



MISSION REPORT

GRAND BARGAIN LOCALISATION WORKSTREAM
DEMONSTRATOR COUNTRY FIELD MISSION TO NIGERIA

Nigeria. 01 - 05 April 2019



MISSION REPORT

This mission report is for public use and is primarily intended for the Grand Bargain Localisation Workstream members and the various local and national organisations, donors, UN agencies, international NGOs, and the International Red Cross and Red Crescent Movement in Nigeria who gave their valuable time and shared their views to the Mission Team. Results and findings will be shared with interested external persons via webinar and will also be highlighted in regional workshops in the summer of 2019.

The mission was planned and organised by the Localisation Workstream co-convenors, the International Federation of Red Cross and Red Crescent Societies (IFRC) and the Swiss Agency for Development Cooperation (SDC), with support from OCHA and the Accelerating Localisation Through Partnerships (ALTP) Project.

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LIST OF ACRONYMS

ALTP	ACCELERATING LOCALISATION THROUGH PARTNERSHIP
CSO	CIVIL SOCIETY ORGANISATION
DHC	DEPUTY HUMANITARIAN COORDINATOR
HCT	HUMANITARIAN COUNTRY TEAM
HRP	HUMANITARIAN RESPONSE PLAN
ICRC	INTERNATIONAL COMMITTEE OF THE RED CROSS
IFRC	INTERNATIONAL FEDERATION OF RED CROSS AND RED CRESCENT SOCIETIES
INGO	INTERNATIONAL NON-GOVERNMENTAL ORGANISATION
ISWG	INTER-SECTORAL WORKING GROUP
L/NGO	LOCAL / NATIONAL NON-GOVERNMENTAL ORGANISATION
MBNP	MINISTRY OF BUDGET AND NATIONAL PLANNING
NECSOB	NETWORK OF CIVIL SOCIETY ORGANISATIONS IN BORNO STATE
NEMA	NATIONAL EMERGENCY MANAGEMENT AGENCY
NHF	NIGERIA HUMANITARIAN FUND
NIF	NIGERIA INGO FORUM
NINGONET	NIGERIA NGO NETWORK
NSIA	NATIONAL SOCIETY INVESTMENT ALLIANCE
OHCT	OPERATIONAL HUMANITARIAN COUNTRY TEAM
PCNI	PRESIDENTIAL COMMITTEE FOR THE NORTHEAST INITIATIVE
RC/HC	RESIDENT COORDINATOR / HUMANITARIAN COORDINATOR
SEMA	STATE EMERGENCY MANAGEMENT AGENCY

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

The third Localisation Workstream demonstrator country field mission was conducted in Nigeria from 01 to 05 April 2019 by a nine-member mission team led by the Localisation Co- Sherpa from the International Federation of Red Cross and Red Crescent Societies (IFRC). Discussions were held with humanitarian actors from various agencies and stakeholder groups in the capital Abuja and in field visits to Maiduguri in the Northeast and Makurdi in Benue State to better understand what localisation means in the country and to identify good practices and barriers on delivering the Grand Bargain localisation commitments.

There are several on-going humanitarian emergencies in the country, with the largest and most severe in the Northeast having displaced some 1.8 million people, while new displacements continue due to insecurity. In 2017 the international response to the crisis scaled up significantly following warnings of looming famine in the Northeast, and this required establishing a presence for both international and national actors in locations where there previously had not been any, recruiting additional staff, setting up partnerships, and building the acceptance and participation of local communities. The operational scale-up coincided with a system-wide mobilisation to strengthen capacities across humanitarian leadership, coordination, delivery, support and funding mechanisms.

Inter-communal and political conflict in other parts of Nigeria has also created pockets of humanitarian need which did not previously exist or exist at the present scale. In the Middle Belt region, the growing presence of pastoralists from the north seeking grazing for their livestock, and the increasing cultivation of land by local farmers, has resulted in a number of violent inter-communal conflicts and displacement for tens of thousands of people. In Makurdi, Benue State, flooding and inter-communal violence have led to significant hardship and displacement but have inspired only very minimal international presence.



Many of the challenges present in the response in Nigeria's Northeast resemble those seen in other large-scale responses. Local civil society organisations know the context well but have struggled to and cannot adequately deliver to scale.

International staff are on short rotations and a resulting high turnover is an impediment to effectiveness. Local authorities have mainly fled from many affected villages or small towns, so the delivery of assistance is essentially in the hands of local civil society actors in conjunction with the international community. In addition, while local needs have galvanised L/NNGOs and community-based organisations (CBOs) to step up, many of these are either newly formed, new to humanitarian work or new to the area of response – limiting their impact.

Fraud and high fiduciary risks are pervasive concerns in the country and a major impediment to stronger partnerships between international and local actors. A level of distrust among stakeholders' groups, including civil society, certain government agencies and the international community has also been observed. There were also concerns about the perception of neutrality of aid and on some of the counter-terrorism measures that are having adverse impact on principled humanitarian action and humanitarian actors' ability to deliver humanitarian aid.

For most L/NNGOs interviewed, localisation was understood to be primarily about funding, both for their program and for their longer-term organizational sustainability. Adequate and quality representation in the HCT and other coordination mechanisms, long-term equitable partnerships and

adequate support for capacity strengthening, sharing of security information and support for security management, increased transparency and complementarity, and recognition of their capacity and experience were also key localisation concerns. For some UN agencies and INGOs, localisation was understood to be a strategy to access otherwise inaccessible areas, to support the delivery of their projects/activities, or to deliver better outcomes for the (disaster-affected) communities. Others see localisation as a long-term approach to partnership and as an investment for and acknowledgement of the legitimate space for local actors including local governments to work alongside communities to be (disaster) resilient.

There are efforts across donors, UN agencies and INGOs to action the GB localisation commitments and there are emerging good practices observed, particularly around capacity strengthening and financing. Many blockages remain, however, as there seems to have been limited space and opportunity to have regular and open dialogue between and among local and international actors.

Trust needs to be built from both sides, and from this a shared objective towards localisation that delivers principled and effective humanitarian aid and more importantly accountability to affected populations. Concerns about fraud, high fiduciary risks, and perceptions of neutrality of aid make localisation more complex and challenging and local/national and international actors need to have honest and evidenced based conversations and agree on what can be done to address these.

