Policy

LIGHT GUIDANCE ON COLLECTIVE OUTCOMES

Developed by IASC Results Group 4 on Humanitarian-Development Collaboration in consultation with the UN Joint Steering Committee to Advance Humanitarian and Development Collaboration

May 2020
Extensive explanatory text has been written on the humanitarian-development-peace nexus (HDPN) and collective outcomes. However, there is no single model of good practice at the country level. There remains a demand for concise and practical guidance aimed at those tasked with implementing the HDPN at country level. This guidance presents the many choices that must be made to create and deliver context-specific collective outcomes.

Light Guidance on Collective Outcomes

Planning and implementing the humanitarian-development-peace nexus in contexts of protracted crisis.

May 2020
1. Who is this guidance for?

This guidance is aimed at senior management across the humanitarian, development and peace community at country level, including the United Nations Resident / Humanitarian Coordinator (UNRC / HC) and their Resident Coordinator’s Office (RCO), Special or Deputy Special Representatives of the Secretary General (SRSG / DSRSG) and their teams, UN and Non-Governmental Organization (NGO) agency heads, United Nations Country Teams (UNCTs) / Humanitarian Country Teams (HCTs), and donor representatives. It may also be helpful to individuals responsible for implementing programmes at field level which contribute to collective outcomes.¹

The guidance uses the collective term the “HDP Community” to describe the full range of humanitarian, development and peace actors working and funding in a country.

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2. Why is focusing action on collective outcomes needed now?

The 2030 Agenda for sustainable development sets out 17 Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs) and 169 targets. Their achievement is far from guaranteed. The World Bank Group estimates that by 2020 the majority of the world’s extreme poor will be living in fragile and conflict-affected situations and that up to two-thirds of the world’s extreme poor may live in such settings by 2030. The focus on collective outcomes was also a key feature of the World Humanitarian Summit (WHS).

Leaving no one behind, ending needs by reducing risks, vulnerabilities and drivers of conflict is now a shared commitment of the UN and the IASC. Reducing the impact of protracted crises requires both, meeting immediate needs and investing in the medium to long-term to reduce vulnerabilities and risks affecting communities and wider economic and governance systems and contribute to sustainable development and sustained peace. Aid actors must evolve their thinking and working methods to address these issues more coherently. Business as usual is not delivering the results needed. The policy direction is clear and well-established: behaviors, attitudes and work processes must change to make the “new way of working” the established norm.

Related work includes the UN Secretary General’s reform efforts related to the development system as well as the Sustaining Peace Agenda.


The IASC commissioned in-depth research in 2018 to establish a shared definition of collective outcomes, presented in the box below. It is consistent with that in the UN Sustainable Development Cooperation Framework (UNSDCF) guidance’s companion piece on the HDPN.

A collective outcome (CO) is a jointly envisioned result with the aim of addressing and reducing needs, risks and vulnerabilities, requiring the combined effort of humanitarian, development and peace communities and other actors as appropriate. To be effective, the CO should be context specific, engage the comparative advantage of all actors and draw on multi-year timeframes. They should be developed through joint (or joined-up) analysis, complementary planning and programming, effective leadership/coordination, refined financing beyond project-based funding and sequencing in formulation and implementation.

Strengthening the humanitarian-development-peace collaboration as identified by the majority of stakeholders as a top priority at the WHS, including donors, NGOs, crisis-affected States and others. Humanitarian assistance, development cooperation and peacebuilding are not serial processes: they are all needed at the same time in order to reduce needs, risk and vulnerability. Collaboration can be achieved by working towards collective outcomes, over multiple years, based on the comparative advantage of a diverse range of actors. Collective outcomes have emerged as a strategic tool for humanitarians, development and peace actors to agree on a concrete and measurable result that they will jointly achieve in a country with the overall aim of reducing people’s needs, risks and vulnerability.

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This has also been recognized by OECD DAC members when they put out their recommendations.

Collective outcomes are the tool on how to best achieve humanitarian, development and peace collaboration. They set out concrete and measurable results, collectively developed between the HDP Community in country and aimed at reducing humanitarian needs, risk and vulnerability. They are based and articulated on a shared analysis and a shared understanding and allow for humanitarian, development and peace actors to align their programming individually towards those collective outcomes, in accordance with respective mandates.

Based on their respective mandates, which are derived from General Assembly or Security Council resolutions, the humanitarian, development and peace actors have developed principles, policies and ways of working to ensure that they can deliver the best outcomes for the people they serve. The principles of humanity, neutrality, impartiality and independence guide humanitarian action. Development cooperation is based on the support to national priorities and plans, under the leadership and ownership of national governments, in their pursuit of the SDGs. Peacebuilding actors, too, are driven by the UN reform commitments. All actors are aware of and abide by the “do no harm principle” as well as trying to ensure conflict sensitivity in programming. The Quadrennial Comprehensive Policy Review (QCPR) recognizes that a “comprehensive whole-of-system response, including greater cooperation and complementarity among development, disaster risk reduction, humanitarian action and sustaining peace, is fundamental to most efficiently and effectively addressing needs and attaining the Sustainable Development Goals” and “calls upon the entities of the United Nations development system, in full compliance with their respective mandates, to enhance coordination with humanitarian assistance and peacebuilding efforts at the national level in countries facing humanitarian emergencies and in countries in conflict and post-conflict situations.”

The 2030 agenda is anchored in human rights, “leaving no one behind, first reaching those furthest behind and addressing inequality and discrimination”. Practical commitments are made in the Peace Promise and the Key Messages on the Humanitarian Development Nexus and its links to Peace.

These principles, policies and ways of working have evolved for good reasons and are often consistent and coherent. Collective outcomes developed at the country level allow for the collective identification of a concrete result driving complementary programming of humanitarian, development and peace actors, in accordance with their respective mandates.

