Humanitarian Response Review

An independent report commissioned by the United Nations Emergency Relief Coordinator & Under-Secretary-General for Humanitarian Affairs, Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA)

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Humanitarian Response Review
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The opinions expressed in this report are those of the authors and do not necessarily represent those of the Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs

New York and Geneva, 2005
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FOREWORD

BY THE UNDER-SECRETARY-GENERAL FOR HUMANITARIAN AFFAIRS
AND UNITED NATIONS EMERGENCY RELIEF COORDINATOR

In recent years, humanitarian organizations have become increasingly effective in saving lives, alleviating human suffering, and advocating for the rights of people in need. Nonetheless, there still are considerable gaps in the ability of the humanitarian system to respond adequately to all humanitarian crises. Hence, we must, and we can, do better to be more predictable in our response to vulnerable populations around the globe.

This Humanitarian Response Review is an important step in this direction. It is an independent assessment of the humanitarian system in which the experts identify reasons why the aid community sometimes falls short of its goals. The report seeks to demonstrate what the humanitarian system’s current capabilities are and shows where the shortfalls lie. Already, it has prompted the discussion of how the entire humanitarian system can ensure faster and better responses to the needs of people in distress. Some of the Review’s recommendations have been addressed in this year’s ECOSOC discussions; others will form part of this year’s General Assembly debate on reform of the United Nations, including the larger humanitarian system.

I would like to thank Ms. Costanza Adinolfi, Mr. David Bassiouni, Mr. Halvor Fossum Lauritzsen, and Mr. Roy Williams, the accomplished and experienced consultants, who completed this daunting project in a tight timeframe, for their tremendous efforts. I also would like to extend my thanks to the OCHA team, led by Ms. Yvette Stevens, for the successful completion of this project, and to all those who participated in the consultation process. In this year of reform for the United Nations, I would like to call upon each of us in the broader humanitarian community, to do our part in seizing the opportunity to improve the system in which we all play crucial roles.

I would also like to express my gratitude to the Governments of Australia, France, Norway, Sweden and the United Kingdom for making this independent study possible through their generous contributions.

[Signature]

Jan Egeland
Under-Secretary-General for Humanitarian Affairs
and Emergency Relief Coordinator
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<td>Action contre la Faim</td>
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<td>Active Learning Network on Accountability and Performance in Humanitarian</td>
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<td>ASEAN</td>
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<td>Group of Seventy-Seven at the United Nations</td>
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<td>Good Donorship Humanitarian Initiative</td>
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<td>Humanitarian Accountability Project</td>
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<td>Humanitarian Response Review</td>
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<td>International Humanitarian Partnership</td>
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<td>INSARAG</td>
<td>International Search and Rescue Advisory Group</td>
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<td>IOM</td>
<td>International Organization for Migration</td>
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<td>Acronym</td>
<td>Description</td>
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<tr>
<td>IRIN</td>
<td>Integrated Regional Information Network</td>
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<td>IWG</td>
<td>NGO Interagency Working Group</td>
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<td>MCDA</td>
<td>Military and Civil Defence/Civil Protection Assets</td>
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<td>MDG</td>
<td>Millennium Development Goals</td>
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<td>MoU</td>
<td>Memoranda of Understanding</td>
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<td>MSF</td>
<td>Médecins Sans Frontières</td>
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<td>NATO</td>
<td>North Atlantic Treaty Organization</td>
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<td>NGO</td>
<td>Non-Governmental Organization</td>
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<td>NOREPS</td>
<td>Norwegian Emergency Preparedness System</td>
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<td>Norwegian Refugee Council</td>
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<td>OCHA</td>
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<td>ODI</td>
<td>Overseas Development Institute</td>
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<td>OECD</td>
<td>Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development</td>
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<td>OECD-DAC</td>
<td>Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development - Development Assistance Committee</td>
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<td>OSCE</td>
<td>Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe</td>
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<td>OSOCC</td>
<td>On-Site Operations Coordination Centre</td>
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<td>RC</td>
<td>Resident Coordinator</td>
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<td>RDRT</td>
<td>Regional Disaster Response Teams</td>
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<td>SCF</td>
<td>Save the Children Fund</td>
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<td>SCHR</td>
<td>Steering Committee for Humanitarian Response</td>
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<td>SG</td>
<td>Secretary-General</td>
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<td>SIDA</td>
<td>Swedish International Development Cooperation Agency</td>
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<td>SMART</td>
<td>Standardized Monitoring and Assessment of Relief and Transitions Initiative</td>
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<td>SRSA</td>
<td>Swedish Rescue Services Agency</td>
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<td>SRSG</td>
<td>Special Representative of the Secretary-General</td>
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<td>TACRO</td>
<td>The Americas and Caribbean Regional Office (UNICEF)</td>
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<td>Special Relief Operations Service (FAO)</td>
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<td>ToR</td>
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<td>UN</td>
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<td>United Nations Centre for Human Settlements</td>
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<td>United Nations Country Team</td>
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<td>UNDAC</td>
<td>United Nations Disaster Assessment team</td>
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<td>UNDAF</td>
<td>United Nations Development Assistance Frameworks</td>
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<td>United Nations Development Group</td>
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<td>United Nations Development Group Office</td>
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<td>UNDP</td>
<td>United Nations Development Programme</td>
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<td>UNDRC</td>
<td>United Nations Disaster Relief Coordinator</td>
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<td>Office of the United Nations Disaster Relief Coordinator</td>
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<td>UNEP</td>
<td>United Nations Environment Programme</td>
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<tr>
<td>UNFPA</td>
<td>United Nations Population Fund</td>
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<tr>
<td>UNGA</td>
<td>United Nations General Assembly</td>
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<tr>
<td>UNHAS</td>
<td>United Nations Humanitarian Air Service</td>
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<td>United Nations High Commission for Refugees</td>
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<td>UNJLC</td>
<td>United Nations Joint Logistics Centre</td>
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<td>UNOG</td>
<td>United Nations Office at Geneva</td>
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<td>United Nations Security Council</td>
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<td>UNSECOORD</td>
<td>United Nations Security Coordinator</td>
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<td>United Nations Volunteers</td>
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<td>WFP</td>
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<td>World Health Organization</td>
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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

I. THE PROCESS

1. The perception that humanitarian response does not always meet the basic requirements of affected populations in a timely fashion and that the response provided can vary considerably from crisis to crisis prompted the Emergency Relief Coordinator (ERC) to launch an independent Humanitarian Response Review (HRR) of the global humanitarian system. The review was planned to assess the humanitarian response capacities of the UN, NGOs, Red Cross/Red Crescent Movement and other key humanitarian actors including the International Organization for Migration (IOM), map the gaps, and make recommendations to address them.

2. The Review was conducted by four independent consultants, between February and June 2005. In undertaking the review, the team adopted a bottom up approach, and the report is based on the results of the analysis of material collected through customized questionnaires, interviews, seminars, background documents, as well as the results of a number of evaluations and lessons learned exercises. An interactive process allowed the consultants to engage, at different stages, in discussion with the Inter-Agency Standing Committee (IASC), the donors’ Humanitarian Liaison Working Group (HLWG) and, in the context of the “G77”, representatives of the CAP, UNDAC and tsunami affected countries.

3. The review covered complex emergencies and natural disasters. The team gave special attention to reviewing the preparedness of the international humanitarian organizations to predict crises, prevent them, mitigate their impact on vulnerable populations and respond effectively to their needs. In view of the limited assigned timeframe and resources available, the focus of the review was on the capabilities of the international response system and on aspects relevant to the initial period of a crisis, commencing at four weeks and extending to a maximum of 18 months. This is the critical period in which fundamental shortcomings in the response can have long-lasting impact on the affected populations.

4. The review team believes that their study should be considered as an initial input to a larger project. While it provides a fairly good picture of the UN family and other organizations such as IOM, it does not provide a global mapping for the NGO community and the Red Cross/Red Crescent Movement. Similarly, the assessment of the international capacities does not represent the humanitarian global response capacity, especially since local and regional capacities in recipient countries or regions play a major role in the response of the humanitarian system, particularly in natural disaster situations. Also capacities of other actors, such as the private sector or the military have not been analyzed. On the donors’ side, the review can be considered representative in relation to the major traditional donors but cover only partially the potential of new donors. Finally, the perspective of the beneficiaries has been addressed indirectly through the findings of a number of recent evaluations or lessons learned exercises and the review of some literature relating to accountability.

II. KEY FINDINGS AND CONCLUSIONS

5. Notwithstanding the above, the quantity and quality of the information received are sufficient and relevant to enable the identification of international response trends and to draw conclusions and recommendations at the global and sectoral levels. The team is of the opinion that some of the trends observed at the global level are also present at the local, national or regional levels, in the countries or regions affected. Hence, some of the conclusions and recommendations identified at the global level could also be applicable at these levels.

6. The screening exercise reveals a mixed image of the present response capacity of the international system, with some positive indicators, but also elements of concern. In particular, it highlights a number of well-known long-standing gaps that the system has failed to address in the past. This may raise questions as to the commitment of the international humanitarian community to make efforts to eliminate hurdles that do not allow for an inclusive, well-linked humanitarian response system to function, grow and thrive. Nevertheless, a positive element is that, both in the humanitarian organizations and in the donor community, there is a sense of urgency on the need to address those
failures, thus opening a window of opportunity to move from the analysis of the problems to remedial actions. The challenge is how to build consensus around a number of objectives that the humanitarian organizations and the donors could agree upon to pursue in the near future, for instance in the next three years, and that the recipient countries and the beneficiary populations would consider as responding to their preoccupations and needs.

7. Humanitarian organizations and donors acknowledge that the humanitarian response provided is not good enough and that remedial action is needed and a number of initiatives are currently being taken to address this. Such initiatives focus on accountability to direct beneficiaries, donors and taxpayers, national or local authorities, as well as to governing bodies of the humanitarian organizations. The major challenges are to reconcile different, sometimes contradictory imperatives, to define the appropriate limits of accountability and to ensure that the accountability agenda is driven by the humanitarian principles and the needs of the beneficiaries.

8. In nearly all the organizations, strategies exist or are being developed to address major shortcomings and to improve the quality and timeliness of the response and the sense of direction is well defined and supported by the senior management of these organizations. Nevertheless, the reform process is faced with the usual problems of obtaining the continued engagement of the whole organization and of all the staff, as well as the failure to secure adequate political and financial support from the organizations’ governing bodies and from the donors.

9. While individual initiatives are proceeding in the right direction, a global vision, supported by a plan of action providing an agreed shared response to many of the challenges experienced by all the humanitarian organizations is lacking. The three international humanitarian networks examined (UN, Red Cross/Red Crescent Movement and NGOs), as well as the IOM, remain vertical to each other within each network and collaboration between the networks needs to be considerably improved. The humanitarian system has developed sufficient tools and experiences to be able to go a step further and to establish and apply a limited number of benchmarks (and related indicators) to promote progress. Global benchmarks can be built on notions of effectiveness and relevance.

10. The major gap identified is the low level of preparedness of the humanitarian organizations, in terms of human resources and sectoral capacities.

In the area of human resources, major shortcomings in managerial capacities are acknowledged. Recruitment policies, in particular during emergencies, fail to provide, in a timely fashion, the number and quality of required staff. Training within organizations, in general, is limited in scope and number of dedicated hours. The voluntary nature of staff deployment for assignments to emergency missions, which is applied by the majority of the organizations, often hampers the speed of response, especially in very difficult and hardship situations. Reliance on the emergency team approach does not completely meet the challenges of effective response and often has the effect of distracting attention from significant deficiencies in performances.

11. Organizations have allowed internal emergency systems to develop in isolation from the overall organizational objectives or realistic resource capabilities. It is not clear whether the current internal realignments, being made to correct the situation, are being done in isolation or in joint discussions with the networks to which the agencies belong.

12. In relation to sectoral capacities, protection capacities are weak and need to be strengthened. Gaps have also been identified in some sectors, including water and sanitation, shelter, camp management and in food aid, nutrition and livelihoods. In addition, there are limits in common services and surge capacities that need to be expanded.

13. As a sector, protection requires special and urgent attention. Specific examples of this are the many instances of gender-violence in Darfur. A complicating element is that the differing perceptions of roles and responsibilities often confuse discussions on the issues. The NGO and the UN communities approach issues on the ground in distinctly different ways. The NGOs generally focus on a lack of ability to provide “protection” in a loosely defined manner. Whereas the UN system, while acknowledging weakness in the actual provision of protection, tend to regard the subject in terms of far more defined institutional roles. Both groups acknowledge the scale of the human resource problem.
14. The clear discrepancies between declared and actual capacities in water and sanitation need urgent attention. While there is an almost ritualistic acknowledgement of the importance of the Sphere Standards, many agencies lack the capacity to implement these requirements. The main elements needed to make an immediate impact on preparedness and response capacities in this sector, include the recognition of the fact that the overriding significance of this sector has to be translated into commitment, starting with an active and clearly recognized leadership. In addition, the ongoing training of key staff and systematic dissemination of information on best practices needs to be maintained and equipment for training and immediate response must be readily available. Training should be undertaken at all operational levels and, to the extent possible, be expanded to inter-agency clusters as a means of achieving the most widespread results.

15. Almost all recent operations have disclosed a weakness in the sector of camp management. Currently, there is a lack of a clear sense of ownership for the broader aspects of working with displaced populations in camp situations. The levels of training in site placement, construction of shelters and choice of shelter material vary greatly. Consequently, the task of camp management suffers from a lack of direction and NGOs end up assuming responsibility for activities beyond their competence. The sector needs to be strengthened in relation to standards and general expectations, and agencies should recognize that this sector is essential in almost all international emergencies.

16. The information presented on food aid, nutrition and livelihoods reveals an unclear mix of capacity and a lack of clearly defined approaches to the utilization of the established service resources. This translates into shortfalls in the provision of assistance and the treatment of the sector, in primarily responsive terms, on the part of the smaller agencies. There is also no doubt that the agencies operating within the food sector are providing extensive coverage, but the limited number of operators introduces an element of fragility into these sectors.

17. The assumed capacity of individual organizations regarding surge capacities is not consistent with the actual capacity they possess. Mechanisms for reviewing stockpiles are insufficiently developed so that organizations are unable to respond in a timely manner. In addition, interagency cooperation within the NGO community is not frequently utilized at the headquarters for planning and resource management purposes. Furthermore, the existing stockpile registration system is not accessed sufficiently, given its limited capacity. Finally, it is only recently that joint assessments are being systematically organized. New mechanisms, like the EU initiatives to reinforce its emergency and crisis response mechanisms or the French proposal to establish a standing Humanitarian Force, can be considered as positive elements, in so far as they are designed to expand and support established and well functioning international systems.

18. As far as international humanitarian coordination is concerned, the team believes that there are limited linkages and collaboration between the three humanitarian systems examined (UN, Red Cross/Red Crescent Movement, NGOs). However, there is a sense that the time has come for the humanitarian community to work collectively towards an inclusive system-wide coordination mechanism to which all stakeholders can feel a sense of belonging.

19. The lead organization concept encourages the effective use of expertise and technical know-how of mandated organizations. It needs to be adopted system-wide. This will also facilitate clustering at different levels where this model has a potential to increase efficiency in the use of resources. The ERC, in consultation with the IASC and major stakeholders, could designate an entity as Lead Sector to take charge and coordinate the development of the technical and management expertise and know-how for the rest of the system. The system will operate at the regional as well as at the country level coordinated by the Humanitarian Coordinators and supported by Field IASC –Humanitarian Country Teams.

20. Although the IASC is the most representative humanitarian forum yet established, it cannot claim to represent the full spectrum of all humanitarian actors. Its functioning by consensus and non-binding decisions has limited its authority and the impact of its support to the coordination functions of the ERC and the Humanitarian Coordinators. Hence, strengthening the mandate, structure and membership of the IASC at the HQ level and establishing its presence and effectiveness in the field will address a major gap in coordination.

21. Within the UN, including at the Secretariat level, the working relationships of the ERC are judged as good, and humanitarian coordination appears to be working well. The challenge is at the
IASC level and in the donors’ community where there is an increasing demand on the ERC leadership to help to build a broader and more inclusive operational humanitarian community. This calls for a strengthening of the function.

22. In its current form and structure, the performance of the UN humanitarian coordination depends too much on the personal qualities and diplomatic skills of the Resident Coordinator/Humanitarian Coordinator. Where these basic qualities exist, the system operates well. Where its performance is dismal, no stakeholder in the non-UN community feels attracted to be part of the system. It is thus in the interest of the humanitarian community to strengthen the system in order to produce a larger number of outstanding Humanitarian Coordinators, to select and train them well in advance of their assignment and provide them with the appropriate tools in order for effective systemic coordination to become the norm. The merged RC/HC position should be reviewed in order to meet a number of conditions required for an RC to be accepted as an HC by the larger humanitarian community.

23. While in general, OCHA has been seen as having made significant progress in a number of areas, it needs to strengthen its back-up support to the field and to the HC as well as its role in monitoring and identifying gaps in the response system, in order to promote appropriate remedial action in particular in the framework of a reformed IASC.

24. In the collaborative approach for IDPs, the international humanitarian coordination system works by goodwill and consensus and depends too often on the HC authority and skills. While its role has to be maintained and reinforced, there is also a need to make progress in designing a more explicit model where, sector operational accountability will be clearly identified at the level of a designated organization, following standards to be agreed upon. Responsibilities to be covered under such a model are planning and strategy development, standard setting, implementation and monitoring as well as advocacy.

25. A number of tools for coordination such as contingency planning and preparedness, joint-needs assessment, CAP/Appeals need to be developed as growing areas of collaboration between the UN, Red Cross/Red Crescent Movement, NGOs and IOM. Also a number of operational procedures and practices such as human resource policies and procedures and financial management that the Red Cross/Red Crescent Movement are applying can find relevance and use in the UN system.

26. Currently, the model of the UN Integrated Mission does not sufficiently take into account humanitarian concerns and represents a challenge for a more inclusive humanitarian system. In that sense and as a minimum requirement to be met when Integrated Missions are established, it is essential that the DSRSG for Humanitarian Affairs and Development be empowered to ensure that humanitarian space is preserved and the humanitarian principles of independence, impartiality and neutrality are consistently upheld.

27. On the side of donors, recent initiatives indicate a renewed engagement, at least from a large group of traditional donors, to support an improved international response. However a number of inconsistencies in their policies need to be addressed. One such inconsistency relates to the high expectations on quantity and quality of results in humanitarian action and the low priority and very limited support given to the preparedness of the organizations. Another is the insistence on appeals, based on quality and credible assessments from the organizations, and the subsequent lack of support to forgotten or neglected crises, even when the appeals are based on sound needs assessment. An extension of the donor base, including a larger involvement of the private sector, should be actively promoted through common strategies established by the humanitarian organizations and supported by the present traditional donors.

III. RECOMMENDATIONS

28. The recommendations presented in the Report are driven by the identified need to promote:

1 For example, the Good Humanitarian Donorship Initiative (GHDI), the UK proposals for strengthening the humanitarian response capacity, the French proposal to establish a standing International Humanitarian Force or the European Union initiatives to reinforce the EU Disaster and Crisis Response in third countries.
• A global vision of the necessary reforms and a shared plan of action for the improvement of the system in a reasonably short timeframe

• Accountability, in particular towards people in need, bearing in mind the necessity for a balanced and sufficient, including financial, needs based response

• The establishment of appropriate mechanisms to measure results, on which a consensus can be built between humanitarian organizations, donors and recipient countries

• Preparedness across the system, including but not exclusively, at the level of the international humanitarian organizations matched to appropriate political and financial support

• Interoperability within each of the network (UN, Red Cross/Red Crescent Movement, NGOs) and between these three systems.

One major recommendation emerging from the report is the need to obtain a global mapping of humanitarian response capacities that would cover not only international actions but also national and regional action, the private sector and the military. Such a mapping should also aim at obtaining a more complete picture of the capacities of NGOs. This mapping exercise should be pursued in an appropriate framework, including the IASC.

29. The other key recommendations cover, first and foremost, the development and application of benchmarks and indicators to measure performance. In addition, they address the strengthening of response capacities, with priority placed on human resources. Furthermore, steps to improve coordination of the international response system are identified. Finally, they address the adequacy of available funding to ensure timely response in emergencies.

30. As far as benchmarks are concerned, the review recommends the establishment and application of different sets of benchmarks at the level of the organizations (management benchmarks for preparedness and planning) and of the system (process and impact benchmarks for CAP and other planning/appeal models). In addition, it recommends a limited set of global process benchmarks applicable in the first 3 months of a new emergency, to be field-tested over a period of three years. In the area of human resources the team recommends a review of policies (recruitment, training and rules of assignment to emergency missions) to boost capacities, in particular at managerial, sectoral and field levels.

31. For sectoral capacities, the team recommends to organizations to reassess their declared response capacities against agreed thresholds for operational relevance and to establish appropriate plans of action to fill confirmed gaps in water and sanitation, shelter, camp management and protection and to develop the pre-positioning of essential relief items, common services and larger surge capacities. In addition, organizations are called upon to establish standards and guidelines that would facilitate and promote interoperability.

32. In addressing coordination, the report recommends to review the IASC membership, mandate and decision making system and to assign to it a leading role in monitoring the reform process and promoting it. The report recommends also steps to strengthen the role and the functions of the ERC and of the Humanitarian Coordinators, in order to better reflect the broader basis of the humanitarian community they represent. The terms of reference, the recruitment process and training of the Humanitarian Coordinators and Resident Coordinators should be substantially reviewed. In terms of sectoral coordination, the report recommends the assignment of clear responsibilities to lead organizations at sector level, with a priority in relation to the protection and care of IDPs and the development of cluster models between networks at the sectoral, regional and local levels.

33. In relation to the funding of humanitarian operations, the report recommends progress through a clear engagement of donors, in correcting the imbalanced and insufficient response to forgotten or neglected humanitarian needs. It further recommends that an expansion of the current level for funding of humanitarian crises be considered within the framework of the Millennium Development Goals. Finally, it recommends an expansion of financial support, through the engagement of a larger group of traditional and new donors, including the private sector, for preparedness and rapid reaction activities at the level of individual organizations (preparedness and emergencies funding mechanisms) or at central level (revision and expansion of the CERF).
THE REPORT
INTRODUCTION

1. The Humanitarian Response Review (HRR) was launched by the Emergency Relief Coordinator (ERC) to assess the humanitarian response capacities of the UN, NGOs, Red Cross/Red Crescent Movement and other key humanitarian actors including the International Organization for Migration (IOM), identify the gaps and make recommendations to address them.

2. The Review was conducted by four independent consultants (Costanza Adinolfi, David Bassiouni, Halvor Lauritzsen and Roy Williams) between February and June 2005\(^2\), in accordance with the ten objectives, based on the original Terms of Reference (ToR)\(^3\), and the work plan and within the timeframe indicated in the Inception Report\(^4\).

3. The team favoured a bottom up approach\(^5\) and the Report is based on the results of the analysis of material collected through customized questionnaires, interviews, seminars, background documents, a review of best practices, some evaluations and lessons learned exercises.\(^6\) The interactive process allowed the consultants to engage, at different stages of the process in discussion with the Inter-Agency Standing Committee (IASC)\(^7\), the Donors Humanitarian Liaison Working Group (HLWG) and, in the context of “G77”, with representatives of the CAP, UNDAC and “tsunami” affected countries\(^8\). The attitude of the different groups of stakeholders was characterized by a high level of transparency and cooperation. The team would like to express its gratitude to all participants for the support received and its appreciation for the quality of the contributions provided to the review team.

4. The consultants considered complex emergencies (man made) and major emergencies (natural disaster) and have organized the review around the notions of preparedness and response capacities, using already existing definitions largely accepted by the humanitarian community\(^9\). In relation to “preparedness”, they examined specifically the preparedness of humanitarian organizations. In view of the tight timeframe assigned and the resources available, the focus of the study has been on the “international” response and on aspects relevant to the first phase of a crisis (to a maximum of 18 months).

5. The report is organized into four Chapters. Chapter 1 covers benchmarks for accountability and performance of the international response, while the second chapter examines the preparedness and response capacity of the international humanitarian organizations. Chapter 3 focuses on coordination, and the final chapter deals with the financing of emergency operations. Each chapter includes relevant recommendations, with responsibility for action. The consultants consider it the task of the stakeholders to assign priority and appropriate timeframe to specific actions.

6. The main recommendations have been presented in this report after this introduction and detailed recommendations are given at the end of each chapter. For ease of reference, the Addendum to the report (Table 1) shows a summary of all the recommendations, presented in 2 Groups:

   **Group A:** Recommendations implying the need to make additional progress and maintain a sustained effort in ongoing initiatives or processes.

   **Group B:** Recommendations implying the need of changing approach or taking new initiatives.

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\(^2\) With temporary support from C. Page and H. Mareque (assistant researchers); from the Norwegian Red Cross Analysis team and Global Relief Technologies for data analysis

\(^3\) Please see attached document in Annex I

\(^4\) Established in March and revised in April 2005. See also in Annex II the list of objectives

\(^5\) A full list of the organizations, the donors and the persons who participated in the exercise is provided in Annex III.

\(^6\) The HRR team invited all humanitarian organizations to provide reports on evaluation that could contribute to the exercise. From a list of 24 countries, making a balance between complex emergencies, natural disasters and geographic coverage, the team reviewed in particular the following crises: Sudan, Chad, Afghanistan, Indonesia and the southern Africa drought.

\(^7\) At the level of the Reference Group (created for the purpose of the HRR) or at the level of the Working Group

\(^8\) Annex IV provides a description of the process for information gathering and discussion

\(^9\) See Annex V.
7. The Report should be seen as part of a broader exercise and as the first phase of a larger mapping. The team recommends pursuing this mapping in an appropriate framework in order to cover missing or only partially covered elements. The quantity and the quality of the information received are however sufficient and relevant enough to identify global trends in relation to the “international response” and to draw conclusions and recommendations (at the global and sectoral levels). Some of the trends observed at the global level seem to be also present at the local, national or regional levels in the countries or regions affected. Hence, some of the conclusions and recommendations presented at the global level could also be applied at those levels.

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10 These elements relate to coverage of the Red Cross/Red Crescent Movement and the NGO community; of the local, national and regional capacities in recipient countries; of the capacities from other actors (like the private sector or the military).
MAIN RECOMMENDATIONS

i. The humanitarian organizations should continue, in an appropriate framework, including at the level of the IASC, the mapping exercise to cover more completely the capacities of the Red Cross/Red Crescent Movement and the NGO community, as well as to address deployable capacities of other actors, such as the private sector and the military.

ii. The IASC organizations should actively pursue and measure the reform processes in their respective organizations, as well as the improvement of the CAP process, through the establishment and the application of different sets of benchmarks. Priority should be given to

  - internal management benchmarks related to the organizations’ preparedness as well as their assessment and planning capacities, in particular at field level. (Action: All – immediately)
  - a limited number of process and impact benchmarks for the CAP or other forms of appeal. (Action: All – immediately)

iii. The IASC should develop a strategy to promote cross-fertilization amongst organizations on best practices related to the use and the development of benchmarks and to ensure appropriate coherence in particular in preparedness and in the CAP process (at country level).

iv. The IASC and the donors should establish a limited set of benchmarks (and indicators) to be implemented in the first period of a new emergency up to a maximum of 3 months and addressing in priority

  - access and coverage of population in need
  - identification of responsibilities in delivery of assistance and in coordination
  - resources mobilization (human, assets, financial)
  - identification of relevant lifesaving activities
  - protection aspects, where needed.

