The increasingly complex and competitive aid environment makes it essential for the United Nations humanitarian system to position itself in a way that will use its comparative advantages to the maximum benefit of disaster and emergency threatened people. Towards this end, the Inter-Agency Standing Committee has asked for a plan to move forward on proposals outlined in the independent study on *Changes in Humanitarian Financing and Implications for the United Nations System.*

The proposals that follow are based upon conclusions and recommendations arising out of three earlier studies on the broad implications of humanitarian financing trends as well as the research undertaken for this fourth study. Before outlining the suggested elements of the proposed plan in Section III, Sections I and II will review humanitarian financing trends, their implications and consequences, and proposals for strategically repositioning the UN system.

Section I: Trends and their implications

[1] The competitive aid environment, market forces and dysfunctions. In GA 46/182, the UN system intended to address weaknesses in the humanitarian aid sector by providing coordination and leadership and related activities that would facilitate the delivery of relief aid in crises:

There is no distinct or consistent pattern to the purported changes in humanitarian financing. Nevertheless, the United Nations must contend with an increasingly competitive and complex aid environment, marked by a growing number of humanitarian actors and the ever-expanding boundaries of humanitarianism. The former includes a growth in military and private sector involvement, and the latter moving beyond life-saving concerns to a growing range of issues, from recovery of livelihoods to gender and food security. There are no indications that the number of humanitarian actors will stabilise or decrease, or that the concept of humanitarianism will reflect agreed limits;

[b] Dysfunctional market. Competition is inherent in the realm of humanitarianism: between donors and humanitarian organisations, and even between beneficiaries. With the addition of more actors in the humanitarian field, competition will most likely intensify, fuelled for many by humanitarian funds. While trends suggest that the humanitarian financing pool will probably increase, the increase will not be distributed equitably, but rather will reflect the distorting effects of highly visible crises. Funding criteria will be based less and less upon mandated responsibilities, and more and more upon presence, past performance and a “service
orientation” that reflects a “can-do-that-too” attitude. That said, to date there is no substantive agreement on a joint donor strategy or common approach to humanitarian funding, and one can only conclude that funding is all too often based upon criteria that have little to do with the needs of the purported client, eg, beneficiaries;

[c] stagnant market. There are few indications that, overall, humanitarian funding in percentage terms will increase substantially for the UN -- whatever improvements the system might make to its humanitarian services. This conclusion would seem to fly in the face of various “good donorship” initiatives, including efforts to make the UN’s funding relatively more stable and predictable, and the instances of successful programme and project marketing at the field level. However, present patterns – from statistical perspectives and from interview research – lead to the conclusion that a UN system will not increase its market share; but it is hoped that a more effective public goods role will be adequate compensation;

[d] public goods versus market forces. Donors appear increasingly set on maintaining control over their funds even when contributed through the UN system. Earmarking in one form or another is the net result, and its consequences are that it reduces agencies’ operational flexibility, puts the UN system all too often in the position of a sub-contractor, tempts agencies’ to expand their mandates to garner additional resources and forces agencies to respond to the agenda of donors rather than an agenda shaped by broader humanitarian needs. Earmarking in its most basic sense creates gaps and disparities. These factors underscore the UN’s inability to ensure more equitable allocation of resources for “forgotten emergencies”, and it tends to undermine the UN system’s public goods role.

[2] The UN system’s value-added and perceived performance. The UN’s value-added revolves around its public goods role and not its effectiveness within this relatively dysfunctional market. Nevertheless, it is apparent that the UN system continues to compete in the competitive aid environment, to a point where some donors do not distinguish between the UN and other humanitarian organisations. Donors’ perceptions of the UN system’s value-added centres principally around its universality and a priori the legitimacy and integrity of its humanitarian assessments and appeals. Its coordination role and its ability to negotiate humanitarian access, to ensure protection and to promote humanitarian principles and standards are all regarded as UN value-added. Yet, this perceived value-added is undermined by the consequences of the UN system’s efforts to maintain a robust service delivery role. It is interesting in this regard that there is no overarching set of agreed objectives or an appropriate mechanism to hold the UN system accountable for its humanitarian actions:

[a] Preserving the core value-added. Humanitarian standards, norms and principles will increasingly be marginalized in the complex and competitive aid environment. This is progressively evident as one looks at the lapses in some of the most basic forms of protection, the emergence of conditionality, the use of humanitarian assistance for “hearts and minds” objectives and the interplay of foreign policy objectives, with the provision of humanitarian assistance. It is the conclusion of this study that in this regard the UN humanitarian system is seen as compromised in two ways: [a] it is seen to have failed to promote, advocate and monitor humanitarian principles, standards and norms in a consistent and assertive way; and [b] it has been directly involved in too many instances where principles in particular have been sacrificed for reasons of operational convenience;

[b] Leadership and management. As the UN humanitarian system is seen increasingly as just another actor amongst a growing number of actors in the humanitarian aid environment, such perceptions undercut its unique legitimacy and universality. In turn, this
affects its important leadership role in the humanitarian community. While the UN system has been innovative in expanding its resource base through private sector partners and new bilateral donors, its innovativeness has not extended to humanitarian leadership. It continues to take a fragmented and sporadic approach to advocacy, does not promote a strategic vision and offers little in the way of global approaches to vulnerability reduction. One cannot help but draw the conclusion that the UN’s approach to humanitarian leadership often plays second best to managing its own UN humanitarian system;

[c] Coordination. For many in the international community, coordination is a headquarters as well as field issue. At both levels, collegiality and inter-personal skills cannot compensate for mandated authority. If those who seek “coordination with teeth” -- as more than a few have remarked during the course of this study, then teeth will have to be given, and their marks will have to be reflected in such basic coordination instruments as joint assessments, the Consolidated Inter-Agency Appeal Process, monitoring, accountability and reporting. The wider humanitarian community, particularly traditional donors, want assessments based upon sectoral and inter-sectoral needs, leading to results-based programmes, CAPs that are truly prioritised and accountability that reflects results and impact. These are more than reasonable requests, but all too often are scuppered due to the lack of a coordination structure that has expertise and authority;

[d] The UN’s service delivery. The UN’s service delivery role does not seem to be a particularly high valued product by those involved in humanitarian affairs outside the UN system. Service delivery – operating programmes and projects – is seen as the source of too many UN “comprises.” The duality of a role that is designed to provide objective assessments and appeals while at the same time closely tied to UN agencies’ programmes and projects threatens the UN system’s credibility. It is a conclusion of this study that in positioning itself in an ever more complex and competitive aid environment, the UN system must above all else protect its integrity and the perception of its objectivity.

[3] The growing coherence gap and the UN system’s role. There is little doubt in the minds of Study Four team members that there is a growing gap between the needs of disaster and emergency affected peoples and the effectiveness of the humanitarian community. Study Four has tried to explain this gap in terms of the increasingly amorphous nature of humanitarianism and the bevy of different types of actors that are crowding what has been called the competitive aid environment. It has concluded that there are too many contending pressures within the decision-making bodies of most major bilateral donors to ensure a humanitarian funding system that would lend predictability and coherence to humanitarian responses. Yet, far and away the most troubling conclusion of this study is the lack of any real sense of humanitarian strategic objectives. The humanitarian community appears to lack any overarching vision or common accord on the objectives of humanitarian action;

[a] time for strategic vision. The humanitarian community, along with the United Nations, has made considerable progress on various isolated fronts over the past two decades. Agreement about the interface between humanitarian actors and the military is ostensibly one; greater gender sensitivity another; the emerging commitment to protect civilians in times of armed conflict yet another. There are a host of very positive initiatives, but there is no agreement on the construct in which they fit, no sense about the overall “mission statement” of the humanitarian enterprise;

[b] utilising the full range of UN expertise and. For the UN system, humanitarian principles complicate but do not exclude the use of political and security instruments to ensure
the well being of potential and actual crisis affected peoples. A UN system value-added – highly sensitive and too rarely used – is the political, economic, security and humanitarian instruments that it has available to prevent or at least mitigate humanitarian crises. This study suggests that greater attention has to be given to practical ways to use this unique UN “toolkit” more effectively, resulting in preventative alerts and action;

[c] disjointed incrementalism. Throughout this study, reference has been made to the UN humanitarian system, or, UN system. To the extent that such a system exists [and that, too, is open to debate], it is worth reflecting on the fact that little analysis has been made on ways to rationalise that “system” to make it more effective – not in terms of individual institutions, but in terms of fulfilling the needs of disaster and emergency affected peoples. In any corporate endeavour, leadership ascertains the extent to which component parts need to be modified, eliminated, enhanced or integrated. And while on occasions “reform proposals” have over the past fifteen questioned the efficacy of the UN’s baronial structure, there has been no holistic, system-wide analysis of the UN’s humanitarian response capacity. One constraint on such an analysis is the lack of strategic vision and objectives.