Collective outcomes set a concrete and measurable result that humanitarian, development and peace actors want to achieve jointly in a country to reduce people’s needs, risks and vulnerabilities. As such, collective outcomes are the main tool for closer humanitarian-development and peace collaboration. They envision a common result, promote the connectivity and complementarity between plans and programmes within existing mandates and in respect of principles. Collective outcomes can also allow and promote more efficient funding and financing solutions by highlighting programmes that jointly executed contribute to the achievement of collective outcomes.

If collective outcomes are to be addressed within a 3 to 5-year timeframe, development and peacebuilding activities require immediate investment so that these programmes can contribute to reducing needs and vulnerabilities, achieving the SDGs and sustaining peace. In the implementation of collective outcomes, development and peacebuilding actors, local and national actors, affected populations, academia and the private sector, among others, need to engage meaningfully from the outset. Change requires investment in consistent and sound joint context and risk analysis;

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incentivization of better joined-up response planning and programming; strengthened leadership and coordination; and a recalibration of financing modalities.


The HDPN literature and best practices and lessons learned\(^5\) agree that collective outcomes must be highly-context specific. **There is no one-size fits all approach to operationalizing collective outcomes.** The 8-step framework proposed can help the HDP Community to move forward together. Partners must identify and make a series of decisions and choices to operationalize, prioritize and sequence collective outcomes.

There may be other steps to take, issues and choices confronting leaders and implementers that are not mentioned here.

5. 8-step Framework for operationalizing collective outcomes

**STEP 1: Identifying triggers and understanding readiness**

**Purpose:** To determine the most promising entry points and triggers to start the HDPN approach around collective outcomes, to identify the most appropriate planning process for the HDPN, to assess the willingness of key stakeholders to participate, and to understand what barriers to change may exist.

**Key actions to take:**

1. **Determine what the best entry point for HDPN planning and collective outcomes are.** This may be a top-down process resulting from a push from the HQ or RC to adopt collective outcomes or might be generated among the HDP Community in country understanding the potential of closer collaboration in order to not just meet but reduce needs, risks and vulnerabilities. One option is to define the collective outcomes in the UN and Government’s Cooperation Framework, a recovery and peacebuilding assessment (RPBA), a humanitarian response plan (HRP) or a refugee response plan (RRP). A catalytic event such as a change of government may also be a suitable entry point as this may open up space for collective action across several pillars. Recent examples have shown that

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\(^5\) The United Nations Joint Steering Committee to Advance Humanitarian and Development Collaboration (JSC) for instance has carried out a review of its seven HDP priority countries [see www.un.org/jsc](http://www.un.org/jsc) which highlight the importance of context specific collective outcomes.
collective outcomes may be more successfully implemented within a protracted crisis as this provides humanitarian, development and peace actors with the opportunity to jointly identify needs and challenges as well as the required stability to implement long-term programmes.

2. Determine whether the collective support taken up to date is achieving the expected impact. This is the critical “gateway” choice. The determination must be made by the RC or HC in consultation with government and leaders in all three pillars both within and outside the UN system. In Burkina Faso, the RC found that the most effective way to build support for change was to hold individual meetings with leaders from each pillar prior to joint discussions to understand their perspectives and attitudes on the HDPN before bringing the pillars together.

3. Determine the host government’s willingness to lead or participate in the collective outcomes process. Governments bear the primary responsibility to respond to disasters, protect their own populations including displaced persons, abide by the refugee conventions, respect international humanitarian principles and law, and should drive the achievement of the 2030 Agenda and the SDGs in their country and should play a critical role in the articulation and operationalization of collective outcomes, if possible. The IASC’s initial analysis of typologies of engagement, shown in Annex B, outline five basic scenarios characterizing positive to negative roles governments may play in protracted crises. The HDP Community should use the typologies and dialogue with government officials to choose whether and when to seek government leadership or participation. In Ethiopia, the government was a key actor from the outset in collective outcomes for drought prone areas and refugee rights. In Pakistan, the government of Khyber-Pakhtunkhwa province only became actively engaged when the collective outcome plan was (partially) funded.

4. Identify enablers and barriers to address the protracted crisis and assess capacities and missing resources of the HDP Community. In order to achieve the SDGs, governments and the HDP Community are being asked to operate differently in accordance with the Agenda 2030. Leaders must ascertain what barriers to change exist across government authorities and the HDP Community and how best they can be overcome. This assessment is best undertaken in a participatory workshop among key stakeholders. There is substantial literature on the assessment of readiness for change that typically focuses on four domains – motivation for change, institutional resources for change, personality attributes of staff and leaders, and the organizational climate for change. In practice the RC’s and other leaders’ managerial instinct, knowledge of and relationship with key stakeholders play an important role in understanding readiness for change.

5. Determine whether there is adequate capacity to formulate and implement collective outcomes at a reasonable pace. The enhanced core capacities of the RCO should be enough to start HDPN planning. However, greatest progress has been achieved where additional capacity exists. In Cameroon and DRC, the availability of dedicated human resources was described as instrumental in the HDPN approach. An appraisal of the gap between existing and necessary capacity can ensure that existing human resources are appropriately tasked to contribute and, if needed, can help justify investment in additional capacity. There are many tools, such as UNDP’s Capacity Assessment Methodology, that may be adapted for this task. Additional capacity may include project funded human resources, support from HQs, or secondments from participating agencies, including NGOs. In Uganda, international NGOs collectively finance a position within the Secretariat for the Comprehensive Refugee Response Framework, contributing to delivery and increasing the NGO voice. Third party, independent service providers can also play a helpful part.

STEP 2: Convening stakeholders and getting organized.
Purpose: To identify and convene the right people and organizations to be “at the table”, to ensure the process is inclusive and includes all relevant stakeholders.

