Focusing on West and Central Africa, a 2nd meeting of practitioners on the humanitarian, development and peacebuilding nexus was held in Dakar, Senegal. The agenda featured deep-dives on thematic elements of the nexus; analysis, planning/programming, and the elaboration of collective outcomes. The workshop brought together 39 participants from 11 countries.

Summary Report

2nd Practitioners' Network Meeting to Strengthen Collaboration across the humanitarian development and peacebuilding nexus, 28 – 29 May 2018

IASC HDN Task Team

CONTENTS

INTRODUCTION:

1. Actors at country level continue to work on, refine, and develop new solutions to the obstacles that perpetuate the silos between humanitarian, development and peacebuilding actors and their efforts. They are developing new approaches to harmonize programming cycles and to streamline coordination and planning mechanisms to better address risks, vulnerabilities and root causes to crisis.

BACKGROUND:

2. The 1st Practitioners' Support Network Workshop was held in Entebbe, Uganda, 28-29 November 2017, bringing together 21 peer practitioners including representatives from the UN, NGO community and the Red Cross and Red Crescent Movement. The primary aim of this workshop was to facilitate pragmatic trouble-shooting through cross-learning and peer-to-peer knowledge exchange. Practitioners shared their in-depth knowledge and hands-on experiences in advancing a strengthened collaboration across sectors in the field[1].

3. Focusing on the West and Central African region, the 2nd Practitioners' meeting sought to exchange further, build on the learning, findings, and the recommendations from Entebbe. The agenda featured opportunities to deep-dive on thematic elements that feature in the humanitarian, development and peacebuilding nexus; analysis, planning/programming, and the elaboration of collective outcomes. The workshop brought together 39 participants from 11 country and regional offices with representatives from **ACF, Care International, CONGAD, ICVA, NRC, OFADEC, Oxfam, Senegal Red Cross, FAO, ILO, IOM, DPKO-MINUSMA, DPKO-MONUSCO, OCHA, OHCHR, RCOs, UNDP, UNHCR, UNICEF, WFP, WHO** and the **WB** based in **Burkina Faso, Cameroon, Central African Republic, Chad, Cote d'Ivoire, Democratic Republic of Congo, Mauretania, Mali, Niger, Nigeria**, and **Senegal** as well as regional and HQ colleagues from ACF, NRC, UN **EOSG,** FAO, OCHA, **OECD,** UNDP, UNHCR and WFP.

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[1] 29 representatives from IFRC, ICRC, CRS, ICVA, FAO, IOM, OCHA, RCOs, UNDG, UNDP, UNHCR, WFP and WHO based in **Cameroon, Chad, Ethiopia, Mali, Sudan** and **Uganda** as well as regional and HQ colleagues from UN EOSG, FAO, OCHA, OECD, UNDP, UNHCR and WFP.

4. Participants presented country situations where context-specific lessons, challenges, and opportunities were highlighted and discussed. Convened by UNDP and WHO as co-chairs of the Interagency Standing Committee (IASC) [Task Team on the Humanitarian Development nexus in protracted crises](#) (HDN TT), the event was co-facilitated by TT members from ACF, WFP, FAO, UNHCR, ICVA, and OCHA as well as presentations by EOSG and OECD to provide global level policy perspectives on [financing](#) and situate these discussions within broader UN-specific [reform tracks](#). What follows is a summary of the major takeaways, key findings, and proposed recommendations from field-based practitioners. Where relevant, the report also juxtaposes findings and recommendations from the 1st workshop in Entebbe to highlight, points of convergence, divergence, and evolution in thinking over time and across the two regions[2].

KEY HIGHLIGHTS:

1. The humanitarian-development-peacebuilding nexus (HDPN) was referred to as a Coherence Agenda, in contribution to the SDG implementation. It is a "common sense" approach to strengthening the collaboration across eco-systems to decrease needs, risks and vulnerabilities whilst addressing root causes to crises. At the same time, there was an acknowledgement that **the New Way of Working, or the NWoW, is not new, it is borne out of past conversations around the continuum, the contiguum, and resilience thinking**. In West Africa participants noted that the "nexus" is a long-standing issue, that has gone through various iterations and buzz-words over decades; resilience, DRR, human security, to name a few. There has been some success but little measurable and concrete landslide progress for populations overall. HDPN is about meeting immediate humanitarian needs whilst building resilience and contributing to the achievement of the sustainable development and a sustained peace. The novelty now is the global political momentum for implementation during a time when violence and armed conflicts and related humanitarian and development needs have never been higher.[3] In addition, echoing the outcomes of Entebbe, participants agreed that the notion of joint analysis and Collective Outcomes is also a new key feature that can serve to transcend long-standing silos, mindsets and structures.

   As a result of this new momentum, **leadership and coordination modalities of the UN are shifting**: Practitioners welcomed the components of the UNSG's reform transformation. Specifically, they welcomed the proposed new generation of UN country teams (UNCT), led by senior independent leaders supported by more adequate capacity (stronger RCO served by a more prominent and country-focused DOCO). However, the discussions also highlighted the challenges with having the UNCT leading and coordinating on collective outcomes as these, as commonly agreed, needs to be owned by a broader group of actors. At country level, it was also acknowledged that **having a dedicated focal person for the "nexus", with a blended profile, greatly facilitated the implementation of actions that can bridge the divide**. Specifically, the humanitarian development advisor in Mali, and the humanitarian-development-peace advisor in CAR were seen to be promising practice.

