction programme.
6. With respect to the funding mechanisms currently in place for Liberia’s post-war reconstruction programme, it is useful to note that Liberia is a CG Country. However, given the country’s continuing arrears problems with The Bretton Woods institutions, external partners and Government agreed that for the foreseeable future, the most effective resource mobilization mechanism should be special donor meetings, which are a hybrid of the Round

Table and the CG meetings. UNDP also supports special resource mobilization strategies, which takes due cognizance of the current environment for development assistance. All in all, the effectiveness of the above resource mobilization mechanisms has been constrained by negative donor perceptions about Liberia.

7. In respect of the feasibility/desirability of joint training programmes for both humanitarian and development of personnel, this is feasible and could only contribute to facilitating effective harmonization of humanitarian assistance and development activities in Liberia.

In conclusion, it is evident from Liberia's experience that a sound conceptual framework for post-war integration and an effective planning process facilitates collaboration between external partners and the Government and among themselves. In Liberia's case, it is evident that lack of success in closing the reintegration gap is not due so much to inadequate conceptual framework or coordination problems as to lack of sufficient external support. I hope you will find the above comments useful in your efforts to grapple with the problem of the reintegration gap at both the conceptual and operational levels.

## **Rwanda (received 25 October)**

Thank you for sharing with us the draft report. Following are our brief comments:

1. Page 9, section II.3, paragraph 1: Word missing in the sentence "That said, perhaps one of the most important .. of inter-agency in the context"
2. Page 9, section II.3, paragraph 2: When referring to Rwanda and the JRP unit, we suggest to add that this Unit has been receiving important donor support mainly because of the role it plays in the coordination of joint project programming in the transitional relief to reintegration/rehabilitation phase.
3. Page 9, section II.3, paragraph 2: We also suggest that reference be made to the currently ongoing CCA exercise in Rwanda which also leads to further programme coordination and coherence.

Hoping these comments will prove useful and are still timely!

## **Tajikistan (received 24 September)**

It has been a stimulating process analysing the latest report from your office, and I appreciate the opportunity to contribute to the dialogue. Tajikistan, as well as the rest of the former Soviet Union, poses a unique development challenge, as it is not the "traditional" developing environment. Instead, we are dealing with a post-conflict, post-welfare context that does not always permit the use of proven models from other development experiences.

The one issue which I feel could benefit from increased emphasis is the role of the United Nations as an inter-governmental agency, and how that role is crucial to the reduction if not elimination of the gaps. The UN is repeatedly called upon to manage post-war situations, which is by nature an uneven process. Tajikistan is a country where important lessons have been and are being learned, and I have tried to reflect those lessons in my comments in the following pages.

In the case of Tajikistan, independence was not the result of an internal groundswell, resulting in a conflict against external forces. Rather the conflict resulted from the imposition of an unwanted independence, which created an authority vacuum. Although the General Peace Agreement and its protocols address that authority vacuum, the gap is still being filled, resulting in an overall lack of rule of law. The criminalization of society has gained increased momentum over the past seven years, intensifying the effects of the civil conflict in terms of continued economic stability as well as hindered social reconciliation.

Therefore, the political gaps, for example, are subtler, as bilateral relations are newer and less well established. Additionally, the linkage of conditionalities to aid have created/increased the gap, by stalling elements of the peace process due to lack of funds. The priorities of the donors shifted from the country to their own personnel's safety, and whereas previous aid had not been specifically linked to the actual protocols of the peace agreement, donors decided,



after the killings in 1997/98, to place strict conditions on the release or increase of aid to the country linked to security of personnel. This left government and agencies alike stranded, and essentially stalled the peace process even further, as there was a total lack of funds, as well as a deterioration of faith in the donors. It was broadly felt that there was a lack of confidence in the Tajik people and leadership on the side of the donors, which seriously impacted relations between the UN and government, as well as with the communities. The withdrawal of funds, as with any sanction, rarely affects the government, but has serious implications on the quality of life for the general population.

Institutional gaps can also be characterised by the slow moving bureaucracies within donor and implementing agencies alike, in which the capacity to respond immediately is virtually nil, even for agencies whose mandates specify rapid response, such as UNHCR, WFP and UNOCHA. There is a loss of credibility as well as opportunity. Each such agency should establish regional rapid response teams as well as the necessary skeleton budgets to field such teams for the initial assessment and response. However, the emphasis on assessment should be carefully regulated, as the production of a paper which then takes three months for funding is of no use to anyone in a post-conflict situation. In these times of financial strictures, increased formalized partnerships should be urged between agencies. For example, UNHCR and UNDP should improve their coordination in the effort to minimize the gap between relief and development by constituting an inter-agency system of having one UNDP personnel seconded to UNHCR during the initial start-up activities in any given post-conflict environment, to ensure that the longer-term strategies are linked to the first initiatives under UNHCR's mandate.

Political gaps can be addressed not only through improved relations between UN and bilaterals, but also with other agencies specialised in certain areas which are not necessarily within UN areas. For example, if a donor is not convinced that the time is right for placing its funds into a programme supporting the development of a police force of international standard, then the UN has to explore partnerships which would convince the donor, such as the OSCE.

The synchrony gap is less evident in Tajikistan, but is replaced by the welfare gap as well as the lack of well-defined roles for all players – rather than the government feeling that international assistance is ill-placed, it views it as replacing the government. When an international entity implements an initiative in a given area or sector, the government response has generally been to reallocated its resources to its own or different priorities, rather than view the process as a partnership. Granted that humanitarian assistance does not necessarily mesh closely with government activities, there is a serious problem in Tajikistan in the government's understanding of the role of the international community. Essentially, it feels that the role of the international agencies is to fill in the gap created by the withdrawal of the Soviet System.

The United Nations has the mandate and capacity to work closely with the Government in order to establish the "rules of the game". While the circumstances in Tajikistan have not permitted this to happen to the degree preferred, the main task is to convince the government that it still has its obligations, that the international community is a temporary presence, and that a shift which would create the enabling environment for development must take place within the power structures if there is to be sustainable change. The Tajik government is still wedded to the centralised soviet system, and therefore the challenge lies in its acceptance that change is necessary for the survival of the country within a global environment.

This is further exacerbated by the fact that the government has difficulties accepting the mandates and therefore the freedoms of the international agencies. It views such independence as an affront to their authority and an attempt to undermine the system. There is a grave risk in Tajikistan of loss of support from agencies and donors alike as a result of the rigidity and constant attempts to control all facets of activities undertaken by the international community.

This leads to the sustainability gap. This is perhaps the greatest threat in Tajikistan, as there is a lack of will to change and adapt to the skills required for sustainable initiatives. There is no real private sector, and the shift has yet to be made which will permit the communities as well as the government structures to accept and sustain initiatives. This is best encapsulated by the anecdote of the international development worker who proposed an income generating activity but was told it was not a good idea as it had never been done before. The Tajik power structures, as well as large sectors of the population, would prefer to return to the old models of social systems, but lack the financial resources to do so.

