Evaluation of Multi-year Planning
February 2017
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## Acronyms

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Acronym</th>
<th>Full Form</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>3MDG</td>
<td>Three Millennium Development Goals Fund</td>
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<td>ACU</td>
<td>Somalia Aid Coordination Unit</td>
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<td>ADB</td>
<td>Asian Development Bank</td>
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<td>BRACED</td>
<td>Building Resilience and Adaptation to Climate Extremes and Disasters</td>
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<td>BRCiS</td>
<td>Building Resilient Communities in Somalia</td>
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<td>CAP</td>
<td>Consolidated Appeal Process</td>
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<td>CARICOM</td>
<td>Caribbean Community</td>
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<td>CCA</td>
<td>Common Country Assessment</td>
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<td>CERF</td>
<td>Central Emergency Response Fund</td>
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<td>DAC</td>
<td>Development Assistance Committee</td>
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<td>DFID</td>
<td>Department for International Development</td>
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<td>DRR</td>
<td>Disaster Risk Reduction</td>
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<td>DSRSG</td>
<td>Deputy Special Representative of the Secretary-General</td>
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<td>EC</td>
<td>European Commission</td>
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<td>ECHO</td>
<td>European Union Humanitarian Aid and Civil Protection Department</td>
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<td>ERC</td>
<td>Emergency Relief Coordinator</td>
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<td>EU</td>
<td>European Union</td>
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<td>FAO</td>
<td>Food and Agriculture Organisation</td>
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<td>FSNAU</td>
<td>Food Security and Nutrition Analysis Unit (Somalia)</td>
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<td>FTS</td>
<td>Financial Tracking System</td>
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<td>HC</td>
<td>Humanitarian Coordinator</td>
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<td>Humanitarian Country Team</td>
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<td>HDI</td>
<td>Human Development Index</td>
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<td>HNO</td>
<td>Humanitarian Needs Overview</td>
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<td>HPC</td>
<td>Humanitarian Programme Cycle</td>
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<td>HRP</td>
<td>Humanitarian Response Plan</td>
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<td>IASC</td>
<td>Inter-Agency Standing Committee</td>
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<td>IDP</td>
<td>Internally Displaced Person/People</td>
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<td>IFI</td>
<td>International Financial Institution</td>
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<td>INFORM</td>
<td>Index for Risk Management</td>
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<td>INGO</td>
<td>International Non-Governmental Organisation</td>
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<td>IOM</td>
<td>International Organisation for Migration</td>
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<td>ISF</td>
<td>The UN Integrated strategic framework</td>
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<td>JICA</td>
<td>Japan International Cooperation Agency</td>
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<td>JPF</td>
<td>Joint Peace Fund</td>
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<td>LIFT</td>
<td>Livelihood and Food Security Trust Fund</td>
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<td>MINUSTAH</td>
<td>United Nations Stabilisation Committee in Haiti</td>
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<td>MYP</td>
<td>Multi-year planning / multi-year plan</td>
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<td>NDP</td>
<td>National Development Plan</td>
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<td>NFI</td>
<td>Non-Food Item</td>
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<td>NGO</td>
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<td>National League for Democracy</td>
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<td>OCHA</td>
<td>Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs</td>
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<td>ODA</td>
<td>Official Development Assistance</td>
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<td>Acronym</td>
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<tr>
<td>OECD</td>
<td>Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development</td>
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<td>OPS</td>
<td>Online Project System</td>
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<td>PSG</td>
<td>Peace-building and State-building Goals</td>
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<td>RC</td>
<td>Resident Coordinator</td>
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<td>REGIS</td>
<td>Resilience and Economic Growth in Sahel</td>
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<td>SDG</td>
<td>UN Sustainable Development Goals</td>
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<td>SDRF</td>
<td>Somalia Development and Reconstruction Facility</td>
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<td>SIRNA</td>
<td>Somalia Immediate Rapid Needs Assessment</td>
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<td>SOMREP</td>
<td>Somalia Resilience Programme</td>
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<td>SPEGS</td>
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<td>SRP</td>
<td>Strategic Response Plan</td>
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<td>TAP</td>
<td>Transitional Appeal Plan</td>
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<td>ToR</td>
<td>Terms of Reference</td>
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<td>UK</td>
<td>United Kingdom</td>
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<td>UN</td>
<td>United Nations</td>
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<td>UN MPTF</td>
<td>United Nations administered Multi Partner Trust Fund</td>
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<td>UNDAF</td>
<td>United Nations Development Assistance Framework</td>
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<td>UNDG</td>
<td>United Nations Development Group</td>
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<td>UNDP</td>
<td>United Nations Development Programme</td>
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<td>UNHCR</td>
<td>United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees</td>
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<td>UNICEF</td>
<td>United Nations Children's Emergency Fund</td>
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<tr>
<td>UNOG</td>
<td>United Nations Office Geneva</td>
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<tr>
<td>USAID</td>
<td>United States Agency for International Development</td>
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<tr>
<td>WASH</td>
<td>Water, Sanitation and Hygiene</td>
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<td>WB MPTF</td>
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<td>WFP</td>
<td>World Food Programme</td>
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<td>WHS</td>
<td>World Humanitarian Summit</td>
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Executive Summary

Introduction

1. **In advance of the recent World Humanitarian Summit (WHS), the report of the Secretary-General: “One Humanity: Shared Responsibility” laid out a view of key challenges facing humanitarian assistance.** The report noted that the need for emergency aid continues to rise; the forecast for 2017 is that 93 million people in 33 affected countries will require humanitarian assistance. Funding levels fall increasingly short of requirements; in 2015, UN appeals were funded to approximately 56 per cent of total requirements. The report recommends a paradigm shift in order to begin to address the shortfall. The three key elements are as follows:

   - reinforce, do not replace, national and local systems;
   - anticipate, do not wait, for crises; and
   - transcend the humanitarian-development divide by working towards collective outcomes, based on comparative advantage and over multi-year time frames.

2. **The rationale for multi-year Planning (MYP) is clear.** The average duration of a humanitarian appeal is 7 years, and 90 percent of appeals last longer than three years. There is also a realisation that protracted crises cannot be addressed through humanitarian action alone, and that a fundamental shift is needed to break the cycle of humanitarian dependence and generate more sustainable outcomes. **Moving from an annual planning cycle to MYP intuitively presents a number of advantages, which include improvement in collective humanitarian response and stronger coherence between humanitarian and other response elements.**

3. **A number of inter-agency commitments have been developed post-Summit and MYP is a central component of the proposals therein,** with a proposal that the UN Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs) can act as a common framework for humanitarian and development actors to work towards the overall goal of meeting needs while contributing to a reduction in people’s risks and vulnerabilities and an increase in their resilience. Agencies are already meeting and working together on MYP-related issues. Thus the evaluation is timely and there is great scope to build on the post-WHS appetite for change.

4. The WHS, of course, did not start the process of the development of multi-year time frames. There has been much work on this issue over a number of years. Indeed, the Terms of Reference (ToR) for this evaluation state that, by 2015, there were fifteen multi-year humanitarian plans, including a transitional plan.

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5. **The evaluation is formative, with an emphasis on building understanding and learning in order to allow for correcting mistakes, adapting approaches and building on the successes of current experiences with MYP.** The findings are based on triangulated evidence collected through visits to three country case-studies (Haiti, Somalia, and a counter factual, Myanmar), visits to OCHA HQ (New York and Geneva), remote interviews for Sahel, oPt, South Sudan and Iraq and as well as post-WHS interviews to assess changes in the system. The focus of the evaluation is multi-year planning rather than multi-year financing or multi-year programming, although it is recognised that the three are mutually supportive and brought together explicitly in the HRP model.

**Key Findings**

6. **The evaluation concluded that there is no single, standard model for a multi-year humanitarian plan or planning process.** Multi-year humanitarian planning has meant and can mean different things in different places, from ‘full’ extensions of the HRP process to high-level strategic planning processes. It can include planning frameworks in contexts where stand-alone humanitarian planning is required for principled reasons, but can also mean joined-up planning frameworks involving both humanitarian and development systems, with varying degrees of national leadership. Multi-year plans can be regional, national or sub-national.

7. Humanitarian Response Plans are not necessarily meant to tackle longer-term, structural issues, but rather to create stronger synergies and opportunities for collaboration with development partners, so that they address these issues to eventually reduce underlying vulnerabilities. However, some of the MYPs considered attempted to include more than just humanitarian activities and had combined humanitarian and development plans in the same document, which was then used as a fund-raising as well as a planning tool. **Such a link between planning and fund-raising over multiple years in a single process invokes a fundamental problem - ‘the prioritisation dilemma’ - whereby the drive to prioritise scarce humanitarian funding means that short-term work can displace resilience programmes and other work to tackle longer-term, structural issues.** This undermines the combination of acute and chronic needs in one plan, and is a greater problem the longer the planning time-frame. Given these challenges, the evaluation found that **high-level, strategic planning frameworks - strategic planning over multiple years with no direct link to fundraising - were the most stable expressions of MYP.**

8. Donors and agencies have sought a way around the prioritization dilemma through the creation of **resilience platforms and country-level pooled funds.** These introduce new funding sources for longer-term work, and can be an important first step in MYP. However, they **can create parallel systems not effectively tied to existing coordination and planning mechanisms, and thus a barrier to coherent joined-up planning between humanitarian and development actors.**
9. The concept of resilience can challenge the construction and conceptualisation of relief and development as a bifurcated system and has specific implications for humanitarian planning. Whilst resilience seems a better fit for development actors, there is an acknowledgment that humanitarian actors should also seek to build resilience as much as possible, particularly where development actors may struggle to engage. However, the term ‘resilience’ was not consistently applied across the case-study countries, nor understood in the same way in each country. It is seen by some as an overarching term that subsumes relief and development interventions. For others, it is seen from a purely humanitarian perspective, as a contextually appropriate style of humanitarian intervention. The result of the difference in viewpoints is reflected in the fact that in some countries there are separate resilience platforms which sit outside the HRP, while in other countries, resilience activities can be found within the HRP.

10. Collective humanitarian strategies such as the HRP, for example, have tended to act more as aggregators of multiple actors' individual contextual analysis and response plans, as opposed to acting as the drivers of these individual strategies. They have a clear coordination function, but do not always have a significant impact on the way that agencies programme. In addition, International Non-Governmental Organisation (INGO) decisions can be disconnected from the HRP process - seen by some INGOs as predominantly a fund-raising tool for the UN. The evaluation found that, in order for national civil society to be afforded greater access to planning and resources, efforts to improve inclusiveness would need to be both explicit and proactive. Despite this, joint planning exercises are still seen as having inherent value in building consensus, getting everyone on the same page and building and/or enhancing Government ownership. Finally, it is important to consider that although cluster coordination remains at the centre of the organisational structure of humanitarian assistance, it was not designed with longer-term and resilience approaches in mind. The way in which clusters currently function can work against a more coherent approach that links shorter- and longer-term activities.

11. Current HRP planning has a strong focus on prioritisation of the most immediate assessed needs. However, MYP requires an underpinning analysis which differentiates root causes from short-term needs and so a different needs assessment process is required, one that specifically considers needs in phases: short-, medium- and long-term or something more specific according to context. This requires change and will be a challenge while collective needs assessment processes are still relatively new.

12. The analysis of the multi-year plans concludes that, currently, MYP strategic objectives tend to be general statements of intent, framed in such a way that defies easy measurement and often with no measurement mechanism in place. The higher level the plan, the bigger the challenge in attributing change at the ground-level and putting realistic measurement systems in place. In going forward, the high level objectives should be complemented by more specific lower-level objectives that can be measured and monitored.
13. Although few of the case-study multi-year plans contained elements which constituted a risk-management framework, things do seem to be improving in terms of risk-modelling, particularly in respect of the resilience platforms. These generally had a crisis modifier or internal risk facility as a way to adapt the programme style to protect longer-term investment in the event of short-term shocks.

14. Good leadership is of vital importance in building strong planning processes, and staff continuity also key. Effective leadership and coordination from the RC/HC, relevant national counterparts, UN entities and other actors is needed to identify a set of collective outcomes for all based on their comparative advantage. A change in leadership can have significant negative effects, as was evidenced by the pattern of expansion and sudden contraction of some of the MYPs studied. A number of these MYPs were launched with an ‘ask’ to donors significantly higher than a more traditional appeal, as they included resilience and longer-term needs. However, in several cases a change in leadership resulted in the production of a pared-down, sharply prioritised emergency appeal at much lower cost. Such significant changes in plans affect the credibility of the approach with donors and partners.

15. The evaluation also highlighted the importance of ensuring adequate synchronization with the relevant planning processes, in particular development ones. In every case-study country, there was a plethora of joint and individual agency planning frames and only in a few cases a conscious alignment of planning frames. Development actors can struggle to align planning milestones with those of the humanitarian MYP where they consider them too short to engage in sustainable development activities with true ownership by the Government. Longer-term strategic planning processes may need to make specific reference to event horizons such as harvests, elections, etc rather than one or even several years. Especially in the case of transitional plans, these could mirror the cycle of development plans or political cycles.

16. With regard to the context, the evaluation noted that there are practical, structural, political and cultural tensions between humanitarian structures and other forms of intervention which complicate the introduction of an MYP. In many fragile and conflict-affected contexts, there is a deficit of development action and where this does take place it is often under-resourced. Humanitarians find themselves drawn into costly long-term substitution. ‘Transcending’ the humanitarian-development divide requires a boost in development action and funding in fragile and conflict-affected states, with greater risk tolerance, earlier engagement, and more flexible and context-adaptable instruments and programming by development actors. A multi-year plan will not succeed on its own if development action is not at scale.

17. One constraint to closer cooperation is that, for development actors, a government lead is appropriate, but the requisite government structures do not always exist, do not map onto humanitarian planning structures, or are undermined by a lack of political will or capacity. For humanitarian actors, adherence to the humanitarian principles of humanity, neutrality, impartiality and operational independence is of paramount importance, which can result
in hesitance to working closely with a Government. This can result in collapsed frameworks and a re-assertion of ‘binary’ aid logic.

18. Moreover, conflict in one or more parts of a country can create problems in framing a collective response strategy at the national level. Such context may require a principled humanitarian response independent of government. As development actors tend to engage at the central level, the need for humanitarian actors to remain independent can act as a barrier to greater alignment. As a result there can be a need for geographically specific, sub-national planning.

19. While both disaster-preparedness and finding ‘durable solutions’ for displacement are important steps towards reducing humanitarian workloads, the political and developmental interventions needed to create such solutions are not humanitarian work per se. There can be a tendency for this work to be ring-fenced from other collective, strategic planning processes, but this needs to be tackled if overall planning is to be done in the most effective way. Those preparing MYPs need to be cognizant of such work.

20. An additional challenge to MYP is that demand from donors and agency headquarters hasn’t always evolved to match the multi-year ambition of new planning frameworks and there remains an ongoing demand for annually aggregated presentation of the context, needs, requisite humanitarian response, and humanitarian funding requirements. Other fundamental humanitarian tools, such as OCHA’s Online Project System (OPS) and the Financial Tracking System (FTS) can struggle to deal with multi-year programming, leading to localised ‘work-arounds’ that do not have a ready infrastructure to support them.

Conclusions

21. All protracted humanitarian responses should have, at the very least, a multi-year high-level strategic plan that sets out a vision for moving beyond the crisis. However, and in keeping with the Secretary-General’s report for the WHS, the evaluation finds that one-size-fits-all approaches do not work, and that the planning process needs to be tailored to the context.

22. Despite the theoretical benefits of MYP, in practice it can be a significant challenge to design and implement a MYP successfully, even a relatively limited version. In all case-study countries, senior staff and partners highlighted these challenges, some going as far as to say that the MYP experience had been a failure. It is important to note, however, that few of the examples studied contained all the elements of best practice described in more recent policy documents. Also, there was no specific policy advice or guidance in place at the time of the development of the plans under review. Thus, the evaluation team supports the use and development of MYPs whilst simultaneously recognising the difficulties with those undertaken to date.

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However, in September 2016, tip sheets on MYP were finalized and shared with country offices developing MYPs for 2017.
23. Progress towards MYPs will require genuine systemic change and new, substantive ways of working, which look at root causes and collective outcomes. The concepts of "leaving no one behind" and "reaching those furthest behind first", common to the SDGs and the WHS report provide a basis for shared outcomes for humanitarian and development actors, and allow for a broadening of discussion away from a focus on roles and responsibilities to include a more sustained attention to the affected population. Multi-year planning should be seen as one means to that end, and given the chronic nature of many 'emergencies', this is to be welcomed.

24. The overarching conclusion of the evaluation is that the MYP process has great potential but that there are a number of challenges which exist to bring it to fruition – challenges encountered in the efforts and experiences to date and which are identified and discussed in this evaluation report. WHS and post-WHS commitments and work streams towards joint analysis and outcomes-based framing can take the concept forward but those creating MYPs must also be cognisant of the challenges which have undermined attempts at MYP to date. A number of these challenges are fundamental and systemic, woven into the fabric of existing aid architecture. Others are beyond the purview of OCHA and humanitarian actors. The aim of the evaluation team throughout has been to highlight these challenges for learning purposes and so that future MYP iterations can have a greater chance of success.

Recommendations:

Recommendation 1: OCHA should drive the development of multi-year high-level strategic plans that set out a vision for moving beyond the crisis in all protracted humanitarian contexts. As a first step, OCHA should establish a working group consisting of humanitarian and development stakeholders to develop further guidance - building on ongoing work - on MYP processes and tools.

1. Where 'ideal' conditions prevail – a stable situation with an engaged government and minimal conflict – MYPs should involve all actors and reflect the vision of MYP in which long-term needs are addressed whilst meeting emergency humanitarian needs. However, few 'ideal' situations are likely to exist, and so the MYP may need to be more restrictive and limited in ambition and scope.

2. Where ongoing conflict rages, and where the government is a party to the conflict, MYPs may exist largely on paper only as a set of aspirations, rather than a concrete, highly-elaborated plan. Nonetheless, even at this level, an overarching strategic plan should be discussed amongst those interested parties who are able to engage, including some or all of the following: donors, UN agencies, INGOs, NNGOs and government and opposition bodies.

Recommendation 2: OCHA should explore new funding modalities with donors and agencies involved in post-WHS MYP work streams for fragile and crisis contexts which align and sequence development and humanitarian funding streams in a more coherent way.
In the interim, planners may need to review how they raise funds for emergencies so that an entire MYP is not judged solely on the funds raised against it. Local solutions will depend on contexts and the willingness of donors to provide multi-year funding. A broader range of financing options is required, along with better alignment of funding cycles between donors, humanitarian and development actors to enable short-, medium- and longer-term programmes to take place simultaneously and more coherently. Development partners, including multilateral development banks, must act on their commitments to further scale up their operations in humanitarian crises. In protracted crises, funding needs to move beyond annual project-based grants towards financing that supports flexible multi-year humanitarian programming.

**Recommendation 3:** OCHA should consider adapting the coordination model in protracted crises to include more joined-up work by and between clusters as well as options for geographic-based coordination modalities. Just as development and humanitarian actors need to work better together, so do the sectoral response teams to ensure the most optimal response.

**Recommendation 4:** The ERC should plan carefully and well-ahead for any change of senior leadership in protracted crises taking into account the potential impact of the timing of the leadership change on the existing plans. OCHA should put measures in place to ensure a smooth hand-over process between the incumbents.

**Recommendation 5:** OCHA should convene or participate fully in a working group consisting of humanitarian and development stakeholders to develop further guidance on MYP processes and tools, which include options for different planning models adapted to various contexts. Such guidance should build on ongoing work, such as UNDP’s Post-Disaster Needs Assessment and Recovery and Peacebuilding Assessment (RBPA) processes.³

In keeping with the other recommendations of this evaluation, this does not assume that ‘one size fits all’. Guidance should reflect the roles of the respective systems in situations where stand-alone humanitarian planning (developed in line with OCHA guidance) is appropriate; where jointly constructed (transitional) plans are appropriate; and where high-level, strategic plans are being developed. Such work should build upon the increased momentum since the WHS, including the Commitment to Action and other initiatives, such as the October 2016 joint workshop between the IASC Humanitarian Development Nexus and the UN Working Group on Transitions.⁴

**Recommendation 6:** In protracted contexts, HC/RC offices should be staffed to explicitly support MYP given the increased workload involved in bringing together more actors and planning further forward in the future. This might include positions which subsume or complement OCHA’s normal functions for solely humanitarian planning, such as posts which explicitly link humanitarian and development systems for information management, needs assessment, monitoring and evaluation etc.

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³ Revised guidance on RPBA is currently being developed, and this could serve as an opportunity for improved alignment and complementarity between development and humanitarian processes.

Recommendation 7: As part of ongoing work, OCHA should ensure that all of its internal systems, structures and tools (notably FTS and OPS) can handle multi-year projects and financial contributions where MYPs are in place.

Recommendation 8: To ensure successful MYPs, OCHA should develop guidance on the preparatory steps needed in advance of launching MYP. This process guidance should give careful consideration to the suitability and durability of the administrative structures and tools required, as well as complementarity of the timeframe proposed with pre-existing planning frameworks.

Recommendation 9: OCHA should work with other stakeholders to develop:

- A collective needs assessment model which specifically considers needs in phases: short-, medium- and long-term. Recognising the heavy investment in collective needs assessment in recent years, such a process should build on what exists. Needs assessment should start with a collective root-cause analysis, which incorporates data from development, humanitarian and peace-building actors who may be present, as well as national actors, and which re-defines the way ‘needs’ are presented, away from simply immediate and urgent need.

- A risk-management framework which embraces the concepts of crisis management and risk-contingent financing.

- An M+E framework incorporating benchmarks against which to measure progress. While systemic guidance will be useful, each framework is likely to be very context-specific and will vary programme-by-programme.
Issues to Consider for Successful MYP

Following on from and in keeping with the conclusions and recommendations of the evaluation, this section provides suggestions for approaches to MYP. As above, the evaluation finds clearly that there is no ‘one-size-fits-all’ model for MYP. Each context will require the design of a contextually appropriate model. Multi-year, OCHA-led HRP’s which seek to frame humanitarian action and resilience are one possible variant; others include plans constructed jointly by humanitarian and development actors which explicitly seek to build coherence between humanitarian action and other interventions in shared operational space; and higher-level, strategic frameworks which seek to frame and guide a number of annual HRP’s. MYPs might be regional and or national; and are likely to include sub-national components as part of a national framework. For such sub-national plans, it will be necessary to consider the relationship with national planning frameworks. An important part of the preparation, therefore, is to establish what sort of MYP is likely to be successful. An overly ambitious plan increases the risk of failure and a loss of credibility. Initial consultations need to include agreement on the scope and limitations of the potential plan and openly acknowledge the conceptual challenges.

Pre-conditions for MYP

- A MYP will be more stable the greater the degree of political stability and the lower the likelihood of armed conflict. Significant levels of ongoing conflict and instability, and severe access challenges for humanitarian actors, create an environment in which longer-term planning is more challenging; to the extent that consideration should be given as to whether the investment in time and resources is worthwhile.

- MYP is likely to be more successful where there are national planning bodies with the capacity and the will to engage with the international community. Where such bodies exist, they should be reinforced rather than replaced.

- MYP must be demand driven. It requires the support and buy-in from a critical mass of stakeholders in any given country, including development and peace actors, and government. MYPs must be owned by institutions and not by individuals within institutions. The commitment of key donors is pivotal.

- All significant humanitarian action should happen within the collective plan and not outside as sometimes happens with the HRP’s. At the very least, planners should be aware of all the major humanitarian and development activities underway.

- Successful MYP requires a set of significant commitments by all operational actors. These include commitments by each to:
  - collective analysis
  - collective outcomes
  - work to their respective, comparative advantages
  - work towards an appropriate exit strategy
  - work proactively towards a greater participation of local actors in the response

- MYP is likely to be more successful the greater the commitment of development actors to be risk-tolerant, to engage earlier, and to ensure their plans and programmes have an in-built flexibility to change as conditions change. It will also require a commitment by development actors to focus on reducing risk and vulnerability, and reaching those furthest behind first.
Timing and time frames

- Rushed MYP processes are counter-productive. Consideration needs to be given to the appropriate timing of the introduction of a MYP, and there needs to be sufficient time to draw up the plan. Overly short deadlines and turnaround times lead to frustration and disengagement. Planning frameworks that keep shifting and changing lead to a loss of credibility in those plans and in the leaders involved. A realistic calendar is needed for the design and consultation process.

- Preparation for a MYP exercise should include careful consideration of the institutional as well as the operational context. The start date and duration of a planning framework needs to consider the suitability and durability of the administrative structures which support it, the leadership required to drive and champion it, and its complementarity with pre-existing frameworks (for example, development planning cycles, electoral cycles).

- Significant planning cycles should be aligned: while there are often multiple planning frames for development work, multi-year humanitarian plans should be aligned with those which are most significant in each particular context (UNDAF, ISF, national planning frameworks). Aligned time frames would facilitate the construction and monitoring of joint theories of change and outcomes-based planning.

- Other issues of timing are also important to consider: election cycles and duration of senior UN leadership posts. Time frames should not be arbitrary or be the result of compromise to which stakeholders are not fully committed. Time frames should be connected to meaningful event horizons. MYPs should be of a duration that allows adequate time for achievement of outcomes.

- MYPs should be anchored in regular monitoring of the situation and the response and there should be regular updates of MYPs – the timing of which should depend upon the context. It may be appropriate to carry out a light review of all plans annually, but more substantive changes should, ideally, depend on clear benchmarks e.g. elections or changes in key leadership.

Key components of MYP

- A strong analytical framework which brings together an assessment of risk as well as an assessment of needs and possible interventions. Whether or not the plan is jointly constructed by humanitarian and development actors and is explicitly transitional, this analytical framework would ideally be shared by humanitarian and development actors and result in a jointly constructed theory of change.

- A forward-looking view of needs and risks. Short-term, collective needs assessment should be supplemented and supported by a longer-term, risk-informed analysis.

- A risk-management framework, based on a collective analysis of potential risks and including strategies to anticipate, project, and to mitigate potential negative effects. Such strategies should include, where possible, measures to avoid risks, reduce their frequency and/or otherwise mitigate their effect through early identification and action. Concepts such as ‘risk facilities’ or ‘crisis modifiers’ are useful. Triggers/thresholds for early action would be required as data came in suggesting a

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5 Plans are underway to introduce INFORM at the country level for this purpose.
situation was deteriorating.

