**SUMMARY REPORT**

**AND ROADMAP FOR FUTURE ACTION**

**JOINT WORKSHOP BETWEEN**

**THE IASC TASK TEAM ON HUMANITARIAN-DEVELOPMENT NEXUS IN PROTRACTED CRISES**

**AND**

**THE UN WORKING GROUP ON TRANSITIONS**

**on the Humanitarian-Development-Peace Nexus**

**20-21 October 2016, New York**

*The summary report which follows reflects the views of those individuals who participated in this informal workshop. The views expressed therefore do not necessarily reflect the view of the UN System. In addition, it is important to note that this workshop was seen by all participants as a first step, in a long and sustained process. This report should be distributed on that basis. The discussions, agenda items and background documents were prepared with the aim of beginning a discussion and contribute to shape future work which may require a more formal consultation process with relevant stakeholders.*

**Executive Summary**

1. On 20-21 October 2016, in follow up to commitments made at the World Humanitarian Summit (WHS), the Inter-Agency Standing Committee’s Task Team on the Humanitarian-Development Nexus (IASC TT HDN) and the UN Working Group on Transitions (WGT) held a joint workshop in New York to increase collaboration among humanitarian, development and peace actors.
2. As a key outcome of the workshop, the participants developed a roadmap for the IASC TT HDN and UNWGT in order to better support field operations to conduct, as much as possible, joint analysis (including context/conflict, vulnerability and risk analysis) and strategic planning and agree on collective outcomes for the short-, medium- and long-term, based on the specific comparative advantages and driven by the local contexts, while fully respecting humanitarian principles.
3. The workshop allowed representatives from the humanitarian, development and peace communities to drill down together on the key elements of the new way of working – particularly in cases of protracted crises and in fragile contexts – where programming would be guided by improved and more joined up analysis and planning. In practice, it means aiming for coherent, joint collaboration between humanitarian, development and peace actors to identify needs, the greatest risks and sources of vulnerability, working together to measurably reduce them, and also sustaining peace.
4. In line with the SDGs, it was acknowledged that ‘reaching the furthest behind first’ and effectively reducing needs require the humanitarian, development and peace communities to target the most vulnerable people with a mix of short-, medium- and longer-term assistance, concurrently as much as possible. It also requires earlier engagement, and more flexible and context-adaptable programming by development and peacebuilding actors.
5. As an initial premise, it was agreed that the new way of working is dictated by context. For example, at present, in a setting like Aden or Aleppo, humanitarian plans would have to remain separate in order to safeguard humanitarian space – even if analysis of the situation can be shared or even conducted jointly. In other contexts – more amenable to building peace - there will be more flexibility and scope to have joint assessments and more joined up planning processes too, while ensuring that both international and national actors do not compromise core humanitarian principles.
6. Joint analysis was acknowledged as being possible and of added value in all situations. The range of analytical approaches was discussed, as were possible entry points for bringing them together. It was noted that joint analysis is more realistic than joint assessments. Possible examples of collective outcomes were discussed. While the 17 SDGs remain the overall 15-year framework, it was envisioned that collective outcomes for the short-, medium- and long-term could focus on achieving 3-5 objectives, defined for each context, deemed to have a catalytic and multiplier effect in improving people’s lives. Collective outcomes would also – in most cases – mean a change in mindset, behavior and approach in order to achieve tangible change. It was acknowledged that there would be varying levels of contribution/responsibility for achieving collective outcomes based on comparative advantage. Participants agreed that joined up planning does not necessarily mean developing a joint plan; it could just mean a strategic alignment around collective outcomes, which is subsequently translated into separate humanitarian, development and peace plans, as required. It was acknowledged that there must be different levels of “jointness” depending on the context.
7. It was clear from the discussions that transcending the humanitarian-development-peace divide does not mean simply more coordination among separate or individual blocks, but rather, cooperation and contribution of individual agency capacity and expertise to achieve common objectives aimed at reducing need and vulnerability, - and where context allows – also the notion that these interventions broadly support efforts to address root causes to conflict and develop institutions and capacities.
8. The workshop was useful in highlighting the unique comparative advantages that the humanitarian, development and peacebuilding community have – and the importance of working more closely together. This could mean, for example, working closely between humanitarian to development actors where stronger investment would reduce future humanitarian needs, and it could equally reflect the need for a better recognition of the broader political and security imperatives – as reflected in collective outcomes.
9. There was broad recognition from the workshop participants of the existing barriers to transcend the current silos – such as mandate, financing, accountability to respective governing boards, government restrictions, misaligned timing of the planning processes, incompatible planning, assessing and programming tools, lack of space to innovate, internal barriers within dual-mandated organizations, unavailability of good baseline data to measure progress, as well as the leadership required to move forward in a new way.
10. The following roadmap for moving forward on the nexus was put together by the workshop. It will serve as the basis for both the UN Working Group on Transitions and the IASC TT on Humanitarian Development Nexus to proceed in providing support to field operations wanting to move forward on the new way of working. Cognizant of context specificities, there was consensus among participants that prioritization needs to be made by the field to allow better collaboration across peace, humanitarian and development imperatives. In practice this means that field colleagues (and country teams), under the aegis of the UN Resident/Humanitarian Coordinator, would self-select to take forward the new way of working whilst headquarters would assist by making systems more flexible and by ensuring dissemination and support to the field.

