

# Independent Grand Bargain Report

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The Grand Bargain aims to reduce the humanitarian financing gap – estimated at US\$ 15 billion – by improving the delivery and efficiency of aid. 52 donors and aid organisations, which account for the lion’s share of the international humanitarian response, have endorsed the Grand Bargain. One year after the Grand Bargain’s adoption, signatories report, on average, action on 40 per cent of the commitments that apply to them – an important feat considering the breadth of the initiative. But progress is uneven, and the initially high political momentum is fading. True to its core objective to increase efficiency, the Grand Bargain has maintained a light bureaucratic footprint, and joint leadership roles have increased buy-in. At the same time, there is growing impatience about the Grand Bargain’s impact on field operations. To ensure that the Grand Bargain is a true game-changer, this report recommends to keep the light structure and joint leadership roles; re-engage signatories at the political level; increase coherence within the Grand Bargain; apply the Grand Bargain in its entirety to specific emergency operations; and expand the Grand Bargain’s reach among non-signatories.

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# Acronyms

AAP	Accountability to Affected Populations
CAFOD	Catholic Agency for Overseas Development
CaLP	Cash Learning Partnership
CBPF	Country-Based Pooled Fund
CDAC	Communicating with Disaster Affected Communities Network
CHS	Core Humanitarian Standard on Quality and Accountability
CRS	Catholic Relief Services
DAC	Development Assistance Committee
DG DEVCO	International Cooperation and Development Department of the European Commission
DG ECHO	Humanitarian Aid and Civil Protection Department of the European Commission
DI	Development Initiatives
ECOSOC	United Nations Economic and Social Council
FAO	Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations
FTS	Financial Tracking Service
GPPi	Global Public Policy Institute
GHD	Good Humanitarian Donorship
IASC	Inter-Agency Standing Committee
IASC HFTT	Inter-Agency Standing Committee Humanitarian Financing Task Team
IATI	International Aid Transparency Initiative
ICRC	International Committee of the Red Cross
ICVA	International Council of Voluntary Agencies
IFRC	International Federation of Red Cross and Red Crescent Societies
IOM	International Organization for Migration
MSF	Médecins Sans Frontières
M&E	Monitoring and Evaluation
NGO	Non-Governmental Organisation
NRC	Norwegian Refugee Council
OCHA	United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs
OECD	Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development
PACT	Platform for Action, Commitments, and Transformations
RC/RC	Red Cross and Red Crescent Movement
SCHR	Steering Committee for Humanitarian Response
SDGs	Sustainable Development Goals
STAIT	Senior Transformative Agenda Implementation Team
UK	United Kingdom
UK DFID	United Kingdom Department for International Development
UN	United Nations
UNDP	United Nations Development Program

UNFPA	United Nations Population Fund
UNHCR	Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees
UNICEF	United Nations Children's Fund
UNRWA	United Nations Relief and Works Agency for Palestine
UN Women	United Nations Entity for Gender Equality and the Empowerment of Women
WFP	World Food Programme
WHO	World Health Organization
WHS	World Humanitarian Summit

# Executive Summary

Humanitarian response is “woefully underresourced”<sup>1</sup>: it faces a financing gap of an estimated US\$ 15 billion.<sup>2</sup> At the World Humanitarian Summit in May 2016, more than 30 major donors and aid organisations agreed on the adoption of the Grand Bargain, a package of reforms that would seek to reduce the financing gap by improving the delivery and efficiency of aid. One year afterwards, donors and aid organisations reported on the extent to which they have followed up on their Grand Bargain commitments.

This report, an independent assessment of the progress made to date, is based on 44 self-reports submitted by June 1, 2017; 80 interviews with signatories (including all co-conveners) and experts; consultations with over 40 non-signatory NGOs; the inputs of eight thematic experts consulted by the authors; and a review of secondary sources. It includes the following main findings:

## **There is strong endorsement from key organisations**

As of May 2017, the Grand Bargain has been endorsed by 52 organisations, including key donors, United Nations agencies, two components of the International Red Cross and Red Crescent Movement, NGOs, the World Bank, and the OECD. The signatories represent the lion’s share of today’s humanitarian response: they account for 88 per cent of international humanitarian donor funding and 72 per cent of aid organisations’ budget.

## **Signatories report action on an average of 40 per cent of relevant commitments**

All consulted stakeholders view the Grand Bargain as a highly relevant catalyst for change. 43 of the Grand Bargain’s 52 signatories and the World Health Organization have submitted self-reports. Each report describes actions related to an average of 40 per cent of the commitments that apply to the signatory in question and planned activities on an additional 5 per cent of the commitments. This is an important achievement, considering that the Grand Bargain is a voluntary agreement that covers a broad spectrum of activities and includes a total of 51 commitments.

While generally good, progress has been uneven. The most active work streams of the Grand Bargain are those concerning localisation, cash, and reporting requirements,

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1 Australian Aid et al. (2016) The Grand Bargain – A Shared Commitment to Better Serve People in Need. Istanbul, Turkey.

2 High-Level Panel on Humanitarian Financing (2016) Too Important to Fail – Addressing the Humanitarian Financing Gap.

with over 45 per cent of relevant signatories reporting activities.<sup>3</sup> Less activity – 35 per cent or lower – has been reported in the work streams concerning management costs, participation revolution, earmarking, and the humanitarian–development nexus. The differences between individual commitments are starker. 73 per cent of signatories, for example, report collaboration, information sharing, and the development of standards and guidance for cash, while 30 per cent report investments in new delivery models. Similarly, 70 per cent of signatories report investments in durable solutions for refugees and internally displaced persons, while 7 per cent report joint multi-hazard risk and vulnerability analysis and multi-year planning.

## Summary of progress made per work stream

### 1. Greater transparency

The work stream has strong momentum behind strengthening endorsement of and reporting to IATI. Most donors and the majority of aid organisations are reporting some data to IATI, and there are efforts to improve the Financial Tracking Service. Activities to review technical and legal challenges could help signatories publish complete, high-quality, and timely data. More frontline actors should be included to track financial flows from donors to crisis-affected people.

### 2. More support and funding tools for local and national responders

Localisation remains at the forefront of the political agenda. The strongest activities (73 per cent) are related to investments in the capacity of local and national responders. In addition, 51 per cent of signatories report efforts to assess and address legal and technical barriers to funding local and national responders, while 34 per cent report increases in funding, mainly by increasing contributions to pooled funds. A decision on how to track flows to local and national actors is anticipated.

### 3. Increased use and coordination of cash-based programming

Aid organisations have made strong progress, with almost half, including the largest UN agencies, reporting increases in cash transfer programmes. Among donors, 19 per cent report an increase in cash-based assistance in their funding portfolios, and some have been promoting the use of a single contractor to deliver cash, raising concerns among aid agencies. The coordination of cash transfer programmes remains controversial, as the issue is perceived as linked to the question of which organisation might emerge as the cash lead.

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<sup>3</sup> The work stream on collaborative multi-year planning and funding is not included here because it has only one relevant data point.

## 4. Reduced duplication and management costs

This work stream has had varied progress. Key UN agencies have taken promising steps to introduce shared partner arrangements and increase joint procurements. However, and despite important NGO-led initiatives, it seems improbable that aid organisations will introduce comparable cost structures by the end of 2017. More donors have participated in joint oversight processes, but this has not resulted in an automatic reduction in individual reviews.

## 5. Improved joint and impartial needs assessments

Important investments have been made to improve technical capacities and resources required to conduct joint and impartial needs assessments. Two-thirds of cluster lead agencies and half of the signatories have reported investments in needs assessments and analysis. However, there are widespread concerns that inter-agency competition for funding will continue to obstruct better data-sharing and collaboration in assessments.

## 6. A participation revolution

42 per cent of aid organisations report investments in feedback mechanisms and accountability to affected populations guidelines. The same share of donors have reported providing more-flexible funding to facilitate programme adaptation. However, coordinated approaches and the proposed collective service for communication and community engagement have seen little progress.

## 7. Increased collaborative humanitarian multi-year planning and funding

18 of the Grand Bargain's 22 donors provided multi-year funding in some form for their partners in 2015 (although most contributions were single-year), and most have reported activities enabling increased multi-year financing. The UN and the Red Cross and Red Crescent Movement have reported a significant shift toward multi-year planning. Meanwhile, most NGOs had already undertaken multi-year planning prior to the World Humanitarian Summit. There are concerns that there is insufficient investment in improving the design of collaborative multi-year plans and that donors have not yet aligned funding with those.

## 8. Reduced earmarking of donor contributions

63 per cent of donors have reported more or already high levels of flexible contributions. An additional 16 per cent plan to follow suit. But aid organisations perceive generally more earmarking since signing the Grand Bargain because donors have largely increased support to pooled funds (which also advances their commitments on localisation), instead of decreasing the earmarking of bilateral contributions to aid organisations.



## 9. Harmonised and simplified reporting requirements

64 per cent of donors and aid organisations with implementing partners have taken steps to reduce some of their individual requirements, and an additional 16 per cent plan to do so. However, there is a small risk that signatories will fall short of harmonising their reporting requirements by the end of 2018, despite a recent agreement to pilot the common reporting template. Several aid organisations – NGOs in particular – have pressed for simplified donor reporting but did not report steps taken to enhance the quality of their own reporting.

## 10. Enhanced engagement between development and humanitarian actors

Signatories have reported investments in durable solutions for refugees (70 per cent of signatories), social protection systems (32 per cent), and/or disaster risk reduction (28 per cent), but it is unclear whether these investments reflect an actual increase in efforts. Very few signatories have reported activities towards the commitments in this work stream that require collective action, such as joint multi-hazard risk and vulnerability analysis.

## **The Grand Bargain's design strengthens buy-in**

The main driver behind the progress observed so far is the Grand Bargain's unique design. The Grand Bargain is the only agreement that has brought donors and aid organisations together and commits both sides to contribute their share. The agreement builds on the strong buy-in and involvement of its members. 22 signatories have taken a leadership role as co-conveners of the different work streams and/or as members of the Facilitation Group. Most signatories have participated actively, and many have referenced the Grand Bargain in operational strategies and policy documents, making it a more binding internal reference point.

While the logic of mutual concessions – the quid pro quo – was instrumental in bringing the Grand Bargain to life, it does not play a significant role today. Most signatories report that they are unable to follow developments in all Grand Bargain work streams and thus prioritise and focus on those they deem most important. This pick-and-choose approach is understandable, given the breadth of the initiative. However, it results in uneven progress and enables signatories to pursue their agendas one-sidedly, thereby upsetting the level playing field between donors and aid organisations that has been so highly praised by everyone.

## **Political momentum is fading**

If the Grand Bargain fails to deliver as a true game-changer, there is a risk that it will be knocked down in priority by newer initiatives. The Grand Bargain played a prominent role at the World Humanitarian Summit, but its political momentum, according to all signatories, has faded ever since the September 2016 departure of Kristalina Georgieva

from her role as Co-chair of the High-Level Panel on Humanitarian Financing. Although the Facilitation Group “picked up the ball” in early 2017, the Grand Bargain still lacks an eminent person to maintain high-level political engagement with signatories. This is critical for overcoming non-technical obstacles and would increase the extent of change likely to result from the Grand Bargain. At the same time, the secondary role played by northern- and southern-based NGOs as well as the little buy-in from non-OECD donors are likely to limit the breadth of change.

## **The Grand Bargain has a light bureaucratic footprint**

In keeping with its core objective of increasing efficiency, the Grand Bargain has maintained a light bureaucratic footprint. The work streams have adopted a flexible approach, rallying key stakeholders where joint action is needed and facilitating an exchange of lessons where signatories can effect change on their own. Work streams have made good use of existing processes to limit duplication – for example, by linking to the work done by the Inter-Agency Standing Committee, the Good Humanitarian Donorship initiative, and the “New Way of Working” put forth by the United Nations.

At the same time, there are concerns about the lack of oversight and coherence across work streams. Considering the wide range of topics covered under the Grand Bargain, only a few signatories command the necessary resources to follow developments in all 10 work streams, and many have hoped for the architecture to act as a clearing house for information. Work stream co-conveners, the Facilitation Group, and the Secretariat have recently begun to link with other work streams to leverage potential synergies and address tensions; however, five work streams continue to have weak or missing important links to other work streams.

## **There is growing impatience about the Grand Bargain’s impact on field operations**

While follow-up on the Grand Bargain is commendable, there is growing impatience about its impact in the field. Initial efforts often focused on time-consuming but necessary global-level discussions, from defining a localisation marker to developing a template for harmonised donor reports. In addition, policy and institutional changes within signatory organisations often need time before they have a tangible effect on operations. Due to an initial focus on activities at the global level and piecemeal field-implementation of activities related to individual commitments, the benefits of the Grand Bargain are thus far little recognised by actors on the ground.

## Recommendations

In sum, the Grand Bargain has created important momentum for change. The significant follow-up on commitments reported one year after its adoption provides reason for optimism. However, the initiative continues to face important challenges and constraints. They must be addressed to ensure that the Grand Bargain maintains its momentum for change, particularly as famine threatens to devastate the lives of millions in several protracted emergencies around the world, and as the financing gap for humanitarian response seems doomed to increase only further, not least due to recent political changes in key donor countries.

The following recommendations are addressed to the annual meeting of Grand Bargain signatories in June 2017:

### Recommendation 1: Keep the light structure and the joint leadership roles

- Do not increase the Grand Bargain's bureaucratic footprint when the Facilitation Group and Secretariat have already begun to address concerns more actively;
- Maintain joint leadership roles between donors and aid organisations in the work streams, as they reflect the Grand Bargain's unique design and strengthen the engagement of signatories.

### Recommendation 2: Re-engage signatories at the political level

- Re-engage signatories at the level of Sherpas or principals;
- Table strategic decisions for the upcoming Grand Bargain meeting in June to encourage high-level participation;
- Nominate an eminent person or a group of eminent persons to maintain high-level signatory engagement;
- Ensure continued monitoring through the annual independent Grand Bargain report and by supporting civil society initiatives that monitor progress;
- Improve the integration of Grand Bargain reporting with reporting on the overall follow-up to the World Humanitarian Summit (e.g., OCHA's Platform for Action, Commitments, and Transformations PACT).

### Recommendation 3: Increase coherence within the Grand Bargain

- Closely coordinate and sequence commitments related to the accountability of aid organisations (i.e., the work streams on transparency, reporting, and management costs, as well as elements of the localisation, cash, and earmarking work streams) to ensure that agreements reached in one work stream do not require re-negotiation in another;
- Facilitate information exchange on the core commitments of the "bargain" in order for actors to leverage the quid pro quo – for example, by including examples

- of relevant signatory action in work stream updates, using the Grand Bargain website to facilitate the sharing of relevant information, and using meetings of humanitarian country teams and donors to exchange good practice and hold each other to account;
- Coordinate efforts on commitments that require potentially far-reaching changes to the work processes of UN agencies and donors, and agree on a joint vision and joint advocacy, potentially using the upcoming annual meeting of Grand Bargain signatories;
  - Use Grand Bargain events and meetings of humanitarian country teams and donors to jointly consider and prioritise potential tensions and synergies – between, for example, increasing localisation, cash, and participation on the one hand, and decreasing earmarking and reporting requirements on the other.


## **Recommendation 4: Make a concerted effort to apply the Grand Bargain in its entirety to specific emergency operations**

- Shift as much as possible the attention of signatories to implementing the Grand Bargain in the field;
- Select a few important emergency contexts for a concerted effort to showcase the Grand Bargain's benefits that result from a simultaneous step change across all work streams and commitments, and work with humanitarian country teams and donors to fine-tune priorities and approaches according to context;
- Consider using the meetings between the IASC Emergency Directors Group and donors as well as the Senior Transformative Agenda Implementation Team to identify challenges and solve problems when implementing the Grand Bargain in specific emergency contexts;
- Enable donors and aid organisations at country level to hold each other accountable for implementing the commitments – for example, by providing user-friendly information on the obligations of each party to the bargain.

## **Recommendation 5: Expand the Grand Bargain's reach among non-signatories**


- Appoint an eminent person/group;
- Support the communication efforts of the Grand Bargain Secretariat;
- Include discussions about the Grand Bargain on the agenda of the upcoming ECOSOC Humanitarian Affairs Segment and related resolutions or communications;
- Offer leadership roles in the Facilitation Group or as work stream co-conveners to non-OECD donors and NGOs;
- Encourage signatory donors to reach out to non-signatory governments;
- Strengthen the efforts of the three signatory NGO alliances to operationalise what the Grand Bargain means for their members and to reach out to other NGO alliances.

# The Grand Bargain One Year After The World Humanitarian Summit




The Grand Bargain has successfully mobilised key stakeholders, representing 86-88% of international humanitarian donor funding and 72% of aid organisations' budget. But little buy-in from non-OECD countries and NGOs limits its potential.


... But the progress is uneven.



Signatories have on average reported progress on 40% of their commitments (and plan to act on an additional 5%) ...



% Applicable commitments on which signatories reported actions



22 of the 52 signatories have taken a leadership role in the Grand Bargain's architecture, which is comparably flexible and light.

## Recommendations

1. Keep the light structure and the joint leadership roles
2. Re-engage the signatories at the political level
3. Increase coherence within the Grand Bargain
4. Apply the Grand Bargain in its entirety to specific emergency operations
5. Expand the Grand Bargain's reach among non-signatories



In the field, there is growing impatience about realizing the benefits of the Grand Bargain.



# Progress Made Per Work Stream

This table illustrates scores assigned to the Grand Bargain work streams along five assessment criteria. Each criterion is assessed on a scale from 0 to 4 (from no significant progress to excellent progress, or from important missing links to full coherence). For a work stream’s overall assessment, see the narrative summaries in section 4 of the full report or the executive summary.

Work Stream	Donor activity	Aid organisation activity	Activity on joint commitments	Links to other work streams	Links to other existing processes
Transparency	●●○○	●●○○	●●○○	●●○○	●●●●
Localisation	●●○○	●●●○	●●○○	●○○○	●●●○
Cash	●○○○	●●●○	●●○○	●○○○	●●●●
Management Costs	●○○○	●●●○	●●○○	●●○○	●○○○
Needs Assessment	●○○○	●●○○	●○○○	●●●○	●●○○
Participation Revolution	●●○○	●●○○	●○○○	●○○○	●●●○
Multi-Year Planning and Funding	●●●○	●●○○	●○○○	●●○○	●○○○
Earmarking	●○○○	●○○○	●○○○	○○○○	●●●○
Reporting Requirements	●●●○	●○○○	●●●○	●●○○	●●●●
Humanitarian-Development Nexus	●○○○	●○○○	●○○○	○○○○	●●●○

# A Grand Bargain to Make Humanitarian Response More Efficient and Effective

Humanitarian response is “woefully underresourced”<sup>4</sup>; it faces a financing gap of an estimated US\$ 15 billion.<sup>5</sup> At the World Humanitarian Summit in May 2016, more than 30 major donors and aid organisations agreed on the adoption of the Grand Bargain, a package of reforms that would seek to reduce the financing gap by improving the delivery and efficiency of aid. The Grand Bargain was intended to complement efforts to shrink needs and broaden the resource base for humanitarian action.<sup>6</sup> In the agreement, donors committed, for example, to provide longer-term and more-flexible funding, and aid organisations pledged to increase transparency and lower management costs.