### Response to the questions

1. How is the analysis presented in the IASC Reference Group paper on Post-Conflict Re-integration relevant to your country situation? There is great relevance of the points presented, although the application of the concepts may not be as anticipated.

2. Which recommendations appear appropriate or useful for your country situation? While all are relevant, of particular significance are the recommendations related to coordination of planning and the timing of such planning. Clearly defined entry and exit strategies are necessary to minimize gaps and ensure continuity of approach and priority. Similarly, the issues related to donor relations are quite applicable to Tajikistan, where donor whim is the determining factor of project success and strategic viability of any planning framework, regardless of the title (SF, CCA, CDS, etc.).

What is of particular issue, is that while recognizing the need for forward-thinking strategies, any framework must have the necessary flexibility which would enable it to accommodate the shifting environment in which the activities are to occur. Too often such frameworks are too rigid or the process of adaptation so protracted that a new revision already is required by the time the previous is finally ratified.

Inter-agency Assessment Teams should be encouraged in the very initial stages of establishing a UN presence in a post-conflict situation. Many of the gaps can be minimized at the very beginning by creating a common approach.

3. Describe the relationship of the Resident/Humanitarian Coordinator with the World Bank, EU, USAID and other major bilateral donors in terms of post-conflict planning and implementation. In Tajikistan, the number of resident donors is limited to World Bank and EU through ECHO, although this is slowly changing. Through concerted efforts on the part of the RC/HC and the UNDP management, ADB and EBRD are soon to join the resident donor community, while USAID is active from its regional position in Almaty. Additionally, the Japanese Government has responded positively to the advances of the RC/HC in this regard, providing substantial funding to UN initiatives. Because of his role as SRSR a.i., the RC/HC has an enhanced profile with the donors, and is able to leverage funding more successfully.

It should be noted that Tajikistan has an excellent collaborative relationship with the World Bank, with complete complementarity between programming initiatives. There is a conscious effort to ensure that the policy reforms being advocated by the Bretton Woods Institutes are supported through project initiatives by the UN agencies. To what extent is the capacity, or lack of it, of government institutions an obstacle to post-conflict rehabilitation? What can be done to improve it?

4. As mentioned earlier, the government needs to shift and adjust its operational methods from the centralised systems to accommodate the new social and political context. It is anticipated that greater strides will be made in this area once the elections have been conducted and the leadership structure confirmed. The United Nations in Tajikistan will then have to accelerate its activities in terms of enhancing the government's capacity to institute and adhere to the "rules of the game". Authority vacuums and the criminality of both government and social structures must be addressed in order to ensure that rule of law and human rights are respected and enforced.
5. How would you describe the interaction between humanitarian and development agencies in your country, and in what manner is humanitarian and development planning integrated to deal with the gap? In an environment such as Tajikistan, there is an unusual situation in terms of this issue. There are differing opinions whether Tajikistan is still facing a humanitarian crisis or has already started the transition to longer term development. Within the NGO community, there is a mix of those agencies focused on humanitarian, those focused on development, and those which have a transitioning mandate (i.e., they enter with humanitarian assistance and then transition to development). Sectoral coordination meetings facilitate the coordination between agencies, and addressing the gap is the underlying theme of most meetings. The CAP has provided an excellent forum for this discussion, fostering a sort of annual "state of the union" assessment.

With such a fuzzy division between the two, there is a continuous need for policy discussions which are problem-solving oriented but recognize the difference between the two: one being based upon assessments, while the other is based on governmental priorities.

6. What funding mechanisms are currently in use and how effective are they in addressing post-conflict transition? Tajikistan has been using the CAP and informal donor conferences as its primary inter-agency fundraising mechanisms. However, as the focus of the CAP is humanitarian assistance, individual agencies also have been directly addressing donors for particular projects or programmes. It is essential that aid coordination be systematized in order to avoid confusion. Pledges are sometimes re-stated in different appeals, and the total amount

is often unclear. Tajikistan has experienced greatest success in those initiatives contributing directly to or in support of the peace process, as this is of vital concern to the donors.

Similarly, Tajikistan has had to take a more direct and aggressive approach to resource mobilization, due to the circumstances surrounding the peace process. High-level publicity campaigns are undertaken by the RC/HC during every meeting with donors, and tours of donor countries have been undertaken to personalize the process and encourage donors' trust. However, it is very difficult to provide a common perception, particularly in a country with a peacekeeping mission, whose perception of the country is from the political view. One of the challenges of the RC/HC in his other role as SRSG a.i., is to integrate the political concerns with the humanitarian and development issues facing the country.

It should be noted that one of the lessons learned in Tajikistan is that continuous, objective analysis is essential when there is a peace process involved. It is very easy to equate the progress of the peace process with development, and a result programmes have shifted too quickly to development. Closer analysis indicates that there continues to be a humanitarian crisis in Tajikistan, and that humanitarian and development assistance will run parallel to each other for some time to come. The peace, at this time is a political process, and only with economic stability will it become firmly embedded in the social environment.

7. What is the feasibility/desirability of joint training programs that would involve both humanitarian and development personnel? This is highly desirable and should be pursued immediately. The UN can no longer afford the luxury of agencies working only within their mandates and spheres – there must be shared capacity and knowledge between agencies. In Tajikistan, this has been done informally between OCHA and UNDP, with one of the UNDP International Programme Officers being assigned as disaster/emergency focal point. This greatly facilitates the work of the HC and offers improved linkages between OCHA and UNDP for certain activities. As this PO already has extensive disaster/emergency experience, the process is quite simple. However, this should be institutionalized to some extent, as UNDP's programming is facilitated by a greater understanding of its personnel on the issues surrounding humanitarian versus development environments. Similarly, the current OCHA Head of Unit is fully conversant in both spheres, enhancing the dialogue with the other agencies and government, greatly facilitating the reduction of gaps and the coordination of programming.

I would strongly urge that cross-agency training opportunities be explored at both the country and headquarters levels, and that the necessary funding be allocated for these purposes.

### **III. Bridging The Gap: A Report On Behalf Of The IASC Reference Group On Post-Conflict Reintegration<sup>i</sup>**

#### **THE REPORT'S OBJECTIVES**

This report is written at the request of the IASC Reference Group on Post-Conflict Reintegration. Based upon the terms of reference of the Reference Group and those of the report's author, the purpose of the report is to explore three issues:

1. the nature of what has been called the gap between relief and development, and those countries or regions where the gap has been perceived to be a particular problem;
2. institutional, financial and other impediments to inter-agency coordination that might have given rise to or exacerbated the gap;
3. ways that build synergistic links between relief and development through joint inter-agency planning, with particular attention to operational implementation, resource mobilisation and approaches to the coordination of humanitarian and development activities.

