

# MID-YEAR REVIEW SURVEYS



## *HC Position on CAP 2004*



**UNITED NATIONS**  
New York and Geneva, May 2003

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## THE MID-YEAR REVIEW 2003

### GUIDELINES

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CAP Country Teams were requested to submit a one-page answer to the survey with the Mid-Year Reviews

#### ***MYR SURVEY:***

##### **PART I. POSITION ON CAP FOR 2004**

State the consensus position of the CAP Country Team on whether or not there should be a CAP for 2004. Explain this position based upon the following considerations:


- a) The scale and/or complexity of the humanitarian crisis  
(Estimated total affected population, geographical areas affected)
- b) The extent and complexity of humanitarian response  
(Number and size of programmes of operational agencies, including NGOs)
- c) Changes in access to affected populations and conflict zones (Changes in security phase structure)
- d) Multi-sectoral dimensions of humanitarian response.  
(Protection issues, mine action, negotiations for humanitarian space)
- e) Existence of other strategic planning mechanisms (i.e. UNDAF, Brookings Process)
- f) Existence of other resource mobilisation mechanisms
- g) Position of the Government of the affected country on the CAP
- h) Local capacity to coordinate and respond to humanitarian response (government structures)
- i) Presence of development actors, their emergency preparedness and response capacity, and the degree to which development programmes are being undertaken

##### **PART II. PROCESS QUESTIONS**


- 1) Who was involved in CAP Strategy setting?
- 2) Who is present but not involved, and why?
- 3) Were inter-agency assessments conducted and what were the results?
- 4) What monitoring systems are in place? (Such as common databases, baseline data, inter-agency monitoring unit) Describe constraints to monitoring.
- 5) Has a monitoring report been issued measuring progress against the indicators described in the Appeal? If so, describe the most important results.
- 6) Are the current monitoring system and related indicators sufficient? If not, what is planned to improve them?
- 7) Has there been a CAP Revision or additional Appeals for humanitarian assistance (donor alerts, natural disaster appeals)? If so, why?

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**AFGHANISTAN (TAPA)**



The UN Country Team is discussing programme activities for 2004. The outcome of these discussions will be presented to the IASC Working Group in July.



**PART I. POSITION ON CAP FOR 2004**

*This is a very complicated question for the Angolan team. As you may recall, the Government announced in October 2002 that the 2003 Appeal would be the last for Angola. The Government took this decision in the expectation that a donor conference would be held during 2003. It is still not clear whether, or when, there will be a conference or not. The Government remains adamant about its original position and would almost certainly not accept another "emergency Appeal." UN agencies will need some kind of resource mobilisation tool, however, for 2004 since reintegration needs will still be enormous. The Country Team has discussed the possibility of launching some kind of a "bridging request" or transition document. The Country Team looks forward to the recommendations of Geneva on this point.*

- a) The scale and/or complexity of the humanitarian crisis  
(Estimated total affected population, geographical areas affected)  
*An estimated 2.5 million returnees throughout the interior of the country will still require integrated assistance programmes.*
- b) The extent and complexity of humanitarian response  
(Number and size of programmes of operational agencies, including NGOs)  
*The operation is expected to remain approximately the same size, with at least 10 UN agencies, 11 Government ministries and departments and more than 400 NGOs actively participating.*
- c) Changes in access to affected populations and conflict zones (Changes in security phase structure)  
*Access will continue to expand. Although the general security situation is stable, banditry may increase in areas where populations are unable to establish food security. Criminality is also expected to increase in urban areas.*
- d) Multi-sectoral dimensions of humanitarian response.  
(Protection issues, mine action, negotiations for humanitarian space)  
*Please see humanitarian strategy.*
- e) Existence of other strategic planning mechanisms (i.e. UNDAF, Brookings Process)  
*The UN system will be finalising an UNDAF during coming months. In addition, the World Bank's support for reintegration of former combatants is expected to come on stream.*
- f) Existence of other resource mobilisation mechanisms  
*Please see comments above on the donor conference.*
- g) Position of the Government of the affected country on the CAP  
*Please see comments above on the CAP.*
- h) Local capacity to coordinate and respond to humanitarian response (government structures)  
*As part of its exit strategy, OCHA is currently working with Government officials to develop a year-long capacity building programme aimed at increasing local capacities to coordinate and respond.*


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- i) Presence of development actors, their emergency preparedness and response capacity, and the degree to which development programmes are being undertaken  
*Agencies are already shifting into development programmes. This process will accelerate in coming months as the emergency winds down. Please see humanitarian strategy.*

## **PART II. PROCESS QUESTIONS**

- 1) Who was involved in CAP strategy setting (elaborating the CHAP)?  
*Please refer to page 91 in 2003 Appeal.*
- 2) Who is present but not involved, and why? What actions were taken to make the process more inclusive?  
*All relevant partners participated.*
- 3) Were inter-agency assessments conducted and what were the results?  
*Please refer to pages 25-29 in the 2003 Appeal.*
- 4) What monitoring systems are in place? (Such as common databases, baseline data, inter-agency monitoring unit) Describe constraints to monitoring.  
*OCHA is currently the custodian of 18 integrated databases that monitor conditions throughout the interior. WFP/VAM has an extensive database for monitoring vulnerability. Through the child info initiative, UNICEF regularly monitors key social indicators. WHO monitors epidemiological data and FAO monitors the status of the agricultural campaigns. All agencies share data and information from these databases on a routine basis. Constraints include: a) lack of access; b) lack of Government capacity; c) lack of baseline statistics; d) lack of funding.*
- 5) Has there been a CAP Revision or an additional Appeal for humanitarian assistance (donor alerts, natural disaster appeals)? If so, why?  
*Adjustments have been made to the original Appeal. Please see Mid Year Review.*

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## BURUNDI



### **PART I. POSITION ON CAP FOR 2004**

The consensus position of the CAP Country Team on whether or not there should be a CAP for 2004.

Based upon the following considerations:

- a) The chronic nature of the humanitarian crisis. (3/4 of the population can be affected, although not simultaneously).
- b) The complexity of humanitarian response given both the humanitarian and developmental challenges.
- c) Ongoing difficulty in gaining access [UN ONLY - NGO occasionally] to areas for days, sometimes weeks/months at a time.
- d) Multi-sectoral dimensions of humanitarian response. (Protection issues, HIV/AIDS, refugees/IDPs)
- e) Embryonic stage of the UNDAF.
- f) Local capacity to coordinate and respond to humanitarian response (government structures)


### **PART II. PROCESS ANSWERS**

- 1) INGOs. UN agencies and implementing partners were involved in CAP strategy setting (and elaborating the CHAP).
- 2) The role of the Government continues to improve. Their lack of resources [personnel and physical] constrains their role. OCHA Burundi continues to encourage close participation with the government at every level, particularly during the sectorial meeting, provincial fora and strategy identification.
- 3) Yes. Robert Smith. The report/conclusions has not been shared with OCHA Burundi.
- 4) All monitoring systems are UN agency based.
- 5) MYR ONLY.



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## CENTRAL AFRICAN REPUBLIC



The Central African Republic (CAR), a landlocked and very poor country, has witnessed an unprecedented political and military crisis since the last coup attempt of 25 October 2002, which finally resulted in the political change on 15 March 2003. In order to help the country cope with the crisis, a Flash Appeal covering the period from April to June was submitted to the donors on 23 May 2003. The aim of this Appeal is to obtain sufficient resources to enable the United Nations respond to the critical needs of some 2.2 million persons.


Because of the level of challenges in the country, a more wide-ranging Appeal covering a period of 12 months would be necessary to strengthen the link between emergency humanitarian action and a return to normal development activity in the country:

- The education sector, for instance, could be one of the sectors to be developed in a possible Appeal for 2004. The strike by teachers due to the Government's failure to pay their salary arrears makes the 2002-2003 school year an uncertainty and jeopardises any immediate action in the education sector in the context of the current Flash Appeal. A more broad-based and profound reflection which cannot be carried out within the scope of the present Appeal is necessary for a better understanding of all the dimensions of the issues confronting the education sector;
- Besides the issue of the protection of women from human right violations like rape and physical violence already covered by a project funded by UNDP since January 2003, the problem of family reunion will also have to be addressed. To this end, it is worthwhile to enhance humanitarian coordination both at the level of UN Country Team and of the Government, so as to ensure a better management of the actions to be taken, as well as the conduct of more thorough assessments of needs in some sensitive sectors such as the environment; and
- It would be necessary to strengthen the security system over a period of at least 12 months to ensure better protection for UN Agencies and their humanitarian partners.

Other activities to be undertaken in the context of an eventual 2004 Appeal could be identified in close collaboration with the UN Resident Coordinator and UN Country Team.

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## CHECHNYA & NEIGHBOURING REPUBLICS



### PART I. POSITION ON CAP FOR 2004

Consensus on whether or not there should be a CAP for 2004.

Based on following considerations:


- a) The scale and/or complexity of the humanitarian crisis.  
The crisis is located largely in the Russian Federation's republics of Ingushetia and Chechnya (together less than half the size of Switzerland) and home to some 1,240,000 people. The subsequent response consists of sectors that reach from 1,240,000 beneficiaries of health related assistance to 36,000 beneficiaries of economic recovery programmes.
- b) The extent and complexity of humanitarian response.  
Seven UN agencies have received at least partial funding for this year. The largest programs are run by WFP, which has received over US\$ 6 million, and smallest by UNDP receiving so far more than US\$ 50,000.
- c) Changes in access to affected populations and conflict zones.  
No changes.
- d) Multi-sectoral dimensions of humanitarian response?  
Currently, there are 9 sectors in the humanitarian response: protection/human rights, food, shelter and non-food items, health, water and sanitation, education, mine action, economic recovery and infrastructure, and agriculture.
- e) Existence of other strategic planning mechanisms.  
None.
- f) Existence of other resource mobilization mechanisms.  
None.
- g) Position of the Government of the affected country on the CAP.  
The government has been consulted extensively and accepted the CAP for 2003.
- h) Local capacity to coordinate and respond to humanitarian response.  
The Russian Government has a large capacity to coordinate and respond to the humanitarian consequences of the crisis.
- i) Presence of development actors.  
UNDP is seeking to begin development programmes, as are some NGOs. At this point humanitarian aid is largely still emergency relief.

