


# IASC Alert, Early Warning and Readiness Report

Submitted by the IASC Task Team on Preparedness and Resilience



     
**OUTLOOK PERIOD**  
November 2015 - April 2016

# Alert, Early Warning and Readiness Report Map



## Introduction

The IASC Alert, Early Warning and Readiness report is produced bi-annually as an inter-agency effort by the Task Team on Preparedness and Resilience (TTPR) for IASC member agencies. The report highlights serious risks that were either identified as being of particular strategic operational concern or as having a high probability and impact on humanitarian needs. In addition to collaboratively assembling the report, the report includes an analysis of the state of readiness, prepared by OCHA, which is compared against each risk.

The featured risks are divided into conflict and natural hazard risks and include a detailed risk analysis section followed by an associated preparedness analysis. The risk analysis assesses the risk's drivers and projects trends while the preparedness analysis looks at the IASC system's readiness level as well as national capacities to cope with identified risks. A health risk alert outlines the predominant polio, plague and cholera concerns in a separate section which was added in view of potential restrictions to the UN's operational environment.

### Risk type icons



Conflict



Flood



Drought

### Seriousness

Very Low

Low

Moderate

High

Very High

According to the IASC Analysts' risk assessment, the featured risks are sorted by seriousness, which is reflected in the colour of the risk icon, and within the same seriousness category by likelihood. The INFORM Risk Value, which identifies countries at high risk of humanitarian crisis based on historic data, is added to provide a wider risk context.

The report includes a substantial section on El Niño. This is in the form of both an alert for the ongoing El Niño episode and a warning for the potential effects in the lead up to the peak of this El Niño event. The below El Niño Overview provides more details on past and potential impacts in the affected regions as well as a meteorological analysis of potential El Niño conditions expected over the period covered by this report.

Published on 22 October 2015

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
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## El Niño Overview

By March 2015 the requirements were met for an official El Niño episode and, as El Niño strengthened, the changes to global weather corresponded. Rainfall continued to be below-average across Central America and the Caribbean's second cropping season (Apr-Oct) leading to total crop losses in some regions and, coupled with the 2014 drought, millions require immediate assistance. While the 2014 *postrera* season produced generally good harvests in Guatemala, Honduras, and El Salvador thanks to favourable weather conditions, the *primera* season of both 2014 and 2015 will be below average. In the affected countries, the UN agencies and authorities in these countries jointly work to elevate readiness to respond to a potential food security deterioration.

In Eastern Africa, past failed rains (June-Sept) across Eritrea, Djibouti and Ethiopia's main cropping regions have led to over 8 million people requiring humanitarian needs, and in the coming months, excessive rainfall may exacerbate the situation with potential flooding in southern regions. Similarly, extreme drought and flooding in Pakistan, India, Bangladesh, Myanmar, and across Asia to the Koreas, has displaced hundreds of thousands of people. As El Niño is forecast to strengthen in the coming months, further effects are anticipated in regions that are about to start their cropping season.

Currently the Oceanic Niño Index (ONI) stands at 1.5, the strongest index observed since the record 1997/1998 El Niño episode, which recorded an ONI of 2.3 for two consecutive three-month seasons. Current forecasts are indicating that this year's El Niño will continue to strengthen, likely reaching a similar strength of 1997/1998 episode. Regardless of strength, no two El Niño's will ever have the same effect on global weather patterns: other aspects of climate variability, some partly influenced by climate change, also play a role. Seasonal climate forecasts aim to capture all of these aspects. In addition, changes in vulnerability and exposure, for instance due to population growth or changes in agricultural systems, mean that even similar climate patterns may have different impacts.



El Niño conditions are forecast to peak through December before slowly weakening in spring 2016. In the short-term, however, there is an elevated risk for flooding across the Horn of Africa potentially affecting over a million people in Somalia and Kenya, and a continuation of drought in Southern Africa, South East Asia and the Pacific Islands where as many as eleven countries could be affected. Current drought conditions in the Asia-Pacific region have exacerbated Indonesian forest fires, affected over two million people in Papua New Guinea, and has caused increasing concerns in Fiji, Vanuatu, and the Solomon Islands. In the Long-term, and beyond the scope of this report, forecasts are indicating that a colder and wetter winter is most likely across the Near and Middle East, potentially leading to spring floods and winter avalanches.

## Eastern Africa: Drought in Somalia, Ethiopia. Floods in Somalia, Ethiopia, Kenya



### RISK ANALYSIS

Historically, above average rainfall has been directly correlated with the strength of El Niño in Eastern Africa. Current long-range climate forecasts are indicating that there exists a high probability of significant above-average rainfall across southern Ethiopia, south central Somalia, and Kenya, with strong signals for above average rainfall to occur over the Juba, Shebelle and Rift Valleys. During similar past events, nearly a million people were affected in these regions due to flooding. Through January, there is nearly a 70% chance of above average rainfall occurring over these regions according to the

European Centre for Medium Range Forecasting. However, risk for continued above-average rainfall begins to moderate as we move into February, with only a 40% chance of above-average rain.

