The Humanitarian-Development Nexus: A New Way of Working
Advancing the Pursuit of Collective Outcomes across the Humanitarian-Development-Peace Nexus: Key Messages on the "New Way of Working" and How to Implement it

- **The protracted nature of humanitarian action is now the new normal.** Over the past 10 years, the nature of crises has evolved both in sheer numbers and in complexity. Funding appeals now last an average of seven years and have increased nearly 600 percent in the last decade.

- Whether dealing with the long term consequences of drought; managing the impacts of intractable conflicts that impede the prospects of peace and development; ensuring durable solutions of the millions of displaced populations; or even mitigating the generational impacts of infectious diseases, aid actors now have to contend with situations that call for fundamentally new modalities.

- As these recurrent and protracted crises increasingly dominate the contexts in which humanitarian and development actors operate, the need to consider how to strengthening existing and build new **working methods across the humanitarian, development and peacebuilding actors** is now an imperative that all stakeholders have set as a priority. These emergencies -- often interlinked and multidimensional -- have resulted in massive levels of displacement, lasting 17 years on average. Urban settings are increasingly the locus of interventions, as they are simultaneously the places that are damaged during conflict and the destination of choice for those seeking protection. The **New Way of Working** must be context specific and adaptable to these response settings.

- Operational and policy discussions at global, regional and national levels have moved the agenda around a **New Way of Working** forward. Building on major global processes, such as the 2030 Agenda World Humanitarian Summit, the Grand Bargain, the New York Declaration, and the Sustaining Peace resolutions, the notion of “**collective outcomes** has been placed at the centre of the commitment to implement the New Way of Working. These collective outcomes will act as the target which all actors work towards, and shape their plans and programmes coherently based on what is required to achieve the outcome and who has the comparative advantage and capacity to contribute to its achievement.

- **Against the back drop of the Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs) and the Sendai Framework for Disaster Risk Reduction,** **ending needs by reducing multidimensional risks and vulnerabilities is now a shared responsibility** among all actors and stakeholder, within the United Nations system and beyond. Based on this shared responsibility, humanitarian, development and peacebuilding actors must now jointly define for themselves and for their contexts collective outcomes that transcend long-standing conventional thinking, silos, mandates and other attitudinal, institutional, and funding obstacles.
The New Way of Working is about ensuring that all parts of the UN system and beyond, based on their comparative advantage, work together towards jointly defined collective outcomes, over the short-, medium-, and long-term, and set out clear roles and responsibilities around delivering against those outcomes. In short, the New Way of Working is about greater interoperability among humanitarian, development, and peacebuilding activities, plans, and programmes.

Different principles, shared goals: Humanitarian principles will always guide humanitarian action, and nothing should undermine these. However, respect for humanitarian, development, and other principles does not preclude the pragmatic need for better coordination with a variety of actors. While principles may differ, the centrality of human-rights provides the foundations required to work towards shared development goals with peace dividends in a rights based manner.

Preventing and resolving conflicts and crises, reducing risk, building resilience and sustaining peace are shared responsibilities of the international community, including the UN system. For the New Way of Working to be successful, agencies must address the root causes of conflicts and crises, which often stem from violations and neglect of human rights, including inequality, persistent discrimination, impunity and violence.

Progress has already been made in transcending the humanitarian-development-peacebuilding divide through humanitarian plans that are done in close consultation with development and peacebuilding actors and are designed to achieve common objectives. The Lebanon and Jordan Response plans for the Syria crisis, the Regional Refugee and Resilience Plan (3RP) in response to the Syria Crisis, the Somalia Compact, the Central African Republic's National Recovery and Peacebuilding Plan 2017–21 and the Sahel regional response plan are a few of the best known examples. Country-level experience in disaster risk reduction provides further examples of cooperation that bridges humanitarian and development.

Out of a mix of necessity, pragmatism, and urgency these new approaches, efforts and burgeoning solutions in the most challenging operating environments, demonstrate that coherently working across the silos is indeed possible, and requires sustained efforts and an attention to the context-specific drivers that shape each crisis. More remains to be done.

In practice, the New Way of Working will require strong leadership and a coherent approach in analysis, planning, and programming towards reinforcement of local capacities; building institutions, strengthening resilience, addressing root causes, better anticipating and preventing crises, as well as a coordinated and joined up programmes to deliver on these collective outcomes; and joint monitoring and evaluation to assess progress.

