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## I. INTRODUCTION

1. Evaluations of the international community's response to countries emerging from crises consistently identify a lag between critical life-saving humanitarian assistance and the development inputs required to create a longer-term stable and sustainable environment. The effects of this "gap" are particularly noted in the context of post-conflict reintegration and rehabilitation.
2. The reality of this "gap" is not new to the international community. The end of the Cold War brought with it an increase in complex emergencies that requires a sustained international effort. To date however, there have been frequent gaps in the international community's response to these requirements, resulting in less than successful reintegration of conflict-affected populations to their homes and communities-of-origin. The prevalence thereof has led to a series of inward-looking exercises by the international community, including the UN, to identify the root causes of the gap, so as to enable it to improve its response capacity in the post-conflict context.
3. To move forward on this issue, conceptual introspection must necessarily be followed by the development of the required operational tools. It is with this objective--to identify innovative and creative solutions to reduce the gap in post-conflict reintegration--that the IASC Reference Group on Post-Conflict Reintegration has been working since its inception in November 1998.
4. This paper represents a final analysis and overview of the Reference Group's findings. The information contained therein was obtained through an extensive range of consultations at the headquarters level, substantive input from more than ten countries in a conflict/post-conflict context, and a series of inter-agency missions that were dispatched to more thoroughly glean operational "lessons learned," as well as possibilities to inform operational policy and programming decision-making in the future.
5. The paper proceeds by first providing a historical background and update of the Reference Group's activities in Section II. Section III looks at the lessons to be learned, which were extracted from these activities, with respect to the gaps in the post-conflict reintegration process. Meanwhile, Section IV presents the existing mechanisms to address these gaps. This section is intended to provide examples of what resources and models are available to countries facing a conflict/post-conflict scenario. From these two sections, a number of recommendations have been derived, and are presented in Section V of the paper.

## **II. BACKGROUND**

6. The IASC Reference Group on Post-Conflict Reintegration was established by the Executive Committee for Peace and Security and Humanitarian Affairs and the UN Development Group in November 1998 as the Joint Executive Committees considered the gap in international response to post-conflict reintegration and rehabilitation. The membership of the Reference Group was expanded to include all interested IASC members as well as DPA, the Special Representative of the Secretary-General for Children in Armed Conflict, and the World Bank. In the course of discussion, it was agreed that UNDP would convene and chair a Reference Group, aimed at developing strategies and mechanisms to respond appropriately to the gap. This process was intended to avoid preparing further conceptual documents, while promoting innovative and creative solutions to the problem.
7. The Reference Group's Terms of Reference included among its objectives, to "examine existing post-conflict response tools and capabilities, in particular joint assessment, programming, and evaluation mechanisms, available to the relevant actors and recommend measures to further harmonize them. Expected outputs included:
  - Assessment of the current procedures and incentive structure for information-sharing, coordination and the delineation of roles among UN agencies and other actors, with a view to recommending measures to improve and clarify them;
  - Recommended measures to improve the linkages between relief and development activities at the country and headquarters levels, with a view to achieving more integrated, sustainable reintegration of war-affected populations;
  - Suggested measures to improve the capacity of the country team, including the HC/RC, to respond to post-conflict reintegration issues.
8. To best achieve these expected outputs, the Reference Group outlined a series of steps that needed to be undertaken to adequately assess the headquarters and field-level approaches to the issue of the gap in post-conflict reintegration. As its first major initiative, the Reference Group commissioned a paper to explore three key areas:
  - the nature of the gap between relief and development, and those countries or regions where the gap has been perceived to be a particular problem;
  - institutional, financial, or other impediments to inter-agency coordination that might have given rise to or exacerbated the gap; and
  - ways that build synergistic links between relief and development through joint-inter-agency planning, with particular attention to operational implementation, resource mobilization and approaches to the coordination of humanitarian and development activities.

9. The resulting paper, “Bridging the Gap,”<sup>1</sup> identified five critical - and related - gaps that operationally contribute to and perpetuate the “gap” in post-conflict reintegration. These are the:
- institutional gap;
  - political gap;
  - authority vacuum;
  - synchrony gap; and
  - sustainability gap.
10. The paper was endorsed by the IASC Working Group and shared with the Brookings Roundtable group of UN actors and donors, the OECD/DAC Task Force, the Humanitarian Liaison Working Group, the 1999 ECOSOC Humanitarian Segment, and the Conflict Prevention and Post-Conflict Reconstruction Network.
11. Subsequent to the paper’s endorsement at the headquarters level, the Reference Group sought the substantive involvement from UN field offices engaged in conflict/post-conflict countries to ensure that the paper was consistent with the reality in the field. Consequently, the Reference Group disseminated the paper with an accompanying questionnaire to the Resident/Humanitarian Coordinators in the following conflict/post-conflict countries: Afghanistan, Azerbaijan, Tajikistan, Haiti, Liberia, Burundi, Angola, Sudan, Democratic Republic of Congo, Rwanda, Sri Lanka, and Colombia.
12. The RC/HC responses overwhelmingly supported the paper’s findings and reaffirmed their relevance to the context of post-conflict reintegration in the field. Furthermore, the RC/HCs provided an overview of the operational measures undertaken by their respective offices and Country Teams with a view to address the “gaps” that had persisted in the post-conflict reintegration process.
13. The findings contained within the “Bridging the Gap” paper and substantiated by the field analysis and responses, culminated into a series of key conclusions. Fundamentally, it became evident that the issue of funding and coordination are among the essential factors in determining the extent and effectiveness of international response in post-conflict situations. In view of such findings, the Reference Group decided to conduct a series of inter-agency missions to further evaluate country-specific contexts with a view to develop “lessons learned” from the field activities to address the gap. The purpose of these missions would be:
- to identify and analyze key background and situational factors and constraints, building on country team responses to the IASC Reference Group questionnaire;
  - to assess the effectiveness and appropriateness of existing strategic and operational coordination arrangements at the country level; and
  - to assess the adequacy of funding levels and the appropriateness and effectiveness of funding mechanisms for post-conflict transitional programs.

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<sup>1</sup> For more details, please refer to “Bridging the Gap: A Report on behalf of the Inter-Agency Standing Committee Reference Group on Post-Conflict Reintegration” by Randolph Kent, 1999.

14. Following an exercise whereby all the countries under discussion were categorised according to varying levels of funding and coordination, it was decided to focus on five cases that together were deemed as a representative subset. The cases initially chosen were Azerbaijan, Bosnia, Democratic Republic of Congo, Liberia, and Somalia. Due to political and security considerations, Liberia was subsequently removed from the list and the Democratic Republic of Congo was replaced by Congo-Brazzaville.
15. The inter-agency missions were conducted between March and May 2000. They consisted of a small number of IASC Reference Group members that included representation from at least one humanitarian, at least one development, and if relevant one political entity. The Reference Group also invited partners from the OECD/DAC Task Force on Conflict, Peace and Development Cooperation to participate. The missions were led at the Director level by UNDP (Azerbaijan), UNHCR (Bosnia), UNICEF (Somalia), and OCHA (Congo-Brazzaville). This paper incorporates the results of these missions, *inter alia*, in the next three sections.

### III. LESSONS TO BE LEARNED

16. This section highlights the relevance of the identified gaps to the reality on the ground. It is a result of the analysis on the field – through the missions and the questionnaire, and through discussions between agencies at headquarters level. Underlining these lessons serves as an important first step to making concrete recommendations that are grounded in reality.

#### A. Institutional Gap

17. The institutional gap is defined as “the inability of concerned organizations—both indigenous and international—to respond in a timely and appropriate manner to significant changes in the operating environment.” This gap is derived from a number of factors, including:

##### (1) lack of common country/region-specific vision

- a. *Common country vision:* Field offices emphasized the importance of planning commonly and sharing of background data. This overall common planning process, ideally initiated at the pre-conflict stage, involves:

- ◆ The relevant humanitarian and development actors, including donor support groups;
- ◆ Engagement with political elements, such as DPA and DPKO, to ensure that peace agreements are viable and can facilitate a sustainable reintegration process;
- ◆ Strengthening of the RC/HC system; and
- ◆ Strategic partnerships, and strategic objectives.

#### **Box - 1**

*-In the case of Angola, the World Bank and UNDP collaborate closely on macroeconomic policies and institutional and human capacity building projects.*

*-In Bosnia, there is a lack of development thinking, vision, and strategy among local actors and donors for medium and longer-term development.*

*-In the case of Somalia, there is a lacking vision for the future of Somalia that is a cross-cutting theme that impacts on all other areas. Furthermore, the Somalia mission also noted that “the long-term interests in Somalia need to be addressed and both political and humanitarian interests of the bilaterals needs to be realigned.”*

- b. *Regional vision:* Given the very cross-border nature of reintegration, field offices identified the need to strengthen the planning process to include regional considerations and particularities.