### PART II. PROCESS QUESTIONS

1. Who is involved in CAP strategy setting?  
The government, donors, UN agencies, ICRC, NGOs, and beneficiaries.
2. Who is present but not involved, and why?  
The response is highly inclusive, involving nearly everyone. One constraint limiting participation is that some donors are not allowed to travel to the North Caucasus because of their governments' security protocols.
3. Were inter-agency assessments conducted and what were the results?  
In this case, we have ongoing assessment and monitoring mechanisms.
4. What monitoring systems are in place?  
A CAP Monitoring Working Group and a web-site and database enhance monitoring capacity. The main constraint is restricted access to Chechnya.
5. Has there been a CAP Revision or an addition Appeals for humanitarian assistance?  
No.

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## COLOMBIA



*The scale and/or complexity of the humanitarian crisis.* Displacement and the humanitarian crisis worsened in 2002. The illegal armed actors have declared rural and urban civilians to be legitimate military targets. This has had an adverse impact on displacement trends.

According to accumulated data, the NGO Advisory Office for Human Rights (CODHES) indicates that 2,903,920 persons have been displaced in Colombia since 1985 (6.8% of the population), while registration by the Social Solidarity Network (SSN) records 912,463 officially displaced persons over the past 7 years.

Data for 2002 shows an increase both in the number of displaced persons and in the areas impacted by displacement. In 2002, SEFC (System of Cross-Referenced Forced Displacement Estimates by the Social Solidarity Network) data reported 312,048 displaced persons, as compared to 2001, an increase of 69.82%. Data from CODHES indicated a 2% rise in displacement, from 341,925 persons in 2001 to 412,553 in 2002.

*The extent and complexity of the humanitarian response.* In the context of the humanitarian crisis, undeniable progress has been made in developing a policy on displacement and in improving assistance mechanisms. However the State's capacity to respond to the demand for assistance from the population displaced by violence is insufficient. There have been very important steps forward in the design and delivery of emergency assistance. However, there are problems associated with displacements that last longer than the three-month emergency period established by the government. In this sense, The UN humanitarian strategy is based upon the Humanitarian Action Plan (HAP). Actions are not defined as emergency assistance, but rather on the post-emergency period and with an emphasis on prevention. The Plan targets the transition period between the humanitarian crisis and the socioeconomic stabilization phase, as defined in Law 387/97 that regulates IDP matters.

The twelve UN agencies that have participated in the HAP, together with humanitarian partners, including many NGOs, continue to provide assistance to approximately 2.9 million persons throughout the country. The UN in Colombia has activities and projects in 223 of the 1,099 municipalities comprising 25 of the 32 departments. The UN response has focused mainly on national institution-building. Each agency's programs and projects are consistent with its own mandate and with bilateral agreements with the national counterparts.

*Changes in access to affected populations and conflict zones.* One tactic of the armed groups is to "besiege" rural communities, preventing villagers from leaving, and blocking their access to food, fuel, medicines and hampering their productive activities. Communities sometimes find themselves enclaved or isolated between two or more armed groups and cannot displace themselves, although their circumstances are objectively similar to those described in article 1 of Law No. 387/97. This situation is also, in part, due to the scarce civil state presence. There are cases of recruitment and disappearance of leaders, particularly among the indigenous populations.

*Position of the Colombia Government on the CAP.* Consultations with the government are ongoing in order to determine if there will be a CAP for 2004. An official answer is still pending.

*Multi-sectoral dimensions of humanitarian response.* Given the violent nature of the Colombian conflict, the displaced population is forced to leave behind most of their belongings and requires direct humanitarian assistance in the areas of shelter, food, health and sanitation, education, psychological assistance, protection. Hence, a multi-sectoral response that involves all operational UN agencies present in Colombia is required, creating the need for a well co-ordinated, inter-agency planning and response.

*Existence of other strategic planning mechanisms.* The operational coordination level involves planning actions on the ground, organizing tasks and defining concrete coordination mechanisms. The local humanitarian plans LHP of action are the mechanism, which coordinates the definition of the inter-agency

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strategy at the local level. The most important examples are the Pilot Plan for Magdalena Medio and for Chocó.

*Existence of other resource mobilization mechanisms.* In July 2003, a meeting will be held in London under the auspices of the UK Government with the participation of Norway, Switzerland, Canada, Japan, US, and Argentina, Brazil, Chile, Mexico, the EU and the UN. In this meeting, the Colombian Government will present a political document on its position *vis-à-vis* the humanitarian crises and development issues. This meeting will be followed by a round table convened by the Inter American Development Bank to take place in October, possibly in Brussels, to discuss about co-operation issues and resource mobilisation for Colombia.

*Who was involved in HAP:* UN system, ICRC, National and International NGOs, Donors community and Government institutions.


*Local capacity to coordinate and respond to humanitarian response.* The Social Solidarity Network has the responsibility of coordinating the National System of Comprehensive Assistance to the Displaced Population NSCADP. According to law and policy, NSCADP should work in a decentralized way through the local governmental and non-governmental organisations. However, procedures are still not in place to ensure full compliance with these regulations.

One of the HAP's objectives is to improve the capacity of institutions to respond to the humanitarian crisis caused by the armed conflict. This objective is to be achieved through the strengthening of the entities involved, particularly at the local level, the promotion of decentralisation in policy management, and the active participation of civil society, particularly through incentives to the private sector.

*What monitoring system is in place.* An inter-agency Humanitarian Situation Room was established in December 2002 to monitor and evaluate the humanitarian crises. Information from various humanitarian information sources, particularly about displacement, is collected, categorised and analysed. Situation reports are produced and disseminated on a regular basis.


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**COTE D'IVOIRE**



The form and process of the CAP for 2004 for Cote d'Ivoire/ West African Sub-region will be part of the scheduled inter-agency Field Review mission, which will visit Cote d'Ivoire, Guinea and Sierra Leone between 23 June and 3 July.

***TO BE UPDATED following completion of mission***



**PART I. POSITION ON CAP FOR 2004**

*State the consensus position of the CAP Country Team on whether or not there should be a CAP for 2004.*

The DPRK CAP Country Team has recognized for a number of years that the chronic problems in DPRK cannot be resolved by humanitarian assistance. After nearly nine years of substantial intervention by the international community, it is very clear that the solution to the chronic emergency in DPRK will not be through continued ongoing provision of relief items. The entire population of approximately 23 million people has crosscutting vulnerability caused by inadequate food availability. Poor quality of and limited access to basic health, water, sanitation, and education services compound this vulnerability.


A process, led by the Government, with the support of the international community, must be put in place to create an enabling environment for the implementation of a comprehensive rehabilitation and development strategy, particularly focused on creating the conditions for sustained economic growth. This needs to be supported by an increased presence of development actors, which apart from UN Agencies, is restricted to SDC, Italian Development Cooperation and a EuropeAid project office. If this process is not achieved the humanitarian crisis will not only continue, but will invariably worsen. The worsening crisis will be compounded by an increased reluctance by donors to support rehabilitation activities without a complementary Government policy framework. Given the prevailing security situation it is unlikely that conditions for development will be created this year.

There is no concrete evidence that the necessary positive improvements required to sustain a transition from humanitarian assistance to rehabilitation and development programming will be created in the foreseeable future. In 2004, resources directed through the CAP will be still required to save the lives of those people suffering from the cumulative effects of chronic malnutrition, a fractured economy, inadequate food production, and a decaying social sector. It is likely that international support for a humanitarian response to the crisis in 2004 will be more uncertain due to the prevailing security situation. Support for non-food programmes is likely to continue at current levels however some major donors have expressed concern about continued assistance without improved operating conditions. (Note from WFP: This concern is also expressed by (major) donors providing food aid to DPRK.)

The agreement of the DPRK Government to participate in the UNDAF strategic planning mechanism is a positive indicator that in the medium term a transition to development may yet occur. Participation in the UNDAF process could in the medium to long-term assist the Government access ODA outside the framework of the CAP, the main resource mobilization tool for the provision of assistance to DPRK. At the time of writing the MYR review Government participation in UNDAF this year was less certain. Participation in the CAP by the Government remains limited.

**PART II. PROCESS QUESTIONS**

The DPRK CAP Country Team, which consisted of resident UN Agencies, bilateral donors, IFRC and resident NGOs, formulated the MYR of the 2003 CAP. The MYR exercise was a desktop process, utilizing agency and organization inputs based on monitoring of their program activities. Monitoring is characterized by an absence of transparent assessment, monitoring and evaluation methods consistent with international practice. Monitoring of the Appeal is undertaken using a CAP activity-based approach. The 2003 MYR was less participatory than previous years due to requirements for agencies to respond to operational concerns regarding implementation of SARS preventative measures by government.



**PART I: THERE IS A CLEAR NEED FOR A 2004 CAP FOR THE DRC.**

**a. The scale and/or complexity of the humanitarian crisis (estimated total affected populations/geographical areas affected)**

As a result of five years of war following decades of mismanagement, the entire Congolese population (estimated at about 54 million people) is to be considered affected and vulnerable. The state apparatus, social infrastructure, local economy, have collapsed. There are an estimated 2.7 million IDPs in the country. The results of the MICS 2 (in the CAP 2003) show an alarming situation of the Congolese population at all levels and in all areas. Especially the situation in the eastern provinces of North and South Kivu, Maniema, northern Katanga, Orientale and the Ituri area, has continued to deteriorate as clashes and fighting continued, creating new population displacements, as well as continuous looting, killing and sexual violence.

**b. The extent and complexity of humanitarian response (number and size of programmes of operational agencies, including NGOs)**

It is estimated that humanitarian access in the eastern provinces diminished over the past year. The first priority of the humanitarian community working in the DRC is therefore the advocacy for humanitarian access to the people in need and the respect of fundamental humanitarian principles. International pressure needs to be put on all stakeholders in the conflict in order to stop the fighting, looting, and violence against civilians. It is only when the security and the protection of the civilian population is guaranteed that humanitarian activities will have a sustainable impact.