**Roadmap for Action Towards Collective Outcome**

*The UNWGT an IASC Task Team members will undertake the following efforts to support greater coherence and incentivize collaboration between humanitarian, development, and peace actors, in order to promote field implementation of the nexus and ensure the support of HQ in terms of norms-setting, communications and partnerships to make it happen successfully:*

1. **Identify priorities for short, medium and long-term concrete actions to address system-wide and institutional constraints to improved collaboration between humanitarian, development, and peace actors based on consultations with requests for support from UNCTs/HCTs and other relevant partners**.
   1. **Strengthening Partnerships**
      * Build on UN-WB collaboration on Operationalising the Humanitarian-Development-Peace Nexus at the Country Level, which will focus first on five countries/areas;
      * Strengthen and/or develop partnerships with governments, international financial institutions (IFIs), national and international non-governmental organizations, civil society, the private sector, etc.; and
      * Ensure that international and national NGO consortia are involved and meaningfully and actively participate in the decision-making process.
   2. **Providing Incentives**
      * Financial: Develop options for providing better principled financing incentives for collaboration and address financial fragmentation, including through pooled funding. Further develop incentives for donors to invest in risk-informed programming, preparedness, durable solutions – for example, through demonstrating higher return on investments in these areas;
      * Political: Encourage Member States to provide incentives, and political support and urge for collaboration among humanitarian, development and peacebuilding actors;
      * Administrative: Encourage UN Country Leaders to engage in humanitarian, development, and peacebuilding coherence.
2. **Based on a review of good practices, and gaps identified by field- based actors, produce appropriate guidance for joint analysis and joined up planning across the humanitarian, development and peace architecture, particularly in terms of alignment and compatibility of UNDAF and HRP frameworks at the country level, as necessary.**
   1. **Seizing Field Opportunities**
      * Implementation will focus on demand from the field and in a context-specific manner;
      * Self-selection by countries to take the lead in implementation and support to such champions from headquarters and by donors would be important;
      * Opportunities for countries include: trigger events; upcoming processes regarding analysis, assessments, planning or programming, including in relation to SDGs (e.g. UNDAFs, ISFs, strategic assessments, New Deal fragility assessments, compacts, Recovery and Peacebuilding Assessments (RPBAs), etc.); and donor interest; and
      * Participating countries will use existing instruments, processes and mechanisms for analysis and planning as much as possible, at least until enough field-generated evidence exists to provide a sound basis and direction to possibly consider new ones.
   2. **Learning from the field**
      * Lessons learned will be developed from field experiences in order to generate additional evidence and capture good practices and innovation, starting with current practices in Lebanon, the Central African Republic and the Democratic Republic of Congo.
   3. **Providing Support**
      * Participants agreed to provide various types of support, including through:
        + Analytical, facilitation processes or technical support through missions, surge capacity and/or remotely;
        + Inter-agency missions, including members of civil society and other partners (IFIs for example) based on country-level demand;
        + Process facilitators to bring various international and local actors together on equal and neutral basis;
        + Enlisting international bilateral and multilateral humanitarian, development and peace partners to play a key role in convening and supporting processes; and
        + Ensuring financial support for collaborative activities, for example from entities own resources, UN-WB humanitarian-development-peace initiative, Peacebuilding Fund, etc.
3. **Develop common messages and a common strategy to advocate for relevant policy changes and adaptation across a range of key stakeholders, including Member States.**
   1. **Advancing a shared mindset and narrative**
      * Strengthening collaboration among humanitarian, development and peace actors should be based on **existing principles and modalities** including **v**arious policies, reports and resolutions requiring the entire UN and Humanitarian ecosystem, including the political, peacekeeping, humanitarian, human rights and development entities, to conduct joint conflict, risk analysis and joined up strategic planning and to agree on collective outcomes, for the short-, medium- and long-term, including to sustain peace, drawing on comparative advantages. (See Annex 3)
   2. **Development of new modalities:**
      * Develop common language and key messages on the humanitarian-development-peace nexus and common outcome indicators to assess progress in the implementation;
      * Review existing policies and corporate strategic plans and adapt if necessary for dissemination at Headquarters and to field offices;
      * Ensure that political will and the peace dimension are mainstreamed into the broader conceptual understanding of the WHS Commitment to Action effectively integrating the peacebuilding component, where relevant, based on the GA and SC resolutions on sustaining peace (A/RES/70/262 and S/RES/2282 (2016));
      * Initiate a discussion on the technicalities and possibilities of connecting (aligning and ensuring complementarity and coherence between) the HRPs and UNDAFs (and ISFs when applicable) within the current framework of operation and, where appropriate, with a multi-year planning trajectory in mind.
   3. **Common communications**
      * Based on experiences and advances, develop common key messages on concrete new ways of working among humanitarian, development and peace actors for internal and external use.
      * Develop inter-agency quick context-specific guide on new way of working among humanitarian, development and peace actors with more granularity than Commitment to Action (CTA) and adding peace component;
      * Develop key messages for Principals to engage the new UN Secretary-General regarding the new way of working and tailor messages – if necessary – to the vision, language and framing of the Secretary-General; and
      * Senior leadership of the participating organizations in the workshop to disseminate common key messages on norms and standards and providing vision and direction regarding the new way of working, the collaboration among humanitarian, development and peace actors, and adherence to International Humanitarian Law, Human Rights Law and standards and humanitarian principles.

**Next Steps**

Following the joint workshop, the IASC Task Team and the UN Working Group on Transitions will:

1. Review and adapt if necessary their respective workplans;
2. Review existing instruments and mechanisms and adjust them to strengthen the collaboration among humanitarian, development and peacebuilding actors as necessary;
3. Identify a limited set of indicators to measure progress on the implementation of the collaboration around the nexus, including on Accountability to Affected Populations;
4. Leverage existing frameworks: e.g. recovery and peacebuilding assessments, plan of action on disaster risk reduction, work on disaster risk management, preparedness, resilience agenda, early recovery, cluster transitioning; and risk informed programming;
5. Continue the dialogue regularly, develop an operationalization plan of action to monitor progress on this roadmap and organize subsequent meetings as necessary.

