

SUMMARY REPORT

PEER-TO-PEER SUPPORT NETWORK MEETING TO STRENGTHEN COLLABORATION ACROSS THE NEXUS

28-29TH NOVEMBER, ENTEBBE, UGANDA

I. INTRODUCTION:

1. Despite systemic, procedural and administrative challenges, actors at the country level are working to find solutions to the obstacles that perpetuate the humanitarian and development silos, including different programme cycles, tools and procedures; lack of uniformity in support and flexibility in funding; and inconsistent membership of actors in different planning processes. However, despite these strides at policy and field level, questions remain.

II. BACKGROUND:

2. The Peer-to-peer support network meeting targeted 21 peer practitioners including representatives from the UN, NGO community and the Red Cross and Red Crescent Movement, possessing the mind-set, in-depth knowledge and hands-on experience in advancing a strengthened collaboration across sectors in the field. The primary aim of this workshop was to facilitate pragmatic trouble-shooting through cross-learning and peer-to-peer knowledge exchange.
3. Participants of the workshop included colleagues from FAO, IOM, UNHCR, WFP, WHO, OCHA, UNDP, UNDG (Great Lakes), RCOs, IFRC, ICRC, ICVA and CRS from 6 countries Uganda, Ethiopia, Chad, Mali, Cameroon and Sudan as well as regional representation and HQ colleagues from UNDP, OCHA, UNHCR, FAO, WFP and DOCO.
4. This workshop was convened in response to requests by field colleagues and is in support of the joint Plan of Action of the UNDG Sustainable Development and Sustaining Peace Results Group 'Task Team A' and the Inter Agency Standing Committee (IASC) Task Team on the Humanitarian Development Nexus in protracted crises (HDN TT).
5. The agenda featured opportunities to deep-dive on thematic elements of the humanitarian development nexus; namely analysis, planning/programming, coordination/leadership; and collective outcomes. In addition, participants also had the opportunity to present their country contexts where context-specific lessons, challenges, and opportunities were highlighted and discussed. The workshop included co-facilitation by TT members from WHO, WFP, FAO, UNHCR, ICVA, OCHA and UNDP as well as presentations by EOSG to provide global level policy perspectives and situate these discussions within broader UN-specific reform tracks.
6. What follows is a summary of the major takeaways, key findings, and proposed recommendations from this group of field-level practitioners.

III. KEY TAKEAWAYS

7. **Reducing the impact of protracted crises requires not only meeting immediate needs but also reducing vulnerabilities** and boosting resilience through coordinated efforts such as strengthening institutions and capacities, improving livelihoods, and increasing access to services that can enhance peoples' abilities to withstand future shocks. To do so, in line with the

2030 Agenda 2030 and the shared responsibility by all actors *to leave no one behind*, the efforts to strengthen the Humanitarian Development Nexus should target in particular, vulnerable populations currently trapped in protracted crises.