#### **Box -2**

*-As raised by the RC/HC in Burundi, the Great Lakes situation provides a strong argument for more regular, effective regional/sub-regional planning and action. But while the UN Country Team has taken a number of its own initiatives with the UN Country Team in*

*Rwanda, it was recognized that more HQ institutional support and encouragement would be useful in following this through.*

*-Events in Bosnia are highly sensitive to regional political solutions such as in FRY and Croatia.*

- (2) **inappropriate and/or conflicting standard operating procedures:** Field offices identified inappropriate or slow standard operating procedures as a detriment to the post-conflict reintegration program and policy development. Observations include:
- ◆ Flexible, appropriate procedures have not been developed, and the few that have been developed are not yet operational;
  - ◆ The most difficult problems have arisen because of slow, inappropriate procedures at HQ level and/or mandate battles at global (rather than country) level, in the case of Burundi. However, Country Teams acknowledged no real difficulties in working together as a UN country team, or in working with NGOs;
  - ◆ To address this gap, there is a need for the UN operational system to speed up the process of adapting its current operational rules and procedures for evolving conflict situations.
- (3) **unpredictable and often inadequate funding:** In some instances, particularly those where key concerns involve humanitarian considerations, the inter-agency CAP appears to be an effective mechanism for mobilizing efforts to respond to the funding requirements of urgent emergency humanitarian activities. As raised by the RC/HC in Angola, these activities are prerequisite for the implementation of more sustainable rehabilitation and reconstruction programs with medium and long-term development objectives. At the same time however, it is recognized within the country team that challenges result from the fact that funding mechanisms are too compartmentalized. In the case of Somalia, funds are available for only from emergency funds, in spite of the fact that work is especially in the north is development rather than humanitarian.
- (4) **inadequate personnel policies:** Human resources constraints at the country level were consistently noted as a significant challenge in a Country Team's ability to design and implement post-conflict reintegration programs. Constraints noted include:
- ◆ The inavailability of qualified staff with experience in policy analysis and planning in a conflict/post-conflict environment;
  - ◆ The failure of challenging post-conflict operations to attract caliber staff on a relatively long-term basis;
  - ◆ Contractual conditions among the agencies are often poor and short-term, which results in high-turnover among staff and undermines organizational efforts to engage in long-term planning that can facilitate the transition from relief to development; and
  - ◆ The current low level of both staffing and delivery of certain services in e.g. Angola and Somalia leads to a negative perception of the presence. A proportional increase of both is needed.
- (5) **lack of coordination between HQ and Field:** The behavior of donors and agencies on the ground have been strongly influenced by political analysis of situation and directions of their respective capitals and HQ. Unless implementation of directions specifically required

coordination, most organizations accepted that coordination was of secondary importance, eventually leading to less than desired results.

## B. Political Gap

18. Political gaps arise when “bilateral donors determine their engagement in a country not by needs assessments alone,” but also by factors, which add a substantial degree of unpredictability both to planning and operations, such as:

### (1) Political calculations

- a. *confidence in government*: Donor confidence was identified as a critical factor in the level of funding available for a country beyond the immediate emergency/humanitarian phase. The question of confidence seemingly pivots around the issues of:
- ◆ Government accountability, capacity, and commitment;
  - ◆ the UN’s capacity to strategically respond; and
  - ◆ security—including access to affected populations, security of staff, and security conditions for the affected populations.

#### **Box -3**

*-In Azerbaijan, it was apparent that donor attitudes and resulting funding levels (i.e., inadequate to sustain a transition from emergency to sustainable reintegration or self-reliance) have been affected over the years by serious concerns regarding the Government’s commitment and cooperation with regard to assisting the IDPs and refugees. These attitudes have reached a stage of fatigue, which is reinforced by nebulous progress with regard to the peace settlement, other competing world demands and a general lack of donor confidence in the government’s willingness and ability to undertake relief to development activities rather than basic humanitarian assistance.*

*-In Liberia, the overall effectiveness of resource mobilization mechanisms has been constrained by negative donor perceptions. According to the RC/HC, “it is evident that lack of success in closing the reintegration gap is not due so much to inadequate conceptual framework or coordination problems as to lack of sufficient external support.”*

*-In the case of Somalia, the Reference Group mission highlighted the issue of security as a detriment to staff security and to donor perceptions of Somalia in general. Based on the impact of security and related factors, the mission emphasized “the need to initiate a dialogue with ECHA and ECPS to trigger a discussion in the Security Council that may eventually lead to a resolution updating the arms embargo.”*

- b. *historical/strategic reasons*: In some instances, donors have made deliberate decisions:
- ◆ to fund programs in countries/regions where they have historical ties; and
  - ◆ not to fund anything other than immediate emergency humanitarian needs based on political considerations.

**Box -4**

*-Bosnia has received relatively high funding, at least initially, because of its unique status in the international community. Aside from humanitarian obligations, Bosnia's historical linkage with other European countries and its strategic importance for the stabilization and development of the region are compelling reasons for such a large international presence. Furthermore, the main donor countries are also the asylum countries. As such, funding of the post-conflict rehabilitation has been directly related to the expectation of quick solutions for repatriation of Bosnian refugees.*

*-In Burundi, "most donors have linked assistance to the signing of a peace accord in Arusha for the last three years, the only funding available has been for strictly-defined humanitarian activities. The UN and its partners have developed a series of strategies to stretch this funding to cover the gap ("expanded humanitarian assistance", "constructive engagement") with limited success." The lack of funding for sustainable reintegration and development considerations due to political considerations on the part of the donors in some instances is at the detriment of creating sustainable conditions that can improve the stability of the country in the long-term by addressing community needs, building capacities, contributing towards improved governance structures, and so forth.*

19. These political calculation factors are further compounded by:

- (2) delays encountered in attempting to persuade donors to become involved
- (3) delays in finding ways to fill gaps in programs and projects that some donors do not find attractive for administrative reasons, reasons of accountability, and political acceptability."

**C. Authority Vacuum**

20. An authority vacuum – a gap extended by all the problems and difficulties of engaging emerging authorities in a post-conflict recovery process – emerged under the following circumstances in the post-conflict phase:

- (1) when post-conflict authorities are **defensive and overwhelmed by the new experience of formal government**, leading them to be often wary and resistant to outside proposals, particularly if these proposals are perceived to threaten the gains made during conflict
- (2) when there is **very limited capacity at the government and civil service levels to actually affect policy**. There may be a lack of indigenous expertise, total breakdown of communications systems between the capital and provincial areas and profound disagreements among authorities themselves about what may be required.
  - ◆ Capacity-building at the community and government level was consistently identified as a viable tool that can be integrated even during the conflict/humanitarian phase to ensure that the Government is well-positioned to participate in the design and implementation of the reintegration process. The Government's involvement—if capacity exists—is key to facilitating the transition between relief and rehabilitation: it enhances the integration of cultural norms within the reintegration process; contributes to the sustainability of the programs; and enhances donor confidence in the Government's commitment to the process.

**Box –5**

*In the case of Angola, “institutional capacity is weak at all levels of government, due largely to a fragile human resources base and an inherited colonial administration beset by problems of over-centralization and excessive bureaucratic procedures reinforced after Independence by a one-party system.... The problem has been exacerbated by the acute shortage of educated and trained staff and low morale and motivation caused by poor salaries and incentives. As a result, relevant government institutions found themselves ill-prepared to formulate and implement post-conflict rehabilitation programs or even coordinate humanitarian/development activities.”*

(3) owing to the **internal dynamics**, e.g. because

- ◆ the common cause in war is not replaced by a common cause in peace;

**Box –6**

*In Tajikistan “independence was not the result of an internal groundswell resulting in a conflict against armed forces, rather the conflict resulted from the imposition of an unwanted independence, which created an authority vacuum. Although the general peace agreement and its protocols address that authority vacuum, the gap is still being filled resulting in an overall lack of rule of law. The criminalization has gained increased momentum over the past seven years, intensifying effects of civil conflict in terms of continued economic instability as well as hindered social reconciliation.” Still in the context of the Former Soviet Union, “the Government of Azerbaijan is only eight years old, and requires a significant amount of capacity building before it will be able to address issue of durable solutions. As such the Government is challenged by poor economic conditions that prevail throughout country in spite of external perceptions to the contrary.”*

- ◆ in a country still engaged in civil war, but where relief and development activities can exist simultaneously within the same country, addressing the authority vacuum is exacerbated by perceptions of non-neutrality. At the same time, this same authority vacuum can negatively impact on the international community’s efforts to work with and through the Government in providing assistance.

**Box –7**

*-In the case of Sri Lanka, “the Government has claimed that it has the primary role to play in leading the country through a process of rehabilitation and recovery. But the institutional arrangements are much fragmented. There is a multitude of complex Government structures dealing with relief and rehabilitation, often leading to disparate working arrangements for UN agencies, donors, and NGOs alike.... Additionally, the context is not limited to one of capacity, but also of political commitment and room for maneuver for a state whose sovereignty is being challenged by a separatist group. The shift from relief to development demands that the government institutions be central to the process and their capacity enhanced. But in the context of the on-going conflict situation with the state as one of the parties to the conflict, empowerment of the government’s capacity may jeopardize the UN’s perceived neutrality and impartiality.”*

**Box –8**

*-It is essential to address capacity building in a coherent manner that addresses both the institutions that address relief and humanitarian needs as well as rehabilitation and reconstruction to facilitate the transition throughout the reintegration phase. In the case of Azerbaijan, the existence of two separate offices dealing with related issues of IDPs and reconstruction is untenable and has resulted in poorly coordinated activities and according to donors, lack of donor confidence. Such dilemmas can be addressed through joint strategies on the part of UN and partner agencies in addressing institutional capacities.*

**D. Synchrony Gap**

21. This gap exists in post-conflict situations as a result of the considerable difficulties:

(1) to establish agreements or understandings between the international community and host authorities. Many times the international community embarks on programs that it feels are required or should be implemented without the full concurrence and more importantly the full commitments of appropriate authorities.