In addition to the main flood prone regions mentioned above, many areas within Ethiopia, Kenya and Somalia are prone to flash flooding, mud slides, lightning strikes and water-borne and animal health diseases. While the forecast for the season ahead appears dire, the potential exists for some regions to acquire some much needed rainfall in parts of Ethiopia, Kenya and Somalia that have received inadequate rainfall during their previous seasons. However, this rainfall will not mitigate the effects of the failed rains during Ethiopia's main rainy season in 2015 (June -Sept), which has negatively affected millions of people and caused widespread drought across the countries' main cropping regions in north central Ethiopia. There is a 100% likelihood that more than 500,000 new people in the three countries will need humanitarian assistance in the coming six months as a result of this risk.

Due to failed rains in Ethiopia, the government released grain reserves, however, the number of new people requiring food assistance is overwhelming the national response capacities. The Ethiopia Humanitarian Country Team (EHCT) labels this an emergency and, with its well established management and operational arrangements already in place, it is consolidating Action Plans. Current assessments by the EHCT and Cluster Lead Agencies have determined that the availability of stocks in the country is insufficient. Procurement of humanitarian commodities is needed now to address delivery lead times of up to three months and expected congestion at the port of Djibouti in February.

### PREPARED- NESS ANALYSIS

Unlike the slow onset risks such as drought, daily weather monitoring of rainfall amounts, upstream river levels, and both flood and weather forecasts are needed to provide adequate early warning for potential flooding events. In Kenya, the Government's flood mitigation preparations outline at-risk regions and areas of improved growing conditions due to average to above-average rainfall. The Government's operational plan for El Niño is finalized under an Inter-Ministerial Task Force led by the Vice President. With the recent devolution of power, there is no clarity on responsibilities and triggers, and limited capacity at the county and sub-county level, however, the Kenyan Red Cross' estimated capacity can support about 80% of the most likely caseload.

In Somalia, the government's capacity to deliver services and provide disaster response remains very limited. Yet, the IASC preparedness level is relatively high, particularly the ability to re-programme. Strong coordination mechanisms, including an HCT with active donor engagement, provides for system-wide mobilization and expansion. Humanitarian agencies agreed on measures to mitigate the risks (such as strengthening weak spots in the rivers) and build response preparedness (such as identifying additional warehouses to preposition existing stocks). In September 2015, the HCT's contingency plan calls for US\$29.7 million to fund preparedness requirements and \$35 million to provide humanitarian assistance from October to December 2015. Based on existing response capacity, partners agreed to preposition humanitarian relief items to assist at least 50,000 people for eight weeks in all potential hotspot areas. Roadblocks and checkpoints particularly in South Central Somalia hamper aid delivery. Al-Shabaab will likely ban or restrict the humanitarian access in areas where they have a strong presence, leading to further displacement as people attempt to leave Al-Shabaab controlled areas to get access to humanitarian assistance.

	SOM	ETH	KEN
<b>INFORM Risk Value</b>	<b>8.7</b>	<b>6.4</b>	<b>6.1</b>
Hazard & Exposure (Nature)	6.2	3.8	4.2
Lack of Coping Capacity	9.1	7.3	6.5
Vulnerability	8.3	6.7	6.1

## Southern Africa: Drought in Zimbabwe, Zambia, Malawi, Mozambique, Botswana, Lesotho, Madagascar



### RISK ANALYSIS

Current long-range rainfall forecasts for Southern Africa are indicating below-average rainfall as being exceedingly likely from the central Mozambique region, southern Malawi, southern Madagascar, south-eastern Zambia and across Zimbabwe, Botswana and South Africa including Lesotho well into March 2016. Malawi, Zimbabwe and Madagascar are of greatest concern. Current weather model statistics are providing a 70% probability of significant below-average rainfall over the next six months. Historically, El Niño has little effect on the regions cyclone season, however current guidance is suggesting a below-average cyclone season, which could further reduce seasonal rainfall accumulations.

In addition to the poor seasonal outlook, these regions are already coping with below-average harvests from their previous season due to both drought and floods. Estimates of food insecure people during the 2015/16 lean season in Zimbabwe is 1.5 million people, 2.8 million in Malawi, 13,700 in Mozambique, 30,000 in Botswana, 80,000 in Zambia, and 463,000 in Lesotho, according to the Food and Nutrition Security Working Group. In the very short term, it is highly likely that there will be delays in the start of the rainy season, and if the season continues to perform poorly in the new year, there will be a significant increase in the number people requiring humanitarian aid. Due to the previous season's poor weather, there are currently more than 5 million people in the region experiencing food insecurity.

In the Southern African region, the Humanitarian Country Team (HCT) does not have separate contingency plans, instead they are integrated into national contingency plans. National contingency plans are expected to be finalized by 31 October 2015. In Zimbabwe, 15 organizations (UN and non-UN) are capable of supporting a humanitarian response. A temporary HCT is in place to respond to the current food insecurity though a lot needs to be done to ensure that agencies are part of a strengthened HCT. Most sectors are based in the capital and do not have a coordination structure at the sub-national level with the exception of the WASH sector. In Malawi, most agencies are based in Lilongwe and Blantyre, with an operational HCT and clusters. In the event of a major emergency, it will request surge from their HQs. There are insufficient stocks in country, in particular shelter, NFIs and WASH stocks. In Madagascar, it is expected that most agencies would be able to cover the needs of 25,000 people (for most of the sectors). The food security sector has stocks to cover the needs of 190,000 people for two weeks in case of emergency. In respect of Lesotho, the situation is exacerbated by the risk of a breakdown in government structures that could trigger serious human rights violations and a possible humanitarian crises.