Section II: Recommendations

[1] Enhanced accountability. The UN system has done little to ensure accountability to its ultimate client, namely, those affected by disasters and emergencies. To move towards a more accountable system, the UN needs to reposition itself strategically and tactically at headquarters as well as at field levels. Strategic repositioning will entail greater attention to the wider-humanitarian community, a more focused approach to humanitarian needs, more attention to the normative role of the UN system and a move away from a focus on symptoms of vulnerability and towards greater attention to vulnerability causation. More specifically:

[a] Greater external engagement with the wider humanitarian community. While the UN interacts with the wider humanitarian community on a variety of levels – through its implementing partners, the Inter-Agency Standing Committee, etc. – it is perceived as an institution that remains inward looking and self-absorbed. The UN system has to become more externally focused, and towards that end, the IASC should consider the creation of a humanitarian governance board “of the UN but not in the UN.” This board, consisting of eminent persons would serve as a “conscience” of the international community. It would focus upon issues of global advocacy, broad strategies and independent evaluation and analyses of humanitarian activities, including those of the UN system. It would relate to ECOSOC’s “humanitarian segment”, and it would also be responsible for establishing broad strategic objectives for the IASC.

[b] Establishing the parameters of humanitarianism. Humanitarianism is increasingly concerned with the causes of disasters and emergencies as much as it is with their symptoms. This trend brings in the full panoply of development, political and socio-economic disciplines, and in so doing confuses objectives, results in profusion of unprioritised “humanitarian” programmes and loses the focus on the immediate need to save and protect life. Efforts must be made to establish a global framework for humanitarian response, reflecting how vulnerability reduction can be achieved in parallel with but separate from the life-saving objectives of relief assistance;
The UN system's normative role. The humanitarian realm is not only expanding, but also involving more and more actors, from increasingly diverse backgrounds and with increasingly diverse humanitarian motives. The UN system has the universal prestige and engagement that can play a major role in fostering and protecting the principles, standards and norms that will be so needed in the ever more uncertain humanitarian environment. This role is of far greater importance to the wider humanitarian community than its operational involvement, and is key to ensuring the humanitarian community’s accountability to beneficiaries.

Visionary leadership. There are several essential ways to enhance leadership in the UN’s humanitarian system. These involve a spectrum of activities, from strategic advocacy and broad-based humanitarian strategies, to accountability to donors based upon system-wide criteria and accountability to beneficiaries. Leadership in this regard would have to be a responsibility for the proposed humanitarian governance board as well as for the Inter-Agency-Standing Committee under the guidance of the Emergency Relief Coordinator: the former concerned with overarching humanitarian strategies, the latter for management and implementation of the proposed board’s broad humanitarian strategies. Leadership also will require very fundamental choices about the direction in which the UN system should utilise its comparative advantages for the humanitarian community at large. While the study team suggests that there are three models that the UN system’s leadership needs to consider, it at the same time recommends a merging of what earlier were called the standard-bearer and critical intervention models:

[a] The standard-bearer model. The UN needs to become the standard-bearer of principles, standards and norms, and this should be its focus and direction in the future. While a bevy of actors undertakes service delivery activities, the future role of the UN system will be not only to be the standard-bearer of principles, but also the managerial focal point for objective assessments, sectoral and inter-sectoral results-based appeals, coordination and monitoring and evaluation. This role should be a key UN system function, for which as noted below will require considerable donor support and UN system field presence;

[b] The critical intervention model. On very rare occasions, highly political situations might arise in which only the UN system can effectively intervene, including service delivery. In such situations, special stand-by arrangements will be required, including a special humanitarian intervention force, stored supplies of specific types of equipment for such interventions and special Security Council procedures and support mechanisms.

Effective management. Over the past decade, the IASC has evolved as an important and relatively robust policy forum for the UN system and other components of the wider humanitarian community. The IASC now needs to be more actively engaged in the management of the UN system’s overall response and coordination functions. It would be guided at the broad strategic level by the proposed humanitarian governance board. As a management board, the IASC would be responsible for ensuring results-based programmes and joint sectoral needs assessments, greater systemic coherence and higher standards of accountability. For effective management, it will be important to ensure a coherent relationship between the IASC structure at headquarters and the proposed IASC field structure. In that context, four inter-related recommendations necessarily follow:

[a] Restructured field offices and responsibilities. The UN Resident and Humanitarian Coordinator system would be supported by local IASC country teams. Wherever possible representatives of IASC member organisations should be part of the RC/HC’s office. The country team would serve as a management board at the field level. The RC/HC, with his or
her country team, would be responsible for assessments, prioritised appeals that were sectorally and results-based and would be actively engaged in monitoring and evaluation;

[b] A strategic planning process. Essential to human vulnerability reduction and development goals is the need to establish strategic plans that reflect a practical vision of long-term national objectives. From the UN system’s point of view, this sort of strategic planning process will rest with the UN Resident and Humanitarian Coordinator and the local IASC. It will be a process that is designed to gather information and data on an on-going basis and update strategic plans accordingly. This exercise should serve, inter alia, as a sound basis for “early warning systems and vulnerability reduction efforts as well as for readily available strategic perspectives for CAPs. These initiatives would be enhanced by the use of more precise performance indicators, as suggested by Darcy;³

c] Monitoring and evaluation as a core function. Active and comprehensive monitoring and evaluation are to become core functions of the UN field system in dealing with humanitarian crises. This means that the UN Coordinator through the sectoral expertise of the IASC country team will identify and report on areas where assistance needs are not being met or not being met effectively, based upon the priorities established. The UN Coordinator’s reports will also measure the impact of emergencies and disasters as well as the relief process against broad country strategies – the basis of which is an on-going strategic planning process [SPP];

[d] The common appeals process. The Consolidated Inter-Agency Appeal requires two fundamental adjustments. The first is that an active effort must be made to bring more humanitarian actors into the appeals formulation process; the second is that it must focus upon a narrower interpretation of “humanitarian” in order to emphasise immediate life-saving and protection needs. While other recommendations to improve the appeals process have been noted earlier, a third recommendation in this regard is that the CAP be renamed the Common Appeals Process.

4] The locus of global humanitarianism. Linked to more effective management is the issue of where such management function should be located institutionally. Given the constraints that departments within the UN secretariat must face and the need for a more externally-oriented focus for the UN humanitarian system, consideration could be given to management structures that -- similar to the proposed humanitarian governance board -- are “of the UN but not in the UN.” This recommendation would be only an alternative if the present structure could not be improved in ways to allow for quicker and more comprehensive early warning/vulnerability analysis, for speedier response capacity and for more effective platforms for advocacy. The UN’s 1984 Office for Emergency Operations in Africa suggest a possible model. In any event, there is need for a UN humanitarian focal point at the coordination level that has greater flexibility, less institutional constraints and is perceived as more open to a wider humanitarian community.

5] An alternative UN system operational focus. One of the comparative advantages of the UN system is its global presence and, as a system, its broad range of expertise and its commitment to member-states over time. One of the increasingly critical roles of the UN system now and in the future and one which will indeed require commitment over time will be to develop and operate programmes that form part of human vulnerability reduction strategies. Human vulnerability reduction strategies integrate crisis prevention and preparedness with development objectives that are focused upon ways to mitigate the causes of human vulnerability. The UN system must use its comparative advantages to embark coherently and vigorously on a vulnerability reduction strategy.
Links with Good Donorship and related initiatives. As noted at the outset of this chapter, these recommendations can only be achieved and have their desired outcomes if they are part of a broader set of initiatives. In this context, the UN system should seek to relate its own efforts with those of others whose intentions are to enhance the effectiveness of humanitarian responses to emergency and disaster-affected peoples. In practice this would mean that through the proposed donor Implementation Group as well as through appropriate ECOSOC fora, the UN system should press for funding arrangements consistent with the repositioning strategies and relevant models noted earlier.

Section III: A way forward

The humanitarian community -- its objectives, its roles and responsibilities -- is in a transitional phase. Yet, it has a choice – to be dragged along by the tide of events, or to assert and pursue its own vision of the future. In so doing, it will have to address the inter-related issues of accountability, coherence and self-regulation. The Inter-Agency Standing Committee is well placed to guide that process. Based upon the conclusions and recommendations outlined in Sections I and II, an eleven point plan is proposed to guide the way forward:

[i] Implementation plan monitoring group. The conclusions and recommendations noted in Sections I and II respectively could have very positive, important and community-wide ramifications. The IASC will need to decide on those recommendations that it feels should be pursued, either to test their feasibility and overall implications, or, to implement within the immediate future. In order to ensure that its decisions are pursued coherently and that they effectively relate to other IASC activities and initiatives, the IASC should establish an ad hoc Implementation Plan Monitoring Group. This group would regularly report to the IASC until all those actions that fall within its remit are completed.