Key actions to take:

1. **Decide who is best placed to identify and convene stakeholders.** Typically, this task would be the responsibility of an RC or HC in collaboration with the government. Stakeholders will be drawn from national and local governments, affected populations, the HDP Community comprising of the UN system, civil society, communities, international financing institutions (IFIs) and NGOs. It is important to ensure the participation of women and youth. Other groups representing academia, the private sector, faith and minority groups, among others, may also participate.

2. **Strengthen existing coordination structures.** Existing structures, for example the UNCT or HCT, may be adapted for this purpose through revision of their composition, if/as needed. In some countries new structures have been formed. The structures must fulfill three functions:
   - Governance: direction setting, monitoring of progress towards collective outcomes. Ideally co-lead by the RC/HC or lead agency, and a government representative, plus a representative of the three pillars, donors, affected communities and civil society.
   - Operations: membership is determined by the governance body, drawing on voluntary, solicited or outsourced capacity from all three pillars, which formulates and monitors the implementation of collective outcomes.
   - Consultation: large, diverse and self-selected group of stakeholders, including affected populations, that is convened periodically for validation of collective outcomes and dissemination of key information.

3. **Ensure participation of affected persons in planning and decision making.** The IASC’s Commitments on Accountability to Affected Persons outline the ways in which affected persons should participate in planning and decision making. Significant practical experience has been documented to help the HDP Community ensure the participation of affected persons although ALNAP’s 2014 study found participation in design to be rare. Practical, structural, skills and attitudinal challenges must be addressed to put affected persons at the center of the HDPN process. A tool such as UNHCR’s Age, Gender and Diversity Framework may be helpful to ensure effective mainstreaming of the different needs of men, women, boys and girls. Finally, in circumstances where governments take the lead in collective outcomes the rest of the HDP Community must remain vigilant about the participation of affected persons and strenuously advocate for their inclusion in all processes.

4. **Determine participant’s comparative advantage for specific roles in the HDPN process in a transparent way.** Responsibility for determining comparative advantage is unclear. The UN’s Guidance on Common Country Analysis (CCA) offers some criteria, but these may not be entirely appropriate for collective outcomes. It is important to ensure a transparent determination of comparative advantages to avoid negative attitudes which can undermine implementation of a HDPN approach. While there are practical reasons that leaders recruit the “usual suspects” to undertake specific roles, structure and transparency should be put around the identification and tasking of key stakeholders by:
   - Highlighting objectively verifiable mandates, experiences and capacities an organization must demonstrate to play specific roles.
   - Establishing a process for evaluating comparative advantage.
   - Applying this approach to the choice of which organizations should represent their peers from each of the three pillars, or from affected communities etc.
• Promoting the importance of participating in consultations as a significant contribution to the HDPN.

5. **Ensure common understanding of collective outcomes.** Before embarking on the process of the articulation and operationalization of collective outcomes, it is important that stakeholders share the same definition and vision to collaborate around collective outcomes and its process. Selection of the right terminology is a context-specific choice based on the knowledge and understanding of local preferences and sensitivities.

6. **Maximize the participation of IFIs, such as the World Bank, in the HDPN process from the outset.** The World Bank, donors and IFIs have committed to increase their funding to countries experiencing fragility, conflict and violence. Experience has shown, however, that it can be challenging to bring financial institutions into the collective outcomes process if it is outside of the parameters of explicitly defined cooperation instruments, such as the **State and Peacebuilding Fund**. Initiatives such as **PARCA in Chad** show the importance of World Bank participation in the HDPN.

**STEP 3: Undertaking joint analysis.**

**Purpose:** Conclude a joint analysis to identify and understand the drivers and root causes of protracted crises, **risks and vulnerabilities** and their humanitarian consequences, conflict drivers, fault lines and stakeholders. Use the evidence collected to determine those groups at greatest risk of being “left behind” and the priority short, medium and long-term actions to eliminate humanitarian needs and reduce future vulnerabilities in all three pillars.

**Key Actions to take:**

1. **Agree on a conceptual framework for the joint analysis.** The conceptual framework identifies the subjects for analysis, identifies some of their key interactions, enables the process of weighting the relative importance of different subjects and facilitates the formulation of research questions and indicators. Each of the HDP pillars uses a range of established conceptual frameworks. Two examples are included in Annex C. The policy driver of leaving no one behind requires a focus on those who benefit least, or who are entirely missed, by the routine service delivery of government and the HDP Community. The joint analysis should focus on:

   - Who are those being left behind – gender, age, disability, social status, nationality, ethnicity, another context-relevant characteristic? Who are those who can best contribute to improving the situation affecting people in protracted crises?
   - Where are those left behind?
   - When are they likely to fall behind?
   - What is causing these people to be left behind (risks, vulnerabilities and insufficient capacities)? Are the causes and consequences of being left behind different depending on sex, age, ability etc.?
   - How can those at risk be prevented from being left behind?

The CCA Companion Piece and a range of agency specific analytical approaches, such as **UNHCR’s**, provide guidance on how to appraise the risks, vulnerabilities and capacities of those affected persons.

To better understand the contexts in which the collective outcomes will be achieved, and to understand the interaction between the humanitarian, development and peace actors’ interventions in conflict and post-conflict contexts, it is important to conduct a conflict analysis. It is equally
important to implement collective outcomes in a conflict sensitive way by applying the "do no harm" principle, in order to prevent and mitigate any negative impact of implemented actions on affected populations. The joint analysis report will first and foremost enable a shared understanding of the overall needs, risks and vulnerability that will be the basis for planning and programmes for humanitarian, development and peace actors in their respective planning frameworks. More specifically it will enable the identification of the highest priority target groups, areas, HDP needs and their root causes that can be distilled into programmatic themes.