8. **The strengthening of the humanitarian development nexus cannot succeed without an explicit attention to peace:** In some country contexts conflict dynamics and social cohesion dimensions cannot be disregarded as they are often the root cause of needs and vulnerabilities. In this regard, there was broad agreement to “scope the peace element” when discussing the Humanitarian-Development-Peace nexus. For the structure, processes, and mechanisms that will be put in place to strengthen the nexus (joint analysis, joined up planning and programming) to have a concrete impact on affected populations caught in protracted crises, they will have to include a peace dimension to the extent possible in reference to preserving humanitarian principles, through conflict sensitive programming, a comprehensive understanding of the root causes; and the role that government or local authorities play in these dynamics.
9. **The notion of joint analysis and collective outcomes is at the heart of strengthening the humanitarian development nexus.** Collective outcomes, once agreed, can serve to transcend long-standing silos, mindsets and structures. Endorsed, or agreed upon, whenever possible, by the national government, they can provide a collective goal to which all actors can contribute. Genuine joint analysis, involving all relevant stakeholders that articulate a collective problem statement and shared understanding of priorities is integral to identifying and articulating collective outcomes.
10. **Joined-up programming must be based on a small set of harmonized plans.** Currently there are different development and humanitarian plans, mechanisms, tools, and processes to implement humanitarian and development programmes. These need to be harmonized, joined-up or at a minimum synchronized. Across, analysis, planning, programming and coordination repetition, overlaps, and duplications have proliferated, some of which, in their current form, are not fit to implement collective outcomes. Depending on the context, there might be value in keeping separate planning tools, or at minimum, some core elements of the UNDAF and the HRP. This is particularly the case in sudden emergencies, where the humanitarian partners are, in many cases, able to issue a joined-up plan and appeal in 48-96 hours.
11. However, any new modalities that might come out of the need to strengthen the humanitarian development nexus **should not contribute to this proliferation of processes and tools but rather seek to harmonize and build complementary.** The HDPN, should not become a stand-alone process leading to parallel and heavy mechanisms. Good practices showed pragmatic and innovative approaches, capitalizing on existing structures and processes.
12. There is a need to have the right mix of accountabilities. In a new policy thrust that is aiming for convergence and coherence, mindsets and attitudes need to **shift towards a more flexible understanding of comparative strengths and advantages.** At the same time, strong collaboration and joint work should not lead to the dilution of accountabilities.
13. Across planning, and programming, there is a need to balance inclusivity and broad-based consultations on the one hand, with the need to maintain agility and responsiveness. However, for analysis **a broad-based and full multi-stakeholder approach was considered necessary to achieve the definition of a collective problem statement** that can, in turn, inform planning and decision-making for programming. Participants agree that to build true consensus, joined up planning and programming must also include the implementation modalities of multilateral and bilateral actors that exist outside of the UN coordinated UNDAFs and HRPs.
14. Strengthening the nexus should not just be about all actors engaging at the same time, at the same place. Instead, the **Nexus is about gaining a collective and comprehensive**

understanding of what each actor can and will contribute towards strengthening resilience in a strategically sequenced manner spanning prevention, preparedness, response and recovery.

15. The idea of a “Tabula Rasa” was mentioned. While it would be unrealistic to pretend that the complex and protracted situations can be approached as a blank slate, when **thinking about establishing the joint and joined up mechanism necessary to advance the Nexus practitioners should seek “reset moments”**. That is, practitioners should actively seek out strategic moments (either through workshops, missions) where a critical review of current structures can be undertaken to determine what would be the best way to achieve the collective outcomes. Participants also identified the elaboration of a national development plan as one such critical reset moment where all actors can gain the necessary impetus and buy-in to kick-start “nexus work”.
16. It was also acknowledged that **clear, inter-agency, field-level guidance is needed for practitioners that have the buy in of all stakeholders, primarily on how to determine collective outcomes**. It should be developed by a group representative of the breadth of sectors and endorsed by a majority of stakeholders and be genuinely inclusive spanning UN inter-agency fora that include non-UN actors. Without genuine inter-agency guidance and agreement, it was argued, agency/organisation-specific planning instructions are unlikely to change.