2. **Context matters:** The Sahel region is characterized by two conflict corridors, namely up through Northern Mali and Northeast Nigeria (Lake Chad Basin), where armed conflicts and violence are rife. Some generic features and characteristics define these two corridors. First, they directly or geographically manifest the impact of armed conflict and large-scale

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insecurities. Second, governments are responding to the insecurity by deploying troops, increasing patrols or combating with armed groups. Third, tensions occur between host communities and displaced or refugee communities. Fourth and last, the corridors crisscross national boundaries[4]. Similarly, in DRC, the population face both armed conflict and inter-communal violence, as well as disease outbreaks, malnutrition and food insecurity.

Given the specificities of the Sahel and wider West and Central Africa region, many participants felt—albeit not without concerns, that **strengthening collaboration between humanitarian and development actors is inextricably linked to considerations related to peacebuilding, peacekeeping, and security.** To some participants, the nexus represents the intersection of *Do No Harm*; reducing risks and vulnerabilities; *while* preventing the outbreak, escalation and deepening of conflicts by creating an environment capable of sustaining peace and bringing development gains. The fragility and flare ups of insecurity in the region should become opportunities for strengthening the nexus, not re-entrenching the siloes we have created. To this end, both **the** [Recovery and Peacebuilding Assessment](#) **(RPBA) and the** [Peacebuilding Fund](#) **(PBF) were considered good entry points** for joint analysis and joint planning/programming respectively. In situations of open conflict, participants expressed the most serious challenges to performing joint planning and programming.

3. Country-contexts such as CAR, Burkina Faso, Mali, Cote d'Ivoire, Cameroon, and Mauritania, are at the forefront of implementing this so-called "triple nexus", **with each iteration applying varying degrees of integration with "the peace element"**. The degree to which this could be done was described as striking a balance on the "sliding scale" of engagement among actors from collaboration, coordination, to coexistence.

   To some, *coordination,* should be done with "softer" elements of peace. Referred to as, for example, making sure that programming is conflict sensitive, or that analysis includes an assessment of root- and proximate causes. Others believe that engagement with peace actors could extend to closer *collaboration* with peacebuilding actors aiming, where possible, to design humanitarian and development programming in such a way that they offer peace dividends, offer space for dialogue and addressing grievances, and improve overall social cohesion. It was also acknowledged that peacebuilding should be, and often is part and parcel of good and risk-informed development planning and programming. By contrast, others urged for simple *coexistence*, and that the 'harder' elements of peace (stabilization, security, anti-terrorism, countering violent extremism (CVE) and potentially even preventing violent extremism (PVE)) should be clearly demarcated from other nexus initiatives. All participants agreed, however, that in whichever degree of engagement is chosen, **serious consideration must be given to preserving humanitarian space and centrality of the humanitarian principles must be maintained.**

4. Contrary to Entebbe, where there was no clear consensus, participants in Dakar converged on the notion that **the achievement of the SDGs should be at the heart of the HDPN.** Collective outcomes should be linked to national planning frameworks and should articulate how they contribute to the SDGs, or even be based on the nationally-adapted SDGs prioritization. However, politicization of aid was noted as a possible danger against which centrality of protection can be a safeguard measure.

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[4] Conflict in the Sahel region and the developmental consequences by the Economic Commission for Africa,

5. **Furthermore, for the "nexus" to work, it will need to be decentralized**. The HDPN discussion and implementation cannot stay at HQ nor at capital level. Implementation of the "nexus" will require renewed efforts in area-based programming, localization, community engagement, and participation and data sharing. Where feasible, moving from planning to co-designed and jointly delivered programming will require **field-oriented activities that involve affected populations and that empowers local actors.** It was also argued that state building support must to be complemented by people centered approaches to ensure that peace and development dividends reach and have a long-lasting impact on the broader populations of concern, leaving no one behind**.**

6. In the meantime, obstacles remain. Chief among them, "*La Guerre des Definitions*", highlights **the need to harmonize not only analysis, planning, and programming but also basic assumptions and mindsets**. The nexus cannot succeed without a shared understanding and definitions of crucial elements incl. vulnerability, resilience, and root causes. To address this obstacle, teams are developing "bilingual products" and "trilingual products" that bridge divides in understanding. These collaborative tools such as HDN 4Ws (in Chad and DRC), mini-sectorial Roadmaps (Cameroon, Chad), co-referenced planning documents (Cameroon, Chad) help to **harmonize the understanding and use of data, vocabulary, and language**.

7. **There is still a need to think carefully and thoroughly about operational implication of the NWoW**—understood as the strengthened collaboration across humanitarian, development and peacebuilding actors, particularly as it relates to COs. While there is a lot of buy-in and momentum at the global level, regional and national level, tough questions remain: What happens to the non-Collective Outcomes? How do we "de-UNize" the New Way of Working, e.g. making it a more inclusive process, well beyond the UN? How do humanitarian actors uphold their commitments to Accountability to Affected Population? Who is accountable to the achievement of COs? How do we monitor progress against COs? How do we ensure predictable, multi-year, flexible financing for COs?

8. Against this backdrop – and echoing the practitioners in Entebbe -- it was also acknowledged that **clear, yet light, inter-agency**, **field-level guidance, with emphasis on presenting promising practice is needed. Such guidance must be collectively developed to gain the buy in of all stakeholders**, primarily on how to determine COs but also unpacking how humanitarian action and development activities relates to peace and peacebuilding.

Recommendations:

i. Promote the establishment of a predictable point-person for the nexus at country level (where they sit TBD depending on context and architecture).

ii. Establish clear modalities, roles and responsibilities between OCHA and DOCO in the coordination of nexus related activities, with a view to ensure consistent participation of also non-UN actors.

iii. Guidance and good practices on coordination, leadership, ownership and accountability, are needed to guide further implementation in the field.

iv. Leverage current field level learning to inform the implementation of current UN system reforms. (letter from practitioners to senior leadership?)