2. Use preparation or annual review of the CCA, Humanitarian Needs Overview (HNO), and RPBA to undertake joint analysis. Integrating joint analysis for collective outcomes into processes established for other mandated assessments is common sense. Participation of a suitably broad range of stakeholders for a CCA or HNO is likely. The identification of vulnerabilities and structural causes underlined in Chad’s HNO 2017 served as the basis for the HCT to develop a three-year strategic framework (2017-2019). In turn, annual HRPs, UN Development Assistance Framework (UNDAF), the World Bank’s Country Strategic Paper and the National Development Plan 2017-2021 are contributing to collective outcomes. In Somalia, the 2017 HNO and Drought Impact and Needs Assessment (DINA) included the joint analysis that underpinned collective outcome formulation for the Recovery and Resilience Framework (RRF) there.

3. Assemble the right team of analysts to undertake the task. Mobilizing the right capacity for joint analysis is important. The joint analysis requires participants to periodically dedicate uninterrupted time to the task. Double and triple hatting of staff is not an effective way to proceed. In Pakistan, the RCO utilized the support of IRC’s IVAP to support data collection, with a working group of specialists from UN agencies and NGOs deciding the survey design and methods. The World Bank deployed a senior staff member to analyze the data and report on findings. This report informed collective outcomes of the funded FATA Transition Framework. In DRC and Cameroon, the analysis is being conducted with the support of the OECD-INCAF using their methodology for Resilience Context Analysis Process.

4. Determine scope of the context – local, national, regional. Protracted crises are influenced by factors that are driven from all levels of society and beyond the borders of a country. A joint analysis must identify the relevant factors for analysis at all levels and cut across the HDP pillars. Examples are shown in Annex D.

5. Identify and agree the data sources that should be analyzed. A desk review to collate existing and historic, socio-economic, humanitarian and development indexes and data from government, IFIs, donors, UN and NGOs, among others is good practice. A selection of common sources is presented in Annex E. Human rights, barriers to women and girls’ empowerment, social exclusion and conflict must also be integrated to ensure that the peace perspective is captured. Overlaying the geographical focus of existing investments in humanitarian, development and peace actions on mapping data for poverty, social exclusion, gender equality, disaster and other risk factors is often illuminating. In many countries, development investment is concentrated in areas where delivery is most conveniently achieved rather than where those at greatest risk of being left behind are located.

Guidelines on conflict analysis, such as UNDP’s Conflict and Development Analysis, provide guidance on identifying the dynamics of conflict and the key actors in conflicts: https://reliefweb.int/sites/reliefweb.int/files/resources/UNDP_CDA-Report_v1.3-final-opt-low.pdf; UNDP’s Post-Disaster Needs Assessment (PDNA) guidelines provide more information on how to apply a conflict sensitive lens: https://www.undp.org/content/undp/en/home/librarypage/crisis-prevention-and-recovery/pdna-guidance--integrating-conflict-sensitivity.html
6. Prepare a plan for data collection and analysis. UNHCR recommends a basic three step process for analysis – prepare, conduct, disseminate and learn, which provides a suitable framework for the process. It can be seen in Annex F. The plan should be made by the operational body. Some basic statistical methods can be agreed to explore relationships and interactions among variables; to establish causality among them—directions, chains, magnifying effects; to assign importance to them (severity, weighting); and to identify and explain patterns. Normalization of data to enable comparisons between data sets is also important. Such quantitative analysis should be reinforced and validated by qualitative data. For primary data collection (if needed), a sampling plan, methodology, data collection instrument, data rehearsal, data entry process, quality control standard and agreement of an analytical process, must be undertaken.

**STEP 4: Formulating and programming for collective outcomes.**

**Purpose:** To agree several specific, measurable, achievable, relevant and timebound (SMART) collective outcomes that can be implemented over a 3 to 5-year time frame by actors demonstrating appropriate comparative advantage working in each of the three pillars.

**Key Actions to take:**

1. **Form thematic outcome groups in each thematic area with representatives from each pillar.** Assign responsibility to agencies with clear comparative advantage in each thematic area identified by the joint analysis to agree on the collective outcomes. Outcome groups **must include representation from each of the HDP pillars.** A clear timetable for determining the collective outcomes must be agreed by the operations structure members.

2. **Benefits of SMART collective outcome.**

   Broad collective outcomes facilitate participation and are, in general, easier to agree but are more difficult to measure. For example, several country teams have formulated collective outcomes in terms of “access to (and quality of) basic social services” without defining the actual basket of services nor the measurement methodology. In North-East Nigeria, a broad collective outcome was “by 2021, an increased number of affected people in the north east will have access to quality and integrated basic social services”.

   A more specifically focused collective outcome will be more “SMART”. However, it may risk being less collective, more output vs. outcome focused, and more mandated. Often, as in Somalia, specific collective outcomes are developed at the outset of the formulation process and are, over time, grouped and refined into fewer, broader outcome statements. It is recommended to keep a focus on SMART collective outcomes set at the right level and which engage multiple actors (e.g.: 10% reduction of maternal mortality by 2022; 10% increase over baseline in social cohesion as measured by UN-SCORE index by 2022; etc.).

3. **Ensure that the existing plans or results framework to outline the contributions of international support to the collective outcomes.** A plan or results framework sets out the specific outputs that agencies will contribute in each pillar to achieve a particular outcome. Specific contributions may include those delivered in existing, funded programmes, those in the pipeline, or unfunded programmes that target gaps identified in the joint analysis. A target and indicator set should be made explicitly along with an indication of agency contribution to create accountability for delivery. A timeline for implementation is necessary for sequencing of actions across pillars. Finally, a financing framework is needed to estimate total cost of outputs, the extent to which those costs are covered in a range of existing projects and programmes of different stakeholders, and identification of a clear
funding gap or surplus. The results framework must be integrated into the cooperation framework and / or other planning instruments to make the HDPN concrete. The Roadmap for the implementation of Joint Planning Framework of Assistance in Chad sets out, in goal 8, the actions for an implementation framework as part of the collective outcome process. A format for a nexus results framework and financial gap analysis is attached in Annex G.