IV. ANALYSIS & ASSESSMENT

17. The bulk of the conversation centred on the Common Country Analysis (CCA), part of the UNDAF process, and the Humanitarian Needs Overview (HNO), part of the HRP. While most participants agreed that these two analysis tools might still be relevant in some contexts, there was an acknowledgment that, in theory, **there is a need to find commonalities and complementarities between respective findings in a more strategic way**.
18. In practice, the degree to which these tools need to inform each other varied across settings. In some country settings, the CCA and HNO are suggested being merged; in other contexts, such as Burkina Faso in which the HRP was discontinued, the HNO *informs* the CCA and UNDAF as a whole. Similarly, in Mauretania and Senegal, the HNOs and HRPs were discontinued. And in Chad, the 2017 HNO process involved development partners and the analysis captured root causes of needs and vulnerabilities. However, it was highlighted that neither the methodology of the **CCA nor the HNO adequately captures the root causes that are driving needs and vulnerabilities**. This perceived shortcoming of both of these products further contribute to delink between the activities addressing immediate humanitarian needs (found in HRP) and the development solutions that should address root causes to crises (ideally found in the UNDAFs). Therefore, it was proposed that in some contexts it might be useful to consider one needs assessment, including a conflict and stakeholder analysis, to facilitate a joint analysis.
19. At the same time, the CCA and HNO are only a part of the totality of analysis and assessment products that should inform “nexus work”. **Six constituencies were identified as key stakeholders in providing a comprehensive picture of the needs, vulnerabilities, and capacities in place to meet them:** UN; the national and local government/district authorities, NGOs; IFIs, the private sector, and the donor community and their respective development agencies.
20. Participants highlighted a **distinction between assessments (which largely gather information and can be both sectoral and multi-sectoral, undertaken by single actors or as a multi-stakeholder activity) and analyses (which should be an analysis of the information available through the assessments at hand.)** A distinction was also suggested

between joint assessments (which is a product) and joint analysis (which is a process). For the most part, joint assessments were seen as a means to bring together a few key actors around common and often sector or multi-sector based issues. Joint analysis on the other is viewed as more complex and infrequent requiring concerted and coordinated efforts to gather all primary and secondary data in one place

21. Some participants also noted that **joint analysis** cannot simply be the aggregation of various assessments; it **is a strategic process that should serve to establish a common problem statement**. Joint analysis was also referred to as needing to be multi-dimensional and multi-stakeholder in nature to capture the breadth of underlying root causes of crises identified. An aggregate of sector specific assessments was not considered sufficient to this end. It was suggested that moving away from needs analysis to a risk a vulnerability- oriented approach might aid in fighting the urge to simply aggregate and combine needs assessments.
22. **Joint assessments were identified as particularly useful when they were conducted by a smaller set of sector based participants** and often led to broad endorsement, including by government and donors.
23. In addition, some sector specific assessments and associated analysis have seasonal attributes. For food security and livelihoods where seeding and cultivation are crucial, it was raised that **CCA/HNO timeframes are often not aligned with 'seasonal considerations'**. It was therefore argued that proper alignment can be vital to the legitimacy of analysis, in particular in areas affected by food insecurity and should inform inter-agency planning and programming. Other suggestions included a more dynamic approach to needs analysis, by updating existing analysis more frequently and on a regular basis, e.g. when major assessments are conducted.
24. In this regard, a major bottleneck around joint analysis revolves around timeframes of the assessments. CCA's occur every five years, while HNO's run on an annual cycle and can be updated even more regularly on needs basis. In conflict affected areas and with the examples provided from Cameroon and Mali, the Recovery and Peacebuilding Assessment (RPBA) also needs to be factored in. **Conflict and socioeconomic analyses at regional level is of vital importance to address root causes with cross-border dynamics** and root causes beyond own borders.
25. Another major obstacle to achieving timely and comprehensive joint analysis is the **fact that national government themselves are siloed**. Inter-ministry dynamics sometimes result in undue delays and unreliability of data. In addition, in situations where government capacity is weak, or can be politically motivated, data quality and sharing of information can be of concern.

Recommendations:

- *Macro socio-economic analysis could be used to augment CCA and HNO findings to provide better visibility on root causes.*
- *Current analysis and assessment tools are generally too static. Joint analysis should also rely on predictive analysis/early warning/risk forecasting.*
- *Joint Analysis should include a mapping exercise that identifies primary and secondary data available in country.*
- *Explore establishing joint analysis process by aligning CCA/HNO timeframes, aiming for broader, more periodic analysis whilst taking into consideration the need to 'time' the outcome of such processes with seasonally sensitive programme activities or otherwise lose such stakeholders from the collective approach.*