- An analysis of the synergies and complementarity with development, peace and other non-humanitarian frameworks, with consideration of comparative advantages of those involved.
- A shift from sectoral analysis to inter-sectoral and possibly geographically, thematically or population group-specific, integrated planning.
- A shift from activity-based thinking to outcome-based planning. Outcome-based planning should allow for the reconciliation of humanitarian and development thinking by the elaboration of geographically, thematically or population-specific short-, medium- and long-term outcomes which recognises that different sets of coherent and/or sequenced interventions are required in any given context.
- Sequenced, integrated or layered approaches to programming to ensure MYPs are implemented in an effective way.
- A prioritised and evidence-based response strategy.
- Clearly defined exit strategies for humanitarian action and a realistic, actionable strategy for increasing the role of national actors within the response.
- Funding arrangements that allow for medium- and longer-term programmes to run alongside those that cater for immediate needs.
- A set of collective outcomes and success indicators, which can be regional, national or sub-national and/or thematic (e.g. food security, durable solutions for displacement); such collective outcomes should be clearly time-bound and/or sequenced (short-, medium- and long-term objectives).
- Clear and well-funded accountability and monitoring frameworks, which measure accountability at all levels, including at the beneficiary level, and should involve partners (including host government) whenever possible with third-party independent review, beneficiary feedback system and response, etc.
- Integrated MYPs may also need strong cross-cutting components (e.g. capacity-building) that might require action at the national or sub-national level, even to reach geographically-specific stated outcomes.
- Both disaster preparedness and planning for ‘durable solutions for displacement’ are usually managed by development actors working with Government. Though often not humanitarian itself, they can have a direct and significant effect in reducing the caseload for humanitarian actions. Time frames for the negotiation and implementation of solutions for displaced populations and for disaster-preparedness, therefore, need to be considered as part of collective action. Those preparing MYPs need to take such issues and timing into account when preparing their plans to make them more coherent with what else is going on in-country, and to help ensure humanitarian contributions work towards collective long-term goals.

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7 This will not be an easy transition. The weakness of the concept of ‘needs’ analysis has long since been noted. The concept has prevailed because it lends itself to the immediate, output-driven nature of ‘traditional’ humanitarian operations. Risk-based planning remains an intangible concept for some operational actors.
Main Report

I. Introduction

1.1 Background

25. The current standard model for OCHA-led, collective humanitarian planning at the country-level is the HRP. The HRP builds on the previous standard - the CAP - but aims to address a number of noted weaknesses in and critiques of the CAP\(^8\). The HRP focused on improving the evidence base at its centre, the strategic narrative around the different response components, and the monitoring and evaluation function within it. Successive rounds of humanitarian reform, latterly the Emergency Relief Coordinator’s (ERC) Transformative Agenda, have stressed the importance of the HRP and the greater centralisation of the system under it; increasing the prominence of the Humanitarian Coordinator (HC) position, the role of OCHA and cluster coordination. Reform has also focused on humanitarian financing, as a complementary component, emphasising country-level responsibility for the allocation of funds from country-based pooled funds and the prioritisation for the Central Emergency Response Fund (CERF) under the HC and the clusters, as a way to strengthen the link between funding and coordination.

26. The first multi-year appeal was launched in Kenya for 2011-2013. Prior to that, humanitarian appeals adhered to an annual cycle, normally under the CAP. ToR for this evaluation state that by 2015, there were fifteen multi-year humanitarian plans, including a transitional plan. However, and as discussed in more detail later in the report, these plans have not been constructed against a standard or common multi-year model and few have remained in place until the end of their projected time-span. Nonetheless, moving from an annual planning cycle to MYP logically presents a number of advantages.

27. It is clear that in many countries, humanitarian responses have been and continue to be required for many years; and so the rationale for MYP is strong. Multi-year humanitarian plans offer the potential to be part of a more coherent effort to address the root causes of protracted crises:

“The multi-year plans developed to date rest on a realisation that protracted crises cannot be addressed through humanitarian action alone, and that a fundamental shift is needed to break the cycle of humanitarian dependence and generate more sustainable outcomes\(^9\).”

28. Other envisaged benefits include: “strengthening strategic relationships with national actors and allowing for a closer cooperation with national authorities; introduction of outcome-based planning with gradual disengagement strategies built in from the outset

\(^8\) See Section 2 for more on this

\(^9\) Evaluation of Multi-Year Planning, Terms of Reference
of interventions and strategic alignment of development, peace and security, governance and residual emergency relief engagements.”

29. Benefits should also accrue for the collective response and for those operational actors involved: “Additional potential advantages include lower operational costs (e.g. reduced workload on country teams and partners), improved flexibility, and ability to react more quickly to changing conditions.”

30. In summary then, aspirations for MYP include improvement in collective humanitarian response and stronger coherence between humanitarian and other response elements. It is worth noting that MYP is a trend beyond UN-led collective plans. Individual humanitarian actors typically plan over multiple years, as do humanitarian donors. Humanitarian agencies, such as the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR), have already made the move and are committed to the shift towards multi-year planning. Sixteen members of the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) Development Assistance Committee (DAC) have committed to providing multi-annual funding to the UN, non-governmental organisations (NGO) and the Red Cross Movement. The Terms of Reference do not seek to limit the evaluation to OCHA-led planning processes, but, with the exception of Haiti’s Transitional Appeal Plan (TAP), these make up all of the case-studies.

1.2 Purpose, objectives and use of the evaluation; scope and key challenges

1.2.1 Purpose, objectives and intended use of the evaluation

31. The overarching purpose of this evaluation is to learn about “the experiences with multi-year planning to date” and an examination of “what works, what doesn’t, and what can be done better when implementing multi-year planning approaches in humanitarian crises.” The ToR list a number of specific objectives for the evaluation (in full at Annex A). These include:

- An assessment of experiences with multi-year approaches to humanitarian planning to date; including identification of strengths, weaknesses and contextual/other influencing factors.
- Exploration of the extent to which MYP has contributed to strengthening linkages and synergies with development actors; more effective resource mobilization and improved support from the donor community.

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10 Evaluation of Multi-year Planning, Terms of Reference
11 Evaluation of Multi-year Planning, Terms of Reference
12 Syria’s 3RP was referenced in the evaluation ToR, but ultimately falls outside of the scope of the evaluation (see case-study selection). UNHCR has also piloted MYPs in six other countries (i.e. Ghana, Senegal, Tanzania, Uganda, Costa Rica and Ecuador). These plans look at long-term planning that extends beyond immediate humanitarian needs and focus on protection, sustainable self-reliance of people and durable solutions for all populations of concern, including those in protracted situations. These strategies focus on achieving economic, legal, socio-cultural, and civil-political solutions.
13 The relationship between multi-year financing and multi-year planning and the evolving policy environment are both covered later in the report.
• Provision of actionable recommendations at both the policy and operational levels on how multi-year planning approaches might be strengthened; including innovations and best practices which might be replicated; and leading to the development of one or multiple models for multi-year humanitarian planning.

32. The ToR also state two uses for the evaluation report – to inform OCHA’s approaches to the Humanitarian Programme Cycle (HPC) and the development of Inter-Agency Standing Committee (IASC) policy and guidelines for multi-year planning, and to inform discussions at the World Humanitarian Summit. This second aim was not possible given the ultimate timing of the evaluation. Therefore, the report contains a summary of outputs from the WHS and assesses the evolving policy environment since the WHS. This helps place the findings, conclusions and recommendations of the evaluation into the current (rapidly evolving) context.

33. The evaluation report makes 9 recommendations for MYP, in addition to analysing limiting factors to successful MYP. The recommendations are based on the research undertaken and are independent.

1.2.2 Evaluation scope and key issues

34. The evaluation Terms of Reference state that, by 2015, there had been fifteen multi-year humanitarian plans “including a transitional plan”. It also acknowledges, however, that at the time of commissioning, there was “no accepted definition or comprehensive guidelines for multi-year HRP and transitional strategies”\(^\text{14}\), which forms part of the rationale for undertaking this study. The ToR do, however, refer to internal OCHA guidance which contains an informal and relatively broad definition:

> “a multi-year HRP remains primarily a tool for planning and delivering coordinated humanitarian aid (life-saving). Where it differs from a traditional HRP is in its greater focus on establishing a strategy for the emergency that goes beyond one year of activities and projects.”\(^\text{15}\)

35. In its description of experiences with MYP to date, the ToR make multiple references to multi-year HRPs. The HRP (which is part of the HPC), is the current standard for OCHA-led, collective humanitarian planning at the country level. However, the scope of this exercise is broader than just HRPs, as the country and regional cases in the ToR for this evaluation explicitly expand the scope. Cases included in the ToR include multiple types of planning frameworks, which are described in more detail in the report. In summary, the scope is broadened to include:

\(^{14}\) Humanitarian Programme Cycle Multi-Year Humanitarian Planning (MYP) Tip Sheet for OCHA Country/Regional Offices was developed in September 2016

\(^{15}\) Evaluation of Multi-Year Planning, Terms of Reference
• Planning frameworks which seek to frame a predominantly humanitarian response over multiple years (e.g., Somalia CAP 2013-15, amongst others). Although the CAP predates the HRP, this type of MYP, in broad terms, has the complexity of making all elements of the HPC suitable for a span of two or more years, acting as the primary vehicle for the financial appeal and utilising existing humanitarian tools for this purpose (for example OCHA’s OPS and FTS for project and financial tracking respectively).

• A framework which explicitly seeks to bridge humanitarian and other response profiles over multiple years (e.g., Haiti’s TAP). This deviates from the HRP model in that it is not tied to the HPC or ‘standard’ humanitarian structures and mechanisms (e.g. humanitarian needs assessments, clusters, aid tracking via FTS, etc).

• ‘Higher’ planning frameworks which seek to bring a collective (or overarching) strategic approach to a set of discrete, single-year HRPs (covering either one or multiple countries e.g. the Sahel Regional Plan).

36. While all of these plans are deemed relevant for study, they do not make up a set of consistent or fully comparable cases for the purposes of evaluation. One objective of the evaluation is an exploration of the extent to which MYP has contributed to strengthening linkages and synergies with development actors. Since the scope includes planning frameworks for wholly humanitarian action (multi-year HRPs and similar) as well as a transitional plan, it is clear that the extent to which they play this ‘bridging role’ will differ significantly.

The focus of the evaluation is MYP rather than multi-year financing or multi-year programming, although it is recognised that the three are mutually supportive and brought together explicitly in the HRP model. This connectivity has been deepened by successive rounds of humanitarian reform (explored in more detail in section 2 on humanitarian planning). For this reason, the report makes reference to humanitarian financing, whilst recognising that it is not the direct subject of the evaluation.

37. MYP is a central theme in a number of key OCHA policy documents. These references (as well as the ToR for this evaluation) make a clear link between MYP and a number of other concepts and issues including: multi-year financing; attempts to link relief and development proactively; the creation of coherence between humanitarian and other intervention types; and, resilience. One key theme of this emerging perspective is that humanitarian planning should link with development planning16 (or indeed that planning

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16 The ToR cites the recent Report of the Secretary-General (United Nations General Assembly Economic and Social Council, Strengthening of the coordination of emergency humanitarian assistance of the United Nations, Report of the UN Secretary-General, April 2015), which highlights “the importance of multi-year planning” in this respect. This theme is also central to a key ECOSOC Resolution (ECOSOC Resolution 2015/14. “Strengthening of the coordination of emergency humanitarian assistance of the United Nations”, June 2015), which encourages humanitarian and development organizations, in consultation with Governments to “plan transitions from humanitarian response to longer-term development over a multi-year framework”, as appropriate, “and linked with development planning processes”.

should be done jointly and include Government where feasible). OCHA’s key policy paper on MYP\textsuperscript{17} aims for the humanitarian system to:

- better align humanitarian and development action within the context of the Sustainable Development Goals (SDG) framework, focusing on clear outcomes that facilitate the responsible disengagement of international humanitarian assistance actors over time;
- approach protracted displacement with a development lens requiring development actors to complement the work of humanitarian assistance.

38. MYP is viewed as facilitating and strengthening linkages between humanitarian and development partners, and of importance in addressing short-term needs and their root causes i.e. aiming to alter the rhythm or progression of protracted crises as well as better addressing their consequences. In general terms, however, retrospective studies exploring linkages between humanitarian and development programming, architecture and financial mechanisms have found them to be the exception rather than the rule\textsuperscript{18}. Significant, systemic challenges are entrenched in the make-up of the humanitarian and development ‘systems’. These are often referred to as the key elements in a ‘bifurcated’ aid system, recognising that development and relief systems are “designed to be different in terms of their goals, institutions and time frames” and each with “its own jargon, procedures and organisational allegiances”\textsuperscript{19}.

39. Throughout the interviews for the evaluation, it was evident that many interlocutors continue to default to descriptions of humanitarian and development ‘systems’ as ‘bifurcated’, and many make frequent use of the term ‘binary logic’. There is a clear challenge in creating better linkages and more coherent planning between humanitarian and development actors. Various tools and frameworks have been piloted to try and bridge the divide, including Haiti’s Transitional Plan as well as various donor resilience platforms.

40. One critical issue within this debate is the extent to which humanitarian actors can work with and through host governments (supported by UN political and development entities) in any given context. An aspiration for MYP is that it enhances the likelihood of some responsibilities for service delivery and protection being transferred to national systems (public or private – including development actors). In situations with conflict (most obviously where the host state is a party to the conflict), independent, neutral and impartial humanitarian action is essential. The SG’s report of 2015 is supportive of integrated programming overall, but it notes that there needs to be:

\textsuperscript{17} UNOCHA, “An end in sight: Multi-year planning to meet and reduce humanitarian needs in protracted crises”, July 2015
\textsuperscript{18} The inception report for this study explores this topic in more detail.
\textsuperscript{19} Macrae, J., “The continuum is dead, long live resilience” – in: Voice out Loud (issue 15 – May 2012). This article is part of a long-running critique of the simplistic model of a ‘relief-development continuum’.
“a clear distinction between situations where it is appropriate to call for a common approach by humanitarian, development and climate change adaptation work and other situations where a principled “core humanitarian work only” approach is important to safeguard access and protect humanitarian actors as well as their ability to reach people affected by conflict20.”

41. In reality, of course, protracted and cyclical crises inevitably sit within a complex grey area which defies a simple configuration whereby humanitarians engage with Government in non-conflict settings and disengage in conflict settings.

42. Resilience is another key theme in linking relief and development, but is also a key theme in humanitarian response itself. The OCHA MYP policy study notes that the humanitarian system should “plan emergency activities as part of a coherent strategy where each actor must play its particular role enabling resilience in a complementary way.”

43. Resilience, however, is not well understood or consistently characterised, even though the term is used frequently. The evaluation sought to unpack resilience and to analyse the use of the term and its implications - often significant - for multi-year planning.

44. The report makes forward-looking recommendations and suggests options for consideration for those preparing MYP. It also highlights the challenges encountered in MYPs to date, including pre-existing and pre-acknowledged challenges in humanitarian planning, such as linking planning and fundraising in a single instrument, and linking relief and development.

1.3 Methodology, evaluation criteria, case-study selection and limitations

1.3.1 Methodology

45. MYP aims to harness the potential of a range of initiatives to improve systemic performance: specifically, to drive the collective response to plan for the longer term in such a way that it improves both results and process. The evaluation framing, however, recognised the importance of context: that the humanitarian system manifests in a different form in each context; and that the type of planning framework under review varies from country to country. It was also acknowledged that the influence of MYP in attaining its potential benefits could be enhanced or undermined by systemic or contextual factors.

46. The evaluation is formative, with an emphasis on building understanding and learning from experiences with MYP rather than critically evaluating past attempts at MYP. It started with a review of the relevant literature, to help set the scene and to determine what work had already taken place on this issue and similar overlapping issues. The evaluation employed

20 Report of the Secretary-General for the WHS: https://www.dropbox.com/s/tzkv9il3v5zuhde/2.5G%20Report%20on%20the%20Outcome%20of%20the%20WHS.pdf?dl=0
mixed methods of data collection and analysis (qualitative, quantitative and participatory). Interviews and perceptions of process formed the key component of research at country level. The evaluation selected three country case-studies (Haiti, Somalia and a counter-factual, Myanmar) as well as remote interviews for the Sahel region, oPt, South Sudan and Iraq. The evaluation attempted to obtain further cross-referencing of information through an online survey.

47. In total, the team conducted three country case-studies, along with 182 interviews. (Full list available in Annex C.) In addition, the team carried out another 14 interviews to assess changes in the system since the WHS took place, as well as a review of key documents emerging from the WHS. The team ensured that both male and female staff members were interviewed. Interviews were supplemented with a review of relevant available literature.

48. OCHA’s FTS was used as a source of quantitative data, especially on funding levels for different appeals as well as other questions related to donor behaviour and the linkage between MYP and multi-year financing. In addition, OCHA’s OPS was used as a source of project-level detail for the case-study countries.

49. Because of the limited number of full MYPs, and the fact that none of them were examples of the ‘ideal’ for MYP as presented in policy documents, not all recommendations could come directly from the evaluation team’s retrospective analysis. For this reason interviews and review of policy papers were an important component of developing future recommendations.

50. A full explanation of the methodology for this study can be found in Annex D.

1.3.2 Evaluation Criteria

51. The OECD/DAC evaluation criteria were used to help frame the evaluation questions and the organisation of the work. (See Inception Report for more.) More specifically:

- Relevance was assessed in Section 3.1, where we looked at the appropriateness and relevance of MYPs to humanitarian needs, risks and country contexts.
- Effectiveness was considered in Section 3.2 – MYPs as drivers or aggregators of strategy and also in Section 3.6 – Systemic and structural challenges for MYP.
- Efficiency was looked at in Section 3.3 where we looked at combined planning and appeal frameworks, but also was a key criteria in Section 3.6 – Systemic and structural challenges for MYP – where we looked at the efficiency of certain aspects of the planning process such as OPS and the FTS.
- Coherence was looked at in Section 3.2.2 – Resilience – as well as in Section 3.5 – MYPs as combining or linking humanitarian and development frameworks. In both these sections we discussed the links between humanitarian planning and development partners working on longer-term programmes, as well as work with peace and security and government and other national actors.
• Coordination was specifically looked at in Section 3.4 - Coordination, leadership and continuity - but was also considered throughout the report in multiple sections, as an underlying theme that run throughout the evaluation. Coordination between humanitarian actors is a key rationale of HRP and existing planning mechanisms but is expected to play a larger role in MYPs that seek to bring more actors together.
• Connectedness was looked at throughout the report in the analysis we did linking humanitarian work with longer-term work. More specifically it was looked at in Section 3.5 – MYPs as combining or linking humanitarian and development frameworks
• Impact on affected populations was difficult to comment on as few of the MYPs looked at had survived for long, so it was impossible to determine actual impact at the affected population level. However, a more limited look at impact on those involved was carried out and comes through the case-study reports.

1.3.3 Case-Study Selection

52. The ToR specified the scope of the evaluation: a global study drawing from a sample of “four countries with multi-year plans, including one of the two countries that have reverted to single-year planning - South Sudan or Iraq”. The rationale for the selection of cases to study in detail was to cover:

- active multi-year plans
- a geographical diverse set
- a contextually diverse set.

53. The possible case-studies were selected from the list detailed in the ToR. These are listed below with positives and limiting factors which were discussed in the inception phase:

- **Syria’s 3RP**: The evaluation is managed by OCHA’s Strategic Planning Evaluation and Guidance Section (SPEGs) and is not an ‘inter-agency’ evaluation. Given the central roles of UNHCR and UNDP in the Syria regional plan, this was ruled out as a case-study by SPEGs at the inception phase.
- **Iraq**: Iraq has seen a change in leadership and a very high staff turnover in the OCHA office as well as in other UN agencies. While interesting as a case-study, the team concluded that a visit to Iraq would encounter few if any staff involved in the previous plan and would not glean a significant amount of information.
- **South Sudan**: Given the severe decline in the humanitarian situation in South Sudan, the team concluded that a retrospective analysis of previous models would not be well received at this time.
- **Yemen**: Yemen constructed a two-year HRP for 2014-15, with an emphasis on resilience and recovery. Given the intensification of the conflict, however, and the decision to revert to annual planning (as in South Sudan and Iraq) Yemen was ruled out as a suitable case-study at the time of planning the field research.
- **The Sahel**: Though clearly an interesting case-study in respect of the Regional Response Framework, interviewees questioned the extent to which any of the
countries in the region had adopted MYP and specifically whether a visit to any one country of the nine in the plan would give an adequate overview of the issues in the region. In addition, a recent study on multi-year financing in the region, has covered many of the key questions for the MYP evaluation.

- **Djibouti**: Ruled out consistently by interviewees as being too small an appeal and too specific a context to provide lessons for the global case.
- **occupied Palestinian territory**: oPt has had one MYP but has since gone back to single-year planning again. Given the very specific context, several interlocutors questioned the validity of the findings for other situations.

54. During the inception phase, it became clear that there were not as many active and relevant MYPs as suggested in the ToR, which limited the choice of case-studies.

55. The two country cases which received the strongest support were Somalia and Haiti, although the latter had some detractors. The research team also presented the idea of looking at a ‘counter-case’ study - a country in which the conditions for MYP were understood to exist, where the issue was being debated, but an annual planning framework was still in use. The purpose of this ‘counter factual’ was to explore the rationale for the use of annual planning, the prospective benefits of MYP, and the arguments against its use. In discussion with OCHA staff, Myanmar was selected as an ideal case. These three countries had strong support and all were recommended as country case-studies.

56. In the search for a fourth case-study, there was no clear-cut support or consensus, and the team applied an alternative logic. A number of interesting case-studies remained: Sahel, Iraq, oPt and South Sudan, but there was doubt as to whether any would provide enough for a full study. Ultimately, the team concluded that the best approach would be to undertake targeted interviews with key individuals in these contexts, complemented by a survey and a review of relevant literature, in order to learn lessons from a broader range of experiences with MYP.

1.3.4 Limitations

57. The relatively small number of ongoing MYPs of significant duration meant that the choice of case-study countries was limited. Few face-to-face or telephone interviews were possible in Iraq, South Sudan and oPt, perhaps as a result of the time lag (as much as 4 years in the case of oPt) between the construction of the plan and the evaluation; the short-lived nature of each plan (South Sudan’s MYP was never launched); and the high turnover of staff in each case making it hard to identify the key individuals involved. The case-study work was supplemented with a short targeted online survey with a mix of 48 semi-structured questions. The sample targeted the Sahel, South Sudan, Iraq and oPt using lists provided by OCHA. 418 invitations to the survey were sent, there were 30 total respondents, out of which 16 completed the survey fully.
The multi-year nature of the plans evaluated offered just one point of comparison, with other differences in the plans also likely to have had an effect, thereby hindering clear-cut analysis of the effects of just the expanded time frame.

The formative nature of the evaluation and its focus on process, rather than programming, meant that cross-cutting issues and gender were examined only indirectly, i.e. a view on whether these issues were addressed adequately in MYP processes.

1.4 Report structure

The report has four main sections. Section 1 introduces the evaluation and looks at the objectives, its scope and limitations along with key challenges faced. This section includes an outline of the methodology and case-study selection with further details contained in the annexes. Section 2 establishes the background and context for the evaluation, outlining the role of humanitarian planning, and its evolving nature. It also sets out how MYP is reflected within the case-study countries. Section 3 details the main findings of the evaluation, identifies the strengths and weaknesses, the appropriateness and relevance of MYP. Section 4 sets out the conclusions and recommendations. The Annexes contain the Terms of Reference, a list of those interviewed, a detailed account of the methodology used, an account of the case-study country studies and their experiences with MYP.

2. Background and Context

2.1 Humanitarian planning

The current standard model for OCHA-led, collective humanitarian planning at the country-level is the HRP. The HRP builds on the previous standard - the CAP. The HRP aims to resolve a number of noted weaknesses in and critiques of the CAP\(^2\). Recognising the need to address these issues, the HRP (and the numerous elements of humanitarian reform which were central to its creation) focused on improving the evidence base at its centre, the strategic narrative around the different response components, and the monitoring and evaluation function within it.

Successive rounds of humanitarian reform, latterly the Emergency Relief Coordinator’s (ERC) Transformative Agenda, have stressed the importance of the HRP and the greater centralisation of the system under it; increasing the prominence of the HC position, the role of OCHA and cluster coordination. Reform has also focused on humanitarian financing, as a complementary component, emphasising country-level responsibility for the allocation of funds from country-based pooled funds and the prioritisation for the Central Emergency Response Fund (CERF) under the HC and the clusters, as a way to strengthen the link between funding and coordination.

63. The HRP process is, in general terms, recognised as having improved on the CAP. It is important to note, however, that systemic change is slow. HRPs are implemented in different ways in different countries and quality is variable. During the inception phase for this evaluation, staff in OCHA headquarters acknowledged that, in some cases, the HRP framework had been used to ‘re-package’ the previous logic of the CAP, i.e. as an ‘annual, static document’, rather than an attempt to build a ‘rolling’, strategic process. It was also acknowledged that donor pressure for improved needs assessments, outcome-based programming and a number of other elements into which significant efforts have been poured, have led to a certain amount of ‘process fatigue’.

64. One additional issue is of central relevance to the findings of this evaluation. The HRP has inherited and has not resolved the tension between its use as a planning tool and as the principal appeal document for the collective system. Referring to ‘trust issues’ amongst the partners within the Appeals process, a benchmark CAP study of 2002 noted:

- From the donor perspective, a lack of faith in the quality control and prioritisation of projects within the appeal.
- From the perspective of operational actors, a recognition that many donors do not base funding decisions on the CAP and that there is “no discernible correlation between the quality of planning and strategy set out in a CAP and the response to an appeal”.
- From the perspective of INGOs, that there are limited incentives to participate given that many have direct relationships with key donors.

65. Whilst reform has made strides in improving collective working, these basic issues are widely acknowledged as remaining at the heart of humanitarian planning, and were identified as significant issues in the case-studies. Section 3.3.1 below (the prioritisation dilemma) expands on these issues.

66. In advance of the WHS, the report of the Secretary-General: “One Humanity: Shared Responsibility” laid out a view of key challenges facing humanitarian assistance and recommends a paradigm shift in order to begin to address them:

- Reinforce, do not replace, national and local systems.
- Anticipate, do not wait, for crises.
- Transcend the humanitarian-development divide by working towards collective outcomes, based on comparative advantage and over multi-year time frames.

67. The third point made specific reference to MYP, but all are associated with the perceived potential benefits of MYP that are at the heart of this evaluation. From the policy perspective, there are significant aspirations for MYP that it can harness the potential of a number of ongoing initiatives within the humanitarian system, and catalyse genuine change.
2.2 Evolving context

2.2.1 Summary of the evolving international debate on MYP, including developments since the WHS.

68. MYP has been a focus of the international aid system for some time. Although an important agenda item of the WHS, it has also been discussed at other fora, and as part of other reviews, including the Sendai Framework for Disaster Risk Reduction, the Peace Operations and Peace-building Reviews, and the Addis Ababa Action Agenda on Financing for Development. Interviewees noted that the momentum has increased since the WHS, which opened space for greater dialogue and information exchange, and promoted a greater understanding of the need for cooperation between humanitarian and development actors, at three levels:

- Conceptually, in terms of understanding where there could be greater coherence and synergy in planning, for example in setting shared outcomes and joint needs assessments; and also clarifying, to a certain extent, the different understandings of key terms such as “resilience”.
- The organizational level, in terms of the ways in which development and humanitarian actors need to take greater responsibility for non-traditional areas when planning.
- At the level of establishing where and when MYP is most appropriate.