[ii] Reform coalition. A variety of influential organisations continue to undertake studies and propose recommendations intended to strengthen the humanitarian community in general, and more often than not the UN’s humanitarian system. Some of these initiatives inevitably overlap or at least relate to conclusions and recommendations found in this paper. The IASC might wish to consider ways that its own considerable influence can generate coherence and a sense of priority in the actions and activities of these organisations. One step in this direction would be to invite a representative number of such organisations [approximately twelve] to hold preliminary discussions with IASC representatives to compare agendas and agree on priorities. The net result should be to add coherence to a relatively diffuse and disjointed approach to reform, and more importantly to use the combined weight of important actors to advocate for change.

[iii] Donor Implementation Group and the IASC. There is a growing awareness that the humanitarian community requires not only more effective support, but also more fundamental change. One could argue that this two-pronged approach underscores recent initiatives that fall under the rubric of “Good Donorship”, and have more recently resulted in the creation of a donor-led Implementation Group. The IASC should be seen to be relating to this growing donor interest and concern in a positive and productive way. And while there are sound reasons for keeping the work of the two entities separate, there are equally cogent reasons why both could not establish a common agenda on areas of immediate and mutual concern, e.g., parameters of humanitarianism. The common agenda from the IASC’s side could be developed through the proposed Implementation Plan Monitoring Group, which in turn would be responsible for reporting regularly to the IASC on steps towards achieving the common agenda.
[iv] **System accountability.** There are many areas where greater accountability is necessary, starting with disaster and emergency affected peoples. However, accountability also needs to be strengthened between agencies and their donors, between UN agencies and their partners and amongst UN agencies, themselves. The IASC will need to introduce more results-based objectives into planning and programme implementation arrangements, agree on more measurable indicators of performance and on more systematic means of performance assessments. At the same time, the IASC should review measures that would increase the transparency of agencies’ individual and system-wide performance reviews for specific disaster and emergency response operations.

[v] **Advocacy instruments review.** There are few who deny the ever-growing importance of effective humanitarian advocacy. Under the leadership of its chairperson, the IASC should review the instruments it has at its disposal to promote advocacy in ways that are coherent, substantive and impact decisions, which in turn impact humanitarian issues. This review should take into account the need for a *Human Vulnerability Index* that goes beyond immediate analysis of natural disaster agents and consequences, and covers the gamut of human vulnerability indicators now and over time. The IASC should also review the ways that it identifies areas requiring greater advocacy and the approaches that it uses to ensure that advocacy initiatives are not only embraced but also followed-up.

[vi] **Promoting the United Nations system’s normative role.** This paper’s conclusions and subsequent recommendations reflect the value of the UN system’s normative role. And while the recommendations reflect three ways that such a role could be presented, fostered and promoted, there is no doubt that in one way or another greater coherence and projection of the UN’s normative role are required. In so saying, there are a variety of areas and mechanisms that should be identified to ensure that humanitarian principles, standards and norms are understood and upheld. Three might be considered immediately: [a] the corporate sector through global compact mechanisms; [b] the military through deep sensitisation bilaterally and through DPKO; and [c] training of UN system staff at headquarters and in the field.

[vii] **Enhanced IASC role in the field.** There have been a few instances, e.g., Kosovo in 1999, when an IASC structure was established in the field. This replication of a headquarters model in the field has clear and distinct advantages. For example, there would be clearer flows of information, instructions, advice and proposals if the headquarters’ “decision-making” entity had field-based counterparts. It also would mean that broader humanitarian community support would underpin many field-based activities with more automaticity. Therefore, the IASC should consider ways to replicate the IASC model in operational areas, and in so doing, also agree on ways that such field-based IASC structures can enhance the Consolidated Inter-Agency Appeal process [or *Common Appeal Process*], monitoring and accountability as well as to strengthen overall coordination.