- *in some contexts, it might be useful to consider one needs assessment (not purely combination of HNO and CCA), including a conflict and stakeholder analysis, to facilitate a joint analysis*
- *Depending on the dynamics in-country, explore “Team of 6” joint assessment missions; including participants from UN; the national and local government/district authorities, NGOs; IFIs, the private sector, and the donor community and their respective development agencies.*
- *Joint analysis should be the starting point for joined-up planning and programming. It should be multi-dimensional and multi-stakeholder in nature and build on any and all sector or thematically oriented assessments undertaken.*
- *The result of a truly multi-stakeholder joint analysis should result in the elaboration of a common problem statement that is aligned with the government’s national development plan. When stakeholders are parties to conflict, the common problem statement should, as a minimum, be informed by national development plans.*
- *The Collective Problem Statement, can in turn, help identify a set of Collective Outcome Issue Areas that require further analysis and refinement, with the ultimate view defining SMART collective outcomes.*

V. PLANNING AND PROGRAMMING

26. Overall, the main part of the discussions and country-specific examples centred on joined-up planning as well as the prospects for joint programmes and collective outcomes. It was acknowledged that comparatively, more work and effort has been put into achieving joined-up planning as opposed to joint programmes. Therefore, concrete examples or good practices of joined-up programming were not highlighted.
27. Many bottlenecks and gaps were identified as key obstacles in achieving truly joined-up planning and programming. Chief among them is the national government’s engagement: lack of capacity, siloed structures that are difficult to converge, lack of willingness, vested interest (not interested in changing the way the business is done, etc.) However, all agreed that the lack of, or insufficient, engagement by authorities should not be a reason not to enhance joined-up planning and programming.
28. Other structural and administrative bottlenecks were highlighted. For example, agency plans are often approved by individual agency HQs according to a specific timeline, usually without any flexibility or appetite to veer from traditional planning modalities.
29. In addition, collective plans (whether through the HRP or UNDAF) are often considered secondary to agency plans. In many cases, collective plans are in fact aggregations of agency plans, rather than holding an internal logic of their own.
30. Donors, in particular, were identified as contributing to this attitude towards collective plans as an afterthought. In many settings, donors support initiatives outside existing coordination structures and bilaterally fund individual projects and programmes that are sometimes not in line or in synch with existing UN strategic frameworks or outside existing UN coordination structures.

UN's share of resource flows differs across pillars

UN share of development ODA, total humanitarian flows and total personnel in int'l peace operations (2015/16)



31. There is a need for **UN development assistance frameworks to encompass a broader set of stakeholders from the inception phase**, including a more inclusive analysis process outlining a shared problem statement as suggested above with the “*Team of 6*”. This could contribute significantly to help ensure that larger shares of the 90 per cent of additional separately channelled multilateral and bilateral resource flows could be provided under the overall strategic guidance of mutually agreed collective outcomes. Another large share of resource flows within development assistance included remittances emphasizing even further the need to include the voice of local communities and civil society actors in the formulation of collective outcomes and development priorities.
32. Such an approach could also help galvanize broad-based buy-in on the prioritization of development activities in areas more directly affected by crisis, despite the risk of lower returns. This would help ensure a **stronger link between the activities addressing immediate humanitarian needs (found in HRPs) and the development solutions that should address root causes to crises** (ideally found in the UNDAFs), ref item 2 under analysis and assessments above. This would further facilitate a more joined up approach in that development activities would be considered from the beginning of an emergency response.
33. At the same time, there is also the need to **acknowledge the different operational, administrative and logistical approaches to response and explore how to best harmonise these with a good operational programming plan**. It was noted that the different pace of engagement—with humanitarian response requiring quick response, whilst development activities tend to require a more consultative approach and hence have a slower pace, at times lead to tensions around the imperative to save lives. In this context, the imperative for humanitarian assistance to abide by the principles of neutrality, independence, impartiality and humanity were also underlined.
34. **Genuine joint analysis is key**. It should include all relevant stakeholders from the onset, including bilateral donors but also the private sector. In this region, private companies have a real leverage power. Ways of engaging should be carefully crafted.
35. Similar to the issues and bottlenecks that obstruct joint analysis, different planning timeframes of system-wide frameworks hinder opportunities for strategic alignment, coherence and prioritisation. For some, the **sheer multiplicity of plans also contributes to the difficulties in**