In the western part, especially Equateur, activities have been undertaken in order to stimulate actors to work in this isolated and often forgotten part of the DRC that houses a large number of IDPs. However, several sectors of humanitarian assistance remain so far largely uncovered such as mine action, water and sanitation, rehabilitation and reconstruction activities.

**c. Changes in access to affected populations and conflict zones**

Access to the populations in need has been extremely difficult in the east, as only the strategic towns are controlled by the RCD-Goma while the rest is in the hands of Mayi Mayi militias. As a result, the province of South Kivu has only been accessible for about 80% over the past months. The same goes for the Ituri area that changed hands twice over the past year. Nevertheless, access was gained in northern Katanga, and humanitarian space opened up in the whole of the governmental area and most of MLC territory (the two Kasai, Katanga, Equateur).

**d. Multi-sectoral dimensions of humanitarian response (protection, access...)**

Due to the changing environment and the continuation of insecurity problems and lack of political goodwill, most humanitarian actors in the east have adapted their strategy to advocacy activities for humanitarian access and for the protection of civilians, together with rapid intervention mechanisms. There is a clear demand for international pressure on all warring parties to stop the hostilities.

**e. Existence of other strategic planning mechanisms (UNDAF, Brookings Process)**

There exists a UNDAF process that was started up about a year ago. In the near future, weekly meetings will resume with programme officers of the UN agencies in order to define weekly priorities for humanitarian action.

**f. Existence of other resource mobilisation mechanisms**

The Humanitarian Advocacy Group gathers every Friday morning in order to discuss humanitarian issues and to take decisions accordingly. This meeting is also attended by the two major donors (USAID and ECHO).

**g. Position of the Government of the affected country on the CAP**


The government of the DRC is consulted in the process of the CAP. A representative of the Minister of Health, who is also in charge of the National Crisis Committee, is being consulted.

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- h. Local capacity to coordinate and respond to humanitarian response (government structures)**  
The National Crisis Committee gathers regularly under the auspices of the Minister of Health in case of emergency. There is however a strong dependence on international actors.
- i. Presence of development actors, their emergency preparedness and response capacity, and the degree to which development activities are being undertaken**  
Since about one year, development actors have become interested again in the DRC as a result of some kind of stabilisation and the progress made in the Intercongolese dialogue. Bilateral cooperation has resumed, and the World Bank and the IMF have taken up cooperation with the DRC again as well. However, their activities so far are still limited to exploration, and will hopefully be expanded and fully implemented in the following months after the signing of the peace agreement and the installation of the transitional government. They are also very much involved in the DDRRR process.

## **PART II: PROCESS QUESTIONS**

- 1. Who was involved in CAP Strategy Setting?**  
The framework of the CHAP was discussed over the CAP Workshop that took place in July 2002 with all humanitarian partners and donors. Later in the year it was developed by OCHA and circulated for remarks among all UN agencies, NGOs and donors. For the Mid-Year Review, a mission was organised to the east of the DRC for a consultation with humanitarian actors present.
- 2. Who is present but not involved?**  
It is recommended to include already in the elaboration of the CHAP the partners in the eastern provinces and not only during the Mid-Year Review. A first step was taken by the mission to Goma for the MYR, but should be followed up by at least one week of consultations in the east in preparation of the 2004 CAP.
- 3. Were inter-agency assessments conducted and what were the results?**  
OCHA facilitates interagency assessment missions throughout the year, trying to cover a large part of the country as possible.
- 4. What monitoring systems are in place? (common databases, baseline data, interagency monitoring unit)**  
Monitoring is being done through coordination and information meetings and sectoral working groups on field level, through humanitarian situation reports, assessment missions, databases and mapping, and through the weekly coordination meetings of the Humanitarian Advocacy Groups at Kinshasa level.
- 5. Has there been a CAP revision or additional Appeals for humanitarian assistance? If so, why?**  
An additional appeal was developed for the Ituri area after the fighting of the 6<sup>th</sup> of March when the region changed hands from UPC to UPDF control, as this brought about a certain stability leaving the opportunity for opening humanitarian space and reaching a large number of populations in need. A revision of the CAP is also recommended as several organisations wish to change some of their project summaries and others to introduce some.



**PART I. POSITION ON CAP FOR 2004**

- a) Scale of the crisis: The consequences of severe drought is impacting on the lives of up to two-thirds of the Eritrean population of which 1.4 million are directly drought-affected. The breadbasket agricultural regions of the country (Gash Barka and Debub) are those most affected by war and now by lowest rainfall seen in more than a decade and experiencing severe food and water shortages. The Northern and Southern Red Sea Zones and Anseba continue to suffer from years of repeated drought. There are reports of unacceptable levels of anaemia, malnutrition and other drought related diseases countrywide; Surveys indicate acute malnutrition rates of up to 30% with severe malnutrition of 4% among children in N & S Red Sea Zobas; increase and lingering of high levels of wasting of children and excessive under-5 mortality (1.5 per 10,000 per day. Food and water shortages are causing movements of agro-pastoralists migrating to potentially better areas in search of water and food for themselves and their livestock.

58,180 IDPs who have yet to return to their villages of origin and some 16,811 persons, out of the 75,000 persons expelled from Ethiopia are accommodated in camps and temporary settlements. The 185,569 IDPs who were assisted to return to their villages in May-June 2001 are still dependent on assistance. 103,000 refugees from the Sudan who were assisted to return home since July 2000 have to be reintegrated in a sustainable manner in communities in the zones of return (Gash Barka- 95%).

The lack of substantive progress in the dialogue between Ethiopia and Eritrea in the run-up to the crucial demarcation of their disputed border continues to have an indirect impact on the humanitarian programme. Thousands of IDPs who are still waiting to return home continue to need assistance. Demarcation and transfer of territory will affect civilian populations.

- b) In Eritrea, there are 42 national and international NGOs, the Red Cross Movement and UN agencies.
- c) There have been changes in the security phase structure. Areas outside of the TSZ in the Southern Red Sea (including Assab) zone, Debub zone and Ghela'eo sub-zone of Northern Red Sea zone were reduced from Phase Three to Phase One. All other areas remained unchanged. Thus access to the vulnerable population improved. However, there have been several incidents and mine related to security such as the recent murder of a British national.
- d) A very effective and efficient coordination mechanism among the various actors and stakeholders in the humanitarian situation has been fully functional. The diverse sectoral working groups composed of relevant government institutions, UN Agencies, NGOs and other development partners have been responsible for the identification of needs, planning activities and allocation of resources according to priority, as well as the implementation, monitoring and evaluation of interventions.
- e) A transitional three-year Integrated Recovery Programme (IRP) envisaged under the UNDAF and developed through the joint Government-UNDAF Thematic Group on Recovery was developed to address medium and longer-term development needs of returnees and communities in war-and drought-affected Gash Barka, Debub and Southern Red Sea.
- f) Other UN joint resource mobilization mechanism includes the IRP and the UNDAF, which are complementary resource and planning tools for 2003 onwards.
- g) The position of the Government of Eritrea is that the CAP has been a very important mechanism for a coordinated humanitarian response, bringing together the various agencies and sectors, as well as donors, in a concerted manner to deal with the overarching humanitarian crisis. This has proven to be an essential joint needs assessment, planning, monitoring, coordination and resource mobilization tool, under which the bulk of humanitarian assistance has been delivered in the last three years. The process has been successful in meeting the objectives of averting human disaster and stabilizing the crisis. Yet, this year's drought, the worst in a decade is more

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extreme and extensive than previously thought. This was not adequately planned for in the 2003 CAP. Some activities have not been carried out and food distribution has been limited, with the limited resources available. In addition, the devastation caused by the war is vast and the transition from emergency to recovery will consequently require a protracted response. Until such a transition has been achieved, the CAP will remain an important instrument. The Government of Eritrea believes that the huge caseload of IDPs, the return of refugees and IDPs, the reintegration of expellees and widespread food insecurity due to the combined effects of war and drought necessitate the continuation of the CAP into 2004.

- h) ERREC is the government body responsible for the coordination of humanitarian activities in Eritrea. ERREC and the UN Humanitarian Coordinator are jointly responsible for overall coordination and general humanitarian response. OCHA supports the Humanitarian Coordinator in his coordination functions.

Many of the development actors present in Eritrea have developed programmes in collaboration with humanitarian actors. Rehabilitation and development programmes are regaining momentum and are slowly replacing humanitarian assistance.

## **PART II. PROCESS QUESTIONS**


- 1) Partners involved in the CAP strategy setting were UN agencies, Government partners, donor representatives IOs and NGOs.

NGOs and the Red Cross movement participated in the CAP workshop, attended CAP WG meetings and contributed to the CA document but did not submit project proposals in the CAP.

- 3) WFP and the Government relief agency (ERREC) conducted a joint needs assessment in late 2002. Drought and other assessments involving one or more agencies were conducted during the course of 2002 and early 2003.
- 4) Monitoring systems are in place, such as the W3 (who does what where) and GIS databases. WFP has a large monitoring capacity in the field with over 15 field monitors in 4 sub-offices. UNHCR's monitoring capacity in 2002 –2003 has been enhanced to include Technical Specialists based in Asmara, the Sub-Office in Barentu and the Field Office in Tesseney in the five priority sectors (Health, Education, Agriculture, Water/Sanitation and Community Services). UNDP and OCHA also have well-established field offices. OCHA Information Coordination Centre (ICC) undertakes regular field trips to monitor issues related to IDPs, reintegration and drought-affected populations as well as issues regular situation reports and monitoring the humanitarian situation. Sectoral Working Groups undertake sectoral monitoring, reporting to the humanitarian community at large at monthly general coordination meetings. The Zonal Recovery Committee (ZRC), set-up in Gash Barka, has overall authority for coordinating, approving and overseeing all UN-funded reintegration assistance projects in the Gash Barka Zone.
- 5) There has been no CAP revision as a whole, but some agencies have reviewed their requirements. WFP has revised its figure from US\$ 105 million down to US\$ 100 million due to a much larger than anticipated carryover stock at the end of 2002. UNICEF has revised its requirement upwards from US\$ 9,237,945 to US\$ 14,109,945. UNHCR has adjusted its requirements downwards from US\$ 25,159,104 to US\$ 19,457,704.