The report is principally based upon interviews with member organisations of the Inter-Agency Standing Committee and documentation, including case studies, provided by them. It takes into full account the very useful work undertaken by the Action Group in preparation for the Roundtable on the Relief to Development Gap and the substance of a meeting of the Action Group in Geneva on 18 May.

Consistent with the request of the IASC Working Group to its Reference Group in November 1998, this report is less concerned with conceptual aspects of the "relief and development" debate, and more focussed upon what the Working Group termed as "innovative and creative approaches to a practical solution to the problem."<sup>ii</sup>

An initial draft of this report was submitted to the IASC Reference Group on 7 June 1999 before being submitted to the IASC Working Group the following day. This paper now incorporates the written and verbal comments made by IASC participating organisations during this deliberative process.

#### **I. THE NATURE OF THE GAP**

There is grave concern that a serious operational "gap" exists between relief and development, particularly in what has been called post-conflict situations, or, that "period when hostilities have abated to the level where some reintegration and recovery activities can begin".<sup>iii</sup> For some, the most striking example of this purported gap has been reflected in post-conflict efforts to reintegrate returning refugees and internally displaced persons. These situations are felt to expose the institutional and funding failures that are seen to be at the core of the disjunction between relief and development.

Yet, the experiences of different humanitarian and development agencies suggest various types of post-conflict reintegration gaps. Some of these are political and structural while others are clearly institutional. However, in one way or another, they all concern discontinuities in time and capacities. Section I.1 briefly defines the "gap", while Section I.2 summarises structural and institutional factors that agencies perceive as responsible for the gap. Section I.3 looks more specifically at agencies' explanations about the ways that certain factors in the UN system perpetuate the gap and compound the operational difficulties associated with it.

## **I.1 Defining the gap**

To be successful, post-conflict response must stabilise conflict-affected societies in order to prepare the way for appropriate governance structures, to support measures that will provide essential infrastructure and to pave the way for economic security and growth. At the same time, an appropriate response will also be sensitive to the “intangibles”, eg, the balance of reconciliation demands with those of justice, the introduction of initiatives that enhance peace environments and of approaches that are sensitive to the psycho-social needs of traumatised populations.

Many factors prevent or hamper achieving these sorts of general objectives and, hence, contribute to “the gap”. In the context of post-conflict re-integration, the gap is manifested by an inability to transfer the momentum of crisis response to recovery, rehabilitation and development activities. The gap has both temporal and capacity dimensions. In so saying, it is important to emphasise that the gap is not an inevitable feature of post-conflict situations. The gap expands, contracts, is bridged and even on occasion closed, depending upon a variety of factors that will be described in Section II, below.

Broadly speaking, there are five sorts of gaps. Each of these is more or less inter-related and each are normally evident in post-conflict situations:

- institutional gaps
- political gaps
- authority vacuums
- the synchrony gap
- the sustainability gap

### **I.1.a Institutional gaps**

More often than not, efforts to move rapidly from relief to development activities, and more importantly in this context, from relief to recovery and rehabilitation have been notoriously slow. Significantly, the opportunities to undertake relief, recovery and development in a coherent and simultaneous manner have all too often been ignored or abandoned. It is the inability of concerned organisations – both indigenous and international – to respond in a timely and appropriate manner to significant changes in the operating environment that defines one major gap.

Despite a variety of initiatives to address this institutional gap and a few examples of success, it appears that many institutional issues continue to be regarded as perpetuating the gap. These include lack of common country/region-specific vision, conflicting principles and mandates, poor leadership, lack of objective-oriented coordination, institutional cultures, inappropriate standard operating procedures, unpredictable and often inadequate funding and inadequate personnel policies. Agencies are well aware of these difficulties. It would seem, however, that the culture of semi-autonomy and the operational isolation which that breeds, the disconnects between agencies’ administrative procedures and the on-going efforts to secure the attention of donors make it difficult to change some of the worst failings of the system.

### **I.1.b Political gaps**

The gap under this heading principally refers to the actions of bilaterals. In recent years, conventional wisdom suggested that there was a recovery/rehabilitation gap due in no small part to the fact that relief and development aid was so rigidly compartmentalised. While this remains a problem, it is less and less so. Of far greater significance is the gap created by bilateral political interests.

Bilateral donors determine their engagement in a country not by needs assessments alone. Individual bilaterals’ political calculations add a substantial degree of unpredictability both to planning and operations.

On the one hand, bilaterals are usually keen to become engaged in areas where there are abiding political interests; on the other, they are averse to risks when political interest may be low, the outcome is uncertain and the limits of engagement unclear.

The gap is then further widened by delays encountered in attempting to persuade donors to become involved, and in finding ways to fill gaps in programmes and projects that some donors do not find attractive for administrative reasons, reasons of accountability or political acceptability. All too often the victims of political acceptability are programmes dealing with core post-conflict issues, including demobilisation, security and police forces.

**Complicating the planning process**

*In Haiti in 1994 there was an urgent need to disband and demobilise some of the military and quasi-military forces that had been so central to Haiti's recent chaotic past. At the same time there were calls for social reconciliation and demands for justice. The dilemmas created by these potentially contradictory concerns were seen as slowing down crucial elements of the recovery process affecting demobilisation. Not only did it "complicate" the planning process, but it also raised doubts in the minds of some donors about the demobilisation programme's viability.*

**I.1.c Authority vacuums**

Frequently defensive and overwhelmed by the new experience of formal government, post-conflict authorities are often wary and resistant to outside proposals, particularly if they are perceived to threaten the gains made during conflict. In attempting to support nascent authorities, international representatives may also find that there is very limited capacity at most government and civil service levels to actually affect policy. There may be a lack of indigenous expertise, a total breakdown in communications systems between the capital and provincial areas, and profound disagreements amongst the authorities themselves about what may be required.

**Crumbs from the negotiating table**

*The peace process in Guatemala was reported to have been responsible for creating a gap between the needs of affected peoples and the peace agreement. In the case of Guatemala in 1996, most of the main actors had relatively well established representatives at the negotiating table. The refugees reportedly had substantial political support as eventually did the guerrillas. The IDPs, highly dispersed and representing fragmented communities, were isolated from the process, and came late to the table. In terms of benefits, the IDPs reportedly got "crumbs from the negotiating table".*

In addition to what might be called "external factors" are the internal dynamics of post-war governments or authorities. The harmony that has been a reflection of common cause in war may rapidly dissipate as various factions now vie for post-war power and positions. Or, for that matter, the seeming end to conflict, as happens all too often, may not result in the dissolution of contending forces. Instead these opposing groups may call a halt to violence, but not to a continuation of their authority in specific geographical areas. In either case, the need to switch into recovery and rehabilitation mode involves a seemingly endless effort to reconcile peaceful though contending factions.