**Workshop Summary Report**

**Opening Remarks**

1. This workshop was referred to as “historic” by some Member States recognizing it as a first discussion on this topic of collective outcomes involving so many diverse perspectives from so many UN and civil society actors. There is fresh momentum created by the 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development and Member States calling for more coherent approaches to dealing with protracted crises.
2. The drivers of this discussion is the protracted nature of the crises today that call for new approaches to reduce needs and vulnerabilities, otherwise the international community will not meet its 2030 Agenda with its goals and targets. This means that working towards collective outcomes is an imperative.
3. We are experiencing a new set of violent conflicts that have severe implications for the way the international system responds. We need a new way of working and to break out of existing silos, acknowledging the inter-dependent nature of the issues we are confronting. Member States and our principals through the Chief Executives Board (CEB) are demanding it. The question is not what we need to do (we know that) it is how, and how depends on the different circumstances of the contexts we work in.
4. This is the beginning of a dialogue that will continue. We are convinced that we need to work together and in that sense the meeting is an historic opportunity to share our different perspectives.
5. The NGO community appreciated that it has been invited to participate. NGOs are anxious to move away from the silo-ed approach that separates humanitarian and development work towards a more ecosystem approach. The NGO community hopes that this process leads to greater effectiveness and alignment.

**Setting the Scene**

1. A new way of working together is urgently needed because humanitarian needs have risen to levels not seen since the end of WWII. Those affected will be left far behind in achieving the SDGs unless urgent action is taken. These crises have become more protracted, lasting seven years on average with 89 per cent of humanitarian resources spent on crises lasting more than 3 years. Violent conflict has become a very significant driver (for over 80 per cent of humanitarian needs) as well as another significant constraint to reaching the SDGs. At the same time, it is important to bear in mind that some protracted crises are also acute and highly dynamic, as in the DRC for example, which is protracted but faces acute spikes in displacement on an ongoing basis.
2. Alleviating suffering and meeting needs in violent conflict and crisis-affected areas required different approaches because it is a more complex setting. ‘Leaving no one behind’, reaching those furthest behind, and effectively reducing needs require the humanitarian and development communities to target the most vulnerable people with a mix of short-, medium- and longer-term assistance. Our communities need to go beyond coordination towards delivering commonly-agreed results, even if this means acknowledging varying levels of contribution/responsibility for achieving these results based on comparative advantage. This is something the donors are also calling for.
3. The international community’s work in Lebanon illustrates creative ways to link up humanitarian, development and peace communities in an integrated fashion under the rubric of the UN Strategic Framework. Responding to the crisis in Lebanon generated by the conflict in Syria required the need to understand the role of development to create opportunities for refugees and host communities. A new instrument was established to bring together an integrated approach with a long-term perspective of building resilient communities, although a separate crisis response plan (the Lebanon Crisis Response Plan) was also maintained given the realities on the ground.
4. A cultural shift is needed in the way we work both at an inter-agency level and internally. To a large extent individual agencies have made strides in integrating this new way of working into practice, but because this is being done at different paces we see great variance at field level. In order for this process to move forward we not only need to be on the same page but move at the same rhythm.

Participants agreed that, for the international community to address a range of challenges including security, political, social and humanitarian concerns more coherently, a common narrative and framework for response is required.

**Framing the Context**

1. In order to frame the discussion of collective outcomes in protracted crises there was a strong recognition that context matters. Although it was acknowledged that this would be an oversimplification, a typology of countries in crisis was elaborated distinguishing humanitarian situations on the basis of three determinants:
   * 1. The “responsibility” of Government/Local Authorities
     2. The “capacity and resources” of Government/Local Authorities; and
     3. The “security and access” in the context

If the Government is unwilling to uphold its obligation and responsibility to protect and provide assistance to all affected people, and is limiting the scope of international involvement, this situation Type is described as “**constrained**”.

If the Government is willing to uphold its responsibility, but has little to low capacity, and low ongoing budget support, this situation Type is described as “**capacity driven**”.

If the Government is willing to uphold its responsibility, and has capacity and resources, but is recovering or emerging from a political settlement, a high intensity or active violent conflict, or suffers from an insecure operational context, this situation is described as “**consultative**”.

Finally, the best-case scenario discussed is the one where a “host” Government/authority is willing and able to uphold its obligations and responsibility to protect in a stable situation, and where it has adequate capacity to respond. This situation is described as “**collaborative**”

1. This typology of different archetypes is theoretical and intended to illustrate most cases, acknowledging that these simplifications do not fully capture all the specificities or nuances in real world cases.
2. The workshop process used these four scenarios as a way of framing our discussion of joint analysis, framing collective outcomes and joined up planning through a series of four break-out sessions. Key points and discussions have been summarized below organized around those main components; further details on each discussion can be found in the annex.

**Operationalizing Joint Analysis**

1. A range of analytical frameworks already exists and differ widely in focus (Needs analysis, conflict analysis, capacity analysis, market analysis, risk analysis, stakeholder mapping, coordination platform mapping, and international financing). Joint analysis should be done on the basis of existing processes and frameworks. Existing multi-stakeholder tools, in particular should seek to be maximized – such as the UN/WB/EU Recovery and Peacebuilding Assessment (RPBA) and Post Disaster needs Assessments (PDNA), and New Deal Fragility assessments and compacts.

Analytic processes also vary widely in terms of timeframes (humanitarians short to medium-term (1-3 years for HRP/MYHRP) versus longer-term perspectives of development (5 years for UNDAF, 15 years for SDGs) and peacebuilding (20-30 years)).

The sheer multitude and diversity of analytical tools in humanitarian, development and peacebuilding communities means that the guiding principle for operationalizing joint analysis should be one based on strategic aggregation. Different forms of analysis can be brought together at different times, but we must acknowledge that different groups will have their own areas of priority and different comparative advantages.

This can be done through, for example, the creation of joint comprehensive databases; the alignment of analytical processes so that one informs the other(s); and restraining from ‘starting from zero’ at the onset of an emergency. The Index for Risk Management (INFORM) could serve as a common analysis baseline.