69. A number of inter-agency commitments have been developed post-Summit and MYP is a central component of the proposals therein. The Commitment to Action to transcend humanitarian and development divides\(^2\), signed by the Secretary-General and the heads of 8 UN entities with the endorsement of the International Organisation for Migration (IOM) and the World Bank (WB), refers to the Report of the Secretary-General for the WHS and notably Core Responsibility 4 within this: “Changing people’s lives: from delivering aid to ending need”. It suggests that the SDGs can act as a “common framework for humanitarian and development actors to work towards the overall goal of meeting needs while contributing to a reduction in people’s risks and vulnerabilities and an increase in their resilience”. Whilst noting an ongoing commitment to principled humanitarian action, “especially in politically contested and violent conditions of armed conflict”, it cites a “shared moral imperative of preventing crises and sustainably reducing people’s levels of humanitarian need in the long term”.\(^3\)

70. The commitment adds details to “a new way of working” to further strengthen coherence among humanitarian and development actors. The commitment and other follow up

\(^2\) Commitment to action: https://www.dropbox.com/s/rh34emcg8eudwy3/3.%20WHS%20Commitment%20to%20Action.pdf?dl=0

\(^3\) Report of the Secretary-General for the WHS: https://www.dropbox.com/s/tzkv9il3v5zuhde/2.SG%20Report%20on%20the%20Outcome%20of%20the%20WHS.pdf?dl=0
reports 24 revolve around three central concepts: collective outcomes, comparative advantages and multi-year time frames:

- A collective outcome is a commonly agreed result or impact in reducing people’s needs, risks and vulnerabilities and increasing their resilience, requiring the combined effort of different actors.
- A comparative advantage is the capacity and expertise of one individual, group or institution to meet needs and contribute to risk and vulnerability reduction, over the capacity of another actor.
- A multi-year time frame refers to analysing, strategising and planning operations that build over several years to achieve context-specific and, at times, dynamic targets.

71. The concepts of “leaving no one behind” and “reaching those furthest behind first”, common to the SDGs, the WHS report and the Humanitarian Principles25, provide a basis for shared outcomes for humanitarian and development actors, and allow for a broadening of the discussion away from a focus on roles and responsibilities to include a more sustained attention to the affected population. Nonetheless, interviewees felt that more work was required to build a truly common understanding of what these mean in practice and ultimately to produce system-wide guidance.

72. The ‘multi-year’ element of MYPs is only one of the elements of the change that is being pushed for in the system. Indeed, it may be one of the least important elements. What really counts is new, substantive ways of working, which look at root causes and collective outcomes. MYP is a means to that end.

73. The WHS highlighted the need to take into account national and regional contexts and develop MYP accordingly. Interviewees provided examples of what they perceived as positive post-WHS MYP-related activities at country level:

- The Lebanon Strategic Framework 2017-2020 (albeit a very specific context, where the government leads the humanitarian response).
- The consideration of a two-year planning framework in Yemen.
- Linkages forged between the HRP and development planning in Sudan.

74. There was little appetite amongst post-WHS interviewees for a ‘top-down’ or ‘one size fits all’ MYP process. In addition, there was an observation that country-level activities in relation to MYP were proceeding at a faster rate than those at HQ. Although each context is different, interviewees felt that some activities – for example, more coherent root-cause analysis - could take place jointly irrespective of context, though work is needed to

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24 After the World Humanitarian Summit: Better Humanitarian-Development Cooperation for Sustainable Results on the Ground - A think piece drawing on collaboration between OCHA, UNDP, UNHCR, UNICEF, WFP, and the World Bank, supported by the Center on International Cooperation
develop a common platform to gather data from the development, humanitarian and peace-building actors present. Interviewees noted progress since the WHS in understanding the importance of taking risk into account during root-cause analysis.

75. Despite the progress detailed above, change has been slower with respect to resolving the challenges of multi-year funding, which include concerns from both humanitarian and development agencies about loss of resources for their agencies as well as a lack of clarity as to which funding modalities will promote greater coherence between humanitarian and development actors. Nevertheless, the WHS has increased attention on the importance of revising funding modalities to support strengthened MYP, even if these revisions have not as yet taken place at any significant scale.

76. Interviewees noted that positive changes in the UN system have either taken place since, or been given greater impetus by, the WHS. In particular, greater attention is being given to assessment of comparative advantage of different UN agencies and the need for a more collective approach; and changes in the Common Country Assessment (CCA)/UN Development Assistance Framework (UNDAF) Guidelines promote greater attention to risks and a discussion of areas where development actors can support longer-term planning to avert humanitarian emergencies. A number of interviewees praised the post-WHS inter-agency think piece on methods for improved collaboration and MYP for the way in which it clarified key concepts. They also pointed to the October 2016 joint workshop between the IASC Humanitarian Development Nexus and the UN Working Group on Transitions as a significant and sustained discussion on MYP which may not have taken place pre-WHS.

77. Capacity and leadership were key elements for interviewees for strengthened MYP post-WHS, and it was noted that there was continued unmet demand for additional capacity at country level, with a need for people with the right expertise who:

- Bridge the different understandings of the different planning mechanisms.
- Have a good understanding of how the different pillars of the UN system work.
- Can come in and create a common picture and help senior management with an articulation of collective outcomes linked to planning processes.

78. Interviewees pointed to the increased involvement of the World Bank as a signatory to the Grand Bargain and in relation to the Concessional Financing Facility, and financing to support refugees and host communities in Jordan and Lebanon. This is encouraging as it suggests a greater willingness of important development actors to become involved in what has previously been seen as humanitarian work. This enhances the chances for more collaborative approaches.

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2.2.2 OCHA MYP Guidance

79. OCHA’s previous HRP guidance had limited reference to MYP, listing only a number of conditions to be considered if a multi-year approach was under discussion. These included:

- The likelihood of humanitarian needs persisting for a number of years, yet “a context in which preparedness and resilience actions are possible”.
- A reasonable degree of political stability and an upward trend in “national capacity”.
- From the perspective of information and analysis: sufficient information on crop cycles, livelihood and market analyses and sufficient monitoring methods.

80. The document also recognised challenges for MYP:

- Key partners and NGOs continue to plan and develop programmes over a yearly time frame due to institutional inertia or lack of incentives from donors.
- There is still a dominance of single-year donor policies, and even where multi-year funding is available this alone does not necessarily translate into multi-year programming.
- Benchmarks are linked to budget cycles rather than more context-specific events that do not necessarily align with calendar years.
- There is a lack of global initiatives to promote MYP, and where there are such initiatives they are linked to the strong leadership of individuals.
- Planning assumptions are not informed by sound risk analysis, and where information is available it does not necessarily affect decision-making.

81. The paper also listed a number of important ideals for the planning process itself:

- A clearer focus on outcomes, rather than parallel and incoherent sets of short-term inputs and outputs (towards addressing long term needs in a sustainable way).
- The incorporation of risk modelling / analysis into humanitarian planning that can enable a more anticipatory and foreseeable approach to humanitarian response.
- An advocacy platform to highlight that many of today’s protracted crises present development challenges which require the appropriate investments and political support.

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29 OCHA (2015) An end in sight: Multi-year planning to meet and reduce humanitarian needs in protracted crises. This document has now been supplemented by an MYP tip sheet finalized in September 2016 and shared with the countries developing a MYP for 2017.
3. Main findings: Strengths and weaknesses of MYPs and factors influencing performance

3.1 Appropriateness and relevance of the MYPs to humanitarian needs, risks and country contexts

82. Given the nature of humanitarian action and the conflict and political contexts in the majority of the case-study countries, and the expectation that humanitarian aid would be needed for some time to come, a multi-year approach to planning was found to be highly appropriate.

83. In Somalia, the principle rationale for longer-term planning was the recognition by Food and Agriculture Organisation (FAO), World Food Programme (WFP) and the UN Children’s Fund (UNICEF) that a multi-year resilience approach was warranted in many, but not all parts of Somalia. A collective response was launched under the Joint Resilience Strategy (or Joint Resilience Programme) and this was the basis for the construction of the three-year CAP\(^{30}\).

84. Haiti’s TAP aimed to “replace and broaden” the Humanitarian Action Plan of 2014 and to serve “as an integrated strategic and operational plan for humanitarian aid and resilience-building”. The TAP is not a multi-year HRP but rather a Transitional Plan\(^{31}\). The overarching principle of the TAP was to better frame preparedness, resilience-building and responses to acute needs. It did so within a context clearly framed as ‘post-disaster’ whilst recognising vulnerability to future shocks. The TAP is not a planning tool for protracted, ongoing crisis but rather for a context of cyclical crisis. The framing of the TAP also echoes (interim) UNDAF guidance\(^{32}\) which explicitly links development and humanitarian planning. As was the case in Somalia, the framing of this response as multi-year was entirely appropriate to the context and noted as such by interviewees. Although a different ‘type’ of planning framework than Somalia, a similar set of issues (examined below) undermined its longevity.

85. Interviewees were clear that the role of the Sahel Strategic Response Plan (SRP) was appropriate in its vision of unifying nine countries around a multi-year goal. In and of itself, this was viewed as a welcome effort and an achievement to the extent that it managed

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\(^{30}\)This approach is an example of agencies seeking “collective, geographically specific outcomes”.

\(^{31}\)According to the UNDP guidance note on Transitional Planning, “the main distinction between a transitional appeal and a strictly humanitarian appeal lies in the nature of programme results and activities for which financing is being sought. The transitional appeal is characterized by an explicit strategic focus on the shift from humanitarian relief to recovery and reconstruction. […] characterized by a preponderance of recovery type projects, with an emphasis on supporting national actors in leading the transition from relief to development”.

\(^{32}\)‘Leave no one behind’ also requires closer coherence across the UN Charter, particularly in crisis and conflict settings where the UN needs to put the protection of those people most at risk as its central priority. The transition from emergency relief to post-crisis recovery and development is rarely linear. Effective emergency response can help protect hard-won development gains by meeting immediate needs during a crisis. Development planning must also be sensitive to the risk of humanitarian crises and be responsive to sudden shocks and changes in the needs of vulnerable populations.
to do so. It was seen as an appropriate response to a widespread regional drought which exacerbated an already precarious food-security situation. Overall, however, respondents felt that this unifying factor dissipated quite quickly, as country-level responses evolved in accordance with their specific country contexts. As the Boko Haram threat began to dominate discussions in some countries, the SRP, with its food security and resilience focus, declined quite quickly in relevance.

86. The notion of a MYP for South Sudan was appropriate at the time of its conception and construction. The rapid escalation of the conflict, however, undermined the concept and energy, and focus inevitably turned to short-term, emergency response options.

87. In Iraq, the MYP was initiated partly in response to the decision in 2014, by the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia, to contribute US $500 million to operations in the country. This created a highly unusual funding surplus, which meant that at the time of the donation, the interim appeal was 120 per cent funded. The availability of this new, significant and longer-term funding enabled a MYP to be drawn up despite the instability in the country. This was appropriate given the circumstances and allowed for other donors to commit to the MYP rather than the fully funded interim appeal, thereby helping to smooth future funding flows. This MYP, however, with its lack of longer term, strategic aims or a specific focus on resilience makes the Iraq plan quite different from the other cases.

Recommendation 1: OCHA should drive the development of multi-year high-level strategic plans that set out a vision for moving beyond the crisis in all protracted humanitarian contexts. As a first step, OCHA should establish a working group consisting of humanitarian and development stakeholders to develop further guidance - building on ongoing work - on MYP processes and tools.

1. Where ‘ideal’ conditions prevail – a stable situation with an engaged government and minimal conflict – MYPs should involve all actors and reflect the vision of MYP in which long-term needs are addressed whilst meeting emergency humanitarian needs. However, few ‘ideal’ situations are likely to exist, and so the MYP may need to be more restrictive and limited in ambition and scope.

2. Where ongoing conflict rages, and where the government is a party to the conflict, MYPs may exist largely on paper only as a set of aspirations, rather than a concrete, highly-elaborated plan. Nonetheless, even at this level, an overarching strategic plan should be discussed amongst those interested parties who are able to engage, including some or all of the following: donors, UN agencies, INGOs, NNGOs and government and opposition bodies.

3.2 Planning frameworks

3.2.1 MYPs as drivers or aggregators of strategy?

88. In each case-study, across all types of MYP, representatives of operational actors and donors interviewed for the evaluation were specifically asked to reflect on the extent to which participation in the MYP planning process affected the way in which they
undertook programming decisions (or in the case of donors, funding decisions). The answers received from the interviewees suggest strongly that collective strategies act more as aggregators of multiple actors’ individual contextual analysis and responses plans, as opposed to acting as the drivers of these individual strategies. Despite this, the joint planning exercises linked to HRPs (either annual or multi-annual) are still seen as having inherent value (they were variously described as catalysing ‘consensus building’, ‘getting everyone on the same page’, ‘building’ or ‘enhancing Government ownership’. They have a clear coordination function, but do not always have a significant impact on the way that agencies programme.

89. Programming decisions by INGOs appear to be similarly disconnected to the HRP process. Interviewees from INGOs stated consistently that they are committed in principle to participate in joint planning processes, this position having been reinforced by humanitarian reform and the IASC. In Somalia, however, INGOs were equally clear that the joint planning process, whether single- or multi-year, is not of great relevance to programmatic decisions, but was rather seen as predominantly “a UN fund-raising tool”. INGOs made programming decisions outside the HRP in bilateral talks with donors and also through donor-led resilience platforms. A number of interviewees referred to donors rather than OCHA as leading planning processes, largely as they controlled the bulk of resources.

3.2.2 Resilience in multi-year humanitarian Plans

90. The concept of building resilience as a contextually appropriate/superior means of addressing vulnerability and risk at the community level has broad buy-in in the case-study countries, and has been a significant first step in developing a multi-year approach. In general terms, resilience-based approaches to humanitarian action are those which, at a minimum, apply a ‘do no harm’ approach; do not undermine development gains; ideally contribute to sustainability (or durability); are risk-informed; take a community-centred approach; and support functioning markets using cash interventions where possible. Resilience platforms in the case-study countries tend to focus on communities, implementing sequenced and coherent interventions with inbuilt crisis modifiers, through which emergency interventions can be triggered to deal with the consequences of short-term shocks, as part of a longer-term strategy. The approach replaces the ‘traditional’ humanitarian model of repeated short-term interventions with one in which responses to shocks are built into longer-term programming cycles.

91. The concept of resilience attempts to challenge the construction and conceptualisation of relief and development as a bifurcated system and, as such, has specific implications for humanitarian planning, including multi-year humanitarian planning. The term ‘resilience’ was not consistently applied across the case-study countries, nor understood in the same way in each country. Resilience is seen by some as an overarching term which subsumes relief and development interventions. For others, it is seen from a purely humanitarian perspective, as a contextually appropriate style of humanitarian intervention. The result of the difference in viewpoints is reflected in the fact that in some countries there are separate resilience platforms which sit outside the HRP, while in other
countries, resilience activities can be found within the HRP. A wide range of activities can be viewed through a resilience lens, but there is a challenge in putting ‘less humanitarian’ resilience projects into an HRP as it risks being unfunded, as not ‘humanitarian’ enough. This issue is at the heart of the ‘prioritisation’ dilemma (discussed below in section 3.3).

92. Developing a shared understanding of resilience was a challenge across the case-study countries. In Somalia, the need for a resilience approach was widely accepted, as was a MYP framework and appeal, but a resilience approach was not deemed appropriate or possible in all areas of the country, and the exact implications of the approach were disputed. The initial drive for a resilience approach came from the heads of the three main agencies involved in the HRP. Some interviewees, however, felt that the three agencies had failed to explain adequately the practical implications of a resilience approach, or the fundamental differences involved between this approach and a more traditional one. Interviews also revealed a clear tendency for many actors in the humanitarian system to continue to make a clear distinction between resilience work and “genuine, life-saving humanitarian interventions” 33. This distinction, between needs requiring a ‘traditional’ humanitarian response and those for which a resilience approach is appropriate, inevitably sets up a tension between a longer-term (resilience) approach, and ‘traditional’ short-term interventions, which then complicates the drawing up of the humanitarian appeal. The different aims can end up competing for funds rather than appearing complementary, with the risk that the resilience work is abandoned when funds are tight in favour of more immediate ‘life-saving’ interventions.

93. Resilience programming was also problematic from the perspective of some development actors in Somalia, who argued that resilience framed the response in such a way that did not press the Government into its appropriate leading role.

94. Multi-year HRPs (and previously CAPs) should and can contain different programming styles. Taking Somalia as an example, however, it is clear that the multi-year CAP for 2013-2015 did not contain all the proposed interventions designed to build resilience, nor was it the principal planning or fundraising platform for the resilience work of non-UN actors. During the time-span of the case-study, there were four principal resilience platforms, namely, the Joint Resilience Platform - made up of three UN Agencies - and three more resilience platforms established by three major donors (in two cases with a large set of supporting donors): BRiCs, SOMREP and the USAID resilience consortium. These platforms were designed as consortia approaches through a variety of INGOs and local partners; each had its own planning, management and results framework. Many or most of the partners in BRiCs, SOMREP and the USAID platform also participated in the multi-year CAP, though this only contained a limited amount of their work from the various resilience platforms.

95. In theory, resilience programming appears to offer a very useful bridge between humanitarian and development programming. In reality, there are still a number of

33 Interview with a senior UN representative.
challenges to overcome before this can happen consistently. In some ways, these challenges are a microcosm of those linking development and humanitarian programming more generally, and thus the use of resilience platforms and approaches provides useful learning for MYP more generally.

**Recommendation 2: OCHA should explore new funding modalities with donors and agencies involved in post-WHS MYP work streams for fragile and crisis contexts which align and sequence development and humanitarian funding streams in a more coherent way.** In the interim, planners may need to review how they raise funds for emergencies so that an entire MYP is not judged solely on the funds raised against it. Local solutions will depend on contexts and the willingness of donors to provide multi-year funding. A broader range of financing options is required, along with better alignment of funding cycles between donors, humanitarian and development actors to enable short-, medium- and longer-term programmes to take place simultaneously and more coherently. Development partners, including multilateral development banks, must act on their commitments to further scale up their operations in humanitarian crises. In protracted crises, funding needs to move beyond annual project-based grants towards financing that supports flexible multi-year humanitarian programming.

### 3.3 Multi-year HRPs and combined MYP and appeal frameworks

96. In some case-study countries, strategic plans also acted as the principal, collective financial appeal. This was the case in Somalia for the 2013-15 CAP, for Haiti’s TAP and also for the MYPs in Iraq, South Sudan and oPt. In each of these cases, the planning process and fund-raising platform were linked. In launching a strategic plan that aims to solicit humanitarian and other funds, if any significant part of the framework ‘fails’ - for example, the appeal falls significantly short of its fundraising target - then the whole framework, including the strategic planning component, is in danger of collapsing. If funds are inadequate, the strategy cannot be implemented. This can lead to a situation in which, if plans are designed with a budget in mind that is acceptable to donors but funding is tight, then longer-term programmes - which might reduce humanitarian needs in the future - are disadvantaged and may be excluded. This can undermine efforts to build more coherence between humanitarian and development actors, and is discussed at greater length below. This does not, of course, prevent humanitarian actors from identifying synergies and areas for complementary work with development partners, which may provide longer-term support outside the humanitarian plan with development funding. However, such synergies then sit within separate planning and funding processes.

97. For UN agencies, HRPs remain essential as fundraising documents and advocacy tools. The extent to which this is the case varies from context to context, but interviews suggest that it holds true overall. In Somalia, for example, although each agency in the Somalia Resilience Platform has its own fundraising platform, the HRP is the only collective appeal. Critically, in some contexts, stand-alone HRPs are seen as providing access to humanitarian funding that would otherwise not be available. Haiti provided a case in
point, where the introduction of an HRP, shortly after the launch of the TAP, was justified on the basis that this would allow access to a significant grant from the CERF.

98. The principle of impartiality dictates that aid should prioritise the most urgent cases, and so humanitarian assistance has the concept of ‘prioritisation’ hardwired into its basic logic and it is central to the HRP process. Prioritisation criteria, agreed during planning, aid in the appropriate sequencing of interventions and implementation. Prioritisation has an important operational value, of course, but the degree to which it is important depends on the level of funding available. Where funding is tight, more attention is needed to ensure the most important projects are funded first. However, when appeals are launched, it is often not clear what funding will be available, so those drawing up the appeal need to make a judgment as to what would be a ‘reasonable ask’ of donors. An ‘over-inflated’ appeal can risk failure. This can mean that resilience approaches are limited within or even excluded from ‘competitive’ humanitarian funding appeals. Multiple evaluations of country-based pooled funds have noted this challenge. Current reporting from country-based pooled funds continues to demonstrate the dilemma.

99. In short, the principle of impartiality and strictly prioritised needs, particularly where funding is scarce, works against the inclusion of resilience activities, even within the span of any given year. The current interaction of needs and funding lends itself to working in the ‘immediate’: fixed, short time-spans compatible with the ‘snapshot’ of urgent outputs provided by the Humanitarian Needs Overview (HNO).

100. Given that humanitarian funding is in constant deficit, donor commitments to longer-term objectives risk being diverted to acute needs as these needs emerge. This has the potential to undermine multi-year commitments and multi-year programmes even where these have the aim of reducing the scale of the humanitarian response spending in the long term. As a result, separate donor-led resilience platforms have been created outside of the collective appeal process. To bring these activities together as envisaged in current MYP aspirations requires overcoming this prioritisation dilemma.

3.4 Coordination, leadership and continuity
3.4.1 Cluster coordination

101. In the case-study countries (with the exception of Haiti), cluster coordination remained at the centre of the organisational structure of humanitarian assistance. Needs are identified and programmatic responses are selected and aggregated for presentation through the

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34 Whilst interviews confirmed clearly that CERF funding was one of the main justifications for the stand-alone humanitarian plan, CERF rules and guidance do not require such a stand-alone plan, either for the rapid response or underfunded emergencies windows, and CERF has consistently funded aid in countries without an HRP.

35 “...the HRF prioritized life-saving interventions over those primarily intended to build resilience and recovery” - Ethiopia Humanitarian Response Fund 2015 Annual Report – Executive summary. This is one example of a widespread phenomenon.

36 This problem has already been identified in multiple evaluations of the operations of UN-led country-based pooled funds and their suitability for funding preparedness and resilience.
cluster system and into the HRP. The cluster process has been central to recent rounds of humanitarian reform. Clusters are important features of the humanitarian system, but the way in which they currently work can frustrate a more coherent approach that links shorter- and longer-term activities.

102. INGOs interviewed presented a picture in which, typically, programmatic planning frameworks, often covering several years, are first drawn up internally, albeit involving ongoing discussions with donors, with a number of factors determining areas of intervention and programmatic scope. The HRP (multi-year or annual) is organised along cluster lines and seeks to present a set of projects according to collectively agreed priorities. To fit into this process, INGOs submit project sheets to the cluster lead in accordance with the agreed priorities i.e. a sub-set of their operational plan or ongoing operations. For those already participating in resilience consortia, and in the case of an annual HRP, this can involve artificially deconstructing multi-sectoral and multi-annual programmes into single-year, single-sector projects. Some projects are accepted, others rejected after discussions with the cluster lead. Accepted projects are entered into the appeal as a collective response strategy, as well as for fundraising purposes. INGOs reported that whether or not these projects were already funded, either in part or in full, had no bearing on their presentation in the appeal. Thus the HRP/CAP is not always a true strategic collective plan (and appeal), but rather a somewhat arbitrary aggregation of projects, with some activities sitting outside the plans, and other already-funded activities forming part of the plans/appeals. The logic of this manner of HRP construction via clusters makes more sense for rapid-onset, short-scale, single-sector appeals, but can work against resilience and longer-term approaches. That said, clusters do have the potential to play a role in bridging humanitarian and development work as many of the cluster leads and partners are also implementing development programmes.

3.4.2 Leadership and continuity

103. The case-studies showed that strong and consistent leadership had the potential to overcome some of the systemic challenges in implementing full MYP processes. The other side of the coin was that changes in leadership could dramatically undermine MYP if the incoming RC/HCs had a different approach or outlook. Interviews in a number of the case-study countries contained criticism of previous leaders and their strategic approaches. If MYPs can only work successfully where RC/HCs are championing the plan, inevitably changes in leadership (or vacuums of leadership) can have a substantial impact on such a plan.

104. The change of the Haiti HC just six weeks after the launch of the TAP was cited by a large number of interlocutors as a key blow to the implementation of the plan: “the owner should not have left”. The incoming HC reportedly prioritised oversight of the support to the upcoming elections over the existing TAP which was then effectively derailed. A similar picture emerges in the Sahel. An HC - identified as a strong leader - invested energy in the SRP and in building consensus around it. The incoming HC, however, had a different vision and approach. In Iraq, the HC arriving shortly after the launch of the MYP took the view
that a tightly prioritised plan was more appropriate to the evolving conflict. More generally in Iraq, a very high level of international staff turnover (both OCHA and clusters) was observed as having had a negative impact on the stability of coordination and planning processes.

105. The evaluation noted a pattern of expansion and contraction of some MYPs, partly as a consequence of a change in leadership. A number of the MYPs studied were launched as more expansive and with an ‘ask’ to donors significantly higher than a more traditional humanitarian appeal. This is not surprising, for the concept of resilience, and working towards the longer-term, tends to bring in a range of additional activities and increases appeal totals. The Somalia CAP was costed at US$3.8 billion for three years, Iraq’s plan required US$2.2 billion and Haiti’s TAP US$401 million both over two years. All three were quite quickly abandoned (in some cases remaining in name only.)

106. In each case, the incoming RC/HC drove the production of a pared-down, sharply prioritised emergency appeal at much lower cost. In each case this was justified in part by the low level of funding for the incumbent plan. This phenomenon is linked to the prioritisation dilemma above, and to the fact that the same humanitarian funding source is being asked to fund different activities. The overall size of HRPs as appeals, and the level of funding counted against them, remains of central importance to HC/RCs. UN leadership at the country level continues to place great importance on having a plan which is adjusted to the ‘market’. Where the funding comes from the same humanitarian pot, problems then arise with a larger ask.

107. Haiti’s TAP was launched in March 2015 and initially appealed for US$401 million for a period of two years, of which US$141 million were for acute needs. The urgent request for humanitarian funding which followed in August 2015 covered only a period of 5 months for which it requested US$25.5 million to “respond to the most urgent humanitarian needs”. The 2016 HRP is costed at US$193.8 million “to provide critical life-saving and livelihoods recovery assistance”. Interviewees felt that, for understandable reasons, the planning cycles were chosen based on funding mobilisation considerations rather than the transitional context. Given that the TAP failed to find funding, there was little alternative.