Under such circumstances, there is a kind of vacuum of authority, a gap extended by all the problems and difficulties of engaging emerging authorities in a post-conflict recovery process. Time passes and frustrations intensify, all too often leading to the source of a fourth gap, one marked by a lack of synchrony between the international community and national authorities.

#### **I.1.d the synchrony gap**

One of the considerable difficulties in post-conflict situations is to establish agreements or understandings between the international community and host authorities. Many times the international community embarks upon programmes that it feels are required or should be implemented without the full concurrence and more importantly the full commitment of appropriate authorities. This is often the case when it comes to programmes dealing with reconciliation, justice and governance.

***Contending priorities between host governments and the international community***

*If the IDPs were not guilty of the genocide, then they should have no fear of going home, was the assumption of the government of Rwanda in 1995. IDPs, despite the protection and humanitarian concerns of the international community, were a source of potential disruption for Rwandan authorities. Most governments in post-conflict situations, measure stability and success more in terms of economic growth and settled populations than in terms of dealing with specific sectors of the population. International assistance provided to special groups such as IDPs or returning refugees is often regarded as an unwarranted deviation from more important objectives that require international support.*

These sorts of programmes are on occasion bounded by several understandable but unacceptable planning features. They for example reflect certain donor driven cultural and political assumptions about appropriate governance systems. Reconciliation programmes in too many instances have been structured to fit funding timeframes rather than to meet the needs of extensive social trauma. Justice systems also are restructured based upon the mechanics [eg, physical assets such as court houses] of a justice system rather than upon the substance.

The gap in such instances therefore also stems from the lack of commitment by the affected communities to the recovery process. Authorities might agree formally for reasons that have little to do with the proposals, themselves. Yet, the gap that emerges will be reflected in terms of persistent efforts to revise various aspects of the proposals, and in ways subtle and less subtle to suggest that these “are your priorities, not ours”.

#### **I.1.e the sustainability gap**

A gap of considerable significance arises from governments’ inability to sustain the momentum of recovery. In the context of external assistance for post-conflict recovery, this has been explained in two ways. In the first place, a considerable portion of such assistance – particularly that which deals with public services and infrastructure – creates obligations that fragile governments all too often cannot sustain through conventional government funding mechanisms. Furthermore it is perhaps ironic that at the same time the international community hands over the munificence of their recovery programmes to government, the same government is criticised for expanding its public sector commitments.

Secondly, lack of sustainability opens up the equally as fundamental problem that, despite all sorts of post-conflict recovery assistance, there is little that ensures the types and levels of investment that will generate economic growth. In that regard, there are all too few examples of active attempts to encourage the private sector to become engaged in planning processes.<sup>iv</sup>

There is a related dimension of post-conflict recovery that also involves a very fundamental aspect of sustainability, namely, the difficulties of ensuring post-conflict assistance, eg, hospitals, schools, when despite a significant reduction of violent conflict, there are no formal government structures at all, eg, Somalia.

## I.2 Factors compounding the gap

Few interviewed for this project seemed to doubt that the return of refugees and internally displaced persons in the aftermath of violent conflict is an immensely complex and frequently frustrating problem. It is a problem that so vividly and so frequently reflects all five of the gaps described above. Yet, like all aspects of post-conflict conditions, these gaps are linked to events, perceptions, negotiations and institutional dynamics that go well beyond the immediate causes of the gaps, themselves. They are factors that further compound and complicate relatively definable gaps.

All these factors are well known. However, there are two very practical reasons for making brief reference to them. The first is that they move the issue of the gap away from the clinical world of mechanistic solutions to the world of operational reality. The second reason is that central to any leadership or strategic role which might be required must be a sound understanding of the *limits* as well as the opportunities for engagement in post-conflict recovery.

protracted emergencies and post-conflict recovery. The definition of a post-conflict situation and the principal elements of post-conflict recovery assistance have received considerable attention over the past four years. However, the vast majority of situations where post-conflict recovery may have some applicability remain in so many respects simmering protracted emergencies. In other words, the likelihood is that at the operational level one will be dealing simultaneously with aspects of humanitarian assistance, development and stabilisation programmes [eg, recovery and rehabilitation needs]. Not dissimilar to the now disfavoured concept of the “relief-to-development continuum”, post-conflict recovery should not lock the UN into overly compartmentalised instruments that do not relate to the fluidity of most operations.

the right aid. In most instances, the provision of assistance is determined by what an organisation perceives to be the needs and what it can deliver. In other words, the “right aid” is as much a function of what an organisation can do as it is of an unbiased assessment of needs. To a very significant extent, this organisational “hometruth” continues to be reflected in the provision of humanitarian assistance and in no small part in the assistance given in the aftermath of crisis and conflict. The dynamics inevitably result in mechanistic assistance which in the context of post-conflict societies can be socially insensitive. The point may be obvious, but the consequence compound those previously mentioned institutional, synchrony, sustainability and authority gaps.

people-centred versus state-centred assistance. Post-conflict assistance, as with all stages of assistance, inevitably is pushed up against a set of very complex choices. These choices are linked to principles and priorities as well as to strategies and operational realities. They can be summarised simply: is the longer-term interest of a post-conflict country better served by supporting efforts to ensure stability or by efforts to meet human needs? The two are not the same when it comes to what can be called state-centred and people-centred aid. This issue is not posed as a metaphysical dilemma, but a very straightforward operational one. In a period when resources are purportedly limited, either choice may sow the seeds of instability or at least complicate efforts to bridge the gap.

This is not to suggest that the dichotomy cannot to some extent be reconciled. Experience has shown that one can enhance community participation of both locals and returnees while at the same time addressing at least some of the priorities of government. The former, for example, might focus on reconciliation, community cooperation and certain types of advocacy issues, eg, gender issues, while the latter focuses on broader-based development. However, the basic premise underlying the point is that the issue of “people-centred versus state-centred” is in the final analysis readily reconcilable over time.

humanitarian and development dynamics. The boundaries of humanitarianism are increasingly uncertain, perhaps less so those of development. Yet, between the two “disciplines” there remains a disconnect that is reflected in assumptions about timing, engagement with national authorities and priority activities. These



differences are not merely conceptual. They are re-enforced on a daily basis through criteria and procedures that form the bases for the assessment of individuals in those organisations. Institutional culture once again can have considerable impact upon extending the gap.