In working towards a transformative localisation agenda, in which local actors are enabled to lead an effective, principled and accountable humanitarian response, the Mission team puts forward the following points for consideration:

1. FOR UN AGENCIES AND INGOS

to support L/NNGOs' consortia building, including support for the newly-formed women's organisation network, provide longer-term and more demand-driven capacity strengthening support to their local partners, take greater responsibility for their local partners' security, to support and encourage direct dialogue between their local partners and back donors, to adhere to ethical HR procedures on recruitment of local actors' personnel, and to promote awareness on, and articulate, their agency's localisation commitment under the Grand Bargain.

2. FOR DONORS

to encourage true partnerships between the intermediaries they support and L/NNGOs, to develop strategic criteria within project selection focusing on projects that include long-term capacity strengthening, to include security needs and passing on indirect costs for local actors in project financing, to explore ways to use development funds for capacity purposes and the potential for dedicated funds, to promote awareness on and articulate their agency's localisation commitment under the Grand Bargain, and to elaborate on a new funding mechanism to "channel" funds as direct as possible to local actors including L/NNGO networks or consortium.

3. FOR LOCAL AND NATIONAL ACTORS

to come together and develop a more unified voice in joint advocacy on localisation, to seek alternative ways of raising funds such as endowment facilities and from the private sector, to prioritise capacity strengthening initiatives that support improvement in governance, systems and policies, and to commit to transparency and improvement in risk mitigation within partnerships.

INTRODUCTION

In May 2016, on the occasion of the World Humanitarian Summit, several dozen donor governments and international humanitarian organisations signed the Grand Bargain, making commitments to transform their practices in ten areas (called workstreams) in order to make the humanitarian ecosystem more efficient, more effective and more people-centred. The Localisation Workstream includes commitments on **funding** local actors as directly as possible, investing in the long-term institutional **capacity** of local actors, removing barriers and obstacles to and promoting more equal **partnerships** between international and local actors, and ensuring better integration with local **coordination** mechanisms¹.

In order to promote and facilitate the achievement of these commitments, Grand Bargain signatories participating in the Localisation Workstream have chosen three demonstrator countries for group missions designed to:

- *deepen understanding about what localisation means for the various stakeholders*
- *identify good practices, challenges and barriers on delivering on the main areas of the Grand Bargain localisation commitments, and integrating gender into the localisation efforts*

- *promote progress on the localisation commitments in each country.*

The third and last of these series of missions was conducted in Nigeria from 01 to 05 April 2019. The nine-member Mission Team was composed of Headquarters representatives from donors (Germany and Switzerland), UN agencies (OCHA, UNICEF and WHO), International NGO (CAFOD), local actors representing the NEAR Network/WASDA Kenya and Community Health Initiative Liberia, and the International Federation of Red Cross and Red Crescent Societies (IFRC).

The first two days of the mission were led by the Localisation Sherpa from IFRC and involved high level meetings with relevant Federal Government agencies, Humanitarian Country Team and donors as well as discussions with local and national NGOs including women's rights/led organisations, the INGO Forum, and the International Red Cross and Red Crescent Movement. The mission team then split into two groups to visit camps for internally displaced people and to conduct discussions with local government officials, local NGOs, and aid agencies responding to the crises in these locations. A debriefing session was held in Abuja during the last day to present the mission team's initial findings and recommendations.

[1] The full text of the Grand Bargain including the six Localization Commitments under Workstream 2 can be found in <https://interagencystandingcommittee.org/grand-bargain-hosted-iasc> and https://media.ifrc.org/grand_bargain_localization/home/



This report presents the Mission Team's² key observations and learning as well as recommendations that were informed or directly contributed by stakeholders during the meetings and discussions the team had during the five-day mission. Details of the programme, meetings with humanitarian actors and the list of Mission Team members are annexed at the end of this report.

COUNTRY CONTEXT

RISK PROFILE³

The Federal Republic of Nigeria accounts for 47% (or 140,431,790) of West Africa's population of which 46% is under 15 years old. Its climate varies from equatorial in the south, tropical in its centre, to arid in the north. It is ranked 85th on the Climate Risk Index 2013 with climate change expected to increase mean annual temperature and the intensity and frequency of heat waves. Drought has become common in the north, while flooding is a major problem in the south, particularly during the May–September rainy season.

Competition for land has triggered many clashes among communities. The growing presence of pastoralists from the north in the Middle Belt region seeking grazing for their livestock, and the increasing cultivation of land by local farmers, has resulted in a number of violent inter-communal conflicts. Availability and exploitation of natural resources, and the impact of climate change in the north and centre are key issues. Socioeconomic factors, including poverty, high levels of illiteracy, unemployment and insufficient income levels are among the underlying causes fuelling tensions and violence in the North (as described further below), as well as the Middle Belt.

As of February 2019, OCHA identified five on-going humanitarian emergencies in the country: (1) the Northeast conflict (Borno, Adamawa and Yobe States); (2) the September 2018 flooding in 9 States; (3) an outbreak of Lassa fever affecting 20 States; (4) conflict in the Niger Delta and (5) inter-communal conflict in Middle Belt States (Benue, Plateau, Nasarawa, Taraba, and Adamawa)⁴.

[2] The report represents the findings of the team members as individuals. It does not necessarily represent the position of their sponsoring agencies or governments.

[3] Based on the last census in 2006

[4] Ongoing humanitarian emergencies, OCHA Nigeria, As of 19 February 2019

OVERVIEW OF THE CRISIS IN THE NORTHEAST⁵

According to the UN, 7.1 million people (2.3 million girls, 1.9 million boys, 1.6 million women and 1.3 million men) will need humanitarian assistance in Northeast Nigeria in 2019 as a result of a crisis that is now in its tenth year. The crisis has largely been triggered by an ongoing regionalised armed conflict, characterised by massive and widespread abuse against civilians, including killings, rape and other forms of sexual violence, abduction, child recruitment, burning of homes, pillaging, forced displacement, arbitrary detention, and the use of explosive hazards, including in deliberate attacks on civilian targets.

An estimated 1.8 million people are already internally displaced and new displacement continues due to insecurity. While the humanitarian community provided life-saving assistance to over 5.5 million affected people in 2018, significant humanitarian needs remain. It is estimated that more than 800,000 people are still in areas that are inaccessible to international as well as to some local humanitarian personnel.