ANALYSIS & ASSESSMENTS:

9. Similar to Entebbe, **most practitioners agreed first and foremost that no new analysis tools are needed.** The group largely agreed that vulnerability assessment tools and methodologies exist to identify geographical and thematic priorities for formulation of collective outcomes. Having multiple sectorial tools and assessments should not be an issue if an inclusive process is in place to strategically analyze them to identify collective outcomes.

   It is important that the joint analysis process aims to determine the problem statement and aim at identifying risk and vulnerabilities as well as the root causes to crises. Joint analysis can only succeed if all stakeholders agree to follow the theory of change, the optimal sequencing or concurrence of activities as deemed necessary, (in particular if under joint programming and collective funding), the main target populations, and prioritization that the analysis suggests.

10. In Entebbe, participants highlighted a distinction between assessments (which largely gather information and can be both sectoral and multi-sectoral, undertaken by single actors or as a multi-stakeholder activity) and analyses (which should be an analysis of the information available through the assessments at hand). A distinction was also suggested between joint assessments (which is a product) and joint analysis (which is a process). For the most part, joint assessments were seen as a means to bring together a few key actors around common and often sector or multi-sector based issues. Joint analysis on the other hand is viewed as more complex and infrequent requiring concerted and coordinated efforts to gather all primary and secondary data in one place. Similarly, in Dakar, in presentations on country implementation, these distinctions were further refined: while joint needs <u>analysis</u> can be similar in nature (multi-stakeholder, multi-dimensional, risk informed, as well as focused on vulnerabilities and root causes), kickstarting HDPN can begin with different types of needs <u>assessments:</u>

   a. **[Resilience Systems Analysis](link):** The RSA aims at building a shared understanding of the main risks (conflict, natural disasters, disease, economic shocks etc.) in a given context as well as the existing capacities within those societies to cope with such risks. The analysis is then used to identify gaps in programming and develop a 'roadmap' to boost resilience – namely determine what should be done, by whom and at which level of society. In Mauritania, the OECD and the UNCT conducted a RCA workshop in April 2017 in order to help inform the new UN development strategy. The outcome report of this workshop identified the major risks in-country as: rising unemployment rates particular of women and youth; social anxieties linked to poor governance; uncontrolled and rapid urbanization; human and animal health (particular the risk of epidemics); and food security.

   b. **Recovery and Peacebuilding Assessment**: While in Entebbe, the discussion revolved mainly around two analysis tools (the [Common Country Analysis](link) (CCA) and [Humanitarian Needs Overview](link) (HNO), in Dakar the RPBA conducted by the UN-WB-EU assessment, a clear example of a joint assessment, prominently featured as one of the main analytical foundation for articulating collective outcomes. For example, in CAR, where the RPBA was used to inform the country's national Peace Building and Recovery Programme (RCPCA) covering the period of 2017-2021. In Cameroon, a similar process, known as the [Recovery and Peace Consolidation Strategy](link) (RPC), led to the identification of five priority themes: Forced displacement, protection, human security; Governance and basic social services; Economic and territorial integrity; Access to land and production; and Youth. Three cross-cutting issues were also identified, and are

addressed within each thematic area: gender, climate change, and violent extremism. In addition, the assessment has highlighted the cross-cutting nature of the solutions needed to address issues related to forced displacement, human security, and youth.

c. **Sectoral Assessments:** In Burkina Faso (food security), in Chad (food security and WASH).

11. While there are ample assessments and sectoral analyses, it was felt that there is a need for a collective stocktaking exercise through which these products can be combined, in a way that is not just simply aggregating data but instead strategically identifying overlaying risks and vulnerabilities. Ideally, it was proposed, analysis should therefore be done as group. No matter the process, or participants - **A multi-dimensional analysis of vulnerabilities and their underlying root causes should be the output of joint analysis.**

12. **Analysis should therefore, at a minimum, be inclusive and collective, and with a Government lead/ co-leadership where possible.** The CCA and HNO were deemed to be only a part of the totality of analysis and assessment products that should inform "nexus work". Echoing the findings in Entebbe, six constituencies were identified as key stakeholders in providing a comprehensive picture of the needs, vulnerabilities, and capacities in place to meet them: UN; the national and local government/district authorities, NGOs; IFIs, the private sector, and the donor community and their respective development agencies. Additionally, the need to qualify any analysis against the view of affected populations was emphasized as crucial, in particular when applying such analyses to a shared vision with collective outcomes with corresponding programmatic responses.

13. To support this joint analysis process, a clear need for dedicated support was expressed. Many practitioners noted that the degree of analysis required to adequately target, prioritize, and monitor on COs requires a level of 'professionalization' that does not currently exist in-country. In addition, the highly volatile contexts in countries such as Nigeria and CAR mean that **analysis needs to be dynamic and in real time**. To a few participants, the resources (both human and financial) needed to support such a continuous analytical process was seen as potentially drawing practitioners away from the operations themselves. **Given the political nature of data, it was also suggested that an independent body (perhaps academia?) could serve as convener for the joint analysis process**. In CAR, the University of Bangui in collaboration with the national office of statistics played a similar role. Regardless of the convener, it was concluded however, that handling of data always needs to be done with respect for privacy and protection safeguards, an element that may challenge the full sharing of data.

Recommendations:

i. Establish virtual forum as repository for assessment reports, data management and joint analysis as a shared resource for all actors, whilst ensuring respect for privacy and protection safeguards when handling sensitive data. If possible, to be hosted in government national coordination structure.

ii. Seek to create analysis structures that are as independent as possible, for ex through the involvement of national academic institutions to support the government to lead data management and analysis.

iii. In the short term, explore deployable capacities in information management, data analysis, and macro-economic analysis that can support the joint analysis of pre-existing joint and/or sectoral assessments.

iv. Secure funding for assessment and dedicated analysis costs.