Organizations and donors should agree on it and test it over a 3-year period, starting in 2006, before becoming the reference set. (Action: ERC/IASC with Donors – immediately)

v. Humanitarian organizations should reassess continuously, through an extended mapping of material and human resources in all sectors, their declared response capacities as compared to credible thresholds, below which a declared capacity becomes operationally irrelevant. (Action: All/IASC for threshold definition)

vi. The IASC should identify and assign lead organizations with responsibility at sectoral level, especially in relation to IDP protection and care and develop a cluster approach in all priority sectors. (Action: ERC/IASC – immediately)

vii. The IASC should accelerate the establishment of common standards and guidelines at sector level, in recruitment or training policies, as well as for material assets in order to facilitate interoperability in the different networks and between networks. It should establish a work programme with identified issues and a timeframe for results, on a yearly basis. (Action: ERC/IASC Principals for decisions on priorities before end 2005; IASC WG for implementation, starting in 2006)

viii. The IASC should establish a functioning relief stock positioning system, in addition to the present registration, among UN, the Red Cross and Red Crescent Societies, the IOM and the NGOs, governments and other stakeholders, aimed at increasing preparedness, reducing costs, increasing access and assuring stock rotation. (Action: IASC)

ix. The IASC should take the lead in establishing the clear understanding that organizations must measure their surge capacity according to a consistent and predictable standard. A reporting mechanism should be developed by the IASC Working Group with special attention being paid to the NGO community.

x. OCHA should promote the expansion of surge capacities through the progressive establishment of pre-identified modules at national or regional level, building, inter alia, on new initiatives such as the European Union mechanisms and the French Proposal to establish a standing
International Humanitarian Force (Action: ERC/OCHA to engage in discussions in order to agree on modalities for cooperation and implementation – immediately)

xi. The IASC should accelerate the development of common services. (Action: IASC to identify priority sectors before end 2005; design implementation modalities before end 2006)

xii. Organization Field Directors should clear and establish agreements with operational partners on matters pertaining to local hiring and procurement in particular. (Action: All)

xiii. Non-UN networks, such as those organized by IFRC and the Interagency Working Group, should make liaison with the HC a priority. (Action: Red Cross/Red Crescent members; NGOs)

xiv. The ERC should consult with the IASC Principals and major stakeholders to agree on designating operational accountability for the various sectors and crosscutting areas to respond to the protection and care of IDPs. A similar approach should be followed in order to designate lead organizations in sectors where this is missing and would seem appropriate. (Action: ERC/IASC - immediately)

xv. In an integrated mission with significant humanitarian component, the DSRSG should be vested with the authority to make major decisions on humanitarian matters as well as delegated the functions of the Designated Official (DO) for security for the mission. (Action: ERC/IASC - immediately)

xvi. The IASC and country teams should accelerate the establishment of the IASC at the country level, to be named the Field Humanitarian Team (FHT). (Action: IASC - immediately)

xvii. The ERC should review the composition, functions and decision-making process of the IASC based on the following elements: i) memberships to be based on substantive involvement in humanitarian operations; ii) major leadership to be ensured in monitoring and promoting the reform process through cross-fertilization amongst organizations; iii) organizations to agree on an appropriate system of empowerment of the IASC in making its decisions binding for the members in pre-identified situations (Action: ERC with IASC for proposals before end 2005)

xviii. The IASC should establish a joint consultative UN/NGOs/ICRC/IFRC forum at the level of Directors of Emergencies, which should meet at least every quarter or as the need arises, with a rotating chair, to take common orientations on urgent humanitarian issues, using as a basis for discussion the “Early Warning Mechanism” being developed by the IASC. (Action: IASC before end 2005)

xix. The IASC should review the roles of the ERC and Humanitarian Coordinators and make recommendations to strengthen them in order to better reflect the broader basis of the humanitarian community they serve in their coordination functions (Action: ERC/IASC – immediately)

xx. The IASC should review the selection, training and management system for the Humanitarian Coordinators as well as develop a career path for this cadre, including the establishment of a pre-selected roster of candidates, coming from the different networks part of the IASC.

xxi. The IASC should establish criteria (such as independence from any agency, neutral position vis-a-vis host government, strong humanitarian experience, a mix of operational and diplomatic skills) which the Resident Coordinator would need to meet to be selected as a Humanitarian Coordinator. In cases in which the Resident Coordinators do not meet these criteria, the system should consider a stand-alone HC. A stand-alone HC to be appointed also in case of failed states, uncommitted governments with no degree of accountability and obligations to their citizens and countries at the height of emergencies/disasters without any development opportunities. (Action: ERC/IASC – immediately)

xxii. OCHA should assess the coordination capacities of the HC offices in the field, in preparedness, planning, needs assessment and resource mobilization and to draw up a time-bound plan of action for equipping them with the necessary tools and mechanisms. (Action: OCHA with IASC)
xxiii. IASC should increase coherence in the appeal mechanisms, especially where networks exist. The CAP process should be the tool, with the IASC taking a stronger leadership and establishing by end 2005 a plan of action to speed up the process. (Action: Organizations/IASC)

xxiv. Organizations should develop stronger advocacy for forgotten or neglected needs, through a shared “communication” strategy, established through the IASC, addressed in particular to public opinions and media in the current and potential donor countries. Donors’ policy should be challenged on the basis of sound needs assessments. (Action: All/IASC)

xxv. Humanitarian organizations should review their financial systems, with a view to use available funds in a way that anticipates donor disbursements and prevents loss of funds.

xxvi. Humanitarian organizations should identify, in the framework of existing networks or at the level of the IASC, the preparedness activities including recruitment and training that could be part of a common plan to be presented to donors for financial support; exploring in particular the opportunity offered by such an approach in engaging with the private sector. (Action: All/IASC)

xxvii. Humanitarian organizations should agree to use a common funding appeal system managed by the Humanitarian Coordinator, when as members of a Field Humanitarian Team, they have contributed to establish a Common Action Plan for the initial phase (12 weeks) of a new emergency.

xxviii. Donors should make substantial progress in addressing the acknowledged imbalance in support to different emergencies (forgotten or neglected needs) (Action: All - through inter alia the GHDI – immediately with clear objectives fixed for 2006 budgetary exercise)

xxix. Donors should actively support humanitarian organizations efforts in enlarging the donor base (institutional or private), while preserving respect for the established humanitarian law, principles and practices.

xxx. Donors should introduce only progressively and after appropriate preparation, new funding mechanisms, such as country pooled funding, to prevent negative effects on the financial capacities of humanitarian organizations. (Action: concerned donors)

xxxi. Donors should review disbursement procedures in order to reduce the time span between pledging and disbursement to a maximum of six weeks. (Action: All)

xxxii. In the framework of the GHDI, donors should rapidly agree on the possible simplified reporting approaches (annual reporting of organizations or common format) and establish the common format by end 2005. (Action: donors in the GHDI - for decision before end 2005 and implementation in 2006)

xxxiii. Donors should consider an increase of the present level of funding for humanitarian assistance in the framework of the debate on the MDG. (This should be a priority for the GHDI)

xxxiv. A larger group of donors, including the private sector, should engage in support of preparedness or rapid reaction- through establishing financial mechanisms covering these types of activities at the levels of organizations and, complementary, at central level, such as a revised CERF. Donors should consider devoting at least 5 to 10 per cent of their annual funding to preparedness activities of the organizations.

xxxv. Donors should agree on the revision of the CERF in order to increase its size (between 350-500 M $), to enlarge its scope (support to start up and preparedness activities), to modify its modalities (a large grant element) and the role of the ERC in managing it.

xxxvi. Donors should engage to channel funding, in the initial (12 weeks) phase of a new emergency, through the common appeal which will support the Field Humanitarian Team’ Plan of Action and will be managed by the Humanitarian Coordinator.
CHAPTER I
CHAPTER I

ACCOUNTABILITY AND PERFORMANCE OF THE INTERNATIONAL RESPONSE SYSTEM

1. PROBLEM STATEMENT

Accountability, quality and performance in humanitarian action have been at the core of many often inter-linked debates and initiatives in the last decades. They have been initiated and promoted by the humanitarian organizations themselves, by the donors or by a mix of those two groups\(^{11}\). In the operational humanitarian community, this has been in general linked to the concern for accountability in respect of mandates and the rights of beneficiaries, as well as for the need to obtain financial support, especially from institutional donors. In the donor community the primary motivation has been a concern for efficiency and regularity of use of public funds even if, more recently and in particular under the Good Humanitarian Donorship Initiative (GHDI), accountability towards beneficiaries has become a major concern.

Considerable progress has been achieved in establishing methodologies in order to set “benchmarks” and to assess performance and results/impacts from different perspective. However, a perception exists that progress in using them has been limited and the process needs to be accelerated.

There is no consensus on the concept of a “unique” set of benchmarks against which the “international system” can be held accountable; many have challenged the added value of such a set of global benchmarks as opposed to benchmarks, developed and applied in each specific humanitarian context.

2. FINDINGS

2.1 The Humanitarian Organizations

2.1.1 All the organizations participating in the HRR have, through their mandate and/or their mission statements, established major objectives which they are obliged to fulfil. A large majority confirmed that they apply some kind of standards and/or guidelines\(^{12}\) to ensure that they act in conformity with and are supportive of the humanitarian principles and practices. The most often cited instruments are the Sphere Standards and the Code of Conduct for RC/RC Movement and NGOs. Many agencies have also established specific standards or guidelines linked to their specific mandates or certain aspects of them. All the organizations confirm to have in place planning systems, albeit more or less complex, following very often the logical framework cycle approach. The large majority confirmed to be in the process of reviewing the system or planning to do so to improve them and achieve better effectiveness and accountability.\(^{13}\) The majority of the organizations have large and relatively sophisticated evaluation systems in place (ex ante, ex post, more recently “real time”). Even smaller organizations confirm resorting systematically to lessons learned exercises in order to assess their performance and take corrective measures.

2.1.2 The large majority of the organizations have responded positively to the question on the existence and use of benchmarks. Many have indicated that they are in the process of establishing them or reinforcing their use. Elements looked at relate to speed, quantity, relevance,

\(^{11}\) Sphere Project, the Humanitarian Accountability Project (HAP-I), Active Learning Network for Accountability and Performance (ALNAP), the Code of Conduct for the Red Cross/Red Crescent Movement and NGOs, People in Aid, the SMART initiative, the Quality Initiative, the Good Humanitarian Donorship Initiative (GHDI)

\(^{12}\) Please see illustrative graph in Annex VI.

\(^{13}\) A table of ongoing or planned “reform” processes in the humanitarian organizations participating in the HRR is provided in Annex VII.
appropriateness, and sustainability. Although there is a clear acknowledgement of the need to have a more holistic approach, many of the benchmarks currently in use, are linked to output be they operational or administrative and financial. These benchmarks are often sector-oriented. The large majority of the organizations agree that, while impact benchmarks and indicators should be in place, they are also the most difficult to establish and the most context sensitive. There is also an issue about the nature of benchmarks and indicators to apply, following the evolution of an emergency. Arguably the initial phase of a crisis does not necessarily require the same type of benchmarks as a protracted situation.

2.1.3 A system process exists through the Consolidated Appeal process (CAP), defined\textsuperscript{14} as a programme cycle for planning, coordinating, funding, implementing and monitoring activities. The use of benchmarks and indicators in this framework has been very uneven and a process is underway to develop and use them in a more consistent way.

2.2 The Donors

2.2.1 The donors participating in the HRR all declared that their policies are based on the humanitarian principles\textsuperscript{15}. Many have policy documents that establish the framework for action. Only a few of them translate such policies into a full planning process with a clear statement based on yearly (and/or multi yearly) objectives and targets and linked to resource allocation. Many either base their decisions on the planning of the humanitarian organizations represented by the CAP process and the IFRC/ICRC appeals or take ad hoc decisions especially as far as the financing of NGOs is concerned.

2.2.2 They all have evaluation systems in place. Answers to questionnaires and other information received do not provide enough elements to conclude if those evaluations are limited to the performance of the humanitarian organizations that have received financial support or if they cover also, in a systematic way, the donor’s performance. Our assumption is that the two aspects are often covered. Only a limited number have claimed to have some benchmarks already in place but many have confirmed their engagement to establish benchmarks to measure the performance of donors under the GHD1. Recent discussion in this framework indicates that donors are searching for benchmarks linked to funding that are sensitive in particular to flexibility, timeliness, relevance, appropriateness to support the use of more robust needs assessments as well as to improve coordination mechanisms.

2.2.3 The response given by donors to the questions related to the perception of the performance of the humanitarian organizations provide some interesting perspectives, even if they are to be interpreted with caution (only 6 out of 13 the donors have answered those questions). In general donors have considered that the humanitarian organizations are capable of setting the right priorities. On the average, the perception of the performance of the Red Cross/Red Crescent movement is consistently assessed as good to very good in terms of quality, quantity and speed. For the UN agencies, IOM and NGOs the perception is much more mixed. An “acceptable”, even “bad” rating has been applied by some of the donors for assessing these groups.

2.2.4 All the donors require or expect the organizations they are supporting to apply one or more of the existing international standards or guidelines. Some of them have specific requirements such as the participation of organizations, particularly NGOs, in the CAP as a precondition for obtaining financial support. The most cited benchmarks that, the donors expect the humanitarian organizations to apply, are: transparency and accountability, as the basis for appeals; effectiveness, including quality; and strong and quality coordination. Speed, effectiveness and quality of results as measured by performance indicators, seem to have the support of a large group. The donors otherwise widely use a large number of the other indicators mentioned.

2.2.5 Amongst the elements which can have impact on the improvement of the performance of the global humanitarian system, there is a majority consensus amongst the donors on the need for sound needs assessment and strong coordination. Support given to elements such as “reduced number of actors, higher professionalism and effective management” tends to confirm a strong desire on the part of donors to see the establishment of a better “organized and accountable” system.\textsuperscript{16}

\textsuperscript{14} See the « CAP » leaflet published by OCHA, February 2005
\textsuperscript{15} They are all engaged in the Good Humanitarian Donorship Initiative.
\textsuperscript{16} Please refer to graph on donors’ suggested elements to improve the performance of the global humanitarian system in Annex XII
2.2.6 Donors underlined their perceived shortcomings in the functioning of coordination mechanisms in place. They rated the performance in general as only acceptable and stressed the need to reinforce the role and the quality of the Humanitarian Coordinators and of OCHA. Many have challenged the relevance of the choice of the Resident Coordinators for coordination of humanitarian action especially in complex emergencies. At the same time, the donors do not wish to have a more direct role in the coordination of the system. They expect the humanitarian organizations to organize themselves and cooperate to produce better results.

2.2.7 On transparency and accountability, examining the questionnaire as they relate to the situation of the different groups of humanitarian organizations analyzed, was perceived as very similar and more than acceptable generally averaging at the rate of 2 - on a scale from 1 to 3 - Donors seem to agree that humanitarian organizations are, to a large extent, fulfilling reporting requirements. This could indicate that the accountability and transparency donors are looking for are less at a purely technical or financial level and more at the level of the strategic processes on which they tend to base their own decisions, and against which the soundness of these decisions will be measured by their policies, governing bodies and their public opinion.

3. CONCLUSIONS

3.1 The wealth and the quality of the efforts already undertaken by the humanitarian and the donor communities to establish appropriate methodologies and tools to fulfil the basic humanitarian obligations is impressive. Many of these initiatives have been and continue to be very comprehensive and based on a largely participatory process involving the engagement of all the humanitarian groups the HRR has examined. However the impression is also given that new initiatives on benchmarks and indicators continue to be driven by an approach or by the perspective of specific groups of organizations.

The quality of the internal review process, in which a certain number of organizations are currently engaged, has also to be underlined and should produce in the near future, significant changes in the way the system performs.

Over the last few years, the Good Humanitarian Donorship Initiative (GHDI) has probably been one of the strongest engagements by the donors to subject themselves to the same standards they expect of the humanitarian organizations.

The efforts made in improving the CHAP and the CAP processes, by both humanitarian organizations and donors, are also elements that will contribute to building an improved response system.

3.2 The humanitarian system represented by the international organizations and institutional donors that the HRR has examined – has developed sufficient methodological tools and should have learned enough from a large number of different crisis situations to be able to go a step further and set for itself a limited number of benchmarks and related indicators. Many evaluations and lessons learned results the HRR team has been able to examine reveal the same fact that unless some pressure is created, lessons seem not to be learned enough to produce action. A decision to use a limited set of benchmarks, adapted to the different phases of an emergency, could provide the appropriate peer pressure required to promote progress in the way the international humanitarian assistance is provided.

3.3 In order to create the right environment for further progress, the following concerns need to be addressed:

- Considerable reservation from the humanitarian organizations on the way donors could use the accountability versus benchmarks argument as conditionality to allocate or withdraw financial support;

- The existence, especially in complex emergencies situations, of external and contextual factors, very often linked to access and to security, which are not, or in a very limited way, under the control of the humanitarian organizations; the attitude of the governments in the

17 They have acknowledged in the framework of the GHDI the need to improve their own coordination
recipient countries and the behaviour of parties in conflict could be major factors contributing to the ineffectiveness of the humanitarian organizations;

- By engaging in measuring their actions and demonstrating readiness to have their performance assessed through the establishment of benchmarks, the humanitarian organizations will assume a global commitment, especially toward the beneficiaries, which should be mirrored by a similar commitment from the donor community. Nothing exists to give such an assurance even if the GHDI represents some progress. It remains a voluntary engagement and does not eliminate a certain level of unpredictability from the donors, especially for less high profile crises.

3.4 From the analysis presented in the previous parts of this chapter, possible global benchmarks can be built on notions such as effectiveness and relevance, using to a large extent methodologies already existing and widely accepted. This type of approach could be tested in the context of different initiatives already developed by some organizations or networks, especially in the field of internal preparedness. It could also be tested in the context of the CAP.

The IASC should, at the senior level, take a leading role in establishing a time-bound plan to introduce appropriate sets of benchmarks for preparedness and the CAP, taking into consideration the following elements:

- Preparedness benchmarks, specific to individual organizations, remain coherent with those of other organizations, especially at the sectoral level or, for organizations participating in a network, in the timing of deployment and in the composition of teams.
- Excessive country/context-oriented benchmarks do not create inequity in the way similar problems are addressed in different contexts.

Such a plan should be elaborated with an appropriate involvement of the donors 18, in order to ensure their responsibility and secure their support upfront.

3.5 The HRR team has paid a particular attention to the response capacity of the system in the first period of an emergency (from the first 4 weeks to a maximum of 18 months), as this is the timeframe in which loss of lives and suffering could be very high and when fundamental shortcomings in the response could have long-lasting impact on the affected populations. This is also the timeframe in which public opinion and media attention are often at their highest and when, as mentioned in a HAP-I paper on New Emergencies Policy, it is important “to be seen to do it right!”

3.6 In considering a set of possible benchmarks in the first 4 to 12 weeks, the concepts of effectiveness and relevance will have to be applied having in mind that an essential element is to guarantee the involvement and views of beneficiaries. Unless a strong preparedness element, including a good knowledge of the country and of the socio-political context, is in place, the benchmarks could be deprived of the positive influence on the organization and content of the immediate international response.

One can however see that the major failures observed in many emergencies are linked to: shortcomings in triggering timely actions, the appropriate process to mobilize human resources, assets and financial support; in taking the appropriate management decisions and in allocating clear and undisputed responsibilities in the sectoral response and in coordination. This would call for process-oriented benchmarks in the first phase of an emergency.

3.7 Bearing this in mind, the following possible benchmarks and related indicators are proposed:

Under effectiveness

1. **Access and coverage of population in need**

...per cent of the population in need is being accessed, at least at the level of a first need assessment, in the first ... week of a crisis. At least ...per cent of the accessible population is provided with assistance in the same timeframe

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18 Some donors have already engaged, at country level, in such a path, in the framework of the “pilot CAPs” in the GHDI
Possible Indicators:

- At least .. per cent of the accessible population is provided assistance at the latest by week ….
- Access is gained/obtained and assistance provided to at least an additional … per cent of population in need at the latest by week ….
- By week … no more than … per cent of the population in need should have been reached (including for a first needs assessment)

2. Identification of responsibilities in the delivery of assistance and coordination

At the latest by week …, organizations capable to assist are identified, appropriate coordination mechanisms are put in place and planning has started to cover the period immediately following (to a maximum of … months)

Possible Indicators:

- First assessment teams deploy (to accessible zones) in a maximum of … hours and establish a first assessment of needs in major sectors by the end of week….
- A Field Humanitarian Team (FHT), including a limited but relevant19 number of humanitarian organizations (already present or called to intervene) is established at the latest by end of week …;
- The Humanitarian Coordinator (eventually a temporary one if needed) is identified and deployed in the country at the latest by end of week …;
- Organizations participating in the Team deploy the appropriate number of senior/management staff at the latest by week …;
- Sectoral coordination responsibilities are assumed by one organization with competencies in the specific field at latest by week …;
- The FHT establishes a first “Common” Plan of Action and a supporting funding appeal, covering the first … weeks of the operation, at the latest by week …;
- Funds are appealed for by the Humanitarian Coordinator, with the support of the organizations as part of the Plan of Action (a clear commitment is assured at senior level, in the IASC framework); he allocates the funds received on the basis of the priorities agreed in the Plan of Action by the Team at the latest by week … after … per cent of the funds have been pledged.

3. Resources mobilization, including financial resources

Immediate needs up to week … after the event will be covered, at least by … per cent, by the humanitarian organizations participating in the response. The Common Appeal launched by the Humanitarian Country Team through the Humanitarian Coordinator will be honoured by donors at least by … per cent at the end of week … after the launch of the appeal

Possible indicators:

- Organizations are ready to deploy … of priority staff and … of needed assets through mobilization of their emergency response capacities and their financial reserve mechanisms at the latest by week ….
- The ERC will at the latest by week … decide, if appropriate, to allocate additional emergency funding from the CERF (loans and or grants)20.
- The time span between pledges and disbursement by donors will not exceed … weeks

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19 Relevance is linked to the type of needs which have to be addressed in priority in this first phase
20 On the basis of the criteria developed in Ch IV, par 3.2.2
Under relevance

1. **Assistance provided will include at least ... per cent of the life saving activities that are the most relevant for the specific context at the end of week ....**

Possible indicators:

- The assistance is organized in order to ensure that at the latest by week ...the need of the most vulnerable group(s) present (for example children, lactating women...) are covered at least by ...percent,
- A timeframe is established in order to cover the rest of the need at the latest by week ...

2. **Protection will be provided at least to ... per cent of the “accessible” population at the latest by week ... and to ... per cent of the “accessible” population at the end week ....**

Possible indicators:

- Organizations with a protection mandate or capacity are identified and deploy a sufficient number of senior and relevant staff at the latest by week...
- An appropriate sectoral coordination mechanism is put in place and one organization with a protection mandate is assigned responsibility to lead
- A plan to cover the protection needs is established at the latest by week...

3. The triggering factors, which would determine the starting moment of the use of such a mode, could be the following:

- In the case of natural disasters or an active conflict situation, the starting date of the event,
- In the case of new events, which create an aggravation of the humanitarian situation in an ongoing emergency (…) reports or comparable documents coming from different sources (humanitarian organization, donors, host government, etc.) are brought to the attention of the ERC and of the IASC in a timeframe of ... weeks, for instance in the framework of the Early Warning System the IASC is developing.

4. **RECOMMENDATIONS**

1. The IASC organizations should actively pursue and measure the reform processes in their respective organizations, as well as the improvement of the CAP process, through the establishment and the application of different sets of benchmarks. Priority should be given to

   - internal management benchmarks related to the organizations’ preparedness as well as their assessment and planning capacities, in particular at field level. (Action: All – immediately)
   - a limited number of process and impact benchmarks for the CAP or other forms of appeal. (Action: All – immediately)

2. Agree on effectiveness and relevance as the central criteria on which to build appropriate benchmarks, from preparedness to implementation. Processes aiming to facilitate and obtain management decisions should be in place, reviewed and adapted on a regular basis. (Action: Organizations and donors)

3. Planning by objectives and the use of benchmarks and indicators should be applied in a more systematic way by the humanitarian organizations, building on existing standards and methodologies, such as the Sphere standards, the Code of conduct for the RC/RC Movement and the NGOs. (Action: All)

4. The IASC should develop a strategy to promote cross-fertilization amongst organizations on best practices related to the use and the development of benchmarks and to ensure appropriate coherence in particular in preparedness and in the CAP process (at country level).

5. The IASC and the donors should establish a limited set of benchmarks (and indicators) to be implemented in the first period of a new emergency up to a maximum of 3 months and addressing in priority:
- access and coverage of population in need
- identification of responsibilities in delivery of assistance and in coordination
- resources mobilization (human, assets, financial)
- identification of relevant lifesaving activities
- protection aspects, where needed.

Organizations and donors should agree on it and test it over a 3-year period, starting in 2006, before becoming the reference set. (Action: ERC/IASC with Donors – immediately)
CHAPTER II
CHAPTER II

PREPAREDNESS AND RESPONSE CAPACITY

A. INTERNATIONAL HUMANITARIAN ORGANIZATIONS’ PREPAREDNESS AND CAPACITY

1. PROBLEM STATEMENT

The fundamental questions to be answered are: is there a predictable deployable capacity of the humanitarian response system and if so, what are its limits? If one examines the Darfur experience, it is evident that expectations and assumptions on the nature of this capacity have been severely disappointing, even in the face of the very significant efforts being made to expand it. Although the limitations may not be linked to only one specific issue, it can be assumed that one of the major reasons for the shortcoming was the lack of actual capacity.

2. GENERAL FINDINGS

2.1 In making its findings, the team have had to move beyond the descriptions of capacity stated in the responses to specific questions in the questionnaires. In many instances, frank statements of difficulty with internal procedures and staffing limitations contradicted the descriptions of deployable capacity.

Emergency teams have frequently been developed in isolation from overall organizational support. Some organizations are caught between reacting to the need for a speedy response, involving sending an emergency team (generally understood to be within 72 hours), and organizational structures and procedures that are not compatible with this objective.

2.2 Nearly all the organizations responding to the questionnaires indicated that they were engaged in an internal process of strengthening their overall response performance and 50% of them were at the mid point of this process. A reasonable conclusion is that, to some varying degree, this is the result of felt inadequacies. Also the interviews seem largely to point in the direction of a general weakness in the area of preparedness. Overall, the indicators display a discrepancy between the information provided on supposed involvement in the different sectors at the field level, and the actual participation of the agencies on the ground.

2.3 Questions on recruitment received a range of responses. Staffing has been identified as a serious weakness, especially the recruitment and retention of experienced staff with managerial skills. This is seemingly in contradiction with the responses received to questions such as, “Does your agency have an emergency team?” (96% responded in the affirmative) or “Is the recruitment policy of your organization responding with appropriate speed to the needs of an emergency?” (75% responded positively).

Staffing shortfalls are evident in protection as opposed to health, which seems more robust. Similarly, recruitment for health emergencies is more successful than for those emergencies involving major issues of protection. Further, all agencies with one exception reported that the assignment of professional personnel to emergency missions was based on a voluntary commitment/agreement from staff. The presumed compatibility between development capacity and relief capacity was not borne out by experience. One responder, speaking for a group of agencies, stated:

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21 See graphs on the speed of deployment of emergency response teams and on duration of emergency teams able to remain self-contained in case of deployment in Annex IX
22 See graph in Annex X.
23 See graph in Annex XI.
“The initially sluggish performances of the Agency X raised very important questions and painful questions about the degree of compatibility of relief and development agencies”.

2.4 The availability of stockpiles has been presented as a key element in planning of UN, Red Cross/Crescent and NGO preparedness. The information gathered, however, suggests that there is a gap between the assumptions and the realities regarding what is available, where and when. Some 60% of the responders indicated that they have stockpiles available to them, and 80% of these responders stated that they control procurement within their own structures. A breakdown of the items available in the stockpiles, however, indicated significant shortfalls.

3. **GENERAL CONCLUSIONS**

3.1 A recurrent apparent weakness is that organizations have allowed internal emergency systems to develop in isolation from the overall organizational objectives or realistic resource capabilities. This has required initiating a process of correction, which is largely ongoing. However, it is not clear to what extent these internal realignments are being made in isolation or in joint discussions with the networks to which agencies belong.

3.2 Certain categories of personnel seem to be less of a problem to recruit than others. The geographic area and the nature of the emergency will often determine how successful organizations will be in attracting the required personnel. In addition, there is a lack of trained expatriate and local personnel within most categories, and when it comes to recruitment of trained and experienced personnel. Some agencies such as the Norwegian Refugee Council have specialized in recruiting personnel for the UN under standby arrangements.