The humanitarian community has provided life-saving assistance to millions

of affected people since 2016 when the international response to the crisis scaled up significantly following warnings of looming famine in the Northeast.

Assistance and protection interventions have primarily been targeted at individuals and communities who have been directly affected by chronic under development and who lack access to basic services.

Humanitarian funding to Northeast Nigeria increased steeply from \$268 million to \$733 million between 2016 and 2017 (UN OCHA Financial Tracking Service). In 2018, funding received decreased slightly to \$685 million while for 2019, UN and partners are appealing for \$848 million. The scale up in 2017 required setting up operations in locations where the Nigerian government had recently re-established limited presence. This required NGOs to establish presence in locations where they previously had none, recruit staff, set up partnerships, and build acceptance with local communities, among others. The operational scale-up coincided with a system-wide mobilization to strengthen capacities across humanitarian leadership, coordination, delivery, support, and funding mechanisms. Before 2016, the structures, systems, mechanisms and capacities enabling the response today did not exist⁶.

[5] Nigeria Humanitarian Response Strategy- January 2019-December 2021, OCHA December 2018

[6] NGOs and Risk, Managing Uncertainty in Local-International Partnerships, Case Studies: Northeast Nigeria and South Sudan, Lindsay Hamsik, Interaction and Humanitarian Outcomes, March 2019

HUMANITARIAN ACTORS AND STRUCTURES

There are several governmental structures currently engaged in leading and coordinating humanitarian response work in the country including the conflict crisis in the Northeast. These are:

(1) Presidential Committee on the Northeast Initiative (PCNI) established in September 2016;

(2) the National Emergency Management Agency (NEMA);

(3) the State Emergency Management Agency (SEMA) and;

(4) the Inter-Ministerial Task Force (composed of 7 Ministries, NEMA and PCNI plus the National Security Advisor to the President and the Chief of the Army Staff) established in September 2016 under the Ministry of Budget and National Planning.

The Humanitarian Country Team (HCT) currently has 21 members (including, as full members, 10 UN agencies, 5 INGOs, and 1 INGO Forum representative as well as 5 observer members⁷. An “**Operational HCT**” was set up in 2016 in Maiduguri to provide increased operational guidance and decision making in the complex humanitarian emergency of the Northeast and is chaired by the Deputy Humanitarian

Coordinator (DHC).

There are technical sector groups in place of clusters with the Inter-Sector Working Group (ISWG) based in Maiduguri covering Borno, Adamawa and Yobe States reporting to the HCT in Abuja on relevant issues through the Operational HCT in Maiduguri. For the Humanitarian Programme Cycle processes including the Humanitarian Response Plan (HRP) and Humanitarian Needs Overview (HNO), the ISWG reports directly to the HCT in Abuja.⁸

The **Nigeria INGO Forum (NIF)** was formed in October 2014 and as of January 2019 has a membership of 51 INGOs with 6 observers. It currently has 9 paid staff, with funding from ECHO and USAID. This funding enables it to undertake research and analysis and formulate coordinated advocacy messages. It also works on coordination and information sharing, representation⁹, and partnership and capacity building.

Local civil society engagement in humanitarian action in northeast Nigeria was rather limited before the response scale up. Overall, Nigeria has a strong and vibrant civil society, with a particularly strong mobilisation force when it comes to advocacy. However, the focus and expertise has not traditionally been in the operational humanitarian realm.

[7] These are ICRC, MSF, ECHO, US, and UK

[8] Nigeria Annual Review of Operations, January 2019 IASC Emergency Directors Group

[9] INGO Forum has a seat in five humanitarian coordination mechanisms including the HCT

The Network of Civil Society Organizations in Borno State (NECSOB) serves as the convening platform for L/NNGOs and includes around 160 members.¹⁰ The majority of L/NNGOs currently responding to the crisis are either traditionally development-oriented organisations with little or no experience in responding to humanitarian crises or newly established humanitarian NGOs. Other major local CSO networks directly and indirectly involved in the Northeast crisis and in the Middle Belt region include: the **Nigerian NGO Network (NINGONET)**, the **CSO Coalition for Eradication of Poverty (CISCOPE)**, the **Network of CSOs in Yobe**, and the **Centre for Democracy and Development (CDD)**. An example of collaborations between INGOs and L/NNGOs is the Accelerating Localization Through Partnership Project (ALTP), a consortium project of 6 INGOs and their 19 national and local NGO partners. A National Steering Committee for its L/NNGO partners has been established.

As part of the 2019-2021 Humanitarian Response Strategy for Borno, Adamawa and Yobe states, the United Nations and partners are aiming to reach 6.2 million people in need of life-saving humanitarian assistance in 2019. The funding appeal for this year is \$847.7 million. As of 31 March 2019, \$51.3 million has been received against the appeal with the three biggest contributions coming from the US, Germany, and the European Commission. This amount includes \$11.1 million¹¹ contribution to the **Nigeria Humanitarian Fund**, a country-based pooled fund that is accessible to international and national NGOs, UN agencies and Red Cross. Since the NHF became operational in May 2017, donors have contributed \$83 million to the fund with Germany and Sweden providing the biggest funding.¹²

The Nigeria Humanitarian Fund – Private Sector Initiative was launched in November 2018 for private sector engagement in humanitarian action through a country-based-pooled fund set up and managed by the UN. The Steering Group is co-chaired by OCHA, Zenith Bank and the Nigeria Economic Summit Group. Steps are underway to determine approval mechanism for receiving business contributions and enabling the NHF to receive, manage and disburse funds in local currency.¹³

[10] NGOs and Risk, Managing Uncertainty in Local-International Partnerships, Case Studies: Northeast Nigeria and South Sudan, Lindsay Hamsik, Interaction and Humanitarian Outcomes, March 2019

[11] The \$11 million funding received to date are contributions from Germany (\$6.8 million), Sweden (\$2.2 million), Norway (\$1.7 million), and Spain (0.3 million). In 2017 and 2018, Germany and Sweden were also the top two contributors to NHF with total funding of \$16.8 million and \$14.4 million respectively.