1. The group agreed that in all situations joint analysis should be applied. However, the degree to which it is done would vary based on context. In some ‘constrained’ settings for example, information could be shared across the three pillars but be treated in a confidential manner where sensitivities may arise. In those settings pragmatism and timeliness are essential elements. When analysis is shared, some noted, it is shared too late.
2. But while joint analysis was deemed applicable in all situations, it was noted that it does not necessarily (and will rarely) mean joint programming. In scenarios that are ‘constrained’, or where the communities’ target population do not overlap, joint or common analysis can be the basis for separate activities and interventions.
3. Joint analysis also doesn't always mean joint assessments. While there was wide acceptance that agencies would continue to undertake their own assessments that focus on sectoral priorities, the need to share, jointly analyse and jointly validate is now more important than ever.

Conscious and structural efforts must be made. In particular the lack of systematic mechanisms or forums for “safe sharing” of analysis, means that there is often a reluctance to share when information is highly sensitive. Linked to this, it was mentioned that precisely because of the lack of this sharing, some countries manipulate/instrumentalise agencies playing on such perceptions and fear.

**Advancing Collective Outcomes**

1. Given the perceived lack of clarity by some of what collective outcomes mean, -- and for the purpose of discussion -- ‘Collective Outcomes’ were described in broad terms as overarching goals of the greater impact that the international community seeks to achieve to make a real difference in the lives of the most vulnerable people.

This is drawn from various global level discussions over the last few years. Particularly those around the SDGs, where not only has there been explicit mention of populations affected by humanitarian crises, but there is also consistent emphasis on reaching those furthest behind. For the peacebuilding facet, there are clear linkages with short term protection and ‘do no harm’, in addition to the long term aim to prevent the recurrence of violence and instability.

Participants agreed that, in order to achieve collective outcomes in recurrent and protracted crises, more programming was needed to address underlying development and peacebuilding issues (rather than humanitarian ones alone), and that this required earlier engagement and more flexible and context-adaptable programming by development and peacebuilding actors. It was felt that development and peacebuilding actors need to be less risk-averse. It was also agreed that humanitarians need to be better informed of contextual aspects such as power balances in the areas where they deliver humanitarian assistance to ensure doing no harm. Clear messaging is therefore required from the HQ level to give staff flexibility to leave their comfort zone and to try to implement projects towards collective outcomes.

1. Humanitarian, development and peacebuilding analysis (when done jointly) serves to gain consensus on where the short- medium, and long term shortfalls exist and what needs to be done to reduce suffering, protect development gains and sustain peace.

In this sense collective outcomes are commonly agreed priority areas in need of “course correction” towards the SDGs. The added value of using the SDGs as the framework for collective outcomes is that there is already political buy-in from member states and donors. In addition, the SDGs already have an in-built set of objectives, indicators, and accountability framework that could be used to set outcomes in the short, medium and long term.

1. To other participants, collective outcomes can be defined as the 4 or 5 big issues that cut across the interests of all three communities. For example, equitable delivery of social and public services (education, health, justice, etc.); the effects of protracted displacements; supporting and diversifying livelihoods; improving local capacity with the view of transitioning as early as possible; protection; sustaining peace; institution-building for delivery of social services; preparedness; inclusivity and participation.
2. What was clear to all participants is that in order to operationalize collective outcomes they should avoid remaining general and should be translated to lower-level outcomes and outputs at the subnational level. Some noted that such an area/local based approach would avoid the tendency of international actors to focus on capitals, and work across the country guided by the SDG indicators.

More thinking will need to be done around measuring monitoring, and evaluating collective outcomes, given the different timeframes of action. For humanitarians who work over shorter timeframes, success would be defined in terms of progress towards the collective outcomes; not achieving them per se. Similarly, the role of the human rights and peacebuilding communities would be to sustain peace and/or prevent further deterioration, while development activities would be put in place to strengthen institutions and make them more resilient.

That said, often there is a misconception that the peacebuilding process is a separate or external workstream, as it goes beyond merely security sector reform, disarmament, and demobilization related activities. There are clear contributions that development actors can have in building and sustaining peace, the aim is to make these activities more explicit and connected. In some contexts what may suffice is to integrate peacebuilding as secondary objectives in development programming; using sectoral interventions as dialogue, grievance, or trust building mechanisms. Humanitarian action can also have potential peacebuilding impact and these linkages should be identified and, where appropriate, promoted.

1. All participants agreed that these activities cannot be done in a sequential manner as is often the case; that there is a need to move away from “complementary goals”, to truly collective outcomes. This will require concerted and concurrent effort. Planning processes will need to be properly aligned and harmonized. Some countries have already decided to delay UNDAFs and other processes to be synchronized with other planning processes (e.g. Palestine, Lebanon).

It is also critical that joint analysis and collective outcomes are translated into changes on the ground when required. A token presence of one sector in what is essentially an analysis and planning process of another sector is not sufficient. To support this process, sharing information can provide a better understanding of the gaps in the required response as well as help identify (or create) common avenues to assess how we can deliver together.

1. One major challenge in achieving collective outcomes is that current leadership and coordination architecture makes it difficult to discern who has the political mandate to decide what collective outcomes will be tackled. Who, in the end, is accountable of these joined up approaches? And how do we build the necessary expertise and leadership profile to implement? Further work will be needed to understand what leadership and coordination may look like in the new way of working.

**Operationalising Joined Up Planning**

1. Participants agreed that joint planning does not necessarily mean developing a joint plan. It could mean a more strategic alignment around collective outcomes which is subsequently translated into separate but coordinated humanitarian, development and peace plans, entity-specific or sector-specific plans and programmes. Depending on the context, different permutations of ‘jointness’ are possible across the three pillars.

For the remainder of the workshop the term “joined up” planning was used to discern the variance in operationalizing joint planning that may come about in different contexts; ranging from separate but aligned plans to integrated single plans as seen in Lebanon (peace-development) and Haiti (humanitarian–development).