- ◆ While the field analysis demonstrated that the synchrony gap does indeed exist and plays a significant role in developing strategies for the post-conflict reintegration process, it is also evident that the synchrony gap is closely intertwined with both the authority vacuum and the political gap. Programs are often funded due to the timeframe established by donors based on political considerations, as elaborated upon with regard to the political gap, while there is often a disconnect between the international community and host authorities at least partially due to the authority vacuum and the implied need for capacity building.
- ◆ The complex nature of the relationship between the international community and national authorities is highlighted in a number of post-conflict contexts as a contributing factor to the “gap” in the reintegration process. It also highlights the need for activities that are essential to the sustainable reintegration process - including reconciliation, rule of law, human rights, and electoral processes - are undertaken in close coordination with national authorities and communities and are sensitive to gender norms and realities.

**Box -9**

*-“The involvement of the Government [of Burundi] in humanitarian/recovery initiatives thus far has been uneven. On the one hand many of the largest donors channel funding through NGOs and UN agencies on the condition that Government not be directly involved. Nonetheless, the Government has tried to outline plans in the areas of reconciliation and judicial reform. These plans have received minimal support.”*

*-The challenging context of the Former Soviet Union again bears impact on the relationship between the international community and national authorities. In the case of Tajikistan, the “synchrony gap” is replaced by welfare gap as well as lack of well defined roles for all the players...rather than the government feeling that international assistance is ill-placed it views it as replacing the government.... When an international entity implements an initiative in a given area or sector, the Government response has generally been to reallocate its resources to its own or different priorities, rather than view the process as a partnership.”*

- (2) Often times stemming from the lack of commitment by the affected communities to the recovery process.

**E. Sustainability Gap**

22. “A gap of considerable significance arises from government’s inability to sustain the momentum of recovery.” In the context of external assistance for post-conflict recovery, this has been explained in three ways:

- (1) A considerable portion of such assistance—particularly that which deals with public services and infrastructure—create **obligations that fragile governments all too often cannot sustain through conventional government funding mechanisms...**
- (2) Lack of sustainability opens up the equally as fundamental problem that, despite all sorts of post-conflict recovery assistance, **there is little that ensures the types and levels of investment that will generate economic growth.** Without the sustainability of the government and without economic growth, it is evident that reintegration and rehabilitation efforts most likely will not contribute to long-term development and stability. As such, the sustainability gap is a critical factor in ensuring the success or failure of post-conflict reintegration efforts, and potentially in a return to conflict.

**Box – 10**

*-“In the course of the CAP, initiatives aiming at strengthening the will and capacity of local communities or groups to overcome their own, local crisis (be it of social or ethnic and political nature) through income generating activities. This is the greatest threat, as there is a lack of will to change and adapt to the skills required for sustainable initiatives. There is no real private sector, and the shift has yet to be made which will permit the communities as well as the Government structures to accept and sustain initiatives.”*

*-In Bosnia, the Government could have made additional efforts to make the projects sustainable and well managed by increasing the involvement of local communities and local capacity building in order to promote a sustainable reintegration long after the departure of the international community. Furthermore, Bosnia is plagued by a “brain drain” problem. That is, while Bosnia had a very effective and trained human resource base mainly in the technical field, but as a result of the emigration during the war years, and possible phobia within the international community to utilize available local expertise, Bosnia is now experiencing a human resource gap which has delayed institutional capacity building of authorities taking up ownership hesitantly or not at all, general dependency towards external support. This same phenomenon is witnessed in Somalia, where given this lack of opportunities, many professional and young individuals will continue to try to emigrate to developed countries thus contributing to brain drain.*

- (3) Because **donor funding is tied to political perceptions, often the funding is available when political and security realities on the ground do not permit reintegration.** When such reintegration—which inherently requires rehabilitation and reconstruction support that leads towards longer-term development, not humanitarian assistance—is possible, donors have either exhausted their funds, redirected their funding to other “CNN emergencies”, or have moved towards donor fatigue after months or years of little to no progress with regard to sustainable reintegration.

**Box –11**

*In the context of Bosnia, the pressure to disburse funds quickly was high but at the cost of a lack of developmental planning in rehabilitation assistance....The paradigm of minority returns should be given special attention by major donors in determining their funding timeframe. Massive funding and effort were poured in [to Bosnia] at a time when the political environment and legal prerequisites were not in place. Now that return is happening, funding is decreasing.” The result of such a timeframe that places heavy emphasis on substantial funding in the immediate aftermath of a peace agreement at the expense of reduced funding when returns can actually return distorts the impact of the donor funding and does not adequately address the need to introduce sustainable rehabilitation/reconstruction in support of reintegration.*

23. The sustainability gap is closely intertwined with the other four gaps. If the institutional gap is not addressed, agencies will lack coherent strategies and resources –personal and financial—to development and implement coherent programs. Furthermore, the lack of donor confidence and political uncertainty—often directly tied to concerns regarding a Government’s viability—further contributed to an overall lack of funding required to support reintegration efforts. The authority vacuum entails that the Government in question may not be involved sustainably and productively in the rehabilitation process, thereby further contributing to doubts surrounding its viability and directly contributing

to the synchrony and sustainability gaps. As such, it is critical that these five dimensions are viewed as intrinsically linked with a direct impact on the potential success of post-conflict reintegration efforts specifically and the transition from relief to development generally.

#### IV. EXISTING PRACTICES TO ADDRESS THE GAPS

##### A. Institutional Gap

###### (1) Existing practices to better define a common country/region-specific vision

- a. involvement of the relevant humanitarian and development actors, including donor support groups

➤ *Joint Reintegration Programming Unit:*

24. The JRP Unit was initiated by UNDP and UNHCR in 1996. The overall objective of this collaboration is to assist the Government of Rwanda in strengthening the linkages between relief, rehabilitation and long-term development assistance, to ensure that relief efforts are a step towards development and are delivered in ways that promote long-term development.<sup>2</sup>

➤ *UN Humanitarian and Rehabilitation Coordination Unit:*

25. The UN system in the DRC possesses a unique experience in dealing with development and humanitarian agendas in a coherent and complementary manner, through the establishment of system-wide coordination unit, which was born through merging OCHA and UNDP coordination cells into a UN Humanitarian and Rehabilitation Coordination Unit. Thus, the compartmentalization of relief and development aid has been avoided, at least at this stage.

➤ *UN "Join Hands Agreement":*

26. In the DRC, this entails the UN system, supported by the donor community represented in Kinshasa as well as NGOs, would plead for a humanitarian strategy linking urgent, life saving considerations and objectives on the one hand, and peace facilitating initiatives in the fields of socio-economic reintegration of displaced persons as well as soldiers (including child soldiers) on the other hand.

➤ *Sectoral coordination meetings:*

27. In Azerbaijan, the coordination of inter-agency activities in the humanitarian field is facilitated through four different sectoral meetings, which then report to the main interagency meeting. These sectoral meetings include: non-food, food (chaired by WFP), health (chaired by UNICEF), education (chaired by UNICEF), UNAIDS Theme Group (chaired by UNICEF, UNFPA acting as focal point), and demining (chaired by Azerbaijan National Agency for Mine Action). A similar experience is found in Tajikistan, where addressing the gap is the underlying theme of most meetings.

- b. Engagement with political elements, such as DPA and DPKO, to ensure that peace agreements are viable and can facilitate a sustainable reintegration process

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<sup>2</sup> For more details, please refer to "Renewed Memorandum of Understanding between the United Nations Development Programme and the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees in Rwanda," 1999

[To be developed]

c. Strengthening of the RC/HC system

➤ *CCA/UNDAF (launched by UNDG Sub-Group on Programme Policies):*

28. The Common Country Assessment (CCA) is a collaborative country-based process for reviewing and analyzing the national development situation and identifying key issues as a basis for advocacy, policy dialogue and preparation of the UN Development Assistance Framework (UNDAF). The UNDAF is the planning framework for the development operations of the UN system at country level. The CCA process therefore has the potential to allow country teams to think and work together to achieve a common understanding of a country's development challenges, and to identify new ideas and opportunities together with the national authorities, civil society and development partners. On the other hand, feedback from the field indicates that more work needs to be done to adapt the CCA/UNDAF process to post-conflict situations.

➤ *Strategic Framework:*

29. The strategic framework defines the principles, goals and institutional arrangements for a more coherent, effective and integrated political strategy and country assistance program. It provides a common conceptual tool to identify, analyze and prioritize key issues and activities on the basis of shared principles and objectives. The Strategic Framework comprises a political strategy and field-based arrangements for the common programming of international assistance.

➤ *Heads of Agency meetings:*

30. During the post-conflict phase, there was active dialogue between the Resident Coordinator and the World Bank, whose Representative was a member of the UN Country Team and regularly participated in the Heads of Agencies Meeting. Until the curtailment of its operations in the country early this year, the World Bank collaborated closely with UNDP on macroeconomic policies and institutional and human capacity building projects. Missions from the World Bank regularly met with the Resident coordinator and all heads of UN agencies.