[12] OCHA Nigeria Humanitarian Funding Overview, As of 31 March 2019

[13] Investing in Humanity: The Nigeria Humanitarian Fund- Private Sector Initiative Launch, Lagos, 15 November 2018

KEY OBSERVATIONS AND FINDINGS

UNDERSTANDING THE CONTEXT

The Northeast continues to be a major crisis with strong presence of UN agencies, the Red Cross and Red Crescent Movement, INGOs, local NGOs and national NGOs mostly from outside the affected Northeast States of Borno, Adamawa and Yobe (the so-called “BAY states”). There is widespread acknowledgment of the support that international humanitarian actors have been able to provide, but many local actors (and a number of international actors themselves) felt that the international community is not yet fully engaged with local authorities, chiefs, faith-based organisations and local civil society.

In both the emergencies in Maiduguri and Benue, host communities and civil society actors were the first responders, although they were able to provide very limited coverage before international actors arrived and scaled up operations. After a major surge of new displacements to Maiduguri in late December 2018 while many international staff were away – in some camps in Maiduguri only local organisations were available to give (admittedly very limited) support. More recently, there are some areas, such as Ran, where L/NNGOs are the only source of information for weeks at a time as these areas regularly become inaccessible to international actors due to insecurity.

Many of the challenges present in the response in the Northeast are similar to those which occur in other large-scale responses. Local civil society organisations know the context well but cannot adequately deliver to scale. International staff are on short rotations and a resulting high turnover is an impediment to effectiveness. Local authorities have mainly fled from many affected villages or small towns, so the delivery of assistance is essentially in the hands of local civil society actors in conjunction with the international community. Many L/NNGOs are newly formed, new to humanitarian work or new to the area.

Lack of agreement over the nature of needs has also affected the ability of local responders to operate, as well as the support received, in areas outside the Northeast. Particularly in Benue State and in the South-South region incorporating the Niger Delta, local CSOs complained that an official tendency to label local crises as “political” rather than “humanitarian” effectively restricted their access to areas in need, limited their access to official and non-official sources of resourcing and, as will be seen below, painted local CSOs in terms of partisan “allegiances” and placed their activities under the purview of national legislation on counter-terrorism. Similar concerns were voiced by at least one State Emergency Management Authority (SEMA),

who suggested that the federal government's perception of the local IDP crisis as not being a humanitarian one had the effect of making federal-level support difficult to obtain, forcing it to rely almost entirely on international support.

Support from international actors has also been limited in areas outside of the Northeast. In Benue State, flooding and inter-communal violence have led to significant hardship and displacement, but have inspired only very minimal international presence. An estimated 82,658 households (close to half a million people almost a quarter of whom are children) are internally displaced.¹⁴ A short-term emergency intervention (September 2018 to January 2019) was provided with Nigeria Humanitarian Fund (NHF) implemented by international agencies with their own staff. Local actors asserted that the international responders either did not partner or sufficiently coordinated with local CSOs and left after six months.

While the UN humanitarian appeal for Northeast Nigeria has been well funded to date, there are still major gaps in the provision of services to displaced communities both in accessible and inaccessible areas. In 2018, only 6.1 million in the three most affected states was reached out of an estimated 10.2 million people in six affected States identified to be in need of humanitarian assistance.¹⁵

Recognising the chronic development challenges predating the conflict and the protracted nature of the crisis, the 2019 Humanitarian Response Plan is anchored in a multi-year strategy that is careful to integrate reference to the national and state authorities and highlights the country as a pilot for the Humanitarian-Development Nexus. As one of the countries

[14] Statistics of IDPs in Benue State, Jireh Doo Foundation, Community Links and Benue SEMA

[15] The Humanitarian Response Plan in 2018 received a total funding of \$685 million or 65% out of the total funding request of \$1,048 million. From this funding received, \$36.1 million was disbursed through allocations from the Nigerian Humanitarian Fund (NHF) while the rest constitute allocations from the Central Emergency Response Fund (CERF).



piloting the Nexus, there has been concerted effort within and outside the HCT towards identifying collective outcomes, and a workshop in April 2019 was held to articulate collective outcomes that have since been identified. State authorities have been engaged in the process, with PCNI leading on the Nigerian government's side, and Transitional Teams from across the government being identified to coordinate the implementation of the collective outcomes once confirmed.

Fraud and high fiduciary risks are pervasive concerns in the country and a major impediment to stronger partnerships between international and local actors. A certain distrust among stakeholders' groups, including civil society, certain government agencies and the international community has also been observed, especially in Maiduguri and in Makurdi, Benue State. Or, as one interlocutor put it, in some cases there is a "us versus you" mentality.

In the Northeast, access to many areas remains a challenge, particularly in Borno state. Many local government areas are devoid of civilian structures, with the military the only governmental actors. While local and national actors may in some cases have better access to such areas, they may be subject to perceptions of affiliation, exposing them to possible security issues.

Concerns about the perception of neutrality of aid were shared with the Mission team, adding another level of complexity to localisation. Patronage of certain local and national actors leads to a perception that neutrality may sometimes be a stake. Furthermore, some government officials consider that aid may benefit Non-State Armed Groups, their families or their supporters. This issue of perceived or real affiliation of local and national actors with parties to the conflict are a major obstacle to localising aid while respecting humanitarian principles.

Counter-terrorism measures, both in national legislation and donor requirements, are part of the measures taken by States in their fight against terrorism. However, some of those provisions are having adverse impact on principled humanitarian action, on humanitarian space and on humanitarian actors' ability to deliver humanitarian aid according to humanitarian principles. For example, the Mission team heard about some staff of one international NGO arrested and detained in relation to its humanitarian aid programme in the North-East. This is becoming an issue of increasing concern to humanitarian actors, particularly in the Northeast, and it is likely to have a particular impact on local actors.

UNDERSTANDING LOCALISATION

Everyone interviewed on the mission agreed that localisation is important but the understanding specifically on what it can or should deliver as well as its end goals differs from one group of stakeholders to another but also within those same groups. Although staff of many of the international actors the Mission team met represented organisations or governments which had signed up to the Grand Bargain, understanding of what that entailed or a clear organisational strategy to get there was not evident. For some UN agencies and INGOs, localisation is a strategy to access otherwise inaccessible areas, to support the delivery of their projects/activities, or to deliver better outcomes for the (disaster-affected) communities. Others see localisation as a long-term approach to partnership and as an investment for and acknowledgement of the legitimate space for local actors including local governments to work alongside communities to be (disaster) resilient. Among national and local civil society in Abuja, the discussions about localisation evolved around partnerships between INGOs and local and national NGOs, as well as having greater access to direct funding. Mention was made of the importance of involving community-based organisations and traditional leaders, too, as well as working better with faith-based organisations and religious leaders.