It will also require a renewed investment in participation on affected populations. The New Way of Working cannot succeed without accountability to and by those most affected by these protracted crises. Shared responsibility requires inclusivity, bringing national, local, and affected populations not as beneficiaries but equal partners in achieving collective outcomes.

Inclusivity through shared responsibility also means bringing the private sector closer into the fold. Humanitarian and development actors alike must acknowledge that some comparative
advantages lie beyond the international aid community. Whenever possible, private sector capacity should be fostered and promoted as a key enabler of development goals.

- It is clear that the changes required to make this approach work are institutionally and financially complex and will need sustained leadership for a number of years to come. The results, however will not only improve the lives of the most vulnerable, but the reductions in needs and the mitigation of root causes will be essential to achieving the 2030 Agenda.

- Given the magnitude of the task, implementation of the *New Way of Working* will have to be gradual; learning from the field as much as possible, and as process and guidance-oriented as necessary. Based on the challenges we currently face, **four priority areas should guide the early phases of implementation.**

1. **Predictable and joint situation and problem analysis**: is needed to come to a joint problem statement and identify priorities based on the reliable data that is being collected. These data and conflict sensitive analysis streams rarely come together to inform joint strategies. This joint problem statement, conducted by all sectors and in the service of the HC/RC, should identify the areas of greatest need, drivers of those needs, risk and vulnerability, as well as the capacities available to address them. This shared analysis should form the basis of how collective outcomes are articulated.

2. **Better joined-up planning and programming**: between humanitarian, development and peace/security actors to enable them to agree on a set of collective outcomes in the long-term and plan backwards from them (for short and medium-term objectives). Cooperation in advancing disaster risk reduction strategies provides early wins in strengthening joined-up planning and programming. This should be done in conjunction with national authorities and, to the extent possible, with the affected populations. Where national collaboration is more difficult, at a minimum, the collective outcomes should be linked to national priorities.

3. **Leadership and coordination**: develop and refine the supporting structures that empower the RC/HC to facilitate joint problem statements; identify, implement and financing collective outcomes; that can engage with the national and local authorities; and has mechanisms available that can support connectivity and coordination between all actors and capacities available in country.

4. **Financing modalities that can support collective outcomes**: especially in protracted crisis, funding needs to move beyond annual project-based grants. Rather, it must move towards a financing structure that supports flexible and predictable multi-year programming, including by multilateral development banks. This means a broader range of financing options and better alignment of funding cycles between donors, humanitarian, development and peacebuilding actors to enable short-, medium- and longer-term programmes.
Typologies of Response Scenarios:

Protracted crisis situations are characterized by recurrent natural disasters, conflict, longevity of food shortages, breakdown of livelihoods and insufficient institutional capacity to react to the needs of affected communities. In most cases, alternate governance structures, urban rural dynamics, as well as the willingness and capacity of the government should dictate how the system reacts. But at all times, national ownership and leadership should be paramount.
Towards a Typology of Response Scenarios In Protracted Settings

Background & Introduction:
Increasingly faced with a changing operational environment over the past decade, humanitarian, development and peace actors alike have recognized that crises have evolved, both in sheer number and in complexity; with countries and ever growing number of affected communities facing several simultaneous shocks coming from climate-related hazards, violent conflict, pandemics, unstable economic markets or population growth. The devastating consequences of these hazards are creating new operational environments that are characterised by unprecedented levels of affected populations trapped in long protracted situations.

Against this backdrop, it is increasingly clear that the architecture and current response frameworks will need to be reviewed and adjusted to face these trends. To this end, global processes, such as the World Humanitarian Summit (WHS), have called for all actors to quickly develop policy and operational guidance to translate a new way of working into practical, flexible and context-specific tools that can deliver change in practice.

A changing Scene:
While current response architecture – in terms of assumptions, processes, mechanisms, structures, and relationships – are well suited for sudden-onset scenarios requiring rapid surges in capacity and assistance with short time horizons, what is also clear is that these response modalities are increasingly unlikely to be suitable, nor sustainable, for the protracted emergencies described above. That is, a cyclical short term approach (yearly Humanitarian Response Plans for example), neither alleviates long term vulnerabilities in a sustainable manner, nor does it concretely contribute to the progressive ending of needs that the Secretary General called for in the lead up to and during the WHS.