4. Ensure peace and prevention perspectives are built into the collective outcomes. Many protracted crises are caused and sustained by conflict and violence. The 2016 Peace Promise includes an “ultimate collective outcome” of ending human suffering. Peacebuilding approaches can be integrated into development and humanitarian activities, for example, by including various groups (that might be at odds of each other) in the analysis, design, implementation, monitoring and evaluation and establishing dialogue and/or grievance mechanisms, which can contribute to increasing trust between authorities and the population and among different groups, e.g. between host and displaced people.

The positive contributions from the peace pillar can include advice on the evolution of conflict drivers, the prevention of new conflicts, local level contributions to sustaining peace such as working with communities over natural resource management. Peace actors can improve understanding of how humanitarian and development assistance can contribute (and be adjusted) to improve prospects for local peace and stability. In Somalia, the peace pillar provided specific guidance on the incorporation of a protection and human rights lens into the planning frameworks. Resources from peace organizations are increasingly available, in country or regionally, to assist with the integration of peace actions and perspectives in areas such as equality, non-discrimination, participation and inclusion, accountability and the rule of law. Good practice can also be found in the report on WFP’s Contribution to improving the Prospects for Peace.

5. Decide how many sectors should be included in the thematic outcome areas. Most, if not all, of the collective outcomes designed and approved to date are multi-sectoral. However, it is not necessary to include every sector within collective outcomes. The collective outcomes identified, and the joint analysis will enable the identification of those key sector issues that require a collective approach across pillars to ensure no one is left behind.

STEP 5: Financing programmes contributing to collective outcomes.

Purpose: To identify financial resources to implement the collective outcomes that are adequate in quantity, duration and flexibility. These resources will be predominantly existing funds from current programme budgets with the potential of additional financing from agencies, donors and national governments.

Key Actions to take:

1. Adopt the HDPN approach with existing funding. The rationale of collective outcomes is to reduce overall level of needs, risks and vulnerabilities and therefore to deliver better outcomes for people affected by crisis. It is not a tool to mobilize additional funding. Many of the programmes contributing to the achievement or implementation of a collective outcomes might already be financed. However, there might also be gaps in financing and funding for programmes in the collective outcome’s results framework. For those programmes additional funding need to be mobilized. It is possible that as improved outcomes for affected people are seen, the opportunities to mobilize quality funding will increase. The CRRF Plan in Uganda helped some bilateral donors to shift their funding to refuge
hosting areas to support the collective outcomes agreed by the host government, humanitarian actors and the World Bank.

2. **Engage donors as bilateral partners in the collective outcome process from the outset.** The HDP Community leaders should take a broad view of the donor community by engaging non-traditional development partners, as well as NGOs, climate finance mechanisms and private sector entities, on supporting the HDPN approach through participation from the analysis phase to the financing of programmes. While implementing organizations can utilize existing resources to initiate an HDPN approach, donors should understand that the HDPN is a long-term process which can be hampered by short-term and tightly restricted funding. Donor commitment to increasing funding of the HDPN approach is part of the OECD-DAC recommendation. Identifying funding gaps should be used to advocate for additional funding.

Donors may wish to participate at the governance / strategic level of the process, to share information and analysis or to contribute in other ways. In DRC, Sweden is supporting the HDPN approach by chairing a donor engagement group to raise awareness and build support for a more collective and coherent approach. This should be encouraged assuming their participation does not compromise humanitarian principles. Donor organizations are also faced with internal nexus challenges some of which are referred to in Development Initiatives Synthesis Report\(^7\). Demonstrating ambition to overcome these challenges with new solutions to common problems may be both a learning opportunity and an incentive for change for donors too.

3. **Use the collective voice and experience of HDPN partners to influence the financing of protracted crises.** IASC member agencies’ implementation usually accounts for a small fraction of overall development assistance in any given country. Utilization of the evidence gained from joint analysis and implementation of the collective outcome should be applied in advocacy to influence the investment choices of governments, and bilateral donors.

Joint analysis and collective outcomes can be a powerful tool for influencing the behavior of bi-lateral and multi-lateral funding flows towards people affected by protracted crises.

4. **Role of IFIs and DFIs:** Partnerships with multilateral development banks, international financial institutions (IFIs) and national and international development finance institutions (DFIs) should be equally incentivized, as suggested in the OECD-DAC recommendations. The HDP Community should identify funding opportunities by IFIs and DFIs, but should also engage them from the very beginning of the planning stage.\(^8\)

**STEP 6: Implementing collective outcomes.**

**Purpose:** To support implementation through the strengthening of coordination and information management at national and sub-national levels.

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\(^7\) Donors at the Nexus, Development Initiatives, 2019.

\(^8\) The study ‘Financing the nexus: Gaps and opportunities from a field perspective’ commissioned by FAO, NRC and UNDP provides further information: [https://www.nrc.no/globalassets/pdf/reports/financing-the-nexus-report/financing-the-nexus-report.pdf](https://www.nrc.no/globalassets/pdf/reports/financing-the-nexus-report/financing-the-nexus-report.pdf)
Key Actions to take:

1. **Promote incentives and changing organizational cultures towards closer humanitarian-development and peace collaboration.** People behave in ways that their organizations condition them to. Often this helps organizations to fulfill their own objectives. Establishing and working towards collective outcomes requires an approach where staff incentives and organization cultures encourage collaboration, complementarity and coherence across participating organizations. Leaders in the HDP Community at all levels, must implement incentives for behavior change within their organizations. Recognition of desirable individual and team performance, the provision of training, secondments and opportunities for advancement can be very effective. Leaders should ensure that their personal behavior and language supports HDP collaboration at all times.