31. At the level of the UN, the interaction is assured by active participation of the Humanitarian agencies in the Resident Coordinator system, through regular meetings of the Heads of Agencies, the UN Programme Working Group and other established bodies. (Angola)

d. Strategic partnerships, and strategic objectives

➤ *National Humanitarian Coordination Group:*

32. Interaction is also achieved through participation in the National Humanitarian Coordination Group, co-chaired by the Humanitarian Coordinator (with the Minister of MINARS) and comprising representatives of key Government Ministries, UN agencies, donors, and the representative associations of the national and international NGOs. (Angola)

➤ *Community Rehabilitation and National Reconciliation Program:*

33. With the Angolan Government's adoption of the national execution modality for the implementation of rehabilitation/development programmes (for example, the Community rehabilitation and National reconciliation Programme), the necessary capacity needs to be, and is being, built and strengthened. It is a long-term development objective. (Angola)

➤ *Rehabilitation Theme Group for Policy and Sub-Group Operations:*

34. We have a Rehabilitation Theme Group of Heads of Agencies on policy issues and a sub-group addressing more operational issues. The membership includes UNICEF, UNHCR, UNDP, WFP, FAO, UNFPA, WHO, together with the World Bank. (Sri Lanka)

➤ *Return and Reconstruction Task Force:*

35. At the municipal, cantonal and regional levels, the Reconstruction and Return Task Forces (local and regional) provide a good forum for the agencies based in the field to exchange information, coordinate priority activities and discuss implementation bottlenecks. UNHCR and OHR established the RRTF to ensure co-ordination of international assistance in the area of refugee (and DP) return and reconstruction. The RRTF is co-chaired by UNHCR and OHR at the field level and there is a Central Secretariat located in the OHR Headquarters in Sarajevo. Office of the High Representative, Organisation on Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE), UNHCR, International Police Task Force (IPTF), Stabilization Force (SFOR) and NGO's participate in the local RRTF's to share information, discuss common concerns and decide on priorities. (Bosnia)

➤ *Property Legislation Implementation Program*

36. Most recently, in early 2000, the four key international organisations (OHR, UNHCR, UNMIBH and OSCE) got together to establish a joint (PLIP) which will facilitate the implementation of the property law in favour of the displaced persons wanting to return to the places of origin. Being a task-oriented body geared towards achieving concrete results with a specific mandate given from the outset facilitated each agency to be clear on the functions and responsibilities. It should be noted also that in addition to the nature of the project itself, this process came about because (1) the four agencies, and their staff at the working level, had the same strong common concerns, (2) they have been working closely on a daily basis and (3) they were aware that the success of the project depended on a concerted approach.

➤ *Secondment of Staff*

37. The UN can no longer afford the luxury of agencies working only within their mandates and spheres – there must be shared capacity and knowledge between agencies. In Tajikistan, this has been done informally between OCHA and UNDP, with one of the UNDP International Programme Officers being assigned as

disaster/emergency focal point. This greatly facilitates the work of the HC and offers improved linkages between OCHA and UNDP for certain activities.

**(2) Existing practices to minimize (the effects of) inappropriate and conflicting standard operating procedures**

- a. Flexible, appropriate procedures – especially in light of fast-evolving post-conflict situations - have not been developed, and the few that have been developed are not yet operational.

[To be developed]

- b. slow, inappropriate procedures at HQ level and/or mandate battles at global level

➤ *Framework of Operational Co-operation between UNDP and UNHCR*

38. Launched in 1997, this governs the implementation of UNDP/UNHCR cost-shared measures toward the institutional capacity building of the national Agency for Reconstruction and Rehabilitation and supports the Government's national program for Reconstruction and Rehabilitation of war-affected areas and repatriation of IDPs. The MOU, combined with the directions from the respective HQ has created a situation when the two country offices could assume their full responsibility in the area of repatriation and reconstruction thereby contributing to a strong coordinated UN effort in the activity considered as priority by the government. The experience of UNHCR in implementation of shelter projects was very useful for the effective implementation of the national program of reconstruction, which encompassed the voluntary mass repatriation of IDPs. UNDP, from the other side, was focused more at the capacity building of the national agency and establishment of sustainable livelihoods for returnees through income generation. Therefore, the joint efforts of UNHCR and UNDP approached the problem from different angles complementing each other.”

**(3) Existing practices to address unpredictable, and often inadequate, funding**

➤ *Social Investment Fund (Azerbaijan):*

39. In order to further increase the efficiency and impact on the post-conflict situation, a Social Investment Fund is planned to be established. As compared to the existent scheme, it will have several advantages; first, it will increase cooperation between the partners; also, since the projects for which the funds would be utilized are expected to be proposed by IDPs, refugees, communities of returnees or non-governmental organizations working with them, they can be expected to have the full support of the potential beneficiaries; secondly, approval, for the proposed use of the funds as well as procurement is greatly simplified compared to traditional projects financed by the World Bank.

➤ *Slovenian International Trust Fund*

40. In response to the continued problematic situation of landmines in Bosnia, the international community has set up this international trust fund to support demining

operations and mine victims. The US Government contributes the equivalent amount donated, within a given timeframe, i.e. it matches dollar for dollar. The ITF has a steering committee consisting of representatives of donor countries and the Slovenian government, which also coordinates the Fund. The BH government, through the Demining Commission and the BH Mine Action Centre, works closely with the ITF. The ITF structure and mechanisms for issuing demining contracts to commercial demining companies, is now well-established. The ITF has also provided a forum for donors, mine victim support groups and demining organizations, to meet and discuss matters pertaining to the problem of clearing mines within Bosnia.

**(4) Existing practices to address inadequate personnel policies**

[To be developed]

**(5) Existing practice to improve coordination between HQ and field**

[To be developed]

**B. Political Gap**

**(1) Existing practices to address the effects of political calculations**

a. confidence in government:

➤ *Country Cooperation Framework*

41. A Country Cooperation Framework (CCF) for Angola, covering the period 1997-1999, mobilized resources to support activities in three thematic areas: (i) assistance in post-conflict situation; (ii) support to poverty eradication; and (iii) support to good governance. A request has been made to the Angolan Government for an extension of the CCF to cover the period January–December 2000, to allow the preparation of a UNDAF and the finalization of a new CCF for the period 2001-2003.

➤ [Co-location and joint security arrangements – To be developed]

b. historical/strategic reasons:

➤ *Trust Fund for Community Assistance:*

42. UNDP has established a trust fund for community assistance in Burundi. This mechanism has enabled the mobilization of donor resources that would otherwise not have been available, built partnerships with national and international NGOs, and better coordinate initiatives at all levels.

➤ *Donor Support Groups:*

43. During the post-conflict phase, collaboration between the Resident Coordinator and multilateral donors like the European Union, Angola's major development and aid partner was particularly marked. It should be recalled that the European Union hosted the UNDP supported Round Table Conference on Angola held in Brussels in

September 1995. Cooperation with important bilateral donors like the United States, Sweden and Norway was also more evident during this period. While consultations with the major bilateral and multilateral donors still continue, the collaborative relationship which has been established needs to be institutionalized. A similar experience can be documented in Burundi, where the UN initiated a local donors group this year. While there are currently only a limited number of donors, it is hoped that a firm foundation is being laid for the future.

➤ *Inter-Agency Consolidated Appeal Process*

44. This has been launched annually in Angola since 1995, and has served as an effective mechanism for mobilizing efforts to respond to the funding requirements of urgent emergency humanitarian activities needed to enable the implementation of more sustainable rehabilitation and reconstruction programs with medium and long-term development objectives. Notwithstanding the often significant shortfalls between appealed funding and funds actually raised, the appeal mechanism has proven effective in addressing relief and rehabilitation problems both during the post-conflict situation and in the present context of armed conflict. The CAP experience has been similarly positive in Tajikistan, where it has provided an excellent forum for this discussion, fostering a sort of annual “state of the union” assessment. Furthermore, Tajikistan has been using the CAP and informal donor conferences as its primary inter-agency fundraising mechanisms. However, as the focus of the CAP is humanitarian assistance, individual agencies also have been directly addressing donors for particular projects or programs.

➤ *Regular visits to donor capitals:*

45. In spite of a complicated environment in the DRC, contacts and daily working relations are being maintained with donor countries and multilateral donors in the fields of Human Rights, Judicial Reforms, and Demobilization of Child soldiers, etc. A contact group made up of US and Belgian Ambassadors, ICRC, the Director of the UN human Rights office and the two Coordinators, have been dealing with the issue of minorities at risk in Kinshasa. In addition, within the framework of the Consolidated Appeal Process, the UN Humanitarian Coordinator maintains regular contacts, including visits to donor capital and regular briefings, with a view to promote the humanitarian and post-conflict resolutions envisaged in the UN Common Humanitarian Assistance Strategy.

➤ *High level publicity campaigns:*

46. Tajikistan has had to take a more direct and aggressive approach to resource mobilization, due to the circumstances surrounding the peace process. High-level publicity campaigns are undertaken by the RC/HC during every meeting with donors, and tours of donor countries have been undertaken to personalize the process and encourage donors’ trust.

**C. Authority Vacuum**

➤ *National Execution:*

47. With the Angolan Government's adoption of the national execution modality for the implementation of rehabilitation/development programs (for example, the Community Rehabilitation and National Reconciliation Program), the necessary capacity needs to be, and is being, built and strengthened. It is a long-term development objective.

➤ *Development of national institution, through UNHCR/UNDP MOU:*

48. In Azerbaijan, the aforementioned MOU, combined with the directions from the respective HQ created a situation when the two country offices could assume their full responsibility in the area of repatriation and reconstruction thereby contributing to a strong coordinated UN effort in the activity considered as priority by the government.

➤ *Secondment of national/government staff to other country programs:*

49. UNHCR, UNDP, WFP, then UNDHA, UNICEF and other agencies and international organizations joined their efforts in order to support the Government in giving the relief aid and resettle refugees and IDPs.