“

(...) the humanitarian community in Nigeria continues to strengthen the role of government counterparts and other local actors, including civil society and the private sector, in the response. (...)

Investment in local capacities, infrastructure and services will support sustainability for the duration of this strategy.

Nigeria HRP 2019 - 2020

”

The strong government institutions, both at Federal and at State levels, are key national and local actors involved in the humanitarian response. However, with an active armed conflict in the Northeast to which the government is a party, raises challenges to localisation within the principles of humanitarian action in relation to the government's role.

For most L/NNGOs interviewed, localisation is about funding, both for their programs, and for their longer-term organisational sustainability (including through the provision of overhead funds), as well as adequate and quality representation in the HCT and other coordination mechanisms, long-term equitable partnerships and adequate support for institutional capacity strengthening, sharing of security information and support for security management, increased transparency and complementarity, and recognition of their capacity and experience.

COORDINATION AND LEADERSHIP

While there is a strong central government, there is weak or a lack of emergency response institutions at the State and local level in many areas affected by the conflict. The roles of the three agencies (PCNI, NEMA, and Inter-Ministerial Task Force/MBNP) are seen to overlap, creating fragmented coordination at federal and state levels.

There is no local actor representation on the HCT at the Abuja level while in Maiduguri, only one local actor representing a network of local NGOs in Borno State is active at OHCT¹⁶. OCHA points out that it would be very difficult to select one local actor that could legitimately represent the huge number of L/NNGOs for the HCT, in light of their lack of internal agreement. L/NNGO representatives interviewed on the mission disagree and are demanding inclusive and adequate representation of local and national actors in both the HCT and ISWG.

In Maiduguri, all sectors of the ISWG except for Logistics are co-led by their respective line ministries. About half of the members of the SGBV sub-cluster are local actors. One barrier to participation that was observed was language. While a multiplicity of languages is spoken in the Northeast, with a prevalence of Hausa, coordination meetings are held in English.

In the Northeast, coordination among L/NNGOs was seen as hampered by a lack of unified voice, as compared to a much stronger and cohesive network in Benue.¹⁷ There are many well-established and experienced women's/women-led organisations involved mainly in development work. Soon after the meeting with the mission team on 2nd April 2019, the group of women's organisations got together and decided to form a new women's humanitarian network. The group is now in the process of formal registration under the name, Women in Humanitarian Response in Nigeria. They have also started to map out other credible women's led organisations across the country to include in their network.

[16] There are 3 NNGO network representatives in the OHCT for each of the three provinces (Borno, Adamawa and Yobe).

[17] In early 2018, 26 civil society organisations came together to form the Benue CSO Coalition primarily in response to the worsening hostilities between herdsmen from the Northeast and the Benue farming communities. The group served as a platform for dialogue and advocacy and in coordination with Benue SEMA and with funding from UNICEF implemented a three-month hygiene promotion in all IDP camps which they have continued to do even after the funding ended.

CAPACITY & CAPACITY STRENGTHENING

Before the scale up in 2016, less than a thousand national staff were employed by international aid agencies. This number went up to more than 5,000 (2018) and it is likely that a significant proportion of them came from national or local organisations. Staff movement from L/NNGO to INGO or UN agency is a major concern for L/NNGOs and as one of them stated, “You poach our staff and then you tell us that we don’t have capacity.” While staff movement should not be discouraged per se, national NGO representatives voiced their concerns about the way this is done e.g. on a very short notice, with no possibility to replace trained staff on time thus leaving gaps in the organisation.¹⁸

“

*You poach our staff and then you
tell us that we don't have capacity*

LNGO representative

”

The big discrepancy between salaries offered by UN agencies and INGOs for national staff and what the L/NNGOs are able to offer limits the latter’s ability to recruit and retain skilled staff.

UN agencies and INGOs have provided significant capacity strengthening support for their national staff as well as to local and national NGOs and local government, e.g. SEMA. In 2018, for instance, \$1.5 million from the NHF was allocated for capacity building including support for 12 National NGOs. Support, however, has been mainly one- off technical and project management trainings and there have been duplication of efforts in capacity assessments and training. Some INGOs recognise that there is a need to consolidate the

[18] Although the Grand Bargain does not refer to this, the Charter4Change recognises this as a huge challenge for national and local actors and contains a specific commitment for INGO signatories to address unfair recruitment practices.

results of the capacity building support they have provided in the last couple of years and to consider moving to different approaches and methodologies such as mentoring, coaching and embedding staff to their local partners. There is currently no shared objective among international actors about the kind of local capacity they would like to help establish through their efforts.

L/NNGOs called for more capacity strengthening support in the areas of organisational development and governance including how to meet due diligence processes/policies. At the same time, they called for recognition of the value that they do already bring to the table – such as local knowledge - this call was particularly strong from women's organisations.

GOOD PRACTICES OF CAPACITY STRENGTHENING

MENTORING

Successful peer to peer mentoring and interagency collaboration was reported in the SGBV sub-cluster of the Protection Sector. While the sub-sector was quickly successful in engaging a number of NNGOs, they did not initially participate in an active way in decision-making. The international actors in the cluster decided to undertake mentoring for their national partners to participate in the meetings and contribute in a strategic way in the discussions and strategic planning.

CAPACITY STRENGTHENING 1

The Presidential Commission for the Northeast Initiative (PCNI), with funding from the Federal Government, conducted a mapping and capacity assessment of local humanitarian actors from which a database of more than 720 CSOs was developed. PCNI contracted Mercy Corps to develop and deliver a humanitarian capacity building project primarily around technical and project management skills training as well as mentoring for 120 CSOs/staff (20 each from 6 of the affected states).

CAPACITY STRENGTHENING 2

CAFOD, with funding from EU Aid, is supporting Caritas Maiduguri's two-year capacity strengthening programme (2018-2020), Preparing for Emergencies by Strengthening Organisational Procedures, Learning and Exchange (PEOPLE). Through this project, Caritas Maiduguri was able to put in place an emergency preparedness plan, volunteers' manual, reviewed human resources and finance policies and developed new policies on procurement and travel that are now being used. Caritas Maiduguri was appreciative of the flexible grants and "accompaniment" approach, which it considers to make a big difference.