The Grand Bargain consists of 51 commitments, which are divided into 10 work streams (see Box 1). The work streams take up longstanding demands for change in the humanitarian response system. Together, they seek to make humanitarian action more efficient and effective,<sup>7</sup> and to strengthen collaboration and trust between aid actors, including those in development cooperation.<sup>8</sup> If successful at improving delivery, the Grand Bargain could draw in more funding and thus mobilise additional resources for humanitarian action.

The idea behind the Grand Bargain is to create momentum for change by bringing together different actors and requiring each group to contribute its share. As of May 2017, the Grand Bargain has been endorsed by 52 entities: 22 donors, 12 NGOs, 11 UN agencies, three NGO networks, two components of the International Red Cross and Red Crescent Movement, the OECD, and the World Bank. The humanitarian system’s largest

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4 Australian Aid et al. (2016) *The Grand Bargain – A Shared Commitment to Better Serve People in Need*. Istanbul, Turkey.

5 High-Level Panel on Humanitarian Financing (2016) *Too Important to Fail – Addressing the Humanitarian Financing Gap*.

6 High-Level Panel on Humanitarian Financing and UN General Assembly (2016) *One Humanity: Shared Responsibility*. Report of the Secretary-General A/70/709.

7 This contributes to Core Responsibility 5 – “invest in humanity” – of the UN Secretary General’s report for the World Humanitarian Summit.

8 This contributes to Core Responsibility 4 – “change people’s lives: from delivering aid to ending need” – of the Secretary General’s report and connects to the “new way of working” agreed upon in the World Humanitarian Summit’s outcome document.

members make up most of the signatories, but smaller aid organisations, including local ones, are also expected to benefit from the Grand Bargain.

The signatories created a light set of institutions – i.e., the Grand Bargain architecture – to sustain momentum upon the conclusion of the World Humanitarian Summit. All signatories are expected to report every year on the progress made with

regard to their expressed commitments; in addition, an annual independent report will assess the overall progress of the Grand Bargain. Each of the bargain's 10 work streams is led by two co-conveners, typically a donor and an implementer.<sup>9</sup> In October 2016, the Grand Bargain Facilitation Group was established to maintain an overview of all work related to the agreement. The group supports the work streams, inter alia, through a secretariat created in March 2017.<sup>10</sup> To increase the Grand Bargain's visibility and maintain high-level dialogue, the signatories had the intention to appoint another eminent person upon the departure of former European Commission Vice-President Kristalina Georgieva from her role as Co-chair of the High-Level Panel on Humanitarian Financing, but this has yet to happen.

As shown in Illustration 1, the Grand Bargain seeks to contribute to greater efficiency, effectiveness, collaboration, and trust in the aid system. It relies mainly on the actions taken by the signatories with regard to the 51 commitments that seek to achieve these objectives. The activities of the Grand Bargain architecture, public and peer pressure, and the logic of mutual

concessions between donors and aid organisations (i.e., quid pro quo) should further encourage signatories to take relevant action.

### Box 1: The Grand Bargain's Work Streams

1. Greater transparency
2. More support and funding tools for local and national responders
3. Increased use and coordination of cash-based programming
4. Reduced duplication and management costs
5. Improved joint and impartial needs assessments
6. A participation revolution
7. Increased collaborative humanitarian multi-year planning and funding
8. Reduced earmarking of donor contributions
9. Harmonised and simplified reporting requirements
10. Enhanced engagement between development and humanitarian actors

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9 Work stream 1 (transparency): the Netherlands and the World Bank. Work stream 2 (localisation): Switzerland and IFRC. Work stream 3 (cash): UK DFID and WFP. Work stream 4 (management costs): Japan and UNHCR. Work stream 5 (needs assessments): ECHO and OCHA. Work stream 6 (participation revolution): the US and SCHR. Work stream 7 (multi-year planning and funding): Canada and UNICEF. Work stream 8 (earmarking): Sweden and ICRC. Work stream 9 (reporting requirements): Germany and ICVA. Work stream 10 (humanitarian-development nexus): Denmark and UNDP.

10 The Grand Bargain Facilitation Group's responsibilities are to (1) work with the eminent person; (2) provide continued momentum of the process; (3) prepare for the annual Grand Bargain meeting in the margins of the ECOSOC HAS; (4) tender out the annual report; (5) act as a problem-solving mechanism; and (6) support activities across work streams and encourage coherence. ICVA and Germany (2016) Grand Bargain Meeting 5-6 September 2016. Final summary Note. The facilitation group is currently composed of Switzerland, the Humanitarian Aid and Civil Protection Department of the European Commission (DG ECHO), the UN Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA), the UN Entity for Gender Equality and the Empowerment of Women (UN Women), the World Food Programme (WFP), the International Federation of Red Cross and Red Crescent Societies (IFRC), and the Steering Committee for Humanitarian Response (SCHR). The Grand Bargain secretariat is hosted at the IASC Secretariat in Geneva.






Illustration 1: The Logic Model of the Grand Bargain

Source: Authors

# An Independent Report to Track the Progress of the Grand Bargain

## Objective

Endorsing the Grand Bargain is voluntary. It is thus crucial to maintain momentum by tracking and publicly reporting the agreement's progress as well as leveraging public and peer pressure. The present report is the result of a commission from the Grand Bargain Facilitation Group. GPPi was asked to produce the first annual, independent report on the progress made by the Grand Bargain; the report would be largely based on the self-reports submitted by the signatories. This report is the Grand Bargain's primary monitoring mechanism. Working alongside it are other activities that contribute to transparency and the accountability of Grand Bargain signatories. These include the UN's annual review of progress in implementing the broader commitments made at the World Humanitarian Summit (based on the online Platform for Action, Commitments and Transformation)<sup>11</sup>; the OECD-commissioned project to capture crisis-affected people's perceptions of the aid they receive;<sup>12</sup> an updated OECD Development Assistance Committee (DAC) review process that includes certain Grand Bargain commitments;<sup>13</sup> and various civil society monitoring initiatives that assess progress made against specific Grand Bargain commitments and work streams.<sup>14</sup>

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- 11 UN Secretary-General (2017) Standing Up for Humanity: Committing to Action. Chair's Summary.
  - 12 OECD (N/A) Delivering the Grand Bargain and the World Humanitarian Summit: Monitoring and Supporting the Progress of OECD Donors. Available from: <https://www.oecd.org/dac/governance-peace/grand%20bargain-flyer.pdf> (downloaded on January 11, 2017).
  - 13 OECD (2017) DAC Peer review Reference Guide. Available from [http://www.oecd.org/officialdocuments/publicdisplaydocumentpdf/?cote=DCD/DAC\(2017\)10&docLanguage=En](http://www.oecd.org/officialdocuments/publicdisplaydocumentpdf/?cote=DCD/DAC(2017)10&docLanguage=En) (downloaded on May 30, 2017).
  - 14 For examples of initiatives that track progress made within certain work streams or on specific commitments, see, e.g., IRC – Humanitarian Commitment Scorecard: [www.medium.com/rescue-aid/the-humanitarian-commitment-scorecard-1c65a813d61c](http://www.medium.com/rescue-aid/the-humanitarian-commitment-scorecard-1c65a813d61c), or CaLP – State of the World of Cash Report (forthcoming).

## Scope

The present report attempts to assess the progress made one year since the adoption of the Grand Bargain. It remains too early for the commitments to have been reached, or for there to be a tangible difference in efficiency, effectiveness, and cooperation. Therefore, this report focuses on assessing to what extent the Grand Bargain has galvanised efforts to improve humanitarian response; to what extent signatories have acted on their commitments; and the factors that most enable or hinder progress. Subsequent reports will assess whether or not commitments were realised, as well as the progress made towards reaching the Grand Bargain's objectives.

## Methods

The main data sources for our assessment are the signatories' self-reports as well as interviews and consultations with signatories and other relevant stakeholders. In total, 43 signatories and the World Health Organisation submitted self-reports: 19 donors, 12 United Nations agencies and programmes, eight NGOs, three NGO networks, the IFRC, and the ICRC.<sup>15</sup> We coded these reports to track how many signatories report activities against each commitment. The figures reported in Section 4 reflect activities that are already underway (red numbers) or planned (blue numbers). They represent the share

of organisations reporting activities out of the total number of relevant organisations that have submitted self-reports. Signatories that have not submitted a self-report are not included in the count.

For example, commitment 1 under the transparency work stream applies to all signatories, except for the three NGO networks. The percentage thus refers to the total of 41 aid organisations and countries that have submitted self-reports. By contrast, commitment 3B under the transparency work stream applies only to donors. The percentage thus refers to the total of 19 donors that have submitted self-reports. The self-report template requires signatories to provide information on each of the work streams, but not on each of the commitments. Nevertheless, where a self-report contains no information about a specific commitment, this is counted as "no action reported." Where a commitment

### Box 2: Scorecard to Assess Individual Action By Donors, Individual Action By Aid Organisations, and Collective Action

**0 - No significant progress** No activities have been reported, or reported activities do not reflect any significant change.

**1 - Little progress** Only a small number of activities have been reported, or the reported activities reflect only limited change.

**2 - Some progress** An important number of activities have been reported, but major obstacles remain - for example, activities only address some (not all) crucial aspects covered by the work stream, or important stakeholders have reservations or concerns about the way forward.

**3 - Good progress** Many (not all) relevant stakeholders report significant activities, addressing many (not all) aspects covered by the work stream.

**4 - Excellent progress** All relevant stakeholders report activities, reflecting significant change and addressing all aspects covered by the work stream.

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<sup>15</sup> See Annex 3 for a list of signatories that have submitted self-reports. Two additional self-reports that were submitted after the official deadline will be integrated into the final version of this report.

includes several different activities that are expected from signatories, these aspects are tracked separately. In such a case, the percentage reflects the average across the different aspects, and the short text accompanying the numbers explains noteworthy patterns or differences between them.

Some commitments require not only individual action by signatories, but also collective or joint action – for example, developing a harmonised template for donor reports or a marker to track the amount of aid funding that goes to local organisations. Where individual signatories report related activities (e.g., engagement in the process to develop a common report structure), we present the numbers reflecting these activities. Where a quantitative analysis of individual signatory actions is not meaningful, no percentages are presented.

In total, the research team conducted 80 interviews. In addition to all work stream co-conveners, we interviewed 25 Grand Bargain signatories that were selected using stratified random sampling to represent the range of organisation sizes as published by the Financial Tracking Service.<sup>16</sup> The thematic experts who were consulted for this report have themselves interviewed other representatives and experts.<sup>17</sup> The team also consulted over 40 NGO non-signatories to understand their perceptions

of the Grand Bargain, as well as considered the recommendations of the VOICE Grand Bargain Task Force, which includes 18 of VOICE's NGO members.<sup>18</sup>

In addition to tracking reported signatory activity for each commitment, this report summarises the progress made in each work stream, drawing on additional sources such as periodic updates provided by the work streams, information gathered through interviews, and analyses made by the thematic experts about each work stream. This qualitative assessment considers various dimensions: the progress made by donors and aid organisations on individual commitments; the progress made on commitments that require collective action; and the efficacy of links to other Grand Bargain work streams and to other, external processes. To facilitate comparisons between work streams, the present report not only provides a narrative summary, but also assigns a score between 0 and 4 to each of these dimensions (see Boxes 2 and 3).

### **Box 3: Scorecard to assess links to other Grand Bargain work streams and to external fora or processes**

**0 – Important missing links** No links established despite important potential synergies or the need for coordination and sequencing.

**1 – Weak links** Some links have been established, but they are weak and do not apply to all relevant commitments that have important potential synergies or the need for coordination and sequencing.

**2 – Effective partial links** Effective links have been established, but they cover only some of the commitments that have important potential synergies or the need for coordination and sequencing.

**3 – Adequate links** Effective links have been established with those work streams or external fora/processes that offer the most-important potential synergies or need for coordination and sequencing. Where there is little need or only limited opportunities, no links have been established.

**4 – Full coherence** Strong links have been established with all work streams or external fora/processes that offer potential synergies or need coordination or sequencing, and connections between these have been established.

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<sup>16</sup> Financial Tracking Service (2017) Global humanitarian funding in 2016: Totals per appealing agency; Totals by donor (report as of 3 March 2017). UN OCHA.

<sup>17</sup> Please see Annex 2 for a complete list of individuals consulted for this report.

<sup>18</sup> VOICE Grand Bargain Task Force (2017) Recommendations for GPPi's annual report on the Grand Bargain.

## Limitations

The independent Grand Bargain report has been challenging to develop due to the short timeframe available, the wide spectrum of activities covered by the bargain, and the absence of predefined metrics or indicators. To address these challenges, the research team consulted thematic experts for each of the 10 work streams; developed a basic logic model and proposed ways of measuring progress in discussion with the co-conveners; and systematically coded the self-reports accordingly. Nevertheless, the report still faced some limitations:

- The team did not verify the information contained in the self-reports. It based its analysis on the information provided by the signatories.
- The quantitative analysis of the self-reports may reflect biases. Since the self-report templates featured broad lead questions, signatories were not explicitly required to provide information about every single commitment. Counting an absence of information as “no action reported” may have thus introduced a negative bias. At the same time, signatories that did not submit any self-reports were excluded from the total count. This self-selection may have introduced a positive bias, as signatories with a stronger record in following up on their commitments might have been more likely to submit self-reports than those with weaker follow-up.
- The involvement of non-signatories in the reporting process was limited. While a series of NGOs were involved through either interviews or consultations by means of NGO networks, no non-signatory donors, host governments, or development and peace actors were involved.

## Outline

The report starts with an analysis of the overall momentum for change created by the Grand Bargain, as well as the factors that explain this result (Section 3). It subsequently provides an assessment of progress made to date in each of the 10 work streams (Section 4). It concludes with general recommendations (Section 5).

# Overall Assessment of Momentum Created by the Grand Bargain

The idea behind the Grand Bargain was to create momentum for change by bringing together different actors, requiring each group to contribute its share in order to achieve a more efficient, effective, and collaborative response to humanitarian emergencies. Overall, the Grand Bargain successfully mobilised key stakeholders. At the current stage, most signatories have been focusing on a selection of commitments, rather than implementing the package as a whole. While the signatories appreciate the Grand Bargain's light bureaucratic footprint, it has resulted in limited coherence between the activities of the various work streams, and there is growing impatience regarding the Grand Bargain's impact in the field.

## **Finding 1: The Grand Bargain has successfully mobilised key stakeholders.**

Ahead of the World Humanitarian Summit in May 2016, the High-Level Panel on Humanitarian Financing created strong momentum by bringing together leading government donors and aid organisations to draft the Grand Bargain. Despite the hasty process imposed by a tight deadline, European Commission Vice-President and Co-chair of the High-Level Panel on Humanitarian Financing Kristalina Georgieva oversaw to completion the creation of the most anticipated outcome document of the World Humanitarian Summit.

Since the summit, the Grand Bargain has been endorsed by an additional 18 aid actors, putting the current tally of signatories at 52. This includes the biggest donors, the OECD, the World Bank, and the largest aid organisations from the three operational families – the United Nations, the Red Cross and Red Crescent Movement, and NGOs. The 22 government signatories provided 86 to 88 per cent of the over US\$22.7 billion spent on international humanitarian action in 2016; the 29 aid organisations received 72 per cent.<sup>19</sup>

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<sup>19</sup> The OECD is neither a donor nor aid recipient. Financial Tracking Service (2017) Global Humanitarian Contributions in 2016: Totals by donor. UN OCHA.

On the whole, signatories have shown strong buy-in to the Grand Bargain. Over 40 per cent of signatories have taken a leadership role in the Grand Bargain’s architecture: seven signatories are part of the Facilitation Group, and 21 signatories have served as work stream co-conveners (including six members of the Facilitation Group). A much larger group of actors has contributed actively to individual work streams as well as to the overall Grand Bargain process. For example, 43 signatories and the WHO have submitted self-reports, including all UN agencies, Red Cross and Red Crescent signatories, and NGO networks, as well as 19 of the 22 signatory donors and eight of the 12 signatory NGOs. Nearly every signatory approached by the research team has contributed actively to the present report by participating in interviews and providing comments.

All interviewed signatories have communicated strong support for the Grand Bargain, which they see as a highly relevant catalyst for change. Although most have not hired new staff to oversee the Grand Bargain’s implementation or dedicated additional resources for it, the majority have taken steps to institutionalise commitments. Many, for example, refer to the Grand Bargain in operational strategies and policy documents, making it a stronger internal reference point to galvanise organisational change.

Crucially, signatories that submitted self-reports have on average taken relevant action on 40 per cent of the commitments that apply to them (see Illustration 2).




Illustration 2: Share of Applicable Commitments With Relevant Actions Reported Per Signatory

Source: Authors

Conversely, for each of the 51 Grand Bargain commitments, an average of 40 per cent of signatories to which the commitment applies reported taking relevant steps, and an average of 5 per cent reported planned activities.<sup>20</sup>

At the same time, high-level engagement since the World Humanitarian Summit has declined substantially, as discussions have moved from the political to a more technical level. This is a natural development, given the kind of change process at hand. However, almost all signatories consulted for this report feel that the departure of Kristalina Georgieva left an important void in leadership, and they suggest it would be crucial to re-engage organisations at the political level.

As the Grand Bargain has been losing high-level political momentum, donor agencies and aid organisations have started to engage with new initiatives, including those championed by the new UN Secretary-General António Guterres. While Guterres has expressed his continued commitment to a more efficient UN, interviewees feel that the UN, and the international community as a whole, has attached greater importance to other initiatives that came out of the World Humanitarian Summit, to the 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development, and to the UN Summit for Refugees and Migrants: “a new way of working” and “leaving no one behind.”<sup>21</sup>

Most signatories have also voiced concerns about the changes recently unfolding in key donor countries and the consequent rise in uncertainty regarding future financing. For example, the new United States administration recently announced plans to cut its foreign aid budget by 37 per cent.<sup>22</sup> While the effect of these changes on the Grand Bargain’s implementation remains unclear, the resulting anxiety will not benefit any joint endeavour.

## **Finding 2: The Grand Bargain risks developing into a pick-and-choose deal.**

The Grand Bargain is different from other efforts to improve the humanitarian system in that it brings together donor governments and implementing organisations into a single agreement that is based on a compromise. The idea that each side would make concessions in exchange for receiving important improvements from the other side (*quid pro quo*) was instrumental in bringing the Grand Bargain to life. In practice, however, this aspect does not play a significant role today. The overwhelming majority of signatories report that the logic of mutual concessions has neither been raised as an expectation in bilateral discussions, nor encouraged them to make greater investments in any specific commitment. Interviewees have mentioned three reasons for this.

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20 Not all of the 51 Grand Bargain commitments apply to all signatories, as some are only relevant for donors or aid organisations. The percentage of reported action only includes those signatories to which the commitment applies.

21 António Guterres (2016) Secretary-General-designate António Guterres’ remarks to the General Assembly on taking the oath of office. United Nations Secretary-General. Available from: <https://www.un.org/sg/en/content/sg/speeches/2016-12-12/secretary-general-designate-ant%C3%B3nio-guterres-oath-office-speech> (downloaded on May 30, 2017).

22 Nahal Toosie and Burgess Everett (2017) Source: Trump wants 37 percent budget cut to State, USAID. Politico. Available from: <http://www.politico.com/story/2017/02/trump-budget-cuts-state-department-usaid-235505> (downloaded on May 30, 2017).