### PREPAREDNESS ANALYSIS

Challenges to a timely and effective response are mainly linked to a lack of availability of humanitarian stocks in the region due to financial constraints and a low level of presence of humanitarian actors.

Planned activities to increase readiness:

- Contingency plans are being finalised for the countries in the Southern Africa region. These will incorporate natural disaster risks as well as man-made risks.
- Training for rapid response team (Madagascar 30 Nov-4 December); training on advanced preparedness actions (Malawi 5-9 October and Zimbabwe – date TBD)
- Simulations (Madagascar (November ; dates TBD) and Malawi (dates TBC))

	ZWE	ZMB	MWI	MOZ	BWA	LSO	MDG
<b>INFORM Risk Value</b>	<b>4.2</b>	<b>4.1</b>	<b>4.1</b>	<b>5.8</b>	<b>3.1</b>	<b>3.9</b>	<b>4.9</b>
Hazard & Exposure (Nature)	2.5	2.0	3.2	6.0	2.6	2.0	5.7
Lack of Coping Capacity	5.6	6.4	6.4	6.9	4.9	6.6	7.9
Vulnerability	5.3	5.7	5.7	6.2	3.9	5.3	4.2



## South Pacific & South East Asia: Drought in Indonesia, the Philippines, Papua New Guinea, Vanuatu, Solomon Islands, Fiji, Tonga, Cambodia



### RISK ANALYSIS

Below-average rainfall from Cambodia to Tonga has negatively affected crop and ground conditions, elevating the risk for wildfires and severely affecting subsistence farming families. Currently, each country outlined in this region is experiencing drought conditions with millions of people facing food shortages. Seasonal forecasts for the remainder of the year and into next year are for a continuation of drought conditions. However, other regions such as Papua New Guinea, parts of Indonesia, and the Solomon Islands may face flooding events as rainfall is likely to be above normal during the main growing months in 2016. Historically, this has led to the proliferation of waterborne diseases and risk of landslides. The greatest risk with respect to climate forecasts and a country's ability to respond is likely across the South Pacific Islands where according to the Pacific Humanitarian Team there are as many as 4.1 million people at risk. In the Pacific, as many as eleven countries could be affected but four are of most concern: Fiji, Vanuatu, Solomon Islands and Papua New Guinea.

Within each country, clusters representing WASH, NFI/Shelter, Health, Nutrition, Education and Protection are active to some degree, and most have updated their contingency plans. The National Disaster Management Offices (NDMO) in Vanuatu, Solomon Islands, and Fiji have begun assessments and have activated several disaster and drought committees to monitor the situation and provide updates on vulnerable areas. In Fiji, a draft drought management plan has been circulated and Fiji government-led clusters have been activated. A UN field office was established in Fiji to support telecommunications and logistics around the Pacific. In Vanuatu, the NDMO is consolidating a 12 month El Niño response plan. A request is being made to the Prime Minister's office to divert TC Pam recovery funds to the El Niño response. The Government is beginning to do contingency planning for mass evacuations of worst-hit villages and communities. In the Solomon Islands, the NDMO is in the early phases of preparing its response and there may be a need for support moving forward. A National Drought Committee has now been established. In Papua New Guinea, the government has started responding to drought conditions and activated its National Disaster Centre as well as relevant disaster committees. However, humanitarian emergency expertise within Papua New Guinea is limited, and key agencies have little to no representation on the ground. Assessment and preparedness missions to Papua New Guinea and other affected countries are ongoing or planned to assess the current situation and evaluate adequate preparedness and response measures.

### PREPAREDNESS ANALYSIS

	IDN	PHL	PNG	VNT	SLB	FJI	TON	KHM
<b>INFORM Risk Value</b>	<b>4.5</b>	<b>5.2</b>	<b>5.1</b>	<b>4.6</b>	<b>5.6</b>	<b>3.3</b>	<b>3.3</b>	<b>4.0</b>
Hazard & Exposure (Nature)	7.4	8.9	5.2	5.8	6.4	5.7	3.4	4.4
Lack of Coping Capacity	5.2	4.3	8.1	6.3	7.0	4.3	4.9	6.7
Vulnerability	2.7	4.0	5.2	4.4	6.3	2.4	3.9	3.2



**Libya:** Armed conflict between armed group alliances
**RISK  
ANALYSIS**

The UN-led negotiations for the formation of the national unity government have been unable to bridge the gap between the discordant Libyan factions. As of mid-October, the House of Representatives (HoR) and the General National Congress (GNC) have yet to agree on the UN-brokered proposed list of unity government. The deadline for the deal has been extended to 20 October, after which the internationally-recognised House of Representatives (HoR) will be illegitimate as its mandate expires. The prolonged process of negotiations for the past months has created a political and security vacuum which the various militias, jihadist groups, and criminal gangs would likely fill, increasing further the risk for civilians to be subjected to indiscriminate attacks, summary executions, arbitrary arrests and abductions. Given the fragile and porous border situations, Libya has also become a major transit country of irregular onward movements, in which refugees and migrants are also often caught in the hands of the smuggling and trafficking network.