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## ETHIOPIA




### PART I

The UN Country Team will undertake to prepare a Consolidated Appeal for 2004 jointly with the Government and other partners.

- a) Presently there are some 12.5 million people affected by the drought and related situation in Ethiopia in 2003. It is not possible to predict the number that will require continued food and other assistance in 2004 until the crop and drought assessments in June/July and October/November 2003 and non-food assessments are completed.
- b) The response must be enormous and will include government, UN, other IOs and NGOs. More than 100 NGOs are operating in the country and the UNCT is increasing direct cooperation and joint programming in some cases with them. The appeal will be prepared jointly with the Government, UN and NGOs.
- c) There is no major problem with access to most of the affected population due to conflict.
- d) N/A
- e) There are other development processes in place including UNDAF, PRSP and direct programmes as well, both multi-lateral and bi-lateral.
- f) Note e)
- g) The Government is supportive of the Joint Appeal Process and in the past year has seen the value of conforming to the Global CAP launch time-table.
- h) Government structures include the Disaster Prevention and Preparedness Commission (DPPC) and regional DPP Offices at the as well as Government-led sector task forces to address emergency needs. UN coordination is provided by the Disaster Management and Strategic Disaster Management Teams as well as regular Joint Coordination Meetings with NGOs.
- i) Most development actors are in place (multi-lateral and bi-lateral) as well as research and development private actors.

### PART II

- 1) UNCT, Government, Donors and some NGOs were involved in Food Sector Strategy setting in 2003.
- 2) NGOs were not involved in non-food strategy setting, but actions have been taken to involve them in current mid-term re-assessments and for the 2004 Appeal process.
- 3) Inter-agency assessments were conducted with the Government, Donors and other partners for food and crops. Non-food assessments are being broadened in 2003 and for 2004 to include other actors (NGOs and relevant government ministries).
- 4) A common monitoring system is in place for food with the government. Early warning systems are in place in most regions of the country. Lack of man-power is a problem with monitoring at the present time.
- 5) Re-assessments of food and non-food are being conducted in June/July 2003 with the prospect of an Appeal Update by August 2003. An update (Appeal Addendum was done in March 2003) providing an increase in beneficiary numbers due to overly optimistic crop assessments, continued drought and lack of early warning in some areas.



### PART I: POSITION ON CAP FOR 2004

The position on a Regional CAP for the Great Lakes Region was discussed in a meeting of regional Stakeholders on 15 April 2003. The consensus reached was that **a CAP would be required for 2004**. In justification of this it was argued that there seems little prospect of an early end to the crisis in the Great Lakes Region. While there has been some nominal progress in peace processes, the continued fragility of the situation and the considerable potential for further deterioration all argue for the maintenance, and possible increase, in existing programmes. Even if peace were to come, as access reveals new needs, populations return to their homes and reintegration begins, the humanitarian consequences may be just as significant.

The Regional CAP - both the process and the document - fulfils a variety of functions: it provides information on the regional context and cross-border issues, it advocates for issues of concern in a holistic way with regional and international interlocutors, it facilitates strategic coordination at regional level and it is a resource mobilisation and marketing tool for all stakeholders (whether or not actually appealing in the document)<sup>1</sup>. Its functions as an advocacy and resource mobilisation tool are seen as particularly important in the coming year as other crises, including the reconstruction of Iraq, may draw international attention away from the Great Lakes.

In addition, the Regional CAP provides a 'home' for a number of region-wide projects, such as the WFP PRRO for the Great Lakes (Tanzania, Burundi, Rwanda), which do not always comfortably fit within a country-specific CAP, and for the projects of Agencies which have no other suitable mechanism through which to appeal, i.e., the OCHA RSO-CEA.

### PART II: PROCESS QUESTIONS<sup>2</sup>

- **Who was involved in CAP Strategy setting?** Initial analysis of the humanitarian environment and possible scenarios for the region took place at the Regional Contingency Planning meeting in June 2002, attended by representatives of the UNCTs in countries of the region and agencies with a regional perspective (UN, Red Cross, IOs, NGOs) and donors. Discussion in this meeting on areas requiring regional support provided the basis for further discussion with all actors (UN, RC, IO, NGO, Donor) at the CAP workshop in August, which build consensus on the seven 'sectors' and key elements of each.
- **Who is present, but not involved, and why?** The Regional CAP process has tried to include humanitarian actors present in the Great Lakes with regional portfolios. Not all such actors are present in Nairobi, ie WFP has its regional centre in Kampala, but every effort is made to maintain their inclusion. UNIFEM was undergoing a number of structural changes during the CAP process and was not therefore involved, but hopes to be so in 2004. The UNDP Small Arms project was not initially present/involved, but has taken the opportunity of the Mid Year Review to reflect its regional project. Some new potential stakeholders with regional interests - RedR and UNAIDS - have also been identified for the 2004 process. The greater involvement of NGOs in the process, highlighted through use of the Agency Overviews in the document, has been welcomed in 2003 and it is hoped this might be further developed in 2004 with the potential inclusion of some projects.
- **Were inter-agency assessments conducted and what were the results?** The support programmes undertaken in accordance with the Regional Strategy cannot be assessed in the same way as an operational response, being rather more intangible. However, during the year every effort has been made to 'quantify' what has been done (see the Matrix attached to the Mid Year Review document), discuss requirements with country offices (by individual organisations and, collectively,

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<sup>1</sup> In 2003, Stakeholders developed the format of the Regional CAP to make it more useful as an information, advocacy and marketing tool. These developments included an Agency Overview for each of the Stakeholders that could be used to display their form, function and 'value added' to potential donors, even if the organisation itself were not appealing. Stakeholders expect to continue this initiative in 2004.

<sup>2</sup> A 'Lessons Learned' of the CAP process in 2002 (for 2003) was produced following a review meeting in December 2002, and a document reflecting the Interim Review, February 2003. Both are available on request.


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in the Regional Contingency Planning meeting) and review coordinated/complementary action with partners and further develop this (Review of CAP Launch/Process, Interim Review of CAP Strategy, Mid Year Review Meeting, Emergency Preparedness and Response Working Group).

- **What monitoring systems are in place?** At regional level, monitoring mechanisms are somewhat different to those in-country. The processes mentioned above allow monitoring and review of the achievements and constraints in the implementation of the regional strategy, while fora such as the bi-weekly information exchange meetings, Steering Committee meetings, Contingency Planning, and ad hoc meetings on specific events as required, are mechanisms through which the changing humanitarian context is analysed, which allow the identification of gaps and strategic coordination of response. The Emergency Preparedness and Response Working Group is a new initiative that allows an assessment of current roles and responsibilities and the possibility for coordinated action. OCHA hopes to develop a W3 database, but this has been constrained by lack of staff.
- **Has there been a CAP Revision?** There is no change in the Regional Strategy of the appeal, but there is a request to include an additional project and 'advance warning' of a potential change in funding requested:
  - Inclusion in the Appeal of a **UNDP project 'Addressing Small Arms Proliferation in the Great Lakes Region'** Also annexed, for information, is an Agency Overview on the UNDP Small Arms Reductions Programme.
  - A **budget revision in the WFP Regional PRRO** is forecast in order to adjust the operational cost and to allow for an increased beneficiary caseload in Tanzania and possibly Burundi.

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## GUINEA



### **PART I: POSITION ON CAP 2004**

The nature of the humanitarian situation in Guinea, with heterogeneous composition of groups crossing several borders, high fluctuations of arrivals, and serious security considerations in certain areas, renders the Guinean emergency a complex one that requires the intervention of a variety of UN agencies and partners to deliver quality services in a safe and secure environment.

The most likely scenario for 2004 could be one of a combination of continued influx from Liberia and Côte d'Ivoire along with a complex emergency in Guinea linked to a difficult political transition with a collapse of social services in areas of education and health and with increased insecurity and violence. A risk of additional yellow fever outbreaks and of drought in the north of the country, leading to food insecurity, is also part of this scenario.

With the amelioration of the humanitarian situation last year, there were hopes for a consolidation of a transition from emergency to development assistance in Guinea. However, in view of the escalation of the war in Liberia, the developments in Côte d'Ivoire, the uncertainties of the health of the Guinean Head of State in a year of Presidential Elections, scheduled for December 2003, Guinea is at present rather facing a need for strengthening of preparedness and response measures. Furthermore, the new Humanitarian Coordination structure adopted in early 2003, which incorporates the Government, the United Nations system, the donors- and the NGO community, is in its final stage of implementation.

The humanitarian community intends to continue in 2004 to carry out humanitarian emergency assistance to vulnerable populations in Guinea and promote solutions conducive to the restoration of lasting peace. A CAP 2004 should serve as a viable tool for consolidating a common strategy for this task and for a smooth transition to development; it is for this reason that the UN Country Team has decided that there should be a Guinean CAP for 2004.

### **PART II: PROCESS QUESTIONS**

The Guinean Common Humanitarian Action Plan for 2003 and the Emergency Response Plan from January 2003 were both developed with participation of the Government; key National and International NGOs; Donors and the UN System.


The opening of WHO, UNICEF and OCHA sub-field offices in Nzerekoré has allowed for a strengthening of monitoring mechanisms in this area, in particular of recording mechanisms for influx at border entry points from Côte d'Ivoire and Liberia. Lack of baseline data and wider monitoring along borders continues, however, to restrain early warning and preparedness measures.

The multi-sectoral humanitarian interventions in Guinea ranging from protection issues concerning IDPs, Guinean evacuees returning from Côte d'Ivoire, host communities and refugees, to complex social and economical rehabilitation of areas destroyed under the 2000 and 2001 cross-border attacks, have since 2001 been coordinated through Consolidated Appeals. In addition to the Guinean CAPs for 2001-2003, Guinea took part in the Sub-Regional Cote d'Ivoire+5 CAP launched in late April 2003. In January 2003 an Emergency Response Plan to the crisis in Côte d'Ivoire was furthermore adopted.

#### Note on CAP Revisions:

The UNHCR budget in the 2003 Guinea CA has been increased by \$7.1m to meet the costs of transferring Liberian refugees from Kouankan camp for security reasons (\$4.5m) and to improve standards of assistance to Liberian refugees who arrived in Guinea in 2002(\$2.6m).