[viii] **Strengthening the field role of the RC/HC.** Most studies, evaluations, reports and reform proposals seeking to enhance the effectiveness of humanitarian response return to the issue of field coordination, under the overall authority of the UN’s Resident and Humanitarian Coordinator. Many donor governments are frustrated that, despite myriad calls for more effective field coordination, comparatively little has been done. The IASC needs to come to grips with three issues: [a] strengthening the office of the UN Resident and Humanitarian Coordinator, through the contribution of human and other resources from the field-based IASC; [b] strengthening the authority of the UN Resident and Humanitarian Coordinator to ensure system-wide accountability and operational coherence; and [c] strengthening the effectiveness of RC/HC selection processes and introduce appropriate training.
Self-regulation mechanisms, including CAP procedures. The litany of CAP weaknesses is well known, and serious reforms still need to be initiated. These would include agreement on a framework for CAP “strategies”, results-based objectives and programmes, clear guidelines for prioritisation and sectoral and inter-sectoral-based programmes and projects. It would unequivocally open up the process to all qualified organisations who abided by the CAP guidelines, objectives and procedures. The country-based IASC, through a strengthened RC/HC office, would determine what the contents of individual CAPs should be.

Planning as a core activity. While a great deal of time is spent by the UN system in planning, the “system” does not have a capacity to plan strategically. In part this is due to the limits imposed by member-states on the UN system; in part it reflects an institutional culture that resists advanced organisational and management techniques; and in part it is due to a perception that immediate crises leave little time for “long-range planning”. The IASC might wish to see how this major weakness might be overcome, both in the field and at headquarters. In the field, on-going strategic assessment processes might be explored, as noted in Section II/3/c, above. At headquarters level, the IASC might wish to determine how modern strategic planning techniques can be built into staff training and also become part of the IASC’s core responsibility, from a global, regional and country perspective.

Follow-up studies. The old adage that studies breed studies is true, here, too. There is, however, no ignoring the fact that the IASC may need to be better informed about the implications of issues raised in this paper in order to respond to the recommendations outlined in Section II and in other related studies:

- G-77 views of humanitarian action
- Field functions of the IASC
- The feasibility of devising and implementing results-based standards
- The utility, substance and structure of a *Humanitarian Vulnerability Index*
- Alternative funding approaches and systems for the United Nations
- Comparative analyses of UN agency service delivery capacities in humanitarian crises
- An analysis of private sector delivery in humanitarian operations
- An analysis of the military approaches to the protection of aid distribution, aid workers and goods as well as to delivery
- Enhancing the effectiveness of UN agency personnel and administration for humanitarian operations
- Expanding the global compact to humanitarian assistance

**Expected Decisions/Action Points by IASC-WG:**
- Agreement on the way forward with the Study Four “Changes in Humanitarian Financing and Implications for the United Nations System”.

Prepared by: Randolph Kent/OCHA

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1 This study has been referred to as “Study Four” since it follows three recent studies also concerned with the broad implications of humanitarian financing trends, ie, [i] an analysis of donor decision-making, by Tuft University’s Ian Smillie and Larry Minear; [ii] humanitarian aid flow
Study Four has been guided by two principal questions: [i] how is the competitive aid environment evolving and what are the forces shaping this environment? In that context, in what ways does this evolving aid environment impact upon donors, aid organisations, the larger humanitarian community and beneficiaries?; and [ii] given this evolving environment, how could the UN be best configured to provide maximum benefit to beneficiaries, in terms of its role, its efficiency in the use of resources and its effectiveness as a provider of assistance, while remaining an attractive option for donors? In seeking to answer these two questions, this study has pursued the following five working objectives: [a] to describe how the effects of the competitive aid environment’s impact on the UN humanitarian system, including future funding; [b] to assess the perceived “value-added” of the UN system in responding to humanitarian crises; [c] to make proposals for enhancing and streamlining the UN system’s range of services to assist the emergency and disaster afflicted, its so-called “humanitarian product”, and possible funding implications of such proposals; [d] to anticipate possible structural and procedural implications of changes in the UN’s humanitarian product; and [e] to reflect on humanitarian crises in the future in the context of the repositioning strategies proposed for the UN.

In addition to the conclusions from the three earlier studies, Study Four relies heavily as well upon an intensive interview programme that involved 114 representatives of donor governments, the Red Cross movement, non-governmental organisations and UN agencies, programmes and funds, as well as academics and analysts. That said, the most obvious weakness from the Study Team’s perspective is the lack of direct contributions from those who are intended to benefit from the UN’s humanitarian response, namely, people affected by disasters and emergencies. To some extent, the team hopes that contact with representatives of the G-77, discussions with NGOs that have close links to disaster and emergency affected peoples and the exchange of information and findings between this study and with the three parallel studies would to some extent mitigate this clear weakness.

Arising out of the conclusion of the Good Donorship meeting of 16-17 June, it was agreed that an Implementation Group consisting of donors would be created for a one year period and based in Geneva to improve constraints arising out of present approaches to humanitarian financing.