coalescing around common goals, let alone a singular commonly agreed plan. It was further suggested that a hierarchy of plans could be applied with one overarching commonly agreed plan whilst having different programmatic / response approaches to implement parts of, and often sector based plans.

36. Other permutations around the need for “one plan” also emerged: in some cases, and in particular in context with limited humanitarian caseloads and national governments in the lead of the response, participants called for a **“tabula rasa” – a phasing out and deletion of existing plans with the view of coming up with one plan**, where emergency response would be firewalled. Whilst some cautioned against the risk of weakening linkages between emergency response and preparedness activities other strongly called for resilience components in humanitarian plans. Yet others advocated for joint analysis that outlined a one commonly agreed problem statement followed by multiple plans.
37. Those participants who welcomed the **need to have different planning tools argued that such an arrangement would guarantee flexibility**, particularly in countries where different areas/regions have different needs and vulnerability drivers (conflict, internal displacement, refugee influx, chronic poverty), and in situations where government may be part of conflict. In settings such as these (Sudan, Chad, etc.), developing collective outcomes instead of a single plan would be more useful as they would provide the necessary coherence that different plans can align themselves to.
38. Several potential opportunities were also identified. There was wide agreement that a key enabler of joint planning and joined up programming is an agreement in-country on collective outcomes, or at the very least, common strategic objectives. In this regard, widespread efforts to align plans should be further replicated, as illustrated by the endeavour to align UNDAFs and HRPs in Sudan, Mali and Ethiopia or Chad where the HRP is linked to the UNDAF and the National Development Plan, or in other examples, such as Uganda where it links to RRP and ReHOPE under the CRRF. Although such arrangements are not necessarily new and may present further challenges in terms of the often-unbalanced manner in which they are funded and/or financed, such commitments positively also include the establishment of **cross sector senior advisory teams, multi-sectoral and multi-stakeholder working groups and task forces that bring the discussion forward**. Some therefore argued for alternatives to the existing HRPs and UNDAFs as basis for further planning.
39. In addition to galvanizing around collective outcomes HQ can play a major enabling role. There was an anticipation and recognized **need to create incentives from the top to the bottom. Clear performance based directives were suggested as well as other means of official communication from senior leadership to field practitioners**, outlining the expectations for more joined up approaches and affording field colleagues the room for manoeuvre to outline the most suitable framework in line with context specificities that arguably would improve the response across the HDP nexus. Documenting and learning from these efforts, as opposed to predefining the parameters in advance, can then support more detailed guidance as we move forward.
40. **Regional level initiatives were also identified as important in promoting coherence in planning and programming.** For example, the Great Lakes regional UN strategic framework can support the realization of collective outcomes and help address some of the root causes that cuts across several countries in that region.
41. There was a strong call from some participants for guidance, tools, and in-country-support to determine, define, and work towards collective outcomes. It emerged from the discussions that **there was no common understanding on how to determine and implement collective**

outcomes, beyond individual and sometimes agency-specific positions on the humanitarian development nexus.

42. To this end, there was a **specific call for inter-agency guidance** (and not agency-specific), preferably using existing fora to ensure buy-in and input of relevant governance structures and stakeholders.