1. For those countries that are aiming for a joint plan structural and systemic challenges persist: a) the system is currently silo-ed and prevents breaking out; b) different agencies use different planning tools c) they are not supported and funded uniformly; d) inter-agency tools have differing timelines and programme cycles; e) INGOs have limited engagement in UN planning processes; and f) there is no accountability mechanism, sometimes leading to unrealistic plans.
2. Despite these systemic, procedural, cultural, and administrative challenges some country operations have moved towards joint analysis, and joined up planning. In the DRC for example, proper timing and the creation of an informal coordination venue were integral to fostering joined up planning between the three pillars. Two informal groups were established in the DRC: a strategic level group bringing together the secretariats of humanitarian, development, stabilization actors, chaired by the DSRSG/RC/HC; and an informal group of senior technical planners to ensure linkages between concomitant humanitarian, development and political/security planning processes (UNDAF, peacekeeping mission concept revision, HRP, WB Country Partnership Framework and national development strategy). As part of this, a joint commitment was made to triangulate respective analysis. In addition, new tools were developed to inform these processes. To increase collective visibility on programmes across the three pillars, a ‘9Ws’ (Who does What, Where - across the peace, humanitarian and development communities) exercise was undertaken to inform technical and strategic conversations.

**Conclusions: Developing a Roadmap for Action [see full Roadmap in Annex].**

1. As a key outcome of the workshop, participants developed a roadmap for the IASC TT HDN and UNWGT. This roadmap aims to better support field operations to
   1. Conduct joint analysis (including context/conflict, vulnerability and risk analysis)
   2. Carry out joined up strategic planning; and
   3. Agree on collective outcomes for the short-, medium- and long-term,

The roadmap is based on the principles that specific comparative advantages must be leveraged, that activities must be driven by the local contexts, and that humanitarian principles must be respected by international and national/local actors involved. There was also an agreement to focus on countries that have requested for support to help move implementation forward (Sudan, DRC, and Lebanon have already proposed themselves for possible follow-up).

1. There was broad agreement that lessons and good practice in joint analysis, joined up planning, and collective outcomes need to be collected and shared with colleagues in other settings where clear opportunities exist but where such momentum and engagement is lacking. This approach should form the basis for a framework for action.
2. During a brief discussion on possible country contexts that might benefit from HQ support, the interim UNDAF and MYHRP countries, the World Bank roll out, MAPS, and New Deal countries were identified as potential key opportunities to start implementing more joined up activities [see full mapping in Annex].

Other country contexts could also be prioritized for support: for example countries that have been signalled as potential new emergencies or where conflict is escalating, or where other specific trigger events (e.g. cholera or other disease outbreaks requiring institutional strengthening and tackling underlying causes) have potential to bring the actors together. These could be countries identified in upcoming Integrated Contingency Planning processes, strategic assessments; as well as those identified as Early Warning Risks (IASC).

1. Building on various discussions on different types of operational contexts, it was noted there are some scenarios in which humanitarian principles and practices have implications for other pillars. It was felt that, conceptually, there was a need to clarify the coherence of principles in different settings and to identify the types of situations in which the humanitarian, development, and peace-building principles pull in slightly different directions. In the DRC for example, it was found that the principles of impartiality was clashing with another driver for decision making in the peace-building community. This led to some disagreement on the right approach. This conceptual exercise doesn't need to problematize these principles. In fact, they should express how critical the principles are. But in addition, it was deemed helpful to identify how different settings generate different rationales for decision making; elaborate where these instances could lead to operational tensions; and develop guidance and learn from instances that have bridged those tensions.
2. Ultimately, a cultural shift is needed to change the way we work both at an inter-agency level and internally. To a large extent individual agencies and country teams have made strides in integrating this new way of working into practice. But because this is being done at different paces we see great variance at field level and global level. A plan of concrete actions was therefore discussed. Next steps will be to gain senior and executive-level buy-in; and to develop short digestible quick guides for field level consumption. Field implementation will be supported by technical experts from other countries and HQ/ROs, and by a community of practice, building and bringing together policy, technical and field practitioners across the three pillars.

**Annex 1: Agenda Outline and Expected Outcomes**

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| **Expected Outcomes of the Workshop** | * Enhanced understanding amongst IASC TT and UNWGT of joint analysis and planning across humanitarian-development-peace nexus; and * Roadmap for action for supporting the implementation of the Commitment to Action, focusing on analysis and planning that feeds into the work plans of the two mechanisms. |

## Agenda Outline

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| Thursday, 20 October 2016 | | Friday, 21 October 2016 | |
| 1. Opening Remarks | * **Bruno Lemarquis**, UNDP * **Hansjoerg Strohmeyer**, OCHA * **Henk-Jan Brinkman**, PBSO * **Rudi Coninx**, WHO * **Melissa Pitotti**, ICVA | 6. Operationalizing Joint Planning (con’t) | **Objective:** Continue the previous day’s exercise to identify initial parameters and entry points for joint planning.  Identifying which countries where some discussions of joint analysis or planning are on-going or imminent in order to help focus the discussion on challenges away from the theoretical and onto the more practical and get the discussion more rooted in implementation opportunities where HQ support might help.  **Four Groups**: See Annex |
| 2. Setting the Scene | **Objective**: To provide an overview on where the global policy conversation on the humanitarian-development-peace nexus currently stands, an understanding of where the imperative of linkages comes from.   * **Sarah Cliffe**, NYU * **Spyros Demetriou**, RCO Lebanon |
| 3. Framing the Context | **Objective**: An understanding amongst participants on the contextual parameters of the discussion around joint analysis and joint planning. , how it relates to country operationalization and challenges that need to be taken forward in the coming 12 months.   * **Andre Griekspoor**, WHO | 7. Developing a Roadmap for Action Towards Collective Outcomes | **Objective**: For participants to develop a future roadmap for joint analysis and joint planning that can be shared by the work of the IASC hum/dev TT and UNWGT  **Four Groups**: See Annex   * **Sarah Cliffe**, NYU/Plenary |
| 4. Operationalizing Joint Analysis | **Objective:** Formulation of concrete entry points and identification of bottlenecks in operationalising joint analysis at country level.  **Four Groups**: See Annex | Methodology  Pre-reading was provided to participants including:   * Commitment to Action * Grand Bargain * HDAG paper (“After the World Humanitarian Summit”) * Paper on humanitarian-development-peace nexus (PBSO) * Draft paper on typologies   Groups were pre-assigned, with facilitators and dedicated note-takers  Plenary presentations had opportunities for questions and open discussions | |