WFP food requirements and contributions are reflected in the Sierra Leone CA.

**PART I. POSITION OF CAP FOR 2004**

The Inter-Agency Standing Committee Country Team (IASCCT) feels that there should be a consolidated inter-agency appeal (CA), but focusing mainly on transitional strategies to advocate for more rehabilitation and recovery programmes to consolidate the progress made so far, while addressing the remaining humanitarian needs. While the situation has become more conducive in some parts of the country for the implementation of durable solutions to internal displacement, including return, this does not automatically lead to a dramatic reduction in the need for humanitarian assistance. There is an urgent need to assist IDPs and conflict-affected communities to rebuild livelihoods and to promote reconciliation and peace building at community level, thereby establishing the foundation for sustainable development activities. Although the trend is positive, the situation in Indonesia remains tense, with fragile peace in Maluku and Central Sulawesi, the resumption of military operations in Aceh, and a general election in 2004. The country's proneness to natural disasters and emergencies calls for capacity building in disaster preparedness and mitigation for the Government of the Republic of Indonesia (GoRI) and civil society.


The IASCCT believes that a more 'transition' oriented Common Humanitarian Action Plan (CHAP) /CA for another year, drawing upon donor funds for short-term emergency relief assistance, is necessary to consolidate the progress made so far and linking it to longer-term development programmes supported by other instruments such as the UNDAF.

**PART II. PROCESS QUESTIONS**

- 1) Under the auspices of the Inter-Agency Standing Committee Country Team, the Steering Committee for the CAP 2003, which consisted of the representatives from GoRI, donors, UN agencies and 3 NGO participants, was heavily involved in preparation of CHAP for 2003. Throughout the process, the Steering Committee informed the Red Cross movement, the World Bank, Asian Development Bank, NGOs and donors of the progress and circulated draft documents and other relevant information to ensure close consultation and collaboration.
- 2) Based on the lessons learnt from the previous years, the above-mentioned mechanism was established in July 2002 to make the process more inclusive.
- 3) No inter-agency assessments were fielded from Jakarta for the preparation of the Common Humanitarian Action Plan and the Appeal. However, efforts were made to combine various assessment missions into single inter-agency missions and to share the results of the missions. Also, Regional Analysis Task Forces led by UN Resource Centres where applicable, took stock of the results of assessment missions in the concerned conflict affected areas to produce a regional analysis that formed the basis of the CHAP.
- 4) OCHA has been developing a comprehensive database to track the number and locations of the Internally Displaced Persons as well as humanitarian operations in various provinces. OCHA intends to update quarterly the information on humanitarian operations/activities, especially projects/activities included in the Consolidated Appeal. Agencies are expected to report back on achievements and constraints, using the verifiable indicators in the Consolidated Appeal. This process has just started. As contributions for the projects are only now coming in, most of the agencies do not yet have much to report on progress.
- 5) The Consolidated Appeal was revised in February to reflect the increased humanitarian needs in Aceh, following the signing of the Cessation of Hostilities Agreement (CoHA) in December 2002. Reflecting a reduction in the number of IDPs from 1.3 million to some 650,000, some projects were revised at the time of Mid-Year Review.

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## IRAQ CRISIS




The Revised Humanitarian Appeal for Iraq, reflecting substantial revisions made to the "Flash Appeal for the Humanitarian Requirements of the Iraq Crisis" launched by the United Nations on 28 March 2003, covers revised requirements for the period from 1 April to 31 December 2003.

The revised appeal, launched on 23 June in New York is likely to be the last humanitarian appeal for Iraq. A key element of its strategy is transition to reconstruction: a phase out of humanitarian assistance as the UN reconstruction programme, likely to be finalised in September, gears up in the last part of 2003. The reconstruction programme will integrate any humanitarian programmes which continue beyond the end of 2003.



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## LIBERIA



### **PART I. POSITION ON CAP FOR 2004**

In view of the prevailing precarious political and security situation, the Country Team believes that a CAP for 2004 will be necessary to effectively respond to the increasingly complex humanitarian crises, addressing key priorities in response to constantly changing realities on the ground.

The fighting between Government forces and dissidents has spread to 11 of 15 counties, resulting in increased population displacement, in particular towards Monrovia and neighboring counties. The current IDP caseload is estimated to be over 200,000, higher than the projected 130,000. This figure excludes large numbers of displaced people living with relatives in rural and urban communities. In addition, thousands more are believed to be living in conflict areas, inaccessible to humanitarian assistance. The conflict in Côte d'Ivoire has resulted in the influx of an estimated 95,000 people, comprising of Liberian returnees, Ivorians refugees and third country nationals (TCNs). This is in addition to 17,000 Sierra Leonean refugees already assisted in camps.

The UN specialized agencies, the ICRC, 25 international NGOs and 15 local NGOs combine their efforts to respond to the humanitarian needs of IDPs, refugees, TCNs and host populations. The highly volatile security and political situation and inaccessibility to conflict zones (70% of the country) render the work of humanitarian organizations more complex and challenging. Against this background, the action aimed at addressing protection issues and negotiating for humanitarian corridors is often rendered difficult by the emergence of new fighting groups and difficulty identifying respective leaders with potent authority. The UN Agencies continue to operate under Phase IV of the Security Plan. In addition, humanitarian response is constrained by the limited availability of financial resources as well as the difficulty to get accurate and timely information on the population displacements, movements and the actual IDP caseloads. On the other hand, poor funding has negatively affected humanitarian efforts to meet SPHERE standards.

The Government's capacity to coordinate and respond to the humanitarian crisis remains severely limited. In particular, the capacity of LRRRC, the Government branch responsible for coordination and monitoring of humanitarian efforts is weak despite significant support from UNHCR. Notwithstanding the Government has been positive in supporting advocacy and favorably views the CAP.

As far as humanitarian action is concerned, the country possesses no other strategic planning and resource mobilization mechanism other than the CAP. The UN Country Team has put together a modified UNDAF, which encompasses relief, early recovery and peace-building interventions. The Humanitarian Coordinator also continues to interact and mobilize support from the donor community. The deterioration in the security and humanitarian situation, coupled with limited resources, means that development programmes have presently been shelved as humanitarian issues take priority.


### **PART II. PREPARATION PROCESS**

The humanitarian community including UN agencies and NGOs, led by the Humanitarian Coordinator were involved in elaborating the CHAP during the workshop in September 2002. This for the first time, brought together humanitarian actors in the country as well as Government ministries in an effort to better understand the CAP and draw up a common humanitarian action plan. However, some of the NGOs were present but were not involved in the process. This is a matter that could be taken up at IASC level to see how they can be brought on board.

The preparation of the Appeal was hampered by lack of updated, accurate and reliable baseline data. Inter-agency assessments were undertaken particularly in newly accessible areas. Information sharing and reporting have considerably improved through coordination meetings and sectoral working groups, with the development of sectoral monitoring indicators. However, current monitoring systems and other related indicators are still insufficient, and there is need to institute reliable information management systems to service the humanitarian coordination effort. Due to the crisis in Cote d'Ivoire, an additional appeal was launched for Cote d'Ivoire and 5 neighboring countries, for the period April-December 2003. Of the total US\$ 90 million requested, US\$ 19.5 million is for Liberia for requirements not addressed under the Liberia 2003 CAP. WFP food requirements and contributions are reflected in the Sierra Leone CA.

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
## OCCUPIED PALESTINIAN TERRITORY



- a) The UN Country team in the oPt contemplates preparation of a new common humanitarian strategy beyond the time-frame of the current PoA.
- b) While prospects of a political settlement appear brighter following the publication of the "Roadmap", the humanitarian situation remains rather critical and continues to deteriorate. Aggregate effects of protracted closures and mobility restrictions have taken place in the past and continue to take heavy toll on Palestinians. The alleviation of Intifada-inflicted humanitarian consequences will require continued relief efforts.
- c) The current level of humanitarian response reached its peak in the second half of 2002 during widespread military activities in the West Bank. Currently an estimated 2.1 million Palestinians or 60 percent of the total population benefit from direct aid distributions (commodity support projects). The rest of the Palestinian population benefits from indirect assistance channelled through the Palestinian Authority institutions (e.g. Ministry of Health, Education, etc.). Notwithstanding the massive and multi-sector character of relief efforts humanitarian situation continues to decline, reflecting the far-reaching effect of pervasive closures.
- d) Humanitarian access continued to be hindered as a result of the near total closure regime imposed on Palestinian population centres and frequent military incursions of the Israeli Defence Forces into oPt. Most critically, mobility restrictions are severely disrupting the access the civilian population to essential services such as health, education, water supply, etc.
- e) Humanitarian assistance strategies are an integral part of a broader aid/donor communities' strategy laid out in a World Bank "Two years of *Intifada*..." publication (March 2003).
- f) While generally positive, the PA is rather cautious of humanitarian efforts that are increasingly financed from development sources. The PA would like to see more solid linkages between the expanding humanitarian assistance and its development agenda.
- g) The Palestinian national crisis response capacity remains rather developed, although significantly curtailed during and as a result of the current uprising. The PA and non-state service providers continue to offer a wide-range of services including health, utilities, education, social security, etc. The aid coordination capacity on the other hand has significantly declined in comparison with pre-September 2000.
- h) The international community in the oPt is represented by a large number of international development donors, including bilateral cooperation institutions and Breton Woods institutions. The emergency response capacity of development actors has been bolstered particularly in the wake of the war in Iraq. Development efforts, however, have been considerably reduced and a larger portion of development funds is now being disbursed for emergency activities, such as humanitarian assistance or budget support to the PA institutions.

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## SIERRA LEONE



### **PART I. POSITION ON CAP 2004**

The Country Team in Sierra Leone has collectively agreed on the need for a Consolidated Appeal for 2004 to support relief and recovery efforts.

The Liberian refugee population is expected to increase to 90,000 with indications of continued instability in Liberia. The situation in Sierra Leone is expected to further stabilize, enabling the return of 40,000 Sierra Leonean refugees from neighboring countries. There is also expected to be continued pockets of vulnerability and food insecurity in the east and northern parts of the country. Reintegration, rehabilitation, reconstruction and reconciliation efforts for over 275,000 returnees, 221,000 IDPs, 75,000 ex-combatants, hundreds of amputees and thousands of communities, are expected to require the bulk of aid efforts in Sierra Leone.