It is therefore clear, as called for by WHS and other global processes, that closer humanitarian-development-peace (HDP) links in contexts of protracted needs are required. At the same time, greater cooperation, accountability, leadership and ownership will have to be vested in local first responders, and government authorities. The government must play a central role.

1 Draft SG report on the Outcome of WHS
A Spectrum of Scenarios:

The degree to which these links are feasible has raised concerns regarding whether strengthening the HDP nexus runs counter to the humanitarian principles. It is clear, that different contexts and scenarios will require a differentiated approach to collective action.

Drawing from past and current operations, normative discussions, WHS & Grand Bargain outcomes, and various think pieces produced on the subject, three major characteristics have emerged as key determinants of these response scenarios.

A. The ‘Responsibility of the Government/ Local Authorities:’ Echoing the commitments of the Peace Promise and in line with the common goals under the Busan New Deal, the ownership and obligation of both humanitarian and development priorities rests, first and foremost, on the government. Particularly, in complex emergencies, where the affected government may be party to the conflict, the necessity to uphold humanitarian norms and principles is a key determinant of the degree to which humanitarian actors can engage in a given scenario. The “Responsibility” of the government is therefore seen as a key factor in how and to what extent humanitarian actors can engage in specific processes, as it indicates its willingness to fulfil its obligation and responsibility to protect (from this point, a government showing this willingness to do so, will be called a ‘responsible’ government). ‘Responsibility’ therefore also covers situations where Protection is the main characteristic of a crisis (denial of access, violations of human rights, lack of respect for humanitarian principles etc) and the government aims to limit the scope of international access and assistance.

B. The ‘Capacity’ of the Government/Local Actors: The need to localize humanitarian preparedness and response has been an issue for many years but most recently voiced consistently throughout the WHS consultation process. There is broad agreement that local actors play a crucial role in the fast, cost-effective and culturally appropriate delivery of humanitarian assistance. While efforts to “localize” aid are already underway, we need greater recognition of the existing role that local actors are playing. The existing capacity of local actors and government authorities should therefore also be seen as a key determinant of how the response is designed.


   o a) the characteristic of the crisis: High intensity active conflict; lower intensity with emerging political settlement; lower intensity with emerging political settlement; etc;
   o b) Whether the government has on-going/on-budget development assistance

These two factors when combined become an important determinant of how humanitarian, peace, and especially development actors design their interventions in relation to security
and safety. In situations of conflict, for example, the operational context will determine to what degree and where international organizations can work together.

**Form should follow function:**

A quick scan of the current large scale international humanitarian responses shows how, the presence or absence of these key determinants result in sometimes wildly different response scenarios in which humanitarian-development-peace actors must navigate.

A strong (capacity), and ‘Responsible’ government for example, should imply that alternate leadership models should be explored, potentially leveraging national structures either through capacity building programmes, empowering and supporting National Disaster Management Authorities (NDMA); or ensuring closer collaboration between the sectors/clusters and line ministries. Alternatively in context where the government is shirking its responsibility in and fails to respect humanitarian principles, it will not be realistic to aim for joint planning.

To be truly context specific, it follows that a singular coordination model cannot adequately cater to these various typologies of response scenarios. From a systemic point of view, it is important to ensure that humanitarian structures, particularly leadership and coordination models, utilize the right response approach as the context allows.

In this regard, the ALNAP Think Piece entitled: “Responding to Changing Needs? Challenges and opportunities for Humanitarian Action” provides four useful models of humanitarianism on which further guidance on coordination structures can be based. Each of the models offer a response approach based on the stability, capacity, and responsibility of the government and can help guide what approach can be selected over time in creating links between humanitarian and development planning.

1. **Comprehensive (“Cavalry”):** International actors mobilize funds; needs are great and local capacity is overwhelmed; humanitarian agencies take the lead. Blanket service delivery. **Outmoded**

2. **Constrained:** Government is not taking responsibility and unwilling to uphold its obligation; humanitarian space and principles are paramount, limited joint engagement with government, but strong emphasis on local capacity, civil society. This implies both situations where a government may or may not have capacity².

3. **Collaborative:** Strong, and responsible government in an unstable context; where capacity is already present. National and subnational actors given strong leadership role; role of international response is to support and complement existing capacity. Humanitarian and development engagement and service delivery is shared between government and international partners³.