First, there is insufficient overview of progress across the commitments. Most organisations have not dedicated enough capacities to follow developments in all 10 work streams. As of spring 2017, the Grand Bargain architecture has provided insufficient support for creating such an overview. Without knowing what happens in other work streams, the quid pro quo between the larger issue areas cannot function.

Second, there exist different interpretations of the Grand Bargain's essence. Donors tend to expect aid organisations to increase transparency and cut overhead in return for more-flexible funding. By contrast, some aid organisations expect more-flexible funding in exchange for progress in localising aid and increasing cash programmes, and they are frustrated when such progress does not materialise.

Third, the quid pro quo entails risks. As Kristalina Georgieva said, the Grand Bargain can only work in a “spirit of giving.”<sup>23</sup> If one group of actors waits for the other to act first, the bargain will fall into a deadlock; without a leap of faith, trust will evaporate. At least one donor has announced that it would put its own efforts to reduce earmarking on hold until aid organisations increase transparency.

In practice, most signatories do not treat the Grand Bargain as a package that requires progress on all commitments at the same time. Rather, they interpret it as a menu of commitments, from which they can choose specific work streams or commitments to focus on. A few donors have reported, for example, that the work stream on management costs applies only to aid organisations – despite the fact that the work stream features a commitment on oversight processes that specifically addresses donors.

While it is understandable for organisations to prioritise their engagement, especially during the early stages of such a broad initiative, this “pick-and-choose” approach has significant downsides. First, it results in uneven progress and risks leaving some of the more difficult commitments orphaned. As Illustration 3 shows, the most active work streams are localisation (with 48 per cent of relevant signatories reporting activities), cash (47 per cent), and reporting requirements (53 per cent).<sup>24</sup> Significantly less activity has been reported in the work streams on earmarking (30 per cent), the humanitarian–development nexus (32 per cent), management costs (35 per cent), and the participation revolution (34 per cent).<sup>25</sup> Within work streams, the differences are even starker. Under localisation, 73 per cent of all signatories report already high levels of or increased multi-year investment in the institutional capacities of local and national responders, while only 34 per cent report already high levels of or increased funding to local and national responders.

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23 International Council of Voluntary Agencies (2016) Final Summary Note Grand Bargain Meeting. Available from: [https://interagencystandingcommittee.org/system/files/300915\\_-\\_final\\_summary\\_note\\_-\\_bonn\\_grand\\_bargain\\_meeting.pdf](https://interagencystandingcommittee.org/system/files/300915_-_final_summary_note_-_bonn_grand_bargain_meeting.pdf) (downloaded on May 30, 2017).

24 The work stream on collaborative multi-year planning and funding is excluded from this analysis because it has only one relevant data point.

25 Reported activity does not automatically predict progress made towards the realization of the Grand Bargain commitments, especially where commitments require joint action (e.g., multi-year planning and funding). However, the qualitative assessment of progress made in the 10 work streams corroborates the finding on uneven progress (cf. Section 4 of this report).




Illustration 3: Share of Applicable Signatories That Have Reported Relevant Actions Taken Per Commitment

Note: Value for each commitment sorted by work streams; 0 per cent equals N/A (except for commitment 2B, work stream 8).

Source: Authors

Second, the “pick-and-choose” approach could undermine one of the Grand Bargain’s greatest achievements: to create a “level playing field where signatories all meet as equals.”<sup>26</sup> If the Grand Bargain is no longer seen as a package deal, its most powerful signatories might unilaterally impose their will on others. For example, implementing organisations have reported the case of a donor cutting overhead costs across the board to “help” aid organisations meet their commitments under management costs – without, however, providing more-flexible funds or simplifying reporting requirements.

### **Finding 3: The Grand Bargain’s focus on the large, established members of the humanitarian system has facilitated agreement, but many commitments need support from non-signatories as well.**

The Grand Bargain consciously began by forging a deal among the system’s largest and most established actors. This approach has made it possible to quickly reach agreement on a broad range of crucial topics. However, the Grand Bargain’s potential for change is limited by little buy-in from non-OECD donors and host governments, as well as the mainly indirect participation of NGOs.

With the exception of Bulgaria, all government signatories are OECD members.<sup>27</sup> Gulf donors and other key non-OECD donors have not endorsed the Grand Bargain, including those governments that have participated in the bargain’s negotiations<sup>28</sup> or otherwise engaged with their peers in the Good Humanitarian Donorship initiative or OCHA’s Donor Support Group. The absence of these governments and their largest implementing partners limits the global impact of the Grand Bargain’s efforts to improve aid efficiency and effectiveness.

Moreover, the Grand Bargain has not paid enough attention to the role of host governments despite the fact that they might object to the implementation of certain commitments – for example, with regard to cash or the participation revolution.<sup>29</sup> Critically, the Group of 77 (G77) has raised concerns about the Grand Bargain to UN programmes and specialised agencies that they jointly oversee with Grand Bargain signatory governments; they are apprehensive about making a formal endorsement and referencing the Grand Bargain in management plans. Several interviewees remarked that G77 reservations might be due primarily to a dearth of information, but this only indicates the failure of reaching out to these governments. It also bodes poorly at a time when Western governments expect greater burden-sharing with non-OECD

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26 Australian Aid et al. (2016) *The Grand Bargain – A Shared Commitment to Better Serve People in Need*. Istanbul, Turkey.

27 But not all OECD members are Grand Bargain signatories (e.g., France).

28 Turkey and the United Arab Emirates, for example, were involved in the Grand Bargain negotiations, but they did not endorse the deal. Kuwait and Saudi Arabia did not respond to formal requests to join the negotiations.

29 Julia Steets et al. (2016) *Drivers and Inhibitors of Change in the Humanitarian System*. Berlin: GPPi. Available from: <http://www.gppi.net/publications/humanitarian-action/article/drivers-and-inhibitors-of-change-in-the-humanitarian-system/> (downloaded on May 30, 2017).

governments and their partners, and it contravenes the World Humanitarian Summit's overall goal to increase national and local leadership and ownership.

NGOs are also underrepresented among Grand Bargain signatories. With the exception of the three leading aid alliances (ICVA, InterAction, and SCHR), no NGO directly endorsed the Grand Bargain at the World Humanitarian Summit. Although the three NGO networks together represent almost 300 organisations, their members are not considered signatories themselves, unless they endorse the Grand Bargain on an individual basis. Since the summit, 12 NGOs have endorsed the Grand Bargain, but some have expressed feeling that their engagement was not always welcome. Several non-signatory NGOs have engaged actively in the Grand Bargain process in consultations organised by aid alliances or the localisation work stream.

No active efforts to include more NGOs into the Grand Bargain have been reported, aside from the work of the aid alliances. NGOs are concerned that the Grand Bargain only takes forward the proposal of the High-Level Panel on Humanitarian Financing that focuses on efficiency, whereas no similar initiatives exist for the panel's two other proposals – namely, to shrink needs and to deepen and broaden the resource base for humanitarian action. They are also concerned that UN agencies largely consider themselves implementers, rather than focusing on their role in funding other organisations in the bargain. This raises questions about whether benefits (e.g., through reduced earmarking) will apply to NGOs as well.

With the exception of the localisation work stream, southern-based NGOs remain largely absent from discussions about the Grand Bargain and its implementation. Even if the Grand Bargain, delivered as conceived, were to benefit southern-based NGOs, little consultation with local and national responders sends a problematic message about the humanitarian system's inclusiveness and its commitment to true partnership.

## **Finding 4: The Grand Bargain has a comparatively light bureaucratic footprint.**

The architects of the Grand Bargain have sought to prevent it from turning into “another layer of bureaucracy.”<sup>30</sup> They are mindful of the bargain's core objective to increase efficiency, as well as the criticism lobbied against past efforts to reform the humanitarian system for their heavy bureaucratic footprint.<sup>31</sup> The Grand Bargain's architecture consists of 10 thematic work streams, each led by two co-conveners, a Facilitation Group, a secretariat, and an eminent person. The main mechanisms for monitoring progress made on the commitments are the signatories' annual self-reports as well as the annual independent Grand Bargain report. In addition, co-conveners have been asked to report on their approach and progress made at Grand Bargain meetings and within their respective self-reports.

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30 ICVA and Germany (2016) Final Summary Note Grand Bargain Meeting Bonn, 5-6 September 2016.

31 Susanna Krueger, Andras Derzsi-Horvath, Julia Steets (2016) IASC Transformative Agenda A Review of Reviews and Their Follow-Up. GPPi/Berlin. Available from: [http://www.gppi.net/fileadmin/user\\_upload/media/pub/2016/Krueger\\_\\_Derzsi-Horvath\\_\\_Steets\\_\\_2016\\_\\_IASC\\_Transformative\\_Agenda.pdf](http://www.gppi.net/fileadmin/user_upload/media/pub/2016/Krueger__Derzsi-Horvath__Steets__2016__IASC_Transformative_Agenda.pdf) (downloaded on May 30, 2017).

Consulted signatories confirm that the architecture is comparatively light. An important feature of the Grand Bargain is that individual work streams are not expected to follow a common blueprint. Instead, the co-conveners are free to adopt the most suitable approach to implementing the commitments included in their work streams. Where joint action is required to realise a commitment – for example, developing a common reporting template for donors or a localisation marker to track the amount of funding reaching local responders – co-conveners have rallied key stakeholders to reach an agreement. Where individual action is required – for example, increasing the use of cash in emergency response – the co-conveners have adopted a lighter approach, incentivising progress by sharing lessons learned or similar interventions.

In several cases, work streams have opted to strongly link to or even rely on other fora or processes dealing with the same issue. The Humanitarian Financing Task Team of the Inter-Agency Standing Committee is working on a number of commitments, including the localisation marker and transparency.<sup>32</sup> The Good Humanitarian Donorship initiative has work streams on cash, donor earmarking, and reporting. Finally, the Grand Bargain secretariat is hosted by the secretariat of the IASC to nurture links with ongoing IASC processes.

While this approach fosters synergies and avoids duplications, it has also led to some confusion. Several signatories feel that the relationship between the Grand Bargain and other initiatives anchored in the World Humanitarian Summit, as well as the relationship between the Grand Bargain and IASC-led humanitarian reforms, is insufficiently defined. They are also concerned about fragmented reform efforts in which several interagency initiatives exist in parallel, and they question whether the Grand Bargain can be considered the main inter-agency effort at the moment.

Signatories have also noted the additional reporting burden created by the Grand Bargain, which has been particularly criticised for its overlap with the reporting requirements for the overall commitments made at the World Humanitarian Summit through the online Platform for Action, Commitments, and Transformations (PACT). While all consulted stakeholders agree that effective monitoring has been central to maintaining the Grand Bargain’s momentum, most feel it is too early to judge whether the current monitoring and reporting mechanisms are fit for the purpose.

Critically, even the bigger organisations confess that the breadth of topics covered by the Grand Bargain make it near impossible for them to follow all developments, and they point out several areas where the architecture is currently too light. All consulted signatories describe the departure of Kristalina Georgieva and the discontinuation of the secretariat in September 2016 as a watershed moment, creating the impression that the “ball was dropped,”<sup>33</sup> until the Facilitation Group assumed a more active role starting in January 2017, and the Secretariat was staffed in March 2017.

As a result, there is insufficient coherence between the different work streams.<sup>34</sup>

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32 IASC Humanitarian Financing Task Team (2017) Work Plan January 2016 – December 2017. Available from: [https://interagencystandingcommittee.org/system/files/20170222\\_2016-2017\\_hfft\\_workplan\\_v.15.pdf](https://interagencystandingcommittee.org/system/files/20170222_2016-2017_hfft_workplan_v.15.pdf) (downloaded on May 30, 2017).

33 Several interviewees used this expression to describe the state of affairs in fall and early winter of 2016.

34 ICVA and Germany (2016) Final Summary Note Grand Bargain Meeting Bonn, 5-6 September 2016.

Five work streams have weak or important missing links to other work streams. Therefore, tensions between some work streams remain unresolved – for example, between increasing the use of cash and support to local organisations, and reducing earmarking and management costs. In other cases, opportunities to leverage synergies or sequence interventions have not been taken advantage of. It would have been helpful, for example, if the standards or templates developed in the transparency or the reporting work streams had integrated the definitions of earmarking, cost structures, and localisation developed in these other work streams. A meeting for co-conveners on May 17, 2017, helped identify relevant areas and strengthen linkages between the work streams on transparency, management costs, earmarking, and reporting.<sup>35</sup>

## **Finding 5: There is growing impatience about realising the benefits of the Grand Bargain in the field.**

After the adoption of the Grand Bargain, several of its key terms and definitions turned out to be controversial. This is very common in political processes where stakeholders agree to objectives worded in unclear terms and then follow their own, conflicting interpretations.<sup>36</sup> Moreover, signatories only included a concrete target or deadline in nine out of the 51 commitments. Self-reports show that commitments with a concrete target have triggered more follow-up actions (by an average of 49 per cent of applicable signatories) compared to those without a concrete target (follow-up by 38 per cent of applicable signatories).

Eagerness to show progress after the World Humanitarian Summit revealed some of these political tensions early on. In the needs assessment work stream, for instance, there were disagreements on the role that specialised entities should play in improving joint and impartial needs assessments. In the localisation work stream, signatories committed to provide at least 25 per cent of funding to local and national responders as directly as possible by 2020, but they disagreed on the kinds of organisations that fall under “local and national responders” and on the meaning of “as directly as possible.”

Since the adoption of the Grand Bargain, clear progress has been made in clarifying and forging agreement on these issues. For needs assessments, a technical workshop convened over 20 stakeholders in February and March 2017 to identify priorities and action points. For localisation, a multi-stakeholder consultation process on tracking localisation resulted in an agreement to potentially use an upgraded version of the Financial Tracking Service, rather than a localisation marker. However, the debates have not always been inclusive. Many workshops took place in Geneva, and not all signatories had the means or capacity to participate in them. In a few cases, signatories began to question underlying assumptions, opening up debate on the text of commitments they had already endorsed.

While further debates on definitions and approaches were often necessary and

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35 N/A (2017) A Commitment to Complementarity: Taking Forward the Grand Bargain Work-streams Related to Donor Conditions.

36 See, e.g., Brunsson, N. (1989) *The Organization of Hypocrisy: Talk, Decisions and Actions in Organizations*; Krasner, S. D. (1999) *Sovereignty: Organized Hypocrisy*.

fruitful, they also led to less focus on the immediate implementation of the Grand Bargain in the field. Despite the important achievement of acting on 40 per cent of applicable commitments on average, signatories have expressed growing impatience with the pace of the Grand Bargain's application and effects in the field. Most frequently, they referred to commitments aiming to increase the effectiveness of aid through the greater use of cash, localisation, joint needs assessments, the participation revolution, and multi-year planning and funding. Notable exceptions include activities that are in line with Grand Bargain commitments, but are controversial and perceived as unilateral. This includes the aforementioned example of the donor that cut overhead costs, as well as the call by two donors for a single contractor to deliver a major cash transfer programme in Lebanon.

Coordinated attempts to pilot the Grand Bargain as a whole in some emergency operations did not come to fruition, partly due to concerns that first efforts should focus on "inculcating the necessary policy and other changes inside their own institutions."<sup>37</sup> Several work streams have now decided to pilot or roll out changes individually, generating concerns about the lack of coordination. The reporting work stream, for example, is planning to pilot a simplified reporting template in various countries, and a few of the larger UN organisations are piloting multi-year planning in their individual operations. In the meantime, individual donors and NGOs have reported encountering frustration when they reference Grand Bargain commitments at country level, as local UN or donor representatives are often unaware of what the commitments entail in practice. To address this concern, some signatories have been organising workshops or disseminating internal corporate messages about the Grand Bargain.

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37 Sweden and ICRC (2016) Summary Note - 5th Grand Bargain Meeting (28 June 2016 – NY).

# Analysis of Progress Made Within the Grand Bargain Work Streams

## 1. Greater transparency

**CONTEXT** Despite efforts to track humanitarian aid financing through the Financial Tracking Service (FTS) on a voluntary basis since 1992,<sup>38</sup> it remains impossible to find out how many cents of every dollar spent by donors actually reaches aid recipients. This has generated controversy about the humanitarian system's accountability to taxpayers and affected populations, and about the efficiency of aid organisations in general. Late and incomplete submissions to the FTS have made it more difficult to use the data in decisions about resource allocation and operations. In the Grand Bargain, signatories committed themselves to improving the FTS and using the International Aid Transparency Initiative (IATI), an open-data standard launched in 2008 at the Third High Level Forum on Aid Effectiveness in Accra and subsequently endorsed in Busan in 2011.<sup>39</sup> Greater transparency in finances could reduce other forms of reporting demands on aid organisations and increase efficiency through competition.

**WORK STREAM APPROACH** The co-conveners, the Netherlands and the World Bank, have contracted a consultant, Development Initiatives (DI), to facilitate the work of the transparency work stream. The consultant is tasked with supporting signatories in the implementation of their commitments to publish data using an open-data standard, to provide related capacity support, and to help link with work streams on localisation, management costs, and reporting requirements.<sup>40</sup> In early 2017, DI surveyed signatories on the current state of play and conducted an analysis of the perceived challenges and incentives of publishing data. DI also circulated a paper that seeks signatories' feedback on how to improve the IATI standard in order to meet their needs. To assess overall progress made on all transparency commitments, DI will develop a monitoring framework and methodology by June 2017. Efforts to strengthen

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38 Financial Tracking Service (2015) About FTS. UN OCHA. Available from: <https://fts.unocha.org/content/about-fts-1> (downloaded on May 30, 2017).

39 International Aid Transparency Initiative (2015) History of IATI. Available from: <http://www.aidtransparency.net/about/history-of-iati> (downloaded on May 30, 2017).

40 Development Initiatives (2016) Monitoring of the Grand Bargain commitment on transparency. Inception report; Netherlands and World Bank (2016) Grand Bargain. Greater Transparency. Work stream 2-pager.



linkages between the FTS and IATI are led by the IASC Humanitarian Financing Task Team and OCHA. The use of data analysis is viewed as an area where signatories are expected to make progress without support from the work stream.

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## Reported activity against commitments <sup>a (p. 85)</sup>


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● Activities reported ● Activities planned ● No activities reported

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### 1. Signatories publish timely, transparent, harmonised, and open high-quality data on humanitarian funding within two years of the World Humanitarian Summit, with IATI serving as a basis for the purpose of a common standard.

*All signatories • Individual action • Deadline: 2018*




Almost all the donors, as well as the majority of aid organisations, report that they publish high-quality data to IATI. However, many report on only a share of their activities.<sup>b</sup> Aid organisations such as the WHO and IOM joined IATI in early 2017, while other aid organisations such as the ICRC are currently exploring how to adapt their systems to better match IATI standards and how to improve IATI so that it better fits their needs. Some signatories have raised concerns about IATI, as they believe that it responds to the reporting needs of development rather than humanitarian actors.

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### 2. Signatories make use of appropriate data analysis, explaining the distinctiveness of activities, organisations, environments, and circumstances.

*All signatories • Individual action • No target/deadline*




39 per cent of the signatories report having taken steps to make better use of data analysis. UNFPA, for example, has developed a Transparency Portal that shows how the organisation spends its earmarked funds and its core funding.

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### 3A. Signatories improve the digital platform and engage with the open-data community.

*All signatories • Joint action • No target/deadline*



OCHA launched a new version of the FTS in January 2017, which supports the tracking of pass-through funding in order to monitor localisation efforts, provides a more detailed break-down of funding (including the use of cash), and increases the visibility of unearmarked donations.<sup>c</sup> More than a third of all signatories report that they are engaged in this process.