**Annex 2: Roadmap as it appeared on the shared screen during the workshop[[1]](#footnote-1)**

**1. Identify priorities for medium to long-term concrete actions to address system-wide and institutional constraints to improved collaboration between humanitarian, development, and peace actors based on consultations with and demand from UNCTs, HCTs, and other relevant partners.**

* 1. **Strengthening partnerships[[2]](#footnote-2)**
* Strengthen or develop partnerships with governments, international financial institutions (IFIs), national and international non-governmental organizations, civil society, the private sector, etc.
* Build on UN-WB collaboration on Operationalising the Humanitarian-Development-Peace Nexus at the Country Level, which will focus first on five countries/areas.
* Ensure that NGO consortia are involved and meaningfully and actively participate, including in the decision-making process [ICVA to share lists of national consortia].
* Follow evolving policy discussions in IFIs, including at IMF-WB Spring and Annual Meetings.
* Explore linkages with the *New Deal for Engagement in Fragile States*.
* Explore linkages with ongoing work on the global risk platform (currently named Global Initiative on Risk Informed Development).
* Ensure linkages with the OECD experts’ group on risk and resilience.
  1. **Providing incentives**
* Financial: Develop options for providing better financing incentives for collaboration and address financial fragmentation, including through pooled funding. [MPTFO will provide mapping of flows.]
* No regrets approach that effectively allows learning and adaption
* Performance: Develop recommendations on common language to include in performance contracts of senior management accountability for New Way of Working, other WHS commitments and CEB commitments.
* Capacities: Develop leadership and capacities of senior leadership and UN Country Teams on collaboration among humanitarian, development and peacebuilding actors, including through collaboration with UN System Staff College.
* Political: Encourage Member States to provide incentives, political support and urge for collaboration among humanitarian, development and peacebuilding actors.

**2.  Based on a review of best practices, and gaps identified by field based actors, consider producing guidance for joint analysis and joined up planning across the humanitarian, development and peace architecture, particularly in terms of alignment and compatibility of UNDAF and HRP frameworks at the country level, as necessary.**

**2.1 Seizing opportunities**

* Implementation will focus on the field in an organic and context-specific manner.
* Self-selection by countries to take the lead in implementation. Support to champions from HQ and from donors would be important.
* Opportunities for countries include:
  + Trigger events;
  + Upcoming processes regarding analysis, assessments, planning or programming, including in relation to SDGs (e.g. UNDAFs, ISFs, Strategic Assessments, New Deal fragility assessments, compacts, etc; Recovery and Peacebuilding Assessments); and
  + Donor interest.
* Participating countries will use existing instruments, processes and mechanisms for analysis and planning as much as possible, at least until enough evidence exists to require new ones.
* Participating countries will produce a complete mapping of upcoming processes and trigger events (update with showcases, support requested/provided, early warning and high-risk countries and what is moving fastest).
  1. **Capturing lessons learned**
* Participants will develop lessons learned from field opportunities in order to:
  + Generate additional evidence
  + Capture good practices and innovation, as well as bad practices, starting with current practices in CAR and DRC.
  1. **Providing support**
* Participants agreed to provide various types of support, including through:
  + Analytical, facilitating processes or technical support through missions, surge capacity or remotely;
  + Inter-agency missions, including members of civil society and other partners (IFIs for example) based on country-level demand at the highest level interagency missions (SRSG, DSRSG, RC/HC);
  + Process facilitators to bring various actors together on equal and neutral basis;
  + Existing upcoming meetings, assessments and travel of senior staff, for example by holding joint briefings, discussions or workshops at country level and add these to ToRs;
  + Enlisting international bilateral and multilateral humanitarian, development and peace partners to play a key role in convening and supporting processes; and
  + Ensuring financial support for collaborative activities, for example from entities own resources, UN-WB humanitarian-development-peace initiative, Peacebuilding Fund.

**3. Develop common messages and a common strategy to advocate for relevant policy changes and adaptation across a range of key stakeholders, including member states.**

* 1. **Advancing a shared mindset and narrative:**
* Strengthening collaboration among humanitarian, development and peace actors should be based on **existing principles and modalities.**
* Various policies, reports of the Secretary-General and resolutions adopted by Member States require the entire UN system, including the political, peacekeeping, humanitarian, human rights and development entities, to conduct joint conflict, risk analysis and strategic planning and to agree on collective outcomes, for the short-, medium- and long-term, including to sustain peace, drawing on comparative advantages. (See Annex)
  1. **Development of new modalities**
* Develop common language and key messages on the humanitarian-development-peace nexus and common outcome indicators to assess progress in the implementation;
* Review existing policies and corporate strategic plans and adapt if necessary for dissemination at Headquarters and to field offices;
* Ensure that the peace dimension is mainstreamed into the broader conceptual understanding of the WHS Commitment to Action effectively integrating the peacebuilding component, where appropriate, based on the GA and SC resolutions on sustaining peace (A/RES/70/262 and S/RES/2282 (2016));
* Encourage the executive boards of agencies to support the operationalisation of the New Way of Working that addresses the humanitarian-development-peacebuilding nexus, allowing it to be incorporated into strategic plans and policies; and
* Keep track of where different frameworks and practices may contribute to tension among different communities of practice, including when humanitarian principles and the principle to assist the most vulnerable and needy groups diverges from development or peacebuilding goals/objectives, and see how they can be addressed.
* Initiate a discussion on the technicalities and possibilities of aligning and ensuring complementarity and coherence between HRP’s and UNDAF’s within the current framework of operation and, where appropriate, with a multi-year planning trajectory in mind.
  1. **Common communications**
* The target audiences include countries at moments of opportunities, and possible champions at the country level.
* Develop common key messages on New Way of Working among humanitarian, development and peace actors for internal and external use.
* Develop inter-agency quick context-specific guide on New Way of Working among humanitarian, development and peace actors with more granularity than CTA and adding peace component.
* Communications have to strike the right balance between creating a sense of urgency, providing incentives, the need for context specificity, avoiding prescriptions and offering support to facilitate dialogue. Incentives can include financial resources, temporary deployments and technical support.
* Principals to develop key messages to engage the new Secretary-General regarding the New Way of Working among humanitarian, development and peace actors and tailor messages – if necessary – to the vision, language and framing of new the Secretary-General.
* Senior leadership of the present organisations will disseminate common key messages on norms and standards and providing vision and direction regarding the New Way of Working, the collaboration among humanitarian, development and peace actors, and the relationship with International Humanitarian Law, Human Rights Law and additional humanitarian principles and standards.
* Communications recommended:
  + Vertical: Instruction from all principals to field (not optional) and linked to WHS Commitments;
  + Horizontal: Entities will internalize and share messages and guidance within and across agencies (e.g. WFP’s 4-pager);
  + Downwards: Entities will put collaboration among four sectors on agenda of regular senior management meetings, in leadership retreats held in Montreux and in regular training [this needs to be mapped]; and
  + Collective towards donors: Develop common advocacy to donors on more effective donor financing to move away from silos and identify donor champions (e.g. start with the Good Humanitarian Donorship). Perhaps a meeting could be organized to bring humanitarian, development and peacebuilding partners together.