It is likely that the HoR would suffer a split with the Libyan National Army (LNA) under the command of General Haftar. The lack of recognised and legitimate political institutions inside the country could open the door to the establishment of a military council to rule Libya. In Cyrenaica (eastern Libya), General Haftar encouraged the establishment of a political movement demanding that a military council rule Libya, and renewing military efforts in Benghazi. In the absence of a legitimate government, Libya is likely to face a rapidly deteriorating civil war losing any chance of achieving stability or a political solution in the foreseeable future. Over 2.4 million people (of whom 55 per cent are women and children), out of a population of 6.3 million, currently require humanitarian assistance, a sharp increase from one year ago. The ongoing conflict has already led to a deteriorating protection environment, a collapsing health system, large-scale displacement, increasing food insecurity, heightened vulnerabilities for refugees/asylum seekers/migrants, and reduced access to education. There is a 60% likelihood that more than 500,000 new people will need humanitarian assistance in the coming six months as a result of this risk.

Humanitarian operational capacity and international presence in Libya itself is low. The humanitarian community has limited capacity in-country, with seven UN agencies, nine INGOs, few national NGOs and very few national partners. Most international staff operate remotely from Tunis since mid-July 2014. Humanitarian assistance continues to be provided largely through local staff and local NGOs, as well as local civil society organizations, municipalities and local crisis committees, however the capacity of national partners remains insufficient to meet the needs of all those affected. IMC recently re-launched international presence in Tripoli and MSF re-established presence in eastern Libya in May. ICRC also operates in Libya, with international staff based in Tunis. Humanitarian access to areas in need of humanitarian assistance varies considerably across provinces. The areas under the control of Islamic State have not been accessible. Only 31 per cent of the US\$35 million requested against the previous 2014-2015 Humanitarian Response Plan has been received. As a result, the level of preparedness to respond quickly to a sudden deterioration in the humanitarian situation is low and of major concern to the humanitarian community. Although contingency planning has been limited, plans to review the May 2015 plan once humanitarian response planning is completed. Given the rival parallel governments, there are no clear procedures/protocols to request/accept international assistance.

**PREPARED-  
NESS  
ANALYSIS**

The humanitarian operation in Libya is being refocused and strengthened. The HC has flagged improved analysis, advocacy/messaging and information management capacities as key areas to improving the humanitarian response. Continued strengthening of basic coordination structures is also required. The HCT was re-established in June 2015. Sectors are functioning in key areas of health, shelter and NFIs, protection and WASH, however UN agency staff need training and support. DSS will identify a possible strategy to increase access, including through security assessments and the programme criticality exercise.

**INFORM Risk Value: 5.9**

- Hazard & Exposure (Human): 8.0
- Lack of Coping Capacity Value: 6.7
- Vulnerability: 4.7

## Afghanistan: Armed conflict involving armed groups and the ANSF - also affecting Pakistan and Tajikistan



### RISK ANALYSIS

The first half of 2015 saw an increase in conflict both in terms of frequency and geographic spread, notably in Helmand, Kunduz, Faryab and Nangarhar, while various provinces in the Central Region remain unstable with continued displacement. Conflict-induced displacement shows a significant upsurge compared to the same period in previous years. The Taliban attacks in the Northern provinces highlights the strategic importance of this territory at the border with Uzbekistan and Tajikistan, where other armed groups are getting increasingly active. Tajikistan does not accept refugees from Afghanistan, and has expressed concerns that the conflict might spill over into Tajikistan.

The Islamic State (IS) started a recruitment campaign in Afghanistan, and is willing to control the border with Tajikistan. The multiplication of armed groups and competition for money and control is further fuelled by the current military operation in nearby Pakistan that has disrupted the established sanctuaries of these groups. As a result, an increase in fighting between competing armed groups in eastern and northern Afghanistan is likely. As long as the Taliban remain fragmented, there is little prospect for the Taliban leadership to engage in meaningful negotiations with the Afghan government. Without a change in the current dynamics, the security situation is expected to deteriorate. As the attack on the MSF hospital in Kunduz highlights, the humanitarian access for aid workers is worsening with concerns that some Taliban groups acquired access to information of aid workers. Given the high numbers of civilians injured and killed in the first half of 2015, the risks for civilian casualties remains and decreased humanitarian access is likely in the coming six months. There is a 60% likelihood that between 100,000 and 250,000 new people will need humanitarian assistance in the coming six months as a result of this risk.

As per the Standard Operating Procedures approved by the HCT and Government in early 2015, the required response at provincial, regional and national level has been identified and the procedures on when to request international assistance are in place. However, the increase in conflict across the northern region has overwhelmed the response capacity of cluster partners and rapidly depleted the emergency stocks, resulting in insufficient stocks to meet the estimated caseloads. A review of the inter-agency emergency stocks was carried-out in July. The gap analysis, which compared the availability of stocks against the projected caseloads of conflict-induced IDPs and those affected by natural disaster, identified gaps in shelter and NFIs. The prepositioning of stocks is an issue over the coming six months as some of the roads in the north-eastern, central and central highlands will be blocked due to heavy snow and harsh winter. Due to the funding constraints some of the stocks might not be prepositioned in time.

### PREPAREDNESS ANALYSIS

Due to the complex disasters, conflict and natural, a unified contingency plan has not yet been initiated or agreed upon. However, regular flooding- and IDP-specific contingency plans have been produced. The next revision of the contingency plan will take place in October/November as part of the winter contingency planning process. The main operational constraints to efficiently and quickly responding to projected needs are funding and humanitarian access, whether due to active conflict or physical access constraints (mudslides, avalanches, etc).