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## Reported activity against commitments

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### 3B. Donors accept common standard data for some reporting purposes.

*Donors • Individual action • No target/deadline*




16 per cent of the donors report that they accept common standard data in place of bilateral reporting. Meanwhile, 5 per cent plan to do so.

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### 4. Signatories support the capacity of all partners to access and publish data.


*All signatories • Individual action • No target/deadline*



30 per cent of the signatories are making investments in building the capacity of their partners. For example: the Netherlands has established an IATI helpdesk for NGOs, Canada is producing guidance on how to publish on IATI, and UNDP provides peer support to other UN agencies that are new to IATI.

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## Assessment of Progress Made Within Work Stream 1 (Transparency)



**DONOR ACTIVITY | SCORE: 2** As donors are members of the Good Humanitarian Donorship (GHD) initiative and the OECD, their reporting on humanitarian aid financing met relatively high quality standards already by the time of the World Humanitarian Summit in May 2016. A few donors report that they have been supporting NGOs to achieve greater transparency. However, there has been little progress in accepting IATI data instead of bilateral reporting, which has created grave concern among aid organisations that there will be more reporting, instead of less, as envisioned by the Grand Bargain.

**AID ORGANISATION ACTIVITY | SCORE: 2** A growing number of aid organisations report to IATI, but the submitted data is often incomplete (e.g., data is submitted only for projects funded by a specific donor). There are also questions about the quality of data and the timeliness of its submission.

**ACTIVITY ON JOINT COMMITMENTS | SCORE: 2** Although not all signatories have contributed to discussions on transparency, OCHA and the IASC Humanitarian Financing Task Team (HFTT) have made some progress in improving the FTS and ensuring interoperability between the FTS and IATI.

**LINKS TO OTHER WORK STREAMS | SCORE: 2** Links to other work streams have been sporadic, but they have increased recently through a joint workshop and teleconference with the co-conveners of the work streams on management costs, multi-year planning and funding, and reporting. Stronger coordination with the localisation work stream remains necessary, particularly in order to consider the effects and potential integration of the localisation marker.

**LINKS TO OTHER EXISTING PROCESSES | SCORE: 4** The co-conveners are collaborating closely with the IASCHFTT and the FTS, building on their existing efforts to improve the FTS and IATI, to produce technical guidelines, and to continuously consult key stakeholders.

There has been good momentum behind endorsing and reporting to IATI. The work stream is taking relevant action to review the technical and legal challenges faced by signatories, and this could further support the submission of complete, high-quality, and timely data. However, a range of signatories seem to be unaware of the work stream's activities and perceive it as passive. Without the inclusion of a wider range of stakeholders, especially national NGOs and National Red Cross or Red Crescent Societies, it will remain challenging to track financial flows from donors to crisis-affected people. A lack of coordination with other work streams could also create challenges, if, for example, the new common reporting template is not interoperable with IATI, thus increasing the reporting burden.

## 2. More support and funding tools for local and national responders

**CONTEXT** Enabling local and national actors to take on a leading role in emergency response was a central theme of the WHS.<sup>41</sup> As local organisations and people are usually the first to respond in a crisis, reinforcing local capacities could help affected societies to better manage future shocks and to find effective approaches to long-term challenges. The summit has galvanised support from international aid actors and witnessed the launch of the first southern-based NGO umbrella network, the Network for Empowered Aid Response (NEAR). Such a strong commitment to localisation might not have been achieved without the 2015 Charter for Change, in which 29 international NGOs committed to increase direct funding to southern-based humanitarian NGOs, reaching 20 per cent of their funding by May 2018.<sup>42</sup> In the Grand Bargain, signatories committed, among other things, to achieve a global, aggregated target of at least 25 per cent of humanitarian funding to local and national responders as directly as possible by 2020.

**WORK STREAM APPROACH** The IASC Humanitarian Financing Task Team has set up a Localisation Marker Working Group to define and measure direct and indirect funding to local and national responders. The co-conveners, the IFRC and Switzerland, have set out to pilot a “phased approach” to localisation, wherein increased capacity investments would progress to direct funding. They also seek to map how donors and partners have overcome barriers to direct funding; engage the IASC and the Senior Transformative Agenda Implementation Team (STAIT) to ensure more meaningful participation of local and national responders in Humanitarian Country Teams; and pilot locally managed pooled funds in two contexts.<sup>43</sup> In addition, the IFRC is currently undertaking a “quality review” to define what quality funding, quality partnership, and effective and principled humanitarian action look like for local and national humanitarian actors as well as the types of investment and capacities needed.<sup>44</sup>

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41 UN General Assembly (2016) Outcome of the World Humanitarian Summit. Report of the Secretary-General A/71/353.

42 Charter 4 Change (2017) Localisation of Humanitarian Aid. Available from: <https://charter-4change.org/> (downloaded on: June 2, 2017).

43 IFRC and Switzerland (2016) Grand Bargain. Increasing support and funding tools for local and national responders. Work stream 2-pager.

44 Grand Bargain Facilitation Group (2016) Summary of progress from each Grand Bargain work stream – Annex (III) to the meeting report.

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## Reported activity against commitments


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● Activities reported ● Activities planned ● No activities reported

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### 1. Signatories increase multi-year investment in the institutional capacities of local and national responders, including preparedness, response, and coordination capacities.

*All signatories • Individual action • No target/deadline*




Signatories have made considerable investments in building the capacities of local and national responders. The Netherlands, for example, has increased its budget for humanitarian capacity building from 1.7 million in 2016 to 2.15 million in 2017. With funding from UK DFID, six international NGO members of the START Network, including CAFOD and Christian Aid, are delivering the two-year “Shifting the Power” programme to strengthen the capacity of 55 selected local partners in five countries to deliver humanitarian preparedness and response.<sup>d</sup> Aid organisations also report related investments in partner capacities. However, it is often unclear whether signatories’ investments are multi-year. In addition, most signatories do not have systems in place for comprehensively tracking their funding in building the capacity of governments, communities, Red Cross and Red Crescent National Societies, and local civil society.

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### 2. Signatories better understand, and work to remove, barriers that prevent organisations and donors from partnering with local and national responders.

*All signatories • Individual action • No target/deadline*



Many aid organisations and donors have assessed the legal and technical barriers that lie before them and taken steps to address these. Italy, for instance, approved new legal procedures in July 2016 that makes local NGOs who have had partnerships with Italian NGOs eligible for direct Italian funding. Belgium is revising its Royal Decree for Humanitarian Aid to allow for contributions to pooled funds managed by international NGOs. Other signatories, such as the European Commission/DG ECHO, are exploring ways to move forward on localisation within the limitations of their current legal environment. Finally, certain signatories such as UN Women and the Netherlands reported that they do not face any impediments to partnering directly with national responders.

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## Reported activity against commitments

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**3. Aid organisations support and complement national coordination mechanisms and include local and national responders in international coordination mechanisms as appropriate and in keeping with humanitarian principles.**

*Aid organisations · Joint action · No target/deadline*




Our analysis of this commitment is restricted to OCHA and cluster co-leads. Some of these actors have taken first steps. OCHA, for example, is advocating for strengthened ties with local and national actors in its support to field offices through its inter-cluster coordination section. UNDP is involved in discussions in the Global Cluster for Early Recovery on how to transition from externally to locally led responses. CARE reports that a joint workshop with the Global Cluster Coordinators took place in December 2016 to advance thinking and practice with regard to making coordination more local.

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**4&6. Signatories increase funding to local and national responders in order to achieve a global, aggregated target of at least 25 per cent of humanitarian funding to local and national responders as directly as possible by 2020. Signatories make greater use of funding tools which increase and improve assistance delivered by local and national responders, such as country-based pooled funds, the disaster relief emergency fund, and NGO-led and other pooled funds.**

*All signatories · Individual action · Target of 25 per cent by 2020 “as directly as possible”*



42 per cent of the donors and aid organisations with implementing partners report steps or plans to increase funding to local responders, either through pooled funds or directly (self-reports often do not fully distinguish between the two). That said, many donors report that the main way for them to fulfil their localisation commitments is by increasing their support for pooled funds. Germany’s contribution to country-based pooled funds increased significantly in 2016 to US\$ 62 million, and Norway’s contribution has increased to about \$30 million in 2016. USAID has begun contributing to such funds in Iraq and Ethiopia on a pilot basis. Luxembourg has almost doubled its contribution to the disaster relief emergency fund in 2016. In total, for all 17 country-based pooled funds currently in place, allocations to national NGOs increased slightly from 14.63 per cent in 2014 to 17.88 per cent in 2016.<sup>6</sup> For other pooled funds, the research team was unable to assess the share of resources that have been channelled to national and local responders.

Donors report less progress in increasing direct contributions to local and national organisations, and some note that the 25 per cent target is very ambitious. A good practice example comes from Belgium: 8 per cent of the Belgian humanitarian budget went to local organisations in 2016, and the Belgian Minister for Development Cooperation has recently reconfirmed the country’s target of 25 per cent by 2020.


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## Reported activity against commitments

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### 5. Signatories develop, with the IASC, and apply a “localisation” marker to measure direct and indirect funding to local and national responders.

*All signatories · Joint action · No target/deadline*




Under the IASC HFTT, the localisation marker working group has convened the Grand Bargain signatories,<sup>f</sup> southern-based non-signatory aid actors, and technical experts to make progress on definitions needed for the localisation marker. 40 per cent of signatories mention the development of a localisation marker in their self-reports.

However, there remains no consensus on what the term “local and national responder” encompasses or what it means to channel funds “as directly as possible.” The co-conveners will propose a definition ahead of the annual Grand Bargain meeting in June 2017, based on broad consultations, the Localisation Marker Definitions Paper, and the work done by the OECD and the IASC HFTT. The working group has recommended signatories to use the updated FTS and IATI, rather than a standalone localisation marker to measure funding to local and national responders.

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## Assessment of Progress Made Within Work Stream 2 (Localisation)



**DONOR ACTIVITY | SCORE: 2** Although donors have made significant steps to assess or even remove barriers to localisation, a significant increase in direct funding to local and national responders will likely remain a distant goal. Instead, donors have attempted to move forward within current limitations by channelling funding to local actors through pooled funds and investing in the institutional capacities of local partners.

**AID ORGANISATION ACTIVITY | SCORE: 3** Aid organisations, in particular NGOs and the Red Cross/Red Crescent movement, are highly invested in the localisation agenda. Most are actively following up on their Grand Bargain commitments, often as a continuation of their previous efforts surrounding the Charter for Change (e.g., reviewing financial tracking and reporting mechanisms to better capture funding passed on to local actors).<sup>45</sup> Many are adjusting and harmonising their partnership arrangements, developing guidance and tools to build local capacity, and reviewing their recruitment processes to ensure that they do not undermine local capacity.

**ACTIVITY ON JOINT COMMITMENTS | SCORE: 2** The IASC HFTT has facilitated a broad consultative process on the localisation marker, aiming to present working definitions ahead of the annual Grand Bargain meeting in June 2017. The current state of play also questions whether a marker would be best suited to tracking localisation, rather than the upgraded FTS and OECD systems. The joint discussions on how to make coordination mechanisms more local are seen as promising, but they have not yet led to significant operational changes.

**LINKS TO OTHER WORK STREAMS | SCORE: 1** The localisation work stream has strong synergies and tensions with other issue areas. In December 2016, the co-conveners reported no joint action with other work streams,<sup>46</sup> although signatories participating in several work streams can theoretically create linkages. One of the most relevant work streams is transparency (work stream 1), where strong links could ensure that the revised or new digital platform enables the tracking of funds that are directed to local and national responders. In addition, the localisation agenda could benefit from harmonised partnership arrangements by reducing administrative barriers to cooperation (work stream 4), and it could have a positive effect on strengthening collaboration between humanitarian and development actors (work stream 10). However, greater reliance on local and national responders could have adverse effects on reducing management costs (work stream 4) and on earmarking (work stream 8).

**LINKS TO OTHER EXISTING PROCESSES | SCORE: 3** The co-conveners have relied strongly on the IASC Humanitarian Financing Task Team, which has taken forward the work on the localisation marker in a specialised working group. They have coordinated efforts with a related work stream of the Good Humanitarian Donorship initiative. Signatories, more broadly, have actively engaged NGOs in the process – for example, through ICVA’s Humanitarian Financing Working Group and the OCHA–NGO platform on country-based pooled funds. Due to the impressive number and diversity

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45 NGOs that have not endorsed the Grand Bargain are also reviewing how they track funds to local actors. Many have signaled an interest in adopting the definitions put forth by the IASC HFTT.

46 Grand Bargain Facilitation Group (2016) Summary of progress from each Grand Bargain work stream – Annex (III) to the meeting report.



of individual and inter-agency initiatives dealing with localisation,<sup>47</sup> however, there is room for even stronger coordination so as to minimise duplication and scale-up efforts.

Due to the large number of relevant initiatives and vocal advocates, localisation has remained at the forefront of the political agenda. While local responders continue to be involved in some global-level discussions (e.g., on the localisation marker), their contribution could be increased and expanded to other aspects of the localisation agenda within and beyond this work stream. The co-conveners should attempt to re-engage local responders by, for example, presenting better incentives and opportunities for them to participate in close coordination with ICVA, as this might put additional pressure on signatories to move forward with their individual commitments. Another important step is to strengthen advocacy towards organisations that manage pooled funds, such as OCHA, given the tendency of donors to meet their localisation commitments through increased donations to such funds. Finally, the annual Grand Bargain meeting in June 2017 may be a decisive moment for reaching an agreement on definitions and on a way to track localisation.

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47 A rapid mapping commissioned by the co-conveners identified over 40 relevant initiatives. See: Humanitarian Outcomes (2017) Grand Bargain Workstream 2: Increasing Support and Funding Tools for Local and National Responders. Rapid Mapping of Relevant Initiatives.

### 3. Increase the use and coordination of cash programming

**CONTEXT** Where markets exist, there are many benefits to giving cash to people affected by crises, instead of, for example, food. Cash affords greater dignity to aid recipients by enabling them to choose what they need, strengthens local markets and structures, and saves on transaction costs, among other benefits.<sup>48</sup> More and more aid organisations and donors have begun offering cash programmes and creating mechanisms to support this shift – for example, the Cash Learning Partnership (CaLP) and CashCap, a roster of cash experts who can be deployed to emergencies. Nevertheless, the overall level of cash programmes remains low, accounting for an estimated 7 per cent of humanitarian spending in 2015.<sup>49</sup> That same year, the High Level Panel on Cash Transfers made a strong case for increasing the use of cash programmes in humanitarian contexts.<sup>50</sup> At the time of the World Humanitarian Summit in 2016, the question was thus no longer whether the use of cash should increase, but how its use could be encouraged and what the shift might imply for the humanitarian response model.<sup>51</sup> The Grand Bargain includes a cautiously worded commitment to “aim to increase use of cash programming beyond current low levels, where appropriate,” but it does not define a quantitative target for cash transfers.

**WORK STREAM APPROACH** Recognising that significant work is underway in existing fora, the co-conveners, WFP and the UK, have decided to take a light approach and provide incentives (e.g., sharing information and good practice) for signatories to implement their commitments.<sup>52</sup> CaLP has committed to produce a report that takes stock of the progress in expanding the use of cash in humanitarian responses, which will help monitor progress by signatories in their Grand Bargain commitments related to cash.

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48 High Level Panel on Humanitarian Cash Transfers (2015) *Doing cash differently: How cash transfers can transform humanitarian aid*. London: ODI.

49 Ibid.

50 Ibid.

51 Julia Steets et al. (2016) *Drivers and Inhibitors of Change in the Humanitarian System*. GPPi: Berlin. Available from: <http://www.gppi.net/publications/humanitarian-action/article/drivers-and-inhibitors-of-change-in-the-humanitarian-system/> (downloaded on May 30, 2017).

52 UK and WFP (2016) *Grand Bargain. Increase the use and coordination of cash-based programming*. Work stream 2-pager.

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## Reported activity against commitments


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● Activities reported   ● Activities planned   ● No activities reported

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### 1&6. Signatories increase the routine use of cash, where appropriate, alongside other tools. Some may wish to set targets.

*All signatories · Individual action · No target/deadline*




Almost half of the implementing organisations report increases in their cash programmes. For example, cash-based transfers increased from 5 per cent of WFP’s assistance portfolio in 2011 to more than a quarter, valued at US\$ 880 million in 2016. UNHCR doubled its cash assistance from US\$ 325 million in 2015 to US\$688 million in 2016, exceeding its in-kind, non-food assistance. UNRWA reports that operations in Lebanon, Jordan, and the West Bank transitioned from food to e-cards in 2016. Among donors, 19 per cent report an increase of cash-based assistance in their funding portfolios.

A couple of signatories have set ambitious targets. UK DFID aims to at least double its use of cash by 2025 from 10 per cent in 2015/2016. Belgium aims to spend 30 per cent of its funding on cash-based programmes by 2020. The European Union aims to spend 35 per cent in 2017. The IRC is committed to scale up its use of cash from 6 per cent to 25 per cent by 2020. World Vision seeks to deliver 50 per cent of its programmes through a “multi-sectoral and multi-purpose cash first approach” by 2020.<sup>8</sup>

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### 2. Signatories invest in new delivery models.

*All signatories · Individual action · No target/deadline*



A third of signatories report actual or planned investments in new delivery models. Important initiatives revolve around the creation of common approaches, such as UNHCR’s common cash facility or UK DFID’s investment in developing joint cash feasibility criteria.


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## Reported activity against commitments

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### 3. Signatories contribute to building an evidence base to assess the costs, benefits, impacts, and risks of cash, relative to other aid modalities.

*All signatories · Individual action · No target/deadline*




A large number of implementing organisations and donors report there are efforts to strengthen the evidence base and support learning and advocacy with regard to cash. Canada, for example, is developing training modules and a website with resources on cash. Some donors, including Germany and USAID, have also developed guidance on cash programming.

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### 4. Signatories collaborate, share information, and develop standards and guidelines for cash to better understand its risks and benefits.

*All signatories · Joint action · No target/deadline*




There are many examples from both donors and implementing organisations of efforts to collaborate, share information, and develop standards and guidelines. These include the efforts of the Protection Cluster's Area of Responsibility on Gender-Based Violence to ensure a do-no-harm approach when using cash in programmes related to gender-based violence; standards developed by the WHO for the use of cash in health operations; and an inter-agency cash preparedness initiative that is being tested in four countries by UNHCR, UNICEF, WFP, and OCHA.

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
### 5. Signatories ensure that coordination, delivery, and monitoring and evaluation mechanisms are put in place for cash transfers.

*All signatories · Individual action · No target/deadline*



It is relatively common for signatories to participate in existing cash coordination, such as the Geneva-Based Cash Working Group, the Cash and Market Working Group of the Global Food Security Cluster, and the Good Humanitarian Donorship initiative's cash work stream. 54 per cent of signatories report similar activities, and 38 per cent of donors report efforts to improve donor coordination on cash. Several NGOs also report participation in the Collaborative Cash Delivery platform, co-championed by Catholic Relief Services (CRS) and Save the Children, for improved NGO collaboration. By contrast, investments in M&E mechanisms have been reported less frequently, with 19 per cent of signatories reporting relevant activities (the numbers in the graph present the average number of reported activities).