108. In Somalia, in late 2013, less than a year after the launch of the 2013-15 CAP, a new HC/RC arrived after a period of interim heads. The new HC quickly took the view that the multi-year CAP was too large an ask for donors, in part because of the resilience work that the plan contained. Cluster leads recalled a specific instruction to “try to limit resilience” activities for 2014; to all intents and purposes reinstating a stand-alone SRP for 2014. Again,

38 OCHA Haiti: Urgent Request for Humanitarian Funding, August 2015, p.6
39 Haiti HRP 2016, foreword by the humanitarian coordinator.
40 In the general sense, the view of the HC is that humanitarian plans (HRP in this case) should refocus on humanitarian assistance with measurements that allows the identification of genuine lifesaving indicators. “Other programming aspects such as resilience or development should have a different fundraising instrument.”
this points to the prominence of the CAP as a fundraising tool, rather than a planning tool. In the Iraq HRP, which replaced the previous MYP, the urgent nature of the appeal is central to its title\(^ {41}\) and the ‘rebranding’\(^ {42}\) of its information portal.

109. In the Sahel region, the incoming HC in Chad wanted to downsize the 2016 HRP with a view to imposing tighter prioritisation to reduce the overall budget. As he arrived in the country late into the process, these changes were not applied for the 2016 plan yet but there is an agreement to go through the exercise for 2017.

**Recommendation 3:** OCHA should consider adapting the coordination model in protracted crises to include more joined-up work by and between clusters as well as options for geographic-based coordination modalities. Just as development and humanitarian actors need to work better together, so do the sectoral response teams to ensure the most optimal response.

**Recommendation 4:** The ERC should plan carefully and well-ahead for any change of senior leadership in protracted crises taking into account the potential impact of the timing of the leadership change on the existing plans. OCHA should put measures in place to ensure a smooth hand-over process between the incumbents.

3.5 MYPs as combining or linking humanitarian and development frameworks

110. One of the perceived benefits of MYP is that it should encourage and facilitate closer linkages between and coherence across intervention types. This does not mean that development interventions need to be within the MYPs. Linkages, synergies and coherence with development work can be enhanced by identifying specific interventions by development partners for areas/themes/population groups targeted by humanitarians but which remain outside the humanitarian MYPs. Humanitarian work could then still theoretically be supported by work addressing root causes/vulnerabilities of needs. Only the TAP amongst the case-study countries evaluated sought to integrate humanitarian and development planning frameworks. This section looks at the practical, structural, political, and philosophical tensions between humanitarian structures and other forms of intervention in the case-study countries, as well as examples of good practice.

3.5.1 Joint work and analysis with development, peace and security, and national actors

111. In many fragile and conflict-affected contexts, there is a deficit of development action, and where this does take place it is often under-resourced. As a result, humanitarians find themselves drawn into costly long-term substitution with (often) yearly emergency budgets. ‘Transcending’ the humanitarian-development divide requires a boost in development action and funding in fragile and conflict-affected states with greater risk

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\(^{41}\) ‘Iraq on the brink’

\(^{42}\) ‘save-iraq.info’ - ‘Only urgent action can save Iraq and its people.’
tolerance, earlier engagement, and more flexible and context-adaptable instruments and programming by development actors. A MYP will not succeed on its own if development action is not at scale.

112. Despite the theoretical advantages of a closer relationship between development and humanitarian actors, in practice there is often an architectural gap for such a relationship. In purely structural terms, case-studies showed a familiar pattern: from the perspective of development actors, a government lead was appropriate, but the requisite structures either did not exist, did not map adequately onto humanitarian or transitional architecture, or were undermined by a lack of political will or capacity. Ultimately, this tended to result in weak or collapsed frameworks and a re-assertion of ‘binary aid logic’.

113. Haiti’s TAP stands out among the case-study countries as an integrated transitional plan; a context in which there were few political and principled barriers to linking relief and development systems. Overall, interviewees in Haiti concluded that even though the context was ripe for a transitional approach, the institutional environment was not.

114. The TAP was conceived as replacement for the previous humanitarian plan and a bridging mechanism to a National Development Plan (NDP). This was in line with Government plans to ‘reclaim’ sovereignty over aid delivery43 though the Government did not yet have the capacity to take on the coordination of such a plan. As a result, given the absence of clusters and the humanitarian coordination architecture (already disbanded), the development of the TAP was overseen by an ad-hoc Steering Committee and sectoral working groups, which brought together Government, external development and humanitarian actors over several months.

115. Once the TAP was constructed, however, the RC/HC did not have the authority to create any permanent/institutionalised mechanism for the monitoring of its implementation. Furthermore, key UN agencies were actively opposed to such an idea, as they saw it as weakening efforts to hand over coordination responsibilities to the Government. Whilst key Government actors were involved in the TAP’s construction, they lacked the necessary level of ownership of it and viewed the NDP as the priority instrument, some taking the view that funding coming through the TAP was money diverted to UN or NGOs that might otherwise have come through Governmental channels. There was no incentive for continuation of the Steering Committee that oversaw the development of the plan, particularly given the lack of funding for it, and this left an oversight, accountability and monitoring void. Interviews suggest that agencies involved largely reverted to pre-existing plans.

116. Despite its problems, however, the process of development of the TAP was perceived as highly inclusive and one which succeeded in creating a consensus amongst a diverse group of actors on the appropriate direction of travel. This was viewed as a significant

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43 Interview with UN staff
achievement in and of itself, and was valued as a unique opportunity to bring together divided communities of actors.

117. Somalia represents a case where political and principled barriers to collaboration remain. In Somalia, the work of external development actors is typically framed as support to the federal Government’s own development plans and priorities. In keeping with similar contexts, representatives of the federal Government in Mogadishu have expressed frustration with their apparent exclusion from discussions around humanitarian assistance (and control over the resources). A proposal was put forward by the Government (with UNDP in support) to include a humanitarian pillar within the National Development Plan. This idea was rejected by members of the humanitarian community (including the incumbent HC), on the basis that the independence of humanitarian assistance remained paramount. A number of humanitarian actors had concerns about the application of humanitarian principles, their ability to negotiate access and organisational security. This argument applies very much in some areas of the country and is less applicable in others. Given the fluidity of the conflict, it is extremely challenging to present a detailed picture of areas where this is a specific concern/requirement and to project this over the course of a year, let alone more. Albeit with many nuances, the overall picture is familiar: development is largely locked into the Government system, and humanitarian assistance is locked outside, and the two systems have little interface. Indeed, a senior UN manager described ‘rigid’ structures, with difficulties even in sharing data between the two systems. The same manager recognised the need to establish consistent and effective communication between humanitarian and development systems, in part by creating a culture of (and a mechanism for) information sharing as a first step.

118. Resilience appears to offer a ‘technical bridge’ between humanitarian and development interventions. Indeed some operational agencies described their resilience work as existing on a continuum between relief and development. In terms of collective planning, however, there was little evidence at the time of the field visit of joint analysis or joint thinking, largely as a result of entrenched institutional positions.

119. At the time of the visit to Myanmar, and specifically as a result of the ongoing political transition, there was somewhat of a hiatus between development planning frameworks. The previous Government had developed short-, medium- and long-term development plans, and the new Government was in the process of reviewing them. In part, this resulted in a diversity of interim plans developed by operational agencies, donors and the International Financial Institutions (IFIs) present in country. These plans had various time frames and orientations, essentially waiting for the newly formed government to refresh national development plans. At the time of the visit, the first Myanmar United Nations Development Assistance Framework (UNDAF) in decades was scheduled to be drafted in 2017, with a start date of 2018.

120. In Myanmar, as well as being a fundraising tool, the HRP is also important as an advocacy tool - a statement from humanitarian actors that it was inappropriate to subsume the principled humanitarian response within any other framework, or to let the appeal lapse
whilst waiting for the construction of a national or UN-led plan. Support for the 2016 HRP came from OCHA, INGOs and key donors who were insistent on the need to retain an advocacy and fundraising platform for protection programming and needs best addressed through humanitarian intervention. At the national level, there was limited appetite for joint planning or analysis, despite Myanmar having been selected as a counter-factual case-study because of the long standing nature of the humanitarian response and the perception that joint planning might bring coherence between humanitarian and other forms of intervention. It seems that while MYP ought to bring these benefits, consensus on the concept at the national level was not yet possible, though it is important to note that the country was in the midst of a significant transition from one government to another.

121. Whilst there were challenges to the development of a MYP at the national level, the Rakhine Plan, under construction at the time of the field visit took a multi-year, multi-faceted approach, coherent across humanitarian, development, political and other initiatives in a single geographical area. It took a phased approach, including a longer-term plan; in this respect reminiscent of the holistic country plan in place in Lebanon. Thus the conditions for MYP can vary within as well as between countries 44.

3.5.2 Challenges with country-level strategies

122. In two of the primary case-study countries, there were problems in trying to frame a collective response strategy at the national level, because of conflict in one or more parts of the country. In both Myanmar and Somalia (and in many other protracted crises), distinct areas inside the national boundaries are the subject of conflict and/or political tensions with the government, and require a principled humanitarian response independent of government. As development actors tend to engage at the central level, this need for humanitarian actors to remain independent can act as a significant barrier to greater alignment.

123. A significant number of interviewees (both at field and headquarters level) recognised the importance of geographically specific, sub-national planning. There are a number of examples within the case-study countries: resilience planning in Somalia is an example in that it requires an inter-agency focus on a set of specific communities. The Rakhine Plan in Myanmar acknowledges the need for a coherent and simultaneous set of actions in the same areas.

124. In the Sahel, interlocutors feel that the “one size fits all” HNO/HRP approach needs to be fundamentally changed to accommodate contexts such as Burkina Faso or Mauritania where there are residual humanitarian caseloads which need access to humanitarian

\[44\] Reasons for the emergence of a MYP in Rakhine are very context-specific, but include the fact that there was a strong commitment from key donors to engage in such a way and to challenge the government to address some of the underlying drivers of the crisis.
funding but where the situation no longer justifies a full-blown HRP. These countries did indeed discontinue HRPs in 2017.

3.5.3 Linkages with national partners

125. A key aspiration for MYP has been the greater engagement of national actors. In the case-study countries, MYP has so far had no major effect on creating stronger linkages with national partners in terms of the planning process. This may only have been the case in the examples at which we looked, but it would appear to suggest that, for national civil society to be afforded greater access to planning and resources will require an explicit and proactive plan to enable them to do so.

3.5.4 Ongoing challenges of collective action

126. In a number of the case-study countries, there was a notable emphasis on finding ‘durable solutions’ for displacement, this being an important step towards reducing humanitarian workloads. For example, in Somalia, the humanitarian system has provided support for a very high and very static number of Internally Displaced People (IDPs) over eleven consecutive years, making this a very significant portion of the overall humanitarian workload. However, the political and developmental interventions needed to create such solutions are not humanitarian work per se. There can be a tendency for this work to be ring-fenced from other collective, strategic planning processes, but this needs to be tackled if overall planning is to be done in the most effective way.

127. Disaster preparedness is – like durable solutions - another vital element of overall country plans that can significantly help reduce future humanitarian need, yet often is not a significant part of HRPs. For collective planning to work at its most effective, this also needs to be brought into the equation.

Recommendation 5: OCHA should convene or participate fully in a working group consisting of humanitarian and development stakeholders to develop further guidance on MYP processes and tools, which include options for different planning models adapted to various contexts. Such guidance should build on ongoing work, such as UNDP’s Post-Disaster Needs Assessment and Recovery and Peacebuilding Assessment (RBPA) processes. In keeping with the other recommendations of this evaluation, this does not assume that ‘one size fits all’. Guidance should reflect the roles of the respective systems in situations where stand-alone humanitarian planning (developed in line with OCHA guidance) is appropriate; where jointly constructed (transitional) plans are appropriate; and where high-level, strategic plans are being developed. Such work should build upon the increased momentum since the WHS, including the

45 Revised guidance on RPBA is currently being developed, and this could serve as an opportunity for improved alignment and complementarity between development and humanitarian processes.
Commitment to Action and other initiatives, such as the October 2016 joint workshop between the IASC Humanitarian Development Nexus and the UN Working Group on Transitions.\textsuperscript{46}

3.6 Systemic and structural challenges for MYP

3.6.1 Ongoing demand for annualized products

128. It is important to differentiate between the HRP as a product, and the strategic planning process that is one distinct component within it. A number of the case-study multi-year frameworks represent clear efforts on the part of implementers at country level to reorganise and evolve beyond a simple humanitarian/development divide. However, in the case-study countries, demand from donors and agency headquarters has not always evolved to match the multi-year ambition of the new planning frameworks. There remains an ongoing demand for a nationally and annually aggregated presentation of the context, needs, requisite humanitarian response, and humanitarian funding requirement. In short, during the period under review, the annual HRP remained a cornerstone of existing systemic logic.

129. The central importance of discrete humanitarian plans was stated consistently by donor representatives at field and headquarters level. Research\textsuperscript{47} suggests that the basis for funding decisions vary by donor and, in reality, tend to be contingent on multiple criteria. In interviews, however, donor representatives continued to state that an annual HRP was required as justification, \textsuperscript{48} or part justification, for decision making: one donor representative at HQ called the HRP “extremely important for internal budget allocation processes”. Even when decisions are devolved to field level and informed largely or solely by internal analysis, OCHA’s published figures of ‘targeted populations’ remain important as a means of justifying funding decisions.

130. For a number of donors, the distinctly humanitarian nature of an appeal is key. One donor in Haiti mentioned that because the TAP was not a ‘humanitarian’ appeal, it was difficult to use it as a basis to justify a contribution from the humanitarian budget line. Another donor highlighted the need to keep distinct but complementary plans for humanitarian action, development and stabilisation: “‘coordinated co-existence’ between humanitarian and development planning [ought to be] ... the level of ambition.”

131. In summary, and across case-study countries to a varying extent, senior managers at the country level undertook planning processes which represented localised ‘evolutions’ that stretched the single-year tradition. At the same time, however, there was still a demand at the global level for a set of annualised products; and the mechanics of the humanitarian system at country level remained geared to meeting this demand. Donor-driven resilience

\textsuperscript{46}https://interagencystandingcommittee.org/system/files/3._joint_workshop_comendium_of_document_links.pdf
\textsuperscript{47}http://www.oecd.org/dac/governance-peace/conflictfragilityandresilience/criteriaforwhowhatandwheretofund.htm
\textsuperscript{48}This point was stressed by donor representatives in Myanmar and elsewhere ‘the HRP is critical’.
consortia (as above in Somalia, Myanmar and South Sudan) have sidestepped this problem by taking themselves out of the HRP system. Some of the donors to these consortia have flexible funding, or ‘work arounds’ by allocating funding from different internal streams into these platforms or pools.

3.6.2 Key tools and components of the existing HRP model retain an annual logic

132. The Somalia case-study demonstrated the challenges of using MYP whilst continuing to utilise OCHA’s OPS which required response plans to be articulated in annualised, projectised components. OPS was unable to deal with Somalia’s three-year project sheets as presented for the CAP. In part, this was an issue of compatibility with Somalia’s country-level platform in which ‘25-page project sheets’ logged details of the three-year projects. These were retrospectively and laboriously broken down into single-year components to fit with OPS. One UN agency focal point recalled the specific challenges at that time related to internal and OCHA systems and their incompatibility with a three-year framework: [the framework was extended but] “we didn’t change the systems – we didn’t change the mechanisms”. Somalia and Haiti also revealed challenges for OCHA’s FTS (discussed below).

133. In Haiti, OPS was not used, reportedly because the authors of the TAP did not want to code projects or to create a distinction between humanitarian- and development-oriented interventions. There was a concern that this would alienate development donors, since it would defeat the purpose of focusing on outcomes instead of implementing projects (perceived as a ‘piece-meal’ approach). The decision was further supported by the fact that, in the absence of the clusters, there was no agreed project review mechanism that would have had the authority to vet project proposals for inclusion into the document. Instead, the TAP encouraged donors “to pledge funding at the Outcome or Output level and to develop projects and programmes directly with partners contributing to the realisation of results”. The downside to this approach was that the aggregate cost of some outputs or outcomes were extremely high (e.g. “livelihood protection for chronically food insecure” was costed at US$47.52 million) and this made it a very challenging funding ask of donors, whose processes are geared towards project-level funding levels.

134. The level of contributions to the TAP was seen as an important measurement of success, so the inability of the appeal to record contributions eventually became an ‘Achilles’ heel’ for the plan. At the time of its preparation, two options for resource tracking were discussed. The preferred option was to use the national aid-tracking database. Initially, the technical unit in charge of the tool confirmed that it could be used for tracking, but later, discussions with the Ministry concerned stalled due to a change in the staff involved.

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49 Interview with Somalia cluster lead.
50 Ibid
51 TAP (p. 2)
52 Run by the Ministry of Planning and Aid Coordination, supported by UNDP and the World Bank, aiming to track all external aid for Haiti and its alignment with the National Development Plan
The Deputy Special Representative of the Secretary-General’s (DSRSG’s) office then turned to OCHA to see whether FTS could be used, but this was not possible as the FTS was not able to record multi-year contributions, nor designed to track development funding and its sources. The only remaining option was an ad-hoc tracking system, using Excel spreadsheets, which also eventually failed, reportedly due to limited staff capacity in the DSRSG’s office. As well as the technical problems in tracking aid to the TAP, some agencies were reluctant to record existing grants as contributions to the TAP because of internal fundraising systems.

135. Somalia also presented challenges to the use of the FTS to monitor overall spend. Whilst donors funded resilience activities from a mix of development and humanitarian funding streams, the former was not captured in FTS. So, European Union Humanitarian Aid and Civil Protection Department (ECHO) funding to the European Union (EU) resilience framework was recorded in the FTS, but EU development funding was not, producing a partial picture. The distinction between humanitarian and development funding was reinstated due to a need for the global system to make a distinction that many actors are trying to overcome.

3.6.3 Timing: Frequency and duration of planning processes

136. In every case-study country, there was a plethora of joint and individual agency planning frames. Only in a few cases was there a conscious alignment of planning frames. For example, Haiti’s TAP was designed to align with the Mission’s Strategic Plan and proposed mission phase out. Nonetheless, the time frame of two years for the TAP was acknowledged as a compromise that was not completely suitable for either the humanitarian or the development communities, in particular the latter, for whom it was perceived as far too short. This was the case both practically, given that development projects have a very long lead-time and conceptually, as resilience-building/development programmes require a longer span than two years. There was reluctance amongst some development actors to align planning milestones with the TAP as they considered the two-year time frame insufficient to engage in sustainable development activities with true ownership by the Government.

137. In Somalia, the multiple resilience frameworks were examples of planning for collective outcomes along similar timelines, but this planning happened outside and independent of CAP and HRP processes.

138. Interviewees at both headquarters and field level acknowledged the existence of ‘process fatigue’ amongst partners. Planning processes in all countries, but particularly in Myanmar and for Somalia’s three-year CAP, were perceived as extremely heavy, with repercussions for engagement in the following years. Even at the strategic level, MYP needs to have the full support of multiple partners. If it is perceived as adding an additional burden and layer of bureaucracy over and above that of the annual HRP’s, there is a risk of disengagement.
139. Some interviewees noted that longer-term strategic planning processes might make specific reference to event horizons other than one or even several years. Especially in the case of transitional plans, for example, these could mirror the cycle of development plans or political cycles.

3.6.4 Needs assessment and risk management

140. There has been significant investment in collective needs assessment for humanitarian action. In part, this is linked to broader humanitarian reform efforts for better evidenced responses. The production of a HNO at the centre of each collective plan/appeal is a significant achievement. Current HRP planning, particularly when managed through a dominant cluster system with cluster-managed pooled funding, has a strong focus on objectives at the output level and prioritisation of the most immediate needs. However, and as frequently raised in interviews, MYP requires an underpinning analysis and continuous situation monitoring which differentiates root causes from short-term needs and so, for MYP, there will need to be a different needs assessment process, one that specifically considers needs in phases: short-, medium- and long-term, or something more specific according to context. This requires change and will be a challenge when collective needs assessment processes are still relatively new.

141. Although few of the case-study MYPs contained elements which constituted a risk management framework, things do seem to be improving in terms of risk modelling, particularly in respect of the resilience platforms. These generally had a crisis modifier (USAID, European Commission) or internal risk facility (United Kingdom) as means to adapt the programme style during short-term shocks (effectively a means of protecting the longer-term investment in the event of short-term shocks through emergency intervention).

142. Encouragingly, the most recent multi-year framework from Somalia (published after the field visit for this evaluation) describes the need to develop a risk management framework and acknowledges the need for scenario analysis and risk management.

3.6.5 M&E Frameworks, including linkages between high level plans and national / annual HRPs (measurement frameworks)

143. Where MYPs have ‘strategic objectives’—e.g. the Sahel and the new Somalia plan—these tend to be high-level, general statements of intent, framed in such a way that defies easy measurement and often with no measurement mechanism is in place. The Somalia Plan 2016-18 is typical, laying out 7 strategic outcomes, including:

- Fewer people in need of life-saving humanitarian assistance and protection in particular those in ‘emergency’ and ‘crisis’ situations, through the efficient and effective delivery of timely, well-targeted support and services where needed and in line with people’s needs.
Basic social services, including education, health, nutrition and Water Sanitation and Hygiene (WASH) delivered to vulnerable people when needed, where needed and at scale.

- Strengthened humanitarian protection services by preventing and responding to pervasive protection violations against minorities, IDPs, and other vulnerable civilians, and with a gender-sensitive approach, including increased advocacy.

The plan contains no metrics, baselines, or targets against which to measure progress. It does not refer to exit strategies or sub-national components.

The higher level the plan, the bigger the challenge in attributing change at the ground level and putting realistic measurement systems in place. This is not to say that there must not be higher level objectives – indeed, there must – but these should be complemented by more specific lower-level objectives that can be measured and monitored.

Recommendation 6: In protracted contexts, HC/RC offices should be staffed to explicitly support MYP given the increased workload involved in bringing together more actors and planning further forward in the future. This might include positions which subsume or complement OCHA’s normal functions for solely humanitarian planning, such as posts which explicitly link humanitarian and development systems for information management, needs assessment, monitoring and evaluation etc.

Recommendation 7: As part of ongoing work, OCHA should ensure that all of its internal systems, structures and tools (notably FTS and OPS) can handle multi-year projects and financial contributions where MYPs are in place.

Recommendation 8: To ensure successful MYPs, OCHA should develop guidance on the preparatory steps needed in advance of launching MYP. This process guidance should give careful consideration to the suitability and durability of the administrative structures and tools required, as well as complementarity of the timeframe proposed with pre-existing planning frameworks.

Recommendation 9: OCHA should work with other stakeholders to develop:

- A collective needs assessment model which specifically considers needs in phases: short-, medium- and long-term. Recognising the heavy investment in collective needs assessment in recent years, such a process should build on what exists. Needs assessment should start with a collective root-cause analysis, which incorporates data from development, humanitarian and peace-building actors who may be present, as well as national actors, and which re-defines the way ‘needs’ are presented, away from simply immediate and urgent need.

- A risk-management framework which embraces the concepts of crisis management and risk-contingent financing.
• An M+E framework needs to be developed as an integral component of all MYPs, incorporating benchmarks against which to measure progress. While systemic guidance will be useful, each framework is likely to be very context-specific and will vary programme-by-programme.
Conclusion

145. The evaluation finds that multi-year humanitarian planning can be appropriate in many different circumstances and in many different forms, and should always be considered where there is a population persistently in need of humanitarian assistance. In keeping with the Secretary-General’s report for the WHS, the evaluation also concludes that one-size-fits-all approaches do not work, and that the planning process needs to be tailored to the context. It is important to note that multi-year humanitarian planning is not synonymous with subsuming humanitarian action under a development paradigm. Sometimes, a MYP will be a more limited, humanitarian-only plan. At other times and in other contexts, it may include development and government actors.

146. Despite the theoretical benefits of MYP, in practice it can be a significant challenge to design and implement a MYP successfully, even in a relatively limited version. In all case-study countries, senior staff and partners highlighted the challenges to doing so, some going as far as to say that the MYP experience had been a failure. It is important to note, however, that few of the examples studied contained all the elements of best practice described in more recent policy documents. Also, there was no specific policy advice or guidance in place at the time of the development of the plans under review. Thus, the evaluation team supports the use and development of MYPs whilst simultaneously recognising the difficulties with those undertaken to date.

147. To embed MYP into the humanitarian and development system requires systemic change, and is a major undertaking with significant challenges to overcome. The process started some years ago and post-WHS, and there is further momentum building, all of which is very positive and encouraging. The future shape of MYPs will emerge from the discussions currently being held by agencies engaged on this post-WHS work stream. Such work is of utmost relevance and importance, and should continue. Going forward, pragmatism is likely to be required. No single MYP model is likely to work in all contexts, and it is important that the system continues to experiment, to learn, and to share this learning.

148. The ‘multi-year’ element of the move to MYPs is only one of the elements of the change that is being pushed for in the system. A key agreement since the WHS is the need to work more towards collective outcomes over a longer time-frame, highlighting what action is required by humanitarian and development actors as well as government and national actors wherever possible, based on comparative advantage. While successful MYP draws on greater coherence with development and other actors in the same operational space, humanitarian action needs to remain grounded in humanitarian principles. Progress will require genuine systemic change and new, substantive ways of working, which look at root causes and collective outcomes. MYP should be seen as one means to that end, and given the chronic nature of many ‘emergencies’, this is to be welcomed.

149. The overarching conclusion of the evaluation is that the MYP process has great potential but that there are a number of challenges to bring it to fruition – challenges encountered in the efforts and experiences and which are identified and discussed in this evaluation.
report. WHS and post-WHS commitments and work streams towards joint analysis and outcomes-based framing can take the concept forward, but those creating MYPs must also be cognisant of the challenges which have undermined attempts at MYP to date. A number of these difficulties are fundamental and systemic, woven into the fabric of existing aid architecture. Others are beyond the purview of OCHA and the humanitarian actors. The aim of the evaluation team throughout has been to highlight these challenges for learning purposes, so that future MYP iterations can have a greater chance of success.

Specific Conclusions and Recommendations

150. The evaluation found that, in the retrospective case-studies, the implementation of MYPs was undermined by the ‘binary’ logic of humanitarian and development thinking, funding and planning. Given these challenges, high-level, strategic planning frameworks with no direct link to fundraising, were the most stable. Indeed, it would seem logical that all humanitarian contexts should have, at the very least, a multi-year high-level strategic plan that sets out a vision for moving beyond the crisis. Buy-in and ownership of the collective set of operational actors is key.