FINANCING

In 2018, the Humanitarian Response Plan received a total funding of \$700 million (representing 67% of funds requested). A mere 4% or \$28 million was channeled to the Nigeria Humanitarian Fund (NHF) which is the only source of direct funding available to L/NNGOs. Through the NHF, some \$3 million was made available to nine national NGO partners in 2018 and an additional dedicated envelope of \$1.5 million to allow them to be more competitive with international partners while strengthening their capacity to deliver.



2018 Figures.

The NHF has made considerable efforts to encourage successful funding applications from national actors, including : (1) experiments with envelopes for L/NNGOs, (2) extra points for L/NNGOs in the project scoring system, (3) training in financial management and application procedures, and (4) online support procedure and weekly clinics. A number of INGOs helped L/NNGOS in their application process or applied on their behalf.

Funding for L/NNGOs made up only 6% of NHF funding in 2018, one of the lowest percentages of any country-based pooled fund. However, L/NNGOs who had been successful strongly appreciated that they could design their own proposals, unlike their experience with funding/partnerships with UN/INGOs. On the downside, they reported difficulty with due diligence procedures and a sense of "unfair competition" with international actors. Some also noted that it was not clear to them how allocations are decided by sector or location and what the criteria are.

One source of direct funding for L/NNGOs identified to the mission team was from the Dutch Relief Alliance¹⁹ which had supported NNGOs to access the fund, provided information and taken steps to improve L/NNGOs due diligence and get registration. Seven DRA member organisations work together to provide emergency assistance in Northeast Nigeria under the DRA-Nigeria Joint Response.

There is a concern that substantial security risk is being transferred to L/NNGOs while funding allocations to them are not including needs for security. A recent case study on NGOs and risk²⁰ noted that the true costs of aid delivery is misrepresented and that L/NNGOs feel additional pressure to be low cost, distorting funding needs for effective and safe delivery. “In the end, costs are borne by L/NNGO staff members who frequently go unpaid, forego safe and secure accommodation, and take additional risks in how and when they move in the field.”

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The Nigerian Red Cross Society (NRCS) faces financing issues similar to those facing L/NNGOs, specifically around difficulty in obtaining indirect/overhead costs, financing for core staff, and the short-term nature of humanitarian funding sources. Most of NRCS’ current funding comes from ICRC and IFRC, while the National Society explores various opportunities for domestic resource mobilisation from public and private sources. In the past, various ministries and state governments used to contribute funding to the NRCS at the national or branch level but this has now been discontinued. Discussions are currently ongoing (in relation to a new Red Cross Act) to renew this support.

[19] The Dutch Relief Alliance is a coalition of 16 Dutch humanitarian NGOs established in 2015 and funded by the Netherlands Ministry of Foreign Affairs. It aims to provide as direct as possible funding to local actors by end 2019 and 35% by the end of the DRA strategic period in 2020.

[20] NGOs and Risk, Managing Uncertainty in Local-International Partnerships, Case Studies: Northeast Nigeria and South Sudan, Humanitarian Outcomes and Interaction with funding from USAID.

GOOD PRACTICES OF FUNDING

FUNDING

As an example of the potential of new financing modalities to support localisation, NRCS has recently been awarded funding by the joint IFRC and ICRC National Society Investment Alliance (NSIA), a new funding mechanism to support the long-term development of National Societies in high-risk contexts, through dedicated funding for organisational development and capacity strengthening. With funding driven by the demands of the National Societies themselves, achieving financial sustainability and independence has emerged as a key concern.

NSIA funding for NRCS will consist of 50,000 CHF for an initial 12 month period, with the potential to access up to one million CHF over five years, dependent on performance. This first year of funding will allow NRCS to work with partners to complete a detailed market analysis around the opportunity to develop commercial first-aid services in Nigeria, and develop a detailed business plan with a view to access further funding. NSIA demonstrates the demand for long-term targeted investment in organisational capacities, supporting the development of more sustainable and effective local humanitarian actors. It is also an example of how pooled funds can manage some of the risks that have challenged donors in funding local actors, while ensuring that flows are as direct as possible.

PARTNERSHIPS

INGO-L/NNGO partnerships in Nigeria reportedly tend to be short-term – but the team also heard of several examples of long-term partnerships, (e.g., RC/RC Movement, Tearfund, Christian Aid, and Street Child) and sometimes non-financial partnerships, that were not tied to specific projects. Some INGOs provided funding opportunities for their local partners from their own funds or as sub-grantees. Models of INGOs working with a group of local actors, such as Tearfund supporting a consortium of local NGOs, also were reported as working well. At other times, they shared information on requests for proposals with their local partners, supported proposal review processes and in some cases, made the local partner a part of the consortium in proposal design and submission.

Some partners offered long-term partnership frameworks, with accompaniment and guaranteed funding on a multi-year plan, as well as consistent capacity strengthening. They were supportive in terms of communication, feedback, opportunity to make amendments to project budgets, and encouraging joint missions to the field, assessments, and monitoring.

However, L/NNGOs reported that genuinely joint planning and adequate support for overheads and security costs is rare. Many describe their relationships with international actors as sub-contracting. Project timeframes are short and as such do not add value to institutional capacity strengthening.

In Maiduguri, there was a recognition that, while immediate and large-scale response to high levels of emergency had been mostly internationally-led, enhanced engagement with local actors will become a priority once the situation stabilises. So far, plans to transition towards more local ownership have been interrupted by renewed sudden inflows of IDPs. In this context, nexus considerations, especially among the humanitarian organisations with a dual mandate, play an important role.

In Makurdi on the other hand, the humanitarian intervention to address the needs of the over 400, 000 IDPs displaced by inter-communal conflict is mainly addressed by the local actors namely the SEMA and Local CSOs.



What is the quality of partnerships between L/NNGOs and INGOs in Nigeria?

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In Nigeria, the vast majority (90%) of L/NNGO survey respondents said their organisation had experience working on a humanitarian response operation in partnership with an INGO. When asked to judge the quality of the partnership they had experienced, local and national NGO respondents were more critical than INGO respondents; no local NGO respondents qualified their relationship as a ‘genuine partnership’ compared to 40% of national NGO respondents and 60% of INGO respondents. However, on average, 77% of survey respondents said the partnership had been ‘very’ instrumental in meeting humanitarian needs; including all national NGO respondents. There was some divergence in responses to this question however, with 20% of INGO respondents saying the partnership had not been instrumental in meeting humanitarian needs ‘at all’. The majority of survey respondents believe that partnerships are indeed the best pathway towards localization. However, 14% identified better alternative pathways to localization including capacity development, practical experiences (‘learning by doing’) or accessing funding directly.