14. In Entebbe, it was acknowledged that comparatively, more work and effort has been put seeking *joint* planning—in terms of a joint process, (but not necessarily resulting in a single joint plan—in terms of a joint product), while *joining up* (as opposed to *joint*) programming, and then especially in contexts where independence for humanitarian actors is a critical issue. By contrast, in Dakar, there was a **broad agreement that truly co-designed** (processed) **and jointly delivered programmes** (achieving collective outcomes) **is fundamental to the successful implementation of the nexus** (based on one or more plans but developed through joint planning and relating to a set of common outcomes)**. "**Joined up" simply means to better connect our respective programmes with each other, but doesn't capture the spirit of real change in the way we plan and coordinate our work. For collective outcomes to work, programmes need to be planned and designed <u>together</u> to support jointly delivered programmes. In the Sahel region of Burkina Faso, for example, **jointly delivered and simultaneous action to improve food security is conducted by several humanitarian and development actors** including targeting of populations vulnerable to food insecurity, the treatment of acute and severe malnutrition, emergency food distribution, seed and agricultural support, cash for work programmes, resilience work on WASH.

15. As a first step to joint programming, the need for "Bilingual products" was illustrated by a number of presentations. Each context, demonstrated that **bridging the HDPN divide requires new, collaborative products** such as <u>HDPN 4Ws</u> (a tool that maps out who does, what , where, and when) as seen in and Chad and in DRC; <u>mini-sectorial roadmaps</u> that highlight at the sectoral level a theory of change across humanitarian and development action as seen in Cameroon and Chad; and <u>co-referencing</u> in planning documents whereby HRP components include "blurbs" on how they link to [UN Development Assistance Framework](#) (UNDAF)counterpart components (Cameroon and Chad). Developing plans that include data, vocabulary, and language that speak to both sides was said to greatly improve the ability for different stakeholders to work together. Additionally, there was an agreement that joint planning should remain light and not require additional layers of coordination, monitoring and reporting.

16. While the group of participants converged on the need for different planning instruments to be aligned, **there was no consensus on whether the creation of a single plan could be considered best practice in achieving that interoperability**. However, it is important to note that the group was split in opinion regarding two formats that joint planning could take:

> **Approach 1: 'Single but Modular' Planning:** As illustrated in Mauritania, this approach involves a single plan between humanitarian and development actors **where chronic/recurrent risks and potential emergencies are absorbed in the UNDAF-like plan**, **while sudden-onset incidents/flare ups are catered to through ad-hoc/ event -based response plans**. An expanded UNDAF-like document was produced with participation of UN and non-UN actors that integrates development and recurrent humanitarian needs. Named *Cadre de Partenariat pour le Développement Durable, (CPDD)* 2018-2022, this joint plan covers a period of 5 years. In addition, when and if needed, an ad doc event-based short-term emergency response document may be produced should needs and vulnerability requirements go beyond the envisaged threshold anticipated in the UNDAF document. The CPDD is articulated on 3 Strategic Priorities and 10 outcomes. Within these, four were selected as "common outcomes" sitting at the humanitarian/development/peacebuilding nexus. Under this modular

approach, humanitarian clusters are seen as too emergency-oriented. They have therefore been replaced by « Groupes de Travail » matching pillars or collective outcome areas of the plan. Ultimately, the CPDD contributes to respond to both humanitarian and development challenges, fully integrating the two planning streams. This format was seen as particularly useful in transition settings.

Approach 2: 'Separate but Interoperable' Planning: In more volatile contexts, specifically in protracted conflicts, it was argued that a single but modular plan might not be adequate for the realities of the context. Instead a second approach was highlighted wherein, jointly agreed Collective Outcomes provide the foundation for an inclusive planning process that ensures 1) higher level common results are identified, 2) humanitarian needs and root causes are more systematically and simultaneously addressed, 3) help to align Humanitarian Response Plans (HRP) and UNDAF toward common results and, 4) assist in increasing financing development programmes aimed at reducing humanitarian needs. This approach was illustrated by a number of contexts including Cameroon, Chad, Burkina Faso, DRC, Niger, and Cote d'Ivoire.

17. Against the backdrop of these two approaches, it was argued by some practitioners that eventually joint planning will resemble the 'Single but Modular' approach. In other words, **the system currently finds itself in a transition period, slowly evolving into this new type of modular plan. In this sense, 'UNDAF++' and MYHRPs are transitional, temporary measures that get us closer to one harmonized framework where feasible**.

Cameroon best illustrates this point of transition as it currently has an HRP and UNDAF that are aligned (and co-referenced) over a period of four years. With the Anglophone crisis, however, a third plan had to be produced for the emergency response, indicating the need for an ad hoc response plan that caters for the rapid escalation of needs that goes beyond the chronic needs and vulnerabilities identified in the aligned plans. It was argued however, that more flexible, predictable, less risk-averse and less rigid development funding was a pre-requisite for more joint planning and programming to be easily re-allocated towards crisis areas and to "stay" in conflict/fragile contexts where it is needed the most to address root causes of vulnerabilities and need. **While opinion may differ on the appropriate planning approach, almost all practitioners agreed that planning tools in their current formulation, guidance, and processes do not adequately support the effective development and implementation of Collective Outcomes.**

18. On programming, **there was also broad agreement on the need to 'Decentralize the Nexus'**: The HDPN discussion and its implementation cannot stay at HQ nor at capital level. Implementation of the nexus will require renewed efforts in area-based programming (as seen in Cameroon, CAR), localization, community engagement, and AAP (participation) and data sharing (DRC). Specifically, on:

   a. **Localization**: While the articulation of a shared vision and COs are at strategic and overarching levels, they cannot be fully formulated or implemented without the involvement and capacitation of civil society and local actors. For example, it was suggested that needs assessments could include a capacity assessment of local actors – not just to highlight gaps and deficits but also to hone in on actors that can be leverage through capacity building.