## Assessment of Progress Made Within Work Stream 3 (Cash)



**DONOR ACTIVITY | SCORE: 1** Excepting a small number of cash champions, donors have reported little progress in increasing their funding for cash programmes, in part because most have not yet found effective ways to track the share of their funding allocations that is delivered as cash. Instead, donors have enabled actions for cash programming, such as developing guidance, building the evidence base, and sharing information.

**AID ORGANISATION ACTIVITY | SCORE: 3** A strong majority of implementing organisations report activities related to their cash commitments. This includes not only the “softer,” enabling actions such as information sharing, but also increases in cash programming, which implementers are often able to quantify. The area in which implementers report least progress is the development of M&E mechanisms for cash.

**ACTIVITY ON JOINT COMMITMENTS | SCORE: 2** While a large number of signatories report activities related to Commitment 4, most of these activities concern guidelines and standards developed for individual organisations. But the small number of joint or collaborative initiatives referenced in the table above are highly relevant.

**LINKS TO OTHER WORK STREAMS | SCORE: 1** The UK, as the co-convenor on the cash work stream, commissioned Development Initiatives – which also acts as the consultant driving the work related to transparency – to propose ways to track cash programmes. Beyond that, no active efforts to link to other relevant work streams have been reported. More active engagement could strengthen synergies with, for example, the work stream on the humanitarian–development nexus, by more consciously considering how the growing interest in shock-responsive social protection systems<sup>53</sup> could support cash programming in emergencies. More active coordination with the earmarking work stream could also be important for jointly addressing the potential tension between generally reducing earmarking and requiring additional

53 The World Bank (2016) Shock Responsive Safety Net Programs. Building Flexible Systems in Good Times to Respond in Times of Crisis. Available from: <http://pubdocs.worldbank.org/en/226431464189301644/SPLCC-2016-SNCC-D9-Shock-Responsive-Safety-Net.pdf> (downloaded on May 30, 2017); Clare O’Brien (2015) Shock-Responsive Social Protection Research, 2015-17. Available from: <http://www.opml.co.uk/publications/shock-responsive-social-protection-research-2015-17> (downloaded on May 30, 2017).

earmarking to ensure an adequate scale-up of cash programmes. Stronger links with the localisation work stream could help ensure that host governments and local civil society organisations receive more support for implementing cash programmes.

**LINKS TO OTHER EXISTING PROCESSES | SCORE: 4** Links between the Grand Bargain’s cash work stream and other relevant processes are very strong. For example, the UK, as one of the co-conveners, also established a cash work stream within the GHD Initiative (co-led with Norway) and actively supports the follow-up process to the High Level Panel on Humanitarian Cash Transfers. The co-conveners also support and closely interact with CaLP. Signatories consider the work stream’s light approach appropriate, considering the work already being undertaken in other fora.

The progress made by implementing organisations in particular shows that there is strong momentum behind increasing cash programmes. To reach scale, however, donors need to take more direct action to increase funding for cash programmes. Some donors have been promoting the use of a single contractor to deliver cash in emergencies. While these donors are hereby meeting their commitment to invest in new delivery models, this has created concerns among agencies that do not want to be excluded from funding (and thereby from meeting their own commitments on cash) under a single contracting approach. Finally, coordination of cash transfer programmes remains controversial, as the issue is perceived as linked to the question of which organisation might emerge as the lead agency on cash. A World Bank report commissioned by the IASC Principals<sup>54</sup> made recommendations for how to coordinate cash transfer programmes, and a draft white paper by CaLP and GPPi examines different options.<sup>55</sup>

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54 The World Bank (2016) Strategic Note: Cash Transfers in Humanitarian Contexts. Available from: <http://documents.worldbank.org/curated/en/697681467995447727/Strategic-note-cash-transfers-in-humanitarian-contexts> (downloaded on May 30, 2017).

55 Julia Steets and Lotte Ruppert (2017) White Paper on Cash Coordination. Berlin: GPPi. Available from: <http://www.cashlearning.org/downloads/cash-coordination2017---draft-1.pdf> (downloaded on May 30, 2017).

## 4. Reduce duplication and management costs with periodic functional reviews

**CONTEXT** It is widely held that inter-governmental organisations, such as the United Nations, could be more cost-efficient. There have been various efforts undertaken within the UN by the High-Level Committee on Management, as well as efforts undertaken sector-wide by the Quality, Social, and Environmental Procurement Working Group and similar initiatives. Despite these efforts, donor governments continue to sense there is “fat” that could be cut.<sup>56</sup> In the Grand Bargain, signatories committed to increase system-wide efficiencies and reduce management costs by introducing shared partner assessments, comparable cost structures, and joint donor assessments for UN agencies.

**WORK STREAM APPROACH** The co-conveners, Japan and UNHCR, have opted for a light approach, with a focus on the UN. Three UN agencies – UNHCR, UNICEF, and WFP – would harmonise partner assessments and invite others to join thereafter. The Good Humanitarian Donorship initiative would encourage the full use of the Multilateral Organisational Performance Assessment Network (MOPAN) and reduce individual donor assessments and evaluations. There was no support planned at the work stream level for exploring cost-effective ways to deliver assistance. The co-conveners planned to advance the discussion on comparable cost structures, contract a consultant to review duplications in the UN Procurement Network, and engage donors bilaterally about reducing individual assessments and evaluations.<sup>57</sup> In March 2017, UNHCR and Japan organised a workshop to assess the progress made on each commitment under the work stream.

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56 Josh Lederman (2017) Trump Envoy Haley Tells Refugees She Cares, But Defends Cuts. Associated Press. Available from: [http://hosted2.ap.org/APDEFAULT/89ae8247a-be8493fae24405546e9a1aa/Article\\_2017-05-23-EU--Haley-Budget/id-5ceabfa94b-b440e38e0cc22fc78a49e6](http://hosted2.ap.org/APDEFAULT/89ae8247a-be8493fae24405546e9a1aa/Article_2017-05-23-EU--Haley-Budget/id-5ceabfa94b-b440e38e0cc22fc78a49e6) (downloaded on May 30, 2017).

57 Japan and UNHCR (2016) Grand Bargain. Reduce duplication and management costs with periodic functional reviews. Work stream 2-pager; Grand Bargain Facilitation Group (2016) Summary of progress from each Grand Bargain work stream – Annex (III) to the meeting report.

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## Reported activity against commitments


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● Activities reported   ● Activities planned   ● No activities reported

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### 1. Donors and aid organisations explore cost-effective ways to deliver assistance (e.g., using technology and innovation).

*All signatories · Individual action · Deadline: end of 2017*



Signatories have reported a variety of innovations, including biometric registration, the use of mobile technology in vulnerability assessments, reductions in energy consumption on field locations, and investments in new aid delivery models. The ICRC, for instance, has recently begun implementing a new supply chain process known as OSCAR to optimise its procurement process and generate business intelligence that supports evidence-based decision-making.

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### 2. Donors and aid organisations agree on harmonised and simplified procedures for partnership agreements.

*All signatories · Joint action · No target/deadline*



UNHCR, UNICEF, and WFP have been working towards harmonised partnership agreements, including due diligence criteria and reporting formats. They have even set internal deadlines.<sup>h</sup> The group has brought other entities, including OCHA and NGOs, into the discussion. But it is unclear whether NGOs plan to apply the same criteria when they assess their implementing partners. The Red Cross and Red Crescent Movement and donors have not reported participation in related activities (although a few donors support the UN on related work). OCHA harmonised and simplified the partner capacity assessment methodology applied by country-based pooled funds in 2016; OCHA expects a full roll-out in 2017.

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
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## Reported activity against commitments

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### 3. Aid organisations provide transparent and comparable cost structures by the end of 2017.

*Aid organisations • Joint action • Deadline: end of 2017*




UNHCR reports there exists no harmonised costing structures between different donors and aid organisations, rendering it impossible to compare cost performance. Fund recipients are obliged to adjust financial reports for different donors even if funds were allocated to the same project. The previous UN attempt to harmonise costing structure within the UN family produced limited results. Following the Grand Bargain, aid organisations decided to focus on harmonising definitions, together with the NGO community, as a first step toward comparable cost structures.<sup>1</sup> The Norwegian Refugee Council (NRC) has analysed different donor and aid organisation costing structures to provide suggestions for harmonisation (preliminary findings of the second study will be available in June 2017).<sup>2</sup> The UN has collaborated in this endeavour and plans to implement practical proposals to harmonise costing structures. The Red Cross and Red Crescent Movement has not reported similar activities. Among NGOs, the IRC has piloted a systematic cost performance analysis software and is putting together a coalition of implementing agencies that can test, guide, and champion the on-going development of this tool for sector-wide use. InterAction has advocated closer UN-NGO collaboration to institutionalise key partnership initiatives with the aim of advancing work concerning comparable cost structures and partnership assessments.

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### 4. Aid organisations reduce duplication of management and other costs through maximising efficiencies in procurement and logistics for commonly required goods and services.

*Aid organisations • Joint action • No target/deadline*



A small number of aid organisations report investments in improving their own supply management systems. Critically, there are also activities at the collective level. On behalf of the UN Procurement Network, UNHCR has hired a consultant, who has identified 15 procurement areas as having potential for greater savings and has commissioned a second study to further analyse goods and services as well as common vendor opportunities (findings expected in 2017). The Quality, Social, and Environmental Procurement Working Group has developed identical or similar technical specifications for relief items with regard to a range of key aid organisations (UN, ICRC, IFRC, and MSF), which has resulted in lower purchasing prices. WHO is partnering with UN agencies involved in public health emergency responses (e.g., WFP, UNICEF, FAO) to increase the operational capacity of the emergency supply chain, while leveraging potential synergies. NGOs have not reported relevant activities.


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## Reported activity against commitments

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5. Donors increasingly commission joint regular functional monitoring and performance reviews, and reduce individual assessments, evaluations, verifications, risk management and oversight processes.


*Aid organisations · Joint action · No target/deadline*



Despite differences in current donor approaches, many donors have signalled interest in conducting joint performance reviews, monitoring exercises, and other oversight processes. An important first step in joint donor monitoring was the Haiti Hurricane Matthew Real Time Evaluation. However, these joint efforts do not automatically lead to a reduction in individual reviews. A few donors (e.g., Australia, Finland, Norway) have reiterated their commitment to reduce reviews in parallel with their participation in MOPAN or other regular joint functional monitoring and performance reviews. Sweden reports that it is applying already generous oversight arrangements and accepting the aid organisation's systems of monitoring, evaluation, and reporting as the general rule. During the March 2017 work stream workshop, there was consensus among participants that the Grand Bargain self-reporting exercise should be used to collect information on how many individual donor assessments are made per year (instead of creating a separate tracking tool).

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## Assessment of Progress Made Within Work Stream 4 (Management Costs)



**DONOR ACTIVITY | SCORE: 1** Several donors consider this work stream to apply mainly to aid organisations, not donors. Only four out of 16 donors report activities related to new delivery models, but these were important investments that have enabled aid organisations to scale up innovations.

**AID ORGANISATION ACTIVITY | SCORE: 3** A majority of aid organisations report

using innovative delivery models, and many were implemented at scale. In addition, a number of aid organisations have invested in new management frameworks (including supply chain), which could reduce overhead.

**ACTIVITY ON JOINT COMMITMENTS | SCORE: 2** Aid organisations have made important investments in shared processes to reduce duplications and management costs. The most important progress relates to shared partner arrangements and joint procurement, especially within the UN system. There is comparatively less progress made so far in agreeing on comparable cost structures, despite the IRC and NRC's efforts. In interviews, several NGOs expressed ambivalence towards the work stream, questioning whether the text of the commitments were tailored to their operational models; this may explain NGOs' lower rate of reporting in this work stream, compared to the UN.

Donors have not taken an active role in discussions about harmonised partnership agreements and partner assessments, which creates concern about their future applicability for programmes without UN involvement (e.g., local NGOs directly funded by donors). While there is clear willingness to participate in joint donor oversight processes, only one donor has signalled a parallel reduction in individual oversight processes.

**LINKS TO OTHER WORK STREAMS | SCORE: 2** Links to other work streams have increased recently through a joint workshop and teleconference with the co-conveners of the work streams on transparency, multi-year planning and funding, and reporting. There exist additional opportunities to link and sequence efforts with the localisation work stream to ensure that current thinking about shared due diligence processes are figured into the localisation work stream's own reflections.

**LINKS TO OTHER EXISTING PROCESSES | SCORE: 1** Signatories have largely established new working groups or processes to champion work related to management costs, rather than integrating these efforts into existing fora. This has led to some missed opportunities, since initiatives such as the Good Humanitarian Donorship initiative could have served as a forum for discussing joint donor oversight processes and exchanging best experiences. Similarly, global clusters – in particular the Logistics Cluster – could have taken a more central role in expanding joint procurement.

Aid organisations have taken seriously their commitments in this work stream, many of which are part of their core “bargain” with donors. But progress has been varied. Key UN agencies have taken promising steps towards introducing shared partner arrangements (e.g., assessments, agreements, audits). On the other hand, and despite the important work done by the IRC and NRC, it is improbable that aid organisations will introduce comparable cost structures by the end of 2017. Consulted signatories and experts note that this target is ambitious.

To make progress in upcoming years, donors should discuss oversight processes in the Good Humanitarian Donorship initiative to improve joint processes while reducing the number of individual demands. Donors also need to discuss NRC's findings on cost structures with UN organisations and jointly agree on the next steps to be taken. Finally, NGOs and the Red Cross and Red Crescent Movement should reinvigorate commitments on comparable cost structures, harmonised partnership agreements, and shared partner assessments.

## 5. Improve joint and impartial needs assessments<sup>58</sup>

**CONTEXT** The High-Level Panel on Humanitarian Financing has observed that “aid organisations as well as donors often conduct simultaneous, separate needs assessments for the same emergency,”<sup>59</sup> which leads to duplications. Moreover, assessments implemented by aid organisations tend to focus on the services supplied by these same organisations, at the expense of providing a more objective overview of needs. Consequently, humanitarian appeals that are based on a compilation of individual needs assessments may actually undermine the trust of donors. While recognising the significant efforts made in the past few years to improve the IASC Humanitarian Response Planning process, Grand Bargain signatories committed to improve joint and impartial needs assessments to inform decision-making on programming and funding.

**WORK STREAM APPROACH** Following the endorsement of the Grand Bargain, there were initial disagreements on the role that specialised entities should play in improving joint and impartial needs assessments. This slowed down activities in the work stream. In response, the co-conveners, the European Commission/DG ECHO and OCHA, organised a two-day technical workshop in February and March 2017, during which over 20 aid organisations and donors came together to identify challenges and define priorities and action points.

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58 The commitments under this work stream apply only to entities participating in the IASC humanitarian response planning process. Australia et al. (2016) Improve joint and impartial needs assessments. The Grand Bargain – A Shared Commitment to Better Serve People in Need.

59 High-Level Panel on Humanitarian Financing (2016) Too important to fail—addressing the humanitarian financing gap. Report to the Secretary-General.

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## Reported activity against commitments

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● Activities reported   ● Activities planned   ● No activities reported

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**1. Signatories produce a single, comprehensive, cross-sectoral, methodologically sound, and impartial overall assessment of needs for each crisis to inform strategic decisions on how to respond and fund.**

*All signatories · Joint action · No target/deadline*



OCHA has disseminated Grand Bargain commitments and best practices to humanitarian country teams and humanitarian coordinators to strengthen the humanitarian needs overview for 2017. A few donors already rely, to some extent, on the joint needs analysis for their funding strategies. For example, Spain's field staff participates in the joint needs assessments led by humanitarian country teams and bases its humanitarian interventions and strategies on the needs identified by the UN humanitarian coordinator and the humanitarian response plan.

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**2. Signatories coordinate and streamline data collection to ensure compatibility, quality, and comparability, and to minimise intrusion in the lives of affected people. Signatories conduct the overall assessment in a transparent, collaborative process led by the humanitarian or resident coordinator with full involvement of the humanitarian country team, the clusters/sectors, and, in the case of sudden-onset disasters and where possible, the government. Signatories ensure that sector-specific assessments for operational planning are conducted under the umbrella of a coordinated plan of assessments at inter-cluster/sector level.**

*All signatories · Joint action · No target/deadline*



Half of the signatories report investments made to improve their needs assessments. For example, Mercy Corps is currently testing new household assessment tools in the field. Several signatories also report streamlining inter-agency efforts, including a recent initiative spearheaded by the EU, WFP, and FAO to enhance coordination and decision-making related to food security via the Global Report on Food Crises. OCHA plans to update the 2012 IASC operational guidance for coordinated assessments in humanitarian crises to reflect new developments, such as a greater emphasis on inter-sectoral analysis, communication with and accountability to affected populations, and context specificities.

Signatories are working under the Joint Interanalysis Group to develop practical inter-sectoral analysis guidance for humanitarian needs overviews. They report investments made to improve the multi-cluster/sector initial rapid assessment.


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## Reported activity against commitments

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### 3A. Signatories share needs assessment data in a timely manner, with appropriate mitigation of protection and privacy risks.

*All signatories · Individual action · No target/deadline*



Many aid organisations have reported sharing their needs assessment data, though often without specifying with whom they share the data. The global memorandum of understanding between UNHCR and WFP includes an addendum on data sharing, and IOM is advancing its on-going collaboration with OCHA's humanitarian data exchange. No donor has reported implementing comparable needs assessments; therefore, we do not assess their activities for this particular commitment.

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### 3B. Signatories jointly decide on assumptions and analytical methods used for making projections and estimates.

*All signatories · Joint action · No target/deadline*




OCHA has developed a first guidance to derive overall, inter-sectoral humanitarian population figures after consultation with partners in 2016.<sup>5</sup> There is also on-going work to strengthen common operational datasets, which should include baseline population figures. However, there is currently no commonly accepted method for making projections. During the DG ECHO/OCHA technical workshop, projection-making was identified as a possible area of collaboration with the World Bank.

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### 4. Signatories allocate resources and involve independent specialists within the clusters to strengthen data collection and analysis in a fully transparent and collaborative process.

*All signatories · Individual action · No target/deadline*



Many cluster lead agencies report investments made in improving data collection and analysis. In June 2016, OCHA launched a flexible partnership mechanism to strengthen joint inter-sectoral analysis (which is open to the contributions of other entities). A few donors have reported financial support. For example, DG ECHO will support initiatives strengthening the capacity of the humanitarian community to conduct coordinated needs assessments through earmarked contributions of almost €4 million (through its Enhanced Response Capacity 2017 funding programme, published in November 2016).

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## Reported activity against commitments

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5. Signatories prioritise humanitarian response across sectors based on evidence established by the analysis. It is the responsibility of the empowered humanitarian or resident coordinator to ensure the development of prioritised, evidence-based response plans.

*All signatories · Joint action · No target/deadline*




Since this commitment can be acted on only when improved assessment and analysis become available, no signatory actions were expected during the reporting period. No activities have been reported.

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6. Donors commission independent reviews and evaluations of the quality of needs assessment findings and their use in prioritisation to strengthen the confidence of all stakeholders in the needs assessment.

*All signatories · Individual action · No target/deadline*




A few donors have expressed interest in making continued investments in needs assessments, including an eventual evaluation of such assessments. For example, the Real Time Evaluation of the Haiti Hurricane Matthew response commissioned by UK DFID assessed issues relevant to the Grand Bargain, including the quality of needs assessments and analysis.<sup>1</sup> But there is no agreement yet on how to evaluate the quality of needs assessments and analysis. Aid organisations have not reported relevant planned or current activities.

