

**INTER-AGENCY STANDING COMMITTEE-WORKING GROUP
XLII MEETING**

New York 14-15 September 2000

THE POST-DJIBOUTI PLANNING PROCESS

The United Nations operational agencies, in close collaboration with the UN Political Office for Somalia (UNPOS), recently undertook a series of meetings to establish a coherent policy and operational framework in anticipation of what has been called "post-Djibouti Somalia". The summary that follows combines the key issues, agreements and follow-up actions that arose out of this consultative process to be followed by the UN Agencies, Headquarters and the inter-agency Somalia Planning Team (SPT¹).

Consistent with the objectives outlined in the 16 July *Inter-Agency Post-Djibouti Planning Process*, the purpose of this most recent consultative process is four-fold:

- ❑ to ensure that the operational system of the United Nations, in close collaboration with the Somalia Aid Coordination Body [SACB] and UNPOS, responds in an appropriate and timely manner to the Somalia National Peace Conference (SNPC) held in Djibouti and the "post-Djibouti environment" in Somalia;
- ❑ towards that end, to establish amongst UN operational agencies responsible for Somalia an arrangement that reflects the unity, harmony and coherence of the UN's position and activities with regard to post-Djibouti Somalia;
- ❑ to use the post-Djibouti planning process as an example of how UN headquarters and the field can effectively plan together to create a UN operational framework for dealing with "post-conflict recovery" situations;

I - **Engaging in the Peace Process.** While the results and consequences of the Djibouti process will remain uncertain for several weeks if not months, UN agencies agreed that the process itself offers "a unique planning moment". Agencies also recognised that it was for the people and authorities of Somalia to determine with international agencies their priorities, initiate and to the extent possible fund their identified needs.

[1] **A clear and balanced message.** At this stage of the Djibouti process, a clear and balanced message would have to underscore all the activities of the UN system, viz:

- ❑ to inform delegates at the conference and authorities throughout Somalia about the operational planning activities underway by the UN system and SACB partners to respond to the needs of "post-Djibouti Somalia";

¹ The Somalia Planning Team is comprised of a consultant team leader situated at the SNPC, the UN Resident Coordinators Office, members from UNDP and inter-agency colleagues (such as the UN Security Officer). It is envisaged that this team will expand to include colleagues from the SACB.

- ❑ to stress that the UN system has limited resources and that whatever the consequences of the Djibouti process this resource situation will probably not change significantly over the short and medium-term;
- ❑ to re-enforce the UN position that on-going agency programmes and projects agreed with existing counterparts in Somalia will continue;

| <u>Communications Strategy</u> | | |
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| Action point | Contact | Target Date |
| Statement on the UN planning process. | 4/8 | SPT |
| Tour UN representatives to Djibouti and all regions | 6/8 | R/C |
| Technical Experts: to assist the SNPC and regional counterparts | | SPT |
| Consultations with the SACB | 15/22/25/8 | R/C, UNPOS |
| SNPC Weekly Update on recent events | Weekly | UNPOS/ R/C |
| Somalia Planning Team consultations on a regular basis | Weekly | SPT |
| UNDP headquarters to establish an "internal network group" to facilitate action at headquarters | | |
| Briefings in New York, Geneva and Rome | Early Sept | UNPOS, R/C |
| Contacts to be made through IOM with the Diaspora networks | 8/8 | SPT |

II - **Phased Planning Process.** The UN's operational planning process needs to be seen in at least three phases. Should the Djibouti process result in a form of transitional government, there will be an immediate need to provide basic assistance to the nascent administration as well as to continue with on-going programmes. On the other hand, if progress is minimal or even counter-productive, then an operational crisis review will be of predominant concern.

Assuming at this stage the more positive option, there are some immediate steps to be taken, then a first phase concerned with an immediate "100 day programme" in which rapid support will be required.

A second phase will be required to move rapidly from the first one-hundred days to a one-year perspective. Assuming relative stability within that timeframe, a third phase will be focused upon a longer-term plan that is consistent with the three year transitional period of the authorities. For the purpose of this planning process, phase one – or the first 100 days – will be the principal area of concentration.

[1] **Immediate Steps:** to be taken by the SPT and inter-agency colleagues in ensuring operations will be responsive to the post-Djibouti environment;

[2] **The first one hundred days.** The principles that underlie the response to the first 100 days include:

- ❑ immediate engagement at the operational and technical levels to be seamlessly linked with consultations noted in section I, above;
- ❑ a planning process that emphasises an incremental approach to UN activities, ensuring that expectations of Somali authorities are realistic and cohere with the limited resources of the UN system;
- ❑ advocacy concerning the international community's expectations about the role and responsibilities of Somali authorities to be closely coupled with the planning exercise;
- ❑ a "ladder" of initiatives – transparently articulated -- that reflect the sorts of activities that can be achieved under differing circumstances;
- ❑ an initial focus upon "pivotal projects" that will make a significant difference to the new authorities in terms of practical impact and public awareness;
- ❑ develop "packages" of programmes to ensure transparency and improved communications with counterparts;
- ❑ mechanisms will be needed for monitoring resources being pledged to the transitional and regional authorities of Somalia.

| <u>Phased Planning</u> | | |
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| Action point | Contact | Target Date |
| Matrix of UN agency programmes (compatible with NGO database) | 31/8 | SPT and JWG ² |
| Information data base/ transfer of data to counterparts | 31/9 | SACB |
| Comprehensive security analysis combined with "principled action" to improve security | 31/8 | SPT |
| Programme matrix shared with SACB to facilitate planning | September | |