3.3 It is increasingly recognized that the process of integrating activities within and between organizations is an important key to a better utilization of available capacity and resources. Central to such an evolution is the willingness of the organizations to look beyond individual capacities and further develop cooperative arrangements among themselves. An example is the NGO Interagency Working Group (IWG)\(^{24}\), which is committed to the mutually supportive expansion of the emergency capabilities of its members. It is also noteworthy that there are different interpretations of the notion of surge capacity. Some NGOs, for example, understand this capacity as the possibility to draw on UN resources instead of their own.

4. **SPECIFIC THEMES AND SECTORS**

4.1 **Personnel**

**Problem Statement**

The availability of trained and experienced personnel is an issue, which cuts across all sectors. Personnel policies and practices and funding support have not kept up with actual requirements. In addition, practices that organizations pursue toward decision-making for assignments have presented a difficult but critical choice in emergency response.

**Findings**

4.1.1 Organizations are largely relying on full-time or part-time professional staff, and approximately 24% on volunteers. Most of the larger organizations have formalized emergency teams and have also progressively built up regional and local teams, ready to act on short notice (UNDAC, FACT, RDRT, ERU, TACRO, etc.), while the smaller organizations form their teams on an ad-hoc basis, depending on the emergency.

4.1.2 Despite the fact that, in responding to a new emergency, many organizations draw personnel from their own standby pools - for some agencies up to 600/700 people - it is still difficult to find people willing to travel, regardless of geographic location and nature of emergency, even for periods of 4-6 weeks. In many cases, organizations must deploy personnel from their headquarters. This represents a far more limited pool and results in the risk of destabilizing work in other parts of the organizations.

\(^{24}\) It includes 7 NGOs (Care, Save the Children, Concern, OXFAM, International Rescue Committee, Mercy Corps and World Vision) that have engaged in assessing and strengthening their response capacity.
Assignment of personnel for rapid deployment in emergencies is voluntary for all UN agencies with the exception of one. When recruiting expatriate staff, many organizations are often recruiting from each other or are tapping into the same resources, such as through short-term secondments.

4.1.3 Most emergency personnel receive regular training: formal classroom, on-the-job and drills of various lengths and frequencies. The HRR team has limited specific information on the nature, duration and expectations of those trainings. However, training seems to be best formalized within the UN system and the larger networks, such as the Red Cross/Red Crescent Movement, where there are a significant number of standardized approved courses. It is also within the larger networks that both basic field and security trainings are mandatory for all personnel.

A specific problem seems to exist in the case of local personnel. Almost all organizations depend on the capacities of local “hands-on” personnel in the emergency phase of an operation. The hiring of such personnel is usually routinely done in a very informal manner with little staff preparation or training. Agencies with local networks are however less dependent on these short-term arrangements.

4.1.4 Many organizations have expressed concerns regarding the recruitment and training of well-qualified staff to participate in and manage emergency operations. They are equally concerned with the limited options for formal classroom training and the years of necessary experience required.

4.1.5 The large organizations make a distinction between the initial assessment phase and the deployment phase, with a pool of specially trained people for assessment and for kick-starting an operation, and a separate pool of trained people to provide actual assistance. Less of this sort of distinction is found among smaller agencies.

Most of the emergency teams are able to deploy within 72 hours, but primarily for assessment missions. Only a few agencies are able to react within 24 hours (only one within a limit of six hours), despite the fact that most agencies have a 24-hour on-call system.

4.1.6 For those agencies with full-time security officers, only a few have included it in the first part of the operation; organizations outside the UN system are only to a limited degree aware of and follow the UNSECOORD recommendations. All this is despite the fact that almost all state that security concerns are amongst the biggest obstacles in an emergency.

4.1.7 Most organizations have minimum equipment, enabling team members to be self-supplied for about four weeks, to communicate and to do necessary reporting. Many are, however, dependent on external transport and on the erratic provision of electricity during the assessment phase and in the initial period of the operation.

Conclusion

The present approaches to the provision of staff during emergencies are inadequate to the need. There are simply not enough people with the right experience available quickly. Reliance on local hiring can be effective, but it needs to be supported by anticipation of the need for some training. Further, reliance on the emergency team approach does not completely meet the challenges of effective response and often has the effect of distracting attention from significant deficiencies in performances.

4.2 Protection

Problem Statement

From an operational perspective, there appears to be a conspicuous lack of recognition of a generally accepted definition of the meaning and requirements of protection. OCHA, in the “Glossary of Humanitarian Terms”, has defined protection as follows:

“A concept that encompasses all activities aimed at obtaining full respect for the rights of the individual in accordance with the letter and spirit of human rights, refugee and international humanitarian law. Protection involves creating an environment conducive to respect for human beings, preventing
and/or alleviating the immediate effects of a specific pattern of abuse, and restoring dignified conditions of life through reparation, restitution and rehabilitation”.

A perception exists that roles and responsibilities of the various organizations involved, OHCHR, ERC, UNHCR, OCHA or ICRC are often vaguely understood. There is also a sense that the capacity to respond in this sector is severely lacking.

Findings

4.2.1 Protection, in its broader sense, covers a wide range of activities, including physical presence, bilateral negotiations, multilateral diplomacy, training, education, data collection, dissemination, and advocacy and gaining access to victims. Many of the respondents tended to look at protection in its most basic form, namely, ensuring for the victims the right to physical and psychological integrity within the framework of international humanitarian law and human rights. However, the emergence of protection as a cross-cutting issue in all response sectors was recognized.

4.2.2 Respondents spoke in terms of two main contexts where the need for protection is evident: violence, unrest and conflicts, causing internally displaced people (IDPs); and violence, unrest and conflicts, causing refugees (across border). There was reference to other situations caused by natural disasters, that may require a certain level of protection, when criminality and other infringements, may require action beyond what authorities are able to provide. Overall, however, there was an acceptance of the all-pervasive nature of protection concerns.

One could argue that the presence of the agency itself represents protection in a conflict area. This seems to be the reason that as many as 68% of the agencies claim to be involved in providing protection in international emergencies and also defined protection as one of their core areas. However, with the exception of agencies mandated to do protection such as UNHCR, UNICEF and ICRC, few agencies have employed full time professional protection officers.

4.2.3 In this area, the main focus necessarily will be on clarifying agency roles in relations to IDPs. In the case of refugees, the role of UNHCR is referred to in a virtually routine manner. This is not the case with IDPs.

While a policy framework for collaborative response and the decision-making framework exist, both underlining the importance of the decision-making framework, inter-agency arrangement, effectiveness, collaborative approach, accountability, and the leading role of the ERC the actual implementation remains unclear.

4.2.4 There is a general reluctance among the NGOs to be involved in a coordinated framework for protection. This aspect of the problem, as seen from their perspective, has hampered accountability, planning, and leadership, in key sectors of IDP specific vulnerability such as camp management, emergency shelter, repatriation, reintegration, and recovery, as well as in the area of protection itself. Agencies such as ICRC and UNHCR, with core mandates of protection, seem to face less of a problem in this context and deploy a high degree of professionalism and willingness in coordinating their work with other agencies.

Conclusion

This sector requires special and urgent attention. A complicating element is that the differing perceptions of roles and responsibilities often confuse discussions on the issues. The NGO and the UN communities approached issues on the ground in distinctly different ways. NGO respondents generally focused on a lack of ability to provide “protection” in a loosely defined manner. The UN system, while acknowledging weakness in the actual provision of protection, tended to regard the subject in terms of far more defined institutional roles. Both groups acknowledge the scale of the human resource problem. Initiatives taken by the ERC and OCHA to establish an “International Protection Standby Capacity—PROCAP” represent a positive step forward in addressing present shortcomings.

25 2004, IASC Guidance to RC/HCs and country teams on responding to IDP and GA/Res/58/177, 2004
26 It would be a centrally managed (by OCHA) capacity of up to 100 qualified experienced staff, available for immediate deployment to enhance, at their request, the operational response of agencies and of the country team.
4.3 Health

Problem Statement

The appropriate utilization of health resources is a multifaceted concern. Human resources have been found to be either inadequate or poorly mobilized during the early phases of emergency response. Training of emergency staff remains a significant issue. These concerns also apply to the availability, transport, and distribution of needed supplies.

Findings

4.3.1 Recruitment of medical personnel is generally not a problem. However, geographic location and nature of emergency will be major elements affecting recruitment. In the most disaster-prone areas, especially those on the African continent, recruitment of local health personnel can prove to be a severe problem and reliance on local recruitment can easily risk breaking up a fragile, already established health infrastructure.

In recent years, organizations are reporting encountering more and more scepticism among authorities, when bringing in expatriate health personnel, especially in relation to professional quality and skills, and compatibility with national regulations.

4.3.2 Responses indicate that material requirements are generally covered. One could argue for local storage of pharmaceuticals and other medical consumables; however, it takes significant resources to maintain and replenish such stocks. These supplies represent relatively small volumes, and can relatively easily be transported into the affected areas. An exception could be the pre-positioning of a limited selection of life-saving drugs.

Conclusion

A central issue remains the immediate availability of trained and experienced personnel. A traditional response, the recruitment of locally trained personnel, while often the preferred action, can run counter to the requirements of local or regional health structures. Further, education in public health concerns remains one of the most effective and needed tools of the response agencies.

Most fields within the area of health function to an acceptable degree and there is considerable attention paid to meeting Sphere standards. However, more could be done in terms of expanding utilization of community resources, including in emergencies.

4.4 Water and Sanitation

Problem Statement

Immediate access to and availability of clean water is a widely acknowledged imperative in any emergency. However, critical shortcomings persist in both these areas. Institutional capacity is loosely organized and there is a perception of failure in sector leadership.

Findings

4.4.1 Water and sanitation are widely recognised as two of the most imperative and urgent needs in any natural disaster or complex emergency. Despite the fact that many agencies claim to be involved in water and sanitation activities, recent international emergencies have demonstrated lack of capacity.

Some 60% of the agencies report having emergency response capacity in those sectors. About the same percentage indicated access to trained personnel, stocks of material and other water and sanitation preparedness measures. At the same time, participation of these agencies in emergencies involving water and sanitation is down to 40%.
4.4.2 The discrepancy can be explained by looking at the following elements:

- It is unclear what kind of trained staff if any is actually available in each agency.
- Very few organizations have professional water and sanitation personnel engaged full-time, or even part time. Few personnel are trained and immediately available on a regional or local level.
- Centralized or pre-positioned stocks are somewhat available, but in general the quantities are very small, and often limited to as little as one or two water tanks.
- The nature of the equipment available is often complicated and not compatible between organizations. Few efforts have been taken to standardize the equipment.
- There is little coordination on water and sanitation activities, specifically among the smaller actors.
- There seems to be a widespread perception that the traditional lead agency (UNICEF) has not always fulfilled this role at the expected level.

Conclusion

The clear discrepancies between announced and actual capacities need urgent attention. While there is an almost ritualistic recognition of the Sphere standards, many organizations lack the capacity to implement these requirements. The main elements needed to make an immediate impact on preparedness and response capacities include: the recognition of the overriding significance of this sector and translating it into commitment, starting with an active and clearly recognized leadership; the ongoing training of key staff and systematic dissemination of information on best practices are maintained and equipment for training and immediate response made readily available. Training should be undertaken at all operational levels and, to the extent possible, be expanded to inter-organization clusters as a means of achieving the widest possible results.

4.5 Logistics

As logistics cuts across a range of concerns and understandings, this section covers transport, warehousing, procurement, and communications. Related findings will also be elaborated or cross-referenced to the other sections.

Problem Statement

The movement of personnel, material, and frequently food continues to present serious difficulties for many agencies. Delays or lack of knowledge of custom clearance procedures and uncertainties related to stockpile availability compounds these issues.

Findings

4.5.1 Roughly 70% of the organizations surveyed reported having stocks of varying descriptions. Most UN agencies draw on resources from the United Nations Humanitarian Response Depot (UNHRD) in Brindisi, Italy. Stockpiles of the smaller agencies are very limited and often designed to cover only the immediate needs of agency personnel. It has been reported (without specific data) that a number of organizations have available relief stocks (especially Red Cross/Crescent National Societies) that theoretically could be utilized for international purposes. The larger organizations maintain quantities of standardized commodities in accordance with the UN/Red Cross Procurement Handbook. Among the smaller organizations, however there are a number of non-standardized and frequently unsolicited items in stock.

4.5.2 Many organizations report relying on private suppliers and some of them on UN relief stocks (see below under “Surge Capacity”). Most organizations (80%) reported purchasing through their own mechanisms, while most UN agencies are using the United Nations Office in Geneva (UNOG). Many agencies aim to do as much purchasing as possible regionally or locally, though they also acknowledge that often in emergencies it is too slow to procure some items regionally or locally. Roughly 20% of the agencies have indicated consistent local availability of supplies.

4.5.3 Customs clearance as well as international transport of goods and personnel in emergencies remains a frequent problem, particularly for NGOs. Many organizations have severe difficulties in
managing their goods at airports in areas affected by emergencies, in terms of protecting goods, obtaining permits, and negotiating time slots.

While local and regional road transport is available in many operations, it is clear that the use of local transport is a frequently recurring problem depending on the nature of the emergency. Additional difficulties seem to be linked to partners pledging commitments for goods that are not delivered in time or not delivered at all.

There is a stockpile register in operation as a part of the United Nations’ Central Register of Disaster Management Capacities. However in our findings, only about 60% of the organizations were able to account for what they had in stock, and less than 50% had registered their stock in a central stock register.

4.5.4 In terms of radio and telecommunication, (HF, VHF, Sat Com, Intra net, Web Com, GSM, GPS), most organizations have small stocks. However, a lack of knowledge and access to common frequencies and networks is a frequently mentioned issue. At the same time, there seems to be some reluctance among organizations to be involved in broader networks. Procedures for obtaining permission for use of communication equipment locally seem also to be lacking; this may be especially important in conflict areas.

Conclusion

A common element in the problems encountered is reliance of many NGOs on individual initiatives as opposed to group action. Stockpile registration exists but knowledge of and information on access to its capabilities is severely restricted within the NGO community in particular. In the area of communication there is a conspicuous contradiction between the ability of agencies to employ common frequencies and their willingness to be involved in broader networks.

4.6 Camp Management and Shelter

Problem statement

In almost any international emergency today, involving man-made or natural disasters, the result is the displacement of people, either internally or across borders. This displacement will often necessitate the establishment of camps for varying periods. Clarity of roles and responsibilities is lacking in the areas of camp management, particularly in the case of IDPs. While there are widely recognized standards, such as in Sphere and UNHCR Handbooks, the actual provision of shelter material is often a function of what donors are willing or able to provide.

Findings

4.6.1 From the questionnaires, it appears that the percentage of organizations participating in camp management and shelter is low (29% for camp management and 32% for shelter). The percentage of agencies planning to cover this, or those having some provisional involvement from the HQ level is slightly higher (respectively 48% and 54%). Stocks of material such as family tents, kitchen sets, hygiene parcels and family parcels, are in general low, and only a few of the largest agencies have access to such stocks.

4.6.2 A more in-depth study of agency activities underlines that the sector of camp management is seen as a complex function. The function is not viewed just as a matter of planning the infrastructure for site planning and physical allocation of a camp, but one of integrating many other sectors and areas of concern including protection, negotiating with authorities and beneficiaries, health, food and food distribution, water and sanitation, shelter, welfare and education. This has led some agencies to consider camp management not as a separate sector, but as an integrated sector amongst others.

4.6.3 An apparent argument for not being involved in overall camp management, especially in IDP situations, is that the agencies frequently feel they lack local cultural and specific knowledge of community expectations. The issue of staff security is also an argument for lack of involvement. Also, many interviews and discussions have underlined the fact that there is a sense that domestic and local organizations and government are best placed to cover the responsibilities of camp management.
Nevertheless, some organizations are currently planning to increase their involvement in camp management.

**Conclusion**

Almost all recent operations have disclosed a weakness in the sector of camp management. Darfur, Bam, and even the tsunami response have been cited. There is a lack of a clear sense of ownership for the broader aspects of working with displaced populations in camp situations. The levels of training in site placement, construction of shelters and choice of shelter material vary greatly. The sector needs to be strengthened in relation to standards and general expectations and organizations should recognize that this sector is essential in almost all emergencies. This is often a throughway activity with little direction and NGOs, in particular, end up being held responsible for activities which are beyond their competence.

4.7 Food Aid, Nutrition and Livelihoods

**Problem statement**

Food aid is often seen as a sector focusing on distribution with little consideration of longer-term implications. Public attention has gravitated towards the conspicuous images of delivery and made the advancing of initiatives such as the livelihoods approach, overly difficult. At the same time, distribution is critical and inadequate attention paid to appropriate patterns of distribution remains a problem in emergency response.

**Findings**

4.7.1 Food aid, in some circumstances, may be as urgent and life saving as clean water. However, only some 29% of the organizations participate in food delivery and approximately 26% in nutrition, with a slight degree of overlap within these groups. On the level of emergency response, 56% of the organizations are involved in food, and 54% in nutrition. Approximately 63% of the organizations claim that food aid is covered under their emergency relief department; approximately 10% of them are involved in both food distribution and supplementary nutrition. These figures suggest that there may be some spare capacity in the areas of food aid and supplementary feeding. At the same time, however, there may be some hesitation on the part of the organizations to be involved in those areas.

4.7.2 The review of the responses reveals that many organizations consider nutrition, or more specifically therapeutic nutrition to be a natural area of primary health, whereas others consider this to be a distinct area, linked to nutrition centres. One could argue for both, however, nutrition should be considered as a separate area, and in many cases separate nutrition centres are an absolute requirement in order to meet the need of vulnerable group's severe nutritional conditions in emergencies.

4.7.3 The importance of the major role played by the livelihood approach should be addressed here. Donors and international organizations increasingly frame their planning and organizational support in terms of livelihood strategies. This acceptance is based on recognition that protection and restoration of livelihoods are essential elements for successful and rapid reintegration of Dips and refugees. There has been, over the past few years, a significant turn around from the limited concentration on food delivery alone. It is now accepted that early support in emergencies for the livelihoods approach opens the way to a transition to recovery.

**Conclusion**

The information presented on this sector reveals an unclear mix of capacity and a lack of clearly defined approaches to the utilization of the established service resources. This translates into shortfalls in the provision of assistance and the treatment of the sector in primarily responsive terms on the part of the smaller agencies. There is also no doubt that the organizations operating within the food sector are providing extensive coverage but the limited number of operators introduces an element of fragility into the area.
4.8 Urban Search and Rescue

Problem statement

The use of search and rescues teams has become increasingly dysfunctional as a result of the massive number of teams arriving in a disaster area and the lack of appropriate training in a humanitarian context associated with many of these personnel. Effective coordination is rarely accomplished though the means to achieve it are available. Although they may be efficient, the cost of some of those services in particular military contingencies and civil defence groups with heavy infrastructural set up, could be high.

Findings

4.8.1 Among the responders, there are relatively few organizations involved in the sector. Only some 19% reported participating in the sector, and 23% considered this sector as a part of their emergency response. It is likely that the percentage could be even considerably lower for international operations, since some of the responders are operating this service only at the domestic level. The area of urban search and rescue is a relatively narrow field, specifically designed to be active in the first phase of the operation and to work almost exclusively where there is severe material and infrastructural damage.

4.8.2 The overall impression is that the search and rescue teams, under the coordination of the International Search and Rescue Advisory Group (INSARAG) and the On-Site Operations Coordination Centre (OSOCC), are working well, with disciplined coordination and actively functioning groups. Despite great efforts to standardize tasks, equipment and training, there is still some work to be done within this field. Useful efforts have also been made in local and regional training. It also appears that such teams could represent a resource in assisting in training in other response areas.

Conclusion

The overall impression is that there are enough established resources within INSARAG to cover international search and rescue operations, looking at historical data of operations requiring such services.

5. RECOMMENDATIONS

5.1 Global Recommendations

5.1.1 Humanitarian organizations should reassess continuously, through an extended mapping of material and human resources in all sectors, their declared response capacities as compared to credible thresholds, below which a declared capacity becomes operationally irrelevant. (Action: All/IASC for threshold definition)

5.1.2 The IASC should identify and assign lead organizations with responsibility at sectoral level, especially in relation to IDP protection and care and develop a cluster approach in all priority sectors (Action: ERC/IASC – immediately)

5.1.3 The IASC should accelerate the establishment of common standards and guidelines at sector level, in recruitment or training policies, as well as for material assets in order to facilitate interoperability in the different networks and between networks. It should establish a work programme with identified issues and a timeframe for results, on a yearly basis. (Action: ERC/IASC Principals for decisions on priorities before end 2005; IASC WG for implementation, starting in 2006)

5.2 Personnel

5.2.1 Accelerate the revision of Human resources policies on recruitment and training in order to boost the managerial capacities in priority sectors and field levels as well as improve procedures for assignment to emergency missions, especially in hardship duty stations. (Action: All – immediately)
5.2.2. Create an IASC “Human Resource” working group\textsuperscript{27}, focusing on personnel issues (recruitment, contracts including commitments regarding travel and length of stay, salary level, insurance, and strengthening of human resources, sector-by-sector) to lead in developing a more systemic personnel approach. (Action: IASC)

5.2.3 Appoint one organization within each network to be the lead agency for personnel issues, to be responsible for all inter-organizational related human resource issues. This organization should work closely with the IASC working group. (Action: Networks)

5.2.4 Establish at field level, under the supervision of the HC, an appropriate mechanism to facilitate the exchange of personnel and staff on loan, among the organizations, during the emergency phase of an operation. (Action: IASC)

5.3 Protection

5.3.1 Accelerate and expand the recruitment of new protection officers, by NGOs the UN, and Red Cross/Crescent, in order to strengthen general capacities in facing issues of protection both at the HQ and field level. (Action: All - immediately)

5.3.2 Increase the numbers of protection officers and the commitments from the organizations. In this regard, the ProCap initiative should be supported. (Action: ERC/IASC; donors - immediately)

5.3.3 Extend UNHCR’s role as lead agency in the protection of refugees, to include IDPs, with a clear understanding of the role of other organizations with a special mandate such as ICRC or the UNOCHR. (Action: ERC/IASC - immediately)

5.3.4 The IASC to oversee, and take an active role, with the lead agency reporting every six months, on issues as general protection status or recruitment of new organizations involved in protection. (Action: IASC/Lead agency)

5.4 Health

5.4.1 Train and recruit medical personnel, reflecting a strong focus on community mobilization and preventive measures. This should include strengthening the community health programmes, focusing on prevention and monitoring and supporting those capable of rapid interventions. (Action: concerned Organizations)

5.4.2 Designate a sector lead agency to be charged, inter-alia with identifying the essential life-saving material that could be maintained in stockpiles. (Action: ERC/IASC)

5.4.3 Establish a mapping of available health human resources and of immediately deployable health and medical equipment/consumables, within organizations and on the basis of inter-organizational screening. Annual reporting on resources should be made available to the sector lead agency. (Action: Organizations/Lead agency)

5.5 Water and Sanitation

5.5.1 Strengthen the role of the traditional lead agency or alternatively select another lead agency on an urgent basis, in order for it to be a predictable facilitator both at the field and HQ levels. (Action: ERC/IASC)

5.5.2 Give urgent attention to the creation of water and sanitation inter-agency clusters on a regional level with the mandate of monitoring availability of key staff and of tools and equipment (mobile water treatment, transport, storage, and distribution units). The cluster could also be a vehicle for broadening outreach on public health issues associated with water and sanitation. Such responsibility should be taken by the lead agency. (Action: IASC - immediately)

\textsuperscript{27} Whenever, in the following sections, a working group is suggested, it is always meant to be composed of the groups present in the IASC.
5.5.3 Organizations to explore the potential of a larger involvement of the private sector as a source of equipment and qualified personnel. (Action: All)

5.6 Logistics

5.6.1 NGO, at the HQ level, to expand the number of standby arrangements with private airline companies, or with governments in a position to deploy airlifting capacities. (Action: All)

5.6.2 Expand global mapping of relief stock. The process should start as a decentralized process, with each agency reporting through its network (UN, Red Cross/Crescent and NGOs) on quantity, values, geographical positioning, availability and access. The networks should report on its status to IASC once every six months. A lead agency should be assigned responsibility for this reporting. (Action: All - IASC to designate reporting agency)

5.7 Camp Management and Shelter

5.7.1 Establish a camp management working group, regularly reporting to the IASC, to reconcile agency approaches to the provision of shelter and explore the potential for common standards for camp management and shelter in different contexts and geographical areas. (Action: IASC)

5.7.2 Assign to UNHCR the role of lead agency in camp management including for IDPs in complex emergencies situations. (Action: ERC/IASC)

5.7.3 Evaluate separately displacement caused by natural disasters, following each event; a lead agency to be selected by the ERC in consultation with the IASC Principals. (Action: ERC/IASC).

5.8 Food, Nutrition and Livelihoods

5.8.1 The understanding of the role of WFP as a lead agency in the sector of food aid is to be accompanied by establishing clarity on the roles of other agencies with special mandates such as ICRC. (Action: ERC/IASC)

5.8.2 Create a working group for food, nutrition and livelihood, focusing on food related issues, and troubleshooting within the sector, reporting on the status/gaps and actions to IASC, once every six months. It should focus inter alia on: i) establishing common inter-agency assessment teams; ii) ensuring reliable data’s, and a common emergency strategy among the agencies; iii) establishing means of sharing infrastructure resources such as aircraft, boats and trucks in food distribution; iv) expanding understanding and the inclusion of livelihood approaches in the design of emergency response. (Action: IASC).

5.8.3 The working group should explore possibilities of reducing fragility within the sector, through the recruitment of regional agencies involved in the food sector, especially when it comes to food distribution and nutrition. (Action: WG/Lead Agency)

5.9 Urban Search and Rescue

5.9.1 The IASC to endorse efforts by INSARAG to ensure quality control for deploying search and rescue teams. INSARAG should also take the lead in the following: i) further focus on local and regional training; ii) carry out studies and demonstrations, building sustainable search and rescue capabilities in disaster prone areas (earthquakes) at the local level. (Action: IASC/INSARAG)

5.9.2 The IASC to support only highly selective deployment of new search and rescue teams. (Action: IASC)
B. PREPAREDNESS AND SURGE CAPACITY

1. PROBLEM STATEMENT

Preparedness and flexibility in the use of available resources are at the heart of any response system. Determining, to a reasonable degree, the state of that preparedness and the extent of the resulting surge capacity are critical elements in planning disaster response. Funding decisions may also rely upon this knowledge.

2. FINDINGS

2.1 Deployment Capacity

2.1.1 There is no question that agencies have recognized the need to incorporate an emergency response capability at the headquarters level. The following figures illustrate this: 98% has a focal point for response at headquarters; roughly 82% has some pre-arrangements such as available medical kits or pre-arranged transport at their disposal; 83% indicated possessing a system for monitoring of disaster information on a 24-hour basis; 93% had an emergency team of some description; the reported response time of the teams varied from 33% within 72 hours, 18% within 48 hours, and 48% within 24 hours.

2.1.2 A difficulty arises in evaluating the significance of these figures. What does being on the ground within 48 hours signify in terms of assessment capacity or the ability to provide assistance? Looking at these figures in the best light, the above percentages overall suggest a fairly robust response capacity as long as this is the reality on the ground. It is when one looks at the supporting mechanisms that the situation changes.

2.1.3 The compositions and objectives of these teams varied widely depending, in part, on whether they were drawn from in-country or regional programs or exclusively from headquarters.

On the side of international organization, UNDAC is seen as an effective example of an assessment response mechanism in those cases where the teams are well trained, prepared and experienced. This has not proved to be the case with regard to the Red Cross and Red Crescent with its FACT system, despite their having received basic training fairly similar to the UNDAC teams. Perceptions are that the FACT team is slower to arrive, seemingly less committed, and may be less systematic in their overall approach. It is also evident that the follow up training for the UNDAC members is much better organized than that of the FACT team.

The UNDAC team is seen as having a quick and sustainable support system, made up of a number of countries providing assistance through the use of domestic agencies (International Humanitarian Partners), that are willing to provide technical support (typically communications systems, vehicles, sleeping facilities, food etc).

