

**INTERAGENCY STANDING COMMITTEE TASK TEAM ON STRENGTHENING THE
HUMANITARIAN-DEVELOPMENT NEXUS IN PROTRACTED CRISES**

**Synopsis: A Survey Towards Coherent Support for the
Humanitarian-Development Nexus**

The IASC TT on Strengthening the Humanitarian – Development Nexus was tasked by the IASC Working Group (ref 92nd IASC WG meeting, 5-6 April 2017) to reach out to HC/RCs with the objective of clarifying gaps and required guidance on the operationalization on the New Way of Working.

1. The survey was sent to 28 country operations where there is an HC/RC present¹. These respondents in turn chose to share and invite HCT/UNCT members to contribute individual responses. Some 23 individual responses have been received thus far, from the following 15 countries: Cameroon, Central African Republic, Chad, Colombia, Eritrea, Lebanon, Mali, Myanmar, Nigeria, Pakistan, Philippines, Sudan, Syria, Ukraine, and the occupied Palestinian territories. Some by RC/HCs, some by individual HCT members, and some on behalf of HCT/UNCT. Surveys came from country teams responding to sudden onset and slow onset natural disasters, massive internal and refugee population movement, and complex situations due to conflict.

General Findings

2. *Understanding of NWOW varies:* While many know and are familiar with the term the NWOW there is a varied understanding of what it actually means and what core elements make up the NWOW. There is not a comprehensive understanding of what it is. Understanding varies across regions, between humanitarian and development actors, and sometimes within the same country teams.
3. *The parameters are unclear:* Specifically there is a lack of clarity on what the main components of NWOW are and how the other processes fit together, and the need to get clear messages on this issue -- especially vis a vis complex settings where there is a protracted conflict and how to define collective outcomes.
4. *Implementation is unequal:* It is also clear that some are far ahead of the pack in moving this work forward (having had workshops, funding, and even staff dedicated to this subject) others are lagging behind. In some settings there is little distinction or debate as to whether to include peacebuilding actors, conflict prevention, social cohesion, and stabilization efforts.
5. *Support and guidance is required:* There is also a resounding request for additional support, ranging from clear but light guidance coming from the senior leadership (allowing for risk taking and loosely defining the parameters); to field mission support similar to that of done in Sudan. In addition, responses point to NWOW implementation *being largely through informal means*, to cope with the lack of formal structures and mechanisms.

¹ Afghanistan, Cameroon, Central African Republic, Chad, Colombia, Cote d'Ivoire, Democratic Republic of Congo, Eritrea, Ethiopia, Haiti, Indonesia, Iraq, Jordan, Lebanon, Libya, Mali, Myanmar, Niger, Nigeria, Pakistan, State of Palestine, Philippines, Somalia, South Sudan, Sudan, Syria, Ukraine and Yemen.

Leadership and Coordination

6. Responses suggest that the concept of the *NWOW remains vague and non-operational*. Overall, most respondents agreed that both senior humanitarian actors and development actors are somewhat familiar with the core elements of the NWOW. However this did not necessarily mean that the NWOW was specifically discussed in UNCTs and HCTs.
7. *Understanding differs widely*. Through the additional comments, the survey showed that while some said they were familiar with the NWOW, there remained “different understanding about how to translate [it] into concrete programmatic issues” or that “(...) there is lack of clear understanding what are elements and key process that it entails” (only 4 respondents agreed that there is consensus on what NWOW entails and how to implement it).

Some respondents made a distinction between “understanding” NWOW and being “aware” of it, further pointing to the lack of clarity. Similarly, in some country operations, the “World Humanitarian Summit was discussed at HCT and UNCT level, but subsequent resolutions, guidance, and instructions were not”, such as in Myanmar, Ukraine and in Lebanon.

8. Yet, in other country operations, *country teams are far ahead*. There is already an advanced understanding with humanitarian-development coordination mechanisms and processes to share information and data. Some noted that they have reached this point through external support (such as in Sudan and in Mali), while some teams developed this approach before WHS, but welcomed the NWOW as an umbrella term of already ongoing activities (such as in Eritrea and Lebanon).
9. *Coordination arrangements also vary widely*. Most notably in the addition of peace actors in some settings. In conflict settings, such as in Mali, the humanitarian-development nexus working group includes members of the mission (MINUSMA). In Colombia, the joint work between humanitarian and development actors is in service of the stabilization and the implementation of the current peace agreements.
10. However, *inclusivity remains UN-centric*. While most agree or strongly agree that structures are in place to bring together humanitarian, development and sometimes peacebuilding actors, half of the respondents did not agree that similar structures exist to bring non-UN humanitarian and development actors.