Recommendations:

- *Develop inter-agency guidance on collective outcomes to guide discussions and consultations in country on defining them and ensuring engagement and buy-in of all relevant stakeholders*
- *Consider involving regional organizations and bilateral donors from the onset of the planning process*
- *Advocate for development funding to be more flexible, predictable, less risk-averse and less rigid to be easily re-allocated towards crisis areas and to “stay” in conflict/fragile contexts where it is needed the most (e.g. Boko Haram areas) to address root causes of vulnerabilities and need.*

VI. LEADERSHIP & COORDINATION

43. When it comes to coordination, the conversation mainly revolved around the notion of inclusivity and representation in decision making. Similar to the planning and programming discussions, participants highlighted the need to remain agile and retain speed in decision making.
44. The need to **retain agility led to a broad agreement in the group to retain emergency capacity for unpredictable** events (sudden onsets) while dedicating “nexus” structures, e.g. joint coordination structures to predictable/recurrent risks and vulnerabilities. Referencing for example the El Niño famine across 4 countries and the Ebola response which both required additional, alternative and joined-up emergency response measures, sudden events requiring emergency response should then lead to area-based, or other ad hoc time-bound joined-up structures.
45. **The multiplicity of assessments and plans was considered to be one of the factors to having generated just as many accompanying coordination structures.** As a consequence, each coordination structure reflects different stakeholder interests, while there is now a need to align them to establish multi-stakeholder coordination platforms across humanitarian and development action around the collective outcomes. Efforts in countries such as Sudan are being undertaken to ensure a more joint coordination structure for an effective and efficient response across sectors, including peace efforts through a dedicated Coordination Review Task Team, which also includes donors, under the UNCT/HCT.
46. There was broad agreement that **discussions around coordination should be broader than partner coordination in implementation response and thus include a number of additional stakeholders**, including donor representation. The coordination mandate of a joint coordination platform should bring coherence to aid and financing, as well as serve as a means of generating a shared problem statement that inform individual programming as well as the collective prioritization of these through the definition of collective outcomes.

47. The extent to which current coordination mechanisms (HCT/UNCT), development coordination groups, etc. are fit for purpose was raised as an issue. Lack of clarity still remains on how these mechanisms could support coordination around collective outcomes. Some participants highlighted that **current coordination meetings often had no clear purpose—partially due to poor organization, preparation and/or management of the meetings**, leading to non-strategic discussions often repeated in parallel sector meetings, with largely the same membership.
48. In-depth coordination reviews were suggested to achieve joined up coordination arrangements fit for purpose and that such reviews could lead to streamlining and/or discontinuing current structures deemed not to add value. A **decision to expand, adapt or change existing coordination structures should be made in relation to agreed collective outcomes, as ‘form follows function’**. It was also acknowledged that collective outcomes do not aim to capture the entirety of international support to a given country, and that in this vein, other needs based activities beyond collective outcomes should continue.
49. Based on country experiences, a **high-level multi-stakeholder forum could support strengthening coherence and harmonization across the nexus**. For example, in Ethiopia, the Executive Committees of the Development Assistance Group and the Humanitarian Country Team form a platform for the NWoW. A ‘Nexus Group’ including, DFID, EU, WB, Irish Aid, UNAIDS, UNICEF, UNDP, UNHCR, WFP, OCHA and Tuft University, also served as a ‘think tank’ in generating evidence for NWoW in early 2017. In Uganda, the CRRF Secretariat and Steering Group brings together various stakeholders including affected population representatives. In Chad a Humanitarian-Development forum co-chaired by the Minister of Economy and Development Planning and the RC/HC, brings together members of the HCT, CPTF (development forum), NGOs, donors and government partners.
50. However, the need to **tailor these high-level stakeholder fora to country contexts** was highlighted. This includes decisions on leadership, membership and scope/functions. Civil society, private sector, national and international NGOs, UN agencies, donors, national and local governments/authorities, development agencies and people in need were all suggested as potential participants to these forums, as representatives of diverse constituencies.
51. Other potential modalities of such multi-stakeholder fora were also discussed, including a **self-nomination system** such as the one in Uganda, in which existing coordination structures such as the UNCT, Development Coordination Groups, Sector coordination groups, NGO consortia, host communities and refugee populations, were asked to nominate representatives to a National Level CRRF Secretariat.
52. While acknowledging the **indispensable role that national governments can and should play in co-convening and participating** in such fora, the need to be cognizant of conflict dynamics in situations where the government is party to the conflict was highlighted. Some participants noted that in such settings, line ministries and other technical national bodies could be preferable from those of more political nature.
53. Such fora, in principle, **should lead the process of establishing a common and shared problem statement** (either through joint assessment missions or through a light desk review) and be responsible for steering all stakeholders towards the development of a collective strategic road map and on the achievement of common goals. The culmination of this road map would be an agreed set of collective outcomes after which the appropriate coordination structures should be built on national and sub-national levels.
54. Another potential element of these fora would be **dedicated information management and analysis capacity**. In many settings such as Ethiopia, OCHA currently plays this role for both