2.1.4 However the overall advantage for any agency or network is to have local capacities in terms of personnel and assets on the ground, before the emergency strikes. This is closely linked to the ability to access local agency networks and agencies and the presence of trained and equipped personnel. One significant weakness has emerged in relying on this information for planning purposes. The assumption that personnel routinely assigned to long-term projects can quickly transition to emergency response has proved to be flawed. Reports from the agencies indicate that great emphasis has been placed on training people both regionally and globally. It is, also however, suggested that there should always be one experienced team member associated with the event either on the ground or, if need be, at the HQ level.

2.1.5 NGOs do not have a fixed international first response system. They function more in terms of a pragmatic flexible approach, bringing people and resources together whenever needed. This may or may not work well depending on many variables. There is a growing recognition that there is a need for a more predictable manner of engagement at both the field and HQ levels.

It should also be noted that the mandates and roles of the different international emergency NGOs might differ, from country to country and from operation to operation. Similarly, the primary task of the
UN is more closely tied to support of the government while the Red Cross and Crescent may have an auxiliary role to play depending on the situation.

2.1.6 There are a number of other fast response mechanisms constructed as “effort packages” consisting very often of a mixture of personnel and material. Feedback from some agencies report that such packages are working well, as long as the personnel are well trained and the equipment is standardized and designed to handle emergencies effectively.

2.1.7 New mechanisms are being developed at the level of the European Union, primarily for internal deployment but with a possible external use, to expand its response capacity in disasters and crises. This development is seen by many, in the humanitarian community, as a positive or a negative element, depending on the way in which they will evolve (becoming an enlarged, regionally organized, support to existing international systems; or competing for the same resources with existing mechanisms). The French proposal to establish a standing International Humanitarian Force can be considered as a positive approach as far as it is based on the idea of an expanded support to the existing international system and it acknowledges the role of already established coordination mechanisms.

2.2 Personnel Issues

2.2.1 Commitment to an emergency team or crisis location is primarily on a voluntary basis. Only three organizations indicated that it was a requirement for professional staff. These places a considerable pressure on recruiting and training to create what could be described as surplus capacity.

This fact should be related to the surprising overlapping results indicating that 77% of the respondents felt they had an adequate staff pool to draw on and that 78% indicated a degree of satisfaction with the recruitment policies affecting decision-making in the event of an emergency response.

The above notwithstanding, the seemingly contradictory conclusion that a review of all the procedures associated with emergency response capacity was in order, was virtually unanimous.

2.2.2 An additional significant factor emerges when the review looked at training. Training is provided on an irregular basis in the majority of cases; sometimes as infrequently as at one-year intervals. The specific aspects of this training could not be determined. Some 8% of NGO staff receives no training of any kind. We have also concluded that training for international emergencies may even be at a lower level.

2.2.3 The recruitment issue has already been elaborated on, but the significant observation that in certain emergencies there may be a huge pressure on some professional categories of personnel deserves to be emphasized. Despite the fact that many agencies are drawing personnel from their own pools, there is a persistent lack of preparedness mechanisms. In summary, a picture emerges of organizational intent with less than consistent support to the elements required for effective implementation.

2.2.4 It is generally agreed that an essential part of the process of rapid response depends upon the availability of information gained through assessments. The responses to the questionnaires revealed a clear recognition of this need, but relatively little recognition of the need to share assessment information or engage in joint assessments.

2.3 Stockpiles

2.3.1 There proved to be what appears as an abundance of information available on UN and NGO stockpiles. If one looks at the totality of resources theoretically available to which may be added typically unknown local resources, it may be argued that the issue of stockpiles is not an overarching and insurmountable one. An obvious difficulty in this exercise is that the number of organizations involved was limited relative to the overall number working in the field. We have, however, compelling information from the major players. On the other hand, several of the respondents did not provide quantitative information on items such as tents. This might suggest a lack of a systematic approach towards inventory control.
2.3.2 It must be noted that the majority of NGOs have avoided the use of stockpiles considering it as too complicated and expensive per item stored and prefer to rely on internal or external procurement. On the other hand, 60% of the UN agencies either have their own stockpiles or have established interagency arrangements for the procurement of resources. What was routinely missing, however, was consistent indication of either sharing of this information or clear indications of availability for use beyond the individual organization holding the stock. There were, in some instances, general statements in this regard but little clarity on procedures. Only a handful of NGOs routinely draw upon common sources for supplies. As a basic premise of this exercise is to take a global focus, the lack of a transparent mechanism for access to stockpiles is telling.

2.3.3 From the information so far obtained on stockpile inventory it is clear that stockpiles of some relief items are inadequate based on historical need. An illustration of this would be in the case of family tents. On the other hand, we can also conclude that blankets are in sufficient supply. It should also be borne in mind that blankets are frequently available for local purchase, which is rarely the case with tents.

2.3.4 As indicated earlier a fundamental problem exists in the lack of a global stock positioning system. This applies to quantity, quality, geographical location, and ownership. Given the difficulty in determining actual figures experienced by the review team, it is clear that this would be impossible during an emergency. One result has, in all likelihood, been a number of unnecessary and costly moving of goods based on incomplete and less than timely information.

2.3.5 It is also reasonable to assume that a large proportion of the goods being stocked are not maintained in the best condition. This raises the question of how useful this equipment will be in given emergency situations. In the case of local stockpiling, it is likely that some of the equipment being stocked is originally meant for domestic use. This raised the question of applicability of use in international operations.

2.3.6 It is worth commenting that the respondents made frequent note of the Norwegian Emergency Preparedness System (NOREPS), comprised of the Norwegian NGOs, the Norwegian Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Innovation Norge (Norwegian Trade Council) and a number of private relief suppliers. Systems such as this have served as an alternative to agencies organizing their own capacity.

2.3.7 In major emergencies there is, in many cases, competition for transport assets, especially when it comes to airlift of resources. Some of the biggest NGOs have pre-arranged stand by arrangements with selected private freight forwarders, airlines, etc. Such arrangements should also be made available to smaller agencies as well, and it should be an overall mentality to utilize the transport capacities to the sectors mostly in need.

3. CONCLUSIONS

The assumed capacity of individual organizations is not consistent with actual capacity. Mechanisms for reviewing status are insufficienly developed and do not respond in a timely manner. Interagency cooperation within the NGO community is infrequently utilized at the headquarters for planning and resource management purposes. Given its capacity, the existing stockpile registration system is not accessed sufficiently. It is only recently that joint assessments are being systematically organized. New mechanisms, such as the EU initiative or the French proposal, can be considered as a positive evolution as far as they are designed to expand and support established and well functioning international systems.

4. RECOMMENDATIONS

1. The IASC should establish a functioning relief stock positioning system, in addition to the present registration, among UN, the Red Cross and Red Crescent Societies, the IOM and the NGOs, governments and other stake holders, aimed at increasing preparedness, reducing costs, increasing access and assuring stock rotation. (Action: IASC)

2. UNDAC, FACT, and ERUs should examine the status of management and operational training in terms of the above recommendations. (Action: UNDAC, FACT, ERUs)
3. All agencies should seek to find new mechanisms to improve relationships to suppliers and other relevant private enterprises, with the aim of expanding resource options. (Action: All)

4. The IASC should take the lead in establishing the clear understanding that organizations must measure their surge capacity according to a consistent and predictable standard. A reporting mechanism should be developed by the IASC Working Group with special attention being paid to the NGO community.

5. OCHA should promote the expansion of surge capacities through the progressive establishment of pre-identified modules at national or regional level, building, inter alia, on new initiatives such as the European Union mechanisms and the French Proposal to establish a standing International Humanitarian Force (Action: ERC/OCHA to engage in discussions in order to agree on modalities for cooperation and implementation – immediately)

C. EFFECTIVENESS OF HUMANITARIAN COMMON SERVICES (HCS) AND POOLED CAPACITIES

1. PROBLEM STATEMENT

The fundamental issue is the effectiveness of Humanitarian Common Services (HCS) and the extent to which pooled capacities serve operational purposes. The system is therefore concerned with the relation of these services to the total emergency response, including that of the NGOs. In this last regard, a crucial issue is the interaction between communities and the extent to which common services are in fact utilized.

2. FINDINGS

2.1 The findings are largely derived from the desktop review as few comments were directed specifically to this objective during either the interviews or in the responses to the questionnaire. Some specific observations were made in the seminars.

2.2 It is noteworthy that there is an extensive list of IASC recognized agencies providing common services and grouped together under Humanitarian Common Services. They include the Humanitarian Information Centres, the Humanitarian Air Service, United Nations Civil-Military Coordination, Inter-agency Emergency Telecoms, and the Joint Logistics Centre. However, the vast majority of references to common services in the desktop reviews was to the Joint Logistics Centre (UNJLC) and, as indicated above, little was volunteered during the interviews. Also no elements were offered to the team to enable to assess the existence and relevance of similar arrangements in the other networks.

2.3 The trend of the observations in the desktop review indicated that the JLC has had a positive impact on the daily operations of agencies, especially in the areas of communications, capacity, and supply delivery. The JLC has been described as being effective in reducing bottlenecks when used in coordination with other services. The range of countries to which this conclusion applied is impressive.

2.4 The strength of the JLC as an interagency planning process has been noted with particular emphasis in Cyprus, in the IASC external review of December 2003, in that it “constitutes the most sophisticated interagency planning process undertaken to date within the UN or the IASC, and provided important lessons for moving forward”. A basic theme was stated as their ability to deal with the question of added value. “Having central services is fine provided they are fast enough” was how one agency phrased it. The consensus is generally that this requirement has been met. Though the primary task is logistics coordination, the consensus of the partners is that the UNJLC should “focus on getting the job done.” The theme of filling the gaps was reflected fairly consistently in the documents reviewed.

2.5 It has been noted, however, that the success of joint initiatives has been linked directly to the effectiveness of the Country Director. This undercuts somewhat the systemic nature of the role. This point emerges in the Darfur Real Time Evaluation, wherein the evaluation team recommends that standardization of the role of a UNJLC be considered especially as regards non-food items and air
service. It has been noted that a broader approach to common logistics and general operational support would be effective. Donors, the Red Cross, and NGOs have clearly appreciated the contributions of UNJLC.

2.6 The host agency, WFP, while acknowledging internal difficulties with its management responsibilities for the core operations of the JLC, calls for continued support in its 2004 Strategic Plan and development of what is referred to as UN Humanitarian Response Depot. A joint WFP/DFID strategy paper reflects approval of the concept in the joint contingency planning process in Iraq, West Africa, and Nepal. An Inter-Agency Standing Committee Principles meeting noted that common services, with special reference to the common pipeline for non-food items, have been beneficial for UN agencies and NGO alike.

2.7 There are instances, however, where a reasonable observation could be that a certain ambiguity is present, in the relationship of individual agencies and their support of the common services concept. This is reflected in a simultaneous strengthening of and reliance on individual agency capacities while acknowledging the work and objectives of humanitarian common services. In general, the willingness to second staff to the UNJLC does not seem to have been a casualty of this ambiguity.

3. CONCLUSIONS

There is clearly an insufficient awareness of the role of Humanitarian Common Services. We found few references, for example to information technology and communication issues, very much an active area for HCS. Also, little was offered in the discussions addressing the questions of interoperability during emergency response. Reference to systematic approaches to the integration of regional and local capacities and possible relation to the work of the core unit has been largely absent.

4. RECOMMENDATIONS

1. Agencies should accept logistics preparedness as an integral part of the early operations of the UNJLC core unit. (Action: All)

2. HCs should make the participating agencies acknowledge that the role of the UNJLC as part of Humanitarian Common Services is essential for the effective use of resources. The HCs to circulate information on the "matrix" approach adopted by the Humanitarian Common Services, (Action: HCs/support from IASC)

3. The basic relationship with WFP should be as clear as possible for management, planning, and budgeting purposes. (Action: All)

4. Donors should make regular annual contributions to the Special Account for the UNJLC so that financing arrangements may be made on a predictable basis.

5. The IASC should accelerate the development of common services. (Action: IASC to identify priority sectors before end 2005; design implementation modalities before end 2006)

6. Organization Field Directors should clear and establish agreements with operational partners on matters pertaining to local hiring and procurement in particular. (Action: All)

7. Non-UN networks, such as those organized by IFRC and the Interagency Working Group, should make liaison with the HC a priority. (Action: Red Cross/Red Crescent members; NGOs)
CHAPTER III
CHAPTER III

A SHARED VISION FOR THE COORDINATION OF THE HUMANITARIAN RESPONSE

1. PROBLEM STATEMENT

The humanitarian response to emergencies/disasters affecting populations needs strong coordination mechanisms, including all operational stakeholders (the UN, NGOs, Red Cross/Red Crescent Movement, and other actors like IOM). The question is: are the current structures, which continue to be often considered as UN driven (despite the evolution of non-UN entities in this respect) standing up to expectations? Both within the international humanitarian organizations and the donor communities, the effectiveness of coordination is still a subject of continuing concern and debate and dissatisfaction.28

2. SYSTEMS AND MECHANISMS OF COORDINATION

2.1 Existing Humanitarian Coordination System

Findings

Coordination mechanisms exist in each of three networks examined and the large majority of organizations participating in the HRR belong to one of them.

2.1.1 Within the UN, essential coordination functions are discharged by the Emergency Relief Coordinator (ERC), the IASC, OCHA and the Humanitarian Coordinators (HCs) at the country level (further discussion on that in par 2.3 to 2.6). The HCs coordinate the work of the humanitarian agencies through the UN Country Team (UNCT) forum at which the Red Cross/Red Crescent Movement, NGOs and IOM participate at various degrees of involvement. Needs assessments, preparedness, appeals and funding, division of labour and security are the main issues discussed at the UNCTs.

2.1.2 Within the Red Cross/Red Crescent Movement, coordination mechanisms between the ICRC, the IFRC and the National Red Cross and Red Crescent Societies have been established in the framework of the Seville Agreement. ICRC is designated as “Lead Agency” within the Movement for the general direction and coordination of international relief operations linked to armed conflict, internal strife and their direct results. In other situations of emergency such as natural and technological disasters, the direction and coordination of the international relief operations is assumed by the National Society of the affected Country or by IFRC (as the “Lead agency”) if its capacity is not sufficient.

2.1.3 NGOs are linked by have coordination mechanisms at the IASC level through the three consortia represented29. At the operational level, coordination takes the form of networks such as the Disaster Emergency Committee (DEC); Alliance 2015 or Save the Children Alliance, where the Directors of Emergency play often a pre-eminent role. Thematic coordination mechanisms are also being developed, e.g. the Inter-Agency Working Group (IAWG)30.

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28 Please see illustrative graph in Annex XII.
29 Interaction, International Consortium of Voluntary Agencies (ICVA) and Steering Committee for Humanitarian Response (SCHR).
30 It includes 7 NGOs (Care, Save the Children, Concern, OXFAM, International Rescue Committee, Mercy Corps and World Vision) that have engaged in assessing and strengthening their response capacity.
2.1.4 The large majority of donors would like to see the existing coordination mechanisms reinforced and functioning.

Conclusion

The three international humanitarian coordination systems operate as independent entities with limited linkages between them for productive collaboration. However, there is a sense that the time has arrived for the humanitarian community to work collectively towards an inclusive system-wide coordination mechanism to which all stakeholders can feel a sense of belonging.

2.2 Lead Organizations and Clustering

Findings

2.2.1 The concept of lead organization, as initially applied and interpreted by UNHCR in the mid-nineties did not gain much support among humanitarian organizations. Nevertheless, the Lead Organization concept has invoked a renewed growing interest among the international humanitarian community, especially in situations where the existence of such a mechanism can improve the efficiency of the response. A prerequisite of a successful “leadership” mission seems to be the establishment of appropriate and transparent terms of reference, including strong obligations for consultation and accountability (including financial accountability) towards partner organizations.

2.2.2 The concept of developing “clusters” at different level (headquarters, regional, country and operational) was shared with the stakeholders who showed interest.

Conclusion

The Lead Organization concept, which encourages the effective use of expertise and technical know-how of mandated organizations, needs to be adopted system-wide. This will also facilitate clustering at different levels where this model has a potential to increase efficiency in the use of resources (see Chapter II). The ERC, in consultation with the IASC and major stakeholders, could designate an entity as Lead Sector to take charge and coordinate the development of the technical and management expertise and know-how for the rest of the system. The system will operate at the regional as well as at the country level coordinated by the HCs and supported by the proposed Field IASC –Humanitarian Country Team (HCT).

2.3 The Inter-Agency Standing Committee (IASC)

Findings

2.3.1 The Inter-Agency Standing Committee (IASC) includes the UN, Red Cross/Red Crescent Movement, NGOs through their Consortia and IOM; this makes it a widely representative humanitarian forum. An external review undertaken in 2003 assessed the Committee as having made considerable - albeit slow - progress especially in the development of field-based systems, in coordination, planning/funding and needs assessment. However, the Committee’s interaction with donors or with the Cross/Red Crescent Movement, NGOs and IOM in the field was considered weak and its utility in breaking crises limited.

2.3.2 Since then, the Committee has been engaged in pushing the protection agenda for IDPs, developing guidelines and codes of conduct for the protection of women and girls from sexual exploitation and advocacy for populations caught in conflict. However, it has not yet built a strong leverage to address gaps in mandates and division of labour.

31 The consultants understand the notion of lead agency in the following way: « An agency with a designated mandate to assume coordination responsibilities. » Selection of a lead agency is made based on the background and characteristics of a special mandate and/or capacity. The model in Annex VIII presents the consultants’ views on the lead agency general responsibilities.

32 Set up by the General Assembly (GA) resolution 46/182 as one of the three mechanisms, including the Consolidated Appeal Process (CAP) and the Central Emergency Revolving Fund (CERF), to support the ERC in discharging his coordination functions.
Conclusion

Although the IASC is the most representative humanitarian forum yet established, it cannot, claim to represent the full spectrum of all humanitarian actors. Its functioning by consensus and non-binding decisions has limited its authority and the impact of its support to the coordination functions of the ERC and the HCs.

Whereas on the one hand, the IASC has demonstrated relevance, added value and a certain degree of effectiveness in some areas, on the other hand its limited direct interaction with the non-UN operational actors (Directors of Emergency) as distinct from the NGO Consortia, creates a consultative gap that needs to be addressed. In addition its capacity remains yet limited in solving mandate and capacity gaps and to tackle system-wide problems.

Hence strengthening the mandate, structure and membership of the IASC at the Headquarters level and establishing its functional presence and effectiveness in the field will address a major gap in coordination.

2.4 The Emergency Relief Coordinator (ERC)

Findings

2.4.1 As the chair of IASC, the ERC is charged with the responsibility of coordinating the UN's international response to populations affected by emergencies/disasters and ensuring that all stakeholders are meeting their obligations to beneficiaries. Its effectiveness is influenced by the nature of interaction with the IASC Principals, the relationship with the Secretary-General and the quality of briefings to the Security Council.

2.4.2 As the performance of the IASC Principals has considerable importance in shaping the overall inter-agency coordination, the ERC has an important role to play as the consensus builder between them and the humanitarian actors on the ground. The high turnover of ERCs (six in twelve years) has had a varied impact over the years on both the IASC and OCHA as well on its capacity to influence the SG. In terms of advocacy and humanitarian space, more frequent briefings of the Security Council by the ERC, is well received by the humanitarian community.

Conclusion

Within the UN, including at the secretariat level, the working relationships of the ERC are judged as good and humanitarian coordination appears to be working. The challenge is at the IASC level and in the donor community where there is an increasing demand on the ERC's leadership to help build a broader and more inclusive operational humanitarian community. This calls for a strengthening of the function.

2.5 The Humanitarian Coordinators (HCs)

Findings

2.5.1 The coordination of humanitarian assistance within the UN is conducted by 21 Humanitarian Coordinators (HCs) in an equal number of emergency/disaster countries. Resident Coordinators (RCs) in all these countries also generally assume the HC functions. Nevertheless many of UN Agencies, the Red Cross/Red Crescent Movement, the NGOs and many donors do not approve of the merged RC/HC position. This explains also why many organizations are reticent to invest in such position.

A number of minimum requirements have been mentioned for an RC to meet to be accepted as HC. These include: independence from any agency, including his/her mother entity; a neutral position vis a vis the host government; strong humanitarian experience and a mix of operational diplomatic and negotiation skills. Also the responsibility for such a function does not allow wearing more than two hats at any one time. All have stressed the need for a review of the recruitment process and for in-depth training.

2.5.2 The HCs conduct their coordination functions through the UNCT which also engages in developmental and security matters. Although the UNCT operates by consensus within the UN
community, its decisions are not binding and most members revert to their respective HQ for final decisions. Where effective HCs exist, NGOs and other non-UN entities are more inclined to participate in the UNCT meetings.

2.5.3 The advocacy role of the HCs in negotiating access, obtaining concessions from authorities on the ground and resource mobilization is undertaken well by a few outstanding HCs. This has benefited the Red Cross/Red Crescent Movement, NGOs as well as the UN actors and resulted in greater collaboration.

Conclusion

In its current form and structure, the performance of the UN humanitarian coordination depends too much on the personal qualities and diplomatic skills of the RC/HC. Where these basic qualities exist, the system operates well. When its performance is dismal, no stakeholder in the non-UN community feels attracted to be part of the system. It is thus in the interest of the humanitarian community to strengthen the system in order to produce a larger number of outstanding HCs, to select and train them well in advance of their assignment and provide them with the appropriate tools to ensure that effective systemic coordination becomes the norm.

The merged RC/HC position continues to provoke debate on its merits and demerits. On the one hand, it provides the leadership at the country level with the necessary strategic leverage vis à vis national governments. On the other, the proximity of the RCs to national governments, could compromise their HC functions, including their impartiality and independence from the very authorities they could be called upon to hold accountable for responsibilities towards their own people. This strengthens the case for the separation of the two functions.

Even in the case of merging, a number of conditions need to be met by an RC to be accepted as HC. This includes all the elements cited in paragraph 2.5.1.

2.6 Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA)

Findings

2.6.1 OCHA’s mandate is to mobilize and coordinate effective and principled humanitarian action in support of the ERC and HC functions. In 2004, the Office undertook a restructuring of its management structures and systems. It is understood that the ongoing restructuring is aimed in particular at improving its support to the field.

2.6.2 OCHA has made progress in several areas but needs to address others. On one side, a platform has been created at the Security Council and with the media to present humanitarian issues and crises effectively; strengthening the CAP has produced some encouraging results; the natural disaster response through UNDAC and INSARAG is considered good. On the other side, a challenge for OCHA is to be able, when identifying sectoral gaps, to obtain engagement from the appropriate agencies/organizations to fill it, without becoming itself directly involved in operational activities. There is a growing demand on OCHA’s administrative and financial back-up to the field; some OCHA Offices in the field fail to provide appropriate support to the HCs; some HCs have not yet considered these offices as theirs.

Conclusion

While in general OCHA is seen as having made significant progress in a number of areas, it needs to strengthen its back up support to the field and to the HCs as well its role in monitoring, identifying gaps and filling in the response system, in order to promote appropriate remedial actions in particular in the framework of a reformed IASC.

2.7 Collaborative Approach

Findings

2.7.1 The major weakness in recent responses to IDP crises has been the absence of operational accountability and leadership in key sectors of IDP-specific vulnerability; this despite the fact that a
collaborative approach has been agreed upon by the international community and that it has the backing of the IASC membership.

2.7.2 The impact of the leadership role for IDPs by the Emergency Relief Coordinator (ERC) – as the Secretary-General’s focal point on IDPs – and his field-level counterparts, the Humanitarian Coordinators (HCs), is in practice minimized by the lack of operational accountability among UN agencies for addressing IDP needs in these areas.

Conclusion

In the “collaborative approach” for IDPs, the international humanitarian coordination system works by goodwill and consensus and depends too often on the authority and skills of HCs. While its role has to be maintained and reinforced, there is also a need to make progress in designing a more explicit model where, sector operational accountability will be clearly identified at the level of a designated organization, following standards to be agreed upon. Responsibilities to be covered under such a model are: (a) planning and strategy development, (b) standard-setting, (c) implementation and monitoring, (d) advocacy.

2.8 Tools for Coordination

Findings

2.8.1 The key activities for coordination that are required by the international humanitarian system at the country level are preparedness, joint needs assessments, planning, resource mobilization and division of labour. Across the board, the review found a major gap in preparedness at the organizational as well as at the strategic levels. Scenario contingency planning has not yet been developed to the stage of ready inter-organizational systems/mechanisms for application in preparedness and early deployment. Joint Needs Assessments are perhaps the activities with which the country teams, with support from Headquarters, have started to be more involved. The inter-agency guidelines on Joint Needs Assessments developed by the IASC Working Group is now being applied and should be able to introduce marked changes in this area.

2.8.2 In the UN, planning is linked closely to the Consolidated Appeal Process (CAP). Similar programming tools can be found in the Red Cross/Red Crescent Movement and NGOs. Among the donors, some have considered pooled funding as a possible tool to strengthen coordination at country level.

Conclusion

A number of coordination tools such as contingency planning and preparedness, joint needs assessment, CAP/Appeals need to be developed as growing areas of collaboration between the UN, Red Cross/Red Crescent Movement, NGOs and IOM. Also a number of operational procedures and practices in areas such as human resources and financial management that the Red Cross/Red Crescent Movement are applying can find relevance and use in the UN system.

2.9 The Challenge of Integrated Missions

Findings

As a result of the recent increased number of integrated mission structures, the coordination of humanitarian assistance is being increasingly shouldered by the Deputy Special Representatives of the Secretary-General (DSRSG). This arrangement can only work where the DSRSGs combine required leadership qualities with a strong humanitarian knowledge and experience. Moreover this approach faces a systemic problem due to the fact that the international humanitarian community goes beyond the UN. This is clearly expressed by the reservations to this model expressed by the NGOs and the Red Cross/Red Crescent Movement and to a certain extent by donors and humanitarian UN

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33 Pilot projects are developed in Sudan and DRC
35 Responsible for the development and humanitarian pillars
agencies. This dilemma reflects a conflict between the partiality involved in supporting a political transition process and the impartiality needed to protect humanitarian space.

**Conclusion**

The UN integrated Mission model does not take adequately into account, humanitarian concerns and represents a challenge for a more inclusive humanitarian system. In that sense and as a minimum requirement to be met, when Integrated Missions are established, it is essential that the DSRSG for Humanitarian Affairs and Development be empowered to ensure that humanitarian space is preserved and the humanitarian principles of independence, impartiality and neutrality are consistently upheld. For the humanitarians, the challenges revolve around creating and protecting the necessary humanitarian space and preserving the principles of humanitarian imperatives in a politically charged environment.

3. **RECOMMENDATIONS**

3.1 **Global Recommendations**

3.1.1 The ERC should consult with the IASC Principals and major stakeholders to agree on designating operational accountability for the various sectors and crosscutting areas to respond to the protection and care of IDPs. A similar approach should be followed in order to designate lead organizations in sectors where this is missing and would seem appropriate. (Action: ERC/IASC - immediately)

3.1.2 In an integrated mission with significant humanitarian component, the DSRSG should be vested with the authority to make major decisions on humanitarian matters as well as delegated the functions of the Designated Official (DO) for security for the mission. (Action: ERC/IASC - immediately)

3.2 **IASC**

3.2.1 The IASC and country teams should accelerate the establishment of the IASC at the country level, to be named the Field Humanitarian Team (FHT). (Action: IASC - immediately)

3.2.2 The ERC should review the composition, functions and decision-making process of the IASC based on the following elements: i) memberships to be based on substantive involvement in humanitarian operations; ii) major leadership to be ensured in monitoring and promoting the reform process through cross-fertilization amongst organizations; iii) organizations to agree on an appropriate system of empowerment of the IASC in making its decisions binding for the members in pre-identified situations (Action: ERC with IASC for proposals before end 2005)

3.2.3 The IASC should establish a joint consultative UN/NGOs/ICRC/IFRC forum at the level of Directors of Emergencies, which should meet at least every quarter or as the need arises, with a rotating chair, to take common orientations on urgent humanitarian issues, using as a basis for discussion the “Early Warning Mechanism” being developed by the IASC. (Action: IASC before end 2005)

3.3 **ERC and HCs**

3.3.1 The IASC should review the roles of the ERC and Humanitarian Coordinators and make recommendations to strengthen them in order to better reflect the broader basis of the humanitarian community they serve in their coordination functions (Action: ERC/IASC – immediately)

3.3.2 The IASC should review the selection, training and management system for the Humanitarian Coordinators as well as develop a career path for this cadre, including the establishment of a pre-selected roster of candidates, coming from the different networks part of the IASC.