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² The question of whether the government/authority has capacity, if it is deemed to be unwilling to uphold its responsibility and obligation towards its citizens, is moot (since they would be deliberately withholding assistance). In some real cases however, a strong and capacitated government some seeks to control or dominated assistance – further constraining humanitarian action.

³ It is expected that with this approach, collaboration with the government/authority can vary anywhere from light joint work, where international expertise is used, to sector specific ‘contract’ basis.
d. **Consultative:** Civil Society, National Governments is strong and responsible, humanitarian and development engagement consists of targeted service delivery under leadership of government, relatively limited international operational activity– International expertise used when needed, operational involvement may requested after consultation with the government or authority in situations of low access, or instability with the aim of filling gaps.

It is important to note that the ‘comprehensive’ approach as described above is widely considered as outmoded and should therefore never be the default response framework for any type of context as in all cases there should be an aim for joint leadership in support of national ownership. In order to ensure eventual handover to local authorities the so-called ‘cavalry’ approach should be avoided so as to avoid establishing parallel international structures superimposed on local ones. In the exceptional cases of failed state scenario, however, this approach may be explored.

Furthermore, echoing the strong calls for being as 'local as possible and as international as necessary', two additional response models are proposed acknowledging the scenarios where strong and capable governments are well resourced, but still require international expertise.

e. **Capacity-driven:** Responsible/willing government, with limited to no capacity, in the midst of recovery/rebuilding after insecurity. Twinning approach would most likely be used: involving extensive international assistance given the low capacity, with an emphasis on capacity building of government response capacity with the view of handing over operations and engagement to government as soon as possible.

Lastly, it is also important to note that multiple scenarios can occur within the same affect country. In this sense, context specificity also demands that we have an area based approach, where modalities may vary across different pockets of contexts.

**Towards a Typology of Response Scenarios:**

These two think pieces, when combined, provide a normative foundation on which Typologies of Response Scenarios can be elaborated, and which could guide the development of new practical policy and normative guidance on strengthening the humanitarian development nexus in protracted situations.

These Typologies, in turn, can be used to inform response and planning modalities that are context specific, paying attention to government ownership and resources (Capacity), protection (Responsibility), security and stabilization issues (Stability); development actor presence, and appropriate leadership and coordination arrangements to best leverage in-country capacity (See Diagram). The use of these typologies can further refine context and risk analysis at the sub-national level, making clear where humanitarian actors must preserve humanitarian space, and where development, peacebuilding and other actors can be engaged in a more joined up manner.
HUMANITARIAN-DEVELOPMENT- PEACE TYPOLOGIES OF RESPONSE AND ENGAGEMENT SCENARIOS

Responsibility

TYPE 1: CONSTRAINED
Government is unwilling to uphold its obligation and responsibility to protect, and is limiting the scope of international involvement.

TYPE 2: CAPACITY-DRIVEN
Government/authority upholds its responsibility, but little to low capacity, low ongoing budget support.

TYPE 3: CONSULTATIVE
Strong and ‘responsible’ government/authority, recovering or emerging political settlement, high intensity or active conflict/insecure operational context.

TYPE 4: COLLABORATIVE
Government/authority is willing and able to uphold its obligation and responsibility to protect in a stable situation and has adequate capacity to respond.

TYPE 5: COMPREHENSIVE
‘Failed State Scenario’ government shirks responsibility, in the midst of active, high intensity conflict situation.

Responsibility

LOW

HIGH

Capacity/Resources

Security/Access

LOW

HIGH

Main Assumptions:
- **Basis for discussion:** This paper is prepared to not only inform, but also be informed by discussions during the retreat.
- **Scoping the workshop:** these typologies are proposed to help frame the conversation during the retreat, by offering a common reference point and allow for discussion groups assigned.
- **Theoretical:** These typologies remain theoretical and are meant to fit the most amounts of real life cases, acknowledging that they might not fully capture all of them, nor all the specificities and nuances of those they aim to generalize.
- **These types exist at many levels:** for the purposes of discussion, the typologies not only apply to governments, but also other forms of authorities that HDP actors need to interact with.
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The New Way of Working & Sustaining Peace:

Through shared data, joint analysis and joined-up planning and programming — a strong, effective and interoperable New Way of Working between humanitarian-development actors can contribute directly to preventing the outbreak of conflict, as well as building and Sustaining Peace.
Analysis Paper: On the Intersection between the *New Way of Working* and the *Sustaining Peace Agenda*

**Summary:**

The *New Way of Working* represents an opportunity to achieve step changes in the working methods, efficiency and effectiveness of humanitarian and development actors towards reducing needs, risks, and vulnerabilities. However, how this new approach will be applied in protracted conflict situations has generated some concerns mostly around the protection and preservation of humanitarian space vis-a-vis peacebuilding objectives as outlined in the Sustaining Peace resolutions. Thus, in these settings the *New Way of Working* needs to be carefully considered and its implementation clearly framed.

**Background and origin**

The term *The New Way of Working* has its origins in Secretary General Ban’s Agenda for Humanity (AfH), prepared for the World Humanitarian Summit (WHS), which was translated into a joint Commitment to Action signed by most of the UN IASC Principals at the WHS. In its original formulation the *New Way of Working* is described as working over multiple years towards collective outcomes that transcend humanitarian and development divides to tangibly meet people’s immediate humanitarian needs, while at the same time reducing risk and vulnerability."

Shortly before WHS, twin resolutions on Sustaining Peace were passed by the Security Council and General Assembly in April 2016. These resolutions define *Sustaining Peace* as “encompassing activities aimed at preventing the outbreak, escalation, continuation and recurrence of conflict”. The two resolutions called on the three pillars of the UN – (i) peace and security, (ii) development and (iii) human rights – each to make contributions to “proactively address root causes and support institutions that are required for sustainable peace and development.”

The resolutions on Sustaining Peace stress the importance of coherence and complementarity between the United Nations’ peace and security efforts and its development, human rights and humanitarian work. Within the UN system, coherence and coordination in support of peace consolidation in mission settings is grounded in the UN Integrated Assessment and Planning (IAP) policy, which outlines important guiding principles, including respect for humanitarian principles and clarifies the link between humanitarian action and peacebuilding. It recognizes that while humanitarian action can support peace efforts, its main purpose remains to address life-saving needs and alleviate suffering and that, accordingly, most humanitarian interventions are likely to remain outside the scope of integration. The IAP is focused on the importance of including humanitarian actors in analysis and planning for sustaining peace, to “ensure coherence and complementarity with other actors.” It notes that, depending on the context, certain activities may be included in the UN’s integrated strategic approach and calls in all cases for shared analysis and

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4 General Assembly resolution (A/RES/70/262) and a Security Council resolution (S/RES/2282)
5 PBSO Guidance Note on *Sustaining Peace*
coordination among humanitarian and peace consolidation actors. Peacebuilding action however, goes beyond peace keeping settings and can be done at any time, before, during and after conflict. The Guidance Note on Sustaining Peace, that is not limited to mission contexts, echoes these points.

The New Way of Working and the Commitment to Action signed at the WHS do not alter this framing. Policy discussions at global, regional and country level have further explored the programmatic and field implications of these two agendas and their intersection. Within and across the subsidiary bodies of the IASC and the UN Development Group (i.e. the UNWGT), in the CEB, QCPR, and Grand Bargain, discussions around the New Way of Working (joined up humanitarian and development action) have sometimes included ‘peace’ as a third prong. The New Way of Working has been interpreted by some actors to encompass the humanitarian-development-peace nexus. Conversely, others see the humanitarian-development-peace nexus as two separate sets (humanitarian-development and development-peace). Yet others will maintain that peace, and the concrete contributions towards peacebuilding by all actors will be an essential part of the success of sustaining development investments and decreasing humanitarian need.

**Preserving humanitarian space and principles**

It is in the contexts of protracted crises, that are often either driven or exacerbated by conflict, where the Agenda for Humanity calls for the greatest efforts: leaving no one behind, and reaching the furthest first in a joined-up and interoperable manner. It is in these settings the majority—indeed as much as around 80 percent of the caseload, where the greatest need for a coherent and joined up approach towards reducing risk and vulnerabilities is needed.