humanitarian and development actors. It was widely agreed that multi-stakeholder fora should have timely and periodically updated situational awareness both in terms of needs and vulnerabilities but also underlying root causes.

55. There was no common position, however, on the leadership structure and accountability mechanism for joint coordination or coordination structures in support of collective outcomes. An empowered RC/HC strengthened with additional support and expertise capacity was raised by many participants as a potential model for more courageous and far-reaching leadership, but there were also concerns that an additional joint coordination structure could dilute responsibilities and accountability structures.
56. The current humanitarian coordination system, for instance, builds on the premise of provider of last resort for cluster lead agencies; in addition, across the humanitarian and development spectrum many agencies have clear mandates derived from legally binding resolutions. Therefore, it is **important to ensure the right balance between UN entities' accountability against their respective mandates and the contributions towards the collective engagement.**

Recommendations:

- *Wherever possible, explore the creation of a high-level multi-stakeholder forum bringing together UN (incl. peacekeeping actors where relevant), international and national NGOs, donors, IFIs, civil society, academia, to lead strategic discussions and decisions on the NWoW and the HDP nexus.*
- *RC/HC offices should be strengthened with dedicated (advisory) capacity to support the conceptualisation and implementation of the HDP Nexus and the NWoW.*
- *Collective leadership within the UNCT/HCT is crucial. This cannot be at the expense of individual and mandated responsibilities. Accountability should not be diluted.*

VII. COLLECTIVE OUTCOME

57. **A few countries have begun the process of defining collective outcomes.** Uganda, and Somalia have initiated the related discussions while Chad developed and collectively agreed on a set of collective priorities during the course of 2017. Somalia developed an early draft, based on the HNO and a recent-drought impact analysis, and in Uganda, the aid agencies, donors and the Government agreed on collective outcomes under the ReHoPE framework.
58. In the discussions around defining and achieving collective outcomes it is important to understand the causal linkages between humanitarian needs and the state of development; how issues including human rights and protection needs, rule of law, access to justice and good governance can affect social cohesion and contribute to chronic vulnerabilities when not provided and/or upheld. In some contexts, development deficiencies are due in part to neglect along ethnic or political lines and any attempts to address root causes of needs and vulnerabilities would need to be upraised by such analysis.
59. There was no clear agreement on the components of collective outcomes. However, many highlighted the importance of a theory of change when defining collective outcomes aiming to *meet needs and address root causes of vulnerabilities while decreasing humanitarian needs.* Participants raised that there is no common understanding on what a collective outcome is or should be (beyond the very broad description in various SG reports). Further to this, it was

acknowledged that humanitarian and development workstreams make use of words and terminology with predefined and diverging definitions.