b. **Area based programming**: Based on disaggregated needs/vulnerability assessments and context analysis by sub-region, response plans should be tailored at the area/district/community – level. In Mauritania, The CPDD partners acknowledge that implementing the plan in an integrated manner remains a crucial challenge. In order to sharpen integration at the delivery end, closer to beneficiaries on the ground, one of the measures considered was the establishment of "*Zones de Convergences*", areas of concentration of collective and highly coordinated actions, in order to maximize synergies, impact and efficiency. Likewise, in CAR, an area by area mapping and risk profiling was conducted at prefecture level, and assigned prioritization for implementing the nexus.

c. **Participation and inclusion**: There is also a need to ensure an inclusive approach to designing COs in a way that facilitates meaningful participation of affected people. This was highlighted as a necessary key feature of the COs planning process. In CAR, for example, the RPBA (which eventually led to the articulation of COs) consulted 14,000 people, in 16 prefectures, reaching nearly 2000 households through municipal and communal surveys. In addition, it was mentioned that in contexts where the [Comprehensive Refugee Response Framework](#) (CRRF) is being applied, provisions are made for the participation of refugees and host community representatives through the establishment of CRRF Steering Committees.

Recommendations:

i. Where ever possible, ensure that joint planning is light and without additional need for coordination, monitoring and reporting.

ii. Joint planning should when possible, lead to co-designed programmes and jointly-delivered activities.

iii. Linking COs to nationally formulated SDGs require an initial CO framing at capital level, however it is suggested that planning and programming should be disaggregated at the area-level.

iv. Include capacity building requirements as part of the phasing out and exit strategy of the planning process.

v. In conflict settings, ensure that UNDAFs can be adapted to better reflect humanitarian priorities, and vice versa (HRP better aligned with development objectives). Clarify that the main added value of collective outcome is not a plan but the planning process around collective outcomes with results funded, achieved, monitored through other existing tools and plans.

vi. In transition contexts, investigate the possibility to have one plan based on pillars/collective outcomes and with a monitoring framework. This should then ideally drive funding streams from the government, development and humanitarian actors toward the same results.

vii. The humanitarian commitment to accountability to affected population should be upheld in planning and programme design and hence be reflective of the 'ask' of affected populations.

COLLECTIVE OUTCOMES

19. With the prominence of the "Triple Nexus" throughout the workshop, it was highlighted that COs can explicitly contribute to peace. Collective outcomes should include peacebuilding actors where applicable but based on a human rights lens at all times. To this end, both **the RPBA and the PBF was suggested** as key elements to be considered in joint analysis and joint planning/programming. Through these analysis and planning tools it was noted that COs can be expressed in "peace" terms where relevant (Cote d'Ivoire, Cameroon, CAR, OECD).

20. **The [Human rights-based approach](#) (HRBA) should be applied in terms of international principles of equality and non-discrimination, participation and inclusion, and accountability and Rule of Law.** Human rights indicators are available as early warning tools and prevention mechanisms that can identify warning signals that can trigger a crisis across the nexus. A HRBA identifies the root causes of crisis and considers vulnerabilities and protection needs aimed at empowering people to claim their rights and at the same time strengthening the capacity and accountability of duty bearers to meet their legal obligations. Moreover, it is used as accountability mechanisms for the state obligations to respect and implement basic human rights, particularly on economic, social and cultural rights, many of which correspond to the public services that should be in place, e.g. health, education, water and sanitation, etc. and which are closely linked to the humanitarian crisis (when not in place or delivered by humanitarian action) and development goals.

21. The 2030 Agenda represents an unprecedented international commitment to sustainable development adopted by all states. It applies a HRBA and it is subject to a rigorous and developing framework of indicators on which states are required to report. In line with the reform of the UN development system, a systemwide effort to assist countries in mainstreaming the 2030 Agenda and its 17 goals into national development plans, the **[MAPS](#)** (Mainstreaming, Acceleration and Policy Support to SDG implementation) have been developed. Much like the CO planning, it is intended to ensure complementarity, policy coherence, and reinforcement of efforts in line with a shared vision. Several held that **elaborating COs linked with nationally tailored expressions of SDGs will facilitate government engagement and offer an existing framework of indicators as docking station for monitoring progress on COs**. An SDG alignment informed by multi-stakeholder buy-in to policy coherence will also further reinforce joint action and efficiency gains, and thereby help visualise the support of humanitarian, development and peace actors' contributions to incremental SDG implementation.

22. **The notion of Collective Outcomes is also seen as a central -and new feature- of this current iteration of a system wide coherence agenda**. As seen in CAR, Mauritania, Cote d'Ivoire, Burkina Faso among others, COs find their value in providing a wide range of actors with a 'compass' with which to guide coherent programming. **There is still a need to think carefully and thoroughly about operational implication of the NWoW**, particularly as it relates to COs. However, while there is a lot of buy-in and momentum at the global level, regional and national level, tough questions remain. Such as:

    a. **What happens to the non-Collective Outcomes?** The "race" to define COs should give way to pragmatism, and a clear delineation of roles and responsibility as well as a recognition of the sensitivities of each context. We must be careful that the articulation of COs and the process and coordination that support them do not become the identification of the "line of best fit" priorities, nor should it become a means to validate the least common denominator. Given that governments and national authorities should be at the forefront of the articulation of COs, some participants expressed the

concern that issues of political nature or politically sensitive, for example landing and zoning rights, could be seen as too contentious to be considered in a CO planning process. More broadly, identifying priorities will always mean shifting focus away from other areas, and concerns were raised about the consequences for these non-COs.