The volume of development aid is also expected to increase in 2004, with decreased need for humanitarian support to the main social sectors. Government mechanisms for planning, coordinating and mobilizing resources for recovery and development efforts are expected to be well established through the National Recovery Committee (NRC), Development Partners Committee (DEPACO) and Development Assistance Coordination Office (DACO).

The UN Development Assistance Framework (UNDAF) will take effect from 2004, guiding UN efforts on: Poverty Reduction; Human Rights and Reconciliation; Good Governance; and Economic Recovery. The Repatriation, Reintegration, Rehabilitation and Reconstruction (4R) Process, led by UNHCR, UNDP and the World Bank, will provide a framework for planning and implementing reintegration and rehabilitation initiatives.

Despite the positive progress in the recovery and development spheres, the Government sees a continued need in ensuring that humanitarian efforts continue for Liberian refugees and support to repatriation initiatives. The volatile nature of the situation in the sub-region requires continued emergency response preparedness and capacity.

In this regard the Consolidated Appeal for Sierra Leone in 2004, will concentrate on relief efforts for Liberian refugees, repatriation initiatives, selected vulnerable groups as well as recovery efforts to support reintegration and reconciliation. The volume of assistance requested through the appeal is expected to reduce considerably.


### **PART II. PROCESS QUESTIONS**

The strategy for the Interagency Appeal for Relief and Recovery 2003, was elaborated through stakeholder consultations with government, donors, local and international NGOs, community based organizations, the Red Cross family and civil society. The District Recovery Assessments, carried out in August, providing multi-sectoral baseline data for each district were used to identify priority needs and design projects. The National Recovery Database is being used as the nationwide mechanism for monitoring progress. Other sector specific databases such as those maintained for agriculture, food aid and refugee and repatriation movements are also being utilized.

The *Interagency Appeal for Sierra Leone 2003*, has been increased its requirements from US\$ 83 million to US\$ 86 million, to support UNHCR Liberian refugee operations. Note that WFP food requirements and contributions now include Guinea and Liberia.

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## SOMALIA




### PART I. POSITION ON CAP FOR 2004

The consensus of the CAP country team is that **a CAP is required for 2004** for Somalia. This is on the basis of the continued political instability throughout most of the country, including violent conflict in shifting areas of the south, together with drought and flood-related emergencies. There are an estimated 8-900,000 vulnerable people in Somalia, including approximately 350,000 IDPs often living in sub-human conditions with little access to basic services or protection. The CAP is the only national resource mobilisation tool available in Somalia. The only other strategic planning document is the Joint Action Recovery Plan (JARP), which expires at the end of the year. The nature of the humanitarian crisis demands a high degree of coordination. The Somalia Aid Coordination Body (SACB) provides this to some extent, and OCHA is expanding its field presence with a view to strengthen coordination in the field. There is very little capacity at the national/country-wide level to coordinate humanitarian assistance or respond to crises, partly as a consequence of the lack of a central government, but also due to the rudimentary structures and capacity associated with the various regional authorities and faction leaders.

### PART II. PROCESS

1. There is a reasonably well-developed CAP country team in place, comprising the operational UN agencies (including ILO and IOM), FAO's Food Security Assessment Unit (FSAU), together with a small number of International NGOs (including the NGO Consortium) and the ICRC. The European Commission and ECHO were included in all communications, and played an observatory role in the formulation of the CAP.
2. Attempts have been made to include more NGOs in the process, and indeed 2003 was the first time that NGOs submitted projects to the Somalia CAP. Similarly the EC/ ECHO were involved but on a limited scale. Efforts will continue to broaden the participation of NGOs and the EC/ECHO for the 2004 CAP.
3. Interagency assessments were not conducted for the purpose of the CAP development, however the results of assessments and particularly of FSAU's national data were used in terms of determining numbers of vulnerable people and causes of vulnerability. OCHA's survey of IDPs in the country was also used for the same purposes.
4. OCHA introduced monitoring matrices into the process in 2003 to increase the rigour of monitoring as part of the CAP process (these have been forwarded as part of the MYR). In addition, databases are maintained in the education sector (UNICEF's annual schools survey); the water sector (UNICEF, based in the Data Information and Mapping Unit); and the health sector (through the SACB Health Information Management System). No formal systems are in place for the food security or governance sector.
5. There have been no revisions of the CAP additional to the MYR.

**PART I. POSITION ON CAP FOR 2004**

For 2004, the proposed option of a **Consolidated Sudan Appeal for Humanitarian and Transitional Assistance** is under review by the UN Country Team, in close consultation with UN agency headquarters and OCHA. This would be guided by the Millennium Development Goals (MDG) framework and allow potential funders an overview of all of the Sudan's requirements for international assistance including continued humanitarian provision (which may actually increase with greater access following a peace agreement), quick-start peace impact activities To the extent that a peace agreement is delayed and political conditions in 2003 do not allow the QS-PIP programme to be implemented this year, but circumstances in 2004 become more favourable, the QS-PIP Programme could be carried over and integrated into the Consolidated Appeal, and support for capacity building and resourcing of agreed Sudanese institutions. Equity in addressing needs all over the country, taking into account the impact of conflict as well as chronic poverty will be important to underpin confidence in the new peace. The separately presented Sudan Assistance Framework sets out criteria for prioritisation of resources – these will be refined in further consultation with Sudanese counterparts including through the MDG Thematic Goal Groups.

**PART II. PROCESS**

As of mid-year, several substantive improvements had been made regarding planning medium-to-longer term assistance (including CAP revisions), information sharing and overall coordination. The important role of INGOs was re-acknowledged in March 2003 with the inclusion of INGO representatives in all UN-Donor coordination forums as full members. During the same month, discussions commenced on the streamlining of coordination fora to a workable minimum.

During February-March 2003, all projects were again reviewed and subjected to a "CAP 2003 Logical Framework Exercise" to reconfirm their consistency with CAP objectives and project selection criteria, and to identify further opportunities for joint programming, implementation and overall complementarity.


The period January to April 2003 saw rapid development of a comprehensive database (StarBase: Sudan Transition and Recovery Database) to facilitate joint planning of humanitarian, recovery and eventual development assistance and to measure progress of interventions in meeting Minimum Sphere Standards and Millennium Development Goals and Targets. The Sudan Information Gateway (SIG) was also launched (mid-April 2003) as a central, virtual library and forum for information exchange on all assistance to the Sudan.

An Inter-Agency Displaced Persons Task Force (DPTF) was established January 2003 to focus on IDPs, refugees, ex-combatants and residual and host populations. A comprehensive work plan was prepared the same month to guide policy, CAP revisions and overall planning, including means of creating conditions conducive to voluntary and safe return. Consistent with the principle of impartiality, the work of the DPTF will be integrated into the newly-created Joint Planning and Review Service, which will take a balanced, community-based approach to planning that ensures impartial assistance to all groups in areas of potential return and resettlement.

Under the MYR, twenty-nine projects have been revised, three removed and six new projects have been added to the original 63. Total revised CAP 2003 requirements amount to US\$ 269,948,133 to implement 66 priority programmes of nine UN agencies, ten NGOs, and IOM.

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## TAJKISTAN



### **PART I. POSITION ON CAP FOR 2004**

The humanitarian situation remains almost the same as last year, with slight improvements in the food security sector due to the better harvest and the positive effects of the humanitarian and recovery aid on the poorest families (OXFAM Bulletin). The underlying causes of the problems are still there, so the three strategic goals of the CAP are still valid. Tajikistan remains the poorest of the former Soviet republics, with some 83% of the population living below the national poverty line, including 17% extremely poor and 5% considered destitute. The high infant mortality rate, food deficit and malnutrition, lack of access to safe drinking water, dropping school attendance rate, especially among girls, degradation of the health care sector, and inability of the government to deliver basic social services in general define the continuing complex humanitarian situation in Tajikistan.

According to the OCHA Humanitarian and Development Database, there are around 50 agencies, including UN Agencies, NGOs and IAs operating in Tajikistan in sectors like food security, agriculture, health and nutrition, water and sanitation, education and disaster preparedness and response etc.


Consensus was reached among the CAP Country Team members on the need for an integrated coordination/programming & fund-raising document in 2004 as well. For lack of variety of choices in terms of terminology the vast majority spoke in favour of "CAP 2004". However, while agreeing in principle, the question of the format and name of the document was left open and the advice/guidance of the IASC was sought through OCHA/HQ in Geneva. There is common agreement that Tajikistan is clearly in a transition period from humanitarian aid to development assistance. General understanding was also shared that appropriate coordination mechanisms are required to ensure that with the increased development efforts vulnerable population groups should not be deprived of relief aid and existing humanitarian needs must not be neglected.

### **PART II. PROCESS QUESTIONS**

The whole CA 2003 Process, including strategic and sectoral goals, reviews and monitoring, workshop, etc., is being carried out with the participation of a broad range of actors such as UN Agencies, NGOs, donor's representatives and GoT. Four NGOs; Merlin, Mercy Corps, OXFAM-GB and PSF-CI included their projects in the CAP 2003. Whilst they have received no CAP-channeled funding to date, the common understating is that CAP gave credibility to their efforts, whilst raising the awareness of donors to the highlighted issues in Tajikistan.

No inter-agency assessments have been conducted so far, but there are plans to conduct a National Nutrition Survey that will include indicators relevant not only to nutrition but also to household water and sanitation (AAH/Mercy Corps). The CCA/UNDAF is a "work-in-progress" and it is expected that the CCA will be finalized by early summer. OXFAM have established the Community Situation Indicators Project, which monitors vulnerable households in selected districts of Khatlon Oblast in sectors such as food security, agriculture, health etc. There are plans to expand these efforts to other geographic areas. UNICEF together with the Ministry of Health are to launch a national infant mortality / maternal mortality study, and Merlin plans to conduct a morbidity / mortality study focusing on infectious disease in selected districts of Khatlon and DDR. Additionally WFP have released the results of their Vulnerability Assessment Mapping from 2002, and are expecting the arrival of a socio economist consultant to assess the sustainable impact of their programs at the household level.