Recommendation 1: OCHA should drive the development of multi-year high-level strategic plans that set out a vision for moving beyond the crisis in all protracted humanitarian contexts. As a first step, OCHA should establish a working group consisting of humanitarian and development stakeholders to develop further guidance - building on ongoing work on MYP processes and tools

1. Where ‘ideal’ conditions prevail – a stable situation with an engaged government and minimal conflict – MYPs should involve all actors and reflect a vision in which long-term needs are addressed whilst meeting emergency humanitarian needs. However, few ‘ideal’ situations are likely to exist, and so MYP may need to be more limited in ambition and scope.

2. Where ongoing conflict rages, and where the government is a party to the conflict, MYPs may exist largely on paper only as a set of aspirations, rather than a concrete, highly-elaborated plan. Nonetheless, even at this level, an overarching strategic plan should be discussed amongst those interested parties who are able to engage, including some or all of the following: donors, UN agencies, INGOs, NNGOs and government and opposition bodies.

Combining planning and appeal frameworks

151. Linking humanitarian planning to humanitarian fund-raising over multiple years in a single process (like the HRP) invokes a fundamental problem - ‘the prioritisation dilemma’. Humanitarian funding is limited and so there will always be a risk of (and often a need to) sacrifice longer-term work to cover acute needs. This undermines the combination of acute and early recovery needs in one plan, and is a greater problem the longer the planning time frame. Chronic needs and longer-term structural issues should be addressed
outside the HRP by development and/or government partners, which are aligned coherently with humanitarian plans.

152. Resilience platforms that introduce new funding sources for longer-term work can create a parallel system not effectively tied to existing coordination and planning mechanisms and can create a barrier to coherent joined-up planning between humanitarian and development actors. A broader range of financing options is required to reduce need and vulnerability in crisis contexts in the most effective way. It is encouraging to note that donors are already taking on the challenge, with some looking into removing the distinction between humanitarian and development funding and portfolios. WB financing during the Ebola crisis is also a good sign of what can be done with a more joined-up approach.

**Recommendation 2: OCHA should explore new funding modalities with donors and agencies involved in post-WHS MYP work streams for fragile and crisis contexts which align and sequence development and humanitarian funding streams in a more coherent way.** In the interim, planners may need to review how they raise funds for emergencies so that an entire MYP is not judged solely on the funds raised against it. Local solutions will depend on contexts and the willingness of donors to provide multi-year funding. A broader range of financing options is required, along with better alignment of funding cycles between donors, humanitarian and development actors to enable short-, medium- and longer-term programmes to take place simultaneously and more coherently.

Development partners, including multilateral development banks, must act on their commitments to further scale up their operations in humanitarian crises. In protracted crises, funding needs to move beyond annual project-based grants towards financing that supports flexible multi-year humanitarian programming.

**Coordination, leadership and continuity**

153. Cluster coordination remains at the centre of the organisational structure of humanitarian assistance; needs are identified and programmatic responses are selected and aggregated for presentation through the cluster system and into the HRP. Clusters are important features of the humanitarian system, but were not designed with longer-term and resilience approaches in mind. The way in which they currently work can thwart a more coherent approach that links shorter- and longer-term activities. Encouragingly, it is reported that there are increasing examples of where they are working with development structures to enable a more coherent and effective approach over the medium and longer term.

154. Effective leadership and coordination from the RC/HC, relevant national counterparts, UN entities and other actors is needed to identify a set of collective outcomes for all based on their comparative advantage. Good leadership is of vital importance in building strong planning processes, and staff continuity also key, though extremely hard to maintain in conflict scenarios. A change in leadership can have significant negative effects, as was evidenced by the pattern of expansion and sudden contraction of some of the MYPs.
studied. A number of these MYPs were launched with an ‘ask’ to donors significantly higher than a more traditional appeal, as they included resilience and longer-term needs. However, in several cases a change in leadership resulted in the production of a pared-down, sharply prioritised emergency appeal at much lower cost. Such significant changes in plans affect the credibility of the approach with donors and partners.

**Recommendation 3:** OCHA should consider adapting the coordination model in protracted crises to include more joined-up work by and between clusters as well as options for geographic-based coordination modalities. Just as development and humanitarian actors need to work better together, so do the sectoral response teams to ensure the most optimal response.

**Recommendation 4:** The ERC should plan carefully and well-ahead for any change of senior leadership in protracted crises taking into account the potential impact of the timing of the leadership change on the existing plans. OCHA should put measures in place to ensure a smooth hand-over process between the incumbents.

**Linking development and humanitarian frameworks**

155. The theory underlying the current aid model is that humanitarian partners provide life-saving assistance and protection and withdraw as soon as is feasible, while development actors engage early and concurrently in addressing root causes of vulnerability and sources of fragility while humanitarian response is ongoing. In practice, at times only a humanitarian response is possible (for example, to protect humanitarian space).

156. In many fragile and conflict-affected contexts, there is a deficit of development action and where this does take place it is often under-resourced. Humanitarians find themselves drawn into costly long-term substitution. ‘Transcending’ the humanitarian-development divide requires a boost in development action and funding in fragile and conflict-affected states, with greater risk tolerance, earlier engagement, and more flexible and context-adaptable instruments and programming by development actors. A MYP will not succeed on its own if development action is not at scale.

157. One of the perceived benefits of MYP is that it should encourage and facilitate closer linkages between and coherence across intervention types, but there are practical, structural, political and philosophical tensions between humanitarian and other forms of intervention, as well as architectural constraint to closer cooperation. For development actors, a government lead was appropriate, but the requisite structures do not always exist, do not map onto humanitarian/transitional architecture, or are undermined by a lack of political will or capacity. This can result in collapsed frameworks and a re-assertion of the humanitarian/development divide.

158. There can be problems in framing a collective response strategy at the national level, because of conflict in one or more parts of the country. Such areas of conflict require a principled humanitarian response – independent of government. As development actors
tend to engage at the central level, the need for humanitarian actors to remain independent can act as a barrier to greater alignment. As a result there can be a need for geographically specific, sub-national planning.

159. Disaster preparedness and finding ‘durable solutions’ for displacement is an important step towards reducing humanitarian workloads, but are not humanitarian work per se. There can be a tendency for this work to be ring-fenced from the collective planning processes.

160. In the case-study countries, MYP has not had a major effect on creating stronger linkages with national partners in terms of the planning process. For national civil society to be afforded greater access to planning and resources, an explicit and proactive plan is required to enable them to do so.

**Recommendation 5:** OCHA should convene or participate fully in a working group consisting of humanitarian and development stakeholders to develop further guidance on MYP processes and tools, which include options for different planning models adapted to various contexts. Such guidance should build on ongoing work, such as UNDP’s Post-Disaster Needs Assessment and Recovery and Peacebuilding Assessment (RBPA) processes. In keeping with the other recommendations of this evaluation, this does not assume that ‘one size fits all’. Guidance should reflect the roles of the respective systems in situations where stand-alone humanitarian planning (developed in line with OCHA guidance) is appropriate; where jointly constructed (transitional) plans are appropriate; and where high-level, strategic plans are being developed. Such work should build upon the increased momentum since the WHS, including the Commitment to Action and other initiatives, such as the October 2016 joint workshop between the IASC Humanitarian Development Nexus and the UN Working Group on Transitions.

161. Recent changes in the CCA/UNDAF Guidelines to include greater attention to risks and a discussion of areas where development actors can help avert humanitarian emergencies and end dependence on humanitarian assistance are encouraging and need building upon, as does the post-WHS inter-agency think piece on methods for improved collaboration. More detailed work is needed from all actors to find new ways of collaborating. The team have been informed that there are already examples of where UNDAF and HRP are already starting to work together.

162. The concepts of "leaving no one behind" and "reaching those furthest behind first", provide a basis for shared outcomes for humanitarian and development actors, and allow for a more sustained attention to the affected population.

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53 Revised guidance on RPBA is currently being developed, and this could serve as an opportunity for improved alignment and complementarity between development and humanitarian processes.


**Recommendation 6:** In protracted contexts, HC/RC offices should be staffed to explicitly support MYP given the increased workload involved in bringing together more actors and planning further forward in the future. This might include positions which subsume or complement OCHA’s normal functions for solely humanitarian planning, such as posts which explicitly link humanitarian and development systems for information management, needs assessment, monitoring and evaluation etc.

**Systemic and structural challenges for MYP**

A number of the case-study multi-year frameworks demonstrated clear efforts on the part of implementers at country level to reorganise and evolve beyond the existing humanitarian/development divide. However, for donors, an annual HRP can be required as justification for decision-making and budget allocation purposes. Other tools, such as OCHA’s OPS and the FTS are not easily adaptable to deal with multi-year programming.

163. Overcoming the systemic challenges to successful MYP will require all actors to continue to engage in post-WHS work streams, including these focused on financing reform.

**Recommendation 7:** As part of ongoing work, OCHA should ensure that all of its internal systems, structures and tools (notably FTS and OPS) can handle multi-year projects and financial contributions where MYPs are in place.

**Timing and time frames**

164. Rushed MYP processes are counter-productive in the long run. At the country level OCHA, RC/HCs and HCTs need to be aware of the negative repercussions of launching MYPs prematurely and then appearing to abandon them. In every country where this happened, the credibility in leaders and coordinators was lost in the eyes of Government, donors and other partners. This was particularly true in Haiti given the speed with which the humanitarian appeal was launched almost immediately after the MYP had been launched.

165. A purposeful alignment of various joint and individual agency planning frames was found in a very few cases in the countries examined. There was sometimes reluctance amongst development actors to align planning milestones with those of the humanitarian MYP as they were considered too short to engage in sustainable development activities with true ownership by the Government. Longer-term strategic planning processes may need to link to specific events rather than one or even several years. Especially in the case of transitional plans, these could mirror the cycle of development plans or political cycles.

**Recommendation 8:** To ensure successful MYPs, OCHA should develop guidance on the preparatory steps needed in advance of launching MYP. This process guidance should give careful consideration to the suitability and durability of the administrative structures and tools required, as well as complementarity of the timeframe proposed with pre-existing planning frameworks.
Needs assessment, risk management and M&E

166. Current HRP planning model is based on prioritisation of the most immediate needs. MYP would require a different needs-assessment process, which differentiates root causes from short-term needs, as well as continuous monitoring of the situation and the response to inform any required adjustments to the plan.

167. MYP objectives tend to be high-level aims, framed in a way that makes measurement difficult and often with no measurement mechanism is in place. The higher level the plan, the bigger the challenge in attributing change at the ground level.

168. Although few of the case-study plans contained elements which constituted a risk-management framework, risk-modelling is becoming more prevalent, particularly in respect of the resilience platforms. These projects generally had a crisis modifier or internal risk facility as a way to adapt the programme style to protect longer-term investment in the event of short-term shocks.

Recommendation 9: OCHA should work with other stakeholders to develop:

- A collective needs assessment model which specifically considers needs in phases: short-, medium- and long-term. Recognising the heavy investment in collective needs assessment in recent years, such a process should build on what exists. Needs assessment should start with a collective root-cause analysis, which incorporates data from development, humanitarian and peace-building actors who may be present, as well as national actors, and which re-defines the way ‘needs’ are presented, away from simply immediate and urgent need.

- A risk-management framework which embraces the concepts of crisis management and risk-contingent financing.

- An M+E framework, as an integral component of all MYPs, incorporating benchmarks against which to measure progress. While systemic guidance will be useful, each framework is likely to be very context-specific and will vary programme-by-programme.
Issues to consider for successful MYP

169. Following on from and in keeping with the conclusions and recommendations above, this section provides suggestions for approaches to MYP. As above, the evaluation finds clearly that there is no ‘one-size-fits-all’ model for MYP. Each context will require the design of a contextually appropriate model. Multi-year, OCHA-led HRP’s which seek to frame humanitarian action and resilience are one possible variant; others include plans constructed jointly by humanitarian and development actors which explicitly seek to build coherence between humanitarian action and other interventions in shared operational space; and higher-level, strategic frameworks which seek to frame and guide a number of annual HRP’s. MYPs might be regional and or national; and are likely to include sub-national components as part of a national framework. For such sub-national plans, it will be necessary to consider the relationship with national planning frameworks. An important part of the preparation, therefore, is to establish what sort of MYP is likely to be successful. An overly ambitious plan increases the risk of failure and a loss of credibility. Initial consultations need to include agreement on the scope and limitations of the potential plan and openly acknowledge the conceptual challenges.

170. Pre-conditions for MYP

- A MYP will be more stable the greater the degree of political stability and the lower the likelihood of armed conflict. Significant levels of ongoing conflict and instability, and severe access challenges for humanitarian actors, create an environment in which longer-term planning is more challenging; to the extent that consideration should be given as to whether the investment in time and resources is worthwhile.
- MYP is likely to be more successful where there are national planning bodies with the capacity and the will to engage with the international community. Where such bodies exist, they should be reinforced rather than replaced.
- MYP must be demand driven. It requires the support and buy-in from a critical mass of stakeholders in any given country, including development and peace actors, and government. MYPs must be owned by institutions and not by individuals within institutions. The commitment of key donors is pivotal.
- All significant humanitarian action should happen within the collective plan and not outside as sometimes happens with the HRP’s. At the very least, planners should be aware of all the major humanitarian and development activities underway.
- Successful MYP requires a set of significant commitments by all operational actors. These include commitments by each to:
  - collective analysis
  - collective outcomes
  - work to their respective, comparative advantages
  - work towards an appropriate exit strategy
  - work proactively towards a greater participation of local actors in the response
- MYP is likely to be more successful the greater the commitment of development actors to be risk-tolerant, to engage earlier, and to ensure their plans and programmes have an in-built flexibility to change as conditions change. It will also require a commitment
by development actors to focus on reducing risk and vulnerability, and reaching those furthest behind first.

171. Timing and time frames for MYP

- Rushed MYP processes are counter-productive. Consideration needs to be given to the appropriate timing of the introduction of a MYP, and there needs to be sufficient time to draw up the plan. Overly short deadlines and turnaround times lead to frustration and disengagement. Planning frameworks that keep shifting and changing lead to a loss of credibility in those plans and in the leaders involved. A realistic calendar is needed for the design and consultation process,
- Preparation for a MYP exercise should include careful consideration of the institutional as well as the operational context. The start date and duration of a planning framework needs to consider the suitability and durability of the administrative structures which support it, the leadership required to drive and champion it, and its complementarity with pre-existing frameworks (for example, development planning cycles, electoral cycles).
- Significant planning cycles should be aligned: while there are often multiple planning frames for development work, multi-year humanitarian plans should be aligned with those which are most significant in each particular context (UNDAF, ISF, national planning frameworks). Aligned time frames would facilitate the construction and monitoring of joint theories of change and outcomes-based planning.
- Other issues of timing are also important to consider: election cycles and duration of senior UN leadership posts. Time frames should not be arbitrary or be the result of compromise to which stakeholders are not fully committed. Time frames should be connected to meaningful event horizons. MYPs should be of a duration that allows adequate time for achievement of outcomes.
- MYPs should be anchored in regular monitoring of the situation and the response and there should be regular updates of MYPs – the timing of which should depend upon the context. It may be appropriate to carry out a light review of all plans annually, but more substantive changes should, ideally, depend on clear benchmarks e.g. elections or changes in key leadership.

172. Key components of MYP:

- A strong analytical framework which brings together an assessment of risk as well as an assessment of needs and possible interventions. Whether or not the plan is jointly constructed by humanitarian and development actors and is explicitly transitional, this analytical framework would ideally be shared by humanitarian and development actors and result in a jointly constructed theory of change.
- A forward-looking view of needs and risks. Short-term, collective needs assessment should be supplemented and supported by a longer-term, risk-informed analysis.
- A risk-management framework, based on a collective analysis of potential risks and including strategies to anticipate, project, and to mitigate potential negative effects. Such strategies should include, where possible, measures to avoid risks, reduce their
frequency and/or otherwise mitigate their effect through early identification and action. Concepts such as ‘risk facilities’ or ‘crisis modifiers’ are useful. Triggers/thresholds for early action would be required as data came in suggesting a situation was deteriorating.

- An analysis of the synergies and complementarity with development, peace and other non-humanitarian frameworks, with consideration of comparative advantages of those involved.
- A shift from sectoral analysis to inter-sectoral and possibly geographically, thematically or population group-specific, integrated planning.
- A shift from activity-based thinking to outcome-based planning. Outcome-based planning should allow for the reconciliation of humanitarian and development thinking by the elaboration of geographically, thematically or population-specific short-, medium- and long-term outcomes which recognises that different sets of coherent and/or sequenced interventions are required in any given context.
- Sequenced, integrated or layered approaches to programming to ensure MYPs are implemented in an effective way.
- A prioritised and evidence-based response strategy.
- Clearly defined exit strategies for humanitarian action and a realistic, actionable strategy for increasing the role of national actors within the response.
- Funding arrangements that allow for medium- and longer-term programmes to run alongside those that cater for immediate needs.
- A set of collective outcomes and success indicators, which can be regional, national or sub-national and/or thematic (e.g. food security, durable solutions for displacement); such collective outcomes should be clearly time-bound and/or sequenced (short-, medium- and long-term objectives).
- Clear and well-funded accountability and monitoring frameworks, which measure accountability at all levels, including at the beneficiary level, and should involve partners (including host government) whenever possible with third-party independent review, beneficiary feedback system and response, etc.
- Integrated MYPs may also need strong cross-cutting components (e.g. capacity-building) that might require action at the national or sub-national level, even to reach geographically-specific stated outcomes.
- Both disaster preparedness and planning for ‘durable solutions for displacement’ are usually managed by development actors working with Government. Though often not humanitarian itself, they can have a direct and significant effect in reducing the caseload for humanitarian actions. Time frames for the negotiation and implementation of solutions for displaced populations and for disaster-preparedness, therefore, need to be considered as part of collective action. Those preparing MYPs need to take such issues and timing into account when preparing their plans to make

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56 Plans are underway to introduce INFORM at the country level for this purpose.
58 This will not be an easy transition. The weakness of the concept of ‘needs’ analysis has long since been noted. The concept has prevailed because it lends itself to the immediate, output-driven nature of ‘traditional’ humanitarian operations. Risk-based planning remains an intangible concept for some operational actors.
them more coherent with what else is going on in-country, and to help ensure humanitarian contributions work towards collective long-term goals.
Annex A: Terms of Reference

Evaluation of Multi-year Planning

Terms of Reference

Background

The number, scale and severity of humanitarian crises are increasing and the number of people in need, estimated to be 78.9 million in 2015, is higher than never before. The global humanitarian appeal increased by 400 percent in the past ten years, from $4.6 billion in 2005 to $19.5 billion in 2015. Despite unprecedented level of international humanitarian assistance, totalling $24 billion, the UN appeal fell short by $7.5 billion (38 percent) in 2014. The convergence of various global trends - such as climate change, population growth, rapid and unplanned urbanization, food and water insecurity, poverty, inequality, and mass migration - have severely hindered the operational and financial capacity of governments and humanitarian organizations to respond adequately to growing needs.

The humanitarian system is increasingly unable to disengage from chronic emergencies. Traditionally, humanitarian assistance was seen as short-term, helping people weather a shock and get back on their feet. Nowadays, protracted crises are the new norm; most of the humanitarian assistance is required for long timeframes and goes to the same countries year after year. The average duration of a humanitarian appeal is 7 years, and 90 percent of appeals last longer than three years. In fact, 89 percent of all OECD DAC international humanitarian assistance in 2013 went to medium or long-term recipient countries. Out of this total, 66 percent went to 30 countries which have been recurrently supported for more than 8 years.

A country may be in a protracted crisis for a number of reasons, including chronic or recurrent conflict and insecurity, recurrent natural disasters, protracted displacement, or a complex mix of all of these. Humanitarian assistance is increasingly responding to the underlying causes and consequences of protracted crises, which are often associated with development challenges such as poverty and limited state capacity. A recent paper by OECD argues that the humanitarian mandate has stretched beyond its core task of meeting acute needs because most major development actors have abandoned community-based programming in favor of state building.

Until 2011, UN-coordinated appeals had always been for one year or less, even when appeals for the same crises were launched year on year. The acknowledgement that humanitarian responses will be required for many years in many contexts led to the consideration of longer response timeframes, and what this means for how the response is designed and delivered. The first multi-year appeal was launched in 2011 in Kenya, followed by the occupied Palestinian territories in 2012.

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59 As of September 2015
60 Global Humanitarian Assistance (2015)
By 2015, there were 15 multi-year humanitarian plans, including a transitional plan. Somalia’s 2013 appeal covered a three-year period, reflecting longer-term resilience approach after lessons learned from the 2011 famine. The Sahel regional response plan (2014-2016) contains nine specific country appeals (for Burkina Faso, Cameroon, Chad, Gambia, Mali, Mauritania, Niger, Nigeria and Senegal). The multi-year appeal for Somalia (2013-15) is also still active, as well as the Djibouti HRP (2014-15), and the Yemen HRP (2014-15), which are joined by the Syria Regional Refugee and Resilience Plan (2015-16). However, two multi-year appeals, Iraq (2014-15) and South Sudan (2014-16), have reverted to single-year plans, following severely deteriorating situations in both countries. Underfunding has also hindered the potential of Haiti’s two year transitional plan (2015-2016), which aims to mobilize humanitarian, development and recovery funds.

The needs covered by these multi-year plans represent a significant proportion of total needs in all UN-coordinated humanitarian plans. In 2014, 45.8 million people – nearly 52% of the total number of people targeted for assistance – were covered under multi-year plans. In 2014, the financial requirements covered by these plans made up 33 percent (US$6.5 billion) of the total 2014 requirements. By July 2015, this had risen to US$9 billion or 53 percent of the total funding requirements.

New approaches to resilience and multi-year funding

The recent drive towards multi-year planning is closely linked to the resilience agenda and the experiments with multi-year funding. The Report of the Secretary-General, ‘Strengthening of the coordination of emergency humanitarian assistance of the United Nations’ (2015), highlights the importance of multi-year planning and multi-year financing mechanisms to support it, and stresses the importance of linking multi-year HRPs with development planning. Recognizing the need to increase the understanding of the links between durable solutions, fragility, resilience, development, and peacebuilding, the report calls for strengthening the capacity of humanitarian, development and peacebuilding actors to cooperatively support solutions, and for increasing the capacity of humanitarian actors to analyse the implications of emergency responses for durable solutions and calibrate interventions accordingly.

All the 2015 multi-year humanitarian strategies and transitional plans have a strong focus on resilience. In fact, many OCHA internal documents about resilience highlight the need for humanitarians to think and plan longer term in protracted crises. OCHA’s Position Paper on Resilience argues that linear, phased approach to relief, recovery and development has not been successful in preventing recurrent emergencies in regions of chronic vulnerability or in making sustained improvements in protracted emergencies, and calls for a more integrated approach that simultaneously and coherently addresses short, medium and long-term needs. The paper defines three principles for strengthening resilience as: building national and local capacity, making long commitments and strategic plans, and shifting away from relief to development paradigm. OCHA’s flagship policy report for 2014, Saving Lives Today and Tomorrow: Managing the Risks of Humanitarian Crises, recommends to “increase the length of planning cycles to three years in protracted crises”.

Donors are increasingly seeing multi-year funding as a critical tool for improving the allocation and effectiveness of humanitarian aid to protracted crises. A recent paper by the OECD argues that most humanitarian costs can be planned from year to year including: a) protracted

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long-term crises, which receive the majority of official humanitarian aid each year, b) disasters, since there are increasingly accurate scientific models to predict the risks from natural hazards, and c) the overhead and administrative costs of running an operational humanitarian agency. While the paper points out that most OECD governments work with annual public expenditure cycles and therefore do not have predictability about their own humanitarian budgets, it also highlights that multi-annual funding is about commitments, rather than large injections of finance. Another recent Department for International Development (DFID)-funded study concluded that substantial value for money gains can be made by shifting to multi-year humanitarian funding. The study argues that this is the case in protracted crisis as well as in both predictable and unpredictable rapid onset events.

A number of donors have developed mechanisms to allocate funding on a multi-year basis, channelling funding directly to NGOs, the UN and other multilateral agencies, and to country-level humanitarian response or emergency relief funds. In fact, sixteen OECD DAC members are already providing multi-annual funding to UN, NGO and Red Cross Movement partners, and this is acknowledged as an emerging good practice.

**Existing guidance on multi-year planning**

In 2012, OCHA issued guidance on developing appeals, which included multi-year appeals under the ‘experimental methods’ section. The multi-year planning approach envisioned by the guidance aims to build resilience to future shocks, and to incorporate exit strategy and outcome beyond providing quality humanitarian aid, and redefining humanitarian effectiveness as meeting and reducing needs over time.

As part of the IASC Transformative Agenda, the Consolidated Appeals Process was modified in 2013 to include a well-defined Humanitarian Programme Cycle. Prior to this, the appeal documents incorporated monitoring and reporting on the year to date, needs analysis, strategic plan, and detailed cluster plans with specific output targets and budgets. The modification resulted in greater emphasis on a joint analysis of needs to inform strategic response planning and monitoring, and on the importance of related documents as response management tools, and not just tools for resource mobilisation. As of 2014, the key elements appear in a series of documents produced in sequence: humanitarian needs overview; strategic/humanitarian response plan (comprising the country strategy plus cluster plans); and humanitarian response monitoring frameworks (providing an overview of the monitoring scope, reporting responsibilities, and timelines). As part of their monitoring process, countries have produced periodic monitoring reports and humanitarian dashboards to report on achievements against the targets set in the strategic/humanitarian response plans.

The Humanitarian Response Plan is defined as a “comprehensive plan of action for responding to the emergency, supported by evidence. It defines priorities, gaps and accountabilities and includes detailed funding requirements. It is developed through an inter-agency process which reviews the needs, outlines the boundaries of the response, and sets priorities within those boundaries. The plan can be of any duration required, including multi-year, and for protracted crises it can follow a non-calendar year approach in order to take into account a country’s hazard cycle or harvest.”

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64 O. Walton (2011)
65 More information available at https://www.humanitarianresponse.info/es/programme-cycle/space
66 OCHA, Overview of Humanitarian Global Response (2014)
the Humanitarian Programme Cycle from 2014 emphasises that the planning timeframe is flexible and can start at any point in the year and for whatever length of time based on operational requirements.

In the 2015 HRP Guidance, it is stated that the Country Teams should develop a multi-year plan if the needs and planned responses change only slightly from year to year, or if they justify raising resources for multi-year programming of preparedness or resilience-building actions. The document specifies a number of factors to take into account when considering multi-year approaches, including the degree of political stability, availability of information on crop cycles, livelihood and market analyses, forecasting, trends in national capacity, environmental factors including climate change, iterative contingency planning process, likelihood of humanitarian needs continuing to exist in the years covered by the plan; a context in which preparedness and resilience actions are possible; and sufficient monitoring methods.