Responding to this concern, in Mauritania for example, not all the 10 outcomes identified in the CPDD are COs per se. Within these, only four were selected as "common outcomes" sitting at the intersection of the humanitarian-development-peacebuilding nexus. This approach was seen as giving the necessary flexibility to include other priorities that may fall beyond the purview of COs. In particular, participants raised the issue of human rights and protection concerns as examples of such priorities that in certain contexts might need to sit outside the agreed COs.

b. **How do we "de-UNize" the New Way of Working** making it a more inclusive process**?** Many also expressed concern that discussions around the NWoW are too New York and UN-centric—referred to as a branding exercise that leaves the substance and many of its stakeholders by the roadside. Especially in the articulation of COs there needs to be clear pathways for non-governmental organizations whom traditionally—as one participants suggested, have been "spectators" to the process. There is a need to ensure inclusivity, balance and equity in power and voice across all stakeholders.

c. **How do humanitarian actors uphold their commitments to Accountability to Affected Population?** Likewise, the need for better inclusion also relates to how affected populations feature in the nexus discussions, and ultimately in the articulation of COs. While national, regional and local authorities are regularly referenced as key stakeholders, they may not share the same perspectives as affected communities in relation to CO definition—including the problem statement that guides them or how to address them—especially in fragile state settings.

d. **Who is accountable to the achievement of COs?** As country-context continue to refine the process of CO articulation, teams begin to grapple with the issue of coordination and implementation. On this issue, some participants raised the concern that the establishment of COs might result in the dissolution of responsibilities. In breakout sessions, participants suggested guiding principles and a generic architecture of a "steering committee" (very similar to the "Team of 6" elaborated in Entebbe) that would serve as a top-level coordination structure. However, the degree to which this group would be vested with accountabilities, given that organizations have mandates was not discussed. **Ultimately, most participants agreed that there is a need to be courageous in identifying which organizations/ bodies/entities are best placed to deliver on identified targets, have them lead while being respectful of mandates and mindful of comparative advantages[5].**

e. **How do we monitor progress against COs?** Another missing feature relates to CO indicators and monitoring. While a preferred aspect of COs underscored both in Entebbe and in Dakar is that they should be measurable, there has been limited discussion on the M & E frameworks for COs or key considerations in establishing indicators shared by multiple stakeholders. Similar to Entebbe, some participants

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[5] Comparative advantage includes the mandate to act, the capacity to act and the positioning to act.

suggested that COs should only be finalized when clear reporting systems and modalities to support the implementation of COs are in place.

f. **How to ensure predictable, multi-year, flexible financing for COs?** Predictable and coherent financing to support COs and other HDPN initiatives remains a challenge. Currently, grant-based funding instruments have limited scope and triggers for use, and are in some situations not dynamic enough when the system requires mobilization of resources that could help provide more sustainable solutions over multiple years. **Moving from "funding to financing", will require blending different domestic and international sources of public and private financing**. This approach ensures short, medium, and long-term priorities have the right amount of finance, using the right financing tools, over the right timeframe, and provide the right incentives to do so.

Recommendations

i. Clarification on terminology and pitching of COs. Specific guidance, with emphasis on promising practice, and clear messaging on COs is also needed, in particular as it refers to:
   a. Accountability and coordination arrangements
   b. Funding and financing strategies
   c. Monitoring and Evaluation of Collective Outcomes

ii. Collective outcomes should also address root causes. Importance of adaptability and flexibility of collective outcomes, especially in conflict-affected countries that change rapidly, and they need to be based on a collective joint analysis, including relevant government entities.

iii. We need a collective outcome *planning process*, but no need for a collective outcome *plan* per se. A *process* focus is therefore recommended to ensure that it is *collective*.

iv. Where feasible and with a view to the needs in the country, the identification of collective outcome themes should be based on nationally expressed SDGs. This will facilitate government buy-in and engagement and help visualize and hold humanitarian, developmental and peace actors accountable to how we help countries achieve these goals.

v. Improve engagement, linkages and coordination of COs with other mechanisms such as the UN systemwide country support for SDG implementation (MAPS).

vi. There is a need to begin to gather evidence that the nexus approach will produce good results to foster engagement of all stakeholders.

COLLECTIVE OUTCOMES PROGRESS MAPPING

Data presented in this mapping stems from two practitioners' workshops convened by the IASC Humanitarian Development Nexus Task Team; and from ongoing discussions among practitioners through the Community of Practice hosted by the HDN TT.

KEY MESSAGES:

The concept of Collective Outcomes is often cited as the core transformational aspect that sets aside current policy discussions on the Nexus from past attempts to link relief to development, or bridge the humanitarian-development divide.

The implementation, understanding, and even expectations for what and how collective outcomes should be varies widely in their interpretation and has resulted in COs that are pitched at different levels of specificity, granularity (national/sub-national), and timeframes.

A major influencing factor on the nature of Collective Outcomes is the type of joint-analysis and joint-assessment processes that underpin them. There are no established standards for joint context analysis approaches: some country teams use HNOs as entry points, some other use CCA, or RPBA, or RSA, or refugee analysis (CRRF), nationally owned SDG implementation plans or a mix thereof – adapted to their context.

Despite these major advancements in the articulation of COs, challenges remain. These include: developing robust monitoring, and evaluation mechanisms, to assess impact against these Collective Outcomes; ensuring appropriate short, medium, and long-term financing; as well as clarifying/ agreeing on accountability frameworks to deliver the activities under each Outcome.