2. **Strengthen planning and implementation capacity at national and sub-national level.** Collective outcome formulation and planning is typically done at the national level, facilitating senior level involvement in strategic direction setting and to create momentum and buy in across the HDP Community. Involvement of sub-national institutions and agency staff in the initial planning is recommended. During the implementation stage the sub-national level takes the lead. A mechanism for management of implementation must be established with the involvement and/or leadership of local authorities and the implementing organizations. In Cameroon, the communal authorities are taking the lead through the Communal Development Plan mechanisms.

3. **Assess the suitability of existing coordination mechanisms for achieving collective outcomes, adjusting them or creating new mechanisms if needed.** Some existing structures may be useful for specific HDPN coordination tasks. However, no established forum involving the right stakeholders from all three pillars exists for the strategic governance or collective outcome implementation processes. In many of the JSC pilot countries the humanitarian architecture has contributed significantly to collective outcomes, by using humanitarian coordination structures to bring together stakeholders, often both the inter-cluster coordination and local levels. Stakeholders should review terms of reference, tools in place, membership, programmatic scope and ability to coordinate across sectoral boundaries to decide whether using, adapting or replacing humanitarian or other existing coordination structures is needed.

In some countries it has proven possible to integrate collective outcome coordination into local level, government-led planning and coordination processes, as in Cameroon and Lebanon. In other settings, for example the tribal areas of Pakistan, the humanitarian clusters were deactivated and replaced by collective outcome focused coordination groups that have engaged government leadership and participation of humanitarian and development actors.

4. **Put in place appropriate joint information management capacity and systems.** Efficient sharing and analysis of information is critical for coordinated systems to work properly. Existing OCHA and RCO information management systems are important starting points to build from. The UN’s humanitarian and development information management systems are not, however, interoperable with each other or systems outside of their networks, although there is work ongoing to address this. Consequently, donor or NGO generated data are not easily integrated into collective information products. Efforts to establish integrated information management systems within RCOs or other institutions, such as Ukraine’s Ministry of Temporarily Occupied Territories portal for economic and social recovery have been made, but there is, as yet, no standard operating procedure for information management of protracted crises. There are examples of collective information management systems such as the Gender-Based Violence Information Management System (GBVIMS) that provide useful

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9 Keeping in mind the necessary protection of humanitarian space.
examples. The HDPN operations structure, in collaboration with the HDP Community, should establish information hubs, collecting and disseminating information and analysis from and to a wide range of stakeholders, with due consideration of data privacy and security.

5. **Establish relevant partnerships in place to accelerate achievement of collective outcomes.** Collective outcomes may prove catalytic for the formation of new types of operational partnerships, including an increased role for the private sector in service delivery. HDP Community leaders should facilitate the formation, piloting and scale up of new partnership structures including for joint programming in affected areas.

**STEP 7: Monitoring progress and evaluating results**

**Purpose:** Establish a **collective monitoring and evaluation (M&E) process and capacity**, that builds on existing arrangements (e.g. UNSDCF and/or HRP results frameworks), to measure progress of actions specified in the results framework and changes in the wider operating context.

**Key Actions to take:**

1. **Invest in the in-country culture of monitoring and evaluation.** While many agencies have been investing in systems to monitor outcomes many actors are not good at using M&E data for course correction. The need for collective outcomes derives, at least in part, from a recognition that “business as usual” has not been delivering desired results. **Leaders in the HDP Community must use the joint analysis as a clear baseline from which performance will be measured.** Key messages, supported by celebration of learning and change, addressed to all stakeholders, along these lines should help to develop the culture of M&E for collective outcomes.

   **A duty bearer for M&E must be identified to put a functional mechanism in place** that draws on existing or external resources, or both. The duty bearer will disseminate M&E findings and monitor the adjustments that the HDP Community make to their programming. In practice the RCO, as part of its role in the HDPN governance structure, is well placed to act as the duty bearer.

2. **Use M&E frameworks and mechanisms from existing programmes for collective outcomes to the extent possible.** Since collective outcomes will be delivered in large part through existing programmes, their M&E frameworks and mechanisms will remain important. Using existing systems alleviates the need for “reinventing the wheel” and duplicating effort. However, programme or agency specific M&E systems are rarely designed to measure the long-term impact of projects and programmes on a population affected by crisis, especially across the different pillars. Few are robust enough to provide all the answers on what interventions work best or are best value for money. **ALNAP’s 2019 Back to the Drawing Board report** suggests that a significant re-think of the design of M&E systems and processes, their funding and operationalization is needed to measure outcomes. This may include “moving away from pre-defined indicators, using more cross-sectoral measurements, breaking down the definition of outcomes, building long-term evidence-gathering models or creating space for more open-ended enquiry. It might even be time to look at different business models for monitoring and evaluation across the sector”. The operations structure preparing collective outcomes must consider:

   - What sources of information, capacities / comparative advantage exist in country that can be utilized? What additional capacity, if any, may be needed from offshore providers?
• What level of independence is needed for the M&E function for it to be able to meet expectations?
• How much will it cost?

3. **Prioritize what should be monitored and evaluated.** There are myriad actions and issues to monitor and evaluate. Some useful areas for governance and operational structures to consider are:

- Monitor specific agency project or programme outputs.
- Monitor participation of affected persons in analysis, planning, and implementation and M&E and their feedback through permanent mechanisms.
- Monitor qualitative and quantitative measures of the changing socio-economic status of protracted crisis areas, including variables such as service utilization, nutritional status, household income and expenditure, commodity prices, and trust in the state, the UN and others.
- Monitor instances of positive and negative interactions between pillars.
- Evaluate changes in the conflict patterns in affected areas.
- Evaluate changes in the perceptions of crisis affected people about authorities, the UN and about their human security.
- Evaluate changes in the risk and vulnerability profiles of crisis affected.
- Evaluate the impact of changes to collective outcomes and the results framework in response to M&E findings.