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
7. Signatories agree on the criteria/process of conducting risk and vulnerability analysis with development partners and local authorities, in adherence to humanitarian principles.

*All signatories · Joint action · No target/deadline*



Most aid organisations have not reported relevant activities on this commitment. They have mostly reported plans to strengthen the connection between humanitarian and development actors in different processes.

## Assessment of Progress Made Within Work Stream 5 (Needs Assessment)



**Donor activity | Score: 1** A few donors have reported continued financial investments in needs assessments, and there is broad support for efforts aimed at improving the quality of needs assessments. However, only a few donors reported plans to contribute to or commission independent reviews and evaluations of needs assessments.

**Aid organisation activity | Score: 2** Cluster lead agencies have made further investments to improve data collection and analytical capacity within clusters. Aid organisations have reported sharing needs assessment data and streamlining data collection, but the extent of these improvements is unclear.

**Activity on joint commitments | Score: 1** Signatories have started to overcome initial differences in interpreting their Grand Bargain commitments, and the DG ECHO/OCHA technical workshop has resulted in the joint development of an action plan. OCHA is considering strengthening its staff capacities to coordinate assessments and facilitate inter-sectoral analysis, and to continue and possibly expand its partnership with specialised needs assessment entities. Although this seems like an important step in the right direction, there remain questions of leadership at the level of the humanitarian country team, and there is no indication that incentives for improved inter-agency collaboration in needs assessments have changed, although the work stream is planning to analyse existing incentives and disincentives as a first step.

**LINKS TO OTHER WORK STREAMS | SCORE: 3** There has been no immediate need to reach out to other work streams, as synergies with other work streams have come about naturally (e.g., by reinforcing donor trust). However, there could be greater joint reflection, with the work stream on the humanitarian–development nexus, about the commitment on risk and vulnerability analysis. This was identified as a priority at the DG ECHO/OCHA technical workshop.

**LINKS TO OTHER EXISTING PROCESSES | SCORE: 2** Some consulted signatories have pointed out that the work stream could better leverage the clusters and other initiatives. For example, UNDP hosted and facilitated the first joint meeting between the IASC Task Team on Humanitarian–Development Nexus and the UNDG Working



Group on Transition to discuss the “new way of working,” including the importance of joint needs analysis between humanitarian and development partners.

There has been some progress in improving the technical capacities and resources required to conduct joint and impartial needs assessments. However, there are widespread concerns that the incentives will remain unchanged, undermining relevant efforts. Inter-agency competition for funding continues to obstruct improved data-sharing and collaboration in assessments.

## 6. A participation revolution: Include people receiving aid in making the decisions which affect their lives

**CONTEXT** Since at least the late 1990s, humanitarian actors have recognised that people affected by crises have the right to drive their own development and to hold aid organisations accountable. But humanitarian actors continue to fall short of realizing this ambition.<sup>60</sup> The World Humanitarian Summit renewed attention on the goal of putting affected people at the centre, making use of two common reference points: the Core Humanitarian Standard (CHS) and the IASC Commitments on Accountability to Affected Populations (AAP). During the adoption of the Grand Bargain, signatories agreed to develop common standards and a coordinated approach for community engagement and participation. Donors committed to provide flexible funding to enable implementers to adapt programmes to recipient priorities, while aid organisations committed to consider the input of affected people in all their humanitarian response plans by the end of 2017.

**WORK STREAM APPROACH** The Steering Committee for Humanitarian Response and the United States took lead of the work stream in late 2016; prior to that, UNICEF fulfilled the role of convener on its own. The co-conveners have adopted a light, facilitative approach, considering the well-established community of practice and the large number of existing initiatives. The co-conveners focus on (1) establishing a common definition of participation, (2) promoting the participation commitments and engaging with the community of practice, and (3) identifying incentives that can be used to promote participation.<sup>61</sup>

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60 Brown, D. and Donini, A. (2013). Rhetoric or Reality? Putting Affected People at the Centre of Humanitarian Action; ALNAP (2015) The State of the Humanitarian System.

61 GB Participation Revolution Workstream (2017) Draft Plan of Action.

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## Reported activity against commitments


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● Activities reported   ● Activities planned   ● No activities reported

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### 1. Aid organisations improve leadership and governance mechanisms at the level of the humanitarian country team and cluster/sector mechanisms to ensure engagement with and accountability to people and communities affected by crises.

*Aid organisations · Joint action · No target/deadline*




For this commitment, self-reports by cluster (co-)lead organisations and OCHA were analysed. A number of them report relevant activities, such as UNICEF, which supports the development of a common set of cluster performance indicators based on the CHS, which will be integrated into performance management processes.

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### 2. Signatories develop common standards and a coordinated approach for community engagement and participation, with the emphasis on inclusion of the most vulnerable, supported by a common platform for sharing and analysing data to strengthen decision-making, transparency, accountability and limit duplication.

*All signatories · Joint action · No target/deadline*




Rather than developing new common standards on participation, the co-conveners have promoted the Core Humanitarian Standard and the IASC Commitments on Accountability to Affected Populations as existing standards that a coordinated approach will need to have as its foundation.<sup>m</sup>

Signatories have not reported significant progress in developing a coordinated approach, despite the joint efforts of UNICEF, OCHA, the IFRC, and many other stakeholders to develop a collective service for communication and community engagement.<sup>n</sup> This collective service attempts to address the priorities from signatories by focusing on pilots and capacity-building for community engagement at country level, rather than on additional guidance or common definitions.

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### 3. Signatories strengthen local dialogue and harness technologies to support more agile, transparent but appropriately secure feedback.

*All signatories · Individual action · No target/deadline*



Almost a third of all signatories have reported making increased use of technology. For example, Christian Aid now uses digital surveys to collate and compare feedback data from different contexts, and the Czech Republic is focusing on web- and mobile-based communication.


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## Reported activity against commitments

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### 4. Signatories build systematic links between feedback and corrective action to adjust programming.

*All signatories · Individual action · No target/deadline*




A range of aid organisations report significant investments in feedback mechanisms and in guidelines for accountability to affected populations. Many, such as CAFOD and CARE, report efforts to integrate the Core Humanitarian Standard into their operations.

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### 5. Donors fund flexibly to facilitate programme adaptation in response to community feedback.

*Donors · Individual action · No target/deadline*




Almost every second donor has reported providing more flexible funding to facilitate programme adaptation. For example, USAID/Food for Peace is piloting a Refine and Implement model of programming, which focuses on continuously adapting project activities based on consultations with target communities and updated analysis.

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### 6. Donors invest time and resources to fund these activities.

*Donors · Individual action · No target/deadline*



Typically, the larger donors have made investments in activities related to feedback and participation. UK DFID, for example, reports that it has placed accountability at the centre of its emergency response to Hurricane Matthew in Haiti. It provided funding to OCHA for stand-by partnerships with relevant experts, as well as to Internews to provide information to disaster-affected communities.

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## Reported activity against commitments

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7. Aid organisations ensure that, by the end of 2017, all humanitarian response plans – and strategic monitoring of them – demonstrate analysis and consideration of inputs from affected communities.


*Aid organisations • Individual action • Deadline: end of 2017*



OCHA has reported that 13 out of 23 humanitarian response plans in 2016 included plans for the integration of community engagement throughout the planning cycle. But interviewees report that most of the humanitarian response plans to which they have contributed in 2016 and 2017 do not demonstrate thorough analysis and consideration of inputs from affected communities.

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## Assessment of Progress Made Within Work Stream 6 (Participation Revolution)



**DONOR ACTIVITY | SCORE: 2** Large donors in particular have taken steps to invest in relevant activities and change their funding arrangements. Less progress has been made to ensure that the views of affected people are systematically considered in the monitoring and reporting of programs that are funded by these donors.

**AID ORGANISATIONS ACTIVITY | SCORE: 2** Aid organisations have focused their efforts on improving relevant guidelines and tools, predominantly feedback mechanisms. Whether these investments will lead to systematic links between feedback and corrective action to adjust programming will need to be assessed in the coming years.

**ACTIVITY ON JOINT COMMITMENTS | SCORE: 1** The work stream has yet to make significant progress in strengthening community engagement and participation at a system-wide level. Signatories have focused on improving their internal processes rather than on developing a coordinated approach with harmonised feedback and complaint mechanisms. Based on the current situation, it appears unlikely that IASC

agencies and OCHA will ensure that all humanitarian response plans demonstrate consideration of inputs from affected people by the end of 2017, as originally envisioned.

**LINKS TO OTHER WORK STREAMS | SCORE: 1** Signatories view participation as a cross-cutting theme that needs to be mainstreamed into the work plans and decisions of all other work streams.<sup>62</sup> Participation considerations could, for example, be reflected in the revised digital platform for greater transparency (work stream 1), in joint and impartial needs assessments (work stream 5), and in the pilot of a new common reporting template (work stream 9).<sup>63</sup> But signatories do not report that participation has been systematically taken into account thus far in these work streams.

**LINKS TO OTHER EXISTING PROCESSES | SCORE: 3** Due to the Steering Committee for Humanitarian Response's prior involvement with the community of practice on accountability to affected populations and communication with communities, the work stream has managed to capitalise on efforts by relevant fora like the IASC Task Team on Accountability to Affected Populations and Protection against Sexual Exploitation and Abuse, the Communicating with Disaster-Affected Communities Network (CDAC) and the Core Humanitarian Standard Alliance. These fora enjoy active participation from all types of aid organisations and from relevant independent actors with technical expertise. The on-going revision of the Sphere Handbook will offer additional opportunities to promote participation.

While the momentum behind strengthening participation is strong, the Grand Bargain work stream has made relatively little progress thus far. This is due to the rotation of co-conveners, as well as lack of interest from signatories in developing common standards and a coordinated approach for community engagement and participation. The proposed collective service for communication and community engagement presents the most concrete plan for moving some of these commitments forward, but signatories note that this initiative is losing momentum due to its slow inception and insufficient funding. Instead, signatories have focused on fulfilling their individual commitments to improve internal systems and funding arrangements. Stronger progress on joint commitments can be expected in the coming years, now that the co-conveners have successfully engaged with the existing community of practice and drafted a concrete plan of action. Some donors have signalled that they are eager to fund collective participation solutions upon receiving relevant proposals.

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62 ICVA and Germany (2016) Final Summary Note. Grand Bargain Meeting, Bonn, 5-6 September 2016.

63 UNICEF (2016) Grand Bargain: The Participation Revolution. Work stream 2-pager.

## 7. Increase collaborative humanitarian multi-year planning and funding

**CONTEXT** Effective response, especially in protracted and recurrent crises, requires longer-term planning in order to strengthen links between development and other actors, lower administrative costs, catalyse more-responsive programming, and shrink needs. In 2015, humanitarian country teams in 15 emergencies had multi-year plans in place, including a so-called “transitional” plan.<sup>64</sup> However, only a fraction of the projects included in the humanitarian plans were multi-year, and a recent OCHA evaluation found mixed results from implementing the plans.<sup>65</sup> Grand Bargain signatories committed to support more-effective joint multi-year planning and funding in at least five emergencies by the end of 2017, and to ensure that downstream partners equally benefit from multi-year funding and that appropriate monitoring and evaluation mechanisms are in place.

**WORK STREAM APPROACH** The co-conveners, Canada and UNICEF, have opted for a light role, aiming to take stock of existing knowledge and facilitate an exchange of lessons learned, including by means of a conference call with experts in February 2017. The co-conveners took over from FAO and the United States in September 2016, which has created some delay in work stream activities. Since OCHA supports humanitarian response planning processes at country level, it plays a key role in advancing this work stream.

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64 Rodolpho Valente and Romano Lasker (2015) *An End in Sight: Multi-year Planning to Meet and Reduce Humanitarian Needs in Protracted Crises*. OCHA Policy and Studies Series. UN OCHA. Available from: [http://reliefweb.int/sites/reliefweb.int/files/resources/OCHA\\_TB15\\_Multiyear%20Planning\\_online.pdf](http://reliefweb.int/sites/reliefweb.int/files/resources/OCHA_TB15_Multiyear%20Planning_online.pdf) (downloaded on May 30, 2017).

65 Glyn Taylor, Corinna Kreidler and Yves-Kim Créac’h (2017) *Evaluation of Multi-year Planning*. UN OCHA. Available from: [http://reliefweb.int/sites/reliefweb.int/files/resources/MYP%20Evaluation\\_Final%20Report.pdf](http://reliefweb.int/sites/reliefweb.int/files/resources/MYP%20Evaluation_Final%20Report.pdf) (downloaded on May 30, 2017).

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## Reported activity against commitments


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● Activities reported   ● Activities planned   ● No activities reported

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### IA. Signatories increase multi-year, collaborative, and flexible planning and multi-year funding. Aid organisations ensure that the same terms of multi-year funding agreements are applied with their implementing partners.

*All signatories · Individual action · No target/deadline*



The UN and the Red Cross and Red Crescent Movement have reported a significant shift toward multi-year planning, which often includes a results-based perspective in implementation. For example, UNHCR has piloted six multi-year plans and plans to launch another 15 pilots in the next two years. Most NGOs had already undertaken multi-year planning prior to the World Humanitarian Summit. Three NGOs reported also using multi-year arrangements with their implementing partners. UN agencies and the Red Cross and Red Crescent Movement have reported no activities in multi-year funding for their partners.

For their part, 18 of the Grand Bargain's 22 donors provided multi-year funding in some form for their partners in 2015 (although most contributions were single-year), and most donors have reported activities that enable increased multi-year financing. For example, Germany has established a working group to lift legal obstacles to multi-year financing, and Belgium adopted new funding rules to enable five-year implementation periods. Canada has almost doubled the share of its multi-year contributions, from 16 per cent in 2015 to about 30 per cent in 2016. At the same time, there is little information on how these changes will impact the implementation of multi-year humanitarian response plans.

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### IB. Signatories document the impacts of multi-year, collaborative, and flexible planning and multi-year funding instruments on programme efficiency and effectiveness.

*All signatories · Joint action · No target/deadline*



About half of donors and aid organisations report new or revised processes to document the impact of their multi-year activities. At the same time, little progress has been reported in improving monitoring and evaluation for multi-year humanitarian response plans. To date, multi-year plans use the same monitoring frameworks that apply to annual humanitarian response plans and apply the same indicators throughout the plan's duration and defining related multi-year targets. Sudan is currently exploring a results-based approach to monitoring its multi-year humanitarian strategy.



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## Reported activity against commitments

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**2. Signatories support in at least five countries by the end of 2017 multi-year, collaborative planning and response plans through multi-year funding, and monitor and evaluate the outcomes of these responses.**

*All signatories • Joint action • Deadline: end of 2017*



Two countries currently have new multi-year humanitarian plans in place: the Democratic Republic of Congo and Chad (both countries' plans cover 2017 to 2019). In addition, five countries have multi-year strategies – a standalone document that is operationalised through annual humanitarian response plans (Central African Republic, Cameroon, Somalia, Sudan, and Haiti). OCHA reports providing support to countries embarking on multi-year planning. In September 2016, for example, it sent a tip sheet featuring guidance on multi-year planning, good examples for the development of such plans, and an explanation of how they differ from annual response plans. OCHA has also conducted an evaluation of multi-year planning at regional and national levels using selected case studies, and it plans to revise the tip sheet.

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**3. Multi-year humanitarian response plans engage both humanitarian and development actors in the design process.**


*Aid organisations • Joint action • No target/deadline*



In the two countries with multi-year plans, Chad and the Democratic Republic of Congo, OCHA has reported that the country teams have engaged with development partners throughout the planning process (this is also the case in the Central African Republic, which has a multi-year strategy). Moreover, the country team in the Congo mapped humanitarian-development-stabilization interventions. The country teams in the Congo and Sudan created informal teams of planners to engage humanitarian and development actors.

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## Assessment of Progress Made Within Work Stream 7 (Multi-Year Planning and Financing)



**DONORACTIVITY | SCORE: 3** While there are differences in the level of investment, almost all donors have been expanding or reviewing their funding modalities to increase multi-year funding for humanitarian action. To what extent these adjustments lead to improved outcomes at country level will need to be assessed in the coming years.

**AID ORGANISATION ACTIVITY | SCORE: 2** Several aid organisations have made significant investments in management frameworks that set longer programme horizons, with corresponding monitoring and evaluation processes. The self-reports, however, do not reveal whether the organisations made appropriate arrangements to ensure that their partners are also involved in multi-year planning and financing.

**ACTIVITY ON JOINT COMMITMENTS | SCORE: 1** The work stream co-conveners have facilitated an exchange of lessons learned on multi-year funding arrangements, and OCHA has commissioned an evaluation of multi-year plans. Thus far, signatories have developed two of the five multi-year humanitarian response plans they originally pledged. For those two plans, signatories have engaged development actors. An important concern relates to the relatively small extent of investments made to improve the design of the humanitarian response plans and the corresponding monitoring and evaluation frameworks. Moreover, most donors have not reported the alignment of their funding with multi-year humanitarian response plans.

**LINKS TO OTHER WORK STREAMS | SCORE: 2** Activities in this work stream could benefit from stronger engagement with the earmarking work stream to facilitate learning about donor conditions. Improving the quality of multi-year humanitarian response plans will also require building links with the work streams on needs assessment, the humanitarian–development nexus, and the participation revolution.

**LINKS TO OTHER EXISTING PROCESSES | SCORE: 1** At the time of writing this report, there were no clear links between the work stream, the process related to a “new way of working,” the newly established IASC Task Team on the Humanitarian–Development Nexus in Protracted Crises, and the UN Working Group on Transitions. Although many of these components are currently in the process of defining their role<sup>66</sup> or of beginning to implement a work plan,<sup>67</sup> effective linkages between these initiatives and fora could create momentum behind the implementation of commitments under this work stream.

Individually, signatories have made significant progress in enabling multi-year financing and planning (even if aid organisations will need to ensure that the same terms apply to their partners). The work stream needs additional momentum and should more actively bring key stakeholders together to ensure that current investments result in more and improved multi-year humanitarian response plans, along with aligned donor financing as well as adapted monitoring and evaluation processes.

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66 High-Level Workshop on the New Way of Working (2017) Action Area. Outcome note of workshop held in Copenhagen on 13-14 March 2017.

67 Inter-Agency Standing Committee (2017) Plan of Action for Operationalising the Humanitarian-Development-Pace Nexus. Available from: [https://interagencystandingcommittee.org/system/files/revised\\_draft\\_plan\\_of\\_action18jan2017.pdf](https://interagencystandingcommittee.org/system/files/revised_draft_plan_of_action18jan2017.pdf) (downloaded on May 30, 2017).

## 8. Reduce the earmarking of donor contributions

**CONTEXT** Greater flexibility in donor contributions increase predictability, shorten reaction times, and ensure a more equitable response globally.<sup>68</sup> While donors broadly acknowledge these benefits,<sup>69</sup> many fear that a decrease in oversight and visibility may also result.<sup>70</sup> In recent years, the “proportion of fully unearmarked contributions to UN agencies received from government donors decreased from 24% in 2012 to 16% in 2014.”<sup>71</sup> Unearmarked funding for NGOs increased slightly from 2013, but represented a mere 8 per cent of the overall funding they received in 2014. In the Grand Bargain, donors confirmed that they “aspire to achieve a global target of 30 per cent of humanitarian contributions that is unearmarked or softly earmarked by 2020.” Contributions to pooled funds count against that target.<sup>72</sup> In turn, aid organisations have pledged to improve reporting, increase the visibility of unearmarked or softly earmarked contributions, and ensure that the same degree of flexibility is applied downstream.