➤ *Inclusion of income-generation/capacity building in CAP initiatives:*

50. UNDP also made a point in including in the course of the DRC Consolidated Appeal Process (CAP), initiatives – now funded by UNDP - aiming at strengthening the will and capacity of local communities or groups to overcome their own, local crisis (be it of social or ethnic and political nature) through income generating activities.

➤ *Building local capacities for Peace:*

51. The approach supported by the UN Country Team in Sri Lanka is the idea of building local capacities for Peace (DO NO HARM approach) and the concept that conflict resolution and reconciliation should be incorporated in programs.

## **D. Synchrony Gap**

➤ *Opinion Polls*

52. “UN program planning requires to be based on national priorities and national strategy to be reflected in the national programme of reconstruction and rehabilitation. As it was the case with Azerbaijan, the international assistance was required to help the Government to develop the national program. To that end, damage assessment, IDPs and refugee survey and opinion polls were conducted.”

## **E. Sustainability Gap**

[To be developed]

## V. RECOMMENDATIONS IASC REFERENCE GROUP ON POST-CONFLICT REINTEGRATION

*The IASC Reference Group on Post-Conflict Reintegration recommends the following actions to be considered and undertaken by the IASC and its members to ameliorate the UN's collective response to post-conflict reintegration. These recommendations are based on the Reference Group's findings through consultations with headquarters and field-based personnel since the Reference Group's inception in November 1998 as a means to identify creative and innovative solutions to gaps in the post-conflict reintegration process.*

### **Institutional Gap**

#### **Common country/region-specific vision**

- 1) *Develop framework for reintegration in country-specific contexts:* Country Teams recognized that specific geographic regions entail specific challenges that surpass but influence the post-conflict reintegration process. A re-occurring theme in this regard was the need for overall policy guidance from HQ, to include ECPS, UNDG, the World Bank, and so forth, on “gap” programming and national government capacity building in the specific context of the Former Soviet Union countries, as most of these are confronted with unique economic, political, and ethnic challenges. The IASC should encourage its members to work with the ECPS, UNDG, and the World Bank to formulate policy/program guidelines that could address the issue of “the gap” within the larger political and socio-economic realities of this region.
- 2) *Undertake regional approaches:* The IASC members at the field level with support from HQ should ensure that programming and strategy efforts are undertaken at the regional level where relevant to ensure a comprehensive and sustainable regional reintegration and rehabilitation approach.

#### Action:

- a. IASC members involved in the return of refugees should undertake to organize field visits for the members of UN Country Team to refugee camps to ensure smooth transition from emergency to rehabilitation, making full use of transition funding, and complementarity between emergency input and development aid; advocacy; involvement of beneficiaries; draw upon skills and expectations of refugees.
- b. UN Country Teams, with support of the relevant HQ agencies, should organize regional meetings to raise and address issues between Country Teams in neighboring countries that can facilitate the reintegration process in terms of policies and programs.
- c. The IASC members should ensure that such regional coordination is supported by the individual agencies at the HQ as a policy process and from the technical/resource perspective to ensure that regional initiatives are not thwarted by bureaucratic or mandate obstacles.

### **Conflicting principles and mandates**

3) *Integrate common principles throughout programs:* It is apparent through the field responses that there is an array of fundamental principles that should be incorporated by humanitarian and development organizations alike in both strategies and programs to ensure effective and sustainable post-conflict reintegration approaches. These principles include:

- When possible, IASC members should seek partnerships with agencies that were present prior to/during the conflict and that possess expertise, experience, and networks. Such agencies should be utilized optimally instead of bringing in new actors that do not have the necessary country-specific experience to facilitate the transition process.
- Post-conflict reintegration programming should work through community-based approaches to facilitate longer-term capacity building that can contribute to sustainable transition approaches.
- Programming should be aware of gender issues and mainstream gender throughout strategies and projects to the extent possible.
- Programming should utilize local resources, capacities, and skills throughout the transition process to the maximum extent possible.
- Programming should consist of an integrated package that takes into account the variables that may bear impact on the success of a sustainable post-conflict reintegration process including rule of law, institutional reform, economic revitalization, regional implications, security and the proliferation of small arms, and so forth.
- People-centered and state-centered approaches are both vital to the successful and sustainable reintegration process. These two perspectives can be mutually reinforcing if they correctly planned and implemented through a collaborative approach.
- In developing programs, agencies should work to ensure political commitment of the states concerned as a prerequisite to ensure meaningful rehabilitation and recovery processes.
- Conflict resolution and reconciliation should be incorporated into programs—both humanitarian and development—to the extent possible.

Action:

- a. IASC members should undertake to consider these principles when devising strategies and programs as individual agencies or in partnership with other IASC agencies
  - b. IASC members should collectively advocate the relevance of such approaches to donors and partners.
- 4) *Incorporate humanitarian/development considerations into political processes:* Country Offices observed that often, political instruments to facilitate a peace process are developed in isolation of the humanitarian and development realities and concerns. It is therefore essential that the political, humanitarian, and development perspectives are well-coordinated and intertwined to ensure a holistic approach to the issues at hand.

Action:

- a. The IASC should work in close coordination with the relevant political actors to ensure that peace agreements, political frameworks, and so forth make provisions for the “field realities” of a post-conflict reintegration process.
- 5) *Address issues of impunity, justice, and reconciliation in political resolutions:* During events related to attempts at political resolution of a conflict, such as peace agreements, the impact

of such issues as impunity, justice, and reconciliation should be taken into account notably as they relate to post-conflict reintegration. Humanitarian and development actors should be consulted and privy to discussions regarding the role of such issues in any eventual peace agreement/framework before it is finalized.

Action:

- a. The IASC should engage to the extent possible with bi-lateral governments involved in peace negotiations and other political actors (including DPA, DPKO, and so forth). These discussions should be undertaken in close coordination and consultation throughout the process with all spheres (political, humanitarian, and development) to ensure that there is full understanding of the implications of components of a political discussion on the repercussion on the sustainability of the post-conflict process with particular regard to reintegration.

### **Lack of Leadership**

- 6) *Deploy inter-agency teams to develop common approach:* The IASC should adopt a policy that inter-agency teams are deployed from relevant IASC agencies at the HQ level to visit post-conflict countries at least every six months to review the effectiveness of UN coordination structures; to jointly develop and monitor transitional programs and strategies; and to provide a basis for advocacy with the donors.

Action:

- a. The IASC should adopt this initiative as a standard practice in conflict/post-conflict countries, and should encourage its member agencies to participate regularly in such inter-agency missions in a timely and effective manner.
- b. The IASC should invite donors (OECD/DAC) and representatives of the Government, civil society, and so forth from the conflict/post-conflict country in question to participate in these missions to identify concrete actions that can be developed in the relief to development continuum, and to fortify links between the IASC and donor community in formulating and implementing a comprehensive transition strategy.
- c. IASC members should commit to actively participating in such missions on an ongoing basis to ensure continuity of program/strategy development, lessons learned, and so forth.
- d. The IASC should ensure that the practice of deploying such missions at the outset of the crisis, continuing on a regular basis, should be systematized through the IASC mechanism and supported by the individual IASC members.
- e. The IASC should undertake as part of these missions a monitoring component which will monitor the capacity building efforts to determine that the strategy and program can eventually be handed-over to the national authorities and relevant counterparts to ensure long-term sustainability.
- f. The IASC should endeavour to jointly develop an overall Terms of Reference for such missions to ensure consistency in their purpose and outcome.
- g. As a component of this, the IASC should develop indicators regarding the transition progress to the extent possible.
- h. The joint programming process that emerges from the inter-agency missions outlined in Recommendation 13 should be developed in full coordination with the Country Team. The Country Team should work on a regular and ongoing basis to ensure that the programming remains integrated between the UN agencies and the Government to ensure a comprehensive plan of action to facilitate the relief to development process and the eventual hand-over to the relevant national entities.

### **Lack of objective oriented coordination**

- 7) *Establish inter-agency country-specific task forces at HQ level:* The IASC should advocate and support the establishment of inter-agency task forces at the HQ level to support Country Teams that are facing conflict/post-conflict challenges with regard to specific countries. Such a mechanism would enable a consistent source of dialogue, interchange and policy/technical support between the HQ and the Field. Additionally such a mechanism at HQ could help alleviate potential institutional or bureaucratic obstacles to programming, personnel, and other procedural and mandate issues that obstructs progress at the field level.

#### **Action:**

- a. The IASC should advocate with the relevant Executive Committees the establishment of such task forces as a systemized component of the IASC's response to conflict/post-conflict scenarios.
  - b. Individual IASC members should commit to participate regularly and actively on these Task Forces at the appropriate staffing level.
  - c. The IASC should develop generic terms of reference for the Task Forces that could include: program advocacy to the donors; attempt to address/resolve political and security challenges that could hinder effective implementation of humanitarian/development programs and efforts in the field; address bureaucratic or technical constraints that arise between agencies; develop media strategies and links to larger advocacy networks, etc.
- 8) *Forge link to other HQ processes:* The IASC should ensure that Country Teams and HQ agencies should link with other HQ efforts like the DDR Task Force regarding the coordination of reintegration processes.
- 9) *Facilitate common UN premises:* The IASC should consider common UN premises to provide a basis for joint or linked activities between relief and development in the field for increased coordination.

#### **Action:**

- a. The IASC members should facilitate the necessary operational, legal, and technical procedures to establish common UN premises when and where possible and appropriate.