No revision of the CAP is deemed necessary, as there were no significant changes in the humanitarian context and the overall situation. Although, there is a concern that the some of the indicators set out in the CAP are relevant rather to an individual agency or a project than to the whole sector.

**PART I. POSITION ON CAP FOR 2004**

**State the consensus position of the CAP Country Team on whether or not there should be a CAP for 2004. Explain this position based upon the following considerations:**

Upon the recommendation of the ECHA mission to Tanzania during the last quarter of 2002, the UN Country Team started to prepare a CHAP in order to develop a comprehensive framework for a coordinated UN response to Western Tanzania, which hosts 540,000 refugees mainly from DRC and Burundi. The CHAP was approved by the UN Country Team in May 2003 and will be submitted as a CAP for 2004. The process of preparing the CHAP has generated consensus among UN Agencies, NGOs, donors, the Government and Regional Authorities in Western Tanzania over priority areas for support to Western Tanzania.

- a) The scale and/or complexity of the humanitarian crisis**  
(Estimated total affected population, geographical areas affected)  
Despite a relatively calm Presidential transition on 1 May 2003, refugees from Burundi who account for a large proportion of the refugee caseload in Western Tanzania are not repatriating. The reason cited is the lack of a comprehensive ceasefire and restructuring of the country's military to a 50/50 Hutu/Tutsi composition. The situation therefore continues to be volatile to the situation in Burundi, particularly the implementation of the Arusha peace process and the achievement of a comprehensive cease fire. Up to June this year, 50,000 new arrivals from Burundi have been received in Western Tanzania. The ongoing fighting in Eastern DRC has accounted for an influx of 17,000 refugees by June 2003. Despite the Lusaka Accord and appointment of rebel leaders into the transition Government in DRC, the vacuum left when Rwanda and Uganda withdrew their forces has resulted into fresh fighting between warring parties. Incidences of rape, murder, food shortages and increased fighting are likely to trigger additional influx from DRC. The crisis is further aggravated by the steps taken by Tanzania to close its borders to new arrivals from DRC and to allow the resettlement of more Burundi refugees in current camps. This signifies a hardening of Government policy towards hosting refugees. Total population covered in the CHAP for Western Tanzania is 2,424,842 of which 1,908,962 are local population and 515,880 are refugees (CHAP 2003:1).
- b) The extent and complexity of humanitarian response**  
(Number and size of programmes of operational agencies, including NGOs)  
In 2001, agencies requested a total of US\$ 110,440,557 to carry out planned interventions and received a total of US\$ 90, 739,758. In addition, there is a substantial NGO community working in Western Tanzania in collaboration with Government and UN Agencies which has received significant funding outside the CAP process.
- c) Changes in access to affected populations and conflict zones (Changes in security phase structure)**  
Western Tanzania is still in Security Phase 0 though the Country Team has taken precautionary measures to treat the security situation as if it were Phase I.
- d) Multi-sectoral dimensions of humanitarian response.**  
(Protection issues, mine action, negotiations for humanitarian space)  
Relief food rations have been reduced since February 2003. This situation has led to strained relations between refugees and host communities. The Government of Tanzania believes food shortages are posing a security threat, leading to tightening of restrictions on refugees. Prolonged rations reductions will likely lead to increased malnutrition and spontaneous repatriation of refugees to areas still considered as unsafe as the quality of asylum deteriorates.

No additional camp space is available for Congolese refugees in Tanzania as of the end of June 2003. Tanzania continues to offer one site in Ilangala, however a bridge requiring US\$ 3.5 million is required to be constructed in order to access the proposed site. A new camp in Kigoma is urgently needed to increase Tanzania's preparedness for a fresh influx of refugees. If the option of building a bridge to Ilangala is not pursued, Tanzania is threatening to close all way stations along the lake and bar new arrivals from DRC.

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- e) Existence of other strategic planning mechanisms (i.e. UNDAF, Brookings Process)**  
The 2002 CHAP has provided a solid framework for a coordinated UN response to the humanitarian and development situation in Western Tanzania. The Tanzania PRSP provides a framework for support to development interventions in Refugee Affected Areas whereas the UNDAF is positioned to assist national authorities in the implementation of the PRSP. The UN Country Team continues to oversee joint programme in Western Tanzania with UNHCR, UNDP, WFP, UNICEF and FAO forming a Western Tanzania Task Force that regularly report to the UN Country Team.
- f) Existence of other resource mobilisation mechanisms**  
Tanzania receives a considerable amount of bilateral aid which is complementary to humanitarian assistance. The European Commission, Belgium, JICA, Netherlands, Denmark have specific programmes in Refugee Affected Areas. Individual Agencies are already in touch with bilateral donors for support of sector working plans outlined in the CHAP.
- g) Position of the Government of the affected country on the CAP**  
The Prime Minister's Office was involved in the CAP. UNDP has accessed TRAC 3 funds to prepare the 2003 CHAP/2004 CAP through a nationally executed project under the Prime Minister's Office. Regional authorities in Kigoma were consulted during the preparation of the CHAP. A CHAP workshop was facilitated by OCHA to ensure high ownership of the CHAP and its proposed intervention. The Government fully supports the CHAP and invited the international community to assist in the humanitarian response.
- h) Local capacity to coordinate and respond to humanitarian response (government structures)**  
As part of the CHAP exercise, a capacity assessment of Government structures was done to assess Government preparedness to participate in its implementation. The capacity of Government structures can be rated as minimum, meaning sporadic ability to serve beneficiaries to a satisfactory level.
- i) Presence of development actors, their emergency preparedness and response capacity, and the degree to which development programmes are being undertaken**  
A large NGO community exists in the refugee operation. Bilateral donors assisting Tanzania have initiated development projects in selected areas. Their emergency preparedness and responsiveness is just being met, and may fall below the standard if the situation rapidly escalates.

## **PART II. PROCESS QUESTIONS**

- 1. Who was involved in CAP Strategy setting?**  
The CHAP/CAP for Western Tanzania has been developed by the UN Country Team. All UN Agencies are involved in its preparation. Five working groups on Food security and Agriculture, Water and Sanitation, Health and Nutrition, Education and Good Governance have been formed for follow-up action. UN Agencies, NGOs, Government and bilateral donors are represented in the different working groups.
- 2. Who is present but not involved, and why?**  
The CHAP process serves as a coordinating framework for the work of the UN in Western Tanzania. Though a likely outcome, it was emphasised that the primary aim of this CHAP was not to mobilise resources. Although encouraged to participate, bilateral donors understood the CHAP provides a framework that integrates humanitarian and development interventions and defines a UN common approach to the humanitarian situation in Western Tanzania. Donors will therefore be invited at a later stage to support the different response plans of the CHAP.
- 3. Were inter-agency assessments conducted and what were the results?**  
No comprehensive inter-agency assessments were done prior to the CHAP. The CHAP has relied on data and information generated by health and nutrition surveys done by UNICEF, WFP monitoring mechanisms, UNHCR reports and poverty assessment reports supported by UNDP. As an immediate follow-up, UNHCR, WFP, UNDP, UNICEF, bilateral donors represented in the



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DAC sub group on Western Tanzania (Netherlands, USA, DfiD, France, EU) and Government of Tanzania conducted a joint assessment as a baseline for the CHAP/CAP on Western Tanzania.

**4. What monitoring systems are in place? (Such as common databases, baseline data, inter-agency monitoring unit) Describe constraints to monitoring.**

WFP and UNHCR are taking steps to integrate their databases in Western Tanzania. This move will enable the two Agencies to share and compare data. Baseline data on key indicators for both the refugee caseload and host communities exists. The Good Governance component of the CHAP has developed response plans to support integrated monitoring systems and strengthened capacity of the Government at decentralised level to host common databases. UNDP is in consultation with the National Bureau of Statistics to introduce a module on refugees hosting areas in the national socio-economic database.

**5. Has a monitoring report been issued measuring progress against the indicators described in the Appeal? If so, describe the most important results.**

Tanzania has completed the analysis of the Household Budget Survey that provides baseline data for the medium term poverty reduction plan. The report provides information of health, nutrition, education, water and sanitation. An agriculture survey is planned to be undertaken in 2003-2004.

**6. Are the current monitoring system and related indicators sufficient? If not, what is planned to improve them?**


Tanzania has an elaborate framework for monitoring poverty and human development. All development partners including the UN support and rely on the Poverty Monitoring system to track outcomes in the areas they support. The CHAP/CAP aims to anchor its monitoring framework to national monitoring systems at national and decentralised levels.

**7. Has there been a CAP Revision or additional Appeals for humanitarian assistance (donor alerts, natural disaster appeals)? If so, why?**

No.

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## UGANDA



### **PART I. POSITION ON CAP FOR 2004**


The consensus position of the CAP Country Team during the recently concluded CAP Training workshop is that there should be a CAP for 2004 because the situation has greatly changed since the launch of CAP 2003:

- a. Whereas at the launch of CAP 2003, the emphasis was on support for a return, re-integration and recovery of an estimated 550,000 IDPs in Northern Uganda, today the scenario has changed in favour of more emergency assistance, following an escalation of insecurity by the LRA from June 2002. Today, the total number of vulnerable populations is more than 1.3 million, and these include 812,000 IDPs in the North, and 535,000 drought-affected people in the North-east.
- b. The size of the programmes that could be provided is enormous. For example for the over 1.3 million IDPs and drought-affected populations, WFP requires over 170,000 mt of food assistance. There are corresponding needs in non-food items, especially in water and sanitation, education, health, shelter and psychosocial support.
- c. During the preparation of CAP2003, access to IDPs in Northern Uganda was not a major issue, as the focus then was on return, re-integration and recovery. Today, access is a major constraint, not only in the war-affected Acholi sub-region, but also drought affected Karamoja sub-region because of the cattle-rustling culture of the Karimojong. Both sub-regions are in security phase III, according to the UNSecoord Travel Advisory for June 2003.
- d. Multi-sectoral dimensions of humanitarian response include, humanitarian access, protection issues especially in relation to recruitment of children by both sides to the conflict, advocacy, and most importantly, absence of a mechanism for engaging the LRA in any dialogue.
- e. Other local strategic planning mechanisms by the Ministry of Finance include, the Northern Uganda Social Action Fund (NUSAF), The Poverty Eradication Action Plan (PEAP) and Recovery Plan for the North. The UN system has the Disaster Management Team (UNDMT), UNDAF and the CCA.
- f. Other resource mobilization mechanism is the local Donor Group on the North - chaired by the Head of the European Delegation – whose role is to make sure that the development needs of the north are adequately reflected in the national budget. For example donor support to the national budget during the 2002/2003 fiscal year constituted 52% of the total budget.
- g. The government of Uganda is very supportive of the CAP process, and actively participates in it.
- h. The Ministry of Disaster Preparedness & Refugees is responsible for coordinating humanitarian response in the country. At the local level, it has the District Disaster Management Committees (DDMCs) and Sub-county Disaster Management Committees (SDMCs). However, the ministry is still new and under-resourced, and therefore need to be supported through capacity building.
- i. There are many development actors that include UN agencies, NGOs and other bilateral and multilateral institutions. In terms of emergency preparedness, many of the agencies, including the UN agencies which in partnership with relevant government departments. As mentioned earlier, the partner government departments need some orientation/capacity building in emergency preparedness and response. With the exception of the Greater North of the country which has been affected by prolonged conflicts, the rest of Uganda is well-known as success story in terms of economic recovery and combating of HIV/AIDS.