#### INFORM Risk Value: 7.9

- Hazard & Exposure (Human): 10.0
- Lack of Coping Capacity Value: 8.0
- Vulnerability: 7.1

## Burundi: Post-electoral violence


**RISK  
ANALYSIS**

Political pressure is mounting on President Nkurunziza as the main opposition party calls for extensive international sanctions, and states that it will use all legal means, including military force, to push Nkurunziza out of office. As a result, the crackdown on opposition supporters intensified as reports suggest that mass arrests by security forces were conducted in Gitega and Makamba provinces. Since the beginning of September, an upsurge in arrests, detentions and killings amidst ongoing violence of security forces including extrajudicial killings was observed. It is expected that repressive crackdowns will increasingly spread beyond Bujumbura. The risk of a new coup remains extant as the rift within the armed forces widens. Nkurunziza called on the country's army to stay united after the attempted killing of the Chief of Armed Forces, yet it is likely that the rift will persist as crackdowns on dissident soldiers will widen the divide even further. From a sub-regional view, accusations between Rwanda and Burundi over logistical support to opponents continue and Rwanda could intervene militarily in Burundi under the pretext of hunting down FDLR members, yet this remains a less likely outcome.

Due to ongoing threats and intimidation toward opposition supporters and fear among communities of further violence, displacement is likely to continue with most of the displaced people crossing borders into neighbouring countries, particularly Tanzania that as of 7 October hosted over 104,000 Burundian refugees. The six Burundian provinces most likely to be affected by increased IDP numbers are: Bujumbura Mairie, Bujumbura Rural, Cibitoke, Kirundo, Rumonge and Makamba. The crisis has already exacerbated the humanitarian situation in various sectors including: i) food security; ii) nutrition, with GAM rates increasing from 2.5 per cent in 2014 to 8.3 per cent in August 2015; and iii) health with additional demand related to the treatment of people wounded during protests as well the cholera outbreak in Nyanza-Lac commune; and iv) protection risks, including child protection and SGBV. There is a 60% likelihood that between 100,000 and 250,000 new people will need humanitarian assistance in the coming six months as a result of this risk.

The existing national disaster response capacity remains weak and constitutes a challenge for a timely and effective response. The Government counterpart is not expected to deliver any major humanitarian assistance in a complex emergency context. While the Burundi Red Cross is very well established throughout the country, there is a need to reinforce its response capacity. The number and capacity of international emergency partners in the country remain limited. Although they are mainly concentrated in the capital, many have sub-offices in some other provinces or would be able to quickly (re)open sub-offices if there was a need. Surging in more emergency personnel into the country will be required (for all sectors) should there be a sudden increase in needs.

**PREPARED-  
NESS  
ANALYSIS**

The Humanitarian Country Team has been recently re-established and humanitarian partners have agreed on the sectors and leadership arrangements to be set up. A UN presence in Burundi was established to support these coordination arrangements, including facilitating an inter-sector coordination forum. Stocks in country are insufficient if the number of people in need of humanitarian assistance reaches beyond 10,000 in several days or weeks. There are also existing logistics gaps in warehousing and transport capacity in terms of storage units and the availability of trucks. Additional warehouses need to be identified to pre-position existing stocks in potential hotspot areas. An estimated \$39 million are required to prepare and respond to the humanitarian needs of up to 400,000 Burundians for six months, including \$10 million for preparedness and \$29 million for response.

**INFORM Risk Value: 4.6**

- Hazard & Exposure (Human): 1.8
- Lack of Coping Capacity Value: 6.3
- Vulnerability: 7.0

## C.A.R: Communal and electoral violence


**RISK  
ANALYSIS**

Recent politically motivated and orchestrated violence in and around Bangui comes ahead of the presidential and legislative elections scheduled for 18 October but delayed to the end of the year. The upsurge in violence seems to be rooted in a broader political attempt by the largely Christian anti-balaka fighters loyal to former President Bozize to overthrow Samba Panza, the head of state of the transitional government. In addition, the largely Muslim ex-Seleka fighters loyal to former President Djotodia are marching towards Bangui also trying to push the president out of office. The country's sectarian divide is likely to widen as the political forces will capitalise on the political fragility and delayed elections. The peace process is hampered by the armed groups' reluctance to participate in the DDR process as they fear they would lose power under a new government. There is a risk of the violence spreading from Bangui to other provinces.

MINUSCA and French forces have insufficient capacity to ensure security beyond Bangui and the national army FACA lacks the training and capacity to impose any kind of state authority. In some cases, FACA soldiers exacerbate the violence and are often linked to anti-balaka criminal activities. 42,000 people were displaced in Bangui by the upsurge in violence which took place between 26 and 29 September and similar impact trends can be expected with continued violence. Renewed violence and limited state control over territory considerably restrict humanitarian access, especially in the provinces, as implementing partners cannot access the civilian population. In addition, the continued looting of offices of humanitarian organisations highlights the worrying trend of directly targeting humanitarian aid workers. The country's health services are functioning at only 55% and there is limited information on the civilian population's health status. There is a 60% likelihood that between 250,000 and 500,000 new people will need humanitarian assistance in the coming six months as a result of this risk.