### 10) *Create a common mechanism to share information*

Information-sharing among agencies at the headquarters and field level is a critical component in removing obstacles to joint planning and programming that could enable improved responses to post-conflict reintegration. As such, the IASC should develop a common website through which IASC members and partners can post and obtain information related to lessons learned in post-conflict reintegration programming, best practices, specific programs in conflict/post-conflict countries, information relevant to staffing/secondments, and other relevant information.

Action:

- a. The IASC should establish a working group of information technology experts from IASC members to formulate a website (or build on an existing site such as Reliefweb) that would facilitate the exchange of information between IASC members and partners.
- b. With support of the IASC, the working group should establish a mechanism by which all IASC members contribute to the maintenance and upkeep of the website through information dissemination and secondment of personnel to ensure the website is current and pertinent to the conflict/post-conflict situations.

### **Institutional cultures**

- 11) *Utilize formalized MOUs between agencies:* In several field operations, formalized MOUs between agencies at the HQ level have resulted in positive relations and integrated program approaches in the field. For example, in the case of Azerbaijan the UNDP/UNHCR Framework of Operational Cooperation (10 April 1997) has effectively governed cost-sharing measures towards institutional capacity building of government offices involved in reintegration/rehabilitation activities.

Action:

- a. The IASC should encourage its members to develop or, if necessary, revise accordingly MOUs that govern practical issues such as cost-sharing or more strategic divisions of labor between interlinked humanitarian and development oriented activities.
- b. The IASC should encourage agencies at the HQ level to support their field offices in identify practical means to implement the MOU.

### **Inappropriate standard operating procedures**

- 12) *Revise operational rules to expedite programming/implementation:* There is a need for the UN operational system to speed up the process of adapting its current operational rules and procedures for evolving conflict situations to expedite effective programming. Examples of rules to be addressed may include the speed of allocating and accessing extra-budgetary expenditures, more flexibility in the application of certain rules such as those that stipulate the limit on the use of vehicles, hiring of personnel, and so forth.

Action:

- a. The IASC should encourage its members to formally review and revise its operational procedures with regard to operational rules in close consultation with its field offices. The revisions should incorporate specific flexible procedures for addressing operational rules in a conflict/post-conflict environment.
- b. The IASC should encourage its agencies to commit to training its HQ and field-based personnel involved with operational procedures to familiarize them with the new rules and mechanisms to alleviate any misunderstandings and potential accompanying delays.

### **Funding mechanisms**

- 13) *Establish common procedures for funding and disbursement at the field level:* Some Country Teams recommend that there is an agreement between agencies in the field on a common set of procedures that will facilitate joint funding, disbursement, and accountability as a means to

enhance cooperation. To achieve this, however, it is recommended that more flexibility and authority should be delegated to the field level to hasten the receipt and disbursement of resources.

Action:

- a. The IASC should encourage its members at the HQ level to delegate the necessary amount of authority to its staff in the field to coordinate with other field-based agencies to develop innovative funding modalities that can expedite the disbursement process.
- b. Individual IASC members at the HQ level should examine their policies towards delegating authority to the field. In cases where a particular agency's policies and procedures are centered primarily at the HQ level, the agency is encouraged to explore new procedures through which authority is delegated to the field.

- 14) *Collaborate policies and programs with Bretton Woods Institutions:* A collaborative approach with organizations involved in economic reform is essential in developing an integrated approach that sustains reintegration effort. In this regard, it is recommended that Country Teams and HQ, in devising strategies for particular countries, ensure that policy reforms being advocated by the Bretton Woods Institutions are supported through project initiatives by UN agencies.

**Personnel policies**

- 15) *Secondment of staff:* To ensure that longer-term strategies are effectively linked to initial humanitarian activities in a conflict/post-conflict scenario, personnel from development organizations should be seconded to humanitarian office(s) in field operations as team members at the outset of the conflict.

Action:

- a. The IASC should endorse as a general policy that development staff are seconded to humanitarian offices in humanitarian organizations, and encourage its members to adopt the necessary personnel policies and mechanisms to facilitate such an activity.
- b. Each IASC agency should review and revise accordingly its personnel policies and standard operating procedures to ensure that such arrangements can be implemented quickly and effectively.
- c. The IASC should encourage IASC members to participate in an overall IASC MOU which would outline the mechanisms and procedures to ensure the effective and timely implementation of such staffing arrangements.

- 16) *Review/revision of personnel policies:* IASC members, both development and humanitarian oriented, are encouraged to review and revise personnel policies and incentives to attract, encourage and support staff to serve in conflict/post-conflict environments to ensure the availability of an adequate number of qualified staff at all levels.

Actions:

- a. IASC members should revise their incentive packages to ensure that positions at all levels within a conflict/post-conflict environment are career enhancing within the respective organizations.
- b. IASC members should review and revise accordingly their staffing arrangements to ensure quick deployment of the appropriate staff.

- c. IASC members should develop, maintain, and strengthen rosters of qualified staff with experience in conflict/post-conflict reintegration contexts that would be available for quick deployment.
- d. IASC members should make these rosters widely available to the IASC and its partners to ensure that quality staff are readily available to all agencies.

17) *Joint training program*: The vast majority of the Country Teams interviewed during the questionnaire process affirmed their strong support for a joint training process of staff working in conflict/post-conflict environments to ensure they are well-acquainted in principles and programs relevant to both humanitarian and development contexts. In recognition of this need, the IASC should work to develop a training program that addresses issues relevant to the transition between humanitarian and development activities in a conflict/post-conflict field operation.

Action:

- a. The IASC should review the existing training programs within individual IASC members with a view to develop a database of existing training programs.
- b. IASC members should make available their training programs to staff from other IASC agencies and partners to ensure a collaborative training process.
- c. The IASC should ensure that all training programs take into account the various cultural sensitivities, humanitarian principles, psycho-social issues, and other realities that may emerge in a conflict/post-conflict environment.
- d. If the IASC deems that the existing training programs are not comprehensive and do not provide a forum that sufficiently links the question of emergency-development transitions, the IASC should investigate developing a specific joint training program that would take into account these variables and be available to all IASC members and its partners.
- e. In addition to an overall training program, the IASC should ensure that joint training programs are available in the field to address the context-specific nature of particular transition environments.
- f. If the IASC takes this course of action, it should confer with donors to stress the value of such training on the long-term benefits enabling UN staff to facilitate relief-to-develop transitions and should encourage donors to financially support such training programs.

18) *Address security implications*: Country Teams, especially those working in relatively insecure environments or countries facing a “no war/no peace” context, highlighted the issue of security as one that jeopardizes the post-conflict reintegration process due to the security and travel limitations it imposes on staff, and due to the high costs that are involved in maintaining security operations. It is therefore essential to recognize security as a factor that inherently impacts on reintegration programming.

Action:

- a. Headquarters should be seeking funds for staff security measures from core resources or the UN regular budget or a global security trust fund. The IASC should note that extraordinary “security funds” will help eliminate the perception of high “overhead” costs and release additional funds for program activities.
- b. Initiating possible security Council action, which would recognize the issue of staff security and establish a special fund for these purposes in the same manner as the council finances observers and other missions worldwide.
- c. Through the DSG task force on security of staff and the IASC, ECHA or ECPS, HQ should be encouraging decentralized decision making on staff security. Such efforts are

already underway, but field colleagues are not fully aware. Equally, the IASC task force has been looking at the relationship between the UN System and NGOs in the field making use of the UN Security System.

- 19) *Develop task force to address personnel issues:* As noted in Recommendations 1 – 4, Country Teams have stressed the need for the availability of qualified staff in conflict/post-conflict environments. To ensure the implementation of these recommendations, the IASC could consider the merits of establishing an inter-agency Task Force that can review and recommend best practices for personnel procedures, potentially develop a joint training program, and other mechanisms to effectively address staffing issues in a timely manner.

## **POLITICAL**

### **6. Revising and Strengthening Resource Mobilization Strategies**

- 20) *Strengthen CAP for use in the humanitarian phase:* Most Country Offices noted that the CAP is a useful resource mobilization strategy in context where humanitarian issues are fundamental in terms of providing a forum through which agencies can develop integrated approaches, advocate common programs to donors, and develop strategies. At the same time, Country Teams noted that the CAP in its current form can be strengthened and/or used more effectively.

#### Action:

- a. The IASC should consider incorporating NGO activities to become a common programmatic framework for all conflict/post-conflict humanitarian-oriented activities, not only those limited to the IASC members, in order to ensure a comprehensive approach.
  - b. In developing CAPS, IASC members should ensure to include regional aspects in terms of programming and strategies as appropriate.
  - c. The IASC should support the RC/HC and Country Team in resource mobilization by working with the Country Teams to design and convene high-level donors meetings with participation from relevant IASC and partner agencies to advocate the needs and programs outlined in the CAP.
  - d. The IASC should ensure close contact is maintained between IASC members (both at the field and HQ level) during the implementation of the CAP to initiate necessary planning activities for the next phase as early as possible.
- 21) *Investigate, develop, and implement modalities that surpass the CAP for longer-term activities:* While recognizing the value of the CAP in terms of primarily humanitarian-oriented programs, there was a general consensus that the CAP is not sufficient to address the issues of rehabilitation and post-conflict past the emergency and humanitarian phase. As a result, the CAPs are often perceived as an inadequate forum to strategize and outline longer-term needs essential for rendering post-conflict reintegration successful, and often result in insufficient funding. As such, the IASC should investigate the possibility of mechanisms that surpass the traditional CAP that are designed to incorporate transition activities, including longer-term rehabilitation and reintegration.