3.3.3 The IASC should establish criteria (such as independence from any agency, neutral position vis-a-vis host government, strong humanitarian experience, a mix of operational and diplomatic skills) which the Resident Coordinator would need to meet to be selected as a Humanitarian Coordinator. In
cases in which the Resident Coordinators do not meet these criteria, the system should consider a stand-alone HC. A stand-alone HC to be appointed also in case of failed states, uncommitted governments with no degree of accountability and obligations to their citizens and countries at the height of emergencies/disasters without any development opportunities. (Action: ERC/IASC – immediately)

3.4 OCHA

3.4.1 OCHA should assess the coordination capacities of the HC offices in the field, in preparedness, planning, needs assessment and resource mobilization and to draw up a time-bound plan of action for equipping them with the necessary tools and mechanisms. (Action: OCHA with IASC)
CHAPTER IV
CHAPTER IV

THE ADEQUACY, TIMELINESS AND FLEXIBILITY OF EMERGENCY FUNDING

1. PROBLEM STATEMENT

Over the last decade a large number of humanitarian crises, the most recent examples being the Darfur crisis and the tsunami emergency, have in common, encountered funding as one of the most crucial factors influencing success or failure. While looking at the adequacy, timeliness and flexibility of emergency funding, one must distinguish between recurrent funding and funding for immediate action in new emergencies.

Recurrent funding is the financial support given to existing emergencies, including those that, while recent, have already extended to over three months. Funding for immediate action in new emergencies is the financial support given to activities needed in the first period of a completely new emergency (natural or man-made) or activities needed when new major events have created, in an ongoing crisis, an aggravation of the existing humanitarian situation. This chapter addresses the three elements of adequacy, timeliness and flexibility applied to the two sets of funding.

2. FINDINGS

2.1 Recurrent Funding

The International Humanitarian Organizations

2.1.1 Some of the international humanitarian organizations that responded to the questionnaire have only a limited emergency profile and engagement. This is reflected in the percentage of the annual budgets allocated to emergencies. In organizations, such as WFP, the trend has evolved over the last few years, with the increased emergency profile/engagement being also reflected in the rising percentage of their budget allocated to emergency activities.

2.1.2 The global budget of all the organizations has remained relatively stable in the period 2002 to 2004. This does not indicate that their funding requirements have been fully met by the donors. On the contrary, programmes have often been reduced, drastically, to adapt the budgets to the response of donors.

The dependence of the organizations on governmental funding is extremely high, ranging often between 80-100%. The most dependent group is represented by the UN agencies, IFRC, ICRC and IOM. For many NGOs and Red Cross/Red Crescent National Societies, membership fees, private funding or activities represent more than 50% of their financial resources.

2.1.3 On adequacy of funding, the most common remark is, that while budgets have remained stable, needs have increased in terms of: a) the number of crises to be covered; b) the number of activities that humanitarian organizations are required to cover by the donors, their governance bodies, the recipient countries, hence expanding the notion of saving lives to social assistance and c) the difficulty to find development actors (agencies and donors) willing to engage in a sustained way in fragile transition situations. In addition, too extensive and tight earmarking can deprive some emergencies or sectors of appropriate support. Donors allocate very limited resources to preparedness and capacity building of the organizations. It is also difficult to attract new institutional donors. Major private sector involvement creates new opportunities but also new concerns.
2.1.4 On the timeliness of funding, organizations\textsuperscript{36} encounter difficulties with donor budgetary cycles that are at odds with their own cycles. Difficulties are also experienced in relation to the disbursement process. Organizations such as WFP are addressing the problem by introducing new mechanisms\textsuperscript{37}. Others, especially NGOs with a better balance between governmental and private/membership funding, are less vulnerable to such constraints.

2.1.5 On the flexibility of funding, earmarking (especially at project level) is seen by the UN agencies, IFRC and ICRC as a major constraint. NGOs also favour less restrictive earmarking. All the organizations acknowledge that the earmarking issue is also related to the quality of their reporting and the level of trust they are able to establish with donors. The vast majority of the organizations are already engaged or plan to be engaged in a process of reviewing and strengthening the capacity and quality of their reporting.

The Donors

2.1.6 The 12 donors who provided data to the HRR represent a large number of traditional donors\textsuperscript{38}. Many give financial support, directly or indirectly, to all the humanitarian organizations participating in the review exercise.

Their annual humanitarian budget has been relatively stable and for a few it has slightly increased. Support to operations in purely natural disaster situations represents on average a maximum of 10\% of their global humanitarian budget. Geographic coverage indicates in the last three years a relatively consistent pattern, with high involvement and contribution in Africa (between 50-80\% of funds)\textsuperscript{39}. Amounts of financial support are stable or increasing for this continent. As for the other regions (Asia, Central - Latin America, Europe) the trends indicate respective fluctuations, following the occurrence of conflicts or natural disasters.

One group amongst the humanitarian organizations, the Red Cross/Red Crescent Movement, has been receiving on an average, the same level of contribution, ranging at 10-15\% from the majority of the donors. On the other hand, the percentage of support to the UN agencies, IOM and the NGOs varied significantly, following a pattern that is often determined by the policy of each donor government in terms of the respective funding channels.

2.1.7 On adequacy of funding, very few donors have confirmed that their humanitarian budgets could be increased in the future. The vast majority does not seem to consider this a possibility. No explanation has been given for this position. On their approach towards the issue of capacity building of the humanitarian organizations, few donors\textsuperscript{40} have developed and are engaged in a multi-annual strategic approach. Others\textsuperscript{41} provide more focused support to some UN agencies or to ICRC and IFRC. Some have given a negative answer to their willingness to engage in this path. Finally, while all donors state that their policy is based on needs and acknowledge that “equity” should be applied, the majority is still struggling with the difficulty of “unequal” distribution of resources between emergencies and sectoral needs. Many donors are trying to address the issue in the framework of the GHDI.

2.1.8 On timeliness, many donors have already, at least at the level of policy decision-making, aligned their timeframe to the cycles or plans of organizations to do so. On disbursements, many admit that improvements should intervene.

2.1.9 On flexibility, un-earmarked funds are allocated only by few donors. Loosely earmarked funding is given by all the donors but with large variations in percentage ranging from 5 to 75\%. The same pattern can be found for tightly earmarked funding, with the exception of Finland, which confirmed not applying it. While loosely earmarked or un-earmarked funding is given by some donors to UN agencies or IFRC and ICRC, no donor seems to give this type of funding to NGOs. It is not

\textsuperscript{36} Especially for the international organizations with a strict budgetary schema based on a timeframe “1\textsuperscript{st} January - 31\textsuperscript{st} December”

\textsuperscript{37} For example the “Capital Financing Facility”, which anticipate disbursements against expected contributions

\textsuperscript{38} They represented , in the period 2002-2004, in average more than 70\% of the total humanitarian contributions and between 50 to 80\% of the CAP contributions (See Annex XIII)

\textsuperscript{39} The analysis being global, the figures can hide imbalances at regional or country levels

\textsuperscript{40} Australia, Belgium, Denmark, ECHO, New Zealand, UK/DFID

\textsuperscript{41} Like Canada or Sweden
possible to deduce from many of the answers if loosely earmarked funding is given by donors to NGOs or Red Cross/Red Crescent National Societies.

2.2 Funding for Immediate Action

The International Humanitarian Organizations

2.2.1 All the humanitarian organizations have in place, have expanded or are in the process of creating some kind of internal emergency funds.

In terms of adequacy, when asked, many organizations have considered such amounts appropriate to support short and limited initial reactions. On the contrary, organizations such as FAO and WFP view them as insufficient and have recently modified them. Regarding the type of activities covered by such emergency financial mechanisms, they seem in general to be limited to urgent life saving activities, in the immediate aftermath of an event. Only recently, some organizations have expanded the coverage to preparedness aspects (pre-positioning of stocks, pre-investments for needs assessment including logistics, etc.).

The procedures for mobilizing such funds are in general rapid and flexible. The decision is delegated to a senior official in the management structure, while prior authorizations from other departments are limited. Some organizations, such as UNHCR, feel however that their procedures need to be reviewed and improved to make the mobilisation faster and more effective. In general, the mechanisms are of a revolving nature with advances being repaid by funds raised through normal appeal procedures. The possibility to eventually write off advances, if funds are not totally or partially refunded, is foreseen.

The Donors

2.2.2 All the donors have in place an emergency fund or are capable to allocate funds rapidly to new emergencies. It is not possible to determine from the responses to the questionnaires clear conclusions about the “additional” aspect of those funds. Also there is not a clear common pattern on the size of those emergency mechanisms. For the same reason it is not possible to judge the adequacy of such funds compared to possible needs. Finally, there is no clear indication of which kind of activities can be financed through those mechanisms, but, based on information from evaluations in a number of emergencies, only activities deployed after the “event” seem to be eligible.

The process for mobilizing (timeliness) funds is extremely rapid, at least for the initial decision (often less than 48 hours), sometimes with different timing depending on the amount to be allocated. Actual disbursement seems to require more time. Depending on the size of the amount to be allocated, donors have in general, similar decision-making procedures with some authority delegated at the level of the ministry and/or the senior management of the administration. It is not clear how much flexibility in terms of requirements for disbursement, for allocation to sector and for reporting is linked to such emergency funds.

2.3 Fundraising mechanisms

2.3.1 All the major organizations have at least two models for fundraising, an annual appeal for ongoing operations for identified needs at the stage of the initial annual planning; new short term/flash appeal for new emergencies. Smaller organizations tend to approach donors directly to fund specific projects. In the larger networks, in particular the UN and the Red Cross but also in some of the major international NGOs, efforts have been made to coordinate and organize joint fundraising events.

The CAP process has been probably the most ambitious, as it aims to bring together UN agencies, IOM, Red Cross/Red Cross Movement, NGOs at least at the level of the strategic planning (the CHAP). It is however still perceived by many as a UN fundraising exercise. The need for major
improvements has been underlined by both the organizations and the donors, although it is acknowledged that some progress is being made in a number of countries.

Other mechanisms, like pooled funding, in particular at country level, or trust funds have been used or tested\(^{45}\) but they remain open to debate and questioning.

2.4 The Central Emergency Revolving Fund (CERF)\(^{46}\)

2.4.1 The Central Emergency Revolving Fund (CERF) was established in 1991\(^{47}\) as a complementary instrument to the reserve and other contingency funding arrangements of UN operational agencies and IOM. It is meant to ensure the provision of adequate resources for use in the critical initial phases of emergencies that require a system-wide response\(^{48}\). CERF has a target ceiling of $50 million and functions as a loan mechanism. Advances are reimbursed by the voluntary contributions received by the organizations in response to consolidated appeals. CERF is managed, by the Under-Secretary-General for Humanitarian Affairs/Emergency Relief Coordinator under the overall authority of the Secretary-General.

2.4.2 On the adequacy, timeliness and flexibility of CERF, comments received from UN agencies, while underlining the usefulness of such a mechanism, point also to its limits as a loan mechanism and difficulties linked to the access and disbursement procedures. Some evaluations have also signalled that this mechanism has not helped in finding a solution to low profile emergencies as agencies are less inclined to use it for activities in countries where they do not expect donor interest. Other humanitarian stakeholders have mentioned the shortcoming as being a purely UN reserved instrument.

Amongst the donors participating in the HRR, some have already expressed support for a revision of the instrument and its enlargement to include a substantive component of grant, thus confirming positions taken during the consultations in the framework of the GHDI on the UK proposals for strengthening the humanitarian response capacity.

3. CONCLUSIONS

3.1 Recurrent Funding

- Humanitarian actors believe that humanitarian needs are increasing because larger groups are in need, longer periods of assistance are required, and there’s a larger scope for assistance. This is linked to requests from stakeholders, including donors, and to the fact that protracted crisis situations create additional needs, more daunting to satisfy.

- The uneven support given to forgotten emergencies or neglected needs present the humanitarian organizations and the donors with the dilemma of the equity of their response. The steps taken in the framework of the GHDI are an attempt to address the dilemma but with an attitude, on the side of the donors, which remains too timid.

- Linking emergency, recovery and development continue not to be addressed adequately as there are no commitments by development agencies, the governments and the donors in their development policy. In particular, basic social services that represent a major investment in humanitarian action often do not receive enough prominent part in the design of appropriate transition strategies. More risks, including financial, are rarely accepted in the transition phase by the development actors. Humanitarian organizations also have not always interacted in an

\(^{45}\) See « What type of funding models best support funding according to need? » - Development Initiatives – October 15, 2004

\(^{46}\) See « Study on Revised CERF Mechanism » by Barnaby Willitts-King and Tony Faint (June 15, 2005) for a more detailed presentation on CERF functioning

\(^{47}\) G.A. Resolution 46/182.

\(^{48}\) In 2001 the scope was expanded to cover urgent humanitarian assistance to populations affected by natural disasters; humanitarian assistance for new requirements in protracted emergencies where funding has been difficult to secure; emergency staff safety arrangements for UN humanitarian personnel.
appropriate way with development actors in order to facilitate transitions from emergency to recovery.

- The increase in the closely linked needs for the protection of the affected population and for the security of humanitarian workers, as well as the increased expectations in terms of transparency and accountability, carry a price in terms of human and financial resources.

- Traditional institutional donors are in general ready to subscribe to this analysis, but do not reach the same conclusion, especially in terms of efforts to be made. Reasons are to be found in national policies, oriented towards budgetary restrictions as well as in a certain degree of donor fatigue, especially in protracted emergencies. This underlines one of the shortcomings of the present humanitarian response, marked by the lack of will or capacity to find political solutions and a sense of limited responsibility on the side of the donors to assume the consequences of such situations.

- Linking funding to solid and sound needs assessments is right, but this implies sustained investment and support, in particular to the preparedness of the organizations, a sector in which donors are in general not inclined to invest expecting agencies to find the necessary funds. Many organizations have engaged in solid reform processes and are developing instruments that should provide more robust needs assessments in the future. Those efforts should be supported appropriately by a larger group of donors than at present. This would also be the basis for a better quality inter alia of the CAP process, to which many donors confirm attaching high priority.

- While the efforts to enlarge the donor base represent a positive evolution, they are left in general to the organizations, without a strong engagement from the traditional donors to support them, in order to make more rapid progress and to ensure that the humanitarian principles and practices are respected and applied.

- An increased involvement of the private sector seems appropriate. This could probably become a privileged area for support for preparedness, training and enlargement of the surge capacities. Concerns expressed about the respect for humanitarian principles and practices could be addressed through the establishment of appropriate guidelines for the working relationship with this sector. Existing initiatives in this area, such as the Red Cross/Red Crescent Movement project, could inspire other organizations.

- Action to engage the private sector in funding of humanitarian activities, especially from organizations that are part of an established network (such as the UN agencies) is dispersed and could limit the impact of this approach. Considerations should be given to having a more strategic and organized approach, for instance, in the form of a common program on training and security, serving similar needs of a large group of organizations to be presented to interested actors in the private sector.

- Timeliness continues to be an issue, but humanitarian organizations and donors seem to be moving towards a common understanding. Donors should find ways to improve their disbursement procedures while organizations should engage in efforts to use at the best all the funds placed at their disposal, without loss due to unspent funds.

- The humanitarian organizations have integrated the need for transparency, quality and accountability. Processes are in place and the major challenge will be to make them rapidly effective throughout the organizations. Donors should evaluate the results of processes that have started with their support and are ongoing before considering new models, including financing models. It is from such a perspective that initiatives such as country pooled funding, should be carefully planned in order not to disrupt the financing system of the different organizations concerned.

- On earmarking, a system of only un-earmarked or loosely earmarked funds is not a realistic expectation for the near future. However it should be possible to progress towards less earmarked funding, proceeding for instance from a project to a programme base, and identifying sectors where un-earmarked funds could be channelled.
• This will be facilitated by a positive evolution on reporting. Humanitarian Organizations accept that quality and transparent reporting is part of their accountability, not only to donors but also to their major stakeholders, the people in need, and have engaged in efforts to improve it. Initiatives launched by the donors, under the GHD, should be pursued much more actively. The approaches already explored\textsuperscript{49} should be rapidly agreed upon and implemented. In doing so, donors should also explore ways to facilitate the improvement in reporting by the NGOs.

3.2 Funding for Immediate Action

3.2.1 Appropriate financial mechanisms for immediate action are in place or in the process of being developed by the humanitarian organizations. A larger coverage of activities, which include preparedness, is a positive evolution. Those mechanisms should continue to represent the bulk of the immediate response capacity of the international humanitarian system and donors should support them. However there is place and a need for some reinforced global mechanisms; at the central level, through a revised CERF, and at country level, through a pooled funding approach in the first weeks of a new emergency.

3.2.2 The major elements of a revised, enlarged CERF\textsuperscript{50} could be:

1. Maintaining the “loan” aspect and adding a “grant” element.

2. For the loan aspect, the mechanisms should continue to be a complement to the internal mechanisms of the UN agencies; however, its functioning should be reviewed to improve the access and the reimbursement procedures.

3. For the grant aspect, the mechanism is at the disposal of the Emergency Relief Coordinator to cover the following elements to:

   • Complement organizations’ mechanisms, when they are not adequate (too many crises at same time) or when the ERC considers that an organization’s effort has to be stepped up more rapidly than the agency is capable to do on its own,
   • Give the capability to the ERC to rapidly involve and facilitate the involvement of organizations including local or regional organizations he deems necessary to undertake an appropriate response in a specific emergency context,
   • Facilitate preparedness or capacity building of the system at large at the sectoral and regional levels when a major gap appears

4. Allow the benefit of the grant aspect to all the international humanitarian organizations as well as regional and local organizations that the ERC identifies relevant sectorally and emergency related to achieve a specific objective.

5. The size of the fund could be established between 350 and 500 M $, with the level of the loan element not representing more than 25% of the final amount.

3.2.3 A specific “pooled” funding mechanism could be created in order to:

   • Facilitate and ensure a coordinated and inclusive approach to fundraising from the concerned organizations\textsuperscript{51} to cover all appropriate activities during the first 12 weeks of a new emergency;
   • Reduce the “competing” aspect, the risk of uneven response to needs and the dispersion of efforts in fundraising while resources should be mobilised for immediate and rapid action.

\textsuperscript{49} The first one consists in the acceptance, by the donors who are ready or in a position to already do so, of the annual reports of the humanitarian organizations (like the UN agencies, ICRC or ICRF); the second one, in establishing a common format for the donors that have an obligation to request more expanded reporting.

\textsuperscript{50} See also “Study on Revised Cerf Mechanism”, already mentioned. However the proposals presented here are not totally similar to those presented by the HHR team

\textsuperscript{51} Identified as “relevant” in the Humanitarian Country Team, following the model presented in Ch II, par. 3.8.1, Benchmark 2
This mechanism will be managed by the Humanitarian Coordinators, on the basis of the agreed “Plan of Action” established by the Field Humanitarian Team with the agreement and the support of the senior management of the different organizations involved. Funds will be allocated by the HC on the basis of the agreed allocations by priorities as indicated in the Plan of Action.

4. **RECOMMENDATIONS**

4.1 **For the humanitarian organizations**

1. IASC should increase coherence in the appeal mechanisms, especially where networks exist. The CAP process should be the tool, with the IASC taking a stronger leadership and establishing by end 2005 a plan of action to speed up the process. (Action: Organizations/IASC)

2. Organizations should develop stronger advocacy for forgotten or neglected needs, through a shared “communication” strategy, established through the IASC, addressed in particular to public opinions and media in the current and potential donor countries. Donors’ policy should be challenged on the basis of sound needs assessments. (Action: All/IASC)

3. Humanitarian organizations should review their financial systems, with a view to use available funds in a way that anticipates donor disbursements and prevents loss of funds.

4. Humanitarian organizations should identify, in the framework of existing networks or at the level of the IASC, the preparedness activities including recruitment and training that could be part of a common plan to be presented to donors for financial support; exploring in particular the opportunity offered by such an approach in engaging with the private sector. (Action: All/IASC).

5. Humanitarian organizations should agree to use a common funding appeal system managed by the Humanitarian Coordinator, when as members of a Field Humanitarian Team, they have contributed to establish a Common Action Plan for the initial phase (12 weeks) of a new emergency.

4.2 **For the Donors**

1. Donors should make substantial progress in addressing the acknowledged imbalance in support to different emergencies (forgotten or neglected needs) (Action: All - through inter alia the GHDI – immediately with clear objectives fixed for 2006 budgetary exercise).

2. Donors should actively support humanitarian organizations efforts in enlarging the donor base (institutional or private), while preserving respect for the established humanitarian law, principles and practices.

3. Donors should introduce only progressively and after appropriate preparation, new funding mechanisms, such as country pooled funding, to prevent negative effects on the financial capacities of humanitarian organizations. (Action: concerned donors)

4. Donors should review disbursement procedures in order to reduce the time span between pledging and disbursement to a maximum of six weeks. (Action: All)

5. In the framework of the GHDI, donors should rapidly agree on the possible simplified reporting approaches (annual reporting of organizations or common format) and establish the common format by end 2005. (Action: donors in the GHDI - for decision before end 2005 and implementation in 2006)

6. Donors should consider an increase of the present level of funding for humanitarian assistance in the framework of the debate on the MDG. (This should be a priority for the GHDI).

7. A larger group of donors, including the private sector, should engage in support of preparedness or rapid reaction - through establishing financial mechanisms covering these types of

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activities at the levels of organizations and, complementary, at central level, such as a revised CERF. Donors should consider devoting at least 5 to 10 per cent of their annual funding to preparedness activities of the organizations.

8. Donors should agree on the revision of the CERF in order to increase its size (between 350-500 M $), to enlarge its scope (support to start up and preparedness activities), to modify its modalities (a large grant element) and the role of the ERC in managing it.

9. Donors should engage to channel funding, in the initial (12 weeks) phase of a new emergency, through the common appeal which will support the Field Humanitarian Team Plan of Action and will be managed by the Humanitarian Coordinator.
ADDENDUM
**ADDENDUM**

**TABLE I: SUMMARY OF RECOMMENDATIONS**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Recommendation implying progress to be made or sustained effort to be maintained: (Group A)</th>
<th>Recommendation implying change of approach or new action needed: (Group B)</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Global Recommendation</td>
<td>a) Continue, in an appropriate framework, including at the level of the IASC, the mapping exercise to cover mission or not completely covered elements. (Action: Organizations/IASC)</td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>Chapter I – Accountability and Performance of the International Response System</strong></td>
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<tr>
<td>Accountability and Performance of the International Response System</td>
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<tr>
<td>a) Pursue actively and measure the reform process in the different organizations as well as the improvement of the CAP process through the establishment and the application of different sets of benchmarks. Priority should be given to: i) internal management benchmarks related to the organizations’ preparedness as well as their assessment and planning capacities, in particular at field level (Action: All – immediately); ii) a limited number of process and impact benchmarks, for the CAP or other forms of appeal (Action: All – immediately).</td>
<td>d) The IASC to develop a strategy to promote cross fertilization amongst organizations on best practices related to the use and the development of benchmarks and to ensure appropriate coherence in particular in preparedness and in the CAP process (at country level). (Action: IASC)</td>
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<tr>
<td>b) Agree on effectiveness and relevance as the central criteria on which to build appropriate benchmarks, from preparedness to implementation. Processes aiming to facilitate and obtain management decisions should be in place, reviewed and adapted on a regular basis. (Action: Organizations and donors)</td>
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<tr>
<td>c) Planning by objectives and the use of benchmarks and indicators should be applied in a more systematic way by the humanitarian organizations, building on existing standards and methodologies, like the Sphere standards, the Code of conduct for the RC/RC Movement and the NGOs. (Action: All)</td>
<td>e) Establish a limited set of benchmarks (and indicators) to be implemented in the first period of a new emergency up to a maximum of 3 months and addressing in priority 1) access and coverage of population in need; 2) identification of responsibilities in delivery of assistance and in coordination; 3) resources mobilization (human, assets, financial); 4) identification of relevant lifesaving activities; 5) protection aspects, where needed. Organizations and donors to agree on it and test it over a 3 years period, starting in 2006, before becoming the reference set. (Action; ERC/IASC with Donors immediately)</td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>Chapter II – Preparedness and Response Capacity</strong></td>
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<tr>
<td>1. Global Recommendations</td>
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<td>a) Organizations to reassess continuously, through an extended mapping of material and human resources in all sectors, they declared response capacities as compared to credible thresholds, below which a declared capacity becomes operationally irrelevant (Action: All/IASC for threshold definition).</td>
<td>b) Identify and assign lead organizations with responsibility at sectoral level, especially in relation to IDP protection and care and develop a cluster approach in all priority sectors (Action: ERC/IASC – immediately)</td>
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<tr>
<td>Recommendation implying progress to be made or sustained effort to be maintained: (Group A)</td>
<td>Recommendation implying change of approach or new action needed: (Group B)</td>
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<tr>
<td>c) Accelerate, at the IASC level, the establishment of common standards and guidelines at sector level, in recruitment or training policies, for material assets in order to facilitate interoperability in as well as the different networks and between networks. Establish a work programme, with identified issues and a timeframe for results, on a yearly basis (Action: ERC/IASC Principals for decisions on priorities before end 2005; IASC WG for implementation, starting in 2006)</td>
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<tr>
<td>2. Personnel</td>
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<tr>
<td>a) Accelerate the revision of Human resources policies on recruitment and training in order to boost the managerial capacities in priority sectors and field levels as well as improve procedures for assignment to emergency missions, especially in hardship duty stations. (Action: All – immediately)</td>
<td>b) Create an IASC “Human Resource” working group, focusing on personnel issues (recruitment, contracts, including commitments regarding travel and length of stay, salary level, insurance, and strengthening of human resources, sector-by-sector) to lead in developing a more systemic personnel approach. (Action: IASC)</td>
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<td>c) Appoint one organization within each network to be the lead agency for personnel issues, being responsible for all inter-organizational related human resource issues. This agency should work closely with the IASC working group. (Action: Networks)</td>
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<tr>
<td>d) Establish at field level, under the supervision of the HC, and appropriate mechanism to facilitate the exchange of personnel and staff on loan, among the organizations, during the emergency phase of an operation. (Action: IASC)</td>
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<td>3. Protection</td>
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<tr>
<td>a) Accelerate and expand the recruitment of new protection officers, by NGOs the UN, and Red Cross/Crescent, in order to strengthen general capacities in facing issues of protection both at the HQ and field level. (Action: All – immediately)</td>
<td>b) Increase the numbers of protection officers and the commitments from the organizations in this regard, the ProCap initiative should be supported. (Action: ERC/IASC; donors – immediately)</td>
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<tr>
<td>c) Extend UNHCR’s role as lead agency in the protection of refugees to include IDPs with a clear mandate such as ICRC or the UNOCHR. (Action: ERC/IASC – immediately)</td>
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<td>d) The IASC to oversee, and take an active role, with the lead agency reporting every six months, on issues as general protection status or recruitment of new organizations involved in protection. (Action: IASC/Lead agency)</td>
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<td>4. Health</td>
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<td>a) Train and recruit medical personnel, reflecting a strong focus on community mobilization and preventive measures. This should include strengthening the community health programs, focusing on prevention and monitoring and supporting those capable of rapid</td>
<td>b) Designate a sector lead agency to be charged, identifying inter-alia with the essential life-saving material that could be maintained in stockpiles. (Action: ERC/IASC)</td>
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<td>Recommendations</td>
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<td><strong>5. Water and Sanitation</strong></td>
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<td>a) Strengthen the role of the traditional lead agency or alternatively select another lead agency on an urgent basis, in order for it to be a predictable facilitator both on field and HQ levels.</td>
<td>ERC/IASC</td>
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<tr>
<td>b) Give urgent attention to the creation of water and sanitation inter-agency clusters on a regional level with the mandate of monitoring availability of key staff and of tools and equipment (mobile water treatment, transport, storage, and distribution units). The cluster could also be a vehicle for broadening outreach on public health issues associated with water and sanitation. Such responsibility should be taken by the lead agency.</td>
<td>IASC – immediately</td>
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<tr>
<td>c) Establish a mapping of available health human resources and of immediately deployable health and medical equipment/consumables, within organizations and on the basis of inter-agency screening. Annual reporting on resources should be made available to the sector lead agency.</td>
<td>Organizations/Lead Agency</td>
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<td><strong>6. Logistics</strong></td>
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<td>a) NGO, at the HQ level, to expand the number of standby arrangements with private airline companies, or with governments in a position to deploy airlifting capacities.</td>
<td>All</td>
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<td>b) Expand global mapping of relief stock. The process should start as a decentralized process, with each agency reporting through its network (UN, Red Cross/Crescent and NGOs) on quantity, values, geographical positioning, availability and access. The networks should report on its status to IASC once every six months. A lead agency should be assigned responsibility for this reporting.</td>
<td>All – IASC to designate reporting agency</td>
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<td><strong>7. Camp Management and Shelter</strong></td>
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<tr>
<td>a) Establish a camp management working group, regularly reporting to the IASC, to reconcile agency approaches to the provision of shelter and explore the potential for common standards for camp management and shelter in different contexts and geographical areas.</td>
<td>IASC</td>
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<td>b) Assign to UNHCR the role of lead agency in camp management including for IDPs in complex emergencies situations.</td>
<td>ERC/IASC</td>
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<td>c) Evaluate separately displacement caused by natural, following each event; a lead agency to be selected by ERC in consultation with the IASC Principals.</td>
<td>ERC/IASC</td>
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<td>8. Food Aid, Nutrition and Livelihoods</td>
<td>Recommendation implying progress to be made or sustained effort to be maintained: (Group A)</td>
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<td>a) The understanding of the role of WFP as a lead agency in the sector of food aid to be accompanied by establishing clarity on the roles of other agencies with special mandates such as ICRC. (Action: ERC/IASC)</td>
<td>b) Create a working group for food, nutrition and livelihood, focusing on food related issues, and trouble shooting within the sector, reporting on the status/gaps and action to IASC, once every six months. It should focus inter alia on: i) establishing common inter-agency assessment teams; ii) ensuring reliable data's, and a common emergency strategy among the agencies; iii) establishing means of sharing infrastructure resources such as aircrafts, boats and trucks in food distribution; iv) expanding understanding and the inclusion of livelihood approaches in the design of emergency response. (Action: IASC)</td>
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<td>c) The working group should explore possibilities of reducing fragility within the sector, through recruitment of regional agencies involved in the food sector, especially when it comes to food distribution and nutrition. (Action: WG/Lead Agency)</td>
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| 9. Urban Search and Rescue | a) The IASC to endorse efforts by INSARAG to ensure quality control for deploying search and rescue teams. INSARAG should also take the lead in the following: i) further focus on local and regional training; ii) carry out studies and demonstrations, building sustainable search and rescue capabilities in disaster prone areas (earthquakes) at the local level. (Action: IASC/INSARAG) | b) The IASC to support only highly selective deployment of new search and rescue teams. (Action: IASC) |