The ability of the CAR authorities and the international community to address the humanitarian consequences of any deterioration in the crisis is limited by political, security and access concerns as well as a lack of resources (the 2015 HRP is currently only 45% funded). Humanitarian response capacity remains insufficient to meet even current needs, particularly outside Bangui. Although humanitarian response capacity has more than doubled since the declaration of the L3 in December 2013 (from 47 UN agencies and NGOs before the L3 to 108 now), and are now operational throughout the country with seven deployment hubs, the needs are massive and the increased scale and complexity of violence and direct targeting of humanitarians are hampering effective aid delivery.

**PREPARED-  
NESS  
ANALYSIS**

The upsurge of violence since the end of September has severely curtailed access and some 146 NGO staff (non-essential) are being evacuated. Even before the spike in violence, humanitarian partners had already started withdrawing from the interior of the country due to a lack of resources. Only three per cent of the roads in CAR are paved, making access to remote and isolated locations where thousands of people are sheltering extremely difficult.

**INFORM Risk Value: 8.2**

- Hazard & Exposure (Human): 10.0
- Lack of Coping Capacity Value: 8.6
- Vulnerability: 8.3

## Nigeria: Armed conflict between neighbouring armies and Boko Haram - also affecting Cameroon, Chad, Niger



### RISK ANALYSIS

Boko Haram attacks against the civilian population and terrorist attacks as well as regional counter-insurgency operations will likely lead to continued displacement in Nigeria's northeast and the border areas with neighbouring Cameroon, Chad, and Niger. Instead of directly confronting the regional armies, Boko Haram will likely resort to hit-and-run and suicide attacks as demonstrated by the IED and suicide attacks in Nigeria's Yola and Cameroon's Far North in September 2015, the Lake Chad Region in September and October 2015, as well as in Niger's Diffa region in October 2015. It is expected that

Boko Haram will intensify its attacks, including massacres, abductions and sexual violence in its area of control as military pressure increases. Apart from Boko Haram, the regional armies similarly perpetrate human rights violations against civilians, including extrajudicial killings, enforced disappearances, acts of torture and rape. Boko Haram's IED and terrorist attacks also highlight the regional armies' lack of effective counter-terrorism capacity and further asymmetric attacks are likely in IDP camps and urban areas.

With the majority of IDPs living in host communities, secondary and tertiary IDP displacement is likely due to the limited hosting capacity and depleted resources. Civilians returning to Boko Haram controlled areas to grow and harvest their land are exposed to human rights abuses and will likely experience renewed violence and displacement. In addition, the repatriation of Nigerian refugees in border areas will further add to the IDP caseload. Due to the lack of humanitarian access and reliable displacement information, actual displacement figures are likely to be higher than estimated and are expected to rise with the continued repatriation of Nigerian refugees and the ongoing counter-insurgency operations. There is a 60% likelihood that between 100,000 and 250,000 new people will need humanitarian assistance in the coming six months as a result of this risk.

There is strong national emergency capacity through the National Emergency Management Agency (NEMA) and the State Emergency Management agencies. Yet, the national coordination structures remain weak, at state level in particular, with an inadequate number of emergency-experienced programmatic and coordination personnel. Humanitarian coordination mechanisms are not commensurate to the increasing humanitarian needs. The international humanitarian community has not reached a consensus on the activation of clusters and a shared leadership model for coordinating sectors. The very limited IM as well as monitoring and reporting capacity are of significant concern. The limited availability of reliable humanitarian data prevents from informed planning, effective advocacy and sustained donor support.

### PREPAREDNESS ANALYSIS

The IASC contingency plan (IACP), National Contingency Plan and National Disaster Response plan have not been reviewed for at least two years. Limited humanitarian funding has affected the ability to ensure sufficient stocks are available. As of 28 September, the 2015 HRP was funded at 47%. In 2016, the IACP will be updated and implemented. In addition, national authorities will be supported in developing/updating a national multi-hazard contingency plan as well as contingency plans in relation to the Boko Haram insurgency.

#### INFORM Risk Value: 6.3

- Hazard & Exposure (Human): 9.0
- Lack of Coping Capacity Value: 6.6
- Vulnerability: 5.6

## Mali: Armed conflict involving international and government troops, Tuareg militants and Islamist armed groups



### RISK ANALYSIS

Given the lack of a substantive peace process and the fragmentation of armed groups, fighting for territory in the north as well as limited humanitarian access is likely to persist. Regional and municipal elections scheduled for 25 October were delayed by the government due to insecurity. Despite the signing of the peace agreement on 20 June 2015, the Tuareg alliance CMA and the pro-government GATIA Platform are likely to continue attacks to gain territory and increase their political leverage. An upsurge of asymmetric warfare tactics is expected together with increased Jihadist attacks in the border areas, as highlighted by Jihadist attacks and arrests especially along the Burkina Faso and Cote d'Ivoire borders. The Jihadist's expansion will further stretch MINUSMA's and the Malian Army's limited capacity to protect territory. The high number of lethal attacks against MINUSMA adds to the challenges faced by the mission.