gulf between political and development/humanitarian activities. Post-conflict recovery normally takes place in an environment of tumult, brinkmanship, uncertainty and the threat of renewed violence. Rarely in modern post-conflict periods is there the relative certainty of imposed peace and unilateral victory that marked the launching of the 1947 European Recovery Programme. Post-conflict recovery programmes now inevitably are factors that directly and immediately influence political processes. Yet, that said, there remains a very fundamental unwillingness to confront political and development linkages in a forthright manner. This is not to suggest that aid must assume the mantle of conditionality, but rather to say that there needs to be a far better appreciation of the impact of one upon the other if the sorts of synchrony and authority gaps discussed above are to be reduced. In a related vein, one might also ask how possible Security Council sanctions – not related directly to humanitarian operations – might affect recovery needs of people in post-conflict situations.

the trust factor. In considering a return home, the refugee or IDP has to weigh many issues, amongst which security and property rights loom large. Yet, for example, in Bosnia in 1997, it was evident that many of the displaced had little faith in the assurances made by international and state officials that they could return home in safety. For those refugees who had fled Rwanda over two decades before, they could well assume that the new government would make every effort either to restore their property or provide an alternative. Yet, the issue of property rights was one that would take years to settle successfully, and here, too, the trust factor was sorely tried.

the muddy boots factor. Despite all the appeals for more coherent and earlier planning, the reality of an intensive and large-scale emergency is that there is all too often little available energy, attention and resources to focus upon issues that are not immediately relevant. It reflects what one official called the “muddy boots factor” in which the pressure of an emergency operation, the sequencing of funding and future planning all combine with the uncertainty about the outcome of a particular conflict to mire the process of post-conflict planning. The official concluded his point by musing about what steps are being taken to deal with post-conflict Kosovo.

### **I.3 IASC participating organisations views on operational aspects of the gap**

From an operational perspective, IASC organisations pointed to various ways to view “the gap” and also to ways that the UN system in particular perpetuated various elements of the gap. Their views on how these elements are unintentionally fostered and perpetuated by the UN are clustered under seven headings below.

Lack of strategic vision and leadership. Despite innovations such as Strategic Frameworks, there appears no abiding strategy that clearly identifies the overall objectives of involvement in a particular country or region. The lack of a more strategic approach, particularly for the UN system, was seen as a failure to identify not only what the UN as a system should do, but also what it should not do;

Inability to reconcile contending principles and mandates. Within the UN system and clearly from the perspective of the broader humanitarian and development communities, little progress has been made to reconcile contending institutional mandates and principles. This has been a subject that was introduced in the IASC in 1998 and 1999, and one in which individual UN agencies and the UN system has as a whole devoted considerable time. The need to address this issue is particularly salient in the context of post-conflict situations where humanitarian needs, recovery requirements, development, security and human rights all are of acute importance and competing for space and resources;

Planning mechanism failures. Several important planning mechanisms have been developed over the past two years, ranging from UNDAFS and CAPs to CCAs and CDFs. Yet, five critical elements are regarded as

missing: [i] failure to bring in all relevant actors at the outset of the planning period; [ii] cumbersome nature of the instruments; [iii] disconnects between agreed strategies arising out of the instruments and individual agencies' programmes and appeals; [iv] no mechanism for effective regional and sub-regional [ie, trans-border] planning and [v] inadequate linkages between peace agreements and measures to ensure that "gaps" are closed;

Coordination difficulties. Perhaps one of the most persistent themes raised when discussing operational aspects of the gap was the lack of effective coordination. Three issues arose in this context: [i] lack of effective coordination between political [and where relevant peacekeeping] and development/humanitarian objectives both at field and headquarters levels; [ii] lack of means to coordinate effectively with wider international community, including Bretton Woods institutions and non-governmental organisations; [iii] lack of clear and agreed responsibilities for lead agencies;

Lack of quick and flexible access to resources and means for disbursement. It was assumed that the nature of post-conflict periods required access to resources every bit as quick and flexible as were required for acute emergency situations. The reality, if not the irony, is that all too often the same rules and procedures for recovery applies for emergencies, and that for more than one-third of the organisations interviewed, access during either phase was affected by relatively slow, over-centralised systems and regulations. In certain isolated instances, one organisation relied on the speedier disbursement mechanism of another. However, in most situations, the incompatibility of rules and procedures across institutions made that extremely difficult;

Personnel and in-country office issues. There appeared to be a degree of confusion surrounding the number of instruments now available for developing strategies and programmes and a certain degree of scepticism about their usefulness. Much of that scepticism admittedly stemmed from a lack of clear understanding about the instruments, themselves, and also from the assumptions that more such instruments were in the offing, eg, the World Bank's CDFs. The overall issue, however, pointed to two problems that relate directly to the gap: [i] a lack of familiarity with instruments and procedures ostensibly designed to reduce the gap, both at headquarters and field levels; and [ii] personnel who were themselves not familiar with or equipped to deal with transitional issues, including the practical implementation of relief and development activities simultaneously;

Inadequate advocacy and marketing. If strategic and programme coherence in post-conflict situations was regarded as the direction in which the system should be heading, then it was felt that there should be more tangible payoffs. More specifically, the economies of scale, etc., that are bi-products of more effective programming should be acknowledged through more fulsome and speedier donor responses. This view, whether realistic or not, was linked with the belief that greater effort had to be made to promote the "lost causes", eg, those countries that no longer grabbed the attention of the media or had no obvious support groups. Greater attention, it was suggested, should be given to intensified advocacy and raising the profile of those countries not in the limelight.

## **II. BRIDGING THE GAP**

The UN system as a whole and individual agencies have not been oblivious to the often difficult and complex issues presented by post-conflict conditions and the need to stabilise countries in the aftermath of violent conflict. There have been concerted measures to address many of the issues that are seen as perpetuating the gap. These measures have been at the UN system level as well as at the individual and inter-agency level, and have the potential for bridging if not closing at least some of the gaps.

### **II.1 UN system initiatives**

Over the past two years a virtual "tool box" of instruments has been created to deal with various transitional requirements, including relief, recovery, rehabilitation and development. There are now at least seven major

tools that have been designed in one way or another to analyse relief, rehabilitation, recovery and development needs, including Strategic Frameworks and the Extended Consolidated Appeals Process.<sup>v</sup>

While these initiatives have added a degree of coherence to the work of the UN system in a few countries [eg, Burundi, Afghanistan], they overall have had mixed reviews. The strategic framework process, for example, has been regarded as too cumbersome, while the process that links Country Common Assessments, Country Strategy Notes and United Nations Development Assistance Frameworks is seen as too great a luxury – in terms of available time and resources -- for those countries that are in relatively precarious condition.

Though the Strategic Framework process seeks to relate political and assistance objectives, more often than not there is a significant gulf between those responsible for assistance and those concerned with political issues. In a situation where a country is on the precipice of renewed violence or struggling to maintain fragile stability, it is perplexing that there are not closer contacts between the political and assistance arms of the UN system. Indeed, without compromising the essential neutrality of humanitarian assistance, one may need to explore those instances where certain types of recovery and development assistance can support political objectives and *vice versa*. Few deny in any event that a franker and more predictable exchange of information between UN's DPA and Resident Coordinators is needed.