As of now, there is no accepted definition or comprehensive guidelines for multi-year HHRPs and transitional strategies. According to an internal OCHA FAQs document, “a multi-year HRP remains primarily a tool for planning and delivering coordinated humanitarian aid (life-saving). Where it differs from a traditional HRP is in its greater focus on establishing a strategy for the emergency that goes beyond one year of activities and projects. It aims to set multi-year targets for a wider range of humanitarian activities, includes a wider range of early recovery activities and social services, and has an increased focus on building the resilience of affected populations so as to work towards a gradual drawdown of humanitarian assistance. As such, a multi-year HRP can be considered more reflective in its approach to an emergency”. This document also points out concerns regarding the development of multi-year projects with corresponding yearly budgets, indicators and targets, and that some country teams may have to incorporate resilience-building projects. It also underlines that even in more stable environments, most agencies do not budget for two or three years, and donors’ funding envelopes generally do not allow them to make commitments which span several years. There is no specific guidance for transitional appeals from either OCHA or the UN’s Development Operations Coordination Office (DOCO). Experiences have emerged from context-specific needs and risk-informed field leadership, with varying degrees of support from HQ.

Purpose and Scope of the Evaluation

The multi-year plans developed to date rest on a realization that protracted crises cannot be addressed through humanitarian action alone, and that the fundamental shift is needed to break the cycle of humanitarian dependence and generate more sustainable outcomes. Among benefits envisaged are strengthening strategic relationships with national actors and allowing for a closer cooperation with national authorities, introduction of outcome-based planning with gradual disengagement strategies build in from the outset of interventions, and strategic alignment of development, peace and security, governance and residual emergency relief engagements. Additional potential advantages include lower operational costs (e.g. reduced workload on country teams and partners), improved flexibility, and ability to react more quickly to changing conditions.

Despite the fact that multi-year plans form over one half of the global 2015 humanitarian appeal, the approaches have not been subject to a review to date. The need for generating a body of evidence around the effectiveness of multi-year planning, context-specific practices and experiences is recognized in a recent OCHA Think Brief “No End in Sight” which calls for an

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68OCHA, Frequently Asked Questions And Guidance On Multi-Year Strategic Response Plans (May 2014)
analysis of evidence on “what works and what doesn’t work for multi-year planning in order to allow for correcting mistakes, adapting approaches and building on the successes of current experiences.”

This evaluation is meant to follow up on that recommendation and fill that gap. Its purpose therefore is learning: to assess the experiences with multi-year planning to date, and examine what works, what doesn’t, and what can be done better when implementing multi-year planning approaches in humanitarian crises. It will cover the period from 2011 to 2016, be global in scope, and have a forward-looking view.

The evaluation results will inform OCHA’s approaches to the Humanitarian Programme Cycle, the development of IASC policy and guidelines for multi-year planning, and the discussions at the World Humanitarian Summit in May 2016. For countries with the multi-year HRPs, the evaluation results will be used to improve their future planning processes and approaches.

The evaluation is one of the thematic evaluations conducted by OCHA Evaluation and Oversight Unit as per OCHA M&E Plan 2014-2017.

Objectives and Key Areas of Enquiry

The objectives of the evaluation are to:
1. Assess the experiences with multi-year approaches to humanitarian planning to date at regional and national levels, including in transition contexts, and identify their strengths, weaknesses and contextual/other influencing factors;
2. Develop a model or models for multi-year humanitarian planning;
3. Explore to what extent and how multi-year planning has contributed to strengthening linkages and synergies with development actors, reduced humanitarian caseload, and to exit strategies, if/when relevant
4. Assess whether multi-year planning has contributed to more effective resource mobilization and improved support from the donor community, and identify any related challenges;
5. Identify innovations and best practices that can be replicated in other contexts;
6. Provide actionable recommendations at both the policy and operational levels on how multi-year planning approaches might be strengthened.

The key areas of enquiry will be defined through consultation with key stakeholders. Some of the identified areas are:

→ Appropriateness and relevance of the multi-year strategies to humanitarian needs, risks and country contexts;
→ Implication of multi-year planning on how the responses are designed, coordinated and delivered;
→ Linkages and coherence between multi-year HRPs and UNDAFs;
→ Use of risk modelling and analysis and how they are/could be used to support the development of outcome based multi-year plans;
→ Adequacy of gender analysis, and to what extent it has translated into more gender-sensitive programming;

→ Effect of multi-year planning on the scope of humanitarian action and on humanitarian caseloads;
→ Impact of multi-year planning on exit strategies.
→ Impact of funding dynamics on the achievements of strategic objectives of multi-year plans;
→ Implication of multi-year planning, for financial tracking;
→ Partnerships with development, peace and security, and governance actors;
→ Engagement with national actors;

Evaluation Methodology

The evaluation is formative, and will emphasize building understanding and learning from experiences with multi-year planning rather than accounting for past work (as compared to a summative evaluation that judges the worth of a project or program after its conclusion).

The evaluation will employ mixed methods (qualitative, quantitative, and participatory) and a number of data collection tools. Data will be derived from primary and secondary sources, including direct observation in the field, key informant interviews, focus groups, surveys of stakeholder groups, literature review, desk-review of relevant documents, financial and monitoring reports, and meeting minutes. Perspectives from stakeholders will be solicited including Humanitarian/Resident Coordinators, Humanitarian Country Teams, OCHA, UN agencies, IOM, international and national NGOs, clusters, donors (DAC and non-DAC), government stakeholders, civil society organizations, and affected population.

Data collection instruments will be standardized across countries. All data used will be triangulated for validation. The evaluation is expected to use ALNAP criteria for humanitarian evaluations, namely: Effectiveness, Efficiency, Coverage, Appropriateness and Relevance, Coordination and Coherence. The applicability of these criteria should be examined in the inception phase, during which additional criteria may be proposed and/or some of the ALNAP criteria may be excluded (in which case, a rationale should be provided for doing so).

The evaluation team will visit a selection of four countries with multi-year plans, including one of the two countries that has reverted to single-year planning, South Sudan or Iraq. The evaluation team will determine during the inception phase how many countries will be visited within the timing and financial constraints of the evaluation. The selection of countries will be made in consultation with the Advisory Board of the evaluation and the respective Country/Regional Offices.

The detailed methodology, including the Theory of Change for multi-year planning, will be developed during the inception phase of the evaluation. The Theory of Change will be used to guide the analysis and will articulate the multi-year planning change process, including inputs, activities, outputs, outcomes, assumptions, mechanism of change, and indicators to measure its extent. The Theory of Change will be validated by the evaluation and used to develop a model (or models) of multi-year planning.

Management and Governance of the Evaluation

The evaluation will be managed by the Management Group, consisting of representatives of primary OCHA stakeholders. The Evaluation and Oversight Unit of SPEGS (EOU) will act as a chair to the Group.

The Management Group will:
- Finalise the Terms of Reference for the evaluation;
- Recruit the Evaluation Team through a competitive bidding process;
- Manage the evaluation in accordance with agreed budget and timeline;
- Comment on all evaluation tools and products, including inception and draft reports,
- Facilitate Evaluation Team’s access to key stakeholders and specific information or expertise needed to complete the evaluation;
- Help coordinate field research and presentations of evaluation results; and
- Review and facilitate the follow up and a management response to the evaluation, ensuring that the evaluation findings conclusions and recommendations are correctly represented.

SPEGS/EOU will appoint the Evaluation Manager, who will be the main point of contact for the evaluation, chair the Management Group, serve as principal interlocutor between the Evaluation Team and the evaluation stakeholders and ensure day-to-day support and consistency throughout the evaluation process, from drafting the Terms of Reference to the dissemination of the report. The Evaluation Manager could participate in selected field missions.

The Evaluation Advisory Group (AG) will consist of representatives from the primary external stakeholders to the evaluation, including the World Humanitarian Summit, UN Agencies, IOM, UNDP/MDTF, World Bank, and donors. Members of the Reference Group will serve in an advisory capacity, providing guidance to the evaluation, contributing to its relevance, and promoting utilization of evaluation results. The Advisory Group members will provide input into the evaluation design and key issues, participate in interviews, review and provide feedback on draft evaluation products, and help facilitate dissemination and follow up. SPEGS EOU will chair the Group.

Heads of Office of OCHA Country and Regional Offices with present or past experience with multi-year planning will be consulted throughout the evaluation process, and will be provided an opportunity to comment on all evaluation deliverables.

Evaluation Team

The Evaluation Team will be recruited through a competitive bidding process managed by the UN Procurement Division.

The evaluation will require the services of an Evaluation Team of up to four members with the following collective experience and skills:

- Extensive evaluation experience of both humanitarian and developmental strategies and programmes;
- Experience with and institutional knowledge of UN and NGO actors, the inter-agency mechanisms in headquarters and in the field and the Inter-Agency Standing Committee (IASC);
- In-depth knowledge of the humanitarian reform and coordination processes and issues;
- Good understanding of cross cutting issues;
- An appropriate range of field experience;
- Experience in facilitating consultative workshops involving a wide range of organizations and participants;
- Excellent writing and communication skills in English and French.
The Evaluation Team will include a Team Leader, who is responsible for the overall conduct of the evaluation in accordance with the ToR, including:

- Developing and adjusting the evaluation methodology;
- Managing the evaluation team, ensuring efficient division of tasks between mission members;
- Representing the Evaluation Team in meetings with the Management Group and Advisory Board;
- Ensuring the quality of all outputs; and
- Submitting all outputs in a timely manner.

The Team Leader will have no less than 15 years of professional experience in humanitarian action, including experience in management of humanitarian operations and in strategic planning. S/he will, further, have extensive experience in conducting evaluations of humanitarian operations in protracted crises, and demonstrate strong analytical, communication and writing skills.

The Evaluation Team will be gender balanced and, to the extent possible, regionally diverse.

**Deliverables and Reporting Requirements**

The quality of the evaluation report and other deliverables will be assessed according to the UNEG Evaluation Standards and OCHA Quality Assurance system.

The inception and draft reports will be produced jointly by members of the evaluation team and reflect their collective understanding of the evaluation. All deliverables listed will be written in good Standard English and follow OCHA’s guidelines on writing evaluation reports. If in the estimation of the Evaluation Manager the reports do not meet this required standard, the Evaluation Team will ensure at their own expense the editing needed to bring it to the required standard.

A. Inception Report

The Evaluation Team will produce an inception report not to exceed 12,000 words, excluding annexes, setting out:

- The team’s understanding of multi-year planning approaches and the contexts in they have developed (including both HRP’s and variations such as transitional appeals);
- Any suggested deviations from the ToR, including any additional issues raised during the initial consultations;
- Theory of Change for multi-year planning;
- Evaluation framework and first and second-level questions;
- An evaluation matrix showing, for each question, the indicators proposed and sources of information;
- Methodology, including any changes to the proposed methodology, details of gender analysis, and the triangulation strategy;
- Data collection tools (survey, interview questions, etc);
- Any limitations of the chosen methods of data collection and analysis;
- The evaluation criteria to be used, including the rationale for using each particular evaluation criterion and, if needed, for rejecting any of the criteria proposed in the ToR;
- How will human rights and gender equality be addressed during the evaluation;
- Stakeholder analysis and a plan for their involvement in the evaluation process;
• Data collection plan and detailed fieldwork plan;
• Methodological limitations and evaluability issues and how they will be addressed;
• Interview guides, survey instruments, and/or other tools to be employed for the evaluation;
• Draft dissemination strategy of the evaluation findings and recommendations; and
• Draft outline for the evaluation report

B. Interim Report

The Evaluation Team will produce a short interim report (in bulleted paragraph format) outlining the preliminary findings within two weeks after the completion of the field missions.

C. Evaluation Report

The Evaluation Team will produce a single report, written in a clear and accessible manner, allowing the readers to understand readily evaluation findings and their inter-relationship. The report should not exceed 14,000 words (excluding annexes) and should be comprised of:

- Stand-alone Executive Summary of no more than 2500 words;
- List of acronyms;
- Table of contents;
- Summary table linking findings, conclusions and recommendations, including where responsibility for follow up should lie;
- Literature and document review;
- Methodology summary (brief, with a more detailed description provided in an annex);
- Main body of the report, including findings in response to the evaluation questions, conclusions and recommendations;
- Annexes will include: (1) ToR, (2) Detailed methodology, (3) Analysis of funding flows, (4) List of persons met, (5) Details of all surveys undertaken, (6) Details of any quantitative analysis undertaken, (7) Team itinerary, (8) All evaluation tools employed, and (6) Bibliography of documents (including web pages, etc.) relevant to the evaluation.
- For accuracy and credibility, recommendations should be the logical implications of the findings and conclusions. Recommendations should follow logically from the evaluation findings and conclusions and be:
  1) Categorised as a) Critical, b) Important, or c) Opportunity for learning.
  2) Relevant, realistic and useful and reflect the reality of the context within which CHFs operate;
  3) Clearly stated and not broad or vague;
  4) Realistic and reflect an understanding of OCHA and the humanitarian system and potential constraints to follow-up;
  5) Suggest where responsibility for follow-up should lie and include a timeframe for follow-up.

D. Short (4 Page) summary of the Evaluation Report

E. Power-point presentation of the Evaluation Report

E. Evidence Matrix used by the team to derive findings and conclusions

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Preparation</th>
<th>Sep - Oct 2015</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Constituting the Advisory Board</td>
<td>September 2015</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Finalisation of the ToR</td>
<td>September 2015</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Recruitment of the Evaluation Team</td>
<td>October 2015</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Inception</th>
<th>Nov 2015</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Fieldwork</td>
<td>Nov 2015 – Feb 2016</td>
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<tr>
<td>-----------</td>
<td>---------------------</td>
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<tr>
<td>Field visits</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Preparation of country evaluations</td>
<td></td>
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</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Reporting</th>
<th>Feb - March 2016</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Production of draft and final reports</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Presentation of findings</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Annex 1 of TOR: Multi-Year Strategic Response Plans**

**Kenya**

**Funding to Kenya 2013**

- $660 million requested
- $370 million funded
- 56% covered

**Funding to Kenya 2012**

- $800 million requested
- $540 million funded
- 68% covered

**Funding to Kenya 2011**

- $740 million requested
- $530 million funded
- 71% covered

The Kenya Emergency Humanitarian Response Plan 2011-2013 was the first multi-year plan developed by OCHA. According to the 2011 EHRP, “the three-year humanitarian strategy provides an opportunity for partners to, through their projects, respond to immediate emergency priority needs while at the same time laying the foundations for early and eventual long-term recovery through mainstreaming disaster risk reduction approaches across all sector projects”.

A total of 92 projects were selected for the 2011+ EHRP. Each project consisted of an immediate, medium- and longer-term response strategy with a budget attached for 2011 actions and an indication of estimated budgets for actions in 2012 and 2013. The 2011+ EHRP requested US$1,525,827,794 for humanitarian response during 2011. The Response Plan states that, while the previous EHRPs were appropriate planning tools for 2009 and 2010, the new planning mechanisms needed to reflect the Kenyan context and look at tackling vulnerability and mitigating the predictable effects of future shocks, while facilitating emergency response if necessary. Therefore, the Plan included strategies and projects that would reduce vulnerability, increase resilience and incorporate Disaster Risk Reduction across all sectors.

The four strategic objectives of the 2011+ EHRP are:

1. Highly vulnerable populations affected by natural and man-made disasters receive timely and coordinated life-saving humanitarian assistance and protection based on assessed needs and employing a human rights-based approach.
2. Ensure the early recovery of populations affected by natural and manmade disasters and support the further integration of recovery approaches with longer-term interventions to reduce high levels of chronic vulnerability.

3. Enhance community resilience using targeted disaster risk reduction approaches to reduce the impacts of disasters and ensure linkages with longer-term initiatives to reduce vulnerability.

4. Targeted and sustained advocacy with the Government of Kenya and development actors to further their engagement in addressing issues of chronic vulnerability (specifically with regards to populations of the ASALs) and provide durable solutions.

The EHRP has targets and indicators per Strategic Objective and per cluster for 2011.

In 2012, the EHRP still emphasized the twofold nature of the response, which integrated traditional humanitarian values with a more far-sighted approach to tackle underlying causes of predictable emergencies and build resilience of people at risk. It is also mentioned that the response would also focus on early recovery into humanitarian action, in order to sustain the gains of life-saving interventions. While the strategic objectives remain the same in essence from those of 2011, the 2012 EHRP integrated the second and third objectives of 2011 into the following: “Communities have enhanced resilience, reducing the impact of disasters, and lessened chronic vulnerability by means of DRR and early recovery approaches”. Similarly to the 2011 EHRP, it included targets and indicators for each SO and cluster.

In 2013, the final year of the multi-year response plan, the EHRP states that the overall strategy is to transition out of humanitarian aid. According to it, acute humanitarian needs where only residual and the humanitarian actors would support and strengthen the preparedness of national institutions and local responders and the development of livelihoods, while addressing social protection needs. The Strategic Objectives remained the same as in 2012, with new targets per SO and per cluster. Since 2014, Kenya has had only an UNDAF aligned to the government’s five-year development plan and Vision 2030.

**Somalia**

**Funding to Somalia 2015**

- $860 million requested
- $220 million funded
- 26% covered

**Funding to Somalia 2014**

- $930 million requested
- $460 million funded
- 49% covered

**Funding to Somalia 2013**

- $1.1 billion requested
- $585 million funded
- 51% covered

Somalia launched a multi-year appeal in 2013. In August 2012, OCHA facilitated an executive workshop for the HCT, ICWG and donors where the planning assumptions and parameters for a three-year CAP were decided upon. The clusters organized field consultations with members in different regions in order to consolidate the various needs assessments and identify cluster priorities for the next three years.

Based on these consultations the cluster response plans were drafted with a three-year strategy, which was endorsed by the HCT. The humanitarian agencies drafted projects in line with the strategy and cluster response plans. The relevant projects were reviewed by the Cluster Review
Committees and endorsed by the HC. The clusters monitor the progress against the strategic priorities monthly and advise the HCT accordingly. The HCT will update the donors and encourage the donors to make longer-term funding available in order to ensure the implementation of the three-year strategy.\(^\text{70}\)

The Somalia 2013-2015 plan integrates lifesaving and livelihood support to address the cycle of recurring crises brought on by drought and conflict. The CAP retained mid-year and end-year review intervals, with the intent of adjusting targets and indicators as required. These review periods also allowed for adjustments to programming to deal with short-term shocks, while preserving the longer-term, multi-year programming that aims to address the root causes of the crisis. Every year a new HRP is developed to reflect these changes and request specific funding for that year.

The CAP 2013-2015 includes four Strategic Objectives:

1. **Life-saving assistance**: Ensure equal and integrated life-saving assistance to malnourished children and people living in humanitarian emergency and crisis to reduce mortality and destitution.

2. **Improved basic services and delivery of predictable safety nets**: Contribute to improving the quality, reliability, responsiveness and accessibility of basic services, and promote predictable safety-net programming, thereby meeting the humanitarian needs of vulnerable people and households, strengthening their resilience to shocks.

3. **Enhancing household and community resilience**: Invest in household and community resilience through increased access to durable solutions that address livelihood vulnerability, including displacement and climate change—and result in a return to stable and sustainable livelihoods.

4. **Capacity-building**: Strengthen the capacity and coordination of NGOs, affected communities and local, regional and national-level authorities, to prevent and mitigate risks and implement effective emergency preparedness and response.

The CAP has a significant resilience component, by emphasizing the re-building of households and community capacities to enable them to withstand shocks and adapt to changing conditions, rather than focusing on single crisis response. It addresses enhanced investments in building productive, human, social, natural and financial resources within households and communities. It was expected that this would result in a year-on-year decline in the number of Somali households that are in emergency or crisis. However, one concern is that its strong resilience focus might overshadow insufficiently sign-posted urgent humanitarian needs. Indeed, in June 2014, the Emergency Response Coordinator (ERC) issued an urgent request to the UN Security Council for an immediate injection of US$60 million to meet the most urgent funding needs within the critically underfunded appeal.

The CAP establishes specific indicators and yearly targets for each strategic objective, also organizing the information by cluster. The 2014 HRP follows the same four strategic objectives and continues to establish specific targets for 2014 and 2015. Interestingly, the 2015 HRP drops the fourth strategic objective that focused capacity building of NGOs, national and local authorities, by arguing that “capacity building is already streamlined into humanitarian programmes and incorporated into the New Deal”\(^\text{71}\). The new HRP would focus on supporting NGOs, and government structures that specifically address humanitarian preparedness and response.


\(^{71}\) OCHA, Somalia Consolidated Appeal 2013-2015
While this framework was an opportunity to secure multi-year funding and the 2013-2015 CAP provides an indication of financial requirements for the full three-year timeframe, the annual response plans present strategies with one-year financial requirements only\(^{22}\). In addition, multi-year initiatives are not easily distinguishable from short-term projects.

It’s worth noting that the 2013-2015 HRP estimated higher funding requirements for 2014 and 2015 than what was actually appealed (1.23 billion against 930 million in 2014 and 1.24 billion against 860 million requested in 2015).

According to the GHA Report of 2013, the two largest donors in Somalia (the United States (US) and the EU institutions) continued their 12 or 18-month funding cycles but the following donors were providing multi-year funding:

**United Kingdom (UK):** US$89 million over four years (late 2013 to late 2017), including US$41 million to a joint UNICEF/Food and Agriculture Organization (FAO)/World Food Programme (WFP) resilience programme and US$33 million to the Livelihoods and Resilience Consortium. However, DFID agreed this multi-year programme prior to the introduction of the multi-year CAP.

**Sweden:** US$15 million over three years (2013–2015), of which US$9 million is for the multi-year (2013–2016) Somalia Resilience Program (SomReP); Sweden cites the multi-year CAP as the main reason for its multi-year funding.

**Denmark:** over US$11 million to Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) over two years (2012–2013), and over US$20 million over three years (2013–2015) including grants to FAO and SomReP. Notably, this funding comes from both development and humanitarian budget lines; grants were awarded prior to the multi-year CAP but are in line with its priorities. The Somalia Humanitarian Donor Group (chaired by ECHO and Sweden) is currently considering the effects of this multi-year CAP.

In addition to this, the 2015 HRP mentions that three major NGO consortia comprising a total of 14 NGOs have received US$98 million to implement resilience programs in Somalia from 2013 to 2017. These are: i) Somalia Resilience Programme (SomRep): ACF, ADRA, CARE, Coopi, DRC, Oxfam, and World Vision; ii) Building resilience communities in Somalia (BRICS): Concern, CEVSI, IRC, NRC and Save the Children; and iii) ACTED/ADESO.

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**The Sahel**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Total Funding to the Sahel Crisis 2015</th>
<th>Total Funding to the Sahel Crisis 2014</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>$1.9 billion requested</td>
<td>$1.9 billion requested</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$590 million funded</td>
<td>$850 million funded</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>30% covered</td>
<td>44% covered</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

\(^{22}\)This is due to the current design of the Online Project System (OPS) and the Financial Tracking System (FTS)
### Breakdown of Funding to the Sahel Crisis 2015 per country

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country</th>
<th>Requirements</th>
<th>Funding</th>
<th>% Covered</th>
<th>Unmet Requirement</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Burkina Faso</td>
<td>98,800,000</td>
<td>38,200,000</td>
<td>38.60%</td>
<td>60,600,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cameroon</td>
<td>264,000,000</td>
<td>90,400,000</td>
<td>34.20%</td>
<td>173,600,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Chad</td>
<td>571,600,000</td>
<td>158,200,000</td>
<td>27.70%</td>
<td>413,400,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gambia</td>
<td>23,700,000</td>
<td>400,000</td>
<td>1.80%</td>
<td>23,300,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mali</td>
<td>377,400,000</td>
<td>114,400,000</td>
<td>30.30%</td>
<td>262,900,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mauritania</td>
<td>105,200,000</td>
<td>26,000,000</td>
<td>24.70%</td>
<td>79,200,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Niger</td>
<td>375,700,000</td>
<td>127,200,000</td>
<td>33.80%</td>
<td>248,600,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nigeria</td>
<td>100,300,000</td>
<td>27,400,000</td>
<td>27.30%</td>
<td>72,900,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Region</td>
<td>10,300,000</td>
<td>1,100,000</td>
<td>10.50%</td>
<td>9,300,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Senegal</td>
<td>59,400,000</td>
<td>6,500,000</td>
<td>10.90%</td>
<td>53,000,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total:</strong></td>
<td><strong>1,986,400,000</strong></td>
<td><strong>589,800,000</strong></td>
<td><strong>29.70%</strong></td>
<td><strong>1,396,600,000</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

### Breakdown of Funding to the Sahel Crisis 2014 per country

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country</th>
<th>Requirements</th>
<th>Funding</th>
<th>% Covered</th>
<th>Unmet Requirement</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Burkina Faso</td>
<td>99,300,000</td>
<td>40,500,000</td>
<td>40.80%</td>
<td>58,800,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cameroon</td>
<td>125,800,000</td>
<td>73,000,000</td>
<td>58.00%</td>
<td>52,800,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Chad</td>
<td>618,500,000</td>
<td>226,500,000</td>
<td>36.60%</td>
<td>391,900,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gambia</td>
<td>18,300,000</td>
<td>4,400,000</td>
<td>23.90%</td>
<td>13,900,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mali</td>
<td>481,000,000</td>
<td>238,600,000</td>
<td>49.60%</td>
<td>242,400,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mauritania</td>
<td>90,900,000</td>
<td>37,700,000</td>
<td>41.40%</td>
<td>53,300,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Niger</td>
<td>305,200,000</td>
<td>173,000,000</td>
<td>56.70%</td>
<td>132,300,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nigeria</td>
<td>93,400,000</td>
<td>17,800,000</td>
<td>19.10%</td>
<td>75,600,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Region</td>
<td>49,800,000</td>
<td>23,300,000</td>
<td>46.80%</td>
<td>26,500,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Senegal</td>
<td>64,100,000</td>
<td>20,900,000</td>
<td>32.60%</td>
<td>43,200,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total:</strong></td>
<td><strong>1,946,400,000</strong></td>
<td><strong>855,700,000</strong></td>
<td><strong>44.00%</strong></td>
<td><strong>1,090,700,000</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

A three-year (rather than one-year) regional plan has been developed for the Sahel for the first time in 2014. The strategy provides a set of ambitious objectives and targets that, according to the HRP, would require a sustained, multi-year effort to achieve, and that could not be realistically contemplated on a planning horizon of merely 12 months. However, while working on a three-year framework, annual review processes of priorities, results, number or people in need and funding implications, will continue to exist. Financing requests are generated on a yearly basis and are part of a formal annual ‘launch’ process for the region.

The 2014-2016 Strategic Response Plan for the Sahel region proposed three overarching strategic goals that guide each country’s strategy every year:

1. Track and analyse risk and vulnerability, integrating findings into humanitarian and development programming;
2. Support vulnerable populations to better cope with shocks by responding earlier to warning signals, by reducing post-crisis recovery times and by building capacity of national actors;
3. Deliver coordinated and integrated life-saving assistance to people affected by emergencies.

The HRP establishes indicators and targets for each overarching objective and also breaks down the indicators and targets by clusters. The targets are also subdivided by year (2014, 2015 and 2016), emphasizing the multi-year approach to the crisis.