**Annex 3: Relevant Existing Policy Documents**

*Policy on Integrated Assessment and Planning* (IAP), 9 April 2013: “… at a minimum, the political, peacekeeping, humanitarian, human rights and development entities of the organization share a common analysis and agree on a set of common strategic objectives for peace consolidation as a starting point for planning and implementing their responses … [para. 2] … while taking “into account all recognized principles of UN engagement across humanitarian, human rights, development, political and security areas.” [para. 9]

Report of the Secretary-General for the World Humanitarian Summit, *One humanity: shared responsibility* (A/70/709, 2 February 2016): “**1.** **Context matters: create joint problem statements driven by data and analysis: …** the humanitarian, development, environmental and peace and security communities need to come together to achieve a common understanding of risks, needs, gaps and existing capacities. [para. 127] … **2. Move from individual short-term projects to collective outcomes** … that are strategic, clear, quantifiable and measurable [para. 130] … **3. Draw on comparative advantage: …** will require a new level of collaboration among … national and local governments, humanitarian, development, peace and security, human rights and environmental actors, civil society and the private sector” [para. 134]

*Resolutions on the review of the peacebuilding architecture* (A/RES/70/262 and S/RES/2282 (2016), 27 April 2016): “promoting coherence and complementarity between the United Nations’ peace and security efforts and its development, human rights and humanitarian work [para. 10] … 13. Effective peacebuilding must involve the entire United Nations system, and in this regard, emphasizes the importance of joint analysis and effective strategic planning;” [para. 13]

UN System Chief Executives Board, Statement of Commitment: Bringing the UN system together to support conflict prevention and peacebuilding within the broader 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development (27 April 2016): “intensify cooperation and collaboration among actors across peace and security, human rights, humanitarian and development areas of UN efforts … with the aim of preventing and addressing the root causes of violent conflicts, … while … ensuring full respect for humanitarian principles ... and work towards shared outcomes, in particular at country level, through joint analysis, planning, programming, and monitoring …”

*Chair’s summary,* World Humanitarian Summit, 23-24 May 2016: “A new and coherent approach is required based on addressing root causes, increasing political diplomacy for prevention and conflict resolution, and bringing humanitarian, development and peace-building efforts together.”

*The Peace Promise*, the World Humanitarian Summit, 23 May 2016 (endorsed by about 30 UN entities and non-governmental organizations): “… all humanitarian, development and peacebuilding actors, consistent with, and acting within their mandate and comparative advantages, should: 1. Focus on the alignment and coherence of collective short-, medium- and long-term objectives simultaneously; 2. Conduct context, risk or conflict analysis regularly; 3. Develop capacities, tools and partnerships, ensure institutional learning and innovation and share information; 4. Do no harm and ensure conflict-sensitive programming; 5. Provide adequate, sustained and risk tolerant financing … of collective outcomes on peace, humanitarian needs and development.”

*Outcome document of the high-level plenary meeting of the General Assembly on addressing large movements of refugees and migrants* (A/70/L.61, 30 August 2016): “We will address them [the root causes] also through … greater coordination of humanitarian, development and peacebuilding efforts” [para. 12; see also para. 37]

*Report of the Secretary-General on the Quadrennial Comprehensive Policy Review* (A/71/292/Rev.1, 27 September 2016): “Bridging the divides and strengthening the synergies across the development, humanitarian and peacebuilding nexus is critical to realize and sustain peace and development gains … in a manner which respects and safeguards humanitarian action and the space for emergency humanitarian response.” … The UNDS is fully committed to adopting coherent and complementary approaches to the development, humanitarian and peacebuilding nexus. … [I]t is essential to develop a New Way of Working together across institutional divides. … This New Way of Working will require focusing on collective outcomes, working over multi-year timeframes, based on the specific comparative advantages of different actors within and beyond the UN-system. It also offers opportunities to include peacebuilding where appropriate. … Strengthening the links between the development, humanitarian and peace efforts should not result in a diversion of development resources to emergency priorities, and vice versa.