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<tr>
<th>10. Preparedness and Surge Capacity</th>
<th>a) The IASC should establish a functioning relief stock positioning system, in addition to the present registration, among UN, the Red Cross and Red Crescent Societies, the IOM and the NGOs, governments and other stake holders, aimed at increasing preparedness, reducing costs, increasing access and assuring stock rotation. (Action: IASC)</th>
<th>b) UNDAC, FACT, and ERUs, should examine the status of management and operational training in terms of the above recommendations. (Action: UNDAC, FACT, ERUs)</th>
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<td>c) All agencies should seek to find new mechanisms to improve relationships to suppliers and other relevant private enterprises, with the aim of expanding resource options. (Action: All)</td>
<td>d) The IASC should take the lead in establishing the clear understanding that organizations must measure their surge capacity according to a consistent and predictable standard. A reporting mechanism should be developed by the IASC Working Group with special attention being paid to the NGO community. (Action: IASC)</td>
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<td>e) Promote the expansion of surge capacities through the progressive establishment of pre-identified modules at initiatives such as the European Union mechanisms and the French Proposal to establish a standing International Humanitarian Force (Action: ERC/OCHA to engage in discussions in order to agree on modalities for cooperation and implementation – immediately)</td>
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<td>Chapter III – A shared Vision for the Coordination of the Humanitarian Response</td>
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<td><strong>1. Global Recommendations</strong></td>
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<td>a) The ERC should consult with</td>
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<td>the IASC Principals and major</td>
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<td>sectors and crosscutting areas</td>
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<td>(Action: ERC/IASC – immediately)</td>
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<td>b) In an integrated mission</td>
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<td>component, the DSRSG should be</td>
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<td>for security for the</td>
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<td>mission. (Action: ERC/IASC –</td>
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<td>11. Humanitarian Common Services</td>
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<td>and Pooled Capacities</td>
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<td>a) Agencies should accept</td>
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<td>logistics preparedness as an</td>
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<td>operations of the UNJLC core</td>
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<td>unit. (Action: All)</td>
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<td>b) HCs should make the</td>
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<td>participating agencies</td>
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<td>the UNJLC as part of Humanitarian</td>
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<td>Common Services is essential</td>
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<td>for the effective use of</td>
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<td>resources. The HCs should</td>
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<td>circulate information on the</td>
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<td>the Humanitarian Common Services.</td>
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<td>(Action: HCs/support from IASC)</td>
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<td>c) The basic relationship with</td>
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<td>WFP should be as clear as</td>
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<td>planning, and budgeting</td>
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<td>purposes. (Action: All)</td>
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<td>d) Donors should make regular</td>
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<td>annual contributions to the</td>
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<td>Special Account for the UNJLC</td>
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<td>so that financing arrangements</td>
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<td>may be made on a predictable</td>
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<td>e) The IASC should accelerate</td>
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<td>the development of common</td>
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<td>services. (Action: IASC to</td>
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<td>identify priority sectors</td>
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<td>implementation modalities</td>
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<td>before end 2006)</td>
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<td>f) Agency Field Directors</td>
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<td>should clear and establish</td>
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<td>agreements with operational</td>
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<td>partners on matters</td>
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<td>pertaining to local hiring</td>
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<td>and procurement in particular.</td>
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<td>(Action: All)</td>
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<td>g) Non-UN networks, such as</td>
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<td>those organized by IFRC and</td>
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<td>Interagency Working Group, to</td>
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<td>make liaison with the HC a</td>
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<td>priority. (Action: Red Cross/</td>
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<td>Red Crescent members; NGOs)</td>
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<td><strong>2. IASC</strong></td>
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<td>a) Accelerate the establishment of the IASC at the country levels and name them the Field Humanitarian Team (FHT). (Action: IASC – immediately)</td>
<td>b) Review the composition, functions and decision-making process of the IASC based on the following elements: i) memberships to be based on substantive involvement in humanitarian operations; ii) major leadership to be ensured in monitoring and promoting the reform process through cross-fertilization amongst organizations; iii) organizations to agree on an appropriate system of empowerment of the IASC in making its decisions binding for the members in pre identified situations (Action: ERC with IASC for proposals before end 2005)</td>
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<td>c) Establish, within the IASC, a joint consultative UN/NGOs/ICRC/IFRC forum at the level of Directors of Emergencies. It should meet at least every quarter or as the need arises, with a rotating chair, to take common orientations on urgent humanitarian issues, using as a basis for discussion the “Early Warning Mechanism” being developed by the IASC. (Action: IASC before end 2005)</td>
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<td><strong>3. ERC and HC</strong></td>
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<tr>
<td>a) Review the roles of the ERC and Humanitarian Coordinators and strengthen them in order to better reflect the broader basis of the humanitarian community they serve in their coordination functions (Action: ERC/IASC – immediately)</td>
<td>c) Establish criteria (like independence from any agency, neutral position vis a vis host government, strong humanitarian experience, a mix of operational and diplomatic skills) which the Resident Coordinator would need to meet to be selected as a Humanitarian Coordinator. Where the Resident Coordinators do not meet these criteria, the system should consider a stand-alone HC. A stand-alone HC to be appointed also in case of failed states, uncommitted governments with no degree of accountability and obligations to their citizens and countries at the height of emergencies/disasters without any development opportunities. (Action: ERC/IASC – immediately)</td>
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<td>b) Review the selection, training and management system for the Humanitarian Coordinators as well as develop a career path for this cadre, including the establishment of a pre-selected roster of candidates, coming from the different networks part of the IASC. (Action: ERC/IASC – immediately)</td>
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<td><strong>4. OCHA</strong></td>
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<td>a) OCHA should assess the coordination capacities of the HC offices in the field, in preparedness, planning, needs assessment and resource mobilization and to draw up a time-bound plan of action for equipping them with the necessary tools and mechanisms. (Action: OCHA with IASC)</td>
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<td><strong>Chapter IV – The Adequacy, Timeliness and flexibility of Emergency Funding</strong></td>
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<td><strong>1. Humanitarian Organizations</strong></td>
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<tr>
<td>a) Increase coherence in the appeal mechanisms, especially where networks exist. The CAP process should be the tool with the IASC taking a stronger leadership and establishing by end 2005 a plan of action to speed up the process. (Action: Organizations/IASC)</td>
<td>d) Organizations should identify, in the framework of existing networks or at the level of the IASC, the preparedness activities including recruitment and training that could be part of a common plan to be presented to donors for financial support; exploring in particular the opportunity offered by such an approach in engaging with the private sector. (Action: All/IASC)</td>
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<tr>
<td>b) Organizations should develop stronger advocacy for forgotten or neglected needs, through a shared “communication” strategy, established through the IASC, addressed in particular to public opinions and media in the current and potential donor countries. Donor’s policy should be challenged on the basis of sound needs assessments. (Actions: All/IASC)</td>
<td>e) Organizations should agree to use a common funding appeal system managed by the Humanitarian Coordinator, when as members of a Field Humanitarian Team, they have contributed to establish a Common Action Plan for the initial phase (12 weeks) of a new emergency. (Action: All)</td>
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<tr>
<td>c) Review, if necessary, financial systems of organizations to use available funds in a way that anticipates donor disbursements and prevents loss of funds. (Action: All)</td>
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<td><strong>2. Donors</strong></td>
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<tr>
<td>a) Make substantial progress in addressing the acknowledged imbalance in support to different emergencies (forgotten or neglected needs). (Action: All – through inter alia the GHDI – immediately with clear objectives fixed for 2006 budgetary exercise).</td>
<td>f) Consider an increase of the present level of funding for humanitarian assistance in the framework of the debate on the MDG. (Action: Donors – this should be a priority for the GHDI – immediately).</td>
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<tr>
<td>b) Actively support humanitarian organizations efforts in enlarging the donors’ basis (institutional or private), while preserving respect for the established humanitarian law, principles and practices. (Action: All)</td>
<td>g) A larger group of donors, including the private sector, should engage in support of preparedness or rapid reaction through establishing financial mechanisms covering these types of activities at the levels of organizations and, complementary, at central level, such as a revised CERF. Donors to consider dedicating at least 5 to 10 per cent of their annual funding to preparedness activities of the organizations. (Action: All)</td>
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<tr>
<td>c) Introduce only progressively and after appropriate preparation new funding mechanisms, such as country pooled funding, to prevent negative effects on the financial capacities of humanitarian organizations. (Action: concerned donors)</td>
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<td>d) Review disbursement procedures in order to reduce the time span between pledging and disbursement to a maximum of six weeks. (Action: All)</td>
<td>h) Agree on the revision of the CERF in order to increase its size (between 350-500 M $), to enlarge its scope (support to start up and preparedness activities), to modify its modalities (a large grant element) and he role of the ERC in managing it (initiative). (Action: All)</td>
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<tr>
<td>Recommendation implying progress to be made or sustained effort to be maintained: (Group A)</td>
<td>Recommendation implying change of approach or new action needed: (Group B)</td>
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<td>e) In the framework of the GHDI, rapidly agree on the possible simplified reporting approaches (annual reporting of organizations or common format) and establish the common format by end 2005. (Action: donors in the GHDI – for decision before end 2005 and implementation in 2006)</td>
<td>i) Engage to channel funding, in the initial (12 weeks) phase of a new emergency, through the common appeal which will support the Field Humanitarian Team’ Plan of Action and will be managed by the Humanitarian Coordinator. (Action: All)</td>
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ANNEX I

TERMS OF REFERENCE FOR THE HUMANITARIAN RESPONSE REVIEW

1. Background:

There is a common perception that humanitarian response does not always meet the basic needs of affected populations in a timely fashion, that the response provided varies considerably from crisis to crisis and there may be insufficient humanitarian capacity to respond to the demands of concurrent major crises. While some of the factors affecting response are specific to individual crises – such as lack of access and obstruction of aid – some of the key challenges seem to be systemic in nature. In light of the high current levels of humanitarian demand, it is evident that there is a critical need to identify those factors that have hindered the speed and effectiveness of humanitarian response, including in the area of protection, and ensure that appropriate steps are taken to improve the timeliness and impact of humanitarian interventions.

2. Objective, Purpose and Scope of the Review

The objective is to develop a joint plan of action to improve the effectiveness and timeliness of the humanitarian response to emergencies.

To this end, the Emergency Relief Coordinator, based on his General Assembly mandate (resolution 46/182) has initiated an independent in-depth system wide review of humanitarian response capacities. The review will analyze the overall humanitarian response capacities as well as the potential resources available to meet future demands for assistance and protection for both complex emergencies and natural disasters. The focus of the review will primarily give attention to the response capacity of the UN, NGOs, Red Cross/Red Crescent Movement and other key humanitarian actors including the International Organization for Migration (IOM). This should help achieve a common understanding of both the current response capacity and available expertise and of how the humanitarian system can effectively mobilize and deploy them. In addition, it will identify possible gaps in expertise and resources that exist and recommend measures that need to be taken to address the shortcomings.

This exercise will include review of 1) emergency funding, 2) response capacity of the humanitarian community, and 3) coordination and leadership functions and roles. It should result in the identification of gaps in current capacity, as well as identifying trends in response. Based on this analysis it will develop a set of recommendations to address identified shortcomings in line with the principles and approaches envisioned in UN GA Resolution 46/182. The outcome of the review could help ensure that the response capacity of key humanitarian actors, in terms of overall management, human and financial resources, tools and mechanisms, as well as equipment and relief supplies is adequate and appropriate to the changing humanitarian environment. This should ultimately assist humanitarian agencies to meet future challenges through improved response mechanisms and delivery, strengthened emergency funding as well as provide clarification of respective roles based on resources and expertise.

3. Key Review Tasks:

Define Benchmarks for the expected performance of the international humanitarian response system in terms of scale, speed, intensity and impact.

Undertake an inventory of current capacities (at HQ and Field level), in the key response sectors (such as shelter, food, water and sanitation, health, education, protection, joint services) of the UN, NGOs, Red Cross/Red Crescent Movement and other key humanitarian actors including IOM, to respond to humanitarian emergencies, i.e. assess performance of the system against benchmarks as defined in (i).

- Review the establishment, strength, relevance and role of coordination functions.
- Review joint services and assess the capacity and potential of such services to appropriately address emergency needs.
- Examine the adequacy, timeliness and flexibility of emergency funding.
• Analyze the effectiveness and appropriateness of existing surge mechanisms, including in the area of protection.
• Assess the timeliness, efficiency and effectiveness of external stand-by arrangements available to humanitarian agencies and how these contribute to meeting emergency needs.
• Review the effectiveness of existing arrangements for the provision of equipment, infrastructure and relief supplies.
• Review relevant management structures and accountability mechanisms for the collective humanitarian response, including the role of the ERC and the HCs. Particular focus should be placed on procedures facilitating the release of funds and the deployment of personnel and other critical resources.
• Identify existing best practices and gaps and develop practical and sustainable solutions to address these both inside and outside the humanitarian systems (e.g. from member states or private sources etc).

4. Review Methodology

The details of the review methodology will be developed by the team and outlined in the team’s inception report. It can be anticipated that this review will consist of:

(i) A physical mapping out of the existing capacities in the key sectors by visiting, interviewing and documenting relevant existing and prospective humanitarian partners.
(ii) Review of factors that affect the rapid deployment of such capacities. (These could address issues such as: financing mechanisms for contingency planning and response preparedness).
(iii) In-depth interview and dialogue with humanitarian partners, donors, host governments, communities and others stakeholders to help review the current response capacities. Relevant studies on response to past emergencies should be examined.
(iv) Based on the above, a set of recommendations for improving humanitarian response capacity in assistance and protection.

It is expected that the recommendations from the review will be discussed by the IASC WG, which will develop a plan of action for their implementation to be presented to the IASC Principals.

The review will be based on an initial examination of relevant materials, followed by interviews with key informants, including agency focal points and focus groups. The team should also supplement the data collection with a survey among current, potential and/or former humanitarian aid workers.

5. Administrative Arrangements for the Review

A three-person team of senior external consultants will conduct this independent review, which is being commissioned by the Emergency Relief Coordinator. The team will consult regularly with the ERC, during the course of the review. OCHA Geneva will provide Secretariat support for the review under the leadership of the Assistant Emergency Relief Coordinator (AERC) who will be assisted by the Evaluation and Studies Unit of OCHA. The AERC will be the focal point for consultations with the humanitarian community, on behalf of the ERC.

The consultants should combine the following skill set: in-depth knowledge of UN and NGO humanitarian assistance, common service provision, monitoring and evaluation, experience with undertaking institutional surveys, good grasp of sectoral capacity issues, in particular for the issues raised above, and possess management expertise, as well as hands-on operational experience in emergencies. Additional specific sectoral expertise may be brought in as required. The ERC will seek external funding from donors for the Review.

It is proposed that each agency appoint a senior focal point for the review and that the IASC form a reference group. The role of the reference group would be to work alongside with the team, ensure inter-agency participation and reflection, promote the implementation of the survey and provide the team with an agency-specific perspective. In addition, it may be opportune to work with donors to ensure full donor engagement.

6. Review Timeline

The review will start in February 2005 and with a final output expected for June 2005.
ANNEX II

HRR INCEPTION REPORT: THE OBJECTIVES OF THE REVIEW

The Objectives of the Review have been redefined by the HHR Team. While the objectives of the Review are generally respected, the Team examined them in detail and after having given due weight to realistically achievable tasks, has redefined them as follows:

i. Define Benchmarks to be used by the different groups – organizations (UN, NGOs, Red Cross/Red Crescent Movement and other key humanitarian actors including IOM), donors and beneficiaries – to measure the expected performance of the international response system in terms of scale, speed, intensity and impact, giving due weight to the quantity and quality of humanitarian assistance.

ii. Undertake an inventory of current capacities (at HQ and Field Levels) in the key response sectors (such as shelter, food, water and sanitation, health, protection, education) of the UN, NGOs, Red Cross/Red Crescent Movement and other key humanitarian actors including IOM to respond to complex and major emergencies i.e. assess performance of the system against benchmarks as defined in (i) above.

iii. Review the existence, strength, relevance, effectiveness, and acceptance of coordination functions.

iv. Review the effectiveness of joint services within the UN system and pooled resources in the NGOs, Red Cross/Red Crescent Movement and other key humanitarian actors including IOM, and assess the capacity and potential of such services to appropriately address emergency needs.

v. Analyze the effectiveness and appropriateness of existing preparedness or surge capacity within the stakeholder organizations including in the area of protection; how recruitment, training, and deployment and distribution policies and procedures are enhancing their response capacity in terms of deployment of personnel and other critical resources.

vi. Assess the timeliness, efficiency and effectiveness of external stand-by arrangements and pooled resources available to humanitarian agencies and how these contribute to meeting complex emergency/natural disaster needs.

vii. Review the effectiveness of existing arrangements for the provision of equipment, infrastructure and relief supplies.

viii. Review the relevant organizational structure, management, coordination and accountability mechanisms for system-wide covering of all stakeholders, for the collective humanitarian response including the role of the ERC and the HCs.

ix. Identify existing best practices and gaps and develop practical and sustainable solutions to address these gaps both inside and outside the humanitarian systems (e.g. from member states or the private sector).

x. Examine the adequacy, timeliness, and flexibility of emergency funding with particular focus placed on procedures facilitating the release of funds.
## ANNEX III

### LIST OF INTERVIEWEES

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<tr>
<th>Agency/Organization</th>
<th>Name</th>
<th>Title</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>UN</td>
<td>Robert Orr</td>
<td>ASG, Policy Planning</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Nora Galer</td>
<td>Director, Office of the UN Ombudsman</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Georgios Kostakos</td>
<td>First Officer, Executive Office of the SG</td>
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<tr>
<td>UNDGP</td>
<td>Sally Fegan Wyles</td>
<td>Director of DGO</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Judith Karl</td>
<td>Senior Advisor, Crisis-Post Conflict Cluster</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Bradley Foester</td>
<td>Humanitarian Affairs Officer</td>
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<tr>
<td>UNDP</td>
<td>Zephirin Diabre</td>
<td>Associate Administrator</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Kathleen Cravero</td>
<td>BCPR, Director</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>John Clarke</td>
<td>Humanitarian Liaison Officer</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Douglas Keh</td>
<td>Special Assistant to the Administrator and</td>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Director of BCPR</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Jan Mattsson</td>
<td>Assistant Administrator and Director Bureau of Management</td>
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<td></td>
<td>Brian Gleeson</td>
<td>Director of Humanitarian Resources Bureau of Management</td>
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<td></td>
<td>Pablo Ruiz</td>
<td>BCPR</td>
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<tr>
<td>UNFPA</td>
<td>Thoraya Obaid</td>
<td>Executive Director</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Kunio Waki</td>
<td>Deputy Executive Director</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Eriko Hibi</td>
<td>Programme Specialist, Humanitarian Response Unit</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Sean Hand</td>
<td>Director, Division of Human Resources</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Mirkka Henttonen</td>
<td>Humanitarian Liaison Officer</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Alexandra Roth</td>
<td>Programme Analyst, Office of the Executive</td>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Director</td>
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<td></td>
<td>Alain Sibenaler</td>
<td>Resource Mobilization Officer, Resource</td>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Mobilization Branch</td>
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<td></td>
<td>David Del Vecchio</td>
<td>Information Officer, Humanitarian Response Unit</td>
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<td></td>
<td>Pamela Delargy</td>
<td>Manager, Humanitarian Response Group</td>
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<td>OCHA</td>
<td>Jan Egeland</td>
<td>USG/ERC</td>
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<td></td>
<td>Yvette Stevens</td>
<td>AERC/Director, OCHA Geneva</td>
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<td></td>
<td>Ed Tsui</td>
<td>Director, OCHA New York</td>
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<td></td>
<td>Margareta Wahlstrom</td>
<td>ASG, Humanitarian Affairs and Deputy ERS</td>
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<td></td>
<td>Amjad Abbashar</td>
<td>Special Assistant to USG</td>
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<td></td>
<td>Opia Kumah</td>
<td>Chief, OACH/AIMB</td>
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<td></td>
<td>Nancee Oku-Bright</td>
<td>Humanitarian Affairs Officer</td>
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<td></td>
<td>Gregoire de Brancovan</td>
<td>Senior Humanitarian Affairs Officer, Contingency Planning Unit</td>
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<td></td>
<td>Robert Turner</td>
<td>Manager, Field Information Support Project</td>
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<td></td>
<td>Mark Bowden</td>
<td>Chief, PDSB</td>
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<td></td>
<td>Susanne Freue</td>
<td>Chief, Evaluation and Studies Unit</td>
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<td></td>
<td>Maria Luisa Murphy</td>
<td>Executive Officer</td>
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<td>Kelly David Towe</td>
<td>Humanitarian Affairs Officer</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Joel Boutlouse</td>
<td>Deputy Director, Response Coordination Branch</td>
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<td></td>
<td>Jamie McGoldrick</td>
<td>Chief, Europe, Central Asia, Middle East, North Africa Section (ECAMENA)</td>
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<td>Robert Turner</td>
<td>Manager, Field Information Support Project</td>
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<td>Fabrizio Gentilioni</td>
<td>Deputy Chief, Response Coordination Branch</td>
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<td></td>
<td>Dennis McNamara</td>
<td>Director and Special Advisor to ERC</td>
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<td></td>
<td>Laketch Dirasse</td>
<td>Deputy Director, Internal Displacement Division</td>
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<td></td>
<td>Mark Cutts</td>
<td>Chief of Field Response Section</td>
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<td></td>
<td>Marc Vincent</td>
<td>Inter-Agency Internal Displacement Division</td>
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<td></td>
<td>Helena Fraser</td>
<td>Inter-Agency Relations Officer</td>
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<td></td>
<td>Toby Lanzer</td>
<td>Chief, CAP Section</td>
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<td></td>
<td>Merete Johansson</td>
<td>Chief, Asia, Pacific, Americas &amp; Caribbean Section</td>
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<td>Michel Nourradine Kassa</td>
<td>Chief, Africa I</td>
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<td>Ingrid Nordstrom-Ho</td>
<td>Deputy Chief, MCDU</td>
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<td>Arjun Katoo</td>
<td>Chief, Field Coordination Support Section</td>
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<td>Magda Nibiru van Eyben</td>
<td>Chief, Donor Relations Section</td>
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<td>Gerhard Putman-Cramer</td>
<td>Chief, Emergency Services Branch</td>
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<td>Ayodele Fowler</td>
<td>Chief, Africa II</td>
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<tr>
<td>Marilena Viviani</td>
<td>Chief, IASC Secretariat</td>
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<td>Eric Haegglund</td>
<td>Chief, Field Support Section</td>
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<tr>
<td>Christina Bennett</td>
<td>Programme Officer, Promoting of the Humanitarian Agenda Unit</td>
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<tr>
<td>Ross Mountain</td>
<td>DSRSG/RC/HC, DRC</td>
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<td>Bo Asplund</td>
<td>RC/HC, Indonesia</td>
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<td><strong>UNICEF</strong></td>
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<td>Carol Bellamy</td>
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<td>Sadig Rasheed</td>
<td>Special Adviser to the Executive Director</td>
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<tr>
<td>Dan Toole</td>
<td>Director, Office of Emergency Programmes (EMOPS)</td>
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<td>Steve Allen</td>
<td>Director, Human Resources, NY</td>
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<td>Afshan Khan</td>
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<td>Dermot Carty</td>
<td>Senior Programme Officer, Mine Action</td>
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<td>Gerry Dyer</td>
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<td>Olivier de Greef</td>
<td>Senior Programme Officer Resource Mobilization</td>
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<td>Everett Ressler</td>
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<td>Hani Shannak</td>
<td>Chief of IT Operations Services</td>
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<td>Elisabeth Baily</td>
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<td>Christian Skoog</td>
<td>Programme Officer, EMOPS</td>
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<td><strong>OHCHR</strong></td>
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<tr>
<td>Mehr Khan Williams</td>
<td>Deputy High Commissioner</td>
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<tr>
<td>Walter Kaelin</td>
<td>Representative of the SG on Human Rights for IDPs</td>
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<tr>
<td>Gianni Magazziemi</td>
<td>Team Leader, Methodology Team Activities and Programme Branch</td>
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<td>Shahrzad Tadjbakhsh</td>
<td>Human Rights Officer</td>
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<td><strong>UNHCR</strong></td>
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<tr>
<td>Kamel Morjane</td>
<td>Assistant High Commissioner</td>
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<tr>
<td>Anne Willem Bijleveld</td>
<td>Director, Division of External Relations</td>
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<td>Marjon Kamara</td>
<td>Director, Division of Operational Support</td>
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<tr>
<td>Erica Feller</td>
<td>Director, Department of International Protection</td>
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<tr>
<td>Jean Marie Fakhouri</td>
<td>Director, Sudan/Chad (and neighboring countries hosting Sudanese Refugees)</td>
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<td>Operations</td>
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<tr>
<td>Kofi Asomani</td>
<td>Former Director of the Internal Displacement Unit, currently Inspector General</td>
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<tr>
<td>David Lambo</td>
<td>Director, Bureau of Africa</td>
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<td>Janet Lim</td>
<td>Director, Bureau of Asia</td>
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<tr>
<td>Jiddo van Drunen</td>
<td>Director, Supply Management Service</td>
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<tr>
<td>Shelly Pitteman</td>
<td>Deputy Director, Division of Human Resources Management</td>
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<td>Arnould Akodjienou</td>
<td>Head, Emergency and Security Service</td>
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<tr>
<td>Craig Sanders</td>
<td>Senior Head, Desk of Chad and Darfur</td>
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<tr>
<td>Yoichiro Tsuchida</td>
<td>Chief, Technical Support Section</td>
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<tr>
<td>Alan Vernon</td>
<td>Chief, Organization Management Section</td>
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<tr>
<td>Christina Linnér</td>
<td>Private Sector Fund Raising Unit</td>
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<tr>
<td>Dinesh L. Shrestha, Dr. Eng</td>
<td>Senior Water and Sanitation Officer, Technical Support Section</td>
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<tr>
<td>Daniel Endres</td>
<td>Head of Policy Development and Training in EPRS</td>
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<tr>
<td>Joke Langenkamp</td>
<td>Deputy Head, Donor Relations and Resource Mobilization</td>
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<tr>
<td>Jean Noel Wetterwald</td>
<td>Head Donor Relations and Resource Mobilization</td>
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<tr>
<td>Iain Hall</td>
<td>Senior Policy Officer, Policy Development and Training Section</td>
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<td>Kemlin Furley</td>
<td>Senior External Relations</td>
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<tr>
<td>Bernard Kerblat</td>
<td>Early Warning and Emergency Preparedness Specialist</td>
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<tr>
<td>Andrew MacLeod</td>
<td>Head of Desk, North Africa and the Middle East</td>
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<tr>
<td>David Nabarro</td>
<td>Representative of the Director General for Health Action in Crises</td>
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<td>Mukesh Kapila</td>
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<tr>
<td>Alessandro Loretti</td>
<td>Coordinator, Emergency Health Intelligence and Capacity Building</td>
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<tr>
<td>Tanja Sleuwenhoek</td>
<td>Inter-Agency Affairs, HAC</td>
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</table>
ILO
Alfredo Lazarte Director of ILO Crisis Response Programme
Donato Kiniger-Passigli Senior Crisis Response Specialist