**WORK STREAM APPROACH** After a relatively slow start, the co-conveners – the ICRC and Sweden – have invested in getting a better understanding of the benchmark included in the “core” commitment of reduced earmarking. In December 2016, they surveyed different types of aid organisations and donors to establish a baseline for the 30 per cent target, and to identify the obstacles to increasing the share of unearmarked and softly earmarked funds. The co-conveners planned to discuss the results at joint policy workshops between donors and agencies in April 2017, and to present the conclusions of those sessions to the Grand Bargain Facilitation Group in advance of the annual Grand Bargain meeting in June 2017.<sup>73</sup> Any potential future actions will be informed by this baseline assessment. The co-conveners have stated that “for now, moving things forward is in itself an objective.”<sup>74</sup>

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68 High-Level Panel on Humanitarian Financing (2016) *Too Important to Fail – Addressing the Humanitarian Financing Gap*; IASC Humanitarian Financing Task Team (2016) *Donor Conditions and their Implications for Humanitarian Response*.

69 Good Humanitarian Donorship (2016) *GHD Principles & Good Practice*. Available from: <http://www.ghdinitiative.org/ghd/gns/principles-good-practice-of-ghd/principles-good-practice-ghd.html> (downloaded on May 30, 2017).

70 OECD (2014) *Making Earmarked Funding More Effective: Current Practices and a Way Forward*. Available from: [https://www.oecd.org/dac/aid-architecture/Multilateral%20Report%20N%20L\\_2014.pdf](https://www.oecd.org/dac/aid-architecture/Multilateral%20Report%20N%20L_2014.pdf) (downloaded on May 30, 2017).

71 Charlotte Lattimer and Sophia Swithern (2017) *Global Humanitarian Assistance Report 2016*. Global Humanitarian Assistance and Development Initiatives. Available from: <http://www.globalhumanitarianassistance.org/wp-content/uploads/2016/07/GHA-report-2016-full-report.pdf> (downloaded on May 30, 2017).

72 Australia Aid, et al. (2016) Annex I. Earmarking modalities. *The Grand Bargain – A Shared Commitment to Better Serve People in Need*.

73 Grand Bargain Facilitation Group (2016) *Summary of progress from each Grand Bargain work stream – Annex (III) to the meeting report*.

74 *Ibid.*

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## Reported activity against commitments


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● Activities reported   ● Activities planned   ● No activities reported

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### 1. Aid organisations and donors agree on the most effective and efficient way of reporting on unearmarked and softly earmarked funding by the end of 2017.

*All signatories · Joint action · Deadline: end of 2017*




A few donors have reported a review of their reporting requirements related to flexible contributions, but their requirements often differ from each other. It is unclear whether these reporting requirements will be discussed annually with partners. A few aid organisations have also reported relevant actions. For example, IOM is revising internal guidelines to include detailed criteria indicating how the organisation intends to allocate softly earmarked financial contributions.

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### 2A&5. Donors progressively reduce the degree of earmarking of funds, aiming to achieve a global target of 30 per cent of humanitarian contributions that is unearmarked or softly earmarked by 2020.

*Donors · Individual action · Target: 30% by 2020*




Several donors, including Germany, Italy, and the US, have reported progress, especially as it relates to softly earmarked contributions, mainly by increasing funding for pooled funds. Norway reports that it already reached the global target of 30 per cent in 2016. Luxembourg has committed to increase its share of softly earmarked and unearmarked funding from 19.3 per cent to 40 per cent by 2020. Several donors have specifically increased their unearmarked contributions. Canada, for example, has committed to several new unearmarked, multi-year funding agreements with different aid organisations. Without a system in place to oversee progress, however, it is impossible to say whether the work stream is on track to meet the global target by 2020.

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### 2B. Aid organisations reduce the degree of earmarking of funds when channelling through donor funds with reduced earmarking to their partners.

*Aid organisations · Individual action · No target/deadline*



None of the aid organisations have reported relevant activities.

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
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## Reported activity against commitments

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**3. Aid organisations transparently and regularly share information with donors outlining the criteria for how core and unearmarked funding is allocated.**

*Aid organisations · Individual action · No target/deadline*




Many aid organisations report having already improved the quality of their reporting for flexible donor contributions, or they are planning to do so. For example, WFP adopted a new organisational framework in late 2016, which will increase transparency of its resource management and the outcomes of its activities at the country level.

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**4. Aid organisations increase the visibility of unearmarked and softly earmarked funding, thereby recognising the contribution made by donors.**


*Aid organisations · Individual action · No target/deadline*



Several aid organisations report general efforts to increase visibility. In weekly updates on its openly accessible reporting portal Global Focus, UNHCR publishes information on donors that provide unearmarked funding. The ICRC has been working bilaterally with donors that provide flexible funding to find a way to give them greater recognition.

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## Assessment of Progress Made Within Work Stream 8 (Earmarking)



**DONOR ACTIVITY | SCORE: 1** Several donors have taken steps to reach the target of 30 per cent flexible funding by 2020. Most of the progress reported has to do with increases in softly earmarked contributions, often to pooled funds (which donors also use to advance their commitments on localisation), despite the strong preference of aid organisations for fully unearmarked funding. Aid organisations emphasise that pooled funds typically earmark funds when they are disbursed to aid organisations. While donors thus report progress in reducing earmarking, aid organisations generally perceive more rather than less earmarking by donors since the signing of the Grand Bargain. WFP reports that only 6.4 per cent of its total contributions in 2016 were unearmarked. The ICRC reports a record low of 23 per cent unearmarked and region- or programme-earmarked funding out of its total income in 2016. UNHCR has observed a similar trend in its contributions, from 15.2 per cent unearmarked funding in 2014 to 14.3 per cent in 2016.<sup>75</sup>

**AID ORGANISATION ACTIVITY | SCORE: 1** The Grand Bargain commitment on reduced earmarking includes the clause that “aid organisations in turn commit to do the same with their funding when channelling it through partners.” Nevertheless, in their self-reports, many of the relevant signatories, such as UN agencies with implementing partners, do not reflect on their role in funding other organisations. Some aid organisations did take steps to fulfil their other commitments, by regularly sharing information on allocations of unearmarked funding with donors and increasing visibility. Interestingly, most NGOs have not provided any information on this work stream in their self-reports, as they perceive the agreement to be primarily between donors and UN agencies.

**ACTIVITY ON JOINT COMMITMENTS | SCORE: 1** In Annex 1 of the Grand Bargain document, signatories agreed on definitions for the four funding modalities: unearmarked, softly earmarked, earmarked, and tightly earmarked. However, many individual donors maintain different reporting requirements related to flexible contributions, and there remains no consensus on the most effective and efficient way to report on unearmarked and softly earmarked funding. Moreover, only a few aid organisations and donors responded to the baseline survey conducted in December 2016, making it difficult for the co-conveners to move forward on joint commitments.

**LINKS TO OTHER WORK STREAMS | SCORE: 0** The co-conveners recognise the importance of working together with other work streams.<sup>76</sup> Since donors expect improved reporting (work stream 9), more-transparent data on how funds are spent (work stream 1), and, in some cases, better needs assessments (work stream 5) in exchange for reducing the earmarking of their contributions, it is particularly important to establish links with these groups. In addition, decreased earmarking may conflict with the goal of localisation (work stream 2) and increased cash contributions (work stream 3). Thus far, however, the co-conveners have not managed to link their work to others, except for occasional discussions with the reporting work stream.

**LINKS TO OTHER EXISTING PROCESSES | SCORE: 3** The co-conveners have

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75 United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (2017) Earmarking Trend. Available from: <http://reporting.unhcr.org/contributions?t=e> (downloaded on May 30, 2017).

76 Sweden and ICRC (2016) Grand Bargain. Reduce the earmarking of donor contributions. Work stream 2-pager, September 2016.

sought to work with the IASC Humanitarian Financing Task Team, which produced an important paper in 2016 on the implications of donor conditions for humanitarian response.<sup>77</sup> Sweden is also leading the Good Humanitarian Donorship initiative's work stream on earmarking and has linked that process with this work stream well. This connection is crucial since the GHD represents a broader range of donors (42 in total) whose involvement will help Grand Bargain signatories reach the global target of 30 per cent.

Although reduced earmarking is one of the core elements of the Grand Bargain, not much progress has been made since the World Humanitarian Summit. In fact, a number of the consulted aid organisations are observing an opposite trend: increased earmarking. This can partially be explained by the tendency of certain donors to increase their softly earmarked contributions (e.g., through pooled funds), rather than their unearmarked funding. The annual Grand Bargain meeting in June 2017 is a key opportunity to find broader agreement on what the share of softly earmarked funding should be in the 30 per cent target. To regain momentum, the co-conveners should identify incentives for donors to decrease earmarking based on their recent analysis of the obstacles to reduced earmarking. They should step up their advocacy efforts and engage with a wider range of stakeholders, including non-signatory donors as well as UN organisations that do not always perceive themselves as funding agencies.

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77 IASC Humanitarian Financing Task Team (2016) Donor Conditions and their Implications for Humanitarian Response.

## 9. Harmonise and simplify reporting requirements

**CONTEXT** Aid organisations have increasingly raised concerns that donor reporting requirements are excessive, duplicative, and time-consuming.<sup>78</sup> In late 2015, ICVA successfully brought attention to this issue through its “Less Paper, More Aid” campaign, which built on studies and efforts spearheaded by the IASC Humanitarian Financing Task Team. Most donors recognise that their reporting requirements can be burdensome for partners, but greater domestic pressure for accountability, transparency, and quality has led to increased reporting demands.<sup>79</sup> In the Grand Bargain, signatories committed to simplify and harmonise reporting requirements by the end of 2018. Specific commitments include reducing volume, developing a common terminology and report structure, and investing in technology and reporting systems.

**WORK STREAM APPROACH** To avoid duplication, the co-conveners, Germany and ICVA, have aligned their work with the Good Humanitarian Donorship initiative (currently co-chaired by Germany and Australia), the IASC Humanitarian Financing Task Team, and relevant working groups facilitated by ICVA.<sup>80</sup> The work stream’s efforts have thus far centred on creating a common donor reporting template, based on a model known as the “10+3” template, which was developed in a November 2016 GPPi study commissioned by Germany.<sup>81</sup> ICVA and Germany convened signatories in November 2016 and March 2017 to discuss the development of a joint pilot between select donors, UN organisations, and NGOs so as to test the common template approach.<sup>82</sup>

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78 ICVA (2016) Less Paper More Aid Report: Reducing the Burden of Donors Conditions to Improve the Efficiency of Humanitarian Action.

79 Humanitarian Outcomes (2016) Donor Reporting Requirements Research.

80 The IASC Humanitarian Financing Task Team has a work stream on reporting, and the Good Humanitarian Donorship initiative has been considering the establishment of a new work stream dedicated to reporting. ICVA’s Donor Conditions Task Force is an NGO-only platform for NGOs to discuss technical issues related to, e.g., reporting and IATI.

81 Erica Gaston (2017) Harmonizing Donor Reporting. Berlin: GPPi. Available from: [http://www.gppi.net/fileadmin/user\\_upload/media/pub/2017/Gaston\\_\\_2017\\_\\_Harmonizing\\_Donor\\_Reporting.pdf](http://www.gppi.net/fileadmin/user_upload/media/pub/2017/Gaston__2017__Harmonizing_Donor_Reporting.pdf) (downloaded on June 2, 2017).

82 At the time of writing this report, the list of participants and selected pilot countries was not final.



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## Reported activity against commitments


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● Activities reported ● Activities planned ● No activities reported

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### 1A. Signatories simplify and harmonise reporting requirements by reducing its volume.

*All signatories • Individual action • Deadline: end of 2018*




Most donors, as well as many aid organisations with implementing partners, report measures to reduce the volume of their requirements. For example, Estonia has simplified its financial procedures for developmental and humanitarian projects, and Belgium is in the process of modifying its Royal Decree on Humanitarian Aid to reduce reporting requirements. UNHCR and UNICEF have taken steps to simplify and harmonise processes for managing partnerships, including a shared partner portal that will include a harmonised reporting format.

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### 1B. Signatories simplify and harmonise reporting requirements by engaging in processes to jointly decide on common terminology, identify core requirements, and develop a common report structure.

*All signatories • Joint action • Deadline: end of 2018*




Most donors and aid organisations are aware of and engaged in a joint process to develop a common terminology and report structure. NGOs have been highly involved as well. For instance, NRC and WFP are taking the lead in testing the common template approach in South Sudan.

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### 2. Signatories invest in technology and reporting systems to enable better access to information.

*All signatories • Individual action • No target/deadline*



37 per cent of the signatories have invested in technology or better reporting systems. A good practice example comes from ILO, which has recently launched a data visualisation dashboard that shows expenditures and other relevant information.

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
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## Reported activity against commitments

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3. Signatories take measures to enhance the quality of reporting to better capture results, enable learning, and increase the efficiency of reporting.


*All signatories · Individual action · No target/deadline*



About half of the signatories have taken measures. For example, IRC's Monitoring for Action is an effort to improve the quality and use of project reporting data.

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## Assessment of Progress Made Within Work Stream 9 (Reporting Requirements)



**DONOR ACTIVITY | SCORE: 3** Almost all donors have taken steps or plan to reduce the volume of their requirements, to simplify administrative procedures, and/or to introduce greater flexibility in the selection of reporting templates and indicators. However, the reported steps often do not cover the entire breadth of available options for simplifying reporting requirements.

**AID ORGANISATION ACTIVITY | SCORE: 1** Aid organisations – NGOs in particular – have often made use of the self-reporting exercise to emphasise the need for simplified donor reporting, rather than reporting on their own commitments to invest in better reporting.

**ACTIVITY ON JOINT COMMITMENTS | SCORE: 3** The work stream has successfully engaged signatories, including large donors and UN organisations, in the 10+3 common reporting approach. A pilot exercise is also being planned. However, the impact of these activities depends on whether a sufficient number of key donors will participate in the pilot.

**LINKS TO OTHER WORKSTREAMS | SCORE: 2** Aware of the strong need for linkages

to other work streams, the co-conveners are in contact with Development Initiatives, which is working on the transparency and cash work streams. Links to other relevant work streams – such as transparency, management costs, and multi-year planning and funding – have recently been strengthened by a joint co-convenor workshop and teleconference.

**LINKS TO OTHER EXISTING PROCESSES | SCORE: 4** Due to ICVA's well-established network and Germany's co-chair position in the Good Humanitarian Donorship initiative, the co-conveners have made full use of existing studies and efforts to simplify reporting, such as those led by the IASC Humanitarian Financing Task Team.

This work stream has been active. Donors and aid organisations with implementing partners have taken significant steps to reduce some of their individual requirements. But there is a small risk that signatories will fall short of harmonising their reporting requirements. To achieve the proposed target by the end of 2018, the work stream will need to keep key stakeholders, especially large donors and UN organisations, engaged in the joint process and convince signatories to adopt a common reporting template. It is also crucial that all actions around reporting remain coherent with the transparency work stream's efforts. Signatories raised concerns that other work streams and the Grand Bargain process as a whole may add undue burdens in monitoring and reporting.

## 10. Enhance engagement between humanitarian and development actors<sup>83</sup>

**CONTEXT** Stronger links between development and humanitarian actors can lead to more complementary and seamless assistance to people affected by protracted and recurrent crises. While it remains important to safeguard humanitarian principles, it is widely acknowledged that stronger links between the two forms of aid can make assistance more effective and efficient by enabling greater continuity, encouraging a longer time horizon, and encouraging investments in local capacities and durable solutions. Stronger engagement of the development sector is also essential to shrinking needs and reducing dependency on humanitarian aid. This work stream thus responds not only to the World Humanitarian Summit’s commitment to “invest in humanity,” but also to “changing people’s lives: from delivering aid to ending need.”<sup>84</sup> Moreover, the work stream not only is part of the “Grand Bargain on efficiency” proposed by the High-Level Panel on Humanitarian Financing, but also contributes to its recommendations to “shrink the needs.”<sup>85</sup>

**WORK STREAM APPROACH** The work stream co-conveners, Denmark and UNDP, focus on leveraging the activities of other initiatives, rather than initiating standalone interventions.<sup>86</sup> They focus particularly on efforts to transcend the humanitarian–development divide through “a new way of working.”<sup>87</sup>

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83 The Red Cross and Red Crescent Movement has committed to enhance its engagement with development actors, but opted out from endorsing the commitments under this work stream.

84 Ban Ki-Moon et al. (2016) Commitment to Action. Transcending humanitarian-development divides. Changing People’s Lives: From Delivering Aid to Ending Need, Istanbul, Turkey.

85 High-Level Panel on Humanitarian Financing (2016) Too important to fail—addressing the humanitarian financing gap. Report to the Secretary-General.

86 See summary of discussions held at the Bonn meeting in September 2016 and summary of progress by Grand Bargain work streams (December 2016).

87 Agenda for Humanity (2017) Initiative New Way of Working Summary. Available from: <http://www.agendaforhumanity.org/initiatives/5358> (downloaded on May 30, 2017).

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## Reported activity against commitments


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● Activities reported ● Activities planned ● No activities reported

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**1. Signatories use existing resources and capabilities better to shrink humanitarian needs over the long term and contribute to the Sustainable Development Goals. Signatories significantly increase prevention, mitigation, preparedness, and recovery.**


*All signatories · Individual action · No target/deadline*



A range of signatories are investing in these issues. For example, DG ECHO dedicated 13 per cent of its humanitarian budget to disaster risk reduction. However, few signatories have reported increases in their investments. One example is Australia which prioritises early recovery in its new humanitarian strategy.

**2. Signatories invest in durable solutions for refugees and internally displaced people; invest in sustainable support to migrants, returnees and host / receiving communities, as well as for other situations of recurring vulnerabilities.**


*All signatories · Individual action · No target/deadline*



Since most signatories work in contexts experiencing migration and/or recurring vulnerabilities, many are able to report investments. For example, the Netherlands increased its budget for the reception of refugees by €260 million in 2016. IOM has developed and introduced a new durable solutions policy framework. The 2017 Danish Strategy for Development Cooperation and Humanitarian Action has triggered a redesign of long-term partnerships with civil society organisations, which will include both humanitarian and development aspects in a single integrated agreement.

**3. Signatories increase investments in social protection programmes and strengthen national and local systems and coping mechanisms to build resilience in fragile contexts.**

*All signatories · Individual action · No target/deadline*



Again, while many signatories are investing in these issues, relatively few have reported increases in their investments. Canada provides CAD 125 million to Ethiopia's Productive Safety Net Programme for 2016–20. DG ECHO's Emergency Social Safety Net programme for refugees in Turkey is delivered through the existing national social protection systems.


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## Reported activity against commitments

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**4. Signatories conduct joint multi-hazard risk and vulnerability analysis; perform multi-year planning where feasible and relevant; participate in national, regional, and local coordination to achieve a joint vision of outcomes.**

*All signatories · Joint action · No target/deadline*




A handful of signatories report plans for joint multi-hazard risk and vulnerability analysis. The European Commission's humanitarian and development departments (DG ECHO and DG DEVCO) have proposed closer partnership in a number of pilot countries based on joint analysis, to set the stage for closer collaboration and long-term action between development and humanitarian actors.