During these policy discussions, concern has been raised that the need to protect humanitarian space may contradict, diverge from, or simply not contribute, to the calls to sustain peace. There is also concern that the discussion around Sustaining Peace further complicates the already enormous task of operationalizing better collaboration across the humanitarian and development sectors in the first place. Finally, some are concerned with introducing humanitarian actors in political arenas, especially in light of increasing number of attacks on humanitarian workers. If forced to adopt a blanket alignment to national development and peace-building goals, which are essentially political, they fear that this would result in the potential loss of the independence of humanitarianism and perceived neutrality of humanitarianism.

Some therefore adamantly say that, it is thus important to define, and where needed to limit, the notion of “collective outcomes” to the areas of reducing needs, risks and vulnerability. The New Way of Working language emphasizes that the approach is intended to bring tangible development gains to the most vulnerable people, including those affected by protracted and recurrent crises – where context allows. The aim is to promote the kind of multi-year financing and cross-sector collaboration that allow for humanitarian actors to contribute to resilience where possible, and for development actors to increase their engagement and investment in fragile and at-risk communities where crises most often strike. The meeting point between the two communities is where collective outcomes can be identified.

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6 See mapping at https://interagencystandingcommittee.org/iasc-task-team-strengthening-humanitariandevelopment-nexus-focus-protracted-contexts/documents-4
7 See Commitment to Action
It should not be taken forward in situations where working collectively would undermine the effective delivery of humanitarian assistance or the adherence to humanitarian principles. In some contexts, such alignment will not be possible. However, the risk that the approach of collective outcomes will be used to force humanitarian actors towards assimilation seems potent enough to have been duly raised several times among agencies and NGOs, and will therefore require greater clarity and clear guidance of what the New Way of Working does and does not entail. The further practical and operational work on advancing shared data, joint analysis and joined-up planning and programming within the H-D Nexus will necessitate unpacking the realities of the New Way of Working.

**Implementing the New Way of Working**

This being said, there are points of convergence. The 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development articulates the threat that protracted humanitarian crises -- and the forced displacement they cause -- may pose to development. Similarly, humanitarian crises can reverse the gains in peacebuilding. In these protracted settings humanitarian actors find that the reduction of need and vulnerabilities relies on preventing crises through better preparedness, vulnerability and risk reduction, in many cases working in partnership with national and local institutions, including civil society. Depending on the context, certain activities may be included in the UN’s integrated strategic approach.

There is no debate that humanitarian, development and peace action in those ‘constrained’ settings are closely interlinked: They all seek to either address or mitigate the impact of the root causes of crises, which often stem from violations and neglect of human rights, including persistent discrimination, impunity and violence. This however, this does not mean that all actors do peace/conflict work. It is widely acknowledged that prevention and peacebuilding is generally initiated too late or insufficiently sustained in fragile and conflict-affected contexts; efforts should be scaled up but whether or not humanitarian action is appropriate for this must be very carefully reviewed, with a focus on ensuring that this does not threaten its very ability to access the most vulnerable people.

There is also no debate on the elements that need to be reviewed to implement the New Way of Working. It will have to be gradual; learning from the field as much as possible, providing guidance only where clarity is required. Four priorities have been identified to guide the early phases of implementation: a) predictable and joint situation and problem analysis; b) better joined-up planning and programming c) leadership and coordination; and c) financing modalities that can support collective outcomes.\(^\text{10}\)

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\(^8\) See typologies diagram at https://interagencystandingcommittee.org/iasc-task-team-strengthening-humanitariandevelopment-nexus-focus-protracted-contexts/documents-5

\(^9\) As documented in the 2015 Report of the High-Level Independent Panel on UN Peace Operations (HIPPO)

\(^{10}\) draft joint IASC-UNDG shared narrative, forthcoming.
What success may look like

If the IASC aims to adapt its working modalities to ensure more effective aid delivery in the short term while reducing risk and vulnerability in the longer term, it is imperative that the IASC determines what the New Way of Working entails vis-a-vis the elements in the Sustaining Peace agenda. Before operationalization, the parameters must be clear. Based on the points of convergence outlined above, a consensus may be formulated on what this parameter may look like:

In short, successfully implementing the New Way of Working is likely to contribute to peacebuilding, but is not its fundamental purpose.

The Sustaining Peace resolutions recognize that a comprehensive approach to peacebuilding requires: "strengthening of the rule of law at the international and national levels, and promoting sustained and sustainable economic growth, poverty eradication, social development, sustainable development, national reconciliation and unity, through various means including inclusive dialogue and mediation, access to justice and transitional justice, accountability, good governance, democracy, accountable institutions, gender equality and respect for, and protection of, human rights and fundamental freedoms".