IOM
Brunson McKinley Director General
Pasquale Lupoli Director of Operations Support
Marco Boasso Chief, Emergency and Post Conflict
Robert Paiva Director, External Relations

IFRC
Markku Niskala Secretary-General
Susan Johnson Director, National Society and Field Support Division
Peter Rees Head, Disaster Response Unit

ICRC
Francois Bugnion Director of International Law and Cooperation
Jean Daniel Tauxe Head of External Relations
Jean-Philippe Lavoyer Head of Legal Divisions
Jacques Stroun Director of Human Resources
Angela Gussing-Sapina Head of Cooperation with the Movement
Walter Fuellmann Deputy Head of Operations
Anne Zeidan Diplomatic Adviser
Lise Boudreault Diplomatic Adviser, Humanitarian Diplomacy Unit

WFP
James Morris Executive Director
Jean-Jacques Graisse Senior Deputy Executive Director
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David Kaatrud Chief, Assessment, Analysis and Preparedness, OD
Jamie Wickens Associate Director of Operations, ODO
Adrian van der Knaap Chief, UNJLC
Allan Jury Director, PDE
Wolfgang Herbinger Chief, ODAN
Carlo Scaramella Chief, Emergency Preparedness and Response Unit
Annalisa Conte Chief, ODAV
Amer Daoudi Chief, Logistics Service Division
Emma Quinn Logistics Officer, Transport and Procurement Division
Eric Whiting Deputy Director, ADF
Torben Due Director, ODC
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Andrew Lukach Director, Management Services Division and Security Focal Point
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Marianne Ward Programme Officer

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Anne Bauer Chief, Special Relief Operations Service
Heni Carsalade Assistant Director-General
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Fernanda Guerrieri Chief, Emergency Operations Service
Tony Alonsi Chief, Management Support Service
Henri Josserand Chief, Global Information and Early Warning Service Commodities and Trade Division
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D. Baugh Chief, AFFC
Laura Scianimonaco Associate Professional Officer, TCER
Christina Amaral Senior Operations Officer, Emergency Operations Services

UNV
Kevin Gilroy Chief, Special Operations
Alison Tasfachew Chief, External Relations Group
Dirk Bebruyns Programme Specialist, SO
Andre Francois Carvalho Chief, Programme Development and Operations Group
Ramanathan Balakrishnan Programme Specialist, PDOG
Deborah Verzuu Liaison Officer, Geneva
Enid Menamkat Recruitment Associate
OTHERS

Mr. Willits-King Consultant DFID and Ireland Research on CERF
Francois Grunewald President, Urgence Rehabilitation Development

DFID

Jim Drummond Director, UN Conflict and Humanitarian Division
Neil Patrick Head of Team-Global Policy Institutions

French Ministry of Justice

Nicole Guedj State Secretary for Victims Rights
Jean-Bernard Bolvin Cabinet of Ms. Guedj

French Ministry of Foreign Affairs

Jean-Maurice Ripert Director for UN and International Organizations Affairs
Beatrice le Fraper du Hellen Assistant Director for Human Rights, Humanitarian and Social Affairs
Christian Rouyer Head, Humanitarian Department
Sonia Dona Perez Service for Human Rights, Humanitarian and Social Affairs

Prime Minister’s Office

Jean-Claude Mallet Delegate-Interdepartments Coordination for French Assistance to Tsunami Affected Countries
Eric Chevallier Deputy Delegate-Interdepartments Coordination For French Assistance to Tsunami Affected Countries

USAID

Leonard M. Rogers Deputy Assistant Administrator, DCHA
Thomas H. Staal Deputy Director, Food for Peace Office
Gregory C. Gottlieb Deputy Director, Office of U.S. Foreign Disaster Assistance
Robert W. Jenkins Acting Deputy Director, Office of Transition Initiatives
Jeff Drumtra Policy Advisor on Internal Displacement
Jeffery Malick Director, USAID Development Information Services
Richard Owens Darfur Response Management Team Leaders
Laura Powers Food Security
Olga Bilyk Programme Assistant
Caroline Abla Nutrition Specialist
Gilbert Collins Team Leader, Evaluation and Planning Team
Anita Manghetti Humanitarian Advisor, PPC/USAID
Konrad Huber USIAD/Office of Transition Initiatives (OTI)
Brian Bacon Regional Emergency Food for Peace Officer
Nck Cox Office of Food for Peace

US State Department Bureau of Population, Refugees and Migration (BPRM)

Arthur E. Dewey Assistant Secretary
Linda Thomas-Greenfield Deputy Assistant Secretary
Margaret J. Pollack Director, Office of Multilateral Coordination and External Relations
Mary Gorjance Deputy Director, Multilateral Coordination and External Relations
Kelly Clements Deputy Director, Policy and Resource Planning
Andrew Wyllie Civil-Military Officer, Policy and Resource Planning

Migration Policy Institute

Kathleen Newland Director

European Commission - DG ECHO

Michel Arrion Head of Unit (Department for Policy Affairs, Relations with Institutions and Partners, General Coordination)
Susan Hay Deputy Head of Unit
Silvia Ermini Desk Officer

NGOs

World Vision

Ton van Zutphen Director, Humanitarian Accountability & Humanitarian Emergency Affairs Group

International Rescue Committee

George Rupp President
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Organization</th>
<th>Name</th>
<th>Position</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Care USA</td>
<td>W. Ahuma Adodoaji</td>
<td>Director, Emergency and Humanitarian Assistance Unit</td>
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<tr>
<td>The Humane Society Of the United States</td>
<td>Oliver Davidson</td>
<td>Senior Disaster Advisor</td>
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<tr>
<td>Save the Children</td>
<td>Robert G. Laprade</td>
<td>Director, Emergencies and Protection</td>
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<tr>
<td>OXFAM</td>
<td>Jasmine Whitbread</td>
<td>International Director</td>
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<tr>
<td>Interaction</td>
<td>Jim Bishop</td>
<td>Humanitarian Response for Interaction</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ICVA</td>
<td>Ed Schenkenberg</td>
<td>Coordinator</td>
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<td>Manisha Thomas</td>
<td>Policy Officer</td>
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<tr>
<td>SCHR</td>
<td>Joel McLellan</td>
<td>Executive Secretary</td>
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<tr>
<td>Sphere Project</td>
<td>Jean McCluskey</td>
<td>Project Manager</td>
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<tr>
<td>Water Supply and Sanitation Collaborative Council (WSSCC)</td>
<td>Gourisankar Gosh</td>
<td>Executive Director</td>
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<td>UN-Habitat</td>
<td>Gert Ludeking</td>
<td>Senior Adviser on Shelter and Human Settlements</td>
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<tr>
<td>HAP-International</td>
<td>Nick Stockton</td>
<td>Director</td>
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**NAIROBI CONSULTATION – 26 May 2005**

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<tr>
<th>Organization</th>
<th>Name</th>
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<tr>
<td>UNICEF Ethiopia</td>
<td>Stephano Pizzi</td>
<td>Emergency Information Officer</td>
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<tr>
<td>UNICEF ESARO</td>
<td>Susan Namondo Ngonj</td>
<td>Projet Officer, Emergency</td>
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<tr>
<td>UNDP Kenya</td>
<td>Anita Shah</td>
<td>Programme Officer</td>
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<tr>
<td>WFP RO-Uganda</td>
<td>Bienvenu Djossa</td>
<td>Senior Regional Programme Adviser &amp; Head Programme Unit</td>
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<tr>
<td>WHO Kenya</td>
<td>Michel Yao</td>
<td>Technical Officer, Emergency &amp; Humanitarian Action</td>
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<tr>
<td>UNHCR Regional Office</td>
<td>Douglas Osmond</td>
<td>Senior Regional Supply Officer</td>
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<td>OCHA Ethiopia</td>
<td>Lyle Bastin</td>
<td>Deputy Head of Office</td>
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<td>OCHA Uganda</td>
<td>Elaine Duthoit</td>
<td>Head of Office</td>
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<td>OCHA RSO-CEA</td>
<td>Valerie Julliand</td>
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<td>OCHA RSO-CEA</td>
<td>Pierre Gelas</td>
<td>Regional Disaster Response Advisor</td>
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<td>OCHA RSO-CEA</td>
<td>Belinda Holdsworth</td>
<td>Information and Analysis Officer</td>
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<td>OCHA RSO-CEA</td>
<td>Joanna Turner</td>
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<td>OCHA Somalia</td>
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<td>OCHA Somalia</td>
<td>Kazimiro Jocono</td>
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<td>OCHA Sudan</td>
<td>Mona Duale</td>
<td>National Humanitarian Affairs Officer</td>
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<tr>
<td>UNESCO PEER</td>
<td>Charles Indongole</td>
<td>OIC, Centre for Educational Assessment Services</td>
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<td>Mudiappasamy Devadoss</td>
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<tr>
<td>UN Darfur Consultant</td>
<td>Bernard Broughton</td>
<td>Director, Project Design &amp; Management Pty Ltd</td>
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**IO and NGOs in Nairobi**

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<tr>
<th>Organization</th>
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<tr>
<td>AHA</td>
<td>B.T. Costantinos</td>
<td>Senior Vice President, Africa Humanitarian Action and President, Centre for Human Environment</td>
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<tr>
<td>MSF Belgium</td>
<td>Antoine Joguet</td>
<td>Technical and Logistics Coordinator</td>
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<tr>
<td>OXFAM GB</td>
<td>Sophie Battas</td>
<td>Regional Coordinator</td>
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<tr>
<td>SCUK Regional Office</td>
<td>Neil Turner</td>
<td>Regional Coordinator</td>
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<tr>
<td>CONCERN</td>
<td>Gerard McCarthy</td>
<td>Regional Director</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>World Vision</td>
<td>Eleonor Monbiot</td>
<td>Relief Coordinator</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>World Vision</td>
<td>Rosemary Khiu</td>
<td>Coordinator, Humanitarian Learning</td>
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<tr>
<td>TROCAIRE</td>
<td>Elizabeth Muthuma</td>
<td>Emergency Officer</td>
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<tr>
<td>IOM-Nairobi</td>
<td>Eleonore Carael</td>
<td>HIV Programme Officer</td>
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<td>CRS Emergency Response</td>
<td>Karl Egge</td>
<td>Emergency Nutrition Officer</td>
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<td>CRS Emergency Response</td>
<td>Maurice M’Quillan</td>
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<tr>
<td>IFRC Nairobi</td>
<td>Steve Penny</td>
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### NAIROBI BASED DONORS

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<tr>
<th>Country</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Norway</td>
<td>Pippi Soegaard</td>
<td>First Secretary, Senior Regional Humanitarian</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sweden</td>
<td>Linnea Ehrenst</td>
<td>First Secretary, Advisor, The Horn of Africa</td>
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<tr>
<td>Germany</td>
<td>Mario Sauder</td>
<td>First Secretary, Commercial Affairs Political</td>
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<td>Heiko Warnken</td>
<td>First Secretary, Head of Department for</td>
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<tr>
<td>Finland</td>
<td>Timo Olkkonen</td>
<td>Programme Officer, Development Cooperation</td>
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<tr>
<td>Canada</td>
<td>Barbara Richardson</td>
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<tr>
<td>Switzerland</td>
<td>Luke Sookocheff</td>
<td>Counsellor, Regional Affairs</td>
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<tr>
<td>Netherlands</td>
<td>Marjie Maessen</td>
<td>First Secretary</td>
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<tr>
<td>ECHO</td>
<td>Jan Eijkennar</td>
<td>Southern Sudan Programme T/A</td>
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<td>EU</td>
<td>Roland Kobia</td>
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<tr>
<td>USAID</td>
<td>Francesca Arato</td>
<td>Regional Emergency Food for Peace Officer</td>
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### GENEVA HRR-NGO CONSULTATION – 25 April 2005

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<th>Organization</th>
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<tr>
<td>DRC</td>
<td>Ann Mary Olsen</td>
<td>Deputy Head of the International Department</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Salvation Army</td>
<td>Cedric Hills</td>
<td>International Emergency Services Coordinator</td>
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<tr>
<td>Concern</td>
<td>Dominic Crowley</td>
<td>Head of Emergency Unit</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ICVA</td>
<td>Ed Schenkenberg</td>
<td>Coordinator</td>
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<tr>
<td>NRC</td>
<td>Elisabeth Rasmusson</td>
<td>Resident Representative in Geneva</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SHCR</td>
<td>Joel McClellan</td>
<td>Executive Secretary</td>
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<tr>
<td>LWF</td>
<td>John Damerell</td>
<td>Programme Coordinator</td>
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<tr>
<td>VOICE</td>
<td>Kathrin Schick</td>
<td>Director</td>
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<tr>
<td>Oxfam GB</td>
<td>Nick Roseveare</td>
<td>Humanitarian Director</td>
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<tr>
<td>Caritas-Internationalis</td>
<td>Nick Bred Holt</td>
<td>International Cooperation Department</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Handicap International</td>
<td>Paul Vermeul en</td>
<td>Director</td>
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<tr>
<td>ActionAid</td>
<td>Roger Yates</td>
<td>Head of Emergencies Unit</td>
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<tr>
<td>CARE-International</td>
<td>Titon Mitra</td>
<td>Director, Emergency Response</td>
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<tr>
<td>Save the Children-UK</td>
<td>Toby Porter</td>
<td>Director of Emergencies</td>
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<tr>
<td>MSF Holland</td>
<td>Ton Koene</td>
<td>Deputy Emergency Director</td>
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<tr>
<td>World Vision</td>
<td>Tion van Zephen</td>
<td>Director, Humanitarian Accountability &amp;</td>
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<td>Humanitarian Emergency Affairs Group</td>
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<tr>
<td>Facilitator (IFRC)</td>
<td>Richard Blewitt</td>
<td>Director, Movement Cooperation</td>
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<tr>
<td>Action Contre la Faim</td>
<td>Thomas Gonn et</td>
<td>Director of Operations</td>
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</table>

### WASHINGTON DC HRR-NGO CONSULTATION – 27 April 2005

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Organization</th>
<th>Name</th>
<th>Position</th>
</tr>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>ADRAA International</td>
<td>Ken Flemmer</td>
<td>Bureau Chief, International Control and</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
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<td>Compliance</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Africare</td>
<td>Julius Coles</td>
<td>President</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>AirServ</td>
<td>Stu Willcuts</td>
<td>President and CEO</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>American Friends Service Committee</td>
<td>Geraldine Sicola</td>
<td>Assistant General Secretary, International Programs</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>American Jewish World Service</td>
<td>Jacob Fain</td>
<td>Washington Representative</td>
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<tr>
<td>American Red Cross</td>
<td>Lucy Brown</td>
<td>Senior Advisor, International Humanitarian Law</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>American Refugee Committee</td>
<td>Vince Santfuentes</td>
<td>Washington Representative</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>AmeriCares</td>
<td>Frank Catania</td>
<td>Director, International Humanitarian Aid</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CARE</td>
<td>Marianne Leach</td>
<td>Director, Public Policy</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Catholic Relief Services</td>
<td>Nazare Albuquerque</td>
<td>Strategic Issues Advisor for Complex Emergencies</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CCF</td>
<td>Solene Edouard-Binkley</td>
<td>Representative for Policy and Programs</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Church World Service</td>
<td>Jane Strachan</td>
<td>Grants Specialists</td>
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<tr>
<td>Concern</td>
<td>Dominic McSorley</td>
<td>Operations Director</td>
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<tr>
<td>Food for the Hungry Int'l</td>
<td>David Evans</td>
<td>Vice President, Government and GIK Resources</td>
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<tr>
<td>Habitat for Humanity Int'l</td>
<td>Jane Katz</td>
<td>Director, International Programs</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>International Medical Corps</td>
<td>Rabih Torbay</td>
<td>Vice President, International Operations</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>International Crisis Group</td>
<td>Mark Schneider</td>
<td>Senior Vice President</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>International Relief and Development</td>
<td>Arthur Keys</td>
<td>President</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>International Rescue Committee</td>
<td>Anne Richard</td>
<td>Vice President Government Relations</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Jesuit Refugee Service  Mitzi Schroeder  Director for Policy  
Mercy Corps  Nancy Lindborg  Executive Vice President  
Northwest Medical Teams  Bill Essig  Vice President, International Programs  
OXFAM US  Krista Riddle  Deputy Director, Policy and Advocacy  
Refugees International  Joel Charny  Vice President Policy  
Save US  Robert Laprade  Director, Children in Emergencies and Crisis  
United Methodist Committee on Relief  Frederick Opuni-Mensah  DC Representative  
United States Committee on Refugee and Immigration World Relief  Lavinia Limon  Executive Director  
World Vision  Gustavo  Senior Vice President  
Jules-Lynn Frost  Director for Emergency Response  

**Composition of the IASC Reference Group**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>AGENCY/ORGANIZATIONS</th>
<th>NAME</th>
<th>TITLE</th>
</tr>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>OCHA (Geneva)</td>
<td>MS. YVETTE STEVENS</td>
<td>CHAIR OF THE IASC REFERENCE GROUP</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>MR. CLAUDE HILFIKER</td>
<td>HRR TASK MANAGER</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FAO (Rome)</td>
<td>MR. ERMINIO SACCO</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ICRC (Geneva)</td>
<td>MR. LISE BODREault</td>
<td>DIPLOMATIC ADVISE</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IFRC (Geneva)</td>
<td>MR. PETER REES</td>
<td>CHIEF, OPERATIONS SUPPORT DEPART.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>InterAction (Washington DC)</td>
<td>MR. JIM BISHOP</td>
<td>DIRECTOR HUMANITARIAN RESPONSE</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IOM (Geneva)</td>
<td>MR. MARCO BOASSO</td>
<td>CHIEF, EMERGENCY &amp; POST CONFLICT DIV. – OPERATION SUPPORT DEPART.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>MS. LEA MATHESON</td>
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<tr>
<td>OHCHR (Geneva)</td>
<td>MR. ZDZISLAW KEDZIA</td>
<td>RESEARCH &amp; RIGHT TO DEVELOPMENT</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UNDP (Geneva)</td>
<td>MR. PABLO RUIZ</td>
<td>BCPR</td>
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<tr>
<td>UNFPA) (New York)</td>
<td>MS. HENIA DAKKAK</td>
<td>TECHNICAL ADVISOR</td>
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<tr>
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<td>MS. WILMA DOEDENS</td>
<td>TECHNICAL ADVISOR</td>
</tr>
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<td>UNHCHR(Geneva)</td>
<td>MS. KEMLIN FURLEY</td>
<td>SENIOR EXTERNAL RELATIONS</td>
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<td>MR. IAIN HALL</td>
<td>SENIOR REFUGEE RETURNEE SECURITY OFFICER</td>
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<td>MS. CAROLINE HUNT</td>
<td>SENIOR EVALUATION OFFICER</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>WFP (Geneva)</td>
<td>MR. DALY BELGASMI</td>
<td>DIRECTOR, LIAISON OFFICE IN GENEVA</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>WFP (Rome)</td>
<td>MR. DAVID KAATRUD</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>WHO (Geneva)</td>
<td>MR. DAVID NABARRO</td>
<td>REPRESENT. OF THE DG - DEPART. FOR HEALTH ACTION IN CRISIS, HAC</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>MS. TANJA SLEEUEWENHOEK</td>
<td>INTER-AGENCY AFFAIRS, HAC</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UNICEF</td>
<td>MR. ERIC LAROCHE</td>
<td>DEPUTY DIRECTOR, EMERGENCY PROGRAMMES</td>
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<tr>
<td>SCHR</td>
<td>MR. JOEL MCLELLAN</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>ICVA</td>
<td>MR. ED SCHENKENBERG</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>RSG-IDPs (Geneva)</td>
<td>MR. DAVID FISHER</td>
<td>Consultant/Researcher</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**GENEVA DONOR CONTACT GROUP MEETING – 9 May 2005**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country</th>
<th>Contact Person</th>
<th>Position</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Canada</td>
<td>Leslie Norton</td>
<td>Counsellor</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Finland</td>
<td>Aleksi Hokkanen</td>
<td>Attache</td>
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<td>Antoon Delie</td>
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<td>Asbjorn Braanaas</td>
<td>Counsellor</td>
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<tr>
<td>United States of America</td>
<td>Piper Campbell</td>
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<tr>
<td>The Netherlands</td>
<td>Ardl Stroos-Braeken</td>
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<tr>
<td>France</td>
<td>Emmanuel Rousseau</td>
<td>Counsellor</td>
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<td>Australia</td>
<td>Geoff Adlide</td>
<td>Counsellor</td>
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<tr>
<td>United Kingdom</td>
<td>John Webster</td>
<td>First Secretary</td>
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<td>Sweden</td>
<td>Mikael Lindvall</td>
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<td>Denmark</td>
<td>Ole Nestrup</td>
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<td>Ireland</td>
<td>Orla Keane</td>
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<tr>
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<td>Philippe Kaeser</td>
<td>First Secretary</td>
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<td>Germany</td>
<td>Neithard-Höfer-Wissing</td>
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<td>Japan</td>
<td>Tadahiko Yamaguchi</td>
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<tr>
<td>Country</td>
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<td>H.E. Mr. Mike Smith</td>
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<td>Canada</td>
<td>H.E. Mr. Paul Meyer</td>
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<td></td>
<td>Satu Mattila</td>
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<td>Christine Guétin</td>
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<td>H.E. Mr. Michael Steiner</td>
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<td>Greece</td>
<td>H.E. Mr. Tassos Kriekoukis</td>
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<td>H.E. Mr. Pablo Bruni</td>
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<td>H.E. Mr. Shotaro Oshima</td>
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<td>H.E. Mr. Shigeru Endo</td>
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<td>Meinirad Studer</td>
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<td></td>
<td>André Mollard</td>
<td>Attache</td>
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DESCRIPTION OF METHODS USED IN GATHERING INFORMATION

The team developed three customized sets of questionnaires that it shared respectively with the agencies/organizations, the Humanitarian Coordinators (HCs) and Donors to complete. The agencies questionnaire and the humanitarian coordinator questionnaire were sent for completion by the end of March, while the donor questionnaire was sent by the end of April. The questionnaire for the agencies was forwarded to 47 agencies/organizations, of whom 41 responded. The questionnaire for the Humanitarian Coordinators was forwarded to 40 HCs, of whom 14 responded. Finally the questionnaire for the Donors was forwarded to 26 Donors, of whom 13 responded.

It interviewed officials from the stakeholder organizations in Geneva, Rome, Washington DC and Nairobi. It met in some instances, several times, with the IASC Reference Group on HRR, the IASC Working Group, the Humanitarian Liaison Working Group (HLWG), the Donor Contact Group on HRR, the “G77” represented by the CAP, Tsunami and UNDAC countries, the HCs, and the Good Humanitarian Donorship Initiative (GHDI). It met with a large number of Donor government representatives in Washington DC, Geneva, Brussels, Paris, London and Nairobi.

In addition, it addressed an Inter-Agency Emergency Field Coordination Training Workshop (EFCT) held in Geneva/Vaud region. It met with all UNICEF Latin American Country Representatives and their Regional Director visiting Geneva in March 2005 and an NGO Network (Inter-Agency Working Group of seven major NGOs) working on reviewing and strengthening their capacities in Washington DC. In conjunction with the three IASC-NGO Consortia, Interaction, ICVA and SCHR, it organized an NGO-HRR Consultation for the European NGOs in Geneva and another one for the North American NGOs in Washington DC. Participation in these two productive consultations was conducted at the level of Directors of Emergency of the NGOs involved. The team also organized with the support of the OCHA Regional Support Office, a consultation in Nairobi involving 31 field-based UN agencies and NGOs.

The team reviewed numerous documents provided to it by the stakeholders and posted in its library through the support of two research assistants based in its secretariat in Geneva and in OCHA New York. The reviews were supported by a team of analysts based at the Norwegian Red Cross HQ in Oslo and Global Relief Technologies, a US-based data processing/analysis firm.