² The JWG is the Joint Working Group comprised of senior programme officers of the UN Agencies

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| “Start-up” or “expanded” projects to focus on confidence-building and profit from political stability and greater access. | 1/9 | SPT/ SACB |
| Operational plans to support nascent government/ regional authorities | 1/9 | SPT/ SACB |
| Operational plans for increase presence in Baidoa and review of regional coordination structures/ information management | 1/9 | SPT |
| Establish mechanism to monitor and coordinate resources | | SACB |
| Continued dialogue with regional authorities | | UNPOS/ RC |

III - **Operational Framework for Post-Djibouti response.** Whatever the circumstances and with whomever the UN operational agencies work, there will have to be a clear understanding about the nature of UN engagement, the UN’s role and responsibilities as well as the obligations that all authorities have to the United Nations and *vice versa*. In that regard, the following principles will apply to the UN’s response to the needs of the people and authorities of Somalia:

- ❑ principled engagement: to ensure that all authorities have a clear and unambiguous understanding about the roles and responsibilities of the United Nations. In so doing, to emphasise in particular all authorities’ responsibilities under international humanitarian and human rights law, to ensure humanitarian access and to recognise that UN operational agencies are fundamentally apolitical and are focused upon the needs of the people of Somalia;
- ❑ to make it known throughout Somalia and to all relevant partners that the United Nations operational agencies have reaffirmed their obligations reflected in the December 1999 ***Framework for UN Engagement in Somalia***;
- ❑ to ensure that all services contracted or sub-contracted with Somali groups, organisations or authorities are based upon standard UN rates, determined by the UN operational agencies through the UN’s Operations Group;
- ❑ to the extent possible, planning process will give attention to jointly programmed initiatives, utilising the capacities of non-governmental organisations as well as UN agencies;
- ❑ to use the post-Djibouti planning process as a means to formulate a UN system approach to operational response, emphasising the engagement of headquarters and field offices towards a set of common and agreed objectives.

| <u>Principled Engagement and Operations</u> | | |
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| Action point | Contact | Target Date |
| Constructive Engagement: including preparation of appropriate documents, negotiation, training and dissemination | | 1/9 SPT |
| Review and uniform policy of standardised operations, contracts, rents etc | | UN Agencies |
| Strategic monitoring and evaluation team | | |
| Re-enforcement of Framework for UN Engagement in Somalia: through training, dissemination etc | | UN Agencies |
| Incremental expansion of UN presence in Somalia, with particular emphasis upon inter-agency facilitation focal points. | | |

| <u>Headquarters and the Field</u> | | |
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| Action Point | | |
| Presentations at ECHA/UNDG/ECPS/IASC | | |
| Proposed UN DPA Technical Committee in New York closely linked to HQ focal points for Somalia and to the UN Country Team. | | |
| Strengthen information sharing between Field and HQ/ Agencies | | |
| Consideration of institutional structures | | |

IV - **Resource Mobilisation.** It is assumed that there will be few additional resources for Somalia in the immediate aftermath of the Djibouti process. There is considerable concern that even if donors wished to provide substantial new assistance, the present lack of employment, the history of Somalia's aid dependency and the competition of resources will create

Nevertheless, the UN system and its partners would need resources to support in a sensible and realistic manner transitional and regional authorities as well as to continue to provide for the people of Somalia. Resource mobilisation would therefore be an essential part of the UN's post-Djibouti efforts, based upon the following assumptions:

- ❑ quick support projects will be needed should a transitional government which are provided in such a way so as not to prop up structures but to ensure sustainable support for accountable institutions;
- ❑ despite the need to respond rapidly to support nascent transitional authorities, no impression must be given that assistance will be in support of anything other than a Somali-led and funded process and that such support that there is will be essentially incremental;

- ❑ existing funds from the agencies must be found in the short term in order to establish the UN's own *bona fides* and to ensure rapid response to immediate requirements;
- ❑ agencies at the headquarters level will have to move quickly to garner available resources to support the process both in cash and in kind. This will include *inter alia* attention to existing Somalia funds [eg, DPKO], guiding the proposed UN Peace Building Unit, promoting the use of funds for joint programming and making available additional agency resources;
- ❑ fund-raising mechanisms to be considered over time, bearing in mind the need to ensure that Somali expectations are not allowed to become unrealistic.

| <u>Follow-up Action</u> | | |
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| Action point | Contact | Target Date |
| UN resource mobilisation strategy | | |
| Assess resources immediately available to expand relevant post-Djibouti programmes and projects. | | |
| UN agency headquarters to identify pools of resources and raise immediate funds. This will include use of CERF for CAP related needs, unused resources and "stagnant" Somali trust funds. | | |
| UN/UNDP headquarters to facilitate support from World Bank Post-Conflict Reconstruction Unit. | | |
| Informal UNCT meetings with "friends of Somalia" through the mechanism of the SACB to be arranged. | | |
| Greater engagement with "unconventional" donors, eg, Arab states, | | |
| Series of UNCT "packages" for joint initiatives focussing upon series of priority post-Djibouti needs. | | |
| Technical experts required, (e.g. telecoms, constitutional law) who can be provided as in-kind support. | | |
| Mechanisms for medium-term resource mobilisation. | | |