According to the 2014 HRP, there is a trend towards increased humanitarian case-loads in the Sahel, which illustrates a worrying erosion of resilience in the region. Vulnerable households are increasingly less able to cope with the greater frequency and intensity of climate shocks. While early action (defined as responding quickly to help households protect assets and avoid negative coping strategies and, moving quickly in order to reduce recovery times and rebuild assets) is considered the centre piece of the humanitarian response strategy, it is also acknowledged that chronic problems need structural solutions. In addition, the HRP recognizes that the most influential actors on the future humanitarian case-load are, ultimately, governments and their development partners. Therefore, it is stated that a key mission for the humanitarian community in the Sahel is to engage, partner with, and influence, these development actors much more systematically than in the past.

The HRP affirms that in order to build greater resilience amongst households and reduce the future humanitarian case load the Strategy would:

1. Place priority on protecting assets and coping capacities of vulnerable households through (a) acting even earlier on early warning indicators with mitigating interventions and (b) investing more substantially in measures that will shorten recovery periods in the aftermath of a crisis;
2. Accelerate efforts to build the capacity of communities and Governments to prepare for and respond to future crises, ultimately without recourse to international assistance;
3. Invest in more systematic collection, analysis and dissemination of risk and vulnerability data with a view to influencing development policy making and programming, particularly with regard to the households that make up “repeat clients” of emergency interventions.

Djibouti

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Funding to Djibouti 2015</th>
<th>Funding to Djibouti 2014</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>$82 million requested</td>
<td>$74 million requested</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$7 million funded</td>
<td>$21 million funded</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9% covered</td>
<td>29% covered</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

In 2014 Djibouti implemented a two-year HRP with the following Strategic Objectives:

1. Reduce the impact of drought, re-establish livelihoods and strengthen the resilience of affected people.
2. Minimize the risk of epidemics, epizootics and zoonotics and reduce their impact on drought-affected populations and livestock.
3. Strengthen protection and improve access to food and other basic services for refugees and vulnerable migrants.

The 2014-15 HRP explains that consecutive droughts experienced by the Republic of Djibouti over recent years are one of the main reasons for the humanitarian crisis the country is undergoing. In addition, the protracted conflict in neighbouring Somalia drives some 27,500 Somali refugees to Djibouti, which depend entirely on the protection and assistance of the humanitarian community. Also, tens of thousands of vulnerable migrants transit each year through Djibouti to reach Yemen and the other Arab countries. Therefore, Djibouti has adopted a two-year strategy with the prime purpose of saving lives through food assistance, treatment of acute malnutrition, treatment of epidemics and provision of water and hygiene services for the populations rendered most vulnerable by the drought. The HRP also aims to strengthen the coping capacity of drought-affected populations, focusing on activities which will diversify livelihoods and restock herds. It places special emphasis on projects to be carried out in rural areas and supporting innovative production and water management techniques.

The HRP mentions the importance of resilience, stating that its activities will have more impact if due attention is paid to it. In 2013, the UN and the Ministry of Agriculture organized a ‘workshop on reflection and action on community resilience in Djibouti’, which led to the approval of a roadmap by the Government. This would be followed up with efforts by the humanitarian system and the Government to conduct activities which complement one another and strengthen operations on both sides.

In terms of progress monitoring, the HRP does not have specific targets corresponding to each indicator for every year. Instead, it has overall targets and it is not clear whether it is expected to achieve these goals by the end of 2014 or by the end of the two-year period. However, some of the clusters’ plans include charts with target population for 2014 and 2015 that shows gradualism in its objectives. The one exception is the WASH cluster, which has specific annual targets for each indicator.

**Yemen**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Funding to Yemen 2015</th>
<th>Funding to Yemen 2014</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>$1.6 billion requested</td>
<td>$590 million requested</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$170 million funded</td>
<td>$340 million funded</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10% covered</td>
<td>58% covered</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The 2014-2015 Yemen Humanitarian Response Plan is a two-year strategy, which was selected because of its forward-looking elements, such as durable solutions, capacity-building, resilience and early recovery. According to the 2014 HRP, this would require activities beyond the scope of a one-year strategy and it would facilitate a transition towards recovery and development, if political, security and socio-economic conditions improved.
It was argued that a two-year strategy would allow for better coordination with development initiatives, such as the United Nations Development Assistance Framework (UNDAF), poverty reduction efforts, as well as government plans and strategies that were likely to be developed by a new government in 2014.

The strategy and plans were established through two series of sub-national workshops to ensure participation of local humanitarian partners and authorities. As a result, sub-national needs analysis workshops were undertaken and sub-national strategies developed.

The 2014-2015 builds upon the 2013 Yemen Humanitarian Response Plan. The strategy followed two main strands: a) provide life-saving assistance to address the needs of the most vulnerable Yemenis, and b) lift people out of or reducing vulnerability, focusing on durable solutions, resilience, early recovery and capacity building.

There is a specific section about resilience in the 2014-2015 HRP, which explains that the concept was first introduced for Yemen in the 2013 YHRP, but that intertwined the concepts of early recovery and resilience in its definition. The activities aimed at strengthening resilience included rehabilitation of infrastructure and restoration of basic services, livelihood- and agriculture-related activities, such as livestock support (veterinary support, fodder distribution), income-generating activities, agricultural terrace restoration, fishery support, household-dynamics research, training and capacity-building in parallel with ongoing humanitarian and peace-building support.

The 2014-2015 HRP attempts to better define resilience as “[increasing] the capacity of individuals and communities to prepare for, mitigate the impact and recover from shocks and stresses caused by natural disasters or conflict” (HRP 2014-2015, Yemen). However, it also mentions that the activities that build resilience are generally the same as those implemented by the 2013 YHRP, especially as early recovery initiatives, but their impact as resilience-building would be enhanced by a strategic focus and prioritization of action. It also provides guidance and priorities on how to achieve this. For instance is recommends linking humanitarian and development responses, as appropriate, to ensure that short-term actions lay the groundwork for medium- to long-term interventions.

The 2014-2015 HRP has the following Strategic Objectives:

1. Provide effective and timely life-saving assistance to the most vulnerable people in Yemen.
2. Assist and protect people affected by crisis, including refugees and migrants as well as returning Yemenis.
3. Strengthen the capacity of national actors to plan for and respond to humanitarian emergencies.
4. With development partners, including the Government of Yemen, address the underlying causes of vulnerability to reduce the need for continued humanitarian assistance and increase resilience.
5. Ensure meaningful participation and equitable access to services, resources, and protection measures for women, girls, boys, and men.

The HRP also provides specific indicators and targets, but, unlike the Somalia and the Sahel HRPs, there is no specification on whether these targets are for 2014 or for the end of the two-year period.

In 2015, the first HRP revised the 2014-15 YHRP so as to reflect the changes in need and in the operational context. According to the HRP, there are 8% more people in need than in 2014, mainly due to increasing local conflict, improved data collection and deteriorating socio-
economic conditions. As of February, the appeal was of US$747.5 million, (25% more than in 2014), which was explained by a transition towards resilience-focused programmes, particularly within the Food Security and Agriculture Cluster. While the 2014-15 Strategic Objectives remained unchanged, the new HRP introduced a better prioritization of objectives dividing them in: a) directly life-saving or protection; b) Resilience, recovery, capacity-building; and c) Coordination, assessments and research. It also spells out for each cluster what are the “urgent humanitarian priorities” led by humanitarian partners only, what are the “urgent resilience and recovery priorities” led by both humanitarian and development partners, and what are the “longer-term priorities” suggested to the development partners.

The situation in Yemen deeply deteriorated after March 2015, leading to a new Flash Appeal and a revised 2015 HRP that increased the total appeal to $1.6 billion. While the HCT agreed to maintain the original 5 Strategic Objectives, it gave highest priority to saving lives, protecting civilians and ensuring equitable access of men, women, boys and girls to assistance.

Therefore, the focus of the YHRP has shifted towards a more robust approach on emergency relief and protection for civilian populations and substantially fewer resilience and capacity building activities. Nonetheless, it is still noticed that the latter will ultimately be key to resolving Yemen’s chronic vulnerabilities. Where these activities have been maintained, their focus emphasizes training for local humanitarian partners and advocacy with key stakeholders on international humanitarian law, human rights and related issues.

Syria

Funding to Syria 3RP (2015 – 2016)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>$4.5 billion requested</th>
<th>$1 billion funded</th>
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<tr>
<td><strong>24% covered</strong></td>
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In 2014, resilience became a framing concept for the Syria refugee response with the launch of the Syria Regional Refugee and Resilience Plan (3RP). This is a two-year plan (2015-2016), aimed at bringing about a scaling-up of resilience and stabilization-based development and humanitarian assistance to cope with the crises.

It was presented as a paradigm shift in the response to the crisis because it combines humanitarian and development capacities, innovation, and resources. The 3RP is a nationally-led, regionally coherent strategy which is built on the national response plans of the countries in the region. It brings together almost 200 humanitarian and development partners, including governments, United Nations agencies, and national and international NGOs.

It called for “new aid architecture” to respond to the needs of displaced people and their host communities, and to address the “massive structural impact of the crisis” on countries in the region. The 3RP explicitly builds on national response plans and seeks to bring together national and international, development and humanitarian, capacities and resources. It also calls on
international donors to provide both humanitarian and development funding, stating that “This crisis demands that we break down financing silos.”

The 3RP covers the five Syrian refugee-hosting countries in the region – Egypt, Iraq, Jordan, Lebanon and Turkey – and sets out requirements of US$5.5 billion for 2015, US$4.5 billion of which is for agency requirements. Unlike the Somalia and Sahel response plans, where resilience activities are integrated into sectoral needs, the 3RP has two strategic objectives, for each of refugees and for resilience:

1. The 3RP Refugee protection and humanitarian component will address the protection and assistance needs of refugees living in camps, in settlements and in local communities in all sectors, as well as the most vulnerable members of impacted communities. It will strengthen community-based protection through identifying and responding with quick-impact support for communal services in affected communities.

2. The 3RP Resilience/Stabilization-based development component will address the resilience and stabilization needs of impacted and vulnerable communities in all sectors; build the capacities of national and sub-national service delivery systems; strengthen the ability of governments to lead the crisis response; and provide the strategic, technical and policy support to advance national responses.

Resilience is defined as “the ability of individuals, households, communities and institutions to anticipate, withstand, recover and transform from shocks and crises”. The 3RP specifically states that a resilience-based development approach to the Syria crisis is different from humanitarian relief. According to it, creating resilience involves investing in the capacities and resources abilities of those communities and institutions most affected by a crisis. The 3RP champions the resilience approach and has increased the share of resilience-related activities in the regional response by 300 per cent compared to previous plans.

### Occupied Palestine Territories

#### Funding to oPt 2013

- $400 million requested
- $260 million funded
- 66% covered

#### Funding to oPt 2012

- $420 million requested
- $305 million funded
- 73% covered

In 2012, the oPt CAP describes the situation in Palestine as a protracted protection and human rights crisis, which generates some specific humanitarian needs. It explains that since the first CAP in 2003, none of the political root causes of the humanitarian situation have been addressed. The Israeli authorities have consistently failed in their obligation as an occupying power to assist and protect Palestinian civilians, and have prevented Palestinian authorities and humanitarian organizations from meeting needs in a sustainable way.
The CAP explains that given the protracted nature of the conflict, the humanitarian needs barely change from one year to another. Therefore, the analytical and strategic part of the CAP, i.e. the Common Humanitarian Action Plan, would be a two-year plan for 2012-2013. According to the CAP, this would allow for humanitarian organizations and donors to better plan their interventions and contributions; and to increase the predictability of the humanitarian response. It would also complement efforts by humanitarian and development actors to strategically coordinate the CAP, Palestinian National Development Plan and Medium-Term Response Plan processes. Similar to all the other MYPs, while the CAP articulated a two-year humanitarian strategy, organizations’ projects attached to the strategy remained one-year projects. The reason behind this was to ensure that the CAP remained focused on critical emergency projects.

The Strategic Objectives in 2012 were the following:

1. Enhance the protection of populations in Gaza, Area C, the Seam Zone and East Jerusalem by promoting respect for international humanitarian law and human rights; preventing or mitigating the impacts of violations; improving equitable access to essential services; and ensuring the effective integration of protection considerations in service provision interventions.

2. Help improve the food security of vulnerable and food-insecure communities in the oPt, with particular focus on Gaza, Area C, the Seam Zone and East Jerusalem by improving economic access to food, supporting access to a greater variety of food or providing direct food assistance.

As with other CAPs, it outlines indicators and targets for 2012 per objective and per cluster within each objective. The 2013 CAP indicates that during its preparation period, the HCT reviewed the goals set for the 2012-2013 CHAP and reaffirmed that these remained valid in guiding the strategy for 2013. Interestingly, the 2014 HRP also keeps the same Strategic Objectives as the 2012-2013 CHAP.
Annex B: Country case-study outlines

Somalia
173. Somalia continues to rank as one of the poorest and most food-insecure nations in the world, with over 60% of urban and 95% of rural population suffering from multidimensional poverty (UNDP 2014). The situation on Somalia has been characterised by insecurity, conflict and recurrent food and governance crises spanning over twenty-five years. These factors have also created an IDP population that has consistently exceeded 1 million for the past 11 years.\footnote{This situation is predicted to further deteriorate as a result of an ongoing drought exacerbated by El Nino, particularly for the northern regions of the country.}

174. Key to understanding the challenges for planning is recognition of the diversity of operational settings within Somalia itself. The federal government, based in Mogadishu and supported by the international community, does not have territorial control over the entire country. Somaliland is a self-proclaimed independent state since 1991 with very limited relations with the federal government, while the semi-autonomous state of Puntland has recently renewed relations with Mogadishu.\footnote{Ties were previously cut due to dispute over territorial boundaries.} In very general terms, the security and political landscape in Somaliland and Puntland is improved, in addition to the reinforcement of the Federal government in Mogadishu. The rest of the country is divided with some areas under the influence of the federal government backed up by the international community, and others areas (South and South Central) under the control of a diversity of armed groups, including Al Shabaab. In some areas, new state administrations are regaining more control and are in negotiation with the Federal government on division of authority and power. Peace-building, state-building, development and humanitarian assistance operate within the broad operational setting, each with specific objectives. Building coherence between these elements is clearly challenging, and arguably it is doubly difficult to do so in a single national framework with representation split between Mogadishu and Nairobi, as well as ‘regional’ hubs in Somaliland and Puntland (this issue is addressed below).

Humanitarian response
175. The 2016 HRP identified ongoing key humanitarian drivers such as food insecurity and nutritional crisis, conflict, disease outbreaks, cyclical natural disasters, and protracted internal displacement. In response the international community has devised an approach focusing on life-saving activities, basic services delivery, resilience building to shocks and catalyst for durable solutions. The number of humanitarian partners involved varied, ranging from 95 in 2014 to 177 in 2013; 128 are currently registered for the 2016 HRP.\footnote{OCHA OPS (Online Projects System) as of June 2016.} The cluster system is still in place with 10 sectors currently being coordinated. Many international actors, INGOs and UN Agencies would describe themselves as ‘multi-mandate’, implementing both humanitarian and development programmes – and in some cases also peace-building.
176. As described below, the decision to implement MYP was linked to a perceived need to re-frame the humanitarian response in Somalia. Lessons from the 2011 famine and the changing security and political landscape in 2012 were taken as an opportunity to break the cycle of recurring crises through taking a longer-term ‘resilience-building’ approach to humanitarian assistance in Somalia. This approach is described in more detail below and is at the centre of the narrative of MYP in Somalia.

**Development framework**

177. Relations between the international community and the Government of Somalia in respect of development are framed under the New Deal for Fragile States which provided the principles behind the Compact, jointly developed between the government of Somalia and the international community. The Compact sets out priorities for 2014 – 2016 with five Peace-building and State-building Goals (PSGs): Legitimate Politics; Security; Justice; Economic Foundations; Revenue and Services.

178. The funding aspect is managed through the Somalia Development and Reconstruction Facility (SDRF), with the EU being by far the largest contributor. Two funds are currently operational under the SDRF: the UN-administered Multi Partner Trust Fund (UN MPTF) and the WB-administered Multi Partner Fund (WB MPF). Donors consistently delivered over 1 billion US$ per year in addition to substantial resources for peace-keeping operations.

179. The UN Integrated strategic framework (ISF) was developed with the same time frame and as a complement to the Compact. It guides the strategic management of UN activities in Somalia and seeks to ensure complementarity by mirroring the Compact as a framework for the specifics of the UN’s contribution to the five PSGs. It also serves as a basis for UN development programming as well as its funding pipeline. It replaces the UNDAF or transitional plan in accordance with the ‘One UN’ approach, to which it makes direct reference. It also reaffirms the continued requirement for a separate humanitarian appeal.

**The MYP in context**

180. The MYPs which make up the focus of the evaluation are the CAP 2013-15 and the humanitarian strategy for 2016-18. The latter was under development at the time of the research visit, some weeks after the launch of the HRP for 2016. As above, the context in Somalia is one in which multiple strands of international support and interventions co-exist across a range of quite specific ‘sub-national’ contexts’. The aspiration for the multi-year CAP for 2013 and 2015 was to act as a planning and appeal framework for humanitarian action i.e. in a manner as coherent with, but independent from, other forms of support and intervention as possible. It is important to note, for the analysis which follows, that it aimed to frame both resilience approaches in the areas where this approach was

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77 Somali Compact 2014-2016
79 UN Somalia ISF 2014-2016
deemed appropriate, and short term humanitarian interventions for acute needs, where this was deemed most appropriate. As noted above, the shift to a resilience approach by the incumbent heads of WFP, FAO and UNICEF was cited consistently as the primary driver of the 2013-15 CAP.

181. The 2013-15 CAP process was initiated in August 2012 with an initial workshop at which planning assumptions were established. This was followed up by several cluster-led consultations at field level resulting in three-year cluster plans by October. Plans were then reviewed and endorsed by the HCT, allowing for the adaptation of individual agencies’ projects under these approved plans. These projects were then reviewed by relevant cluster review committee and finally approved by the HC. The document was launched in December 2012. It is of note that the 2013-2015 CAP, whilst nominally a three-year plan, was re-issued in the second (2014) and third (2015) years with some changes (including to the Strategic Objectives). Also, as OPS operated on a yearly basis, projects had to be re-developed and re-approved year after year (leading to some minor adjustments to the estimated funding requirements for years two and three).

182. The Federal Government of Somalia, together with newly-formed regional state administrations and the international community, is also finalizing the drafting of a new National development Plan 2017-2019 that will replace the New Deal compact and will be the first Somalia National Development plan in almost 3 decades, and which includes longer-term development aims geared towards the SDGs.

**Haiti**

183. Six years after the 2010 earthquake, in very broad terms, Haiti has shown visible signs of recovery. The context remains complex and fragile, however, due to multiple inter-linked risks factors, notably the persistence of cholera, a recent clear aggravation of the food security situation due to the “El Nino” phenomenon, the ongoing bi-national mixed migration crisis with the Dominican Republic, over and above the remaining caseload of IDPs from the 2010 earthquake. Additional to these issues is a plethora of natural hazards: Haiti is considered the fifth most disaster prone country in the world, with more than 96% of the population exposed to two or more natural hazards including earthquakes, hurricanes, landslides, flooding or drought. There is a very high likelihood of another large-scale ‘shock’ within coming years. Ranking 168 out of 187 countries in the Human Development Index (HDI 2013), capacities to resist and recover from crises remain very low and even small shocks can generate substantial damages for the poorest.

**Humanitarian response**

184. A response framed as humanitarian has been ongoing in the areas of food security and nutrition, as well as in response to continued occurrence of cholera outbreaks due to deplorable sanitation conditions in many parts of the country. Humanitarian agencies have also responded to protection concerns arising from the so-called ‘bi-national crisis’ (caused by the expulsion of Haitian undocumented migrants from the neighbouring Dominican Republic), and to the last remaining IDPs from the 2010 earthquake. Finally, disaster preparedness is a key theme in a country as prone to natural disasters as Haiti.
185. The level of humanitarian funding and the number of humanitarian partners have declined significantly since 2010. In 2010, a record number of 512 partners where registered in OCHA’s database, declining to 84 by 2015. The cluster system ended in 2014, ostensibly to be replaced by sectoral coordination led by Governmental entities. Both UN and INGO actors would describe themselves as ‘multi-mandate’, implementing both humanitarian and development programmes. In fact, most aim at integrating a crisis-response capacity within their on-going development efforts.

Development framework

186. The 2-year planning cycle corresponded with the planned end of the “Cadre Intégré Stratégique” which was the Joint Strategy of the UN system - created in lieu of a UNDAF and inclusive of the UN Stabilisation Committee in Haiti (MINUSTAH) - with a duration from 2013 – 2016. The UN system anticipated a phase-out of MINUSTAH afterwards.

187. The most important donor is the Inter-American Development Bank, with an annual contribution of around 200 million US$, spent strictly through Governmental channels. The Bank works mainly in agriculture, health, education and WASH. The EU’s development funding for Haiti is 420 million Euros for the period 2014 – 2020. The key sectors of cooperation for the EU are state building and public administration, education, urban development and infrastructure as well as food security and nutrition. Within the latter there is the closest collaboration with humanitarian actors, the sector receives around 100 million Euros over the 5 years. The Government is the principal partner for all activities. The third large development donor is USAID spending between 206 and 260 million US$ per year on infrastructure and energy, food and economic security, health and other basic services as well as governance and the rule of law. USAID implements through a mix of delivering channels, governmental and non-governmental.

The MYP in context

188. International actors in Haiti recognised that humanitarian response and ongoing risk related less to the 2010 earthquake than to acute symptoms of larger, chronic vulnerability due to extreme poverty and deprivation, low human development and gender inequality. There was overwhelming agreement that embedding the crisis response within on-going development programmes (including the necessary capacity development for relevant Government actors) was the way forward. That said, a lack of financial resources, systemic governance issues, institutional weaknesses (including capacity gaps at a variety of levels) continued to pose challenges for progress. Humanitarian funding and programming modalities continued to stretch into responses for populations made vulnerable by chronic issues. Development assistance remained inadequate and/or not targeted to the needs of these populations.

189. The TAP, therefore, emerged from a conviction that international partners in Haiti needed a different, better integrated and participatory planning framework for both humanitarian and resilience programming. By stretching over two years (as opposed to one) the Appeal aimed at addressing acute needs and those framed as strengthening community
and systemic resilience: capacity development, system strengthening, local capacity for disaster response, and knowledge and behaviour change.

190. The Appeal therefore was planned as a bridge. It was meant to support a smoother transition between planning cycles, and aimed to strengthen dialogue, analysis, and planning between the Government of Haiti and the humanitarian and development communities. It was also hoped that the TAP would act as a leveraging tool, directing much needed development-oriented assistance towards national systems and budgets for programmes that would foster resilience.

191. The ideas behind the plan were thus:

- Create a bridge between humanitarian needs and development assistance.
- Move out of the post-earthquake/cholera emergency mode.
- Become more strategic as a group.
- Reach out to development actors (who had not stopped working even after the earthquake) to end the “2 speeds aid system” where humanitarian and development actors work in parallel with few opportunities to meet and work together.

192. Although framed as a transitional appeal, the TAP is similar to the Somalia CAP in some respects:

- It is framed in recognition of the need to respond differently to populations in acute need as a result of chronic problems; and that that response is better framed over multiple years.
- It combines a strategic framework and fundraising platform.

193. It differs from Somalia in two fundamental respects however:

- It lacks the element of conflict in which part of the ongoing humanitarian response is hard to bring in on principled grounds.
- It is more specific in its intent to create a bridge between humanitarian and development systems (and of course peace-building too)

Key elements in the planning process

194. In April 2013, a high-level delegation representing the “Political Champions for Disaster Resilience” visited Haiti as one of three pilot countries of the initiative. Established in 2012 and consisting of high-ranking officials from leading international and national institutions (including Caribbean Community (CARICOM), UNDP, OCHA, the UK, USAID, the WB, and the EC), the Political Champions Group aimed to leverage their collective political capital for increased attention and resources towards disaster resilience in at-risk countries.

195. In 2014, the Director of Operations of ECHO who had been part of the high-level visit returned to Haiti and renewed the push for a “National Framework on Resilience”.
Together with the DSRSG/RC/HC at the time, they agreed that the UN planning cycle should be used to create such a Strategic Framework. OCHA and the Office of the DSRSG developed a concept note for a “Transitional Appeal” as a MYP with a focus on addressing structural roots of remaining humanitarian needs and needs resulting from recurrent shocks.

196. In September 2014, the planning process started, overseen by the Committee for Joint Planning, co-chaired by the Ministry of Planning and External Cooperation and the Office of the DSRSG/RC/HC. The DSRSG/RC/HC put a lot of personal effort and strong leadership into the process. 20 different national ministries and institutions participated over a several months-long process. As the clusters had already been phased out early 2014, ad-hoc working groups formed around the sectoral “pillars”, led by UN agencies and government counterparts (and for some groups co-led by NGOs), associating development actors (however not the “real” long-term ones such as International Financial Institutions), and international and national NGOs. Bringing together these different actors to develop a joined-up vision to break the annual repetition of short-term humanitarian response was seen as the right thing to do, and was welcomed by all those who had participated at the time. Creating such a consensus on “the road to travel” was described as a success in itself.

**Myanmar**

197. Myanmar is undergoing a remarkable transition. In October 2015, a Nationwide Ceasefire Agreement was signed by eight of the largest armed groups. A month later, the National League for Democracy (NLD), under the leadership of Aung Sun Suu Kyi, claimed a landslide electoral victory. After decades of military rule, the NLD presents a new diplomatically-recognised government. Most of the international sanctions have been lifted, thereby dramatically improving the country’s development and economic prospects. One of the largest development actors in the region, The Japan International Cooperation Agency (JICA) ranks Myanmar as a top investment priority. Despite this apparently positive outlook for Myanmar, a myriad of urgent challenges remain.

**Humanitarian Response**

198. Very clearly, this is a context where a development paradigm is appropriate as a framework for most international partnerships. That said, an ongoing humanitarian response is fully justified in a number of areas in the country.

199. The 2016 HRP concludes that certain areas remain in acute and urgent need. It reports that immediate interventions are required, to save lives and protect/restore livelihoods in Myanmar’s most vulnerable communities. These include: conflict-related displacement; statelessness and human rights issues surrounding the Rohingya population in Rakhine, the ongoing conflict in states of Kachin and Shan; communities still affected by the flooding of 2015. Other needs which might meet thresholds for humanitarian response are excluded. Myanmar’s South East is absent, the site of ongoing refugee returns and areas still undergoing demining operations. This area is covered by an alternative, UNHCR-led planning process.
200. In keeping with the TAP in Haiti, the HRP frames needs requiring humanitarian assistance as acute symptoms of deeper, chronic development challenges. Throughout the document, however, vulnerability tends to be defined in terms of ‘status’ - IDPs, statelessness, conflict-affected population, flood-affected population - and in a limited number of delineated geographical areas. The clear subtext here is that the roots of statelessness and displacement are political in nature.