*Report of the Secretary-General on the Outcome of the World Humanitarian Summit* (A/71/353, 23 August 2016): A New Way of Working: … that meets people’s immediate humanitarian needs, while at the same time reducing risk and vulnerability over multiple years through the achievement of collective outcomes.” [para. 34] …

**Annex 4: Participants and Groups**

|  |  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- | --- |
| **Constrained** environments (“Type 1”) | | **Consultative** in fragile settings (“Type 3”) | |
| Facilitator: Gina Pattugalan  Note Taker: Yaa Nsiah | | Facilitator: Bradley Foerster  Note Taker: Johannes Fromholt | |
| Kanni **WIGNARAJA** UNDOCO  Taija **KONTINEN-SHARP** UNDP  Henia **DAKKAK** UNFPA  Brian **GROGAN** OCHA  Paul **KEATING** EOSG  Federica **DU PASQUIER** (ICRC)  Tom **DELRUE** (UN RC Office Sudan) | Melissa **PITOTTI** ICVA  Annika **SANDLUND** UNHCR  Davide **TORZILLI** UNHCR  Giorgia **BRIGNONE** OHCHR)  Luis **HOFFMAN** (IOM)  Dino **CORELL** (ILO)  David **COFFEY** (UN-Women) | Jose **EGAS** UNHCR  Benard **MUINDE** IASC Sec.  Bouwe-Jan **SMEDING** UNFPA  Caroline **BLAYNEY** IRC  Henriette **KEIJZERS** MPTFO  Ricardo **DE-GUIMARAES-PINTO** (UNESCO)  Yuasa **MISATO** (IOM)  Vanda **DOS SANTOS** (UNDP) | Andre **GRIEKSPOOR** WHO Ignacio **LEON** OCHA  Lena **SAVELLI** UN  Sharif **BAASER** UNICEF  Frederica **DE FARRARI** UN-HABITAT  Megan **CARROLL** DPKO  Rodolpho **VALENTE** (OCHA) |
| **Capacity driven** situations (“Type 2”) | | **Collaborative** with strong local capacity (“Type 4”) | |
| Facilitator: Henk-Jan Brinkman  Note Taker: Dianna Torres | | Facilitator: Romano Lasker  Note Taker: Hitomi Kishiwada | |
| Andrew **MITCHELL** (UNHCR)  Guillaume **SIMONIAN** (WHO)  Marie-Louise **WANDEL** (UNICEF)  Catherine **ZANEV** (CEB Secretariat)  Anna **STOYANOVA** (World Bank)  Ylva **CHRISTIANSSON** (MPTFO)  Hansjoerg **STROHMEYER** (OCHA)  Sara **SEKKENES** (UNDP) | Alexander **PAK** (UNFPA) Stephanie **JULMY** (OCHA)  Nuhad **AL-ALFI** (IASC Sec.)  Eiko **IKEGAYA** (DPA/DPKO)  Rein **PAULSON** (OCHA) Michelle **BROWN** (ACF) | Rudi J. J. M. **CONINX** WHO  Stan **NKWAIN** UNDP  Jacobo **OCHARAN** Plan Int.  Christian **COURTIS** OHCHR  Maaike **JANSEN** UNEP  Jordan **RAMACCIATO** FAO  Ruth **BLACKSHAW** UNAIDS  Jahal **de MERITENS** UNDP | Anthony **CRAIG** WFP  Kwame **POKU** WHO  Karin **LUCKE** DOCO  James **TURPIN** OHCHR  Daniel **SAFRAN-HON** UN Tatyana **JITENEVA**   |  |  | | --- | --- | |  |  | |

**Annex 4: Acronyms**

|  |  |
| --- | --- |
| 3W/9W | Who, What, Where (x 3 for each domain) |
| ACF | Action Contre La Faim (Action Against Hunger) |
| CAR | Central African Republic |
| CEB Secretariat | Chief Executives Board Secretariat (United Nations) |
| CTA | Commitment to Action |
| DOCO | Development Operations Coordination Office |
| DPA/DPKO | Department of Political Affairs/Department of Peace Keeping Operations |
| DRC | Democratic Republic of the Congo |
| DSRSG | Deputy Special Representative of the Secretary General |
| EOSG | Executive Office of the Secretary General |
| FAO | Food and Agriculture Organization |
| GA | General Assembly |
| HCT | Humanitarian Coordination Team |
| HDAG | Humanitarian-Development Adhoc Group |
| HDN | Humanitarian Development Nexus |
| HRP | Humanitarian Response Plan |
| IAP | Integrated Assessment and Planning |
| IASC TT HDN | Inter-Agency Steering Committee Task Team (Humanitarian Development Nexus) |
| ICRC | International Committee of the Red Cross |
| ICVA | International Council of Voluntary Agencies |
| IFI | International Financial Institution |
| ILO | International Labour Organization |
| IOM | International Organization for Migration |
| IRC | International Rescue Committee |
| ISF | Integrated Strategic Framework |
| MPTFO | Multi-Partner Trust Fund Office |
| MAPS | Mainstreaming, Acceleration and Policy Support |
| MYHRP | Multi Year Humanitarian Response Plan |
| NYU | New York University |
| OCHA | Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs |
| OECD | Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development |
| OHCHR | Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights |
| PBSO | Peacebuilding Support Office |
| QCPR | Quadrennial Comprehensive Policy Review |
| RC/HC | Resident Coordinator/Humanitarian Coordinator |
| RCO | Resident Coordinator’s Office |
| SC | Security Council |
| SDG | Sustainable Development Goals |
| SRSG | Special Representative of the Secretary General |
| UN HABITAT | United Nations Human Settlements Programme |
| UN RC Office | United Nations Resident Coordinator Office |
| UNAIDS | Joint United Nations Programme on HIV/AIDS |
| UNCT | United Nations Country Team |
| UNDAF | United Nations Development Assistance Framework |
| UNDP | United Nations Development Programme |
| UNDS | United Nations development system |
| UNEP | United Nations Environment Programme |
| UNESCO | United Nations Organization for Education, Science and Culture |
| UNFPA | United Nations Population Fund |
| UNHCR | United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees |
| UNICEF | United Nations Children's Fund |
| UNSG | United Nations Secretary General |
| UNWGT | United Nations Working Group on Transitions |
| WB | World Bank |
| WHO | World Health Organization |
| WHS | World Humanitarian Summit |

1. The raw information and points included in this road map form the basis of a more refined plan of action [↑](#footnote-ref-1)
2. This list is not exhaustive. [↑](#footnote-ref-2)