Below, the schedule of meetings the HRR team had in the course of its work:

Meetings participated by HRR

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<thead>
<tr>
<th>Meeting</th>
<th>Location</th>
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<td>IASC Reference Group Meeting</td>
<td>Geneva</td>
<td>3 February 2005</td>
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<td>HLWG Meeting</td>
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<td>Good Humanitarian Donorship Follow-up Meeting</td>
<td>London</td>
<td>10-11 March 2005</td>
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<td>HC/RC Retreat</td>
<td>Geneva</td>
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<td>IASC WG Meeting</td>
<td>WFP, Rome</td>
<td>21 March 2005</td>
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<tr>
<td>Emergency Field Coordination Training (EFCT)</td>
<td>Vevey</td>
<td>21 April 2005</td>
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<tr>
<td>HRR/NGO Consultation</td>
<td>Geneva</td>
<td>25 April 2005</td>
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<tr>
<td>HRR/NGO Consultation</td>
<td>InterAction Washington DC</td>
<td>27 April 2005</td>
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<tr>
<td>HRR Donor Contact Group Meeting</td>
<td>Canadian Mission, Geneva</td>
<td>9 May 2005</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Event</td>
<td>Location</td>
<td>Date</td>
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<tr>
<td>IASC Reference Group Meeting</td>
<td>Geneva</td>
<td>19 May 2005</td>
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<tr>
<td>CAP, Tsunami &amp; UNDAC Countries Meeting</td>
<td>Geneva</td>
<td>19 May 2005</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Humanitarian Reform Meeting (GHDI)</td>
<td>UK Mission, Geneva</td>
<td>20 May 2005</td>
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<tr>
<td>HLWG Meeting</td>
<td>Geneva</td>
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<tr>
<td>Nairobi Consultation</td>
<td>Nairobi</td>
<td>26 May 2005</td>
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<td>Expanded GMM Meeting</td>
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<td>IASC WG Meeting</td>
<td>Geneva</td>
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<tr>
<td>HLWG Meeting</td>
<td>Geneva</td>
<td>24 June 2005</td>
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<tr>
<td>HRR Briefing to CAP, Tsunami &amp; UNDAC Countries</td>
<td>Geneva</td>
<td>24 June 2005</td>
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ANNEX V

DEFINITIONS INDICATED IN THE INCEPTION REPORT AND REFERRED TO IN THE REVIEW

a. Complex emergencies (man made): A humanitarian crisis which occurs in a country, region or society where there is a total or considerable breakdown of authority resulting from civil conflict and/or foreign aggression; which requires an international response which goes beyond the mandate or the capacity of any single agency (Source: IASC).

b. Major emergencies (natural disaster): A situation threatening a large number of people or a large percentage of a population, and often requiring substantive multi-sectoral assistance (IASC).

c. Response capacity: The capability and means of a humanitarian entity or entities to individually or collectively deliver effective, timely, rapid and quality assistance to populations in need (Source: HRR team).

d. Preparedness capacity: the measures taken to prepare for and reduce the effects of emergencies; that is to predict and - where possible - prevent them, mitigate their impact on vulnerable population, and respond to and effectively cope with their consequences (Source: Red Cross/Red Crescent Movement).
ANNEX VI

GRAPH ON RECOGNIZED GUIDELINES AND STANDARDS

D1 - Priority 0 -- Does your agency follow recognized guidelines and standards such as: a) Sphere Standards; b) Code of Conduct (your own, or internationally recognized); c) Others

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<tr>
<th>ID</th>
<th>ANSWER</th>
<th>#ANSWER</th>
<th>#TOTAL</th>
<th>PERCENTAGE (#ANSWER / #TOTAL)</th>
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</thead>
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<td>Sphere Standards</td>
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<td>38</td>
<td>92.1%</td>
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<td>Code of Conduct (your own, or internationally recognized)</td>
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<td>38</td>
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<td>3</td>
<td>Others: answer next question</td>
<td>29</td>
<td>38</td>
<td>76.3%</td>
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## ANNEX VII

### TABLE ON ORGANIZATION REFORM PROCESSES

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<th>Process</th>
<th>Objective</th>
<th>Timeframe (global)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>WFP</td>
<td>A. Strategic Plan</td>
<td>A. Maximize utilization of resources, improve on time availability of food aid in country</td>
<td>WFP started its business process review in 2003 and it will continue implementing its new business model to operations in the coming years.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>B. Business Process Review</td>
<td>B. Helping to better design, implement, monitor and evaluate project activities and account for the results</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>C. Result-based Management</td>
<td>C. Create a systematic and effective approach to managing risks and linked to achievement of objectives and outcomes</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>D. Enterprise Risk Management</td>
<td>D. To change to an aid production model</td>
<td></td>
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<td></td>
<td>E. Famine Insurance Pilot</td>
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<tr>
<td>IOM</td>
<td>New System for HR information management</td>
<td>Expanding emergency response roster (internal and external)</td>
<td>To be operational in 2006</td>
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<tr>
<td>WHO</td>
<td>3 Year Program</td>
<td>Improve performance in crisis on human resources, assessments, equipment, training and partnerships</td>
<td>2004-2007</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UNICEF</td>
<td>Core Corporate Commitments (CCCs)</td>
<td>Define UNICEF specific role in the programmatic sectors of response to an emergency and outline the mandatory obligations for Unicef in terms of humanitarian actions</td>
<td>2000-current</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Strengthen surge capacity for rapid onset emergencies</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Update internal rosters</td>
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<td>New stand-by arrangements</td>
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<td></td>
<td>Train staff on Emergency Preparedness and Response Training (EPRT) and Principled Approach to Humanitarian Actions (PATH)</td>
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<td></td>
<td>Integrate vulnerability analysis into the country program planning process</td>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Improve overall emergency telecommunications</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>IFRC</td>
<td>Review of Strategy 2010 and international response tools and management lines</td>
<td>Focus on national and regional contingency planning, increase of relief stocks, improve diversity within international teams and leadership training</td>
<td>To be finished by end June 2005</td>
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<td>ICRC</td>
<td>Permanent process involving not only departments, but all components of ICRC</td>
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<td>Ongoing</td>
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<tr>
<td>Iran Red Cross</td>
<td>Final evaluation of the Bam earthquake operation</td>
<td></td>
<td>Scheduled for July/August 2005</td>
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<tr>
<td>Swedish Red Cross</td>
<td>Review of Emergency Response Unit (ERU), domestic and international Standard Operating Procedures (SOP), and further cooperation with Swedish Rescue Services (SRV)</td>
<td></td>
<td>During 2005</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Norwegian Red Cross</td>
<td>Review of Emergency Response Unit (ERU), recruitment policies, and review of their emergency fund mechanisms</td>
<td>Review of their ERU to achieve quicker response, high quality, and cover all geographical areas. Review of their recruitment policies to respond with appropriate flexibility to the needs of emergency operations. Review of their emergency funding mechanisms based on evaluations and lessons learned.</td>
<td>Current review of ERU and recruitment policies, and regular review of use of emergency funding.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>British Red Cross</td>
<td>Review of operational capacity in sanitation and relief areas, livelihoods, and surge capacity</td>
<td>Two significant review post Bam and Tsunami focusing on: Strengthen operational capability in Sanitation and Relief areas, Formalise specialist areas in post disaster recovery activities particularly in cash based responses and livelihoods; Strengthen HQ surge capacity; Strengthen recruitment of technical expertise and identify models for retention and rapid deployment of this expertise.</td>
<td>End of 2005</td>
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<tr>
<td>Organization</td>
<td>Review/Exercise</td>
<td>Description</td>
<td>Status</td>
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<td>Austrian Red Cross</td>
<td>Review of national procedures, training and equipment</td>
<td>To meet the recent demands as highlighted by the Tsunami experience</td>
<td>Ongoing</td>
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<tr>
<td>Danish Red Cross</td>
<td>Review of response capacity</td>
<td>Now building up more ERUs and streamlining their functionality</td>
<td>Review process is already done</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Swiss Red Cross</td>
<td>Review of response capacity</td>
<td>To strengthen response capacity in the fields of logistics, relief, basic health and telecommunications</td>
<td>Current</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>OCHA</td>
<td>Restructuring Exercise</td>
<td>Started in 2004 but has been delayed as a result of the Tsunami crisis</td>
<td>2004-ongoing</td>
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<td>FAO</td>
<td>Strategic Framework Review of FAO Emergency and Rehabilitation Division (TCE)</td>
<td>Obj. # 3: Preparedness for and effective and sustainable response to, food and agricultural emergencies Define a vision for TCE mission in the coming 3 years that corresponds to partner's expectation; ensure financial sustainability; tighten TCE business processes Foreseen actions will be articulated around: § shared in-house commitment to FAO's role in emergency with clear identifications within the programming tools of the Organization, i.e. Medium Term Plan 2008-2013 and revised version of the Strategic Framework 2000-2015 which will be reviewed next year (mid-term review); § streamlined administrative support, in particular inspired from lessons learnt from other UN agencies such as WFP, UNHCR or UNDP; § involvement of Technical Divisions in all the phases of the programme cycle from needs assessment to evaluation; § streamlined operational modalities (including business processes, management, programme development, financial sustainability, etc.).</td>
<td>2000-2015 2004-2007 (business model to be developed by June 2008)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>OHCHR</td>
<td>Not yet clear</td>
<td>Strengthening early-warning/emergency response</td>
<td>N.A.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UNHCR</td>
<td>Framework for Result-Based Management (RBM)</td>
<td>Strengthen overall performance of the protection function, and develop a comprehensive framework for RBM, including emergency response</td>
<td>Internal review ongoing</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UNDP</td>
<td>Review of the Bureau for Crisis Prevention and Recovery's operational support mechanisms</td>
<td>Currently revising and improving its operational support mechanism (e.g. roster, retainers, surge capacity) and partnerships (stand by agreements). Additional work in areas of overlap/involvement of UNDP/humanitarian actors has been completed — (e.g. guidance on UNDP CAP contributions, the Humanitarian Information Centres in Transition) and UNDP contingency planning guidelines (underway).</td>
<td>Bureau for Crisis Prevention and Recovery (BCPR) was created in 2001 and currently reviewing its mechanisms.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UNFPA</td>
<td>Review of response capacity to emergency, reconstruction and preparedness</td>
<td>Provide basic health services Extend required rehabilitation support to the damaged health facilities Support treatment, rehabilitation and counseling for traumatized women and their families Support research and data collection on health status, key health and demographic indicators and impact of conflicts on the life of women and girls</td>
<td>Already conducted</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UNV</td>
<td>Constant review of emergency roster and conditions of service</td>
<td>To maintain an effective and balanced emergency roster and streamline conditions of service and policies to generate a rapid, flexible and effective response</td>
<td>Ongoing</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>International Rescue Committee</td>
<td>IRC routinely conducts evaluations, after-action reviews, and lessons learned exercises to review its performance.</td>
<td></td>
<td>Ongoing</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>German Agro Action</td>
<td>Current review of internal structures</td>
<td>Maintain the performance of their Emergency Response Mechanism and strong local partnership with experienced organizations in emergency programming</td>
<td>Ongoing</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Organization</td>
<td>Area of Work</td>
<td>Specific Actions</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>-----------------------------------</td>
<td>--------------------------------------------------</td>
<td>------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Care Canada</td>
<td>Emergency Preparedness Planning among members and country offices</td>
<td>To strengthen response capacity and update annually</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Norwegian Refugee Council</td>
<td>Current process to strengthen contingency planning, including recruitment strategies and setting up of emergency teams.</td>
<td>Review and update on a yearly basis</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mercy Corps</td>
<td>Developing roster and emergency response fund</td>
<td>Also with assistance from IASC, developing human resources, accountability and disaster mitigation capacities</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Handicap International</td>
<td>Strategic Visioning Process</td>
<td>Planning to reinforce and increase the volume of demining and emergency relief activities</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Whilst preserving a shared HI culture, implementing operational differentiation policy for these activities in recognition of the specific nature of the work and operating procedures.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Capitalising on specific distance-management intervention procedures, implemented either by a Handicap International team made up of national staff or by setting up partnerships with local stakeholders.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Increasing HI's know-how of « disability in crisis situations », formalising procedures and a quality approach specific to emergency relief, applicable whether or not the association is already based in the country or zone in which the crisis occurs.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Strengthening existing links with other NGOs specialised in humanitarian demining in order to offer a credible alternative to the purely commercial approach of private companies</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Contribute towards ensuring that the needs of the village communities are taken into consideration to as great an extent as possible;</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Monitoring the application of the 1997 Mine-ban Treaty for a « mine-free world ».</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Save the Children UK</td>
<td>Final stages of approving and then implementing a new Emergency Strategy</td>
<td>To strengthen capacity and improve overall performance on the Regional Emergency Response Roster, management processes, global logistics (including supply chain management), improved security management, rapid assessment protocols, emergency preparedness and response capacity, and new funding procedures</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>New funding procedures to be developed during the 2005/06 financial year</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Save the Children US</td>
<td>Final Stages of setting up an internal REDI Team for emergency response</td>
<td>Creating emergency preparedness plans in coordination with field offices, and involved in an Emergency CapacityBuilding Project on staff capacity, accountability and impact management and risk reduction</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Reached final stages of review of emergency preparedness and response.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Concern Worldwide</td>
<td>Strengthening overall performance; improving emergency capacity</td>
<td>To provide additional support in disseminating humanitarian principles and practice, and increase the number of staff in managerial and technical positions in the areas of water and sanitation, and nutrition on the Rapid Deployment Unit (RDU)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Plan of action to expand Rapid Deployment Unit (RDU) will be completed by the end of June, 2005</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ActionAid International</td>
<td>Emergency regional advisors and post emergency training</td>
<td>Emergency response has now been included as part of their strategies</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Africa Humanitarian Action</td>
<td>Process to establish defined procedures of evaluating overall performance.</td>
<td>To strengthen performance and improve emergency response with greater emphasis on strengthening and measuring over performance and/or improving emergency responses</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Operating strategic direction for 2005-2007</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Organization</td>
<td>Status</td>
<td>Recent Initiatives</td>
<td>Ongoing processes, not likely to diminish and seen as a necessity in perpetuum</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>-------------------------------</td>
<td>-----------------</td>
<td>-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------</td>
<td>--------------------------------------------------------------------------------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Humane Society International of the Humane Society of the USA</td>
<td>Not yet.</td>
<td>Competency enhancement project for current staff, Capacity building initiative of the Inter Agency Strategy Working Group, Capacity building on humanitarian standards, principles, agreements, etc</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>World Vision</td>
<td>Ongoing process aimed at improving competence and capacity building.</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Caritas International</td>
<td>The CI has in the last four years supported capacity building in emergency preparedness especially in the South. A working group has been preparing a new strategy with a focus on a more rapid and concerted effort.</td>
<td>To improve its response capacity</td>
<td>2004-current</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Oxfam</td>
<td>Managerial and procedural contingency planning to respond more effectively on emergencies, in addition to documenting Standard Operating Procedures.</td>
<td>Prioritising life-saving emergency work over other work is made and implemented. Documenting Standard Operating Procedures to support this in large-scale emergencies, including setting up a staffed communications room, a senior management cell, all staff communications, staffing of Oxfam International coordination etc. Logistics, finance, and administrative infrastructure is also growing stronger as a result of ad hoc scale-ups being replaced by sustained investment over time.</td>
<td>2003-current</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
ANNEX VIII

LEAD AGENCY AND CLUSTERING CHART

General responsibilities of a lead agency could be:

- To be a general resource centre for other agencies, working within the same sector on all levels
- To facilitate contracts with partners
- To mobilize financial resources for the different operational elements
- To oversee an appropriate overall level of preparedness for the sector
- To ensure that resources mobilized for an international operation are managed in a sound efficient manner with its partners
- To define general objectives for the operation
- To establish appropriate mechanisms for coordination and consultations with its partners
- To facilitate technical and policy issues with its partners
- To have the general overview of the operation and ensure that gaps are filled in an appropriate manner
- To act as a spokesman on behalf of its partners towards authorities, donors, etc
**ANNEX IX**

**GRAPH ON SPEED OF DEPLOYMENT OF EMERGENCY TEAMS**

F12 - Priority 1 -- How quickly can your emergency response team(s) be deployed?

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Time</th>
<th>Count</th>
<th>Percentage</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>24 hrs</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>50%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>48 hrs</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>17.9%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>72 hrs</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>32.1%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
F13 - Priority 1 -- For how long will your emergency team(s) be self-contained in case of deployment?

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Duration</th>
<th>Count</th>
<th>Percentage</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1 week</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>13.6%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2 weeks</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>13.6%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4 weeks</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>36.4%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6 weeks</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>36.4%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
ANNEX X

GRAPH ON PREPARATION FOR EMERGENCY RESPONSE

B.2 Preparation for and Emergency Response. What fields are covered under this department?

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>ID</th>
<th>ANSWER</th>
<th>#ANSWER</th>
<th>#TOTAL</th>
<th>PERCENTAGE (#ANSWER / #TOTAL)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>Training</td>
<td>38</td>
<td>40</td>
<td>95%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2</td>
<td>Shelter</td>
<td>23</td>
<td>40</td>
<td>57.5%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3</td>
<td>Camp Management</td>
<td>21</td>
<td>40</td>
<td>52.5%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4</td>
<td>Protection</td>
<td>27</td>
<td>40</td>
<td>67.5%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5</td>
<td>Procurement</td>
<td>34</td>
<td>40</td>
<td>85%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6</td>
<td>Distribution</td>
<td>30</td>
<td>40</td>
<td>75%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7</td>
<td>Disaster</td>
<td>34</td>
<td>40</td>
<td>85%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8</td>
<td>Warehousing</td>
<td>25</td>
<td>40</td>
<td>62.5%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9</td>
<td>Food Aid</td>
<td>25</td>
<td>40</td>
<td>62.5%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10</td>
<td>Feeding</td>
<td>23</td>
<td>40</td>
<td>57.5%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>11</td>
<td>Water and Sanitation</td>
<td>27</td>
<td>40</td>
<td>67.5%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>12</td>
<td>Search and Rescue in emergencies</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>40</td>
<td>22.5%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>13</td>
<td>Transport and Logistics</td>
<td>30</td>
<td>40</td>
<td>75%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>14</td>
<td>Public Health</td>
<td>31</td>
<td>40</td>
<td>77.5%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>15</td>
<td>Community Disaster Education</td>
<td>18</td>
<td>40</td>
<td>45%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>16</td>
<td>Primary Health Care (clinics)</td>
<td>21</td>
<td>40</td>
<td>52.5%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>17</td>
<td>Secondary Health Care (field hosp, surgery)</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>40</td>
<td>32.5%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>18</td>
<td>Psychological Support Services</td>
<td>21</td>
<td>40</td>
<td>52.5%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>19</td>
<td>Tracing and Restoring Family Links</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>40</td>
<td>37.5%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>20</td>
<td>Radio/Telecommunication</td>
<td>27</td>
<td>40</td>
<td>67.5%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>21</td>
<td>Community Disaster Preparedness/Risk Reduction</td>
<td>26</td>
<td>40</td>
<td>65%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>22</td>
<td>Detention</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>40</td>
<td>17.5%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>23</td>
<td>Damage/Needs Assessment</td>
<td>32</td>
<td>40</td>
<td>80%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>24</td>
<td>Information and Reporting</td>
<td>36</td>
<td>40</td>
<td>90%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>25</td>
<td>Disaster Role and Policy</td>
<td>29</td>
<td>40</td>
<td>72.5%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>26</td>
<td>Country Profile/Disaster Risk/Hazard Analysis</td>
<td>35</td>
<td>40</td>
<td>87.5%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>27</td>
<td>Advocacy</td>
<td>36</td>
<td>40</td>
<td>90%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>28</td>
<td>Mine Clearance</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>40</td>
<td>10%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>29</td>
<td>Mine Awareness</td>
<td>17</td>
<td>40</td>
<td>42.5%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>30</td>
<td>Small Arms Reduction</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>40</td>
<td>27.5%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>31</td>
<td>Construction/Rehabilitation</td>
<td>27</td>
<td>40</td>
<td>67.5%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>32</td>
<td>Other(s): answer next question</td>
<td>21</td>
<td>40</td>
<td>52.5%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
ANNEX XI

GRAPH ON PARTICIPATION IN EMERGENCY RESPONSE NETWORKS

C.1 Do you participate in an emergency response network or consortium? If yes, please describe the group and briefly indicate areas of your participation.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>ANSWER</th>
<th>#ANSWER</th>
<th>#TOTAL</th>
<th>PERCENTAGE (#ANSWER / #TOTAL)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Training</td>
<td>23</td>
<td>31</td>
<td>74.2%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Shelter</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>31</td>
<td>32.3%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Camp Management</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>31</td>
<td>29%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Protection</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>31</td>
<td>45.2%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Procurement</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>31</td>
<td>48.4%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Distribution</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>31</td>
<td>45.2%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Disaster</td>
<td>17</td>
<td>31</td>
<td>54.8%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Warehousing</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>31</td>
<td>38.7%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Food Aid</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>31</td>
<td>29%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Feeding</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>31</td>
<td>25.8%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Water and Sanitation</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>31</td>
<td>41.9%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Search and Rescue in emergencies</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>31</td>
<td>19.4%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Transport and Logistics</td>
<td>19</td>
<td>31</td>
<td>61.3%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Public Health</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>31</td>
<td>48.4%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Community Disaster Education</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>31</td>
<td>35.5%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Primary Health Care (clinics)</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>31</td>
<td>51.6%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Secondary Health Care (field hosp, surgery)</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>31</td>
<td>32.3%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Psychological Support Services</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>31</td>
<td>48.4%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tracing and Restoring Family Links</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>31</td>
<td>29%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Radio/Telecommunication</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>31</td>
<td>48.4%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Community Disaster Preparedness/Risk Reduction</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>31</td>
<td>41.9%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Detention</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>31</td>
<td>16.1%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Damage/Needs Assessment</td>
<td>18</td>
<td>31</td>
<td>58.1%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Information and Reporting</td>
<td>21</td>
<td>31</td>
<td>67.7%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Disaster Role and Policy</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>31</td>
<td>45.2%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Country Profile/Disaster Risk/Hazard Analysis</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>31</td>
<td>48.4%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Advocacy</td>
<td>18</td>
<td>31</td>
<td>58.1%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mine Clearance</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>31</td>
<td>9.7%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mine Awareness</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>31</td>
<td>25.8%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Small Arms Reduction</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>31</td>
<td>19.4%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Construction/Rehabilitation</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>31</td>
<td>45.2%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other(s): answer next question</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>31</td>
<td>32.3%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
ANNEX XII

GRAPH ON DONORS’ SUGGESTED ELEMENTS TO IMPROVE THE PERFORMANCE OF THE GLOBAL HUMANITARIAN SYSTEM

D 9 -- Which of the following elements (please choose three at the most) would, in your view, improve the performance of the global humanitarian system?

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>ID</th>
<th>ANSWER</th>
<th>#ANSWER</th>
<th>#TOTAL</th>
<th>PERCENTAGE (#ANSWER / #TOTAL)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>Reduced number of actors</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>30.8%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2</td>
<td>Higher degree of professionalism</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>23.1%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3</td>
<td>More local and regional staff</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>7.7%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4</td>
<td>Sound needs assessments</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>61.5%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5</td>
<td>Higher level of preparedness</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>7.7%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6</td>
<td>Clear legal base/mandate</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>7.7%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7</td>
<td>Greater accountability</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>23.1%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8</td>
<td>Effective Management</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>38.5%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9</td>
<td>Strong coordination</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>69.2%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10</td>
<td>Faster reaction</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>7.7%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>11</td>
<td>Quality of work</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>15.4%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
ANNEX XIII

TABLE ON DONORS’ PARTICIPATION IN CAP AND GLOBAL HUMANITARIAN AID
Source: OCHA Financial Tracking Service (FTS)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>TOTAL HUMANITARIAN AID</th>
<th>2002</th>
<th>Donor's total as % of global total</th>
<th>2003</th>
<th>Donor's total as % of global total</th>
<th>2004</th>
<th>Donor's total as % of global total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Belgium</td>
<td>$34,857,802</td>
<td>1%</td>
<td>$23,136,009</td>
<td>0%</td>
<td>$49,899,288</td>
<td>1%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Canada</td>
<td>$100,795,609</td>
<td>2%</td>
<td>$153,541,464</td>
<td>2%</td>
<td>$142,817,057</td>
<td>3%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Denmark</td>
<td>$73,147,067</td>
<td>1%</td>
<td>$110,783,258</td>
<td>1%</td>
<td>$154,028,280</td>
<td>3%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>European Commission</td>
<td>$528,752,984</td>
<td>11%</td>
<td>$769,601,511</td>
<td>10%</td>
<td>$813,338,457</td>
<td>18%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Finland</td>
<td>$46,326,328</td>
<td>1%</td>
<td>$33,017,550</td>
<td>0%</td>
<td>$61,103,854</td>
<td>1%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>France</td>
<td>$25,625,751</td>
<td>1%</td>
<td>$45,086,509</td>
<td>1%</td>
<td>$89,828,604</td>
<td>2%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Germany</td>
<td>$162,101,020</td>
<td>3%</td>
<td>$110,449,458</td>
<td>1%</td>
<td>$189,136,546</td>
<td>4%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ireland</td>
<td>$40,874,975</td>
<td>1%</td>
<td>$26,966,998</td>
<td>0%</td>
<td>$55,025,457</td>
<td>1%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Italy</td>
<td>$118,990,711</td>
<td>2%</td>
<td>$93,125,916</td>
<td>1%</td>
<td>$209,950,350</td>
<td>5%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Netherlands</td>
<td>$197,981,667</td>
<td>4%</td>
<td>$115,646,370</td>
<td>2%</td>
<td>$48,801,581</td>
<td>1%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Switzerland</td>
<td>$143,182,174</td>
<td>3%</td>
<td>$90,905,302</td>
<td>1%</td>
<td>$187,378,999</td>
<td>4%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>United Kingdom</td>
<td>$285,755,023</td>
<td>6%</td>
<td>$394,473,768</td>
<td>5%</td>
<td>$302,007,966</td>
<td>7%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>United States</td>
<td>$1,889,580,423</td>
<td>39%</td>
<td>$3,277,934,661</td>
<td>44%</td>
<td>$992,341,946</td>
<td>22%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Grand Total</td>
<td>$3,762,064,267</td>
<td>77%</td>
<td>$5,378,754,263</td>
<td>72%</td>
<td>$3,447,049,595</td>
<td>78%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

TOTAL HUM. AID PER YEAR (all donors): 4,882,231,065 7,454,579,236 4,418,969,118

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>CAP CONTRIBUTIONS</th>
<th>2002</th>
<th>Donor's total as % of global total</th>
<th>2003</th>
<th>Donor's total as % of global total</th>
<th>2004</th>
<th>Donor's total as % of global total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Belgium</td>
<td>$19,865,231</td>
<td>1%</td>
<td>$12,771,129</td>
<td>0%</td>
<td>$29,574,457</td>
<td>1%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Canada</td>
<td>$47,347,101</td>
<td>2%</td>
<td>$55,938,920</td>
<td>1%</td>
<td>$69,994,293</td>
<td>3%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Denmark</td>
<td>$28,982,108</td>
<td>1%</td>
<td>$18,707,200</td>
<td>0%</td>
<td>$30,487,999</td>
<td>1%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>European Commission</td>
<td>$297,376,863</td>
<td>11%</td>
<td>$249,195,855</td>
<td>6%</td>
<td>$256,350,362</td>
<td>12%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Finland</td>
<td>$18,372,742</td>
<td>1%</td>
<td>$11,507,431</td>
<td>0%</td>
<td>$15,023,677</td>
<td>1%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>France</td>
<td>$14,997,578</td>
<td>1%</td>
<td>$14,187,772</td>
<td>0%</td>
<td>$27,092,271</td>
<td>1%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Germany</td>
<td>$81,639,695</td>
<td>3%</td>
<td>$39,301,446</td>
<td>1%</td>
<td>$55,688,898</td>
<td>3%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ireland</td>
<td>$11,055,882</td>
<td>0%</td>
<td>$13,076,965</td>
<td>0%</td>
<td>$21,858,845</td>
<td>1%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Italy</td>
<td>$65,833,121</td>
<td>2%</td>
<td>$47,383,736</td>
<td>1%</td>
<td>$38,922,595</td>
<td>2%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Netherlands</td>
<td>$119,044,169</td>
<td>4%</td>
<td>$72,383,295</td>
<td>2%</td>
<td>$108,154,985</td>
<td>5%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sweden</td>
<td>$67,917,881</td>
<td>2%</td>
<td>$61,601,467</td>
<td>2%</td>
<td>$82,621,383</td>
<td>4%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Switzerland</td>
<td>$23,270,290</td>
<td>1%</td>
<td>$21,088,548</td>
<td>1%</td>
<td>$37,072,347</td>
<td>2%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>United Kingdom</td>
<td>$142,045,062</td>
<td>6%</td>
<td>$195,612,964</td>
<td>5%</td>
<td>$213,286,408</td>
<td>10%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>United States</td>
<td>$1,046,113,723</td>
<td>36%</td>
<td>$1,247,729,314</td>
<td>36%</td>
<td>$721,638,721</td>
<td>33%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Grand Total</td>
<td>$1,983,861,446</td>
<td>72%</td>
<td>$2,060,486,062</td>
<td>56%</td>
<td>$1,707,766,378</td>
<td>77%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

TOTAL CAP CONTRIBUTIONS PER YEAR (all donors): 2,765,946,693 4,096,428,854 2,209,721,689
ANNEX XIV

CHART ON EXISTENCE OF EMERGENCY FUNDS IN ORGANIZATIONS

G4 - Priority 1 -- Does your agency have a specific emergency fund in place?

<p>| | | |</p>
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>No</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>28.1%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>23</td>
<td>71.9%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
ANNEX XV

CHART ON THE SPEED OF RELEASE OF FUNDS FROM DONORS

B 2 -- How quickly are you able to release funds for new humanitarian emergencies?

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>ID</th>
<th>ANSWER</th>
<th>#ANSWER</th>
<th>#TOTAL</th>
<th>PERCENTAGE (#ANSWER / #TOTAL)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>1hr</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>40%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2</td>
<td>6hr</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>40%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3</td>
<td>12hr</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>20%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4</td>
<td>36hr</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>30%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5</td>
<td>Other</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>50%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>