4. **Decide if an independent M&E capacity is appropriate, desirable and affordable.** Independent, impartial analysis of performance and progress towards collective outcomes is both appropriate and desirable in most cases. The cost and the capacity available are the most likely constraints. For joint programmes individual agencies may pool M&E budgets to finance joint mechanisms. Implementing agencies should not, in an ideal case, be left in a position of having to monitor and evaluate their own work. Independent analysis of process and results indicators can be helpful in building acceptance for change and identifying good practice. In the current climate of hyper-vigilance over the effective use of aid funds a strong, independent M&E function is likely to find supportive donors.

5. **Set up a feedback mechanism for affected populations to use part of the M&E system for collective outcomes.** The ALNAP report on the State of the Humanitarian System 2018 confirms what practitioners have long known, i.e., recipients of assistance want their voice to be heard and programmes are better when their voices are heard. A human rights-based approach ensures that communities are consulted from the outset and that they can meaningfully participate throughout the implementation process. While agencies may utilize a range of programme-specific feedback mechanisms there is a strong justification to simplify communication options for end users by, ideally, establishing a single feedback mechanism to collect, acknowledge and analyze feedback and respond to it. Increasing access to mobile phones in many crisis-affected parts of the world can facilitate feedback through voice, data and text. In practice, RCOs, or HDPN operations and governance structures, may determine whether it is more cost effective to monitor and analyze data coming from a range of existing feedback mechanisms at agency and programme level than to create new mechanisms.

**STEP 8: Mainstream collective outcomes**

**Purpose:** Integrate collective outcomes into the cooperation framework and other appropriate plans. Make the “new way of working” the established way of working in protracted crisis contexts, given
that the collective outcomes are a way of bringing organizations together around the most pressing issues that require collective action. This does not entail a complete overhaul of each and every program of the various actors, but rather a different approach and a clear and joint, context specific determination on whether or not the situation allows for overlapping work across the three pillars. If this is the case, collective outcomes should be considered, and mainstreamed into existing planning documents.

**Key Actions to take:**

1. **Integrate collective outcomes into the cooperation framework.** For the UN system embedding collective outcomes in the cooperation framework is necessary to achieve the 2030 SDG Agenda. The CCA and cooperation framework guidance, and the companion piece on the HDP nexus, elaborate on the inclusion of collective outcomes.

Since situations of protracted crisis are almost never the only defining characteristic of a country it is important to note that collective outcomes may be defined and implemented in specific circumstances, with other development approaches applying elsewhere.

There are several benefits to mainstreaming collective outcomes in the cooperation framework as well as in other planning documents including but not limited to:

- Streamlining joint analysis and planning processes for collective outcomes into an established, single framework.
- Aligning overarching theory of change of UN development plans support to collective outcomes.
- Creating a single UN plan that specifies the development of contributions of different UN agencies and other actors, a coordination mechanism, a M&E process and minimal core RCO capacity to spearhead its implementation.
- Requirement for annual review and updating of the CCA and cooperation framework removes the timing and flexibility challenges associated with the previous UN framework (UNDAF).
- Governments, donors and NGOs often consider the UN’s development plan when formulating their own strategies.

The cooperation framework, though, has inclusion limitations. The guidance for the cooperation framework insists that its underlying context analysis and planning should be undertaken in an inclusive manner with organizations outside of the UN system. This takes discipline and political capital by the RC to make it happen and is to be encouraged. However, non-UN development organizations contributions are not included in the cooperation framework, so mainstreaming in other plans is still needed.

2. **Integrate collective outcomes into other relevant plans or strategies.** While the cooperation framework is the central tool for the UN development system to align its efforts with host governments for the achievement of SDGs, it does not replace other planning processes and instruments, particularly for those used by the humanitarian community and organizations outside of the UN system such as NGOs. It does not replace either the need for independent, principled plans for humanitarian action, for example. Even though field practitioners do not want collective outcomes to create additional planning processes, those that are already in existence will continue to be used. The cooperation framework may be a helpful reference document for further mainstreaming of collective outcomes into HRP, RPBAs, resilience plans, national development plans and agency / NGO strategic and operational plans.
In 2017 UNOCHA Pakistan stopped the preparation of the HNO and HRP for the tribal areas, with the approval of the IASC principals, as the humanitarian nature of the crisis was reinterpreted through the design and implementation of a collective outcomes-based transition framework. The crisis in the tribal areas was no longer of a life-saving humanitarian character, although urgent and time-sensitive needs remained. The HNO was not designed to collect, analyze and present information about the underlying vulnerability of the population. In other countries, such as Somalia and Chad, collective outcomes are included in the HRPs. The governance structure must decide the plans in which collective outcomes will be mainstreamed to build a well-sequenced effort to end need and reduce underlying vulnerability in areas of protracted crisis.
Annex A: Policy and practice documents for the HDPN approach

- Security Council’s [2016 resolution 2282 on sustaining peace and the support of the UN General Assembly](#);
- [World Humanitarian Summit](#) demand\(^{10}\) for a shift from delivering aid to ending need, in part through transcending the humanitarian-development divide;
- [the UNSG’s Prevention Agenda: the Grand Bargain](#);
- [Global Compact on Refugees; Global Compact for Safe, Orderly and Regular Migration. UN Sustainable Development Cooperation Framework (UNSDCF) Guidance](#) and its companion piece on the nexus;
- UN (draft) guidance on [Leaving No One Behind](#);
- IASC / UNOCHA’s [Humanitarian Programme Cycle](#);
- [Peace Promise](#);
- [OECD-DAC recommendation on the HDP nexus](#);
- Grand Bargain Workstream 5 on [joint and impartial needs assessment](#).

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\(^{10}\) UNSG’s Core Responsibility four (of five)
Annex B: Typologies diagram

Type 1: Constrained
Scenario: Government/authorities unwilling to uphold obligation and responsibility to protect and limiting the scope of international involvement.