Shared Data and Joint Analysis

11. *Information and data is shared but structures are lacking*. While most respondents agreed that humanitarian and development actors share data, most did not agree that there are mechanisms in places to do so. Responses from CAR, Sudan, Cameroon, oPt, and Pakistan for example, suggest that while “the principles have been agreed to”, “the will [to share]”, “agreement to work together” are there, and “efforts are being made”, information management systems are not. Information is scattered among a number of “data holders, targeting different audiences”
12. Likewise, *mechanisms to undertake joint analysis require further refinement*. While most agreed that their humanitarian activities are informed by systematic context, conflict and risk analysis at national and subnational level, mechanisms to undertake these analyses jointly are lacking (oPt, for example). In some settings, country teams have gone beyond joint analysis, toward joined assessment. The joint Recovery and Peacebuilding Assessment (RPBA) exercise

conducted by the EU, World Bank and United Nations was cited as an opportunity to gather all actors around the table in order to share data.

13. Most respondents either agreed or strongly agreed that there are mechanisms in place to link humanitarian actors with conflict prevention and peacebuilding/stabilization efforts, including analysis and planning. These linkages were found to be useful. For example in Lebanon, the existence of a stand-alone social stability/cohesion sector was cited as a strong mechanism to link humanitarian and peacebuilding efforts. In Mali, joint analysis between UNDP, OCHA, and the MINUSMA helped identify opportunities for early recovery in areas where the overall security situation allows.
14. A few respondents either noted the need for, or benefit of having, a dedicated/ *'professionalized' interagency capacity to serve the collective*. In Colombia, for example, the Information Management and Analysis Unit (UNMAIC) was created to provide data and analysis products and services to the UNCT for decision making regarding humanitarian and development projects.

Joined Up Planning and Programming

15. *There is a gap between humanitarian activities and Sustainable Development Goals*. Overall, the majority of respondents did not agree that linkages humanitarian activities are explicitly linked with the SDGs, even though about half the respondents reported that humanitarian activities are planned over multiple year timeframes.
16. Similar to joint analysis and sharing of data, many respondents acknowledge that there are mechanisms in place that could be better utilized to deliver more coherent programming. The UNDAF is cited as one of the mechanisms that can bring actors together, although it was noted that the UNDAF requires some structural changes related to better linking with early recovery and existing development plans.
17. However it should be noted that respondents from settings that a mostly afflicted by sudden onset or slow onset natural disasters (Eritrea, Myanmar, Philippines), were found to have advanced further in discussion around joined planning and programming, particularly around the inclusion of non-UN entities (EU, ICRC, INGOs, CSOs).
18. While some respondents reported that HRP/MYRP were aligned with UNDAFs, RPBAs and country development plans, alignment does not necessarily translate to programmes; leading one respondent to say that “programming is mostly still individual-agency driven and to some extent via the clusters. This has its limitations in terms of really creating a joint approach”.
19. Besides reviewing coordination arrangements (Clusters, in Chad, Mali), other barriers “to moving more deeply into NWOW” included the need to establish a common humanitarian and development fund, with funding streams linked directly to joint programmes.

Guidance and Identified Gaps:

20. Overall, all respondents find the current information and guidance they receive on the New Way of Working either useful, or somewhat useful. However most find the guidance to be either somewhat or not sufficient at all as well as largely abstract. In particular respondents identified the following gaps in guidance, some of which were directed directly to the HDN TT (requesting the TT to conduct support missions, provide further guidance, etc.)

- a. Receive short and clear messaging along with concrete examples and lessons learnt of NWOW implementation. Potentially in the form of “Policy Directives” or detailed guidance. Not just through individual agencies, it must be collective.
- b. How to jointly identify and fund collective approaches. Particularly, How to integrate peace. Security and justice (or peacebuilding) agendas into NWOW dialogue. Help with “demystifying political” aspects of NWOW.
- c. Clearer articulation on how to get to Collective Outcomes, and learning from others on their experiences particularly around how these outcomes were conceptualised to how implementation and monitoring could be done.
- d. The need for dedicated processes to align humanitarian and development programmes, as well as practical support in facilitating dialogue.
- e. Adapted NWOW guidance “for non-conventional multiyear protracted crises”. The NWOW should not only be designed for complex situations, it is also needed for sudden onset.