The main humanitarian consequences of further instability related to CMA, GATIA Platform and Jihadist activities will be continued displacement. However, the geographic spread of the civilian population across a large and sparsely populated region of the country and the fact that civilians are accustomed to continued insecurity leading to short-time or preventive displacement, makes it likely that displacement numbers will remain low. Nevertheless, humanitarian access in the north is likely to be continually constrained while attacks against humanitarian actors are expected to continue. In addition, a delayed redeployment of the Malian administration and expansion of basic social services is likely, compelling humanitarian actors to substitute to the Line Ministries in the affected areas while humanitarian funding will remain low. There is a 65% likelihood that up to 20,000 new people will need humanitarian assistance in the coming six months as a result of this risk.

The humanitarian community's overall capacity to respond quickly to a deterioration of the situation is low, especially for sectors other than food assistance, particularly in rural areas. While insecurity is limiting the humanitarian actors' presence in rural areas, the government's presence is chronically weak in those areas as well. Stocks have not been pre-positioned in the regions of Mopti, Timbuktu and Gao, and concerns over potential looting persists. UN stocks are pre-positioned either in Bamako or in Segou which creates some delay in deploying them. Discussions are ongoing at the HCT level to see how to delocalize stocks at the regional level taking into account security constraints.

### PREPAREDNESS ANALYSIS

Emergency response coordination mechanisms are in place at both national and regional levels. They are managed by Government authorities with the support of the humanitarian system. Contingency plans for Gao, Mopti, Segou and Timbuktu were last updated in June 2015. The plans, prepared with local authorities, still need to be validated by the government. In Bamako, a national multi-risk plan was finalized in June as well, together with humanitarian partners. With the Humanitarian Response Plan only 36 per cent funded (of \$377 million), UN agencies and NGOs have difficulties securing funding necessary for the prepositioning of stocks and other preparedness actions. Logistics capabilities are generally weak. There are virtually no transportation means in rural areas, roads are generally of bad quality, especially during the rainy season, and rains also affect the use of landing strips. With the start of the lean season in June, the number of food insecure people will increase from 2.6 in June to 3.1 million in October across the country.

#### INFORM Risk Value: 6.6

- Hazard & Exposure (Human): 8.0
- Lack of Coping Capacity Value: 6.8
- Vulnerability: 6.7



## Ukraine: Armed conflict between the Ukrainian military and anti-government troops



### RISK ANALYSIS

As winter sets in, the humanitarian situation is expected to deteriorate and humanitarian assistance is particularly needed for the relatively high number of elderly people. The UN and INGOs remain unable to provide critical winterization assistance in non-government controlled areas due to the suspension of all UN and virtually all INGO operations by the *de facto* authorities since 21 July. It is expected that any substantial new movement of IDPs will result in displacements not only in the east, but further westwards across the country. The economic situation is likely to further deteriorate.

Both sides of the conflict agreed on a ceasefire in compliance with the Minsk Agreement on early September, in anticipation of local elections. The separatist Luhansk Popular Republics (DNR and LNR) agreed to postpone the elections to 21 February 2016, while the self-proclaimed “Donetsk People’s Republic” intends to hold elections on 20 March 2016. The Russian government, reportedly supporting the DPR and LPR militants, significantly increased its military involvement in Syria in September and is likely to decrease its involvement in Ukraine. As of early October, both sides agreed to remove heavy weapons from the frontline in anticipation of the elections. It is likely that the conflict will de-escalate or remain frozen for the next six months, which would likely allow UN offices in Luhansk to reopen and re-start operations with international staff. However, it remains to be seen if implementing NGO partners will be allowed to restart their operations.

Nevertheless, civilian casualties will continue, due to the risks of mines and the insufficient access to conduct mine risk education, particularly in the areas near the contact line and in the territories controlled by armed groups. The diminishing humanitarian space and the restriction of access to territories controlled by armed groups is of concern. There is a 60% likelihood that between 20,000 and 100,000 new people will need humanitarian assistance in the coming six months as a result of this risk.

The ban on operations and expulsion of UN agencies and INGOs from non-Government controlled areas (NGCAs) has drastically reduced capacity, and is compounded by the limited number of national implementing partners there. The HCT will have to strengthen collaboration with national partners and identify new local partners working in these areas. Humanitarian organizations were planning to scale up operations due to the fast approaching winter, but these have been stalled following the ban on operations. Building on an operational mapping and agencies’ capacities for emergency response, the HCT is developing a plan for ideal operational capacity in field locations. Humanitarian coordination structures are increasingly well-established, including at the sub-national level. Besides general coordination meetings, cluster and sub-cluster coordination mechanisms have been established at each field location, including the NGCAs of Donetsk and Luhansk.

### PREPAREDNESS ANALYSIS

Humanitarian community capacities to address new caseloads are likely to be limited unless more financial resources are available (the HRP was 40 per cent funded at the end of September). The HCT prepared a contingency plan in May 2015 with a view to enhancing preparedness of humanitarian partners for a hypothetical scenario of escalation of violence in eastern Ukraine. The plan calls for \$1.5 million for preparedness and \$20.3 million for up to three months to respond to a sharp increase of the conflict-affected population including displaced persons, host communities and vulnerable groups. The HCT is working to increase readiness including by establishing mechanisms and building up capacities to quickly assess humanitarian needs; prepositioning stocks (especially in Donetsk and Luhansk oblasts) to cater for new displacements; increasing warehouse capacity and locations in high-risk areas; and discussing with the government and non-state actors how to access affected areas if the situation deteriorates further. Partners are supporting a parliamentary effort to re-draft a law on humanitarian assistance to address issues with bureaucratic impediments affecting access to people in need – in particular those beyond government control.