Excerpt from the ALTP research on operational practices in partnership- based humanitarian action

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GAPS IN INFORMATION

The Mission Team did not have the opportunity to examine other relevant issues such as the following:

- **Natural hazards and climate induced disasters such as drought and flooding, how humanitarian mechanisms address them, and how these interplay with the conflict crises** – the Mission Team focused only on the response to the conflict crises in the Northeast and in Benue State. Drought has become common in the North including in one of the most conflict affected State of Yobe while most recent flooding (July to September 2018) inundated 80% of the country.
- **Initiatives to support transition to development and its link to localisation** - In support of the Government of Nigeria, the World Bank has approved \$775m of International Development Association (IDA) funding for the north-east since 2016, representing the largest program for north-east recovery and development among international partners. Additional funds are also available for emergency transition activities and parallel stabilisation initiatives with a focus on:
 - (i) peacebuilding and social cohesion;
 - (ii) infrastructure and social services and;
 - (iii) economic recovery.



CONCLUSIONS AND WAYS FORWARD

There are efforts across donors, UN agencies and INGOs to action the GB localisation commitments and there are emerging good practices observed particularly around capacity strengthening and financing. Many blockages remain, however, especially as there seems to have been limited space and opportunity to have regular and open dialogue between and among local and international actors.

Trust needs to be built from both sides and from this a shared objective towards localisation that delivers principled and effective humanitarian aid and more importantly accountability to affected populations. Concerns on fraud, high fiduciary risks, and perceptions of neutrality of aid make localisation more complex and challenging and local/national and international actors need to have honest and evidenced based conversations and agree on what can be done to address these.

The RC/HC proposed the development of a **localisation strategy** and taking this forward, the Mission team suggests the following to the Humanitarian Country Team for their consideration:

- **That the localisation strategy includes a time-limited action plan, with goals and measurable benchmarks on progress**
- **That this be developed in consultation with local actors and donors**
- **That there be a regular agenda item at HCT and OHCT to discuss progress on the action plan**

There was a request from the L/NNGOs to have **adequate representation** in the HCT in Abuja. The Mission Team considers this an important step on delivering the GB localisation commitment around coordination and leadership and suggests that the HCT initiate a transparent process of selection/nomination the soonest time possible. The example of the HCT in Somalia may be helpful for this.

While the Mission Team acknowledges that there are still gaps in assistance in the major crisis that is in the Northeast and that there are also unmet needs in other emergencies, it would like to call the attention of HCT to the **crisis situation in Benue** and to consider the call for funding support from CSOs/government.

Towards a transformative localisation agenda, in which local actors are enabled to lead an effective, principled and accountable humanitarian response, the Mission team puts forward the following points for consideration:

FOR UN AGENCIES AND INGOS

- 1 Support L/NGOs with consortia building including support for the newly-formed women's organisation network
 - 2 Provide longer-term and more demand-driven capacity strengthening support to their local partners adopting methodologies such as twinning, coaching and mentoring
 - 3 Take greater responsibility for L/NGO partner security by providing adequate funding and support for security management and sharing information as appropriate and useful
 - 4 Support and encourage direct dialogue between their local partners and back donors.
 - 5 Mitigate negative impacts from hiring local actors' personnel by adhering to ethical HR procedures on recruitment e.g. following notice periods and conducting reference checks
 - 6 Develop internal strategies on how to promote awareness of their localisation commitments under the Grand Bargain and articulate to their country programme-based offices and staff what is expected of them
-

FOR DONORS

- 1 Encourage and support true partnership, rather than sub-contracting, between the intermediaries they support and L/NNGOs (including women's organisations) and find ways to engage in direct dialogue with L/NNGOs even if their funding is indirect.
 - 2 Develop strategic criteria within project selection focusing on projects that include long-term capacity and institutional strengthening.
 - 3 Include security needs and passing on indirect costs for local actors in project financing.
 - 4 Explore ways to use development funds for capacity purposes – and the potential for dedicated funds (noting the example of the Red Cross/Red Crescent Movement's "National Society Investment Alliance")
 - 5 Develop internal strategies/workplan on how to promote awareness of their localisation commitments in the Grand Bargain and articulate to their country programme-based offices and staff what is expected of them
 - 6 Elaborate on a new funding mechanism such as a "localisation fund" or a localisation window in an existing mechanism, allowing donors to "channel" funds as direct as possible to local actors including L/NNGO networks or consortium.
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LOCAL ACTORS

- 1** Come together and develop a more unified voice in joint advocacy on localisation and to extend support or establish partnerships with informal community-based organisations
- 2** Seek alternative ways of raising funds such as endowment facilities and from the private sector
- 3** Prioritise capacity strengthening initiatives that support improvement in governance, systems and policies and commit to transparency and improvement in risk mitigation within partnerships



ANNEX 1 - MISSION TEAM MEMBERS

Dr. Jemilah Mahmood	Under Secretary General for Partnerships, IFRC
Philimon Majwa	Humanitarian Policy Specialist, UNICEF
Anne Street	Head of Humanitarian Policy and Advocacy, CAFOD
Julia Knittel	Programme Officer, SDC
Bianca Belger	Humanitarian Affairs Officer, German Federal Foreign Office
Aydrus Daar	NEAR Network Leadership Council Member and Executive Director of WASDA-Kenya
Naomi Tolay-Solanke	Executive Director of Community Health Initiatives - Liberia
Kristele Younes	Section Chief of the Wes and Central Africa Section, OCHA
Aiman Zarul	Humanitarian Policy Officer, WHO

IFRC Secretariat Support:

David Fisher, Humanitarian Policy and Diplomacy Unit Manager
Coree Steadman, Senior Officer on Localisation