Legend

- Work in Progress
- Work in Progress, Collective Outcomes discussed and validated
- Collective Outcomes discussed, ongoing discussions
- Collective Outcome "Focus Areas" discussed

Côte D'Ivoire
- Rule of Law, transitional justice and Human Rights
- Protection, Prevention and Fight against SGBV
- Community Violence Reduction.
- Social Cohesion and National Reconstruction

Burkina Faso
- By 2020, reduce the number of people in IPC 3 by 50% and bring the number of people in IPC 4 and 5 of food insecurity to 0.
- By 2020, reduce chronic malnutrition rates by 30% among children under 5.

Mauritania
- Access to livelihood, to decent jobs and to economic opportunities is strengthened and food security is improved
- Communities contribute to sustainable management of natural resources, and respond to climate change shocks
- Vulnerable populations have access to adequate/durable services for health, nutrition, WASH
- Institutions, civil society and communities ensure improved protect against different forms of discrimination.

Mali
- Food Security
- Health
- Agriculture/ Livelihood
- Protection

DRC
- Outbreak Prevention, Detection and Control
- Education
- IDPs and Refugees
- Justice Reform, Rule of Law and Human Rights

Cameroon
- Protection
- Food Insecurity
- WASH

Niger
- protection and lifesaving needs of displaced persons due to the conflict and insecurity in Boko Haram held areas
- reinforce resilience towards stabilization through security sector reform, governance strengthening, and livelihoods

Chad
- Reduce the number of people suffering of food insecurity by 32% **DRAFT**
- Reduce by 27% the number of people in IPC 3 and above **DRAFT**
- Reduce Severe Acute Malnutrition (SAM) rates in children under 5 from 2.6% to 1.8% **DRAFT**
- Reduce Global Acute Malnutrition (GAM) rates in children under 5 from 11.9% to 10% **DRAFT**
- Achieve 90% coverage of people in need of basic and essential services (WASH, Health, Education) **DRAFT**

CAR
- Economic Recovery is Promoted and Productive Sector is boosted
- Social contract between the State and the Population is renewed
- Peace, Security and Reconciliation processes are supported

Uganda
- To support governments to protect and assist refugees and support host communities involved, through a response based on the principle of international cooperation and on burden and responsibility sharing

Sudan
- By 2022, communities and households benefit from increased production and productivity that lead to sustainable livelihoods, sustainable access to food systems and improved nutrition status with emphasis on the agriculture sector as a driver. **DRAFT**
- By 2022, people in Sudan benefit from more efficient, accountable and equitable governance, enhanced rule of law and access to sustainable and equitable access to social services. **DRAFT**
- By 2022, the population has increased access to energy and the risk for disasters is reduced, through more effective management of natural resources and environmental and climate change by national institutions and communities. **DRAFT**

Somalia
- By 2022, the number of people in acute food insecurity decreases by 84 percent, with GAM rates reduced by 5% and sustained below the emergency threshold **DRAFT**
- Risk and vulnerability reduced and resilience of IDPs, refugee returnees and host communities strengthened in order to reach durable solutions for 100,000 displaced households by 2022 **DRAFT**
- Proportion of population affected by climate-induced hazards (drought and flood) reduces by 25% by 2022 **DRAFT**
- Number of vulnerable people with equitable access to inclusive basic social services increases by 27 percent by 2022. **DRAFT**

Ukraine
- Increased self-sufficiency of populations living in affected oblasts and for all IDPs in Ukraine by xx% by 2023 **DRAFT**
- Improved access to social services and universal health coverage by 20% by 2023 for people living in conflict-affected oblasts and for all IDPs in Ukraine **DRAFT**
- Reach xx% compliance with international (ISO, EU, etc) physical infrastructure-related standards by 2023 in the two Eastern Conflict-affected Oblasts capacities. **DRAFT**

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Inter-Agency Standing Committee
Humanitarian Development Nexus Task Team

FINANCING:

23. As mentioned above, predictable and coherent financing remains a challenge. There is a commonly shared issue of limitation of financing exacerbated by donor agencies that are just as siloed as the agencies funds and programmes meant to deliver on the nexus (Mali, Chad, CAR, Burkina Faso, Mauritania).

24. To alleviate this bottleneck, and to increase coherent financing, a presentation by OECD showed that, **donor agencies have also began introspecting in relation to the HDPN. Several bilateral agencies have committed to enhancing coherence through the SDGs, the Sustaining Peace resolutions, the Sendai Framework, and the New Way of Working with a stronger focus on the humanitarian development and peace building nexus, the Addis Ababa Agenda for Action among other policy thrusts.** In this regard, Australia, Belgium, Denmark, EU, Germany Ireland, Sweden, UK have all explicitly outlined specific positions and ways of working to enhance the coherence of their efforts across the nexus.

25. Germany, in particular, was highlighted as an example of emerging innovation in the area of financing the HDPN, where an inter-ministerial agreement between the Federal Foreign Office (FFO) and BMZ established a new division of responsibilities between the two ministries which oversees the coherent disbursement of a [Transitional Development Assistance Fund](#) (TDA). The TDA serves as an important tool in linking and synchronizing humanitarian and longer-term economic development efforts across the two ministries. The TDA focusses on activities including reconstruction and rehabilitation of basic social and productive infrastructure; disaster risk management; reintegration of refugees; and food and nutrition security.

26. **It was also noted that CO are not envisioned to necessarily generate new funding**. Instead, stronger collaboration across HDPN is about efficiency gains. It is about having the right amount of finance, using the right tools, over the right timeframe and sequenced and/or in concurrence (as deemed necessary for optimal output of linked activities) while providing the right incentives to do so. Strategic financing can therefore support coherent approaches such as a) Strategically phased and sequenced activities over time; b) Prioritise investments with different funds; c) Ensure that the plan/roadmap is backed up by resources; d) Provide a realistic basis for discussions; d) Bring in domestic resources; e) Money as easy basis for measuring and monitoring effort. It was suggested that overviews of country-specific financial flows could inform planning and communication with potential donors and investors.