201. It states that assistance should be oriented towards development, peace-building, and human rights together with humanitarian aid. Based on this contextual analysis, the Plan sets out three strategic objectives:

- Meet life-saving needs;
- Access to basic services and livelihood opportunities;
- Early recovery and durable solutions.

202. The Response Plan contains an operational section in which each of the eight clusters is described. It sets out their individual strategic objectives, and how they relate to the Plan’s overall strategic objective.

203. Although the Index for Risk Management (INFORM) model is referred to (Myanmar is ranked 10 out of 191 countries), the document does not include comprehensive risk analysis, nor document programming aspects to address this overarching risk. It somehow does refer to “new measures that aimed at quicker and earlier responses”.

Development framework

204. Since the recent appointment of the government of Myanmar, a National Development Plan (NDP) has yet to be finalised/endorsed, but a draft National Recovery Framework is in the final design stages. No UNDAF from the international community or transitional plan exist either. As such, the UNDAF is scheduled to be drafted in 2017 and should start in 2018. Consequently all IFIs interviewed reported having current interim plans with a diversity of time frames.

205. According to the latest OECD data, Myanmar is the 8th largest recipient of Official Development Assistance (ODA) in Asia. However due to the change in the political, security and economic landscape this is likely to rise very quickly, as indicated by the 2013 peaks (almost 4 billion US$ recorded) which resulted from the lifting of the US and EU sanctions.

Key elements in the planning process

206. The UN Country Team (UNCT) was divided in opinion over the production of a stand-alone humanitarian plan for 2016. Some proposed that a new comprehensive plan should replace the 2015’s standalone HRP (effectively a national version of the nascent Rakhine initiative). Others, who eventually won out, lobbied intensively for a new HRP, its core value being its efficacy as an advocacy tool, and also as a frame for fundraising.
207. Agencies who contributed to the planning process of the 2015 HRP described it as an extraordinarily heavy process. Consequently, OCHA committed to establishing a lighter process for the 2016 HRP, and provided all the resources to write up the document, leaving clusters and Agencies only to comment on or offer revisions to the main document.

208. Although all the humanitarian clusters and some domestic humanitarian NGOs were consulted, as was the Government, not all major national counterparts were fully involved, possibly because of the workload connected to the ongoing transition from one government to the newly democratically-elected government. Questions were also raised about the location of the planning process, most of the international community being based in Yangon, while the entire government was in Nay Pyi Taw. As a result of these issues, the HRP remains a UN-centric document.

Is the context suitable for MYP?

209. The consensus among a majority of interviewees was that multi-year humanitarian planning would make sense for Myanmar in theory, but political challenges made the idea unlikely. One immediate issue is the need for Myanmar’s government to play a major role. With a full scale political transition in process, the Government could not be expected to engage immediately, and interviewees were clearly of the opinion that long-term planning needed to wait until national development plans were clear. Moreover, the specific political sensitivity surrounding the issues in Rakhine State and other conflict areas made it challenging to lay out long-term plans at the central level, notably during the political transition. (The Rakhine State Government has, however, recently begun to formulate a five-year socio-economic development plan with UN and development partner support, but wishes to pursue such development planning separately from humanitarian planning.)

210. The HRP in Myanmar was seen as a tool for advocacy with donors and with the host Government, as well as a (very successful) fund-raising document. Support for the 2016 HRP came very strongly from OCHA, INGOs and key donors who were insistent on the need to retain an advocacy and fundraising platform for needs best addressed through humanitarian intervention.
Annex C: List of Interviewees

3MDG - Kyaw Nyunt Sein, Senior Adviser, Myanmar
3MDG Fund - Dr. Paul Sender, Fund Director/LIFT, Myanmar
ACTED - Emilie Bernard, Director, Haiti
Africa Development Bank - Salome Kimani, Consultant, Somalia
Asian Development Bank - Winfried Wicklein, Country Director, Myanmar
Australia - Linda Gellard Counsellor, Embassy 1st Secretary, Australian Embassy, Myanmar
Canada - Marie Eve Astonguay, First Secretary, Haiti
CARE - Philippa Beale, Assistant Country Director, Programs, Myanmar
CIC NYU - Gizem Sucuoglu, Senior Programme Manager, New York
CIC NYU - Sarah Cliffe, Director CIC, New York
Civil Protection Division - Marie Alta Jean-Baptiste, Director, Civil Protection, Haiti
Concern Worldwide - Dustin Caniglia, Resilience Programme Manager, Somalia
DEVCO - Massimo Scalorbi, EU Head of Cooperation, Haiti
DFAT - Nick Cumpston Counsellor, Australian Embassy - Yangon, Myanmar
DFID - Ashley Sarangi, Humanitarian Advisor, Department for International Development, Myanmar
DFID - Claire Devlin, Lessons Learning Advisor, CHASE, UK
DFID - Francois Desruisseaux, Country Representative, Haiti
DFID - Patrick Saez Head, Humanitarian Partnerships, UK
DFID - Patrick Vercammen, Humanitarian Advisor for the Sahel, Sahel Regional level
DFID - Sebastien Fouquet, Humanitarian and Resilience Team Leader, Somalia
DOCOD - Bradley Foerster, Team Leader, Country and Regional Support Team, New York
DRC - Simon Nzioka, Country Director, Somalia
ECHO - Cyprien Fabre, Policy Adviser, Paris
ECHO - Ei Ei Tun, Governance and Humanitarian Programme Officer, Myanmar
ECHO - Helene Berton, Sahel Coordinator, Sahel Regional level
ECHO - Henrik Trautmann, Head of Unit Policy Development & Regional Strategy, Brussels
ECHO - Jordi Torres Miralles, Technical Assistant in DG, Haiti
ECHO - Lars Oberhaus, Head of Office, Somalia
ECHO - Nicolas Louis, Head of Office / Humanitarian Emergency Expert, Myanmar
ECHO - Olivier Brouant, Head of Office, Chad
ECHO - Segolene de Beco, Head of Office, Haiti
ECHO - Sigrid Kühlke, Social Protection Advisor, Germany
EEO - David Nabarro, Special Adviser on the 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development, UK
EU - Joachime Nason, EU to the UN Office and other international organisations in Geneva, Geneva
EU - Pauline Gibourde, EU Delegation to Somalia, Somalia
EU - Roland Kobia, Ambassador, Myanmar
FAO - Bui Thi Lan, Representative, Myanmar
FAO - Fritz Ohler, Representative, Haiti
FAO - Khalid Khan, Food Security Sector Coordinator, Myanmar
FAO - Luca Alinovi, Former FAO Representative – Executive Director Global Resilience Partnership, Somalia
FAO - Patrick David, Deputy Head of REOWA Team, Regional Security Analyst, Sahel Regional level
FAO - Richard Trenchard, Representative and Deputy, Somalia
FAO - Sandra Aviles, Senior Advisor/IASC Focal point, Geneva
FAO/FSNAU - Daniel Molla, Chief Technical Advisor, Somalia
Fit for Purpose - John Hendra, Senior UN Coordinator for Fit for Purpose, New York
Foundation Zanmi Timoun (national NGO) - Guylande Mesadieu, Coordinator, Haiti
Freelance - U Aung Min, Myanmar
FSWG - Ma Khin Lay New Tun, Myanmar
FSWG - Zewaka Foundation (Chan State) - U Min Swe, Myanmar
ICRC - Antoine Ouellet-Drouin, Head of Sector, Planning, Monitoring and Evaluation, Geneva
ICRC - Clare Dalton, Diplomatic Adviser - Multilateral Affairs & Humanitarian Diplomacy, Geneva
ICRC - Jüerg Montani, Head of Delegation, Myanmar
IFRC/MRCS - Prof: Thar Hla Shwe, President, Myanmar
IFRC/MRCS - Udaya Regmi, Head of Country Office, Myanmar
IHDG - Frida Akerberg, Secretariat/Facilitator, Somalia
INGO Forum - Marta Kaszubksa, Forum Coordinator, Myanmar
Inter-American Development Bank - Gilles Damais, Chief of Operations, Haiti
IOM - Fabien Sambussy, Head of Operations, Haiti
IRC - Modou Diaw, Roving Country Director, Haiti
IRC - Ralf Nico Thill, Country Director, Myanmar
JICA - Keiichiro Nakazawa, Chief Representative, Myanmar
JST - Bridging Rural Integrated Development and Empowerment (BRIDGE), Kachin Baptist Convention (KBC), Kachin Relief and Development Committee (KRDC), Kachin Women Association (KWA), Kachin Development Group (KDG), Karuna Mission Social Solidarity (KMSS), Metta Development Foundation (Metta), Nyein (Shalom) Foundation and Wunpawng Ninghtoi (WPN), Myanmar
LIFT 3MDG - Andrew Kirkwood, Fund Director, Myanmar
Ligue Culturelle Haitienne pour les Droits Humains, Head of Mission, Haiti
LRC& Gender Equality Network - Daw Pansy Tun Thein, Myanmar
MIMU - Shon Campbell, Manager, Myanmar
Ministry of Foreign Affairs - Eltje Aderhold, Head of the Humanitarian Aid Division, Germany
Ministry of Health - Joseph Donald Francois, National Cholera Coordinator, Haiti
Ministry of Planning - Yves-Robert Jean, Director General, Haiti
Myanmar Consumers Union - U Maung Maung, Myanmar
National Food Security Secretariat - Abnel Desamours, Coordinator, Haiti
NGO Coordination Forum - Carla Loque, Coordinator of NGO Activities, Haiti
NRC - Abdelgadir Galal Ahmed, Country Director, Somalia
NRC - Prasant Naik, Country Director, Myanmar
OCHA - Agnès Dhur, Chief, CASS, Geneva
OCHA - Agnese Spiauzzi, Humanitarian Affairs Officer, PMS, Geneva
OCHA - Alex Binns, Humanitarian Affairs Officer - Strategic Planning, Somalia
OCHA - Alice Sequi, Chief of Section, Africa 2, New York
OCHA - Allegra Baiocchi, Head of Office, Sahel Regional level
OCHA - Anna Maria Pereira, Information Management Officer, Haiti
OCHA - Andrea De Domenico, Chief, FCS, New York
OCHA - Andrew Wyllie, Chief, PSB, Geneva
OCHA - Antonio Masella, Former OCHA Deputy Head of Office, Iraq (former staff)
OCHA - Belinda Holdsworth, Chief, HCSS, Geneva
OCHA - Brendan McDonald, Chief, EPES, Geneva (+former Iraq)
OCHA - Brian Grogan, Chief, PAIS, New York
OCHA - Chirs Hyslop, Deputy Head of Office, Myanmar
OCHA - Dustin Okazaki, CRD Programme and Planning Advisor, New York
OCHA - Edem Wosornu, Chief of Section, Asia and the Pacific, AG member, New York
OCHA - Elisabeth Diaz, (former Deputy Head of Office, Haiti and acting HoO during the main phase of the elaboration of the TAP), Haiti
OCHA - Enzo di Taranto, Head of Office, Haiti
OCHA - Erik Kastlander, IM/Team Leader, CBU/EIS, Geneva
OCHA - Fernando Hesse, Humanitarian Affairs Officer, FCS, New York
OCHA - Florent Mheaule, Head of Office, Chad
OCHA - Gemma Sanmartin, Inter-Cluster Coordinator, Somalia
OCHA - Greg Puley, Senior Adviser, CRD, New York
OCHA - Hansjoerg Strohmeyer, Chief, Policy Development and Studies Branch, New York
OCHA - Ignacio Leon, Chief, PMS, Geneva
OCHA - Ismail Afifa, CHF Somalia, Somalia
OCHA - Julie Thompson, RMS, PRMB, Geneva
OCHA - Justin Brady, Head of Office, Somalia
OCHA - Kasper Engborg, Rakhine Coordinator, Myanmar
OCHA - Laura Calvio, Humanitarian Affairs Officer, FTS, Geneva
OCHA - Mark Cufts, Head of Office, Myanmar
OCHA - Masayo Kondo Rossier, Humanitarian Affairs Officer, ERP, Geneva
OCHA - Michael Jensen, Chief of Performance, Monitoring and Policy, CERF, New York
OCHA - Myo Thiha Kyaw, Humanitarian Affairs officer, Myanmar
OCHA - Nicholas Harvey, Thematic Coordinator, WHS secretariat, New York
OCHA - Nick Imboden, Head, Humanitarian Programme Cycle Information Services, Geneva
OCHA - Nicolas Rost, Underfunded Emergencies Lead, CERF, New York
OCHA - Olivia Tecosky, Chief of Section, CRD, New York
OCHA - Paola Emerson, Chief of Section, Middle East/former Deputy Head of Office, South Sudan, New York
OCHA - Pete Manfield, Regional Office, Somalia
OCHA - Ramesh Rajasingham, Head of Office, oPt
OCHA - Reena Ghelani, Deputy Director, CRD, New York
OCHA - Romano Lasker, Humanitarian Affairs Officer, PAIS, PDSB, New York
OCHA - Rudolph Muller, Chief, ESB, Geneva
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OCHA - Sofie Garde-Thomle, Deputy Head of Office, Somalia
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OCHA - Vedaste Kalima, Deputy Head of Office, Haiti
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Share Mercy - Daw Ni Ni Than, Myanmar
Share Mercy - U Wai Yan Tin Maung Win, Leader, Myanmar
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Shelter - Sarah Khan, CCCM/NFI Cluster Coordinator, Myanmar
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WFP - Domenico Scalpelli, CD & Representative, Myanmar
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World Bank - Sara Cramer, Consultant, Somalia Team, Somalia
Annex D: Methodology

211. MYP, in theory, aims to harness the potential of a range of initiatives to improve systemic performance: specifically, to drive the collective response to plan for the longer term in such a way that improves both results and process. The evaluation recognises, however, that each context is different, and that the humanitarian system manifests in a different form in each context. Any number of factors may serve to undermine the process of collective planning in any given context and/or nullify or reverse the potential benefits of MYP.

212. The evaluation also recognises that different stakeholders in the humanitarian system place emphasis on (or are seeking to achieve) different potential benefits from MYP. Some of these potential benefits, however (such as, for example, operational agencies desiring to achieve net revenue gains, and donors desiring to achieve greater cost-efficiency), do not necessarily lead to improved outcomes for affected populations, though may increase efficiency of current planning processes.

213. The evaluation was formative, with an emphasis on building understanding and learning from experiences with MYP rather than critically evaluating past attempts at MYP. The evaluation employed mixed methods (qualitative, quantitative and participatory). Interviews and perceptions of process formed the key component of research at country level.

a. Interviews, literature review and sources for quantitative data

214. Perspectives from as wide a range of stakeholders as possible were solicited including:

- **Humanitarian aid actors:** Humanitarian Coordinators, Humanitarian Country Teams, OCHA, UN agencies, IOM, international and national NGOs, clusters, donors (DAC and non-DAC), government stakeholders, civil society organizations.
- **Development actors:** Resident Coordinators, UN Country Team, international and national NGOs, donors (DAC and non-DAC), government stakeholders, civil society organizations; international financial institutions.

215. In total, the team conducted three country case-studies with 182 interviews. (Full list available in Annex C). In addition, the team carried out another 14 interviews to assess changes in the system since the WHS took place, as well as a review of key documents emerging from the WHS.

216. The team ensured that both male and female staff members were interviewed, however the final choice of the interview target was the relevance of their role within the architecture.
217. Interviews were supplemented with a review of relevant available literature:

- **Global level**: OCHA policy papers, guidance tools on humanitarian planning, HPC tools, MYP guidelines, financial and monitoring reports, meeting minutes, and other work associated with the WHS;
- **Country level**: HRPs, Compact, UNDAFs and associated/alternative development frameworks, donor strategies, individual agency plans, country studies and other contextual analysis. Country studies on humanitarian and development financing, coordination systems and efficiency formed a key part of the research.

218. FTS was used as a source of quantitative data, especially on funding levels for different appeals as well as other questions related to donor behaviour and the linkage between MYP and multi-year financing. OPS was used as a source of project-level detail for the case-study countries as well as further details on funding at project level.

**b. Case-Study Selection**

219. The TOR specified the scope of the evaluation: “a selection of four countries with multi-year plans, including one of the two countries that have reverted to single-year planning - South Sudan or Iraq”. However, there was a solid consensus amongst OCHA staff that the range of ‘genuine’ MYP ongoing was limited.

220. The two country cases which received the strongest support were Somalia and Haiti, although the latter had some detractors. At an early stage of the inception phase, the research team presented the idea of looking at a ‘counter-case’ study, a country in which the conditions for MYP clearly existed, but in which an annual planning framework was still in use. The purpose of this ‘counter-factual’ was to explore the rationale for the use of annual planning, the prospective benefits of MYP, and the arguments against its use. In discussion with OCHA staff, Myanmar was selected as an ideal case. These three countries had strong support and all were recommended as country case-studies. In the search for a fourth country case, a number of limiting factors were presented and there was no consensus amongst interviewees:

- **Syria’s 3RP**: The evaluation is managed by OCHA SPEGS and is not an ‘inter-agency’ evaluation. Given the central roles of UNHCR and UNDP in the regional plan, Syria was ruled out as a case-study by SPEGS at the inception phase.
- **Iraq**: Iraq has seen a change in leadership and a very high staff turnover in the OCHA office as well as in other UN agencies. While interesting as a case-study, the team concluded that a visit to Iraq would encounter few, if any, staff involved in the previous plan and would not glean a significant amount of information.
- **South Sudan**: Given the severe deterioration in the humanitarian situation in South Sudan, it was felt by all concerned that a retrospective analysis of previous planning models would not be appropriate.
- **The Sahel**: Though clearly an interesting case-study in respect of the Regional Response Framework, interviewees questioned the extent to which any of the
countries in the region had adopted MYP and specifically whether a visit to any one country of the nine in the plan would give an adequate overview of the issues in the region. In addition, a very recent study on multi-year financing in the region has recently covered many of the key questions for the MYP evaluation.

- **Djibouti**: Ruled out consistently by interviewees as being too small an appeal and too specific a context to provide lessons for the global case.
- **oPT**: oPT has had one MYP but has since gone back to single-year planning again. Given the very specific context, several interlocutors questioned the validity of the findings for other situations.

221. Given the lack of clear-cut support for a fourth single case-study, the team applied an alternative logic. A number of interesting case-studies remained, most notably the Sahel, Iraq, oPT and South Sudan. Ultimately the team concluded that the best approach would be to undertake targeted interviews with key individuals in these contexts, and a review of all relevant literature, in order to learn lessons from a broader range of experiments in MYP, complemented with an online survey (see below). This logic was reinforced by the fact that key individuals in each context have moved on, and even if one country was selected, the study would have required the extensive use of telephone interviews.

c. **Online Survey**

222. A short targeted online survey was designed using Survey Monkey with a mix of 48 semi-structured questions. Limited in its scope, it was intended to permit the evaluation to be further informed on enabling and constraining factors, with a larger number of respondents as well as triangulating findings obtained through qualitative means.

223. The initial sample was intended to target the Sahel (Regional office, Chad and Mali), South Sudan, Iraq and oPT. The lists of staff obtained included Chad 2016, Mali (2014/2016), oPT (2012/2013) and Sahel (regional level, 2016). The online survey used all the contacts from the lists provided by OCHA. To ensure maximum reach, 418 invitations to the survey were sent. There were only 30 respondents, however, of which only 16 completed the survey fully. Most respondents were from the Sahel region with a majority being UN staff (50%). They were quite diverse with the majority being facilitator/Coordinator (43.33%), others being implementers (26.67%), designers, participants and donors.

224. The survey ToR, methodology and data collection instruments were designed in April 2016. It was launched on the 12/05/2016. A reminder to complete the survey was sent on 26/05/2016 and the survey was closed on the 30/05/2016. Data were analysed in June 2016 and the findings written up in the same month.

225. Due to the low level of response, the survey results have no statistical significance. Nonetheless, final results are available.
d. Data management

226. Due to its formative nature, the evaluation did not generate a substantial amount of primary data, particularly considering the low level of response to the online survey.

227. However, there is a set of data management rules that the evaluation applied:

- Ensuring the evaluation stays focused on the questions defined with the Interview Guide.
- Interviews were carried out with the understanding that they were ‘not for attribution’.
- For analysis, the team used the written interview notes to prepare an ‘interview findings’ synthesis as a separate (internal) component paper.
- A system of archiving and storage has been put in place, through the allocation of a dedicated Dropbox folder. The Dropbox folder contains all notes, interviews, various reports produced by the evaluation, analysis documents, background documents, etc.

e. Limitations of evaluable and methodological challenges

228. As noted throughout, the aim of this evaluation is to assess experiences with MYP, determine enabling and constraining factors and to assist in elaborating guidance on the basis of these factors, rather than to formally evaluate experiments with MYP to date.

229. The formative nature of the evaluation and its focus on process, rather than programming, means that cross-cutting issues and gender will be examined only indirectly, i.e. a view on whether these issues are addressed adequately in MYP processes.
Annex E: Case-study countries and MYP

Somalia
230. The 2013-15 multi-year CAP (the main object of the case-study) was one of the few attempts to extend the full HRP model over multiple years i.e. it constituted the formal UN and partners appeal for Somalia with a three-year budget and three-year projects. In doing so, it centred on the concept of building resilience as a contextually appropriate expression of humanitarian action; in combination with appealing for acute response components with no resilience framing. The subsequent multi-year Somalia plan, a three-year strategy for 2016-2019 is just that: an overarching strategic framework which sits above annual HRPs, and constitutes the formal Appeal documents for UN and partners. Both are examples of MYP, but are quite different in their depth and ambition.

Haiti
231. Haiti’s TAP - another of the primary case-studies - is a transitional plan, which distinguishes between acute and chronic needs, as well as the needs of displaced people and people affected by health crises. It does not ultimately apply a ‘humanitarian’ label, however, and seeks specifically to promote an equal sense of urgency across the response elements proposed. For this reason, it is perhaps better framed as a MYP which subsumes humanitarian response elements, rather than a discreet multi-year humanitarian plan.

232. It does include several key elements of an HRP such as an overall description of critical needs and a general analysis of external shocks as drivers of vulnerability. Beyond the elements of the HRP, the TAP includes a very useful overview of other frameworks and strategic plans in existence for each theme. This underlines the effort to align the TAP with national plans and priorities.

233. Each sectoral chapter includes a more detailed needs assessment and analysis as well as a response plan. However, several elements of the HRP are covered only partially: with regards to implementation and monitoring, each chapter includes an overview of ongoing coordination structures but, except for one theme - Disaster Risk Reduction (DRR) - the overview does not relate in any direct way to the TAP but only to general coordination efforts in the sector. Similarly, the information on monitoring of the plan is light. In terms of an operational review there is only a list of partners (in alphabetical order with no comments on capacity, presence etc.). The only reference to resource mobilisation is a half-page overview of the funding requirements per sector at the end of the document. An annex with an overview of all activities, partly regrouped as projects, was prepared but is only available online as it was not attached directly to the main document.

Myanmar
234. The UNCT was divided in opinion over the production of a stand-alone humanitarian plan for 2016. Some proposed that a new comprehensive plan (effectively a national version of the nascent Rakhine initiative), should replace the 2015 standalone HRP. Others, who
eventually won out, lobbied intensively for a new HRP, its core value being an advocacy tool, and also a frame for fundraising.

235. Agencies who contributed to the planning process of the 2015 HRP described it as an extraordinarily heavy process. Consequently, OCHA committed to establish a light process for the 2016 HRP. OCHA provided all the resources to write up the document, leaving clusters, agencies and other partners only to comment on or offer revisions to the main document.

236. To a certain extent, therefore, the process traded lightness for inclusivity, and several major national counterparts were missing in the planning process. The Government’s lack of involvement was put down to insufficient preparation time. Questions were also raised about the location of the planning process, most of the international community being based in Yangon, while the entire government is in Nay Pyi Taw. As a result of these issues, the HRP remains a document focused on the external response.

237. The consensus among a majority of interviewees was that MYP would make sense for Myanmar in theory, but political challenges made the idea unlikely. One issue was that with Myanmar’s government involved in a full-scale political transition, it would not be able to engage fully in the process. Interviewees were of the opinion that long-term planning needed to wait until national development plans are clearer. Moreover, the specific political sensitivity surrounding the issues in Rakhine State and other conflict areas, made it challenging to lay out long-term plans at the central level, notably during the political transition.

Occupied Palestinian Territories 2012-2013

238. The Common Humanitarian Action Plan for oPt 2012/13 was framed as allowing humanitarian organizations and donors to better plan their interventions and contributions; and to increase the predictability of the humanitarian response. It also had the specific aim of building coherence between humanitarian and development actors through strategic alignment of the Palestinian National Development Plan and Medium-Term Response Plan processes.

239. The Strategic Objectives in 2012 were the following:

- Enhance the protection of populations in Gaza, Area C, the Seam Zone and East Jerusalem by promoting respect for international humanitarian law and human rights; prevent or mitigate the impact of violations; improve equitable access to essential services; and ensure the effective integration of protection considerations in service provision interventions.
- Help improve the food security of vulnerable and food-insecure communities in the oPt, with particular focus on Gaza, Area C, the Seam Zone and East Jerusalem by improving economic access to food, supporting access to a greater variety of food or providing direct food assistance.

240. The 2014-2016 Strategic Response Plan (SRP) for the Sahel region proposed three overarching strategic goals that guide each country’s strategy every year:

- Track and analyse risk and vulnerability, integrating findings into humanitarian and development programming.
- Support vulnerable populations to better cope with shocks by responding earlier to warning signals, by reducing post-crisis recovery times, and by building capacity of national actors.
- Deliver coordinated and integrated life-saving assistance to people affected by emergencies.

241. The SRP established indicators and targets for each overarching objective and also broke down the indicators and targets by clusters. The targets were also subdivided by year (2014, 2015), emphasizing the multi-year approach to the crisis.

Iraq – SRP 2014-2015

242. There is no stated rationale for the 2-year life span of the 2014-15 SRP, nor are the objectives multi-year. As such, the only visibly multi-year aspects of this appeal are the period covered and the financial ask.

243. The appeal is articulated around 3 strategic objectives:

- Respond to the protection needs of civilians, including those displaced and otherwise affected by the conflict, with due regard to human rights and international humanitarian law.
- Provide life-saving assistance and ensure access to essential services for displaced and vulnerable individuals in a manner that is accountable, conflict-sensitive and supports the government’s responsibility as first responder.
- Improve the access of conflict-affected people to livelihoods and durable solutions to enable them to restore their self-sufficiency and build resilience.

244. The SRP establishes indicators and targets for each overarching objective and also breaks down the indicators and targets by clusters. The targets are not subdivided by year.
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