60. Further misunderstanding was found in language with some participants fearing that the moment the word *sustainable* is included, humanitarians dis-engage. To this end, several pointed out that apart from some actors, most stakeholders are “double- and even triple hatted” institutionally, and indeed working across the spectra. Other preconceptions include that the nexus only concern is to reduce humanitarian needs in protracted crises.
61. A broad set of criteria or principles necessary to define them were proposed, none of which received the full and broad agreement of the group.
 - i. Some mentioned that collective outcomes must be multi-sectoral in nature; while others mentioned that the whole system could be put to the service of one sector should the problem statement identify it as the key entry point.
 - ii. To be achievable, the collective outcome must be pragmatic about in-country capacity, limited in number and in direct relation and prioritisation to the shared problem statement. Whilst they should be realistic, taking into account funding and financing sources, it was also noted that funding assumption must be delinked with strategic thinking around addressing needs.
 - iii. Timeframes are context specific. In general terms, a collective outcome should be based on a planning logic and whilst this for humanitarians was suggested at a 2-3-year horizon, a 3-5-year time-frame was considered more realistic to allow enough time for development actors to engage with humanitarian actors and realistically design and kick-start joined-up programming in a meaning full way.
 - iv. To get the process started, stakeholders should avoid getting lost in discussions around numbers and what are realistic targets. Basing the targets on available data, should avoid lengthy target and baseline discussions.
 - v. While the specificity of collective outcomes may vary depending on context, they should be linked to national planning frameworks and articulate how they contribute to the Sustainable Development Goals. Using the example of food security and SDG 3 on ending hunger, some argued that SDGs could be used to frame language around collective outcomes, others stated that SDGs themselves may be too broad.
 - vi. Collective outcomes must seek to address underlying root causes and drivers of vulnerability, not just to meet needs. They should be based on jointly owned and jointly produced analyses.
 - vii. They should encompass an aspiration by all actors to work differently. They should reflect an expected change that the international community aims to achieve in concert by the multi-stakeholder group of actors as determined locally.
62. Equally, there was a lack of clarity along the key elements of the process necessary to achieve collective outcomes, as well as the mechanisms that need to be in place for the implementation, once collective outcomes have been defined.
 - viii. There was broad agreement that the process should start with a joint analysis and a definition of a problem statement. Then, a broad based consultative process, along with the government, should be initiated to define and agree on a limited number of collective outcomes, in support of national development plans and its SDG vision.
 - ix. Assessment/analysis must be done collectively. This should be a non-negotiable prerequisite. Joined-up planning and programming and where possible, joint

programming will follow to support the realization of collective outcomes. Several early draft examples included a multi-sectoral response, such as one on nutrition currently elaborated in Sudan.

- x. Some concerns were raised about the lack of clear accountability around collective outcomes, as well as the lack of monitoring practices to measure related progress and results. Some even held that collective outcomes should only be finalized and endorsed when clear reporting systems and modalities to support the implementation of collective outcomes are in place.
- xi. The group explored whether the UNDAF and its processes might be the best place to host collective outcomes given their focus also on risks and vulnerabilities and a longer time frame. It was argued that UNDAFs traditionally do not include non-UN actors and therefore are not well positioned to serve this purpose (even though some NGOs highlighted that there were instances whereby they were able to contribute to the process. Striving for a more inclusive approach, efforts around collective outcomes must be multi-stakeholder in nature and aim to reach buy-in across multiple development actors around the collectively defined strategic directions, which should also guide individual and bilateral programming. In addition, the current reform proposals on the UNDS offers an opportunity to “reposition” the UNDAF in such a way that it becomes a more natural repository for collective outcomes and that redefining the parameters for further “UNDAFs” both in name and content are foreseen.

Recommendations:

- *Clarification on terminology and pitching collective outcomes at the right level is required. Explore the possibility of multi-level outcomes – with clearly defined sub-outcomes (outputs, milestones and indicators).*
- *Collective outcomes should also address root causes. This also entails ensuring that collective outcomes address causal linkages between humanitarian needs and development deficiencies, including socio-economic and rights-based public services and goods as well as political and peace dividends– all of which affect social cohesion and can contribute to chronic vulnerabilities and needs when not provided and/or upheld.*
- *Collective outcomes should be based on a collective joint analysis, including relevant government entities. The proposed high-level multi-stakeholder forum could play a key role in this respect.*