Humanitarian Country Teams have developed multi-year plans in several emergencies (see work stream 7). Country teams in the Democratic Republic of Congo, Chad, and Central African Republic have engaged development partners in the planning process. In addition, the IASC Task Team on Humanitarian and Development Nexus, co-chaired by UNDP and WHO, has developed a toolkit to support country teams with key messages, and a number of other tools and analyses that support planning across humanitarian, peace and development fields. Beyond that, very few signatories have reported relevant activities that are already in progress. Several organisations, however, plan to take steps in that direction.

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
**5. Signatories undertake efforts to galvanize new partnerships that bring in additional capabilities and resources to crisis-affected states through multilateral development banks and the private sector.**

*All signatories · Individual action · No target/deadline*



Only a few signatories report efforts to establish new partnerships. They report very specific initiatives. UNHCR and Sweden, for example, have entered a partnership with a microfinance fund to handle a Global Guarantee Facility to enhance refugees' access to credit. Canada has developed a partnership with the World Bank, the International Monetary Fund, France, the UK, Saudi Arabia, and the Islamic Development to guarantee a loan to Iraq.

## Assessment of Progress Made Within Work Stream 10 (Humanitarian–Development Nexus)



**DONOR ACTIVITY | SCORE: 1** Many donors have made relevant investments in durable solutions for refugees and internally displaced people, disaster risk reduction, and/or social protection programmes. However, most donors already made these types of investments in years prior to the Grand Bargain, and they do not provide data on whether these investments have increased.

**AID ORGANISATIONS ACTIVITY | SCORE: 1** As with donors, only a small number of implementing organisations report increased investments or concrete activities related to the commitments under this work stream.

**ACTIVITY ON JOINT COMMITMENTS | SCORE: 1** While the introduction of collective multi-year planning in several emergencies represents important progress, very few signatories have reported activities towards the commitments under this work stream that require collective action, such as joint multi-hazard risk and vulnerability analysis.

**LINKS TO OTHER WORK STREAMS | SCORE: 0** No activities or other active linkages with other work streams have been reported to date. This is despite the fact that the work stream co-conveners have highlighted the importance of mainstreaming the humanitarian–development nexus across other areas of work.

**LINKS TO OTHER EXISTING PROCESSES | SCORE: 3** The work stream links closely to other relevant processes focusing on the humanitarian–development nexus, which are considered the primary drivers behind most activities. Chief among these is the “New Way of Working,” a framework that also came out of the World Humanitarian Summit and aims to reduce needs, risks, and vulnerability. A workshop under this umbrella was held in Copenhagen in March 2017, during which UN agencies, donors, and even NGOs came together and announced individual actions. The work stream is also closely connected to the IASC Task Team on Strengthening the Humanitarian/Development Nexus (co-chaired by UNDP and the WHO) and the UN Working Group on Transitions, which jointly provided input on the design and roll-out of the New Way of Working. The work stream’s co-convenor, Denmark, has also taken the co-lead of the GHD work stream on humanitarian–development nexus, together with Japan.

The World Humanitarian Summit provided an important impetus to efforts to enhance engagement between humanitarian and development actors. Some organisations caution against too much integration between the two forms of aid out of a concern for safeguarding the humanitarian principles. However, the broad majority of stakeholders agree that stronger engagement would be beneficial, and this agenda continues to receive high-level endorsement. Within this overall positive picture, the Grand Bargain work stream plays a subordinate to marginal role. Although the co-conveners had originally envisioned playing a facilitating role (e.g., by establishing links with other work streams), not much activity has been reported to date. With other fora taking the agenda forward, it does not seem necessary to re-inject additional momentum to the work stream, except to establish stronger links and promote the mainstreaming of the humanitarian–development nexus in other Grand Bargain work streams.



## Endnotes: reported activity against commitments

- a As explained in more detail in the methods section of Section 2, the figures in this table reflect activities that are already under way (red numbers) or planned (blue numbers). They represent the share of organisations reporting activities out of the total number of relevant organisations that have submitted self-reports. Since not all commitments require action from all signatories, there are cases in which the percentage only takes into account the relevant signatories (e.g., how many donors have taken action out of the total of 16 donors that have submitted self-reports).
- b The IATI dashboard presents a comprehensive overview of the proportion of activities that publishers cover in their IATI data. For example, UK DFID, Australia, Finland, UNICEF, and WFP are signatories that report on all their activities. See: [http://dashboard.iatistandard.org/summary\\_stats.html](http://dashboard.iatistandard.org/summary_stats.html).
- c Financial Tracking Service (2017) The New FTS. Available from: <https://fts.unocha.org/content/new-fts> (downloaded on May 30, 2017).
- d This project is part of the UK DFID-funded Disasters Emergency Preparedness Programme (DEPP), implemented by the START Network. Overall, DEPP comprises 14 projects that all invest in the capacity development of national and local NGOs.
- e See CBPF Grant Management System (2017) CBPF Allocations. UN OCHA. Available from: <https://gms.unocha.org/content/cbpf-allocations> (downloaded on May 30, 2017).
- f Although NEAR has not endorsed the Grand Bargain, the membership of InterAction, ICVA, and SCHR include a number of international NGOs and the ICRC, which work on the frontlines. ICVA includes a relatively smaller number of southern-based NGOs.
- g World Vision International (2017) Our commitments. Available from: <http://www.wvi.org/disaster-management/our-commitments> (downloaded on May 30, 2017); International Rescue Committee (2015) Commit to Cash. Available from: <https://www.rescue.org/sites/default/files/document/639/whscash.pdf> (downloaded on May 30, 2017).
- h Grand Bargain Facilitation Group (2016) Summary of progress from each Grand Bargain work stream – Annex (III) to the meeting report.
- i Ibid.
- j Jean-Yves Penoy (2016) Four Key Challenges Affecting the Entire Humanitarian Sector. Norwegian Refugee Council. Available from: <https://www.nrc.no/news/2016/mai/four-key-challenges-affecting-the-entire-humanitarian-sector/> (downloaded on May 30, 2017).
- k IASC Information Management Working Group (2016) Humanitarian Population Figures. Available from: [http://fscluster.org/sites/default/files/documents/humanitarianprofilesupportguidance\\_final\\_may2016.pdf](http://fscluster.org/sites/default/files/documents/humanitarianprofilesupportguidance_final_may2016.pdf) (downloaded on May 30, 2017).
- l François Grünewald and Ed Schenkenberg (2016) Real Time Evaluation: Response to Hurricane Matthew in Haiti. Groupe URD/HERE Geneva. Available from: [http://www.urd.org/IMG/pdf/Report\\_-\\_RTE\\_Haiti-MD.pdf](http://www.urd.org/IMG/pdf/Report_-_RTE_Haiti-MD.pdf) (downloaded on May 30, 2017).
- m GB Participation Revolution Workstream (2017) Draft Plan of Action
- n UNICEF, OCHA, IFRC, et al. (2017) A Collective Service for Communication and Community Engagement: Towards System-Wide Accountability to Affected. Concept Note & Work Plan.

# Recommendations

The Grand Bargain has generated important momentum for aid actors to make progress on issues with far-reaching potential for the efficiency and effectiveness of humanitarian action. On average, signatories that submitted self-reports have reported activities on 40 per cent of the commitments that apply to them. Given that only a year has passed since the adoption of the Grand Bargain, this follow-up is commendable. However, the initiative continues to face significant challenges and constraints. They must be addressed to ensure that the Grand Bargain maintains its momentum for change, particularly as famine threatens to devastate the lives of millions in several protracted emergencies around the world, and as the financing gap for humanitarian response seems doomed to increase only further, not least due to recent political changes in the United States and the United Kingdom. For example, signatories could discuss the optimal share of softly earmarked and fully unearmarked funding to reach the global target for donor earmarking, or a roadmap to increase direct funding to local actors (in addition to the recommendations listed in this section). The following recommendations are addressed to members of the 7th annual Grand Bargain meeting in June 2017.

## **Recommendation 1: Keep the light structure and the joint leadership roles.**

Although the level of oversight and information exchange is currently weak, increasing the Grand Bargain's bureaucratic footprint is unwarranted at a time when the Facilitation Group and Secretariat have already begun to take a more active role in addressing related concerns. Joint leadership roles between donors and aid organisations in the work streams should also be maintained, because they reflect the Grand Bargain's unique design and strengthen the engagement of signatories.

## **Recommendation 2: Re-engage signatories at the political level.**

The Grand Bargain's fading political momentum makes it difficult to overcome non-technical obstacles and thereby risks slowing down implementation and creating deadlocks. Therefore, the Grand Bargain should re-engage signatories at the level of Sherpas or principals. Tabling strategic decisions for the upcoming Grand Bargain meeting in June could encourage high-level participation. For example, signatories could discuss the optimal share of softly earmarked and fully unearmarked funding to reach the global target for donor earmarking, or a roadmap to increase direct funding to local actors (in addition to the recommendations listed in this section). Nominating an eminent person or putting in place another high-level leadership model (e.g., an eminent group that includes the Emergency Relief Coordinator, one of the co-chairs of the Good

Humanitarian Donorship initiative, and an NGO representative) could be another important step. Finally, it will be crucial to ensure continued monitoring through the annual independent Grand Bargain report and by supporting civil society initiatives that monitor progress. In doing so, it will be important to better integrate Grand Bargain reporting with reporting on the overall follow-up to the World Humanitarian Summit, such as the reporting requirements related to OCHA's Platform for Action, Commitments, and Transformations (PACT).

### **Recommendation 3: Increase coherence within the Grand Bargain.**

The development of the Grand Bargain into a pick-and-choose approach and the lack of coherence across work streams risk undermining progress over the longer-term. There are four areas within the Grand Bargain that either require close coordination and sequencing, or offer important synergies:

- Commitments related to the accountability of aid organisations need close coordination and sequencing to ensure that agreements reached in one work stream do not require re-negotiation in another. This particularly affects the work streams on transparency, reporting, and management costs, but also requires coordination with certain aspects dealt with under localisation, cash, and earmarking. The Grand Bargain Secretariat could help facilitate coordination between the co-conveners of the relevant work streams.
- Commitments that reflect the core of the “bargain” need more information exchange in order for actors to leverage the quid pro quo. This relates mainly to commitments on transparency, management costs, multi-year funding, earmarking, and reporting. More information, for example, on how aid organisations have strengthened transparency would encourage donors to reduce earmarking, and vice versa. Work stream updates could include examples of relevant signatory action (based on signatories’ self-reports, for example). The Grand Bargain website, which is currently under development, could facilitate the sharing of relevant information, and signatories could use the meetings of humanitarian country teams and donors to exchange good practice and hold each other to account.
- Several commitments imply potentially far-reaching changes to the work processes of UN agencies and donors. These actors are thus likely to encounter similar challenges and obstacles, and they could benefit from coordinated or joint efforts to address them, including agreement on a joint vision and joint advocacy. This relates primarily to the work streams on needs assessments, collaborative multi-year planning and financing, and the humanitarian–development nexus. This is one of the strategic issues that could be discussed at the annual Grand Bargain meeting.
- Finally, there are some potential tensions and dependencies between the work streams that will require joint consideration and prioritisation. This concerns potential tensions between increasing localisation, cash, and participation on the one hand, and decreasing earmarking and reporting requirements on the other. Progress on commitments related to participation, for example, also depends

on other work streams that consider the issue (e.g., participation is reflected in the common reporting template). Grand Bargain events and meetings of humanitarian country teams and donors could be used to jointly consider and prioritise potential tensions and synergies.

## **Recommendation 4: Make a concerted effort to apply the Grand Bargain in its entirety to specific emergency operations.**

One year after the World Humanitarian Summit, there is growing impatience in the field about the Grand Bargain's impact on operations. Many initial efforts to implement the Grand Bargain focused on the global level, and current plans to pilot actions related to specific commitments have yet to be coordinated. Signatories should shift their attention as much as possible to implementing the Grand Bargain in the field. Selecting a few important emergency contexts for a concerted effort would showcase the Grand Bargain's benefits that result from a simultaneous step change across all work streams and commitments. Humanitarian country teams and donors could fine-tune priorities and approaches according to context. To support such a concerted application of the Grand Bargain, the meetings between the IASC emergency directors group and donors could serve as a forum for discussing challenges and solving problems. The Senior Transformative Agenda Implementation Team could help identify challenges and support learning. In addition, the Grand Bargain architecture and signatories could take steps to enable donors and aid organisations at country level to hold each other accountable for implementing the commitments. There could be, for example, user-friendly information about the obligations of each party to the bargain, which not only would make it easier for organisations at country level to follow up on their own commitments, but may encourage them to be more vocal about asking their counterparts to act on their commitments.

## **Recommendation 5: Expand the Grand Bargain's reach among non-signatories.**

While the Grand Bargain was consciously forged by a small group of key actors, the achievement of many commitments will also require action or at least acceptance by a broader range of organisations. Therefore, signatories and the Grand Bargain architecture should invest in encouraging additional donors to endorse the bargain and in strengthening understanding and support among NGOs. This goal could be supported by a variety of activities, such as:

- Appointing an eminent person/group and supporting the on-going or planned communication efforts of the Grand Bargain secretariat;
- Including discussions about the Grand Bargain on the agenda of the upcoming ECOSOC Humanitarian Affairs Segment and related resolutions or communications;
- Offering leadership roles in the Facilitation Group or as workstream co-conveners to non-OECD donors and NGOs;

- Encouraging signatory donors to reach out to non-signatory governments, either bilaterally or in other fora such as the Good Humanitarian Donorship initiative;
- Strengthening the efforts of the three signatory NGO alliances to operationalise what the Grand Bargain means for members and to reach out to other NGO alliances.

# Annex 1: List of Thematic Experts Consulted by the Authors

<b>Name</b>	<b>Organisation</b>	<b>Work stream expertise</b>
Nicolas Seris	Independent consultant	1. Transparency
Véronique De Geoffroy	Groupe URD	2. Localisation
Paul Harvey	Humanitarian Outcomes	3. Cash
Ed Schenkenberg	HERE Geneva	4. Management costs
Urban Reichhold	GPPi	5. Needs assessments
David Loquercio	CHS Alliance	6. Participation revolution
Courtenay Cabot Venton	Independent consultant	7. Multi-year planning and financing
Marzia Montemurro	HERE Geneva	8. Earmarking
Julia Steets	GPPi	9. Reporting requirements
Julia Steets	GPPi	10. Humanitarian–development nexus

# Annex 2: List of Interviewees

The research team conducted interviews with a range of stakeholders: work stream co-conveners, experts, signatories, and non-signatories. We also gathered input from NGOs by facilitating a discussion with six NGO members of Interaction on March 28, 2017; by organising a workshop with over 40 NGO members of ICVA in Geneva on March 29, 2017; and by receiving written inputs from members of the VOICE network of NGOs.

<b>Name</b>	<b>Organisation/Country</b>
Lars Peter Nissen	ACAPS
Alice Obrecht	ALNAP
Steve Scott	Australia
Alex Jacobs	CaLP
Christopher Demerse	Canada
Lisa Fry	Canada
Ted Itani	Canadian Red Cross
Jennifer Poidatz	Catholic Relief Services
Marian Casey-Maslen	CDAC Network
Michael Mosselmans	Christian Aid
Judith Greenwood	CHS Alliance
Abby Bruell	Concern Worldwide
Jette Michelsen	Denmark
Charlotte Lattimer	Development Initiatives
Daniel Clauss	ECHO
Harmke Kruithof	ECHO
Dominique Burgeon	FAO
Daniele Donati	FAO
Irene Maria Plank	Germany

<b>Name</b>	<b>Organisation/Country</b>
Alexander Sultan-Khan	Germany
Erica Gaston	GPPi
Paulette Jones	Grand Bargain Secretariat
Francois Grunewald	Groupe URD
Christophe Hambye	ICRC
Catherine Lune Grayson-Courtemanche	ICRC
Elena Garagorri Atristain	ICRC
Melissa Pitotti	ICVA
Nan Buzard	ICVA
Ajay Madiwale	IFRC
Jemilah Mahmood	IFRC
Peter Rademaker	ILO
Donato Kiniger-Passigli	ILO
Jennifer Hahn	ILO
Mattheo	ILO
Alexander Blecken	Independent, on behalf of UNHCR
Patricia McIlreavy	Interaction
Lindsay Hamsik	Interaction
Caitlin Tulloch	IRC
Kate Philipps-Barrasso	IRC
Seán Ó hAodha	Ireland
Ohikata Makito	Japan
Florence Ensch	Luxembourg
Georges Bley	Luxembourg
Joost Andriessen	The Netherlands
Eva de Ridder	The Netherlands
James Munn	NRC



<b>Name</b>	<b>Organisation/Country</b>
Nick Imboden	OCHA
Agnes Dhur	OCHA
Tensai Asfaw	OCHA
Herbert Tatham	OCHA
Alexandra Sicotte-Levesque	OCHA
Kathryn Yarlett	OCHA
Sarah Bailey	ODI
Cyprien Fabre	OECD
Lara Seigneur	Oxfam America
Luca Pupulin	REACH
Kate Half	SCHR
Jaime Iglesias Sánchez-Cervera	Spain
Elisabet Hedin	Sweden
Olivier Bangerter	Switzerland
Rolla Hinedi	Syria Relief
Emily Henderson	UK DFID
Ruth Andreyeva	UK DFID
Sheila Ahmed	UK DFID
Izumi Nakamitsu	UNDP
Taija Kontinen-Sharp	UNDP
Hiroko Araki	UNHCR
Paloma Vora	UNHCR
Sanjani Quazi	UNICEF
Charles-Antoine Hofmann	UNICEF
Olav Kjørven	UNICEF
Sanjana Bhardwaj	UNICEF
Sam Rose	UNRWA

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<b>Name</b>	<b>Organisation/Country</b>
David DiGiovanna	US Bureau of Population Refugees and Migration (PRM)
Kathryn Stahlberg	USAID Food for Peace
Andrew Kent	USAID OFDA
Kenn Crossley	WFP
Joan Timoney	Women's Refugee Commission
Andrew Roberts	World Bank
Julian Srodecki	World Vision

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# Annex 3: List of Signatories That Submitted Self-Reports

At the time of writing this report (May 2017), 52 organisations and countries had endorsed the Grand Bargain. In total, the research team received and analysed 44 self-reports.<sup>88</sup> Nine signatories have yet to submit a self-report.

## **Self-reports received and analysed**

1	Australia	12	Luxembourg	23	CRS	34	SCHR
2	Belgium	13	Netherlands	24	FAO	35	OCHA
3	Canada	19	United States	25	ICRC	36	UNDP
4	Czech Republic	14	Norway	26	ICVA	37	UN Women
5	Denmark	15	Spain	27	IFRC	38	UNFPA
6	ECHO	16	Sweden	28	ILO	39	UNHCR
7	Estonia	17	Switzerland	29	Interaction	40	UNICEF
8	Finland	18	UK DFID	30	IOM	41	UNRWA
9	Germany	20	CAFOD	31	IRC	42	WFP
10	Italy	21	CARE International	32	Mercy Corps	43	WHO
11	Japan	22	Christian Aid	33	NRC	44	World Vision

## **Self-reports not received**

45	Bulgaria	48	Ireland	51	Slovenia
46	Caritas Spain	49	OECD	52	Syria Relief Turkey
47	Global Communities	50	Relief International	53	World Bank

<sup>88</sup> Though the WHO has not formally endorsed the Grand Bargain, it submitted a self-report and aims to work towards the implementation of the Grand Bargain commitments.

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