ANNEX 2 - MISSION ITINERARY

Time	Activity
Day 0 – Sunday, 30 March 2019	
Various Times	Arrival of delegation to Abuja International Airport
19:00 – 20:00	Team introductions / briefing
Day 1 – Monday, 01 April 2019	
08:30 – 09:30	Welcome and security briefing at the UN House
09:30 – 10:30	Briefing with RC/HC
10:30 – 11:45	Meeting with Humanitarian Country Team
11:45 – 13:00	Meeting with INGOs
13:30 – 15:30	Lunch meeting with donors
	Meeting with Ministry of Budget and National Planning
15:30 – 16:30	Meeting with PCNI
	Meeting with NEMA
18:00 – 20:30	Welcome reception
Day 2 – Tuesday, 02 April 2019	
08:30 – 12:00	Workshop with Local and National Humanitarian Actors
14:00 – 15:00	Meeting with Red Cross / Red Crescent Movement
15:30 – 17:00	Meeting with women / women-led organisations

Day 3 – Wednesday, 03 April 2019

- 07:00 Group 1 – Depart for Maiduguri
 Group 2 – Travel by road to Makurdi
- 11:00 – 12:00 Group 1 – Visit to Teacher’s Village IDP camp with SEMA and partners
- 12:30 – 13:00 Group 1 – Stadium site visit with SEMA and partners
- 13:30 – 14:30 Group 2 – Meeting with SEMA
- 14:30 – 15:30 Group 1 – Meeting with the DHC
- 15:30 – 16:30 Group 1 – Meeting with the humanitarian partners
 Group 2 – Meeting with local and national NGOs
- 16:30 – 17:30 Group 1 – Meeting with civil society heads of networks
 Group 2 – Meeting with UN agencies and INGOs
- 17:30 – 18:30 Group 1 – Meeting with NHF beneficiaries and NGOs

Day 4 – Thursday, 04 April 2019

- 08:30 – 09:45 Group 1 – Meeting with SEMA
 Group 2 – Visit to Abagena IDP Camp
- 10:00 – 11:00 Group 2 – Meeting with Benue Governor
- 11:00 – 12:30 Group 1 – Depart for Abuja
 Group 2 – Travel by road to Abuja
- 16:00 – 18:00 Mission team prepares for debriefing session

Day 5 – Friday, 05 April 2019

- 10:00 – 12:00 Debriefing Workshop with local actors, INGOs, and UN Agencies
- Various times Mission team members depart Abuja

ANNEX 3 - LIST OF ORGANISATIONS MET

In Abuja:

Monday, 01 April 2019

- Resident and Humanitarian Coordinator, Mr. Edward Kallon
- OCHA, IOM, UNFPA, WHO, WFP, UNICEF, FAO, UNDP, UN Women
- Swiss Embassy, DFID, Canadian High Commission, ECHO, German Embassy, Embassy of Finland
- ACF, Nigeria INGO Forum, Mercy Corps, Save the Children, Christian Aid, Street Child, Action Aid
- Ministry of Budget and National Planning, Presidential Commission for the Northeast Initiative (PCNI), and National Emergency Management Agency (NEMA)

Tuesday, 02 April 2019

- Global Agenda for Total Emancipation, Caritas Nigeria, Islamic Counselling Initiatives of Nigeria, Youth Reformation and Awareness Centre, SUWA, WREP/ALTP, COD Nigeria, Faith Alive Foundation, EPRT/JDPC, International Centre for Peace, Charities and Human Development, Women Initiatives to Sustainable Community Development, Society for Promotion of Education and Development, African Centre for Leadership, Strategy and Development, Keen and Care Initiative, CODE – Follow the Money, Hip City Innovation Centre/Green Code, Justice, Peace and Reconciliation Movement, Centre for Social Policy, Advocacy and Leadership, NINGONET, Coalition of Benue CSOs, Selu Afrique
 - Federation of Muslim Women, Women and Youth Environmental Safety and Empowerment Organization, Women Environmental Programme (WEP), Adinya Arise Foundation, Beautiful Eves of Africa Organisation (BEAFRO), Gyunka New Hope Foundation, Gender Advocacy for Justice Initiative (GAJI), Centre for Women Studies and Interventions, Change Managers International Network (CMI), Tabitha Cumi Foundation, Centre for Women Studies and Interventions, Proactive Gender Initiatives, IANSA Women Network Nigeria,
 - Federal Ministry of Women Affairs and Social Services
 - Nigeria Red Cross Society, British Red Cross, ICRC, IFRC
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In Maiduguri:

Wednesday - Thursday, 03 - 04 April 2019

- Translators Without Borders, Nigeria INGO Forum, Street Child, Christian Aid WFP, FAO,
- OCHA, UNFPA, UNHCR, UNICEF,
- EU-ECHO
- Civil Society for Poverty Eradication, Goggoji Zumunchi Development Initiative, Association of Licensed Private Security Action, NECSOB, Aleem Foundation, Gender Equality, Peace and Development Centre, Justice, Development and Peace Committee, Global Education in Emergencies Support Initiative, Rehabilitation, Empowerment and Better Health Initiative, Samaritan Care and Support Initiative, Mercy Vincent Foundation, Greencode, JAPH, Life at Best Development Initiative, Smiling Hearts Initiatives International, Restoration of Hope Initiative
- -SEMA

In Makurdi:

Wednesday - Thursday, 03 - 04 April 2019

- -WREP, GERI, Okana Women and Children Development Organization, Green Hearth Initiative, Mbaclulin Development Foundation, CEDASJ, GRAF, CISHAN, SCASI, GECOME, First Step, WOMSI, Begonet, FJDP, SWAC Foundation, GAJI, EDF Foundation, Joded Foundation, ESLF, IEBPS, ECCAI, GTM, WIM, HCF, OWACDO, Idoma National Youth Forum
- Christian Aid, MSF
- SEMA, Office of Governor

In Abuja:

Friday, 05 April 2019

- OCHA, WFP, WHO, UN Women
 - Mercy Corps, Street Child, Nigeria INGO Forum IFRC, NRCS
 - Canadian High Commission, USAID/OFDA, Swiss Embassy, ECHO, Embassy of Germany
 - Green Code, WREP, IANSA Women Nigeria, CWSI, Keen and Care Initiative, Global Agenda for Total Emancipation, Women and Youth Environmental Safety and Empowering Organization, Youth Reformation and Awareness Centre, Selu Afrique Community Development Initiative for Women Empowerment, Women Right to Education
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MISSION REPORT

Nigeria, 01 -05 April 2019