There is also a general perception that, while agencies may agree on a common strategic approach for a particular country, individual agency funding appeals do not relate to that common strategy. This inconsistency is generally explained as a reflection of many agencies' internal processes and procedures; more particularly, the separation between policy, operations and resource mobilisation.

Even at the field level, agencies confess to a certain discord between the objectives generated, for example, by an UNDAF exercise and the methodology used to develop specific programmes and projects. Again, this is explained by an inadvertent gap between the policy process and the standard operating procedures by which programmes and projects are developed.

## **II.2 Activities of IASC Members**

Individual agencies and organisations within the IASC membership have been quite creative in dealing with post-conflict requirements and bridging certain sorts of gaps. In fact, it would appear that individually various agencies in various ways have come to grips with at least some of the basic institutional problems that have dogged the continuity of transition assistance. A few examples suggest the range of innovations.

The World Food Programme recently developed a new programme category for protracted relief and recovery operations that would seem to provide an effective instrument “to pool” funds for relief and development in ways that accommodate transition requirements. UNICEF and the ICRC<sup>vi</sup> both have made important conceptual adjustments to their aid frameworks: the former, by looking at countries in crisis and post-crisis through the consistent “rights-based” lens of Conventions on the Rights of the Child; the latter with an all-encompassing economic security agenda.

Perhaps one of the oldest and most tried individual agency mechanisms is UNHCR's QIPs which can amongst other things provide the basis for income generation activities for refugee affected areas. The International Organisation for Migration has for the past few years assisted capacity building in post-conflict situations through programmes that give incentives for professionals and experts to return to their home countries.

Through UNDP's TRAC 1.1.3, resources are available to assist governments and, through the Resident Coordinator system, the wider UN system to plan for post-conflict recovery, rehabilitation and development. FAO has reviewed and further strengthened the role of its Emergency Coordination Group to ensure that

coherent preventive action and systematic response are provided in a timely and effective manner, and has expanded its capacity to assist local authorities to deal with emergency prevention, particularly as it relates to trans boundary animal and plant pests and diseases, and WHO has increased its ability to deal with a variety of basic health requirements even when government facilities do not as yet have the capacity to do so.

OCHA continues actively to promote linkages between relief and development activities, as described in GA 46/182, while DPKO has undertaken additional responsibility to ensure that strategic planning in post-conflict situations relate to the security requirements of those situations that fall within its purview. As the Secretary-General has emphasised on many occasions in the recent past, human rights for the United Nations is a cross-cutting issue that should link all activities of the system. In that regard, UNHCHR over the past three years has become increasingly engaged in activities that introduce justice and human rights interventions into post-conflict countries.

OHCHR is advocating a human rights approach in bridging the gap by promoting and providing technical assistance for the participation and empowerment of civil society with a view to national institution building in linking relief and development activities. The development of strong national capacity in the area of democracy and rule of law in order to realise the right to development is fundamental to sustainable post-conflict peace-building efforts.

Yet, despite these and other innovations, individually each all too often fails to relate to others. Except in a few instances, they appear self-contained, with little active cognisance of the need for programme synergy or even clear hand-over arrangements.

### **II.3 Inter-agency collaboration**

Despite the seemingly self-contained nature of these various initiatives, there are at some interesting examples of inter-agency hand-over agreements and cooperative arrangements for post-conflict activities. It is not insignificant that most of these agreements and arrangements have been created and implemented at the field level. That said, perhaps one of the most important of inter-agency in the context of post-conflict reintegration is the headquarters inspired *Framework for Operational Cooperation between UNHCR and UNDP*, signed in April 1997.<sup>vii</sup> The impact of this initiative upon mutually supportive operations in refugee return and IDP-related situations awaits its first review.

The UN's Joint Reintegration Programme Unit [JRPU] in Rwanda, launched in 1998, provides a good example of coordinated planning and programming for refugee and IDP reintegration. UNHCR, UNDP, the government and, on an ad hoc basis, relevant UN and non-UN organisation gather essential data, plan and programme and undertake project appraisals under the umbrella of a joint secretariat. In Angola, the agencies have become increasingly committed to co-funded projects identified through an inter-agency Joint Working Group on Co-funding.

UN representatives in Mozambique speak enthusiastically about the positive impact that the UNDAF has had upon its recovery and development programme, and similarly the country-team in the still fragile state of Burundi has received high praise for the programme coherence that it has generated through the UNDAF process.

These examples would seem to suggest that there is a growing number of instances where mechanisms at the disposal of the system have surmounted some very basic coordination, planning and programming and funding difficulties. Yet, the certainty that that will increasingly be the case, or indeed that the substance of the commendable plans and programmes and the availability of the resources will be adequate to avoid potential gaps is not clear. Faced with more and more situations that will require stabilisation, recovery, rehabilitation and development, certainty cannot be left to incremental progress and happenstance. It can only come through specific measures that are designed to close the gap.

### **III. CLOSING THE GAP**

In some very fundamental senses the gaps so prevalent in post-conflict situations can never be entirely closed. Yet, that said, one can certainly improve upon the bridging operations that have marked even the most recent efforts to date. The institutional constraints that mar more effective and collaborative post-conflict assistance can be addressed in very substantive ways; less so the political, economic and cultural dimensions relating to the synchrony, sustainability and authority gaps discussed earlier.

#### **III.1 Conclusions**

Based upon a range of interviews, evaluations and “lessons-learned” exercises, there are at least seven conclusions to draw about the gap in post-conflict recovery situations:

- The real post-conflict recovery gaps are probably the least amenable to immediate solutions. Addressing the more fundamental gaps that face countries and societies in post-conflict situations would require international commitments to a process and to levels of resources that seem unrealistic to anticipate in the foreseeable future.
- The gap that could most readily be closed is the institutional gap that affects the effective functioning of the international humanitarian and development communities; in this case, the relevant agencies, programmes and departments of the UN system. This, however, will require a real commitment to using already established instruments more effectively to ensure more coherent planning and implementation, resource mobilisation and advocacy. At the same time, active consideration will have to be given to ways to develop new types of strategic partnerships and to revise intra and inter institutional financial, administrative and personnel procedures.
- Post-conflict situations normally are marked by a high degree of political manoeuvring and sensitivity. And yet, the UN system still appears not to have resolved ways to relate its political and peace support functions to those of recovery, rehabilitation and development in a coherent and consistent way. Some have suggested that this chasm reflects a more abiding concern, namely, that more often than not the UN system lacks an overall system-wide strategy and related set of objectives in countries emerging from periods of conflict.
- The roles that individual agencies should play in post-conflict situations still remain uncertain in the minds of many agency staff members. More specifically, there continues to be a degree of uncertainty about the limits of humanitarian assistance and the parameters of development. Part of the issue reflects a continuing tension between the differing assumptions and actions of those who programme and implement humanitarian assistance and those who promote development. This is a matter of institutional culture that which affect attitudes towards implementation.
- Beyond ways to address temporal and capacity factors associated with the institutional gap is a wide range of relatively simple initiatives that could enhance post-conflict recovery. Some most frequently mentioned included regional and sub-regional planning [eg, trans-border], more effective ways to monitor both the totality and use of assistance in countries in post-conflict situations and more “thematic programming” [eg, reconciliation as an abiding, long-term objective].