Engagement: Limited joint engagement with government/authorities, with strong emphasis on local capacities, local civil society, and efforts to strengthen social cohesion at community level and focus on live-saving. Peacebuilding involves Advocacy, Health Diplomacy, and conflict-sensitive programming.

Collective Outcomes: align where possible with national SDG implementation plan. But maintain humanitarian space by developing separate humanitarian plans.

Type 2: Capacity-Driven
Scenario: Government/authorities willing to uphold responsibility, but have little to low capacity to do so, and low ongoing budget support for service delivery.

Engagement: Strong emphasis on capacity building and localization, significant service delivery in consultation/at request of Government and with the view of handing over operations and engagement to government as soon as possible (early recovery). Explore adjusting bilateral mechanisms to finance health sector budget with ODA. Peacebuilding includes community engagement, community violence reduction, working with elites.

Collective Outcomes: align where possible with national SDG implementation plan. Develop common plan with development actors, with anticipated humanitarian caseload. Provide space for Protection/human rights issues in separate humanitarian plan.

Type 3: Consultative
Scenario: Strong/capacitated and ‘responsible’ government/authority, recovering or emerging political settlement, but high intensity or active conflicts/insecure operational contexts persists.

Engagement: Targeted service delivery under leadership of government, relatively limited international operational activity. International expertise used when needed operational involvement maybe requested after consultations with the government or authority in situations of low access, or instability with the aim of filling gaps. Peacebuilding involves supporting government in post-conflict peace processes such as DDR/ returnee settlement and social cohesion and supporting formal reconciliation processes.

Collective Outcomes: align explicitly with national SDG prioritization plan, linking where necessary with the Peacebuilding and Recovery Plan. Embed totality of humanitarian needs in the UNSDCF, with space for ad hoc HRP for pockets of insecurity.

Type 4: Collaborative
Scenario: Strong/capacitated and ‘responsible’ government/authority, is willing and able to uphold its obligation and responsibility to protect in a stable situation or with a politically agreed peace agreement and has adequate capacity to respond.

Engagement: Role of international response is to support and complement existing capacity. Humanitarian and development engagement and service delivery is shared between government and international partners, with leadership from relevant line ministries. Peacebuilding initiatives are limited to conflict forecasting and monitoring.

Collective Outcomes: limited need for system-wide collective outcomes. UN agency-specific planning engagement should be guided by government as agreed in the UNSDCF.
Annex C: Examples of conceptual frameworks that may be adapted for joint analysis – vulnerability; human security
### Annex D: Examples of criteria for local, national, regional

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Local</th>
<th>National</th>
<th>Regional / international</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Inter-group relationships</td>
<td>State vs. local relationships</td>
<td>Relationships with neighboring states</td>
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<tr>
<td>Possession of or access to natural resources, hazard types and risks</td>
<td>Role of the state in conflict</td>
<td>Political and development policy commitments of the state</td>
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<tr>
<td>Immediate humanitarian needs</td>
<td>Access for HDP assistance, state respect for humanitarian principles, posture of state towards displaced populations</td>
<td>Foreign investment priorities and modalities</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Equitable access to public services including health, education, justice, etc.</td>
<td>National policies, plans, capacity and available budget for HDP actions</td>
<td>Availability of HDP financing for the protracted crisis</td>
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<tr>
<td>Socio-economic factors including livelihood sources, household income</td>
<td>National investment in areas of protracted crisis</td>
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### Annex E: Examples of data sources and analytical reporting for review in the joint analysis

There are many potential data sources available at field level that can be reviewed in a joint analysis including, but not limited to:

- National population census
- Household income and expenditure surveys, including IFI reports
- National agriculture census
- Climate data, [IPCC Assessment reports](https://www.ipcc.ch) (AR5 and AR6 preparatory drafts) provide data on the scientific projects, governments and IFIs also produce climate scenarios to interpret climate science effect on sectors.
- [Multi-dimensional poverty indices](https://www.povertydata.org)
- IOM [Migration flow monitoring](https://iom.int) reports, Internal Displacement Monitoring Centre’s [database](https://idmc.net), UNHCR’s [refugee and internal displacement data centre](https://www.unhcr.org)
- HNO, HRP, Multi-sector Initial Rapid Assessment (MIRA), [ACAPS](https://acaps.org) reports, agency level humanitarian needs assessments.
- [International Crisis Group](https://icg.org) reports, [OHCHR country level human rights reports](https://www.ohchr.org), independent peace research institutes e.g. [SIPRI](https://www.sipri.org).

### Annex F: UNHCR recommended phases for joint analysis

In general, most joint analysis activities include three main phases:

**Phase I: Prepare for Joint Analysis:**
- Select Facilitator – neutral and experienced, able to challenge the assumptions of participants.
- Design Session
- Select and Invite Stakeholders
- Undertake and Share Initial Analysis (base summary document)

Phase II: Conduct the Joint Analysis
- Discuss Initial Analysis
- Explain and Interpret the data and Anticipate its implications
- Decide on the key insights and priorities revealed by the joint analysis

Phase III: After Joint analysis:
- Disseminate the findings of the joint analysis
- Learn about the relevance of the findings to programme design and delivery

There is substantial information relevant to joint analysis to be found in the existing guidance for pillar specific joint analysis that includes, but is not limited to:

- Humanitarian assessments, including the HNO.
- Common Country Assessment and Cooperation Framework
- Review of experience and methodology of Recovery and Peace Building Assessments
- UN Common Guidance on Resilience for HDP Actors
Annex G: Results and financing framework examples

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<tr>
<th>Collective Outcome: XYZ</th>
<th>Implementation Timetable</th>
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<th>Target</th>
<th>Implementing Agency</th>
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## Financing collective outcomes

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<th>Existing funding</th>
<th>Duration up until</th>
<th>Funding gap</th>
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<td>Project B (UNDP), $X</td>
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<td>$Y (total cost - existing funding)</td>
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<td>Project C (Government), $X</td>
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