This list, which is also echoed in the QCPR resolution of 2016, offers a menu of programmatic entry points where coherent and joined-up humanitarian-development action may be applied, through principled, yet neutral, action. Humanitarian and development actors are already engaged in these approaches, albeit currently constrained by administrative, budgetary, and structural silos. Breaking these silos between humanitarian and development actors and reducing needs, risks and vulnerabilities through the New Way of Working will allow for more effective efforts towards achieving and protecting the development gains necessary for a peaceful society.

In practice, for the humanitarian system, project timeframes should be flexible and recognized as making a contribution to protecting hard-earned development gains. Where possible, humanitarian programming can also contribute to resilience before, and at the onset of, an emergency through contributing to (share data) and engaging in joint analysis, capacity building and preparedness activities. Even in the most intractable conflicts situations where rights and protection are denied to some, the aim of immediate lifesaving assistance (food, shelter, health, etc.) and the targets that guide them should be designed to protect development gains and contribute improvements in development outcomes, including basic social services, safety nets and other measures that increase resilience in the face of future shocks.

Development actors, by the same token, must be less risk averse, must come in much sooner and have the flexibility to quickly adapt their programming interventions to crisis settings, working on institution-building, capacity development, restoring social sectors and services, and graduating humanitarian caseloads as early as possible onto national programmes. Development planning and programming must therefore be sensitive and adaptable to the risk of crises and be responsive to sudden shocks and changes in the needs of vulnerable populations. In doing so, development plans must be sensitive to those who are marginalized, and seek at all times to prevent or reduce risks, reduce vulnerabilities, and advocate for equitable distribution of public services. After a shock, development actors must seek to resume, rebuild or expand access to basic social services, safety

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11 Para 24, 24a, 24b of A/RES/71/243
nets and other measures that will help affected become self-reliant again as quickly as possible and increase resilience in the face of future shocks.

In conflict-affected situations, strengthening the security sector will be essential. This is a role only peace and security actors can play. Humanitarian action may contribute to peace dividends\textsuperscript{12}, but it will not be the explicit objective of humanitarian action. Humanitarian actors may contribute to developing capacities and supporting inclusive dialogue and grievance mechanisms, but the IASC must not shy away from asking the appropriate actors to intervene where neglect, discrimination, and abuse occurs by holding national authorities accountable and when needed, leveraging existing mechanisms such as \textit{Human Rights Up Front} in a more systematic manner.

In these settings where a constrained environment hampers humanitarian action, the comparative advantage of humanitarian actors will be self-evident. By balancing common sense pragmatism and the principle of do no harm, it is clear that in some contexts, such alignment towards collective outcomes will not be possible. Buttressed by thorough risk, conflict, and situation analysis, pockets of contexts within an affected region, would and should be excluded from the explicit linkages to inherently political instruments. This no one denies -- effective humanitarian collaboration with development actors and mechanisms must be principled and rights-based at all times. This should however not mean that humanitarian actors withdraw from the formulation of collective outcomes. \textit{Collective} outcomes do not mean common ones.

Ultimately, if done coherently – through shared data, joint analysis and joined-up planning and programming – a strong, effective and interoperable \textit{New Way of Working} between humanitarian-development actors can contribute directly to preventing the outbreak of conflict, as well as building and \textit{Sustaining Peace}.

\textsuperscript{12}Where contexts allows, humanitarian sectors can build on its conflict sensitive programming and begin to identify opportunities to support peacebuilding. Using health, WASH, and livelihoods projects, and as means to provide platforms for mediation and reconciliation have been proposed by some ‘double-mandated’ agencies as a viable path to moving from ‘working \textit{in} conflicts to working \textit{on} conflicts’.
Mapping of Global Processes & Mechanisms:

Strengthening the working methods across this nexus, overcoming long-standing conventional thinking, attitudinal, institutional, and funding obstacles were identified by the majority of stakeholders as a top propriety for the World Humanitarian Summit. Since WHS, operational and policy discussions at global, regional and national levels have also moved the agenda forward. Other processes have also contributed in articulating new modalities for working in increasingly complex operational environments.
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