#### Action:

- a. The IASC at the Headquarters level should engage in a dialogue with donors (OECD/DAC) to explore the possibility of initiating an alternative type of CAP, i.e a “CAP Plus”, whereby countries in transition would be given an opportunity to prepare emergency/relief activities in a regular CAP and the longer-term rehabilitation/development elements in a CAP Plus.
- b. The IASC should thoroughly review the “best practices” that have been identified by Country Teams as reflected in this report to address critical resource mobilization and programming issues for presentation to the donors, including: strategic frameworks, donor support groups, roundtables, trust funds, social investment funds, and so forth to facilitate inter-agency resource mobilization strategies in the transition context.
- c. Modalities that have already been developed, such as the strategic framework, should be fully operationalized and supported by both external partners and national stakeholders. The IASC at HQ level should work with the relevant Country Teams to facilitate this process.

22) *Identify joint-funding modalities to increase integrated programming and resource mobilization:* Country Teams, with support from HQ, should identify particular “joint funding” approaches to post-conflict reintegration that involve relevant UN agencies, the Government of the country involved, and donors to collaboratively formulate and implement an integrated approach to the reintegration process. Such an approach also enables the Government to develop its capacity to implement the programs depending on the level of political will. One example of such a mechanism could be a “International Advisory Group” which could serve as a high coordination and policy body to channel the donors’ funds into the reconstruction and rehabilitation activities.

Action:

- a. The IASC should encourage its agencies at the field level to develop such approaches depending on the specific context of the country in question.
- b. RC/HCs should take stock of the programmatic tools and mechanisms utilized by other Country Teams in conflict/post-conflict situations as outlined in this report to serve as a basis for possible programmatic tools, lessons learned, and best practices.
- c. In implementing such mechanisms, Country Teams with HQ support should develop practical modalities to track the information that would be necessary to successfully utilize such a tool, including the availability of donor resources.

23) *Promote mechanisms such as Trust Funds where appropriate:* Several Country Teams noted that UN Trust Funds at the country-level are instrumental in channeling available resources to effective programs, facilitating joint programming, and mobilizing resources. Country Teams also noted that it is useful if funds contributed to the Trust Funds by donors are not earmarked, and that the implementing agencies have the authority to utilize direct execution rather than relying on national partners which may not have the capacity.

Action:

- a. In its dialogue with OECD/DAC, the IASC should promote the use of field-based Trust Funds as a means for donors to channel resources to a particular country.
- b. The IASC should also encourage donors to contribute unearmarked funds to ensure that resources for post-conflict reintegration activities can be programmed quickly, effectively, and as a component of an overall process.

## **7. Relations with Donor Community**

- 24) *Develop flexible funding modalities:* The IASC should recommend to OECD/DAC that donors should consider developing mechanisms that ensure that funds are disbursed in a manner that is consistent with the humanitarian and development needs. Such a timeframe should be adjusted to the prevailing circumstances including the overall funding situation, political developments, reintegration opportunities, and so forth.
- 25) *Ensure continuity of funding beyond emergency phase:* The IASC should encourage bilateral donors/governments to establish mechanisms in their own funding/budget structures to ensure that donor governments can uphold commitments to countries that are no longer “high profile or visibility” but where there is a vested interest to sustain investments already made through the humanitarian relief/efforts. Such budget structures should enable governments to address emergency humanitarian and “CNN” priorities while not reducing rehabilitation/reconstruction activities for other countries.
- 26) *Institutionalize collaborative approaches with donors:* Some Country Teams in conflict/post-conflict environments have successfully incorporated the donor community in strategic discussions that bear impact on policy directives and program approaches in facilitating post-conflict reintegration. Overall, Country Teams that have utilized such an approach note that the donor/Country Team relationship has facilitated transition efforts at the political and financial level. As such, the relationship between agencies/Country Teams and important bilaterals should expand beyond the consultation phase and should be institutionalized as a collaborative approach with such donors.

### Action:

- a. The IASC should encourage Country Teams to seek strategic partnerships with bilaterals.
  - b. The inter-agency task force, as outlined in Recommendation , should support the Country Team’s efforts in this regard.
  - c. Country Teams may consider modalities such as “donor-wide” working groups on relief and rehabilitation to facilitate dialogue and potentially lead to an “institutionalized” relationship on areas of mutual concern/interest.
- 27) *Develop relationships with non-UN agencies such as regional organizations:* In some instances, a donor may not be convinced that the time is right for placing its funds into a programme supporting activities that will complement reintegration efforts, such as the development of a police force of international standards. UN agencies in the field should explore partnerships with other non-UN agencies, such as regional organizations, that are specialised in certain sectors that do not necessarily fall under the area of responsibility of the UN agencies on the ground but directly/indirectly impact on the reintegration process. It is possible that the specialised agency could convince the donor of the need for specific activities.

### Action:

- a. The IASC and its members should further develop relationships with regional organisations at both the HQ and field level.
- b. To the extent possible IASC members should involve regional organizations present on the ground in discussions and strategy formulation, with particular emphasis on sectors that bear impact on the sustainability of post-conflict reintegration efforts.

## AUTHORITY VACUM

### 5. **Building Local Capacities:**

- 28) *Address national capacity building as priority:* It is evident from the field assessments that without strong, credible Government actions in moving relief to development, it is likely that donors will not have the confidence to remain engaged in post-conflict reintegration situations. As such, IASC members should undertake national capacity building as a priority even at the stage where circumstances necessitate primarily relief activities.
- 29) *Include authorities in coordination mechanisms:* In developing coordination structures in the field to link rehabilitation with reintegration, IASC members should undertake to include national and local authorities as well as local NGOs to facilitate the transition from emergency to development with the sustainable component of local participation.
- 30) *Involve diaspora and local resources:* IASC members should work to link up with and encourage the participation and involvement of *diaspora* and exiled communities in the post-conflict reintegration process from the level of strategy development, program design, and implementation to maximize the use of their skills and capacities, and to prevent a potential trend of “brain drain” that could weaken the economic, social, and intellectual base that is required for the country’s sustainable reconstruction.
- 31) *Take stock of local NGO capacities:* IASC members should undertake a comprehensive assessment of the mandate and capacities of national NGOs operating in the country and prepare a “NGO Directory”. This could serve as a basis to develop and implement a capacity building program for local partners that could be involved in both humanitarian and development activities.
- 32) *Support and include civil society organizations:* IASC members should also seek to intensify efforts to inspire activities by civil society organizations, including strengthened roles of women, by providing concrete support to civil society organizations. This includes building the capacity of those organizations able to monitor and advocate on these issues. Such activities would also improve monitoring and collection of information on the ground.
- 33) *Facilitate secondment of national staff:* In some instances it may be useful for relevant staff in government/civil service offices to visit or work with government/civil services in other conflict/post-conflict settings to widen their perspective of possibilities in terms of post-conflict reintegration, modalities for programming, strategies, best practices, and so forth.

#### Action:

- a. IASC members at the field and HQ level should work to facilitate such an “exchange” with other UN operations in a conflict/post-conflict environment and, if necessary, support such a process with the necessary resources.
- b. The IASC should encourage its staff in the field to identify possible “exchange” options as a means to building capacity and expertise of government/civil society officials in conflict/post-conflict reintegration programming and strategies.

### **Synchrony**

[To be developed]

## **Sustainability**

[To be developed]

## ANNEX I. Overview of “Best Practices” Used By The Field

53. The lessons learned through the Reference Group process reveal a number of operational tools and mechanisms that have put into place by various Country Teams to address the issue of the “gap” with regard to post-conflict reintegration. These tools provide a useful inventory for other Country Teams facing post-conflict reintegration contexts while forming the basis for the Reference Group’s recommendations to the IASC.

### **Coordination:**

54. *As country experiences consistently indicate, joint programming by humanitarian and development agencies from the outset of an emergency and enduring throughout the transition process is essential in facilitating the post-conflict reintegration process. Joint programming mechanisms also contributes to an overall strategy.*

**Joint Reintegration Programming Unit:** Rwanda

**Social Investment Fund:** Azerbaijan

**UN Humanitarian and Rehabilitation Coordination Unit:** DRC

**Strategic Framework:** Liberia and Azerbaijan

**Rehabilitation Theme Group for Policy and Sub-Group for Operations:** Sri Lanka

**Secondment of Staff:** Tajikistan

**Return and Reconstruction Task Force:** Bosnia

**Property Legislation Implementation:** Bosnia

**Heads of Agency meetings:** Angola

**Program Working Group:** Angola

**National Humanitarian Coordination Group:** Angola

**Community Rehabilitation and National Reconciliation Program:** Angola

**UN Common Humanitarian Assistance Strategy:** DRC

**CCA/UNDAF (launched UNDG Sub-Group on Programme Policies):** Sri Lanka

**Framework for Relief, Reconciliation, Rehabilitation with UN agencies:** Sri Lanka

**sectoral coordination meetings:** azerbaijan, Tajikistan

### **VI. Funding: donor confidence, security**

CAP as a positive tool: Afghanistan (NGO involvement)  
Angola (enables implementation of more sustainable activities)  
Tajikistan

CAP as negative: Burundi (little funding)

Donor Support Groups: Angola  
Burundi

Round Table:

Open Trust Fund: Angola

CCF: Angola

CCA/UNDAF: need to adapt to post-conflict context (Burundi)