#### **III.2 Recommendations**

The recommendations proposed below should be considered now in order to improve post-conflict recovery responses and, in so doing, to stabilise and assist dislocated populations as well as the affected society as a whole. These recommendations noted in Section III.2.a are essentially achievable, and the hows and ways of

doing so, along with the recommendations of the Action Group, could form the basis of a framework for action in post-conflict recovery situations. Indeed there has emerged considerable interest in developing the following recommendations, reviewed by the IASC Working Group and its Reference Group, into a brief though precise Action Plan to commit agencies to an agreed course of action.

### III.2.a Immediate steps to close the gap

- Planning as a process. Existing planning instruments, if used properly, should go some way towards providing the coherence and sensitivity required for effective post-conflict response. However, the present tool box of planning instruments and process could be further improved:
  - the post-conflict planning process has to begin far earlier than is normally the case. In fact, the process must be a *process* which should begin at what one might call the pre-crisis stage and be developed, adjusted and adapted throughout the conflict period until that point when true stability brings the affected country to a standard development situation. To the extent possible, all relevant actors – development as well as humanitarian – need to be engaged in the planning process from the outset. This should include where relevant those involved in negotiating peace arrangements with contending parties. While accepting that uncertainty will reign through much of the early stages of the process, at least the habit of cooperation, the exchange of information and a greater appreciation for the potential capacities of each of the players should ensue;
  - through the office of the UN Deputy Secretary-General every effort should be made to streamline the ways that these instruments are used [eg, strategic frameworks] and clarify the ways that each inter-relate not only for planning but also for fund-raising purposes. In this regard, the mechanisms of the Bretton Woods Institutions also have to be taken into account and, more importantly, linked in terms of planning and resourcing. It is fundamentally important to have a very clear appreciation about the ways that the donor community views these instruments and which sort of instruments [eg, CAP, ECAP] they regard as most suitable to attract funding;
  - donor support groups – a point that will be revisited on several occasions below – should be encouraged to participate in the planning process as well as other non-traditional actors [eg, private corporations] that could enhance the input into the planning process;
  - there needs to be greater coherence between the planning process that results in overall post-conflict recovery strategies and the specific programmes of participating agencies. Towards that end, the role of the Resident Coordinator/Humanitarian Coordinator should be strengthened. In addition, relevant agencies of the system should review their technical roles to facilitate synthesis between national and international perspectives;
  - few post-conflict situations are isolated within specific state boundaries. Inevitably the effects of violent social transitions flow back and forth across borders. For that reason, the planning process has to be more regional in perspective, and in consequence, the means – including arrangements with organisational counterparts in neighbouring countries – need to be reviewed;
  - accountability criteria should be part of every planning exercise. This will not only establish clear evaluative criteria for individual and overall programmes, but also will make clear to local and national authorities the parameters, if not the conditions, of post-conflict initiatives;
  - greater attention needs to be given to “thematic approaches” in the planning process. In other words, the planning process, the plans themselves and in some instances, ensuing programmes need to reflect ways that certain abiding objectives, eg, reconciliation, can be obtained. At the same time, the process also has to explore ways in which the so-called “intangibles” [eg, non-mechanistic means of

dealing with traumatised communities] can be developed. Elements of these intangibles include ways to work with local communities, and here approaches offered by projects such as the UNRISD project on *War-torn Societies* should be taken into consideration. Furthermore, a coordinated human rights approach could contribute significantly to bridging the "gap" by, for example, ensuring that participation and empowerment of civil society and national institution building is recognised as an essential component of sustainable peace-building efforts already in the planning process;

- while recognising the dichotomy between state-centred and people-centred assistance, there needs to be a more studied and transparent way of reconciling state-centred and people-centred assistance to post-conflict assistance. The IASC might wish to consider how this sort of concern might be explored in the context of the SPHERE project and its related spin-offs.
- **Strategic partnerships.** Gaps can also be reduced through strategic partnerships based upon a combination of country and regionally-specific interests and expertise. Such partnerships may involve an unusual amalgam of multilateral, non-governmental, private sector and bilateral organisations. However they are structured, they should be based upon the assumption that the right combination of interests and expertise of individual members and the group as a whole will speed up the planning and implementation process and bring necessary funds more rapidly into play. Strategic partnerships may take various forms and more than one form of partnership could operate in the same country at any one time:
- **Country-specific donor groups.** Most conflict-affected countries attract the interests of specific sets of donors for a variety of reasons. In the past such groupings have formed the basis of “friends” groups, designed to support the efforts of the country and international institutions engaged in assistance. These groups can be of tremendous service, particularly on the funding front, as long as they [i] operate both at in-country and donor government levels to ensure consistency and sensitivity to the needs of the affected country; [ii] work closely with other strategic partner groups, particularly those specifically designated to coordinate activities in-country; and [iii] do not undercut the efforts of the operational agencies on the ground;
  - **Coordinating structures.** Different types of strategic partnerships should also be considered as possible coordinating structures. There is no reason, for example, why a coordinating “troika” consisting of a major NGO, a multilateral organisation and a donor representative could not take overall charge of bringing together post-conflict recovery plans, fund-raising initiatives, etc.. For that matter, in countries where major private investment might be attracted, a relevant private company could also be represented in in-country coordinating structures. The principle of such groupings is not to undermine present systems, but to accept that under certain circumstances, different sorts of consortia may serve the interests of conflict-affected countries more effectively than standard mechanisms;
  - **Lead agency approaches.** A lead agency for the purposes of this discussion is conventionally assumed to be an agency of the UN system. In the same way that responsibility for coordination can be a shared responsibility amongst diverse actors, the lead agency also need not automatically be from the UN system. There may be very substantive reasons to support a major donor or NGO or private sector organisation as the focal point for post-conflict activities. In any case, the responsibility of a lead agency must be clearly defined, including that agency’s responsibilities towards those under its umbrellas.
- **Intra and inter-institutional reviews.** As Section II has suggested, many members of the IASC have gone to considerable lengths to adjust to the programming and resource demands of post-conflict situations. That said, there is a considerable agenda that agencies need to complete to close the gap still further. This agenda encompasses institutional and inter-institutional issues, and can be grouped under five headings:

- Coordination commitments. There needs to be a perceived as well as actual commitment at headquarters levels to coordination, cooperation and common programming beyond the rather tentative efforts to date. While operational necessity spawns cooperation at field level, it is accompanied by a certain cynicism that such cooperation occurs despite headquarters' instincts. In effect, headquarters' leadership in this regard should also be reflected in reconciling potentially contending principles and mandates, an issue of no small importance in post-conflict situations. In addition, it is recommended that effective coordination should be reflected in efforts to coordinate services across the UN system, and where there is an interest, other IASC organisations as well;
  - Policy, programming and fund-raising. There appears to be within some of the organisations interviewed for this project a disjunction between policy formulation, programme development and fund-raising.<sup>viii</sup> This disjunction is compounded by communication failures between headquarters and the field which further isolate policies from programmes and resource mobilisation. If agencies were to review the process with which these three elements were handled and also sought ways that the three might be more effectively integrated, this exercise would most likely result in greater overall internal coherence. Equally as important, such internal coherence would most likely result in greater harmony of agreed inter-agency post-conflict recovery strategies and individual agency programmes;
  - Joint fund raising and disbursement procedures. In several cases, there have been some interesting initiatives involving joint fund raising and co-funding. Reducing the resource and implementation gap may, however, in many instances depend upon joint funding and joint disbursements. In either instance, procedures for such initiatives are often too complex or non-existent. The more all-encompassing issue is to agree a common set of procedures that will facilitate joint funding, disbursement and accountability. In addition, attention should also be given to greater field delegation to hasten the receipt and disbursement of much needed resources. Without such procedural modifications, key transitional issues such as timely hand-overs and integrated operations will suffer time and again;
  - Personnel policies. Humanitarian workers and those engaged in development bring particular sets of assumptions about needs and appropriate and timely assistance to countries affected by crises. A decade ago, the differences between these sets of assumptions were quite stark. They have narrowed in the recent past as some of the distinctions between humanitarianism, recovery, rehabilitation and development have blurred, and as professionalism in the "aid industry" has increased. Nevertheless, there would appear to be considerable scope for in-house and inter-agency training and sensitisation programmes that would bring humanitarian and development specialists together to consider alternative approaches to transitional issues. This could be done by expanding existing inter-agency mechanisms and reviewing the training/sensitisation roles of the UN's Staff College, etc.;
- "Mini-Marshall Plans" and new funding mechanisms. There is a place for new types of funding mechanisms to provide consistent and "seamless" support for all stages of countries in crisis. At the same time, the United Nations should be expected to play a major advocacy and promotion role to support specific post-conflict recovery programmes, particularly those that no longer attract donor attention.
- Post-conflict trust funds. Special trust funds may be required to ensure that a "pooling" of resources will lead to maximum efficiencies and impact in post-conflict countries. These trust funds should be in response to an overall strategy, reflected in a programme of agreed activities. However, to the extent possible, donors should be discouraged from specific ear-marking. The management of the fund could relate to the types of strategic partnerships suggested above;
  - With or without such trust funds, greater attention must be given to monitoring the overall amounts of funds that are pledged and received in a conflict-affected country. One of the most significant



difficulties in establishing programme and project priorities stems from the lack of data about available resources, obligated funds and project commitments outside the UN system. An essential capacity-building initiative in post-conflict situations is to provide a mechanism for resource monitoring.

- **Strategic objectives.** In the final analysis, the United Nations response to countries in post-conflict situations should reflect an overall institutional perspective, one in which broad objectives provide a framework for guidance, priority setting as well as accountability. This recommendation goes beyond the concept of strategic frameworks or CAP strategies. It stems from a basic conviction that representatives of the system should undertake their responsibilities with “instructions” that reflect overall agreement on the inter-relationship between the myriad issues which in this context will affect the recovery process of a conflict-affected country.
- Instructions for senior representatives in the field. Country-specific instructions for all senior representatives of United Nations organisations assigned to a crisis-affected country should normally be issued before commencement of the field assignment. These instructions, reflecting the agreed strategic vision and statement of objectives, will detail the particular roles and responsibilities for each senior official [eg, SRSG, Resident Coordinator/Humanitarian Coordinator] in order to ensure that they are mutually supportive and that reporting lines are clear;
- The senior UN official will be expected to ensure that the full capacity of the system will be used to support field-based post-conflict recovery programmes, most likely through the existing instruments discussed above. Of particular importance will be that these programmes clearly outline collaborative arrangements, including all important hand-overs procedures.

## **END NOTES**

<sup>i</sup> Prepared by Randolph Kent, consultant engaged by UNDP on behalf of the Reference Group

<sup>ii</sup> In its meeting of 19-20 November 1998, the IASC Working Group, acting on a decision by the Joint Executive Committees [ECPS/ECHA/UNDG] on 3 November 1998, considered “the gap in international response to post-conflict rehabilitation” and agreed that “UNDP will convene a reference group – including interested IASC members and additional entities recommended by the Joint Executive Committees meeting – aiming at developing strategies and mechanisms to respond appropriately to the gap. This process should avoid preparing further conceptual documents but should rather promote innovative and creative approaches to a practical solution of the problem”.

<sup>iii</sup> “Meeting Essential Needs in Post-Conflict Recovery: A Paper prepared by the Centre on International Cooperation for the Roundtable on the Relief to Development Gap” [Draft paper prepared by CIC-NYU in May 1999], p.1

<sup>iv</sup> An interesting example of effective planning and implementation between a humanitarian organisation and a private corporation in post-conflict situations is Save the Children Fund [UK]’s programme with Clough Mining Ltd. in the DRC’s Shaba province.

<sup>v</sup> These include the Common Country Assessment, United Nations Development Assistance Framework, the Country Strategy Note, Global Support System, the Consolidated Appeal Process, the Extended Consolidated Appeal Process and the Strategic Framework. The World Bank at the same time has its own Country Assistance Strategy and is discussing a proposed Comprehensive Development Framework.

<sup>vi</sup> ICRC is a standing participant in the IASC but not a member

<sup>vii</sup> The purpose of the cooperation framework is, *inter alia*, to address the negative effect of large inflows of refugees on hosting areas, to promote at the community level, post-conflict recovery, peace building and reconciliation in war-torn countries with large displaced populations and to foster an early and smooth phase-out of humanitarian assistance in favour of sustainable basic services and local development in areas that have suffered from severe damage and dislocation as a result of conflict.

<sup>viii</sup> There is an interesting and analogous disconnect, namely, that between security at the field level and programming. It is not irrelevant that most agencies suggest that programme and project formulation is not integrated into security analysis and *vice versa*. This suggests, in the words of one analyst, a real discontinuity between safe aid” and “smart aid”.