27. Showing that ODA has flattened, and given that the "market share" that passes through the UN only constitutes around 13-14 per cent, there is a need to look beyond the UN if meaningful coherence across sectors and among different actors is to be achieved. A broadened multi-stakeholder approach is needed to ensure separately channeled bilateral and multilateral resources flows are leveraged in a concerted way.

UN's share of resource flows differs across pillars
UN share of development ODA, total humanitarian flows and total personnel in int'l peace operations (2015/16)

DEVELOPMENT
$162bn
Total ODA (excl. humanitarian)
$14-16bn UN
< 10%

HUMANITARIAN
$26bn
ODA, private, other
$11-12bn UN
< 50%

PEACE OP
170k pers
140k pers UN
80%

HUM. RIGHTS
$1bn
> 25%

28. Therefore, while the commitments and innovations presented emphasized donors' role as 'financiers' they also highlight the importance for them to be viewed as stakeholders of the multilateral system and bilateral development partners and actors. Donors cannot be seen simply as "cash machines", they must be perceived as partners, some even practitioners of the nexus themselves. As such, they should play a prominent role in all elements of the humanitarian development peace nexus, including joint assessments, analysis, planning and programming as well as in accountability for results.

Recommendations:

i.   Produce country-specific mapping that aggregates financial flows in countries to help inform planning and communication with stakeholders including donors.

ii.   Promote transition financing and early warning mechanisms as opportunities to demonstrate the effectiveness of coherence.

iii.   Closer strategic engagement between the UN and OECD DAC to improve joint understanding of the key elements of HDPN.

ANNEX: TRIANGULATION WITH ENTEBBE

In order to build on the outcomes of the previous workshop, the following section cross references recommendations from Entebbe with the discussions in Dakar. The aim of the triangulation below is to provide a wholistic view of the points of convergence and divergence of the 60 practitioners participating to date in this workshop across the two regions.

ANALYSIS & ASSESSMENTS:

Macro socio-economic analysis could be used to augment CCA and HNO findings to provide better visibility on root causes.	Convergence
Current analysis and assessment tools are generally too static. Joint analysis should also rely on predictive analysis/early warning/risk forecasting.	Did not feature prominently in Dakar (D)
Joint Analysis should include a mapping exercise that identifies primary and secondary data available in country.	Convergence
Explore establishing joint analysis process by aligning CCA/HNO timeframes, aiming for broader, more periodic analysis whilst taking into consideration the need to 'time' the outcome of such processes with seasonally sensitive programme activities or otherwise lose such stakeholders from the collective approach.	Convergence, but frequently include RBPA in D.
Depending on the dynamics in-country, explore "Team of 6" joint assessment missions; including participants from UN; the national and local government/district authorities, NGOs; IFIs, the private sector, and the donor community and their respective development agencies.	Convergence, but in D. more frequently include affected populations.
Joint analysis should be the starting point for strengthened collaboration that can lead to joint or more joined-up planning and programming. It should be multi-dimensional and multi-stakeholder in nature and build on any and all sector or thematically oriented assessments undertaken.	Convergence
The result of a truly multi-stakeholder joint analysis should result in the elaboration of a shared understanding of the main challenges, e.g. a common problem statement as referred to in Entebbe, that is aligned with the government's national development plan. When stakeholders are parties to conflict, the common problem statement should, as a minimum, be informed by national development plans.	Problem statement were referred more generally as a shared understanding in D.
The Collective Problem Statement, can in turn, help identify a set of Collective Outcome Issue Areas that require further analysis and refinement, with the ultimate view defining SMART collective outcomes.	Problem statements were not discussed in D.

PLANNING AND PROGRAMMING

Develop inter-agency guidance on collective outcomes to guide discussions and consultations in country on defining them and ensuring engagement and buy-in of all relevant stakeholders	Convergence
Consider involving regional organizations and bilateral donors from the onset of the planning process	Regional NGO and UN were present in D, but not Reg. political bodies
Advocate for development funding to be more flexible, predictable, less risk-averse and less rigid to be easily re-allocated towards crisis areas and to "stay" in conflict/fragile contexts where it is needed the most (e.g. Boko Haram areas) to address root causes of vulnerabilities and need.	Convergence

LEADERSHIP AND COORDINATION

Wherever possible, explore the creation of a high-level multi-stakeholder forum bringing together UN (incl. peacekeeping actors where relevant), international and national NGOs, donors, IFIs, civil society, academia, to lead strategic discussions and decisions on the NWoW and the HDP nexus.	Convergence
RC/HC offices should be strengthened with dedicated (advisory) capacity to support the conceptualisation and implementation of the HDP Nexus and the NWoW.	Convergence, RCO and DOCO in particular
Collective leadership within the UNCT/HCT is crucial. This cannot be at the expense of individual and mandated responsibilities. Accountability should not be diluted.	Convergence

COLLECTIVE OUTCOMES

Clarification on terminology and pitching of the COs at the right level is required. Explore the possibility of multi-level outcomes – with clearly defined sub-outcomes (outputs, milestones and indicators).	Convergence
Collective outcomes should also address root causes. This also entails ensuring that COs address causal linkages between humanitarian needs and development deficiencies, including socio-economic and rights-based public services and goods as well as political and peace dividends– all of which affect social cohesion and can contribute to chronic vulnerabilities and needs when not provided and/or upheld.	Convergence
Collective outcomes should be based on a collective joint analysis, including relevant government entities. The proposed high-level multi-stakeholder forum could play a key role in this respect.	Convergence