Trust Fund for Community Assistance: Burundi

regular visits to donor capitals: DRC

high level publicity campaigns: Tajikistan

informal donor meetings: Tajikistan

**Capacity Building:**

National Debate on Integration/Reintegration: Angola

National Execution: Angola

development of national institution, through UNHCR/UNDP MOU: Azerbaijan

secondment of national/gov't. staff to other country programs: Azerbaijan

inclusion of income-generation/capacity building in CAP initiatives: DRC

building local capacities for Peace: Sri Lanka

## **ANNEX II. Operational tools:**

### **Afghanistan:**

Coordination: Strategic Framework, Afghanistan Support Group, thematic groups  
Funding: Consolidated Appeals Process (NGOs involved), involve donors and Bretton Woods in coordination mechanisms

### **Angola:**

Coordination: donor support groups; humanitarian agencies participation in Heads of Agency meetings, Program Working Group, National Humanitarian Coordination Group involving key Government ministries, UN agencies, donors, local/international NGOs  
Funding: UNDP-supported, EU hosted Round Table Conference; Community Rehabilitation and National Reconciliation Program (\$882 pledged, only \$639 requested); Open Trust Fund (managed by UNDP, to implement CRP); CCF mobilized funds for PC assistance; support to poverty eradication; support to good governance. Inter-Agency CAP effective for urgent humanitarian activities needed to enable the implementation of more sustainable activities.  
Staffing: need for staff with policy analysis and planning  
Capacity: National Debate on Integration/Reintegration  
NEX rehabilitation/development programs

### **Azerbaijan**

Coordination: inter-agency collaboration on reconstruction pilot projects involving Government, donors, etc; involve Gov't. and donors in International Advisory Group; joint WB/UNHCR/UNDP/Gov't. agreement; Social Investment Fund: increase cooperation between partners, involve IDPs  
Funding: limited by "no peace no war"; inter-agency strategy (UNDP to ARRA, WB through grants; TACIS—international NGOs, ECHO, UNHCR, Islamic bank  
Staffing:  
Capacity: ARRA (through UNHCR-UNDP MOU); secondment of national staff to Bosnia;

### **Burundi**

Coordination Regional nature, requires HQ support for initiatives  
Funding Consolidated Appeal results in little to no funding; need to adapt CCA/UNDAF to process; Trust Fund for community assistance that attracts donor resources, builds partnership at local/international level, facilitates coordination; donor support groups useful  
Staffing "OCHA administratively unequipped to fulfill its role; personnel procedures are particularly ill-suited to the tasks at hand  
Capacity: no funds available for capacity building, this will negatively impact on Government's ability to manage future recovery/development initiatives

### **DRC**

Coordination: Coordination unit set up in UNDP in 1995 and merged with OCHA in 98 provides support to RC/HC, runs programs addressing emergency and longer-term assistance as "joint hands agreement"; "inter-agency emergency humanitarian intervention mechanism"—allow for specialised agencies to respond to emergencies while UNDP and other capacity-building oriented agencies will try to strengthen local structures in crisis management capacities; heads of agency meetings; merged UNDP and OCHA coordination cells into a system-wide unit or UN Humanitarian and Rehabilitation Coordination Unit

Funding maintain contacts with donor countries and multilateral donors in the fields of human rights, judicial reforms, demobilization; in context of CAP, HC maintains regular contacts including visits to donor capitals in terms of UN Common Humanitarian Assistance Strategy

Staffing  
Capacity: include in CAP initiatives aimed at strengthening the will and capacity of local communities or groups to overcome their own local crisis through income-generating activities

**Liberia**

Coordination need to operationalize through external partners and national stakeholders  
Funding arrears problems, affects bretton woods institutions; utilize special donro meetings  
Staffing  
Capacity

**Rwanda**

JRPU Unit

**Sri Lanka**

Coordination Rehabilitation Theme Group of Heads of Agencies on policy issues, sub-group on operational issues: UNICEF, UNHCR, UNDP, WFP, FAO, UNFPA, WHO, World Bank—resulted in joint un framework for relief and rehabilitation. RC chairs donor-wide Heads of Mission in-country development forum meetings; donor-wide working group level on relief and rehabilitation.

Funding Country Team involved in CCA, geared to launch UNDAF; launched UNDG Sub-Group on Programme Policies, launched CCA/UNDAF Learning Network to ensure reviewing the process

Staffing  
Capacity building local capacities for Peace (Do No Harm approach); Government has asked the WB to be assisting in establishing a Framework for Relief, Reconciliation, Rehabilitation with UN agencies, donors, NGOs. Empowerment of govt's capacity may jeopardise the UN perceived neutrality and impartiality

**Tajikistan**

Coordination regional rapid response teams with budget; increase formalized partnerships between agencies such as UNHCR and UNDP such as seconding UNDP staff to UNHCR; sectoral coordination meetings. CAP basis of coordination discussions; strengthen links between agencies such as OCHA and UNDP through secondment of staff

Funding funding based on security; strong relationship with WB; CAP and informal donor meetings; high level publicity campaigns undertaken by RC/HC.

Staffing  
Capacity

**1. Donors largely base funding on political interests or issues. There is often a discrepancy between political mechanisms and humanitarian/development considerations.**

- There is an inherent challenge in a situation where the donors have a clear vested interest in certain resources and/or developments within a particular country. If there is no clear co-ordinating mechanism, the donors will pursue their own interests, and it will weaken efforts by the international community to influence the local authorities on policies regarding reintegration. Therefore, donor participation needs to be strengthened in the overall UN programme implementation in order to ensure that donor contributions towards the reconstruction programmes of local authorities are used effectively. The UN system needs to outline a coherent relief-to-development policy in order to create a high degree of confidence among donors. In addition, it is vital that the international community is consistent in removing political obstacles in the area of operation, such as administrative structures, etc., which hinder post-conflict reintegration from taking place.
- In order for long-term interest to be sustained by donors, there is often a need for results or positive developments, whether through peace-agreements or through a demonstrated willingness by the local authorities to commit to reintegration and the overall development process. Humanitarian and relief activities need to be combined with provisions for the transition towards development activities; otherwise, there is the risk of donor fatigue. The challenge is for humanitarian and development agencies and organizations to link the political activities advocated by donors (for example peace agreements) to the humanitarian and developmental needs within the reintegration process. In addition, the perceived level of commitment by the authorities on key issues related to post-conflict integration affects the attitude of donors, and the subsequent funding levels for that country; a perceived lack of cooperation and commitment by the governing authorities will lead to donor fatigue. For this reason, it is necessary that funding modalities are flexible, in order that they take into account possible future developments and the changing nature of the political environment, as well as a decline in funding by other donors.
- It is important that the circumstances and limits in the post-conflict environment is taken into account by the international community as well as by the local authorities, and that alternate plans are developed if the situation necessitates this. If not, there is the risk of a dependency on international aid developing, as well as frustration among the local community. For instance, in a situation where the circumstances are such that there is little likelihood of IDPs returning in the short and medium-term to their former areas of residence, possibilities for their reintegration should be explored. The international community needs to adjust its policies to what is feasible in the context of the local environment. In certain situation, the UN has to be an implementing agency, and has to be able to deal with local businesses and local administration.

**2. Lack of overall macro-economic, political rehabilitation and development policies on the part of UN and donors to sustain post-conflict reintegration process. This is exacerbated by the ability (or lack thereof) and willingness of national authorities to formulate and implement policies and programmes in support of reintegration and development.**

- *It has to be recognized that the circumstances in the country may make it difficult for the national authorities to work on issues, and may result in the authorities not being a consistent partner in moving forward with transitional programming and strategies. In this respect, it is important that:*
  - *the local authorities are made to focus on sustainable solutions for key issues related to post-conflict reintegration.*
  - *the relevant mechanisms and bodies set up by the government needs to have the authority to deal with the international community on these issues.*
  - *there exists an integrated approach between the international community and the government programmes, in order to mobilize the necessary resources for post-conflict reintegration.*

- *It is vital that the UN system engages in capacity building in order to strengthen the authorities, as well in maintaining donor confidence. Strategies for national capacity building and development should be a priority even during relief stages, and should be planned ahead for. During the hand-over of UN administered programmes into the administration of local authorities, it is often the case that the governmental institutions are poorly supplied, equipped and maintained by the appropriate ministries. There is often a lack of involvement by local communities, leading to a lack of capacity within those administrations during the actual hand-over. Therefore, it is important that institutional capacity-building takes place in order for the local authorities to be able to take over the structures which have been created by the international community. This can be achieved through ensuring that the UN works in close collaboration with the authorities, and that issues of transparency are emphasized, in order to build the capacity of the authorities as well as improving the reputation of the authorities. In this respect, it is important that the international community sets up mechanisms to monitor the activities of the national authorities once the hand-over has taken place. In addition, there is also a need for follow-up by the international community on programmes that have been handed-over to the local authorities in order to ensure that those authorities are committed to the programmes. Capacity building for local civil society organizations should also be conducted, including for those organizations involved in monitoring and advocacy. This would also enable the gathering of information on the ground.*
- *In post-conflict reintegration, coherent policies taking into account the regional perspective need to be put in place in order to address the issue of "brain drain". "Brain drain" hinders institutional capacity building, leading to a risk of dependency on external support developing among the remaining local populations. This leads to a lack of opportunity, perpetuating the problem as skilled labor leaves for countries which offer better opportunities. The return of the diaspora population would provide the reintegration process with a skilled and educated resource which would improve the development process. It is therefore important that mechanisms to encourage and enable the diaspora to return home are put in place, involving the countries hosting the diaspora and the refugees.*