#### INFORM Risk Value: 5.4

- Hazard & Exposure (Human): 9.0
- Lack of Coping Capacity Value: 5.1
- Vulnerability: 4.4



## Health Risk Alert

### Polio

In **Afghanistan**, a potential polio outbreak will severely limit the UN system's operational environment and reduce the number of people that can be reached. Renewed conflict in Afghanistan exacerbates the risk further as the polio programme's reach is limited due to conflict related inaccessibility, particularly affecting children. Historically, areas in the southern provinces have been hard to reach, however, access restrictions have now been reported in all of Afghanistan's provinces. To counter the risk of a polio spread which is exacerbated by access limitations, IASC support is needed for advocacy with local communities and other stakeholders to agree on windows of opportunity to conduct immunization campaigns. The programme is establishing permanent transit point vaccination booths to reach displaced populations around areas of conflict and Permanent Polio Teams work continuously in high risk areas, while the existing community-based surveillance network is being strengthened. Funding and operational support is required to stop the spread of polio. **Madagascar** is faced with a polio outbreak with 11 reported cases year-to-year.

### Plague

**Madagascar** has seen two plague outbreaks in the last 12 months (335 cases and 79 deaths year-to-year). This shows a severe vulnerability of the health system which should be reinforced to avoid new outbreaks of communicable diseases in the forthcoming period. The risk of spread of plague is high from October to April and the recent pneumonic plague outbreak in August in Moramanga (14 cases, including 10 deaths) shows the need for prevention and preparedness to avoid further spread of the disease and prevention and surveillance efforts to also avoid the apparition of new diseases. A spread of pneumonic plague to the capital or other heavily populated areas could have disastrous consequences: pneumonic plague is one of the most deadly infectious diseases; patients can die 24 hours after infection.

### Cholera

In **Iraq**, cholera is spreading and has affected already 16 governorates across the country with over 1400 confirmed cases and a very rapid spread of the disease since the beginning of the outbreak mid-September. Teams have been deployed and materials shipped while WASH interventions are being mounted. Specific preparedness should be undertaken by health, WASH and more generally humanitarian actors to avoid further spreading towards neighbouring countries (cases have already been reported in Kuwait and Bahrain), following the seasonal pilgrimage. IDP camps in particular should go through vaccination. A further spread to **Syria**, and by extension to **Lebanon, Turkey, and Jordan** is a preparedness concern: preparedness strategies should be developed to avoid the spread and prepare for such a response. Global stocks of cholera vaccines are not sufficient for a massive vaccination campaign in these countries.

In **Tanzania**, cholera has reached the Capital, Dar Es Salaam, where the water sources are heavily contaminated. The case fatality rate is worrying and social mobilisation and WASH activities are slow to be scaled-up. Numbers are growing day-by-day with already 4200 cases of cholera and 67 deaths reported. The cholera outbreak has now spread to the 12 regions of the country and to the island of Zanzibar where more than 100 cases have been reported. The national task force strategies are not fully implemented at community level. Strong scale-up is required from the WASH actors and from the health community while funding is required to avoid a further spread. A similarly strong El Niño event in 1997/98 caused a cholera outbreak in the region with over 200,000 cases and over 12,000 deaths in those 2 years. There is a likelihood of a regional spread of the current outbreak.

In **DRC**, cholera already affects 8 provinces, with over 3000 cases and has spread towards provinces (Maniema) not used to cholera responses, which raises concerns. Preparedness is required to ensure international and local actors are familiar with cholera response and for vaccination on the transmission road towards Kinshasa.

### Rift Valley Fever

With the elevated risk for flooding across the Horn of Africa, there is an elevated risk of Rift Valley Fever, particularly in Kenya, Somalia, and Tanzania. During the 1997/98 El Niño event, 27,500 infections were reported in Kenya's Garissa district with a population of 230,000. Urgent preparedness measures in the most affected countries (Kenya, Somalia, Tanzania) must be undertaken to avoid a regional epidemic.

## On Watch Risks

### State of Palestine

The October escalation of violence has already seen a spike in Palestinian casualties and a sharp increase in attacks against Israelis. Although efforts to restore the calm are underway and hold potential, further deterioration cannot be ruled out. Against a backdrop of regional tensions, the political stalemate and diminishing hope of its meaningful renewal, the policies that ensue from the longstanding occupation and expansion of settlements, and the religious tensions surrounding the Holy sites in Jerusalem are contributing factors that will continue to influence the dynamics in the upcoming year. Thus, without political engagement and concrete steps to improve the basic livelihood conditions, the deep frustration from the situation in the West Bank, and even more so in the Gaza strip, could give rise to yet another civil unrest that may turn violent, and in shorter and harsher intervals.

### Turkey

Turkey's current military campaign against the Kurdish PKK in south-eastern Turkey and Iraq is set against the backdrop of intensified regional and international military involvement in the Syrian conflict as well as the upcoming Turkish elections on 1 November. While Erdogan will try to regain a parliamentary majority for the AKP, the pro-Kurdish HDP will aim to deny an AKP majority. The political setup will likely translate into political violence with further crackdowns on Kurds. In addition, if Turkey's military operations against the PKK intensify in the lead-up and after the elections, humanitarian access is likely to face political restrictions.