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**PART II. PROCESS QUESTIONS**

- a. The entire UN Country Team, NGOs, and Government were involved in strategy setting;
- b. Because of the prevailing insecurity in the affected region, no inter-agency assessments were conducted. The process based on on-going agency assessments of the situation in the affected areas of the country.
- c. Individual agencies, in collaboration with their government partners do have individual monitoring mechanisms. However, there is no inter-agency monitoring mechanism in place. A major constrain to monitoring is lack of access due to insecurity.
- d. In view of the escalation in the insecurity in northern Uganda and the subsequent increase in IDPs, WFP did issue a flash appeal for assistance in January 2003.

**PART I. POSITION ON CAP FOR 2004**

- a) **The scale and/or complexity of the humanitarian crisis**  
Recovery will be constrained in 2003 because of economic decline, insufficient inputs into the agriculture and the livestock sectors and an absence of development aid. There is a real fear that Zimbabwe will remain short of seeds, fertiliser and agricultural capital in 2003 and the country is unlikely to meet its food security needs. Moreover, there will be a continuing decline in the public health and education sectors, which will exacerbate the increasing rural and urban vulnerability in the country. HIV mortality, which is already high at 2,500 deaths a week, will continue to rise.
- b) **The extent and complexity of humanitarian response**  
The main UN agencies – WFP, UNICEF, FAO, UNDP and WHO have substantial humanitarian programmes. 40–50 local and international NGOs are involved in humanitarian assistance. The population requiring food assistance is 5.4 million in 2003-4. Over 400 million USD was provided in humanitarian assistance from July 2002- June 2003. The 2003-4 CAP appeal is likely to be requesting over 300 million USD.
- c) **Changes in access to affected populations and conflict zones.**  
There remain significant constraints in regards to highly vulnerable groups such as ex- farm workers. Humanitarian access is poor generally to internally displaced people as the government remains in a state of denial about displacement problems.
- d) **Multi-sectoral dimensions of humanitarian response.**  
There are still major humanitarian protection problems in the former commercial farming areas. Possibly a million people from the former farm worker community are in need of humanitarian assistance. There is still insufficient information about displaced people and there are serious political obstacles in undertaking needs assessments in regards to farm workers. Negotiations for greater humanitarian space in the former commercial farming areas has been negotiated for 8 months, without any significant progress made. Political violence will remain a feature on Zimbabwe's landscape.
- e) **Existence of other strategic planning mechanisms (i.e. UNDAF, Brookings Process)**  
A mid- term review of UNDAF was completed in 2003. UNDP may want to work on a new UNDAF in view of the radically changed circumstances in Zimbabwe. A new Common Country Assessment process could also start. Money has been available to conduct a poverty assessment for the last 2 years in order to start the PRSP process. Zimbabwe's suspension from the IMF and the World Bank will hamper a revival of dialogue between the government and the international community.
- f) **Existence of other resource mobilisation mechanisms**  
USAID is managing a parallel food aid pipeline called C-SAFE in partnership with 3 NGOs. The EU is using its EuronAid consortium to support NGO food aid interventions. UNDP is negotiating with the Government and the EU to establish a food importation facility
- g) **Position of the Government of the affected country on the CAP**  
The UN is still waiting for Government approval to launch the CAP for 2003. There remains an ambivalence in certain parts of the Government to make an appeal, as this would continue to highlight the structural weaknesses in government policies and in the country's economic management. The most sensitive sectors are in food security and in agriculture recovery.
- h) **Local capacity to coordinate and respond to humanitarian response (government structures).**  
There is minimal Government participation in co-ordination. Government capacity is under severe strain because of professional and managerial migration, worsening terms and conditions and a severe shortage of resources. There is still no effective Government- humanitarian community forum and no shared understanding on the scale of the humanitarian crisis in Zimbabwe.

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- i) **Presence of development actors, their emergency preparedness and response capacity, and the degree to which development programmes are being undertaken**  
There is minimal development assistance in Zimbabwe. Longer term funding is being provided through the donors and the Global Fund for HIV work. The Government is only a partial beneficiary of these funds, as most money is being channelled through NGOs. Humanitarian response capacity is quite strong with major donors such as DFID and USAID having the capacity to provide new humanitarian aid at short notice. The UN has been co-ordinating a process of emergency preparedness and this will continue.

## **PART II. PROCESS QUESTIONS**

1. **Who was involved in CAP Strategy setting?**  
The main participants were the UNCT, donors, the Red Cross agencies and local and international NGOs.
2. **Who is present but not involved, and why?**  
There was minimal government involvement in the 2003-4 CAP process. The government has remained reluctant to commit itself to any substantial dialogue with the international community for over 3 months
3. **Were inter-agency assessments conducted and what were the results?**  
An inter-agency national nutrition survey was undertaken in February jointly managed by the Government and UNICEF with strong NGO participation. The results of the survey have not been formally released by the government, though preliminary figures suggest higher rates of malnutrition in the new re-settlement areas. The ZIMVAC survey was conducted in April and was jointly managed by the Government, WFP, the NGOs and FEWSNET. The results have still not been released by the Government, though a preliminary presentation indicates a significant cereals gap of 1.3 million MT for the coming year. The FAO/WFP Crop assessment mission published its results in June indicating a major cereals deficit for the country.
4. **What monitoring systems are in place? (Such as common databases, baseline data, inter-agency monitoring unit) Describe constraints to monitoring.**  
The UNDP Relief and Recovery Unit (RRU) is the main inter-agency monitoring unit. On the whole the government has remained hostile to the establishment of the RRU's field units, so that there has been little work done so far on the monitoring of humanitarian interventions.
5. **Has a monitoring report been issued measuring progress against the indicators described in the Appeal? If so, describe the most important results.**  
Sadly, not!
6. **Are the current monitoring system and related indicators sufficient? If not, what is planned to improve them?**  
The current monitoring mechanisms are not sufficient and the donors are increasingly demanding a monitoring programme which effectively measures the impact of humanitarian aid. A CAP review committee will be established in July 2003 comprised of UN, donors, NGOs and hopefully government. The committee will introduce new mechanisms to monitor the CAP. The RRU's field units will undertake a wide range of monitoring in 2003-4, assuming that it will gain government co-operation to do this work.
7. **Has there been a CAP Revision or additional Appeals for humanitarian assistance (donor alerts, natural disaster appeals)? If so, why?**  
The government declared a state of disaster in the southern provinces of the country and the re-settlement areas in March 2003, as a result of drought in these areas.

## ANNEX I.

### HC POSITIONS ON CAP FOR 2004 FOLLOWING MID-YEAR REVIEW

	COUNTRIES / CRISIS	POSITION ON CAP FOR 2004	NOTES
1.	AFGHANISTAN	ANSWER STILL PENDING	
2.	ANGOLA	REQUEST ADVICE	Transition circumstances
3.	BURUNDI	<b>YES</b>	
4.	CENTRAL AFRICAN REPUBLIC	<b>YES</b> (CURRENT FLASH APPEAL)	Humanitarian 12-month Appeal needed – CAP?
5.	CHECHNYA & NEIGHBOURING COUNTRIES	<b>YES</b>	
6.	COLOMBIA	ANSWER STILL PENDING	Current “Humanitarian Action Plan”
7.	COTE D’IVOIRE	<b>YES</b>	
8.	DEMOCRATIC PEOPLE’S REPUBLIC OF KOREA	<b>YES</b>	
9.	DEMOCRATIC REPUBLIC OF THE CONGO	<b>YES</b>	
10.	ERITREA	<b>YES</b>	
11.	ETHIOPIA	<b>Joint GOVT - UN</b>	Not official CAP, but part of CAP launch
12.	GREAT LAKES REGION AND CENTRAL AFRICA	<b>YES</b>	
13.	GUINEA	<b>YES</b>	
14.	INDONESIA	<b>YES</b>	Transition
15.	IRAQ CRISIS	<b>NO</b>	Flash Appeal Revision issued 23 June to end Dec 03
16.	LIBERIA	<b>YES</b>	
17.	OCCUPIED PALESTINE TERRITORIES	<b>HAP - Continued</b>	Common strategy and appeal still warranted
18.	SIERRA LEONE	<b>YES – TRANSITION RELIEF AND RECOVERY</b>	
19.	SOMALIA	<b>YES</b>	
20.	SUDAN	TRANSITION	Consolidated Appeal for Humanitarian and Transition
21.	TAJIKISTAN	<b>YES</b>	Transition
22.	TANZANIA	<b>YES</b>	CHAP discussed
23.	UGANDA	<b>YES</b>	CAP workshop held May
24.	ZIMBABWE	<b>YES</b>	Country-specific as distinct from regional needs

	ADDITIONAL COUNTRIES / CRISIS	STRATEGY/ APPEAL FORMAT	NOTES
25.	SRI LANKA	<b>Government Appeal</b>	Floods
26.	SOUTHERN AFRICA REGIONAL	<b>Regional Appeal</b>	To be finalised July.

